Opening
ST. BASIL OF CAESAREA
ST. BASIL OF CAESAREA
(Canonica Prima.)
(Canonica Prima.)
To Amphilochius, concerning the Canons.
To Amphilochius, concerning the Canons.
Even a fool, it is said, when he asks questions, is counted wise. But when a wise man asks questions, he makes even a fool wise. And this, thank God, is my situation whenever I receive a letter from your diligent self. For we become more learned and wiser than we were before simply by asking questions, because we are taught many things we did not know, and our desire to answer them serves as a teacher to us. Certainly at the present time, though I have never before given attention to the points you raise, I have been compelled to make careful inquiry and to consider both whatever I have heard from the elders and all that I have been taught in accordance with their instruction.
Even a fool, it is said, when he asks questions, is counted wise. But when a wise man asks questions, he makes even a fool wise. And this, thank God, is my case, as often as I receive a letter from your industrious self. For we become more learned and wiser than we were before, merely by asking questions, because we are taught many things which we did not know; and our anxiety to answer them acts as a teacher to us. Assuredly at the present time, though I have never before paid attention to the points you raise, I have been forced to make accurate enquiry, and to turn over in my mind both whatever I have heard from the elders, and all that I have been taught in conformity with their lessons.
I. Regarding your question about the Cathari, a statement has already been made, and you have rightly reminded me that it is proper to follow the custom in place in each region, because those who originally made decisions on these points held different views concerning their baptism. But the baptism of the Pepuzeni seems to me to have no validity, and I am surprised that this could have escaped Dionysius, familiar as he was with the canons. The ancient authorities decided to accept that baptism which in no way deviates from the faith. They distinguished between heresies, schisms, and unlawful assemblies. By heresies they meant people who were completely separated and estranged in matters relating to the actual faith. By schisms they meant people who had separated over some ecclesiastical disputes and questions that could be mutually resolved. By unlawful assemblies they meant gatherings held by disorderly presbyters or bishops or by uninstructed laypeople. For instance, if a man is convicted of a crime and prohibited from performing ministerial functions, and then refuses to submit to the canons, but claims for himself episcopal and ministerial authority, and people leave the Catholic Church and join him, this is an unlawful assembly. To disagree with members of the Church about repentance is schism. Examples of heresy are those of the Manicheans, the Valentinians, the Marcionites, and these Pepuzenes, for with them there immediately comes their disagreement concerning the actual faith in God. Therefore it seemed good to the ancient authorities to reject the baptism of heretics altogether, but to accept that of schismatics, on the ground that they still belonged to the Church.
I. As to your enquiry about the Cathari, a statement has already been made, and you have properly reminded me that it is right to follow the custom obtaining in each region, because those, who at the time gave decision on these points, held different opinions concerning their baptism. But the baptism of the Pepuzeni seems to me to have no authority; and I am astonished how this can have escaped Dionysius, acquainted as he was with the canons. The old authorities decided to accept that baptism which in nowise errs from the faith. Thus they used the names of heresies, of schisms, and of unlawful congregations. By heresies they meant men who were altogether broken off and alienated in matters relating to the actual faith; by schisms men who had separated for some ecclesiastical reasons and questions capable of mutual solution; by unlawful congregations gatherings held by disorderly presbyters or bishops or by uninstructed laymen. As, for instance, if a man be convicted of crime, and prohibited from discharging ministerial functions, and then refuses to submit to the canons, but arrogates to himself episcopal and ministerial rights, and persons leave the Catholic Church and join him, this is unlawful assembly. To disagree with members of the Church about repentance, is schism. Instances of heresy are those of the Manichæans, of the Valentinians, of the Marcionites, and of these Pepuzenes; for with them there comes in at once their disagreement concerning the actual faith in God. So it seemed good to the ancient authorities to reject the baptism of heretics altogether, but to admit that of schismatics, on the ground that they still belonged to the Church.
