Against Eunomius — Book IV

It is perhaps time to examine in our discussion his ridiculous philosophical account of the nature of the product of generation. He says the following (I will repeat his beautifully composed argument against the truth word for word): Who is so indifferent and inattentive to the nature of things as not to know that among all earthly bodies in their generating and being generated, in their activity and passivity, those which generate are found upon examination to communicate their own ousia, and those which are generated naturally receive the same, since the material cause and the external supply that flows in are common to both? And the things begotten are generated through passion, and those which beget naturally have an action that is not pure, because their nature is linked with passions of all kinds. Notice the appropriate style in which he discusses in his speculation the pre-temporal generation of the Word of God who was in the beginning. He examines closely the nature of things, earthly bodies, material causes, passion in things generating and generated, and all the rest—things at which any person of understanding would blush, even if they were said about ourselves, if it were our nature, which is subject to passion, that is thus exposed to scorn by his words. Yet this is our author's brilliant investigation into nature regarding the Only-begotten God. However, let us set aside complaints (for what will sighing accomplish in helping us overthrow our enemy's malice?) and make known as clearly as we can the meaning of what we have quoted—concerning what kind of product this speculation was proposed: that which exists according to the flesh, or that which is to be contemplated in the Only-begotten God.

It is, perhaps, time to examine in our discourse that account of the nature of the product of generation which is the subject of his ridiculous philosophizing. He says, then (I will repeat word for word his beautifully composed argument against the truth):– Who is so indifferent and inattentive to the nature of things as not to know, that of all bodies which are on earth, in their generating and being generated, in their activity and passivity, those which generate are found on examination to communicate their own essence, and those which are generated naturally receive the same, inasmuch as the material cause and the supply which flows in from without are common to both; and the things begotten are generated by passion, and those which beget, naturally have an action which is not pure, by reason of their nature being linked with passions of all kinds? See in what fitting style he discusses in his speculation the pre-temporal generation of the Word of God that was in the beginning! He who closely examines the nature of things, bodies on the earth, and material causes, and passion of things generating and generated, and all the rest of it — at which any man of understanding would blush, even were it said of ourselves, if it were our nature, subject as it is to passion, which is thus exposed to scorn by his words. Yet such is our author's brilliant enquiry into nature with regard to the Only-begotten God. Let us lay aside complaints, however, (for what will sighing do to help us to overthrow the malice of our enemy?) and make generally known, as best we may, the sense of what we have quoted — concerning what sort of product the speculation was proposed — that which exists according to the flesh, or that which is to be contemplated in the Only-begotten God.

Since there are two areas of study—one concerning the divine, simple, and immaterial life, and another concerning material existence that is subject to passion—and since the word "generation" is used for both, we must make our distinction sharp and clear to prevent the ambiguity of the term "generation" from distorting the truth in any way. Because entrance into being through the flesh is material and involves passion, while what is bodiless, intangible, formless, and free from any material mixture is completely alien to every condition that involves passion, we should consider what kind of generation we are investigating—the pure and divine kind, or the kind subject to passion and impurity. Now, I suppose no one would deny that when it comes to the Only-begotten God, what Eunomius is discussing is pre-temporal existence. Why, then, does he dwell on this account of bodily nature, defiling our nature with the disgusting presentation of his argument and openly describing the passions involved in human generation, while he abandons the actual topic before him? We did not need to learn about this animal generation that happens through the flesh. Who is foolish enough, when looking at himself and considering human nature in himself, to need someone else to explain his own nature and to be told about all the inevitable passions involved in the concept of bodily generation—that the one who begets is affected in one way and what is begotten in another—so that a person would learn from this teaching that he himself begets through passion and that passion was the beginning of his own generation? It makes no difference whether these things are passed over in silence or spoken about, whether someone discusses these private matters at length or keeps hidden in silence things that should remain unspoken—we already know that our nature proceeds by way of passion. But what we are looking for is a clear account of the exalted and unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, by which He is believed to be of the Father.

