On the Trinity — Book XII

Come now, let's see where the boundary line lies between the outer and inner man. Whatever we have in our mind that is common with animals rightly belongs to the outer man. The outer man should not be understood as the body alone, but also includes a certain life of the body from which the body's structure gets its strength, along with all the senses we use to perceive outward things. When images of these outward things that we have already perceived are fixed in memory and recalled, this still belongs to the outer man. In all these respects we do not differ from animals, except that our bodily form is not prone but upright. Through this, our Creator warns us not to be like animals in our better part—the mind—even though we differ from them by our upright posture. This doesn't mean we should direct our mind toward elevated bodily things, for seeking rest for the will even in such things debases the mind. Rather, just as the body is naturally raised upright toward the highest bodily things—that is, toward celestial things—so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright toward the highest spiritual things, not through prideful arrogance but through the dutifulness of righteousness.

1. Come now, and let us see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For whatever we have in the mind common with the beasts, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the outer man is not to be considered to be the body only, but with the addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body, whence the structure of the body derives its vigor, and all the senses with which he is equipped for the perception of outward things; and when the images of these outward things already perceived, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, it is still a matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beasts, except that in shape of body we are not prone, but upright. And we are admonished through this, by Him who made us, not to be like the beasts in that which is our better part — that is, the mind — while we differ from them by the uprightness of the body. Not that we are to throw our mind into those bodily things which are exalted; for to seek rest for the will, even in such things, is to prostrate the mind. But as the body is naturally raised upright to those bodily things which are most elevated, that is, to things celestial; so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright to those things which are most elevated in spiritual things, not by the elation of pride, but by the dutifulness of righteousness.

Animals are also able to perceive physical things from outside through their bodily senses, fix them in memory, remember them, and use them to seek what is suitable and avoid what is harmful. However, certain abilities belong to a higher level: to take note of these things and retain them not just through natural instinct but through deliberate commitment to memory; to recall them through recollection and mental conception when they begin slipping into forgetfulness, so that just as conception is formed from what memory contains, the contents of memory itself are also firmly fixed by thought; to combine imaginary visual objects by taking various things that memory recalls and joining them together; to examine how in such matters things resembling truth can be distinguished from actual truth, and this not in spiritual matters but in physical things themselves—these acts and similar ones, although they deal with sensible things that the mind has received through the bodily senses, are connected with reason and therefore are not common to both humans and animals. But it belongs to the higher reason to judge these physical things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons. Unless these reasons were above the human mind, they would certainly not be unchangeable. Yet unless something of our own were joined to them, we could not use them as standards by which to judge physical things. We judge physical things by the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows remain unchangeable.

2. And the beasts, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal from without, through the senses of the body, and to fix them in the memory, and remember them, and in them to seek after things suitable, and shun things inconvenient. But to note these things, and to retain them not only as caught up naturally but also as deliberately committed to memory, and to imprint them again by recollection and conception when now just slipping away into forgetfulness; in order that as conception is formed from that which the memory contains, so also the contents themselves of the memory may be fixed firmly by thought: to combine again imaginary objects of sight, by taking this or that of what the memory remembers, and, as it were, tacking them to one another: to examine after what manner it is that in this kind things like the true are to be distinguished from the true, and this not in things spiritual, but in corporeal things themselves — these acts, and the like, although performed in reference to things sensible, and those which the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet, as they are combined with reason, so are not common to men and beasts. But it is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons; which, unless they were above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet, unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as our measures by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things from the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows to remain unchangeably.

But that part of ourselves that deals with handling bodily and temporal things is indeed rational, since it is not something we share in common with animals. However, it is drawn out, so to speak, from that rational substance of our mind by which we depend upon and cling to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and it is assigned to handle and direct lower things. For just as no helper like him was found for man among all the animals unless one were taken from himself and formed to be his companion, so for that mind by which we contemplate the higher and inward truth, there is no fitting helper for the work that human nature requires among bodily things from those parts of the soul we have in common with animals. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated in a way that breaks unity but rather set aside to provide assistance in partnership, is divided off to perform its specific work. And just as male and female are one flesh, so in the mind one nature embraces our understanding and action, or our deliberation and execution, or our reason and rational desire, or whatever other more precise terms there may be to express them. So just as it was said of the former, "And the two shall be one flesh," it may be said of these that the two are one mind.

3. But that of our own which thus has to do with the handling of corporeal and temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us with the beasts; but it is drawn, as it were, out of that rational substance of our mind, by which we depend upon and cleave to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and which is deputed to handle and direct the inferior things. For as among all the beasts there was not found for the man a help like him, unless one were taken from himself, and formed to be his consort: so for that mind, by which we consult the supernal and inward truth, there is no like help for such employment as man's nature requires among things corporeal out of those parts of the soul which we have in common with the beasts. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated so as to sever unity, but, as it were, diverted so as to be a help to fellowship, is parted off for the performing of its proper work. And as the two is one flesh in the case of male and female, so in the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and performance, or our reason and rational appetite, or whatever other more significant terms there may be by which to express them; so that, as it was said of the former, And they two shall be in one flesh, it may be said of these, they two are in one mind.

When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are discussing a single subject. We do not split it into the two parts I mentioned earlier, except when considering its different functions. Therefore, when we look for the trinity in the mind, we look for it in the whole mind, without separating its rational activity in temporal matters from its contemplation of eternal things. We do not need to search for some third element to complete a trinity. This trinity must be discovered in the complete nature of the mind in such a way that even if activity directed toward temporal things were removed—activity for which assistance is needed and for which part of the mind is turned aside to handle these lower matters—a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is nowhere divided. Furthermore, once this distribution has already been made, not only can a trinity be found, but also an image of God can be found only in that part which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things. In the other part, which is turned away from contemplation to deal with temporal things, although a trinity may exist, an image of God cannot be found there.

4. When, therefore, we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss a single subject, and do not double it into those two which I have mentioned, except in respect to its functions. Therefore, when we seek the trinity in the mind, we seek it in the whole mind, without separating the action of the reason in things temporal from the contemplation of things eternal, so as to have further to seek some third thing, by which a trinity may be completed. But this trinity must needs be so discovered in the whole nature of the mind, as that even if action upon temporal things were to be withdrawn, for which work that help is necessary, with a view to which some part of the mind is diverted in order to deal with these inferior things, yet a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is no where parted off; and that when this distribution has been already made, not only a trinity may be found, but also an image of God, in that alone which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things; while in that other which is diverted from it in the dealing with temporal things, although there may be a trinity, yet there cannot be found an image of God.