Regarding those who gathered in unlawful assemblies, the decision was to reunite them with the Church after they had been brought to a better condition through proper repentance and correction. In many cases, when ordained men had joined with those in rebellion, they were restored to the same rank upon repentance. Now the Pepuzeni are clearly heretical, because by unlawfully and shamefully giving Montanus and Priscilla the title of Paraclete, they have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit. They must therefore be condemned for attributing divinity to human beings and for insulting the Holy Spirit by equating Him with humans. Because of this, they are also subject to eternal damnation, since blasphemy against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven. What basis is there, then, for accepting the baptism of people who baptize into the Father and the Son and Montanus or Priscilla? Those who have not been baptized into the names given to us have not been baptized at all. So even though this escaped the notice of the great Dionysius, we must not imitate his mistake. The absurdity of this position is immediately obvious and clear to anyone who has even a small amount of reasoning ability.
As to those who assembled in unlawful congregations, their decision was to join them again to the Church, after they had been brought to a better state by proper repentance and rebuke, and so, in many cases, when men in orders had rebelled with the disorderly, to receive them on their repentance, into the same rank. Now the Pepuzeni are plainly heretical, for, by unlawfully and shamefully applying to Montanus and Priscilla the title of the Paraclete, they have blasphemed against the Holy Ghost. They are, therefore, to be condemned for ascribing divinity to men; and for outraging the Holy Ghost by comparing Him to men. They are thus also liable to eternal damnation, inasmuch as blasphemy against the Holy Ghost admits of no forgiveness. What ground is there, then, for the acceptance of the baptism of men who baptize into the Father and the Son and Montanus or Priscilla? For those who have not been baptized into the names delivered to us have not been baptized at all. So that, although this escaped the vigilance of the great Dionysius, we must by no means imitate his error. The absurdity of the position is obvious in a moment, and evident to all who are gifted with even a small share of reasoning capacity.
The Cathari are schismatics. But it seemed good to the ancient authorities—I mean Cyprian and our own Firmilianus—to reject all these groups, the Cathari, Encratites, and Hydroparastatae, by one common condemnation. This is because the origin of their separation arose through schism, and those who had broken away from the Church no longer had upon them the grace of the Holy Spirit, since it ceased to be given when the continuity was broken. The first separatists had received their ordination from the Fathers and possessed the spiritual gift through the laying on of their hands. But those who were broken off had become laymen, and because they are no longer able to confer on others that grace of the Holy Spirit from which they themselves have fallen away, they had no authority either to baptize or to ordain. Therefore those who were from time to time baptized by them were ordered, as though baptized by laymen, to come to the church to be purified by the Church's true baptism. Nevertheless, since it has seemed to some of those in Asia that, for the sake of managing the majority, their baptism should be accepted, let it be accepted. We must, however, recognize the wicked action of the Encratites, who, in order to shut themselves out from being received back by the Church, have tried to preempt readmission by a peculiar baptism of their own, violating in this way even their own special practice. My opinion, therefore, is that since nothing has been clearly laid down concerning them, it is our duty to reject their baptism, and that in the case of anyone who has received baptism from them, we should, when he comes to the church, baptize him. If, however, there is any likelihood of this being harmful to general discipline, we must fall back upon custom and follow the fathers who have ordered what course we are to pursue. For I am somewhat apprehensive that, in our wish to discourage them from baptizing, we may, through the severity of our decision, become a hindrance to those who are being saved. If they accept our baptism, do not let this distress us. We are by no means bound to return them the same favor, but only to strictly obey the canons. On every ground let it be required that those who come to us from their baptism be anointed in the presence of the faithful, and only on these terms approach the mysteries. I am aware that I have received into episcopal rank Izois and Saturninus from the Encratite following. I am therefore prevented from separating from the Church those who have been united to their company, since through my acceptance of the bishops, I have established a kind of canon of communion with them.