As the speculation is two-fold, concerning that life which is Divine, simple, and immaterial, and concerning that existence which is material and subject to passion, and as the word generation is used of both, we must needs make our distinction sharp and clear, lest the ambiguity of the term generation should in any way pervert the truth. Since, then, the entrance into being through the flesh is material, and is promoted by passion, while that which is bodiless, impalpable, without form, and free from any material commixture, is alien from every condition that admits of passion, it is proper to consider about what sort of generation we are enquiring — that which is pure and Divine, or that which is subject to passion and pollution. Now, no one, I suppose, would deny that with regard to the Only-begotten God, it is pre-temporal existence that is proposed for the consideration of Eunomius' discourse. Why, then, does he linger over this account of corporeal nature, defiling our nature by the loathsome presentment of his argument, and setting forth openly the passions that gather round human generation, while he deserts the subject set before him? For it was not about this animal generation, that is accomplished by means of the flesh, that we had any need to learn. Who is so foolish, when he looks on himself, and considers human nature in himself, as to seek another interpreter of his own nature, and to need to be told all the unavoidable passions which are included in the thought of bodily generation — that he who begets is affected in one way, that which is begotten in another — so that the man should learn from this instruction that he himself begets by means of passion, and that passion was the beginning of his own generation? For it is all the same whether these things are passed over or spoken, and whether one publishes these secrets at length, or keeps hidden in silence things that should be left unsaid, we are not ignorant of the fact that our nature progresses by way of passion. But what we are seeking is that a clear account should be given of the exalted and unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, whereby He is believed to be of the Father.

Now, while this is the question set before him, our new theologian fills his discourse with flowing, passion, material cause, some action that is not free from pollution, and all other phrases of this kind. I do not know what influences someone who claims, in his superior wisdom, that nothing incomprehensible remains beyond his own knowledge, and who promises to explain the unspeakable generation of the Son, yet leaves aside the question before him and plunges like an eel into the slimy mud of his arguments. He acts like that Nicodemus who came by night, who, when our Lord was teaching him about birth from above, rushed in thought to the hollow of the womb and raised a doubt about how one could enter a second time into the womb, asking "How can these things be?" He thought he would prove the spiritual birth impossible by the fact that an old man could not again be born within his mother's body. But the Lord corrects his mistaken idea, saying that the properties of the flesh and the spirit are distinct. Let Eunomius also, if he will, correct himself by similar reflection. For someone who considers the truth ought, I think, to contemplate his subject according to its own properties, not to slander the immaterial by making charges based on material things. For if a man, or a bull, or any other of those things which are generated by the flesh, is not free from passion in generating or being generated, what does this have to do with that nature (physis) which is without passion and without corruption? The fact that we are mortal is no objection to the immortality of the Only-begotten, nor does human tendency toward vice cast doubt on the immutability found in the Divine nature (physis), nor is any other of our proper attributes transferred to God. Rather, the peculiar nature of the human and the Divine life is separated and has no common ground, and their distinguishing properties stand entirely apart, so that those of the latter are not found in the former, nor, conversely, those of the former in the latter.

Now, while this is the enquiry set before him, our new theologian enriches his discourse with flowing, and passion, and material cause, and some action which is not pure from pollution, and all other phrases of this kind. I know not under what influence it is that he who says, in the superiority of his wisdom, that nothing incomprehensible is left beyond his own knowledge, and promises to explain the unspeakable generation of the Son, leaves the question before him, and plunges like an eel into the slimy mud of his arguments, after the fashion of that Nicodemus who came by night, who, when our Lord was teaching him of the birth from above, rushed in thought to the hollow of the womb, and raised a doubt how one could enter a second time into the womb, with the words, How can these things be? thinking that he would prove the spiritual birth impossible, by the fact that an old man could not again be born within his mother's bowels. But the Lord corrects his erroneous idea, saying that the properties of the flesh and the spirit are distinct. Let Eunomius also, if he will, correct himself by the like reflection. For he who ponders on the truth ought, I imagine, to contemplate his subject according to its own properties, not to slander the immaterial by a charge against things material. For if a man, or a bull, or any other of those things which are generated by the flesh, is not free from passion in generating or being generated, what has this to do with that Nature which is without passion and without corruption? The fact that we are mortal is no objection to the immortality of the Only-begotten, nor does men's propensity to vice render doubtful the immutability that is found in the Divine Nature, nor is any other of our proper attributes transferred to God; but the peculiar nature of the human and the Divine life is separated, and without common ground, and their distinguishing properties stand entirely apart, so that those of the latter are not apprehended in the former, nor, conversely, those of the former in the latter.