Therefore, those who propose that an image of God's trinity in three persons can be found in human nature by looking at the marriage of male and female and their offspring do not seem to me to advance a plausible view. According to this theory, the man represents the person of the Father, what proceeds from him and is born represents the Son, and the third person, like the Spirit, is the woman who proceeds from the man in such a way that she is neither son nor daughter, yet the offspring is born through her conception. They point out that the Lord said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, yet he is not a son. In this mistaken opinion, the only point that is probably alleged and sufficiently demonstrated according to the faith of Holy Scripture is this: in the account of the woman's original creation, whatever comes into existence from a person in such a way as to make another person cannot in every case be called a son, since the woman's person came into existence from the man's person, yet she is not called his daughter. Everything else in this opinion is truly so absurd and indeed so false that it is very easy to refute. I will pass over the notion of thinking the Holy Spirit is the mother of God's Son and the Father's wife, since perhaps it could be answered that these things offend us in carnal matters because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure, but to the defiled and unbelieving, whose mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure, so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumbling-block to some of them. Yet in the case of those supreme spiritual realities, after whose likeness even these kinds of lower creation are made, though very remotely, and where there is nothing that can be harmed and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from the formless, or whatever similar expressions there may be—these ought not to disturb anyone's sober judgment, lest in avoiding empty disgust he fall into destructive error. He should accustom himself to find in bodily things the traces of spiritual things, so that when he begins to ascend upward from there, guided by reason, to reach the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he does not carry upward with himself what he despises in lower things. For no one has ever been ashamed to choose wisdom as a wife simply because the term wife brings to mind the corruptible union involved in begetting children, or because wisdom itself is actually a woman in sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin languages by a feminine noun.

5. Accordingly they do not seem to me to advance a probable opinion, who lay it down that a trinity of the image of God in three persons, so far as regards human nature, can so be discovered as to be completed in the marriage of male and female and in their offspring; in that the man himself, as it were, indicates the person of the Father, but that which has so proceeded from him as to be born, that of the Son; and so the third person as of the Spirit, is, they say, the woman, who has so proceeded from the man as not herself to be either son or daughter, although it was by her conception that the offspring was born. For the Lord has said of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from the Father, and yet he is not a son. In this erroneous opinion, then, the only point probably alleged, and indeed sufficiently shown according to the faith of the Holy Scripture, is this — in the account of the original creation of the woman — that what so comes into existence from some person as to make another person, cannot in every case be called a son; since the person of the woman came into existence from the person of the man, and yet she is not called his daughter. All the rest of this opinion is in truth so absurd, nay indeed so false, that it is most easy to refute it. For I pass over such a thing, as to think the Holy Spirit to be the mother of the Son of God, and the wife of the Father; since perhaps it may be answered that these things offend us in carnal things, because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure; but to the defiled and unbelieving, of whom both the mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure; so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumbling-block to some of them. But yet in the case of those supreme spiritual things, after the likeness of which those kinds of the inferior creature also are made although most remotely, and where there is nothing that can be injured and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from that which is formless, or whatever like expressions there may be; yet they ought not to disturb the sober prudence of any one, lest in avoiding empty disgust he run into pernicious error. Let him accustom himself so to find in corporeal things the traces of things spiritual, that when he begins to ascend upwards from thence, under the guidance of reason, in order to attain to the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he may not draw with himself to things above what he despises in things below. For no one ever blushed to choose for himself wisdom as a wife, because the name of wife puts into a man's thoughts the corruptible connection which consists in begetting children; or because in truth wisdom itself is a woman in sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin tongues by a word of the feminine gender.

We do not reject this opinion because we are afraid to think of that holy, inviolable, and unchangeable Love as the spouse of God the Father, existing from Him but not as offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made. Rather, we reject it because divine Scripture clearly shows it to be false. For God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and shortly afterward it is said, "So God created man in the image of God." Certainly, since the word "our" is plural, it would not be correctly used if man were made in the image of one person alone—whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. But because man was made in the image of the Trinity, it says "after our image." Yet again, lest we think that three Gods are to be believed in the Trinity, when the same Trinity is one God, it is said, "So God created man in the image of God," instead of saying "In His own image."

6. We do not therefore reject this opinion, because we fear to think of that holy and inviolable and unchangeable Love, as the spouse of God the Father, existing as it does from Him, but not as an offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made; but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and a little after it is said, So God created man in the image of God. Certainly, in that it is of the plural number, the word our would not be rightly used if man were made in the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made in the image of the Trinity, on that account it is said, After our image. But again, lest we should think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, whereas the same Trinity is one God, it is said, So God created man in the image of God, instead of saying, In His own image.

These kinds of expressions are common in the Scriptures, yet some people who hold the Catholic faith do not pay careful attention to them. As a result, they think the words "God made man in the image of God" mean that the Father made man after the image of the Son, and they use this to try to prove that the Son is also called God in the divine Scriptures—as if there were not other completely true and clear proofs where the Son is called not only God but also the true God. In attempting to explain another difficulty in this text, they become so tangled up that they cannot free themselves. For if the Father made man after the image of the Son so that man is not the image of the Father but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if a pious faith teaches us, as it does, that the Son is like the Father in equality of ousia (essence), then whatever is made in the likeness of the Son must also be made in the likeness of the Father. Furthermore, if the Father made man not in His own image but in the image of His Son, why does He not say, "Let us make man after Your image and likeness," when in fact He says "our"—unless it is because the image of the Trinity was made in man, so that in this way man should be the image of the one true God, since the Trinity itself is the one true God? Such expressions are countless in the Scriptures, but it will be enough to have given these examples. In the Psalms it says, "Salvation belongs to the Lord; Your blessing is upon Your people," as if the words were spoken to someone else, not to Him of whom it had been said, "Salvation belongs to the Lord." And again, "For by You," he says, "I shall be delivered from temptation, and by hoping in my God I shall leap over the wall," as if he were saying to someone else, "By You I shall be delivered from temptation." And again, "In the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under You," as if he were saying, "in the heart of Your enemies." For he had said to that King, that is, to our Lord Jesus Christ, "The people fall under You," whom he meant by the word "King" when he said, "In the heart of the king's enemies." Things of this kind are found more rarely in the New Testament. But even so, the apostle says to the Romans, "Concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord," as though he were speaking above of someone else. For what is meant by "the Son of God declared by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ," except the same Jesus Christ who was declared to be Son of God with power? And just as in this passage, when we are told "the Son of God with power of Jesus Christ," or "the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness of Jesus Christ," or "the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ"—whereas it might have been expressed in the ordinary way as "in His own power," or "according to the spirit of His own holiness," or "by the resurrection of His dead," or "of their dead"—we are not compelled to understand another person but one and the same person, that is, the person of the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ; so likewise, when we are told that God made man in the image of God, although it might have been more usual to say "after His own image," we are not compelled to understand any other person in the Trinity, but the one and the same Trinity itself, which is one God, and after whose image man is made.