The Cathari are schismatics; but it seemed good to the ancient authorities, I mean Cyprian and our own Firmilianus, to reject all these, Cathari, Encratites, and Hydroparastatæ, by one common condemnation, because the origin of separation arose through schism, and those who had apostatized from the Church had no longer on them the grace of the Holy Spirit, for it ceased to be imparted when the continuity was broken. The first separatists had received their ordination from the Fathers, and possessed the spiritual gift by the laying on of their hands. But they who were broken off had become laymen, and, because they are no longer able to confer on others that grace of the Holy Spirit from which they themselves are fallen away, they had no authority either to baptize or to ordain. And therefore those who were from time to time baptized by them, were ordered, as though baptized by laymen, to come to the church to be purified by the Church's true baptism. Nevertheless, since it has seemed to some of those of Asia that, for the sake of management of the majority, their baptism should be accepted, let it be accepted. We must, however, perceive the iniquitous action of the Encratites; who, in order to shut themselves out from being received back by the Church have endeavoured for the future to anticipate readmission by a peculiar baptism of their own, violating, in this manner even their own special practice. My opinion, therefore, is that nothing being distinctly laid down concerning them, it is our duty to reject their baptism, and that in the case of any one who has received baptism from them, we should, on his coming to the church, baptize him. If, however, there is any likelihood of this being detrimental to general discipline, we must fall back upon custom, and follow the fathers who have ordered what course we are to pursue. For I am under some apprehension lest, in our wish to discourage them from baptizing, we may, through the severity of our decision, be a hindrance to those who are being saved. If they accept our baptism, do not allow this to distress us. We are by no means bound to return them the same favour, but only strictly to obey canons. On every ground let it be enjoined that those who come to us from their baptism be anointed in the presence of the faithful, and only on these terms approach the mysteries. I am aware that I have received into episcopal rank Izois and Saturninus from the Encratite following. I am precluded therefore from separating from the Church those who have been united to their company, inasmuch as, through my acceptance of the bishops, I have promulgated a kind of canon of communion with them.
The woman who deliberately destroys her unborn child is guilty of murder. Among us there is no careful distinction made as to whether it is formed or unformed. In this situation it is not only the one about to be born who is defended, but also the woman in her attack upon herself, because in most cases women who make such attempts die. The destruction of the embryo is an additional crime, a second murder, at least if we consider it as done intentionally. However, the punishment of these women should not be for life, but for a period of ten years. And their treatment should depend not merely on the passage of time, but on the quality of their repentance.
II. The woman who purposely destroys her unborn child is guilty of murder. With us there is no nice enquiry as to its being formed or unformed. In this case it is not only the being about to be born who is vindicated, but the woman in her attack upon herself; because in most cases women who make such attempts die. The destruction of the embryo is an additional crime, a second murder, at all events if we regard it as done with intent. The punishment, however, of these women should not be for life, but for the term of ten years. And let their treatment depend not on mere lapse of time, but on the character of their repentance.
III. A deacon who commits fornication after being appointed to the diaconate is to be deposed. But after he has been removed from office and placed among the laity, he is not to be excluded from communion. There is an ancient canon that states those who have fallen from their ordained rank are to be subjected only to this kind of punishment.
III. A deacon who commits fornication after his appointment to the diaconate is to be deposed. But, after he has been rejected and ranked among the laity, he is not to be excluded from communion. For there is an ancient canon that those who have fallen from their degree are to be subjected to this kind of punishment alone.
Here, I believe, the ancient authorities followed the old rule that you shall not punish twice for the same offense. There is also this additional reason: when laypeople are expelled from the assembly of the faithful, they are sometimes restored to the position from which they fell; but the deacon undergoes the permanent penalty of deposition once and for all. Since his diaconal orders are not restored to him, they limited the punishment to this one penalty. This is what concerns the legal requirements. But generally, a more effective remedy is the abandonment of sin. Therefore, the person will give me full proof of his healing who, after rejecting grace for the sake of indulging the flesh, has then, through disciplining the flesh and subjecting it through self-control, given up the pleasures that had conquered him. We ought therefore to know both what exact prescription requires and what custom requires; and in cases that do not allow for the strictest treatment, to follow the traditional guidance.