Why is it, then, that Eunomius, when the Divine generation is the subject of discussion, abandons his topic and speaks at length about earthly things, when we have no disagreement with him on those matters? Clearly our craftsman's goal is obvious—through his slanderous suggestion of passion, he wants to raise an objection to the Lord's generation. I'll set aside the blasphemous nature of his position and instead marvel at the man's cleverness—how mindful he is of his own zealous project. Having established through his earlier statements the theory that the Son must be, and must be called, a product of generation, he now argues that we should not think of Him in terms of generation. For if all generation, as this author claims, necessarily involves passion, then we are absolutely forced to admit that what is free from passion is also alien to generation. If these things—passion and generation—are considered inseparable, then He who has no share in one would have no participation in the other either. How then does he call Him a product because of His generation, when he tries to show through his current arguments that He was not generated? And why does he attack our teacher, who advises us in matters of Divine doctrine not to be presumptuous in making up names, but to confess that He is generated without transforming this concept into a formal name, so as to call Him who is generated a product of generation, since this term is properly applied in Scripture to inanimate things or to those mentioned as a figure of wickedness? When we speak about the propriety of avoiding the term "product," he prepares his invincible rhetoric for action and also employs his tedious grammatical terminology, and through his skillful misuse of names, or equivocation, or whatever one should properly call his methods—by these means, I say, he brings his syllogisms to their conclusion, not refusing to call Him who is begotten by the name "product of generation." Then, as soon as we accept the term and proceed to examine the concept involved in the name, on the theory that it vindicates the community of ousia (essence), he retracts his own words again and argues that the product of generation is not generated, raising an objection through his foul account of bodily generation against the pure and Divine and passionless generation of the Son, on the grounds that these two things—the true relationship to the Father and exemption of His nature from passion—cannot be found together in God. He claims that if there is no passion, there is no generation, and that if one acknowledges the true relationship, he would thereby, in admitting generation, necessarily admit passion as well.

How comes it, therefore, that Eunomius, when the Divine generation is the subject for discourse, leaves his subject, and discusses at length the things of earth, when on this matter we have no dispute with him? Surely our craftsman's aim is clear — that by the slanderous insinuation of passion he may raise an objection to the generation of the Lord. And here I pass by the blasphemous nature of his view, and admire the man for his acuteness — how mindful he is of his own zealous endeavour, who, having by his previous statements established the theory that the Son must be, and must be called, a product of generation, now contends for the view that we ought not to entertain regarding Him the conception of generation. For, if all generation, as this author imagines, has linked with it the condition of passion, we are hereby absolutely compelled to admit that what is foreign to passion is alien also from generation: for if these things, passion and generation, are considered as conjoined, He that has no share in the one would not have any participation in the other. How then does he call Him a product by reason of His generation, of Whom he tries to show by the arguments he now uses, that He was not generated? And for what cause does he fight against our master, who counsels us in matters of Divine doctrine not to presume in name-making, but to confess that He is generated without transforming this conception into the formula of a name, so as to call Him Who is generated a product of generation, as this term is properly applied in Scripture to things inanimate, or to those which are mentioned as a figure of wickedness? When we speak of the propriety of avoiding the use of the term product, he prepares for action that invincible rhetoric of his, and takes also to support him his frigid grammatical phraseology, and by his skilful misuse of names, or equivocation, or whatever one may properly call his processes — by these means, I say, he brings his syllogisms to their conclusion, not refusing to call Him Who is begotten by the name of 'product of generation.' Then, as soon as we admit the term, and proceed to examine the conception involved in the name, on the theory that thereby is vindicated the community of essence, he again retracts his own words, and contends for the view that the product of generation is not generated, raising an objection by his foul account of bodily generation, against the pure and Divine and passionless generation of the Son, on the ground that it is not possible that the two things, the true relationship to the Father, and exemption of His nature from passion, should be found to coincide in God, but that, if there were no passion, there would be no generation, and that, if one should acknowledge the true relationship, he would thereby, in admitting generation, certainly admit passion also.