7. For such expressions are customary in the Scriptures; and yet some persons, while maintaining the Catholic faith, do not carefully attend to them, in such wise that they think the words, God made man in the image of God, to mean that the Father made man after the image of the Son; and they thus desire to assert that the Son also is called God in the divine Scriptures, as if there were not other most true and clear proofs wherein the Son is called not only God, but also the true God. For while they aim at explaining another difficulty in this text, they become so entangled that they cannot extricate themselves. For if the Father made man after the image of the Son, so that he is not the image of the Father, but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if a pious faith teaches us, as it does, that the Son is like the Father after an equality of essence, then that which is made in the likeness of the Son must needs also be made in the likeness of the Father. Further, if the Father made man not in His own image, but in the image of His Son, why does He not say, Let us make man after Your image and likeness, whereas He does say, our; unless it be because the image of the Trinity was made in man, that in this way man should be the image of the one true God, because the Trinity itself is the one true God? Such expressions are innumerable in the Scriptures, but it will suffice to have produced these. It is so said in the Psalms, Salvation belongs unto the Lord; Your blessing is upon Your people; as if the words were spoken to some one else, not to Him of whom it had been said, Salvation belongs unto the Lord. And again, For by You, he says, I shall be delivered from temptation, and by hoping in my God I shall leap over the wall; as if he said to some one else, By You I shall be delivered from temptation. And again, In the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under You; as if he were to say, in the heart of Your enemies. For he had said to that King, that is, to our Lord Jesus Christ, The people fall under You, whom he intended by the word King, when he said, In the heart of the king's enemies. Things of this kind are found more rarely in the New Testament. But yet the apostle says to the Romans, Concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord; as though he were speaking above of some one else. For what is meant by the Son of God declared by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, except of the same Jesus Christ who was declared to be Son of God with power? And as then in this passage, when we are told, the Son of God with power of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, whereas it might have been expressed in the ordinary way, In His own power, or according to the spirit of His own holiness, or by the resurrection of His dead, or of their dead: as, I say, we are not compelled to understand another person, but one and the same, that is, the person of the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ; so, when we are told that God made man in the image of God, although it might have been more usual to say, after His own image, yet we are not compelled to understand any other person in the Trinity, but the one and selfsame Trinity itself, who is one God, and after whose image man is made.

Since this is the case, if we are to accept this same image of the Trinity as existing not in one person but in three human beings—father, mother, and son—then man was not made in the image of God before a wife was made for him and before they had a son, because a trinity did not yet exist. Will anyone say that a trinity already existed because, although not yet in their actual form, both the woman was already present in the man's side and the son in the father's loins according to their original nature? Then why, when Scripture said that God made man in the image of God, did it continue by saying that God created him, male and female He created them, and God blessed them? (Or if the passage should be divided this way: "And God created man," followed by "in the image of God He created him," and then "male and female He created them"—for some have been reluctant to say "He made him male and female" to avoid suggesting something monstrous, like those people called hermaphrodites, although even in that case both could rightly be understood in the singular because of the phrase "the two shall become one flesh.") Why then, as I started to say, when describing the nature of man made in the image of God, does Scripture specify nothing except male and female? Certainly, to complete the image of the Trinity, it should have also added a son, even though still present in his father's loins, just as the woman was in his side. Or was it perhaps that the woman had already been made, and Scripture combined into a brief, condensed statement something it would explain more carefully later—how it actually happened—and therefore a son could not be mentioned because no son had yet been born? As if the Holy Spirit could not have included this too in that brief statement, while planning to narrate the son's birth later in its proper place, just as it narrated later in its proper place that the woman was taken from the man's side, and yet has not failed to mention her here.

8. And since the case stands thus, if we are to accept the same image of the Trinity, as not in one, but in three human beings, father and mother and son, then the man was not made after the image of God before a wife was made for him, and before they procreated a son; because there was not yet a trinity. Will any one say there was already a trinity, because, although not yet in their proper form, yet in their original nature, both the woman was already in the side of the man, and the son in the loins of his father? Why then, when Scripture had said, God made man after the image of God, did it go on to say, God created him; male and female created He them: and God blessed them? (Or if it is to be so divided, And God created man, so that thereupon is to be added, in the image of God created He him, and then subjoined in the third place, male and female created He them; for some have feared to say, He made him male and female, lest something monstrous, as it were, should be understood, as are those whom they call hermaphrodites, although even so both might be understood not falsely in the singular number, on account of that which is said, Two in one flesh.) Why then, as I began by saying, in regard to the nature of man made after the image of God, does Scripture specify nothing except male and female? Certainly, in order to complete the image of the Trinity, it ought to have added also son, although still placed in the loins of his father, as the woman was in his side. Or was it perhaps that the woman also had been already made, and that Scripture had combined in a short and comprehensive statement, that of which it was going to explain afterwards more carefully, how it was done; and that therefore a son could not be mentioned, because no son was yet born? As if the Holy Spirit could not have comprehended this, too, in that brief statement, while about to narrate the birth of the son afterwards in its own place; as it narrated afterwards in its own place, that the woman was taken from the side of the man, and yet has not omitted here to name her.

We should not understand that man is made in the image of the supreme Trinity—that is, in the image of God—in such a way that this same image should be understood as existing in three human beings. This is especially clear since the apostle says that the man is the image of God, and for this reason removes the covering from his head, while he instructs the woman to use a covering, speaking as follows: For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say about this? If the woman completes the image of the trinity according to the measure of her own person, why is the man still called that image after she has been taken out of his side? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God—just as each person also is God in the supreme Trinity itself—why is the woman also not the image of God? For she is instructed for this very reason to cover her head, which he is forbidden to do because he is the image of God.

9. We ought not therefore so to understand that man is made in the image of the supreme Trinity, that is, in the image of God, as that the same image should be understood to be in three human beings; especially when the apostle says that the man is the image of God, and on that account removes the covering from his head, which he warns the woman to use, speaking thus: For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say to this? If the woman fills up the image of the trinity after the measure of her own person, why is the man still called that image after she has been taken out of his side? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God, as each person also is God in the supreme Trinity itself, why is the woman also not the image of God? For she is instructed for this very reason to cover her head, which he is forbidden to do because he is the image of God.

We need to notice how what the apostle says—that the man, not the woman, is the image of God—does not contradict what is written in Genesis: "God created man: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them: and He blessed them." This text says that human nature itself, which is complete only in both sexes, was made in the image of God, and it does not separate the woman from the image of God which it signifies. After saying that God made man in the image of God, "He created him," it says "male and female," or alternatively, with different punctuation, "male and female created He them." How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God and therefore is forbidden to cover his head, but that the woman is not and therefore is commanded to cover hers? The answer is this: according to what I have already said when I was treating the nature of the human mind, the woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that the whole substance may be one image. But when she is considered separately in her role as helper, which concerns the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God. As for the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman is also joined with him in one. We said something similar about the nature of the human mind: when as a whole it contemplates the truth, it is the image of God, and when something is divided from it and directed toward knowledge of temporal things, nevertheless on that side where it beholds and consults truth, it is still the image of God, but on that side where it is directed to knowledge of lower things, it is not the image of God. Since the mind is formed more and more after the image of God the more it extends itself toward what is eternal, and since it should not be restrained from this on that account, therefore the man ought not to cover his head. But because too great a movement toward inferior things is dangerous to that rational knowledge that deals with bodily and temporal things, this ought to have power on its head, which the covering indicates, signifying that it ought to be restrained. For a holy and reverent meaning is pleasing to the holy angels. God does not see in a temporal way, nor does anything new occur in His vision and knowledge when something is done in time and passes away, in the way such things affect the senses—whether the bodily senses of animals and humans, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.

