St Gregory of Nyssa Letter To Ablabius.
To Ablabius. You who are strengthened with all power in your inner being should by rights be fighting against the enemies of truth and not backing away from the task, so that we fathers may be made glad by the noble efforts of our sons—for this is what the law of nature prompts. But since you turn the battle lines around and send back at us the attacks of those weapons that are thrown by the opponents of truth, and you demand that their fiery coals and their arrows sharpened by false knowledge should be put out with the shield of faith by us old men, we accept your command and make ourselves an example of obedience. We do this so that you, Ablabius, noble soldier of Christ, may give us the same fair response when we give similar commands, if we should ever call you to such a contest. In truth, the question you ask us is not a small one, and serious harm will follow if it receives inadequate treatment. For the force of the question compels us at first glance to accept one or the other of two wrong opinions: either to say there are three Gods, which is unlawful, or not to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is impious and absurd. The argument you present goes something like this: Peter, James, and John, being in one human physis, are called three men, and there is nothing strange about describing those who are united in physis by the plural form of the name derived from their physis if they are more than one. If, then, in the case above, custom allows this and no one forbids us to speak of two people as two or more than two as three, how is it that in our statements about the mysteries of the Faith, though we confess the Three Persons and acknowledge no difference of physis between them, we somehow contradict our confession when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, and yet forbid people to say there are three Gods? The question is, as I said, very difficult to handle. Yet if we can find anything that might support the uncertainty of our mind so that it no longer wavers and staggers in this terrible dilemma, that would be good. On the other hand, even if our reasoning proves inadequate to the problem, we must keep forever, firm and unmoved, the tradition we received by succession from the fathers, and seek from the Lord the reason that defends our faith. If this is found by anyone endowed with grace, we must give thanks to Him who gave the grace. But if not, we shall nonetheless hold our faith unchangeably on those points that have been determined. What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who appear to us in one physis, we normally name them in the plural and speak of so many men, instead of calling them all one, while in the case of the Divine physis our doctrinal definition rejects the plurality of Gods, at once counting the Persons but at the same time not admitting the plural meaning? Perhaps someone might seem to touch on the point if he were to say—speaking casually to straightforward people—that the definition refused to count Gods in any number to avoid any resemblance to the polytheism of the pagans, lest if we too were to count the Deity not in the singular but in the plural, as they are accustomed to do, there might be thought to be some shared doctrine as well. This answer, I say, if made to people of a more innocent spirit, might seem to carry some weight. But in the case of others who require that one of the alternatives they propose should be established—either that we should not acknowledge the Godhead in Three Persons, or that if we do, we should speak of those who share in the same Godhead as three—this answer does not provide any solution to the difficulty. And so we must make our reply at greater length, tracing out the truth as best we can, for the question is no ordinary one. We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in physis by the very name of their common physis in the plural, and saying they are many men, is a customary misuse of language, and it would be much the same thing to say they are many human physeis. And we may see the truth of this from the following instance. When we address anyone, we do not call him by the name of his physis, so that no confusion may result from the shared name, as would happen if everyone who hears it were to think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is made not by the proper name but by the common name of their physis. But we separate him from the crowd by using that name which belongs to him as his own—that is, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the physis—many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs—but the man in them all is one. Since, as has been said, the term man does not belong to the physis of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man, but it does not follow that if anyone is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen. But the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each one separately, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number. Yet their physis is one, united in itself and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of decrease by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appears in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more accurate expression, man would be said to be one, even though those who are shown to us in the same physis make up a plurality. Thus it would be much better to correct our mistaken habit, so as no longer to extend to a plurality the name of the physis, than by our slavery to habit to transfer to our statements concerning God the error that exists in the case above. But since correcting the habit is impractical—for how could you persuade anyone not to speak of those who are shown in the same physis as many men? Indeed, in every case habit is hard to change—we are not so wrong in not going against the prevailing habit in