Herein, as I suppose, the ancient authorities followed the old rule You shall not avenge twice for the same thing. There is this further reason too, that laymen, when expelled from the place of the faithful, are from time to time restored to the rank whence they have fallen; but the deacon undergoes once for all the lasting penalty of deposition. His deacon's orders not being restored to him, they rested at this one punishment. So far is this as regards what depends on law laid down. But generally a truer remedy is the departure from sin. Wherefore that man will give me full proof of his cure who, after rejecting grace for the sake of the indulgence of the flesh, has then, through bruising of the flesh and the enslaving of it by means of self control, abandoned the pleasures whereby he was subdued. We ought therefore to know both what is of exact prescription and what is of custom; and, in cases which do not admit of the highest treatment, to follow the traditional direction.
In cases of trigamy and polygamy, they established the same proportional rule as for digamy: one year for digamy (though some authorities say two years); for trigamy, people are separated for three and often four years. But this is no longer called marriage at all—instead it is called polygamy, or rather, limited fornication. This is why the Lord said to the Samaritan woman who had five husbands, "He whom you now have is not your husband." He does not consider those who have gone beyond the limits of a second marriage as worthy of the title of husband or wife. In cases of trigamy, we have accepted a period of exclusion of five years, not based on the canons but following the practice of our predecessors. Such offenders should not be completely prohibited from the privileges of the Church. They should be considered worthy of hearing after two or three years, and afterward should be permitted to stand in their place. However, they must be kept from the communion of the good gift, and only restored to the place of communion after they have shown some fruit of repentance.
IV. In the case of trigamy and polygamy they laid down the same rule, in proportion, as in the case of digamy; namely one year for digamy (some authorities say two years); for trigamy men are separated for three and often for four years; but this is no longer described as marriage at all, but as polygamy; nay rather as limited fornication. It is for this reason that the Lord said to the woman of Samaria, who had five husbands, he whom thou now hast is not your husband. He does not reckon those who had exceeded the limits of a second marriage as worthy of the title of husband or wife. In cases of trigamy we have accepted a seclusion of five years, not by the canons, but following the precept of our predecessors. Such offenders ought not to be altogether prohibited from the privileges of the Church; they should be considered deserving of hearing after two or three years, and afterwards of being permitted to stand in their place; but they must be kept from the communion of the good gift, and only restored to the place of communion after showing some fruit of repentance.
V. Heretics who repent at the point of death should be received, but not indiscriminately. They should be received only after being tested to show genuine repentance and producing fruit that demonstrates their earnest desire for salvation.
V. Heretics repenting at death ought to be received; yet to be received, of course, not indiscriminately, but on trial of exhibition of true repentance and of producing fruit in evidence of their zeal for salvation.
VI. Sexual immorality by those in canonical orders is not to be considered as marriage, and their union must be completely dissolved, for this is both beneficial for the security of the Church and will prevent the heretics from having grounds to attack us, as though we were attracting men to join us by offering freedom to sin.
VI. The fornication of canonical persons is not to be reckoned as wedlock, and their union is to be completely dissolved, for this is both profitable for the security of the Church and will prevent the heretics from having a ground of attack against us, as though we induced men to join us by the attraction of liberty to sin.
VII. Those who abuse themselves with mankind and with beasts, as well as murderers, wizards, adulterers, and idolaters, deserve the same punishment. Whatever rule you apply to the others, apply also to them. However, there can be no doubt that we ought to receive those who have repented of impurity committed in ignorance for thirty years. In this case there is ground for forgiveness because of their ignorance, their voluntary confession, and the long period of time. Perhaps they have been delivered to Satan for a whole generation of humanity so that they may learn not to behave indecently. Therefore, order them to be received without delay, especially if they shed tears to move your mercy and demonstrate a manner of living worthy of compassion.