10. But we must notice how that which the apostle says, that not the woman but the man is the image of God, is not contrary to that which is written in Genesis, God created man: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them: and He blessed them. For this text says that human nature itself, which is complete [only] in both sexes, was made in the image of God; and it does not separate the woman from the image of God which it signifies. For after saying that God made man in the image of God, He created him, it says, male and female: or at any rate, punctuating the words otherwise, male and female created He them. How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God, and therefore he is forbidden to cover his head; but that the woman is not so, and therefore is commanded to cover hers? Unless, forsooth, according to that which I have said already, when I was treating of the nature of the human mind, that the woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that that whole substance may be one image; but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, which regards the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined with him in one. As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is divided from it, and diverted in order to the cognition of temporal things; nevertheless on that side on which it beholds and consults truth, here also it is the image of God, but on that side whereby it is directed to the cognition of the lower things, it is not the image of God. And since it is so much the more formed after the image of God, the more it has extended itself to that which is eternal, and is on that account not to be restrained, so as to withhold and refrain itself from thence; therefore the man ought not to cover his head. But because too great a progression towards inferior things is dangerous to that rational cognition that is conversant with things corporeal and temporal; this ought to have power on its head, which the covering indicates, by which it is signified that it ought to be restrained. For a holy and pious meaning is pleasing to the holy angels. For God sees not after the way of time, neither does anything new take place in His vision and knowledge, when anything is done in time and transitorily, after the way in which such things affect the senses, whether the carnal senses of animals and men, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.

The fact that the Apostle Paul, when speaking outwardly about male and female sex, was representing the mystery of some more hidden truth can be understood from this: in another place, when he says that a woman is truly a widow if she is desolate, without children and grandchildren, and yet that she ought to trust in God and continue in prayers night and day, he also indicates that the woman, having been brought into transgression by being deceived, is brought to salvation through childbearing. Then he adds, "If they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety." It would be as if it could possibly harm a good widow either if she had no sons, or if those she had did not choose to continue in good works. But because those things called good works are, so to speak, the children of our life—according to that sense of "life" which answers the question "What is a man's life?" meaning "How does he conduct himself in these temporal things?" (which life the Greeks call not ζωή but βίος)—and because these good works are chiefly performed through acts of mercy, while works of mercy profit neither pagans, nor Jews who do not believe in Christ, nor any heretics or schismatics whatsoever in whom faith and charity and sober holiness are not found: what the apostle meant to signify is plain, and figuratively and mystically so, because he was speaking of covering the head of the woman, which will remain mere empty words unless referred to some hidden sacrament.

11. For that the Apostle Paul, when speaking outwardly of the sex of male and female, figured the mystery of some more hidden truth, may be understood from this, that when he says in another place that she is a widow indeed who is desolate, without children and nephews, and yet that she ought to trust in God, and to continue in prayers night and day, he here indicates, that the woman having been brought into the transgression by being deceived, is brought to salvation by child-bearing; and then he has added, If they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety. As if it could possibly hurt a good widow, if either she had not sons, or if those whom she had did not choose to continue in good works. But because those things which are called good works are, as it were, the sons of our life, according to that sense of life in which it answers to the question, What is a man's life? That is, How does he act in these temporal things? Which life the Greeks do not call ξωή but βίος; and because these good works are chiefly performed in the way of offices of mercy, while works of mercy are of no profit, either to Pagans, or to Jews who do not believe in Christ, or to any heretics or schismstics whatsoever in whom faith and charity and sober holiness are not found: what the apostle meant to signify is plain, and in so far figuratively and mystically, because he was speaking of covering the head of the woman, which will remain mere empty words, unless referred to some hidden sacrament.

For, as both sound reason and the apostle's own authority make clear, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind. The idea that God is confined and limited by the outlines of bodily parts is degraded and worthless. But doesn't this same blessed apostle say, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God; and elsewhere more clearly, Putting off the old man, he says, with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him? If we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and the new man is the one who is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him, then no one can doubt that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor randomly according to some part of the mind, but according to the rational mind, in which the knowledge of God can exist. And it is according to this renewal that we are made sons of God by the baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, we certainly put on Christ through faith. Who then would claim that women are excluded from this fellowship, since they are fellow heirs of grace with us; and since the same apostle says elsewhere, For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus? Have faithful women somehow lost their bodily sex? No, but because they are renewed after the image of God where there is no sex, man is made after the image of God where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why then is the man not required to cover his head because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is required to do so because she is the glory of the man, as if the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was fitting to represent through her bodily covering that part of reason which is directed toward the management of temporal things, so that the image of God may remain on that side of the human mind which clings to the contemplation or consultation of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not only men but also women possess.

12. For, as not only most true reason but also the authority of the apostle himself declares, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind. For the thought is a debased and empty one, which holds God to be circumscribed and limited by the lineaments of bodily members. But further, does not the same blessed apostle say, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God; and in another place more clearly, Putting off the old man, he says, with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him? If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and he is the new man who is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him; no one can doubt, that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor indiscriminately according to any part of the mind, but according to the rational mind, wherein the knowledge of God can exist. And it is according to this renewal, also, that we are made sons of God by the baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, certainly put on Christ through faith. Who is there, then, who will hold women to be alien from this fellowship, whereas they are fellow-heirs of grace with us; and whereas in another place the same apostle says, For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus? Pray, have faithful women then lost their bodily sex? But because they are there renewed after the image of God, where there is no sex; man is there made after the image of God, where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why, then, is the man on that account not bound to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is bound to do so, because she is the glory of the man; as though the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to represent under her bodily covering that part of the reason which is diverted to the government of temporal things; so that the image of God may remain on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not men only, but also women have.

A common nature, therefore, is recognized in their minds, but in their bodies a division of that one mind itself is represented. As we climb upward through certain steps of thought within ourselves, following the sequence of the mind's parts, the point where we first encounter something not shared with the animals is where reason begins, so that here the inner man can now be recognized. And if this inner man himself, through that reason to which the management of temporal things has been delegated, slips too far by excessive advancement into outward things, with his head also consenting—that is, the masculine part (so to speak) which presides in the watchtower of counsel, failing to restrain or control it—then he grows old because of all his enemies, namely the demons with their prince the devil, who envy virtue. And that vision of eternal things is also withdrawn from the head himself, who eats with his spouse what was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is taken from him. And so both being stripped of that enlightenment of truth, and with the eyes of their conscience opened to see how they were left shameful and indecent, they weave together good words like the leaves of sweet fruits but without the fruits themselves, covering over their disgrace by speaking well while living wickedly.

13. A common nature, therefore, is recognized in their minds, but in their bodies a division of that one mind itself is figured. As we ascend, then, by certain steps of thought within, along the succession of the parts of the mind, there where something first meets us which is not common to ourselves with the beasts reason begins, so that here the inner man can now be recognized. And if this inner man himself, through that reason to which the administering of things temporal has been delegated, slips on too far by over-much progress into outward things, that which is his head moreover consenting, that is, the (so to call it) masculine part which presides in the watchtower of counsel not restraining or bridling it: then he waxes old because of all his enemies, viz. the demons with their prince the devil, who are envious of virtue; and that vision of eternal things is withdrawn also from the head himself, eating with his spouse that which was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is gone from him; and so both being naked from that enlightenment of truth, and with the eyes of their conscience opened to behold how they were left shameful and unseemly, like the leaves of sweet fruits, but without the fruits themselves, they so weave together good words without the fruit of good works, as while living wickedly to cover over their disgrace as it were by speaking well.