The great John doesn't speak this way, nor does that thunderous voice that proclaims the mystery of theology. He both names Christ the Son of God and cleanses his proclamation from every idea of passion. Look at how, right at the beginning of his Gospel, he prepares our ears. Notice the great care this teacher takes to ensure that none of his hearers should fall into base ideas about this subject by slipping through ignorance into any inappropriate conceptions. To lead untrained ears as far as possible from any notion of passion, he doesn't speak in his opening words of Son, or Father, or generation. He does this so that no one, upon hearing first of a Father, would rush to the obvious meaning of that word, or upon learning the proclamation of a Son would understand that name in the ordinary sense, or stumble, as at a stone of stumbling, at the word generation. Instead of the Father, he speaks of the Beginning. Instead of was begotten, he says was. Instead of the Son, he says the Word. He declares, In the Beginning was the Word. What passion, I ask, can be found in these words—beginning, was, and Word? Is the beginning a passion? Does was imply passion? Does the Word exist by means of passion? Or should we say that just as passion is not found in the terms used, neither is relationship expressed by the proclamation? Yet how could the Word's community of ousia, real relationship, and coeternity with the Beginning be more strongly shown by other words than by these? He doesn't say, Of the Beginning was begotten the Word, to avoid separating the Word from the Beginning by any conception of temporal extension. Instead, he proclaims together with the Beginning the One who was in the Beginning, making the word was common to both the Beginning and the Word, so that the Word doesn't come after the Beginning but, by entering together with the faith concerning the Beginning, forestalls our hearing through its proclamation before our hearing admits the Beginning itself in isolation. Then he declares, And the Word was with God. Once again the Evangelist fears for our untrained state, once again he dreads our childish and untaught condition. He doesn't yet entrust to our ears the name Father, lest any of the more carnally minded, learning of the Father, might be led by their understanding to imagine a mother as well. Neither does he yet name the Son in his proclamation, for he still suspects our habitual tendency toward lower understanding and fears that anyone hearing of the Son might humanize the Godhead through an idea of passion. For this reason, resuming his proclamation, he again calls him the Word, making this the explanation of his physis for you in your unbelief. Just as your word proceeds from your mind without requiring the intervention of passion, so here too, in hearing of the Word, you shall conceive that which is from something without conceiving passion. Therefore, resuming his proclamation once more, he says, And the Word was with God. How he makes the Word commensurate with God! Rather, how he extends the infinite in comparison with the infinite! The Word was with God—the whole being of the Word, certainly, with the whole being of God. Therefore, as great as God is, so great, clearly, is the Word also who is with him. So if God is limited, then the Word also will surely be subject to limitation. But if the infinity of God exceeds limit, neither is the Word who is contemplated with him comprehended by limits and measures. No one would deny that the Word is contemplated together with the entire Godhead of the Father, so that one part of the Godhead should not appear to be in the Word while another is without the Word. Once more the spiritual voice of John speaks, once more the Evangelist in his proclamation takes tender care for the hearing of those who are in childhood. We have not yet grown so much through hearing his first words as to hear of the Son and remain firm without being moved from our footing by the influence of the usual sense. Therefore our herald, crying aloud once more, still proclaims in his third utterance the Word and not the Son, saying, And the Word was God. First he declared where he was, then with whom he was, and now he says what he is, completing through his third repetition the object of his proclamation. He says, It is no Word of those that are readily understood that I declare to you, but God under the designation of the Word. For this Word who was in the Beginning and was with God was not anything else besides God, but was also himself God. And immediately the herald, reaching the full height of his lofty speech, declares that this God whom his proclamation sets forth is he through whom all things were made, and is life, and the light of men, and the true light that shines in darkness yet is not obscured by the darkness, dwelling with his own yet not received by his own, and being made flesh and dwelling, by means of the flesh, in human physis. After he has first gone through this number and variety of statements, he then names the Father and the Only-begotten, when there can be no danger that what has been purified by so many precautions should be allowed, because of the meaning of the word Father, to sink down to any meaning tainted with pollution. For, he says, we beheld his glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father.