the case of the lower physis, since no harm results from the mistaken use of the name. But in the case of the statement concerning the Divine physis the loose use of terms is no longer so free from danger, for that which is of small account is in these subjects no longer a small matter. Therefore we must confess one God, according to the testimony of Scripture, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord,” even though the name of Godhead extends through the Holy Trinity. This I say according to the account we have given in the case of human physis, in which we have learned that it is improper to extend the name of the physis by the mark of plurality. We must, however, more carefully examine the name of Godhead, in order to obtain, by means of the meaning involved in the word, some help toward clearing up the question before us. Most people think that the word Godhead is used in a special way with respect to physis, and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the parts making up the universe are designated by proper names which are meaningful of the subjects, so they say that in the case of the Supreme and Divine physis, the word Godhead is fittingly adapted to that which it represents to us, as a kind of special name. We, on the other hand, following the suggestions of Scripture, have learned that that physis is unnameable and unspeakable, and we say that every term either invented by the custom of men or handed down to us by the Scriptures is indeed explanatory of our conceptions of the Divine physis, but does not include the signification of that physis itself. And it may be shown without much difficulty that this is the case. For all other terms which are used of the creation may be found, even without analysis of their origin, to be applied to the subjects accidentally, because we are content to designate the things in any way by the word applied to them so as to avoid confusion in our knowledge of the things signified. But all the terms that are employed to lead us to the knowledge of God have comprehended in them each its own meaning, and you cannot find any word among the terms especially applied to God which is without a distinct sense. Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine physis itself is not signified, but some one of its surroundings is made known. For we say, it may be, that the Deity is incorruptible, or powerful, or whatever else we are accustomed to say of Him. But in each of these terms we find a particular sense, fit to be understood or asserted of the Divine physis, yet not expressing what that physis is in its essence. For the subject, whatever it may be, is incorruptible, but our conception of incorruptibility is this—that that which is, is not dissolved into decay.
conclusion, that we ought therefore all the more to call those three Gods who are contemplated in the same
Since they say we ought to call three Gods those who are contemplated in the same operation, just as one would speak of three philosophers or orators, or any other name derived from an activity when those who take part in the same activity are more than one. I have taken some pains in setting forth this view to bring forward the reasoning on behalf of our adversaries, so that our decision may be more firmly fixed, being strengthened by the more elaborate contradictions. Let us now resume our argument. As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word Godhead signifies not nature but operation, perhaps one might reasonably suggest as a reason why, in the case of human beings, those who share with one another in the same pursuits are counted and spoken of in the plural, while on the other hand the Deity is spoken of in the singular as one God and one Godhead, even though the Three Persons are not separated from the meaning expressed by the term Godhead—one might suggest, I say, the fact that human beings, even if several are engaged in the same form of action, work separately, each by himself, at the task he has undertaken, having no participation in his individual action with others who are engaged in the same occupation. For instance, suppose the case of several rhetoricians: their pursuit, being one, has the same name in the numerous cases, but each of those who follow it works by himself, this one pleading on his own account, and that on his own account. Thus, since among human beings the action of each in the same pursuits is distinguished, they are properly called many, since each of them is separated from the others within his own environment, according to the special character of his operation. But in the case of the Divine physis we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work together, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit. Rather, every operation which extends from God to the Creation, and is named according to our variable conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided with regard to the number of those who fulfill it, because the action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar. Rather, whatever comes to pass, whether in reference to the acts of His providence for us, or to the government and constitution of the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three, yet what does come to pass is not three things. We may understand the meaning of this from one single instance. From Him, I say, Who is the chief source of gifts, all things which have shared in this grace have obtained their life. When we inquire, then, where this good gift came to us from, we find by the guidance of the Scriptures that it was from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Yet although we set forth Three Persons and three names, we do not consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one from each Person separately. Rather, the same life is worked in us by the Father, and prepared by the Son, and depends on the will of the Holy