When the soul loves its own power, it slips away from the whole that is common to all, toward a part that belongs especially to itself. This apostatizing pride, which is called the beginning of sin, could have been most excellently governed by God's laws if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creation. Instead, by seeking something more than the whole and struggling to govern this by its own law, it is thrust onward—since nothing is more than the whole—into caring for a part. Thus, by desiring something more, it becomes less; for this reason covetousness is also called the root of all evil. The soul administers that whole in which it strives to do something of its own against the laws that govern the whole, through its own body, which it possesses only partially. Being delighted by bodily forms and movements, and not having these things themselves within itself, it becomes wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in memory, and is foully polluted by fornication of the phantasy. While it directs all its activities toward those ends for which it eagerly seeks bodily and temporal things through the body's senses, it either swells with arrogance, thinking itself more excellent than other souls given over to the bodily senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of fleshly pleasure.

14. For the soul loving its own power, slips onwards from the whole which is common, to a part, which belongs especially to itself. And that apostatizing pride, which is called the beginning of sin, whereas it might have been most excellently governed by the laws of God, if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creature, by seeking something more than the whole, and struggling to govern this by a law of its own, is thrust on, since nothing is more than the whole, into caring for a part; and thus by lusting after something more, is made less; whence also covetousness is called the root of all evil. And it administers that whole, wherein it strives to do something of its own against the laws by which the whole is governed, by its own body, which it possesses only in part; and so being delighted by corporeal forms and motions, because it has not the things themselves within itself, and because it is wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in the memory, and is foully polluted by fornication of the phantasy, while it refers all its functions to those ends, for which it curiously seeks corporeal and temporal things through the senses of the body, either it affects with swelling arrogance to be more excellent than other souls that are given up to the corporeal senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of carnal pleasure.

When the soul seeks knowledge for itself or others with good intentions, aiming to understand inner and higher realities—the kind that are held in pure embrace, without restriction or jealousy, not privately but shared by all who love such things—then even if it is deceived about temporal matters (since its action in this case is temporal), and even if it fails to maintain the proper way of acting, the temptation is merely one common to humanity. It is a great achievement to journey through this life, which we travel like a road leading home, in such a way that we face only temptations common to humanity. For this is a sin committed without the body and should not be considered fornication, and for that reason is very easily forgiven. But when the soul acts in order to obtain things perceived through the body, driven by the desire to experience, surpass, or manipulate them, so as to make them its ultimate good, then whatever it does is wicked and constitutes fornication, sinning against its own body. By grasping at false images of bodily things from within and combining them through empty thinking, so that nothing seems divine to it unless it resembles these things, it becomes fertile in errors through selfish greed and drained of strength through selfish wastefulness. Yet the soul would not immediately leap into such shameless and wretched fornication from the start, but rather, as Scripture says, whoever despises small things shall fall little by little.

15. When the soul then consults either for itself or for others with a good will towards perceiving the inner and higher things, such as are possessed in a chaste embrace, without any narrowness or envy, not individually, but in common by all who love such things; then even if it be deceived in anything, through ignorance of things temporal (for its action in this case is a temporal one), and if it does not hold fast to that mode of acting which it ought, the temptation is but one common to man. And it is a great thing so to pass through this life, on which we travel, as it were, like a road on our return home, that no temptation may take us, but what is common to man. For this is a sin, without the body, and must not be reckoned fornication, and on that account is very easily pardoned. But when the soul does anything in order to attain those things which are perceived through the body, through lust of proving or of surpassing or of handling them, in order that it may place in them its final good, then whatever it does, it does wickedly, and commits fornication, sinning against its own body: and while snatching from within the deceitful images of corporeal things, and combining them by vain thought, so that nothing seems to it to be divine, unless it be of such a kind as this; by selfish greediness it is made fruitful in errors, and by selfish prodigality it is emptied of strength. Yet it would not leap on at once from the commencement to such shameless and miserable fornication, but, as it is written, He that despises small things, shall fall little by little.

Just as a snake does not move forward with visible steps but advances by the tiny movements of each scale, so the slippery motion of falling away from what is good takes hold of the negligent person only gradually. Beginning from a perverted desire for the likeness of God, it arrives in the end at the likeness of beasts. This is why, being stripped of their first garment, they received coats of skins through mortality. For the true honor of humanity is the image and likeness of God, which cannot be preserved except in relation to Him by whom it is impressed. Therefore, the less a person loves what is his own, the more he clings to God. But through the desire to test his own power, a person falls by his own choice down to himself as to a kind of intermediate level. And so, while he wishes to be as God is—that is, under no one—he is driven as punishment even from his own middle level to the lowest level, that is, to those things in which beasts take pleasure. Thus, while his honor is the likeness of God, his dishonor is the likeness of the beast. A human being in honor does not remain: he is compared to the foolish beasts and is made like them. By what path, then, could he cross such a great distance from the highest to the lowest, except through his own intermediate level? For when he neglects the love of wisdom, which always remains the same, and desires knowledge through experimenting with temporal and changeable things, that knowledge puffs up but does not build up. So the mind is weighed down and thrust out, as it were, by its own weight from blessedness, and learns through its own punishment, through that testing of its own intermediate state, what the difference is between the good it has abandoned and the evil to which it has committed itself. Having thrown away and destroyed its strength, it cannot return unless by the grace of its Maker calling it to repentance and forgiving its sins. For who will deliver the wretched soul from the body of this death, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? We will discuss this grace in its proper place, as far as He Himself enables us.

16. For as a snake does not creep on with open steps, but advances by the very minutest efforts of its several scales; so the slippery motion of falling away [from what is good] takes possession of the negligent only gradually, and beginning from a perverse desire for the likeness of God, arrives in the end at the likeness of beasts. Hence it is that being naked of their first garment, they earned by mortality coats of skins. For the true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in relation to Him by whom it is impressed. The less therefore that one loves what is one's own, the more one cleaves to God. But through the desire of making trial of his own power, man by his own bidding falls down to himself as to a sort of intermediate grade. And so, while he wishes to be as God is, that is, under no one, he is thrust on, even from his own middle grade, by way of punishment, to that which is lowest, that is, to those things in which beasts delight: and thus, while his honor is the likeness of God, but his dishonor is the likeness of the beast, Man being in honor abides not: he is compared to the beasts that are foolish, and is made like to them. By what path, then, could he pass so great a distance from the highest to the lowest, except through his own intermediate grade? For when he neglects the love of wisdom, which remains always after the same fashion, and lusts after knowledge by experiment upon things temporal and mutable, that knowledge puffs up, it does not edify: so the mind is overweighed and thrust out, as it were, by its own weight from blessedness; and learns by its own punishment, through that trial of its own intermediateness, what the difference is between the good it has abandoned and the bad to which it has committed itself; and having thrown away and destroyed its strength, it cannot return, unless by the grace of its Maker calling it to repentance, and forgiving its sins. For who will deliver the unhappy soul from the body of this death, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? of which grace we will discourse in its place, so far as He Himself enables us.