Not thus speaks the sublime John, not thus that voice of thunder which proclaims the mystery of the Theology, who both names Him Son of God and purges his proclamation from every idea of passion. For behold how in the very beginning of his Gospel he prepares our ears, how great forethought is shown by the teacher that none of his hearers should fall into low ideas on the subject, slipping by ignorance into any incongruous conceptions. For in order to lead the untrained hearing as far away as possible from passion, he does not speak in his opening words of Son, or Father, or generation, that no one should either, on hearing first of all of a Father, be hurried on to the obvious signification of the word, or, on learning the proclamation of a Son, should understand that name in the ordinary sense, or stumble, as at a stone of stumbling 1 Peter 2:8, at the word generation; but instead of the Father, he speaks of the Beginning: instead of was begotten, he says was: and instead of the Son, he says the Word: and declares In the Beginning was the Word. What passion, pray, is to be found in these words, beginning, and was, and Word? Is the beginning passion? Does was imply passion? Does the Word exist by means of passion? Or are we to say, that as passion is not to be found in the terms used, so neither is affinity expressed by the proclamation? Yet how could the Word's community of essence, and real relationship, and coeternity with the Beginning, be more strongly shown by other words than by these? For he does not say, Of the Beginning was begotten the Word, that he may not separate the Word from the Beginning by any conception of extension in time, but he proclaims together with the Beginning Him also Who was in the Beginning, making the word was common to the Beginning and to the Word, that the Word may not linger after the Beginning, but may, by entering in together with the faith as to the Beginning, by its proclamation forestall our hearing, before this admits the Beginning itself in isolation. Then he declares, And the Word was with God. Once more the Evangelist fears for our untrained state, once more he dreads our childish and untaught condition: he does not yet entrust to our ears the appellation of Father, lest any of the more carnally minded, learning of the Father, may be led by his understanding to imagine also by consequence a mother. Neither does he yet name in his proclamation the Son; for he still suspects our customary tendency to the lower nature, and fears lest any, hearing of the Son, should humanize the Godhead by an idea of passion. For this reason, resuming his proclamation, he again calls him the Word, making this the account of His nature to you in your unbelief. For as your word proceeds from your mind, without requiring the intervention of passion, so here also, in hearing of the Word, you shall conceive that which is from something, and shall not conceive passion. Hence, once more resuming his proclamation, he says, And the Word was with God. O, how does he make the Word commensurate with God! rather, how does he extend the infinite in comparison with the infinite! The Word was with God — the whole being of the Word, assuredly, with the whole being of God. Therefore, as great as God is, so great, clearly, is the Word also that is with Him; so that if God is limited, then will the Word also, surely, be subject to limitation. But if the infinity of God exceeds limit, neither is the Word that is contemplated with Him comprehended by limits and measures. For no one would deny that the Word is contemplated together with the entire Godhead of the Father, so that he should make one part of the Godhead appear to be in the Word, and another destitute of the Word. Once more the spiritual voice of John speaks, once more the Evangelist in his proclamation takes tender care for the hearing of those who are in childhood: not yet have we so much grown by the hearing of his first words as to hear of the Son, and yet remain firm without being moved from our footing by the influence of the wonted sense. Therefore our herald, crying once more aloud, still proclaims in his third utterance the Word, and not the Son, saying, And the Word was God. First he declared wherein He was, then with whom He was, and now he says what He is, completing, by his third repetition, the object of his proclamation. For he says, It is no Word of those that are readily understood, that I declare to you, but God under the designation of the Word. For this Word, that was in the Beginning, and was with God, was not anything else besides God, but was also Himself God. And immediately the herald, reaching the full height of his lofty speech, declares that this God Whom his proclamation sets forth is He by Whom all things were made, and is life, and the light of men, and the true light that shines in darkness, yet is not obscured by the darkness, sojourning with His own, yet not received by His own: and being made flesh, and tabernacling, by means of the flesh, in man's nature. And when he has first gone through this number and variety of statements, he then names the Father and the Only-begotten, when there can be no danger that what has been purified by so many precautions should be allowed, in consequence of the sense of the word Father, to sink down to any meaning tainted with pollution, for, we beheld His glory, he says, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father.