Spirit. Since then the Holy Trinity fulfills every operation in a manner similar to that of which I have spoken, not by separate action according to the number of the Persons, but so that there is one motion and disposition of the good will which is communicated from the Father through the Son to the Spirit (for just as we do not call those whose operation gives one life three Givers of life, neither do we call those who are contemplated in one goodness three Good beings, nor speak of them in the plural by any of their other attributes), so neither can we call those who exercise this Divine and superintending power and operation towards ourselves and all creation, jointly and inseparably, by their mutual action, three Gods. For just as when we learn concerning the God of the universe, from the words of Scripture, that He judges all the earth, we say that He is the Judge of all things through the Son; and again, when we hear that the Father judges no man, we do not think that the Scripture contradicts itself (for He Who judges all the earth does this by His Son to Whom He has committed all judgment; and everything which is done by the Only-begotten has its reference to the Father, so that He Himself is at once the Judge of all things and judges no man, by reason of His having, as we said, committed all judgment to the Son, while all the judgment of the Son is conformable to the will of the Father; and one could not properly say either that They are two judges, or that one of Them is excluded from the authority and power implied in judgment)—so also in the case of the word Godhead, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and that very power of superintendence and beholding which we call Godhead, the Father exercises through the Only-begotten, while the Son perfects every power by the Holy Spirit, judging, as Isaiah says, by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning, and acting by Him also, according to the saying in the Gospel which was spoken to the Jews. For He says, If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils; where He includes every form of doing good in a partial description, by reason of the unity of action, for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where the result of their mutual operation is one. Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argument, issuing from the Father as from a spring, brought into operation by the Son, and perfecting its grace by the power of the Spirit; and since no operation is separated in respect of the Persons, being fulfilled by each individually apart from that which is joined with Him in our contemplation, but all providence, care, and superintendence of all, alike of things in the sensible creation and of those of supramundane nature, and that power which preserves the things which are, and corrects those which are amiss, and instructs those which are ordered aright, is one, and not three, being, indeed, directed by the Holy Trinity, yet not severed by a threefold division according to the number of the Persons contemplated in the Faith, so that each of the acts, contemplated by itself, should be the work of the Father alone, or of the Son peculiarly, or of the Holy Spirit separately, but while, as the Apostle says, the one and the selfsame Spirit divides His good gifts to every man severally, the motion of good proceeding from the Spirit is not without beginning—we find that the power which we conceive as preceding this motion, which is the Only-begotten God, is the maker of all things; without Him no existing thing attains to the beginning of its being; and, again, this same source of good issues from the will of the Father. If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the power of the Spirit through the Only-begotten God, without mark of time or distinction (since there is no delay, existing or conceived, in the motion of the Divine will from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit); and if Godhead also is one of the good names and concepts, it would not be proper to divide the name into a plurality, since the unity existing in the action prevents plural enumeration. And just as the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe, is spoken of by the Apostle as one, and no one from this phrase argues either that the Son does not save them who believe, or that salvation is given to those who receive it without the intervention of the Spirit, but God who is over all is the Saviour of all, while the Son works salvation by means of the grace of the Spirit, and yet they are not on this account called in Scripture three Saviours (although salvation is confessed to proceed from the Holy Trinity), so neither are they called three Gods, according to the meaning assigned to the term Godhead, even though the aforesaid designation attaches to the Holy Trinity. It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the assertion that we are not to conceive Godhead as an operation. For we, believing the Divine physis to be unlimited and incomprehensible, conceive no comprehension of it, but declare that the physis is to be conceived in all respects as infinite; and that which is absolutely infinite is not limited in one respect while it is left unlimited in another, but infinity is free from limitation altogether. That therefore which is without limit is surely not limited even by name. In order then to mark the constancy of our conception of infinity in the case of the Divine physis, we say that the Deity is above every name, and Godhead is a name. Now it cannot be that the same thing should at once be a name and be accounted as above every name. But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation but physis, we shall fall back upon our original argument, that custom applies the name of a physis to denote multitude erroneously, since according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to any physis when