Let us now complete our discussion, with the Lord's help, concerning the part of reason that deals with knowledge—that is, the awareness of temporal and changeable things necessary for managing this life's affairs. Just as with the visible marriage of the first two human beings, where the serpent did not eat the forbidden tree but only persuaded them to eat, and the woman did not eat alone but gave to her husband so they ate together (though she alone spoke with the serpent and was led astray by him)—so also with that hidden and secret kind of marriage that takes place and is discerned within a single human being. The fleshly movement of the soul—or as I might say, since it is directed toward the body's senses, the sensuous movement—which we share with animals, is cut off from the reason of wisdom. Bodily things are certainly perceived by the body's senses, but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. However, the reason of knowledge has desire very close to it, since what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons about bodily things perceived by bodily sense—either properly, in order to direct that knowledge toward the end of the highest good, or improperly, in order to enjoy them as if they were goods in which one finds rest with false happiness. Whenever that carnal or animal sense introduces into the mind's purpose (which deals with temporal and bodily things for managing one's actions through reason's living force) some inducement to enjoy itself—that is, to enjoy itself as though it were some private good of its own rather than the public and common unchangeable good—then the serpent, as it were, speaks with the woman. To consent to this temptation is to eat from the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, while the bodily members are restrained by higher counsel's authority so they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness to sin, this should be considered as if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food. But if in this consent to wickedly use things perceived through the body's senses, any sin is so determined upon that it is also fulfilled by the body when there is opportunity, then the woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband to eat together with her. For the mind cannot determine that a sin should not only be thought about with pleasure but also actually committed unless the mind's intention also yields and serves the evil action—the intention that has chief power to apply the bodily members to an outward act or restrain them from one.

17. Let us now complete, so far as the Lord helps us, the discussion which we have undertaken, respecting that part of reason to which knowledge belongs, that is, the cognizance of things temporal and changeable, which is necessary for managing the affairs of this life. For as in the case of that visible wedlock of the two human beings who were made first, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded them to eat of it; and the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they eat together; although she alone spoke with the serpent, and she alone was led away by him: so also in the case of that hidden and secret kind of wedlock, which is transacted and discerned in a single human being, the carnal, or as I may say, since it is directed to the senses of the body, the sensuous movement of the soul, which is common to us with beasts, is shut off from the reason of wisdom. For certainly bodily things are perceived by the sense of the body; but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. But the reason of knowledge has appetite very near to it: seeing that what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons concerning the bodily things which are perceived by the bodily sense; if well, in order that it may refer that knowledge to the end of the chief good; but if ill, in order that it may enjoy them as being such good things as those wherein it reposes with a false blessedness. Whenever, then, that carnal or animal sense introduces into this purpose of the mind which is conversant about things temporal and corporeal, with a view to the offices of a man's actions, by the living force of reason, some inducement to enjoy itself, that is, to enjoy itself as if it were some private good of its own, not as the public and common, which is the unchangeable, good; then, as it were, the serpent discourses with the woman. And to consent to this allurement, is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, but the members are so restrained by the authority of higher counsel that they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; this, I think, is to be considered as if the woman alone should have eaten the forbidden food. But if, in this consent to use wickedly the things which are perceived through the senses of the body, any sin at all is so determined upon, that if there is the power it is also fulfilled by the body; then that woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband with her, to be eaten together. For it is not possible for the mind to determine that a sin is not only to be thought of with pleasure, but also to be effectually committed, unless also that intention of the mind yields, and serves the bad action, with which rests the chief power of applying the members to an outward act, or of restraining them from one.

When the mind takes pleasure in thinking about unlawful things, even though it doesn't actually decide to do them but simply holds onto and gladly considers what should have been rejected the instant it entered the mind, this certainly cannot be denied to be sin. However, it is far less serious than if the person had also decided to carry it out in action. Therefore, forgiveness must be sought even for such thoughts. We must beat our chest and say, "Forgive us our debts," and what follows must be done and included in our prayer: "As we also forgive our debtors." The situation is not like it was with the first two human beings, where each carried their own distinct role. In that case, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she alone would certainly have received the punishment of death. But we cannot say the same thing about a single human being now—that if the thought by itself is gladly fed with unlawful pleasures from which it should immediately turn away, while there is still no decision to actually commit the bad actions but only to retain them with pleasure in memory, the woman can be condemned without the man, so to speak. We must never believe this. Here we are dealing with one person, one human being, and that person will be condemned as a whole unless those things are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator—the sins that are only in thought, where the will to act is absent but the will to please the mind with them is present.

18. And yet, certainly, when the mind is pleased in thought alone with unlawful things, while not indeed determining that they are to be done, but yet holding and pondering gladly things which ought to have been rejected the very moment they touched the mind, it cannot be denied to be a sin, but far less than if it were also determined to accomplished it in outward act. And therefore pardon must be sought for such thoughts too, and the breast must be smitten, and it must be said, Forgive us our debts; and what follows must be done, and must be joined in our prayer, As we also forgive our debtors. For it is not as it was with those two first human beings, of which each one bare his own person; and so, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she certainly alone would have been smitten with the punishment of death: it cannot, I say, be so said also in the case of a single human being now, that if the thought, remaining alone, be gladly fed with unlawful pleasures, from which it ought to turn away directly, while yet there is no determination that the bad actions are to be done, but only that they are retained with pleasure in remembrance, the woman as it were can be condemned without the man. Far be it from us to believe this. For here is one person, one human being, and he as a whole will be condemned, unless those things which, as lacking the will to do, and yet having the will to please the mind with them, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator.

This reasoning, by which we have searched for a kind of rational wedlock between contemplation and action in the mind of each individual person—with their functions distributed separately yet preserving the unity of the mind in both—while still maintaining the truth of the historical account that divine Scripture gives us about the first two human beings, the man and his wife, from whom the human race descended—this reasoning, I say, should be understood only in this way: that the apostle intended to signify something to be found in one individual person by assigning the image of God to the man only and not to the woman, even though they are two human beings distinguished merely by different sex.

19. This reasoning, then, whereby we have sought in the mind of each several human being a certain rational wedlock of contemplation and action, with functions distributed through each severally, yet with the unity of the mind preserved in both; saving meanwhile the truth of that history which divine testimony hands down respecting the first two human beings, that is, the man and his wife, from whom the human species is propagated; — this reasoning, I say, must be listened to only thus far, that the apostle may be understood to have intended to signify something to be sought in one individual man, by assigning the image of God to the man only, and not also to the woman, although in the merely different sex of two human beings.

I am aware that some who came before us were outstanding defenders of the Catholic faith and interpreters of God's word. While looking for these two elements within a single human being, whose entire soul they understood to be a kind of excellent paradise, they claimed that the man represented the mind, while the woman represented the bodily sense. According to this interpretation, where the man is taken to be the mind and the woman the bodily sense, everything seems to fit together well if handled with proper care. However, there is the problem that Scripture says among all the beasts and birds, no helper like himself was found for man, and then the woman was made from his side. For this reason, I have not thought the bodily sense should be understood as the woman, since we see this sense is common to both ourselves and the beasts. Instead, I have wanted to find something that the beasts do not have. I have rather thought the bodily sense should be understood as the serpent, who we read was more subtle than all the beasts of the field. For among those natural good things which we see are common to ourselves and to irrational animals, the sense stands out with a kind of living power. This is not the sense mentioned in the epistle to the Hebrews, where we read that solid food belongs to those who are mature, those who through practice have had their senses trained to distinguish both good and evil, for these senses belong to rational nature and relate to understanding. Rather, it is that sense which is divided into five parts in the body, through which physical forms and movement are perceived not only by ourselves but also by beasts.