Repeat, then, Eunomius, repeat this clever objection of yours to the Evangelist: How do you use the name 'Father' in your teaching, how that of Only-begotten, seeing that all bodily generation involves passion? Truth surely answers you on his behalf, that the mystery of theology is one thing, and the study of unstable bodies is another. A wide gap separates them from one another. Why do you join together in your argument things that cannot be combined? How do you defile the purity of the Divine generation with your foul language? How do you construct systems for the incorporeal using passions that affect the body? Stop drawing your account of the nature of things above from those that are below. I proclaim the Lord as the Son of God, because the gospel from heaven, given through the bright cloud, proclaimed Him this way; for "This," He says, "is My beloved Son." Yet, though I was taught that He is the Son, I was not dragged down by the name to the earthly meaning of Son, but I both know that He is from the Father and do not know that He is from passion. And this, moreover, I will add to what has been said: that I know even a bodily generation which is pure from passion, so that even on this point Eunomius' study of bodily generation is proved false, if, that is to say, a bodily birth can be found which does not admit passion. Tell me, was the Word made flesh, or not? You would not, I presume, say that It was not. It was so made, then, and no one denies it. How then was it that God was manifested in the flesh? By birth, of course you will say. But what sort of birth do you speak of? Surely it is clear that you speak of that from the virginity, and that what was conceived in her was of the Holy Spirit, and that the days were accomplished that she should be delivered, and she brought forth, and nonetheless her purity was preserved in her child-bearing. You believe, then, that the birth which took place from a woman was pure from passion, if you do believe, but you refuse to admit the Divine and incorruptible generation from the Father, so you may avoid the idea of passion in generation. But I know well that it is not passion he seeks to avoid in his doctrine, for he does not discern that at all in the Divine and incorruptible physis; but in order that the Maker of all creation may be counted as part of creation, he builds up these arguments to deny the Only-begotten God, and uses his pretended caution about passion to help him in his task.

Repeat, then, Eunomius, repeat this clever objection of yours to the Evangelist: How do you give the name of 'Father' in your discourse, how that of Only-begotten, seeing that all bodily generation is operated by passion? Surely truth answers you on his behalf, that the mystery of theology is one thing, and the physiology of unstable bodies is another. Wide is the interval by which they are fenced off one from the other. Why do you join together in your argument what cannot blend? How do you defile the purity of the Divine generation by your foul discourse? How do you make systems for the incorporeal by the passions that affect the body? Cease to draw your account of the nature of things above from those that are below. I proclaim the Lord as the Son of God, because the gospel from heaven, given through the bright cloud, thus proclaimed Him; for This, He says, is My beloved Son Matthew 17:5. Yet, though I was taught that He is the Son, I was not dragged down by the name to the earthly significance of Son, but I both know that He is from the Father and do not know that He is from passion. And this, moreover, I will add to what has been said, that I know even a bodily generation which is pure from passion, so that even on this point Eunomius' physiology of bodily generation is proved false, if, that is to say, a bodily birth can be found which does not admit passion. Tell me, was the Word made flesh, or not? You would not, I presume, say that It was not. It was so made, then, and there is none who denies it. How then was it that God was manifested in the flesh? By birth, of course you will say. But what sort of birth do you speak of? Surely it is clear that you speak of that from the virginity, and that that which was conceived in her was of the Holy Ghost, and that the days were accomplished that she should be delivered, and she brought forth Luke 2:6-7, and none the less was her purity preserved in her child-bearing. You believe, then, that that birth which took place from a woman was pure from passion, if you do believe, but you refuse to admit the Divine and incorruptible generation from the Father, that you may avoid the idea of passion in generation. But I know well that it is not passion he seeks to avoid in his doctrine, for that he does not discern at all in the Divine and incorruptible nature; but to the end that the Maker of all creation may be accounted a part of creation, he builds up these arguments in order to a denial of the Only-begotten God, and uses his pretended caution about passion to help him in his task.