VII. Abusers of themselves with mankind, and with beasts, as also murderers, wizards, adulterers, and idolaters, are deserving of the same punishment. Whatever rule you have in the case of the rest, observe also in their case. There can, however, be no doubt that we ought to receive those who have repented of impurity committed in ignorance for thirty years. In this case there is ground for forgiveness in ignorance, in the spontaneity of confession, and the long extent of time. Perhaps they have been delivered to Satan for a whole age of man that they may learn not to behave unseemly; wherefore order them to be received without delay, specially if they shed tears to move your mercy, and show a manner of living worthy of compassion.
VIII. The man who in a rage has taken up a hatchet against his own wife is a murderer. But it is what I should have expected from your intelligence that you should very properly remind me to speak more fully on these points, because a wide distinction must be drawn between cases where there is intent and where there is not. A case of an act that is purely unintentional and far removed from the purpose of the person acting is that of a man who throws a stone at a dog or a tree and hits a person instead. The object was to drive off the animal or to shake down the fruit. The person who happens to be passing falls by chance into the path of the blow, and the act is unintentional. Unintentional too is the act of anyone who strikes another with a strap or a flexible stick for the purpose of disciplining him, and the man being beaten dies. In this case it must be taken into consideration that the object was not to kill but to correct the offender. Further, among unintentional acts must be counted the case of a man in a fight who, while warding off an enemy's attack with a club or his hand, hits him without mercy in some vital part so as to injure him, though not quite to kill him. This, however, comes very near to the intentional, for the man who uses such a weapon in self-defense or who strikes without mercy evidently does not spare his opponent because he is mastered by passion. In the same way, the case of anyone who uses a heavy club or a stone too large for a man to withstand is counted among the unintentional, because he does not do what he intended: in his rage he deals such a blow as to kill his victim, yet all he had in mind was to give him a beating, not to kill him. If, however, a man uses a sword or anything of that kind, he has no excuse—certainly none if he throws his hatchet. For he does not strike with his hand so that the force of the blow may be within his own control, but throws it, so that from the weight and edge of the iron and the force of the throw, the wound cannot fail to be fatal.
VIII. The man who in a rage has taken up a hatchet against his own wife is a murderer. But it is what I should have expected from your intelligence that you should very properly remind me to speak on these points more fully, because a wide distinction must be drawn between cases where there is and where there is not intent. A case of an act purely unintentional, and widely removed from the purpose of the agent, is that of a man who throws a stone at a dog or a tree, and hits a man. The object was to drive off the beast or to shake down the fruit. The chance comer falls fortuitously in the way of the blow, and the act is unintentional. Unintentional too is the act of any one who strikes another with a strap or a flexible stick, for the purpose of chastising him, and the man who is being beaten dies. In this case it must be taken into consideration that the object was not to kill, but to improve, the offender. Further, among unintentional acts must be reckoned the case of a man in a fight who when warding off an enemy's attack with cudgel or hand, hits him without mercy in some vital part, so as to injure him, though not quite to kill him. This, however, comes very near to the intentional; for the man who employs such a weapon in self defense, or who strikes without mercy, evidently does not spare his opponent, because he is mastered by passion. In like manner the case of any one who uses a heavy cudgel, or a stone too big for a man to stand, is reckoned among the unintentional, because he does not do what he meant: in his rage he deals such a blow as to kill his victim, yet all he had in his mind was to give him a thrashing, not to do him to death. If, however, a man uses a sword, or anything of the kind, he has no excuse: certainly none if he throws his hatchet. For he does not strike with the hand, so that the force of the blow may be within his own control, but throws, so that from the weight and edge of the iron, and the force of the throw, the wound cannot fail to be fatal.