20. Nor does it escape me, that some who before us were eminent defenders of the Catholic faith and expounders of the word of God, while they looked for these two things in one human being, whose entire soul they perceived to be a sort of excellent paradise, asserted that the man was the mind, but that the woman was the bodily sense. And according to this distribution, by which the man is assumed to be the mind, but the woman the bodily sense, all things seem aptly to agree together if they are handled with due attention: unless that it is written, that in all the beasts and flying things there was not found for man an helpmate like to himself; and then the woman was made out of his side. And on this account I, for my part, have not thought that the bodily sense should be taken for the woman, which we see to be common to ourselves and to the beasts; but I have desired to find something which the beasts had not; and I have rather thought the bodily sense should be understood to be the serpent, whom we read to have been more subtle than all beasts of the field. For in those natural good things which we see are common to ourselves and to the irrational animals, the sense excels by a kind of living power; not the sense of which it is written in the epistle addressed to the Hebrews, where we read, that strong meat belongs to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil; for these senses belong to the rational nature and pertain to the understanding; but that sense which is divided into five parts in the body, through which corporeal species and motion is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by the beasts.

But whether what the apostle says—that the man is the image and glory of God, while the woman is the glory of the man—should be understood in this way, or that way, or in some other way, one thing is clear: when we live according to God, our mind, which focuses on His invisible things, ought to be progressively shaped by His eternity, truth, and love. But some part of our rational capacity, that is, of this same mind, must be directed toward using changeable and bodily things, without which this life cannot continue. This is not so that we may be conformed to this world by placing our ultimate goal in such good things and directing our desire for happiness toward them, but rather so that whatever we do rationally in using temporal things, we do it with our eyes on attaining eternal things, passing through the former but holding fast to the latter.

21. But whether that the apostle calls the man the image and glory of God, but the woman the glory of the man, is to be received in this, or that, or in any other way; yet it is clear, that when we live according to God, our mind which is intent on the invisible things of Him ought to be fashioned with proficiency from His eternity, truth, charity; but that something of our own rational purpose, that is, of the same mind, must be directed to the using of changeable and corporeal things, without which this life does not go on; not that we may be conformed to this world, by placing our end in such good things, and by forcing the desire of blessedness towards them, but that whatever we do rationally in the using of temporal things, we may do it with the contemplation of attaining eternal things, passing through the former, but cleaving to the latter.

Knowledge also has its proper measure, if whatever in it puffs up or tends to puff up is overcome by the love of eternal things, which does not puff up but, as we know, builds up. Certainly the virtues themselves, through which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed without knowledge, and it is through these virtues that this miserable life may be so governed that we may attain that eternal life which is truly blessed.

For knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, edifies. Certainly without knowledge the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, by which this miserable life may be so governed, that we may attain to that eternal life which is truly blessed.

Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things. The latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. Although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle speaks when he says, Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known, where he doubtless meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints. Yet where he says, For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, he certainly distinguishes these two things without doubt, although he does not there explain the difference or how one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, Behold, piety, that is wisdom, but to depart from evil is knowledge. In this distinction, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebeia. The sentence in the Greek manuscripts has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him and believe and hope that we shall see Him, and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by face to face. This is also what John says, Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. Discourse about these and similar subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time and this world that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain so that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly belongs to that knowledge or discipline by which our action is concerned with avoiding evil and desiring good. So also, whatever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.

22. Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle too speaks, where he says, Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known; when doubtless he meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints; yet where he says, For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, certainly he distinguishes without doubt these two things, although he does not there explain the difference, nor in what way one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, Behold, piety, that is wisdom; but to depart from evil is knowledge. In thus distinguishing, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called θεοσέβεια. For the sentence in the Greek mss. has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him, and we believe and hope that we shall see Him; and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by face to face. This is also what John says, Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. Discourse about these and the like subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time [and this world] that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatsoever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, belongs to that knowledge or discipline wherewith our action is conversant in avoiding evil and desiring good; and so also, whatsoever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.

When a discussion relates to these things, I consider it to belong to knowledge, and it should be distinguished from a discussion belonging to wisdom. Wisdom concerns those things that neither have been nor will be, but simply are. Because of the eternity in which they exist, they are said to have been, to be, and to be about to be, without any change over time. For they have not existed in such a way that they ceased to be, nor are they going to exist as if they do not exist now. Rather, they have always possessed and always will possess absolute being. They remain constant, but not as if they were fixed in some physical location the way bodies are. Instead, as intelligible things existing in incorporeal nature, they are as readily available to the mind's observation as visible or tangible things in physical space are to the body's senses. And just as there are sensible things positioned in physical space, there also exist intelligible and incorporeal reasons for them apart from any spatial location. Similarly, for motions that pass by in successive moments of time, there exist reasons apart from any passage of time—these reasons being intelligible, not sensible. Reaching these with the mind's eye is possible for only a few people. Even when they are reached to whatever degree possible, the person who reaches them does not remain in them but is pushed back, as it were, by the recoil of the mind's eye itself. The result is a passing thought of something that is not itself passing. Yet this fleeting thought is committed to memory through the teaching process by which the mind is instructed, so that the mind, which must move away from these things, can return to them again. If the thought does not return to memory and find what it deposited there, it would need to be led back like someone never taught, just as it was led before. It would find these things where it first found them—in that incorporeal truth—from which they can once more be written down and fixed in the mind. For example, a person's thought does not remain in the incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body in the same way that reason itself remains—if indeed the thought could reach it at all without imagining physical space. Or if someone were to grasp the rhythm of some artistic or musical sound passing through certain intervals of time, as it exists outside of time in some secret and profound silence, it could be thought about only as long as that song could be heard. Yet what the mind's glance, though fleeting, captured from there and stored away in memory like food in a stomach—this the mind will be able to contemplate to some extent through recollection and transform what it has learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been erased by complete forgetfulness, once again, with the help of teaching, one will come back to what had entirely disappeared, and it will be found just as it was.