Eunomius makes this very clear through his argument against our position, where he says that the ousia of the Son came into being from the Father—not put forth by extension, not separated from its conjunction with the one who generated Him by flux or division, not perfected by growth, not transformed by change, but obtaining existence by the mere will of the Generator. What person with an open mind could fail to see from this statement that Eunomius is representing the Son as part of creation? What prevents us from saying exactly the same thing, word for word, about every single thing we observe in creation? Let us apply this definition to anything that exists in creation, and if it does not fit in the same way, we will admit that we have examined the definition carelessly rather than with the care that the truth deserves. So let us substitute the name of the Son and read through the definition word by word. We say that the ousia of the earth came into being from the Father, not separated by extension or division from its conjunction with the one who generated it, not perfected by growth, not put forth by change, but obtaining existence by the mere will of the one who generated it. Is there anything we have said that does not apply to the existence of the earth? I think no one would say so, for God did not put forth the earth by being extended, nor bring its ousia into existence by flowing or by dividing Himself from conjunction with Himself, nor did He bring it through gradual growth from smallness to full size, nor was He fashioned into the form of earth by undergoing mutation or alteration. Rather, His will alone was sufficient for the existence of all things that were made: He spoke and they were generated, so that even the name of generation applies to the existence of the earth. Now if these things can truly be said about the parts of the universe, what doubt remains about our opponents' doctrine? While they call Him Son in words, they represent Him as one of the things that came into existence by creation, distinguished from the rest only by being first in order. It is like saying about the trade of a smith that from it come all things made of iron, but that the tools of tongs and hammer, by which iron is fashioned for use, existed before the making of the rest. Yet while these tools came first, there is no difference in material between the tool that fashions and the iron that is shaped by the tool—for both are iron—but one form is earlier than the other. This is the theology of heresy concerning the Son: to imagine that there is no difference between the Lord Himself and the things made by Him except the difference in order.

And this he shows very plainly by his contention against our arguments, where he says that the essence of the Son came into being from the Father, not put forth by way of extension, not separated from its conjunction with Him that generated Him by flux or division, not perfected by way of growth, not transformed by way of change, but obtaining existence by the mere will of the Generator. Why, what man whose mental senses are not closed up is left in ignorance by this utterance that by these statements the Son is being represented by Eunomius as a part of the creation? What hinders us from saying all this word for word as it stands, about every single one of the things we contemplate in creation? Let us apply, if you will, the definition to any of the things that appear in creation, and if it does not admit the same sequence, we will condemn ourselves for having examined the definition slightingly, and not with the care that befits the truth. Let us exchange, then, the name of the Son, and so read the definition word by word. We say that the essence of the earth came into being from the Father, not separated by way of extension or division from its conjunction with Him Who generated it, nor perfected by way of growth, nor put forth by way of change, but obtaining existence by the mere will of Him Who generated it. Is there anything in what we have said that does not apply to the existence of the earth? I think no one would say so: for God did not put forth the earth by being extended, nor bring its essence into existence by flowing or by dissevering Himself from conjunction with Himself, nor did He bring it by means of gradual growth from being small to completeness of magnitude, nor was He fashioned into the form of earth by undergoing mutation or alteration, but His will sufficed Him for the existence of all things that were made: He spoke and they were generated, so that even the name of generation does not fail to accord with the existence of the earth. Now if these things may be truly said of the parts of the universe, what doubt is still left as to our adversaries' doctrine, that while, so far as words go, they call Him Son, they represent Him as being one of the things that came into existence by creation, set before the rest only in precedence of order? just as you might say about the trade of a smith, that from it come all things that are wrought out of iron; but that the instrument of the tongs and hammer, by which the iron is fashioned for use, existed before the making of the rest; yet, while this has precedence of the rest, there is not on that account any difference in respect of matter between the instrument that fashions and the iron that is shaped by the instrument, (for both one and the other are iron,) but the one form is earlier than the other. Such is the theology of heresy touching the Son — to imagine that there is no difference between the Lord Himself and the things that were made by Him, save the difference in respect of order.