On the other hand, acts committed during war or robbery are clearly intentional and leave no room for doubt. Robbers kill out of greed and to avoid being caught. Soldiers who kill in war do so with the clear purpose not of fighting or disciplining, but of killing their enemies. And if someone has prepared a magic potion for some other purpose and then causes death, I consider this intentional. Women often try to attract men to love them through spells and magic charms, and give them drugs that dull their minds. Such women, when they cause death, even though the outcome may not be what they intended, are nevertheless to be counted as intentional killers because their actions involve magic and are forbidden. Women who give drugs to cause abortion, as well as those who take poisons to destroy unborn children, are also murderers. That is all I will say on this matter.
On the other hand acts done in the attacks of war or robbery are distinctly intentional, and admit of no doubt. Robbers kill for greed, and to avoid conviction. Soldiers who inflict death in war do so with the obvious purpose not of fighting, nor chastising, but of killing their opponents. And if any one has concocted some magic philtre for some other reason, and then causes death, I count this as intentional. Women frequently endeavour to draw men to love them by incantations and magic knots, and give them drugs which dull their intelligence. Such women, when they cause death, though the result of their action may not be what they intended, are nevertheless, on account of their proceedings being magical and prohibited, to be reckoned among intentional homicides. Women also who administer drugs to cause abortion, as well as those who take poisons to destroy unborn children, are murderesses. So much on this subject.
The Lord's ruling that it is unlawful to separate from marriage except for fornication applies, logically speaking, to both men and women equally. However, the actual practice does not work this way. Yet when it comes to women, very strict statements can be found, such as the apostle's words: "He which is joined to a harlot is one body," and Jeremiah's: "If a wife become another man's shall he return unto her again? Shall not that land be greatly polluted?" And again, "He that has an adulteress is a fool and impious." Nevertheless, the customary practice allows men who commit adultery and engage in fornication to be kept by their wives. Therefore I do not know whether the woman who lives with a man who has been dismissed can properly be called an adulteress. The blame in this case falls on the woman who has sent away her husband, and depends on the reason why she left the marriage. If she is being beaten and refuses to endure it, it would be better for her to bear it than to separate from her husband. If she objects to financial loss, even this would not be adequate grounds. If her reason is that he is living in fornication, we do not find support for this in the church's practice. Rather, a wife is commanded not to leave an unbelieving husband but to remain with him, because of the uncertain outcome. "For what do you know, O wife, whether you shall save your husband?" In this case, then, the wife is an adulteress if she leaves her husband and goes to another man. But the man who has been abandoned is excusable, and the woman who lives with such a man is not condemned. However, if the man who has deserted his wife goes to another woman, he himself is an adulterer because he causes her to commit adultery, and the woman who lives with him is an adulteress because she has made another woman's husband come to her.
IX. The sentence of the Lord that it is unlawful to withdraw from wedlock, save on account of fornication, Matthew 5:32 applies, according to the argument, to men and women alike. Custom, however, does not so obtain. Yet, in relation with women, very strict expressions are to be found; as, for instance, the words of the apostle He which is joined to a harlot is one body 1 Corinthians 6:16 and of Jeremiah, If a wife become another man's shall he return unto her again? Shall not that land be greatly polluted? Jeremiah 3:1 And again, He that has an adulteress is a fool and impious. Yet custom ordains that men who commit adultery and are in fornication be retained by their wives. Consequently I do not know if the woman who lives with the man who has been dismissed can properly be called an adulteress; the charge in this case attaches to the woman who has put away her husband, and depends upon the cause for which she withdrew from wedlock. In the case of her being beaten, and refusing to submit, it would be better for her to endure than to be separated from her husband; in the case of her objecting to pecuniary loss, even here she would not have sufficient ground. If her reason is his living in fornication we do not find this in the custom of the church; but from an unbelieving husband a wife is commanded not to depart, but to remain, on account of the uncertainty of the issue. For what do you know, O wife, whether you shall save your husband? 1 Corinthians 7:16 Here then the wife, if she leaves her husband and goes to another, is an adulteress. But the man who has been abandoned is pardonable, and the woman who lives with such a man is not condemned. But if the man who has deserted his wife goes to another, he is himself an adulterer because he makes her commit adultery; and the woman who lives with him is an adulteress, because she has caused another woman's husband to come over to her.