23. When a discourse then relates to these things, I hold it to be a discourse belonging to knowledge, and to be distinguished from a discourse belonging to wisdom, to which those things belong, which neither have been, nor shall be, but are; and on account of that eternity in which they are, are said to have been, and to be, and to be about to be, without any changeableness of times. For neither have they been in such way as that they should cease to be, nor are they about to be in such way as if they were not now; but they have always had and always will have that very absolute being. And they abide, but not as if fixed in some place as are bodies; but as intelligible things in incorporeal nature, they are so at hand to the glance of the mind, as things visible or tangible in place are to the sense of the body. And not only in the case of sensible things posited in place, there abide also intelligible and incorporeal reasons of them apart from local space; but also of motions that pass by in successive times, apart from any transit in time, there stand also like reasons, themselves certainly intelligible, and not sensible. And to attain to these with the eye of the mind is the lot of few; and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to them does not abide in them, but is as it were repelled by the rebounding of the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a thing not transitory. And yet this transient thought is committed to the memory through the instructions by which the mind is taught; that the mind which is compelled to pass from thence, may be able to return there again; although, if the thought should not return to the memory and find there what it had committed to it, it would be led thereto like an uninstructed person, as it had been led before, and would find it where it had first found it, that is to say, in that incorporeal truth, whence yet once more it may be as it were written down and fixed in the mind. For the thought of man, for example, does not so abide in that incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body, as that reason itself abides: if, to be sure, it could attain to it at all without the phantasy of local space. Or if one were to apprehend the rhythm of any artificial or musical sound, passing through certain intervals of time, as it rested without time in some secret and deep silence, it could at least be thought as long as that song could be heard; yet what the glance of the mind, transient though it was, caught from thence, and, absorbing as it were into a belly, so laid up in the memory, over this it will be able to ruminate in some measure by recollection, and to transfer what it has thus learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been blotted out by absolute forgetfulness, yet once again, under the guidance of teaching, one will come to that which had altogether dropped away, and it will be found such as it was.

The renowned philosopher Plato tried to convince us that human souls existed before they inhabited these bodies, and therefore the things we learn are actually remembered from what we already knew, rather than being acquired as new knowledge. He told us about a boy who, when asked certain questions about geometry, answered as if he were an expert in that subject. Through careful, step-by-step questioning, the boy saw what needed to be seen and said what he observed. But if this were truly a case of remembering previously known things, then everyone, or nearly everyone, would be able to answer the same way when questioned. However, not everyone was a geometrician in a former life, since geometricians are so rare among people that you can hardly find one anywhere. Instead, we should believe that the intellectual mind is naturally formed to see those things which, by the Creator's arrangement, are connected to intelligible things in a natural order, through a kind of unique incorporeal light—just as the physical eye sees things near it in bodily light, for which it was made receptive and to which it is adapted. After all, the physical eye also distinguishes black from white without a teacher, not because it knew these colors before it was created in this flesh. Finally, why is it that only with intelligible things can someone properly questioned give answers about any subject they are ignorant of? Why can no one do this with sensible things, except those they have seen in their present body or believed from the reports of others who knew them, whether through someone's writings or words? We must not accept the claims of those who assert that Pythagoras of Samos remembered certain things he had experienced when he previously existed here in another body, and others tell similar stories about other people who supposedly experienced the same thing in their minds. Rather, it can be suggested that these were false memories, like those we commonly experience in sleep when we think we remember doing or seeing something we never did or saw at all. The minds of these people, even while awake, were affected this way through the influence of malicious and deceitful spirits, whose purpose is to confirm or plant false beliefs about the transmigration of souls in order to deceive people. This can be inferred from the fact that if they truly remembered things they had seen here before while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many people—indeed, to almost everyone—since they suppose that just as the dead come from the living, so continuously and without pause the living come into existence from the dead, as sleepers come from those who are awake, and those who are awake from those who sleep.

24. And hence that noble philosopher Plato endeavored to persuade us that the souls of men lived even before they bare these bodies; and that hence those things which are learned are rather remembered, as having been known already, than taken into knowledge as things new. For he has told us that a boy, when questioned I know not what respecting geometry, replied as if he were perfectly skilled in that branch of learning. For being questioned step by step and skillfully, he saw what was to be seen, and said that which he saw. But if this had been a recollecting of things previously known, then certainly every one, or almost every one, would not have been able so to answer when questioned. For not every one was a geometrician in the former life, since geometricians are so few among men that scarcely one can be found anywhere. But we ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things, which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of an unique kind; as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive, and adapted to it. For none the more does this fleshly eye, too, distinguish black things from white without a teacher, because it had already known them before it was created in this flesh. Why, lastly, is it possible only in intelligible things that any one properly questioned should answer according to any branch of learning, although ignorant of it? Why can no one do this with things sensible, except those which he has seen in this his present body, or has believed the information of others who knew them, whether somebody's writings or words? For we must not acquiesce in their story, who assert that the Samian Pythagoras recollected some things of this kind, which he had experienced when he was previously here in another body; and others tell yet of others, that they experienced something of the same sort in their minds: but it may be conjectured that these were untrue recollections, such as we commonly experience in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done or seen it, what we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these persons, even though awake, were affected in this way at the suggestion of malignant and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm or to sow some false belief concerning the changes of souls, in order to deceive men. This, I say, may be conjectured from this, that if they really remembered those things which they had seen here before, while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many, nay to almost all; since they suppose that as the dead from the living, so, without cessation and continually, the living are coming into existence from the dead; as sleepers from those that are awake, and those that are awake from them that sleep.

If this is the correct way to distinguish wisdom from knowledge—that the intellectual understanding of eternal things belongs to wisdom, while the rational understanding of temporal things belongs to knowledge—then it's not hard to decide which should be given priority. But even if we need to use some other method to tell these two apart (which the apostle certainly teaches us are different when he says, "To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit"), the distinction we've established remains crystal clear: intellectual understanding of eternal things is one thing, rational understanding of temporal things is another. And no one doubts that the former should be preferred to the latter. So as we move beyond the things that belong to the outer person and want to rise inward from those things we share with animals, before we arrive at the understanding of intelligible and supreme things that are eternal, the rational understanding of temporal things presents itself to us. Let us then find a trinity in this as well, if we can, just as we found one in the bodily senses and in those things that entered through them as images into our soul or spirit. Instead of physical objects that we touch through physical sensation and that exist outside us, we would have likenesses of bodies impressed within our memory, from which thought could be formed, while the will as a third element united them—just as sight was formed from external things when the will directed it toward the visible object to produce vision and united both, while also adding itself as a third element. But this subject shouldn't be squeezed into this book, so that in the next one, God willing, it may be properly examined and our conclusions clearly explained.

25. If therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge, it is not difficult to judge which is to be preferred or postponed to which. But if we must employ some other distinction by which to know these two apart, which without doubt the apostle teaches us are different, saying, To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit: still the difference between those two which we have laid down is a most evident one, in that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things is one thing, the rational cognizance of temporal things another; and no one doubts but that the former is to be preferred to the latter. As then we leave behind those things which belong to the outer man, and desire to ascend within from those things which we have in common with beasts, before we come to the cognizance of things intelligible and supreme, which are eternal, the rational cognizance of temporal things presents itself. Let us then find a trinity in this also, if we can, as we found one in the senses of the body, and in those things which through them entered in the way of images into our soul or spirit; so that instead of corporeal things which we touch by corporeal sense, placed as they are without us, we might have resemblances of bodies impressed within on the memory from which thought might be formed, while the will as a third united them; just as the sight of the eyes was formed from without, which the will applied to the visible thing in order to produce vision, and united both, while itself also added itself thereto as a third. But this subject must not be compressed into this book; so that in that which follows, if God help, it may be suitably examined, and the conclusions to which we come may be unfolded.