Those who swear they will not receive ordination and decline orders upon oath must not be driven to perjure themselves, although there does appear to be a canon making allowances for such people. Yet I have found by experience that perjurers never turn out well. We must, however, take into account the form of the oath, its terms, the state of mind in which it was taken, and even the smallest additions made to the terms, since if no grounds for relief can be found anywhere, such persons must be dismissed. The case of Severus, however—I mean the presbyter he ordained—does seem to me to allow for relief of this kind, if you will permit it. Give instructions for the district placed under Mestia, to which the man was appointed, to be reckoned under Vasoda. In this way he will not forswear himself by not departing from the place, and Longinus, having Cyriacus with him, will not leave the Church without provision, nor will he himself be guilty of neglecting his work. Moreover, I will not be held guilty of acting in violation of any canons by making a concession to Cyriacus, who had sworn that he would remain at Mindana and yet accepted the transfer. His return will be in accordance with his oath, and his obedience to the arrangement will not be counted against him as perjury, because it was not added to his oath that he would not go, even for a short time, from Mindana, but that he would remain there in the future. Severus, who pleads forgetfulness, I shall pardon, only telling him that the One who knows what is secret will not overlook the ravaging of His Church by a man of such character—a man who originally appoints uncanonically, then imposes oaths in violation of the Gospel, then tells a man to perjure himself regarding his transfer, and finally lies in pretended forgetfulness. I am no judge of hearts; I only judge by what I hear. Let us leave vengeance to the Lord, and ourselves pardon the common human error of forgetfulness, and receive the man without question.
X. Those who swear that they will not receive ordination, declining orders upon oath, must not be driven to perjure themselves, although there does seem to be a canon making concessions to such persons. Yet I have found by experience that perjurers never turn out well. Account must however be taken of the form of the oath, its terms, the frame of mind in which it was taken, and the minutest additions made to the terms, since, if no ground of relief can anywhere be found, such persons must be dismissed. The case, however, of Severus, I mean of the presbyter ordained by him, does seem to me to allow of relief of this kind, if you will permit it. Give directions for the district placed under Mestia, to which the man was appointed, to be reckoned under Vasoda. Thus he will not forswear himself by not departing from the place, and Longinus, having Cyriacus with him, will not leave the Church unprovided for, nor himself be guilty of neglect of work. I moreover shall not be held guilty of taking action in contravention of any canons by making a concession to Cyriacus who had sworn that he would remain at Mindana and yet accepted the transfer. His return will be in accordance with his oath, and his obedience to the arrangement will not be reckoned against him as perjury, because it was not added to his oath that he would not go, even a short time, from Mindana, but would remain there for the future. Severus, who pleads forgetfulness, I shall pardon, only telling him that One who knows what is secret will not overlook the ravaging of His Church by a man of such a character; a man who originally appoints uncanonically, then imposes oaths in violation of the Gospel, then tells a man to perjure himself in the matter of his transfer, and last of all lies in pretended forgetfulness. I am no judge of hearts; I only judge by what I hear; let us leave vengeance to the Lord, and ourselves pardon the common human error of forgetfulness, and receive the man without question.
XI. A person guilty of unintentional homicide has given sufficient satisfaction in eleven years. We will certainly observe what Moses laid down in cases of wounded men, and we will not consider a murder to have been committed if the person who was struck lies down but then walks again leaning on his staff (Exodus 21:19). However, if he does not get up again after being struck, even though there was no intent to kill, the one who struck him is a homicide, but an unintentional homicide.
XI. The man who is guilty of unintentional homicide has given sufficient satisfaction in eleven years. We shall, without doubt, observe what is laid down by Moses in the case of wounded men, and shall not hold a murder to have been committed in the case of a man who lies down after he has been struck, and walks again leaning on his staff. Exodus 21:19 If, however, he does not rise again after he has been struck, nevertheless, from there being no intent to kill, the striker is a homicide, but an unintentional homicide.
XII. The canon absolutely excludes digamists from the ministry.
XII. The canon absolutely excludes digamists from the ministry.
XIII. Our Fathers do not count killing in war as homicide; I assume this is because they wanted to make an allowance for men fighting to defend chastity and true religion. However, it may be good to advise that those whose hands are not clean should abstain from communion for three years only.
XIII. Homicide in war is not reckoned by our Fathers as homicide; I presume from their wish to make concession to men fighting on behalf of chastity and true religion. Perhaps, however, it is well to counsel that those whose hands are not clean only abstain from communion for three years.
XIV. A person who has taken interest on loans, if he agrees to spend his unjust profits on the poor and to rid himself in the future of the plague of covetousness, may be received into the ministry.
XIV. A taker of usury, if he consent to spend his unjust gain on the poor, and to be rid for the future of the plague of covetousness, may be received into the ministry.
XV. I am surprised that you demand such precision from Scripture and argue that there is something forced about how the translation expresses the meaning of the original without rendering exactly what the Hebrew word conveys. Yet I must not carelessly ignore a question raised by an inquiring mind. At the creation of the world, birds of the air and fish of the sea had the same origin, for both kinds came from the water. The reason is that both share the same characteristics. Fish swim in the water, birds in the air. Therefore they are mentioned together. This form of expression is not used without distinction, but is used very appropriately for all that lives in the water. Birds of the air and fish of the sea are subject to man, and not only these, but also everything that passes through the paths of the sea. For not every water creature is a fish—for instance, sea monsters, whales, sharks, dolphins, seals, and even sea-horses, sea-dogs, sawfish, swordfish, and sea-cows; and if you like, jellyfish, cockles, and all hard-shelled creatures, none of which are fish, yet all pass through the paths of the sea. So there are three kinds: birds of the air, fish of the sea, and all water creatures that are distinct from fish and pass through the paths of the sea.
XV. I am astonished at your requiring exactitude in Scripture, and arguing that there is something forced in the diction of the interpretation which gives the meaning of the original, but does not exactly render what is meant by the Hebrew word. Yet I must not carelessly pass by the question started by an enquiring mind. At the creation of the world, birds of the air and the fishes of the sea had the same origin; for both kinds were produced from the water. The reason is that both have the same characteristics. The latter swim in the water, the former in the air. They are therefore mentioned together. The form of expression is not used without distinction, but of all that lives in the water it is used very properly. The birds of the air and the fishes of the sea are subject to man; and not they alone, but all that passes through the paths of the sea. For every water-creature is not a fish, as for instance the sea monsters, whales, sharks, dolphins, seals, even sea-horses, sea-dogs, saw-fish, sword-fish, and sea-cows; and, if you like, sea nettles, cockles and all hard-shelled creatures of whom none are fish, and all pass through the paths of the sea; so that there are three kinds, birds of the air, fishes of the sea, and all water-creatures which are distinct from fish, and pass through the paths of the sea.
XVI. Naaman was not a great man with the Lord, but with his lord—that is, he was one of the chief princes of the King of the Syrians (2 Kings 5:1). Read your Bible carefully, and you will find the answer to your question there.
XVI. Naaman was not a great man with the Lord, but with his lord; that is, he was one of the chief princes of the King of the Syrians. 2 Kings 5:1 Read your Bible carefully, and you will find the answer to your question there.