Who among those counted as Christians in any way admits that the definition of the essence of the parts of the world and of the One who made the world is the same? I shudder at this blasphemy, knowing that where the definition of things is the same, their nature is not different either. Just as the definition of the essence of Peter and John and other men is common and their nature is one, in the same way, if the Lord were by nature like the parts of the world, they would have to acknowledge that He is also subject to whatever conditions they observe in those parts. Now the world does not last forever. Therefore, according to them, the Lord will also pass away along with heaven and earth, if as they say He is of the same kind as the world. But if He is confessed to be eternal, we must conclude that the world too shares in some way in the Divine nature, if, as they claim, it corresponds with the Only-begotten in the matter of creation. You can see where this clever line of reasoning leads the argument, like a stone broken off from a mountain ridge and rushing downhill by its own weight. Either the elements of the world must be Divine, according to the foolish belief of the Greeks, or the Son must not be worshipped. Let us think about it this way. We say that creation, both what is perceived by the mind and what can be perceived by the senses, came into being from nothing—they say this also about the Lord. We say that all things that have been made exist by the will of God—they tell us this also about the Only-begotten. We believe that neither the angelic creation nor the physical world is of the essence of the One who made it—and they make Him also alien from the essence of the Father. We confess that all things serve the One who made them—they also hold this view about the Only-begotten. Therefore, necessarily, whatever else they think about creation, they will also attribute all these characteristics to the Only-begotten. And whatever they believe about Him, they will also think about creation. So if they confess the Lord as God, they will also deify the rest of creation. On the other hand, if they define these things as having no share in the Divine nature, they will not reject the same idea concerning the Only-begotten either. Yet no sane person declares the creation to be Godhead. Then neither—I will not say the rest, lest I lend my tongue to the blasphemy of the enemy. Let those whose mouths are well trained in blasphemy say what follows from this. But their doctrine is clear even if they remain silent. One of two things must necessarily happen: either they will demote the Only-begotten God, so that for them He will no longer either be or be called God, or, if they assert Godhead of Him, they will equally assert it of all creation. Or—since this option still remains for them—they will avoid the impiety that appears on both sides and take refuge in orthodox teaching, and will surely agree with us that He is not created, so that they may confess Him to be truly God.

Who that is in any sense classed among Christians admits that the definition of the essence of the parts of the world, and of Him Who made the world, is the same? For my own part I shudder at the blasphemy, knowing that where the definition of things is the same neither is their nature different. For as the definition of the essence of Peter and John and other men is common and their nature is one, in the same way, if the Lord were in respect of nature even as the parts of the world, they must acknowledge that He is also subject to those things, whatever they may be, which they perceive in them. Now the world does not last for ever: thus, according to them, the Lord also will pass away with the heaven and the earth, if, as they say, He is of the same kind with the world. If on the other hand He is confessed to be eternal, we must needs suppose that the world too is not without some part in the Divine nature, if, as they say, it corresponds with the Only-begotten in the matter of creation. You see where this fine process of inference makes the argument tend, like a stone broken off from a mountain ridge and rushing down-hill by its own weight. For either the elements of the world must be Divine, according to the foolish belief of the Greeks, or the Son must not be worshipped. Let us consider it thus. We say that the creation, both what is perceived by the mind, and that which is of a nature to be perceived by sense, came into being from nothing: this they declare also of the Lord. We say that all things that have been made consist by the will of God: this they tell us also of the Only-begotten. We believe that neither the angelic creation nor the mundane is of the essence of Him that made it: and they make Him also alien from the essence of the Father. We confess that all things serve Him that made them: this view they also hold of the Only-begotten. Therefore, of necessity, whatever else it may be that they conceive of the creation, all these attributes they will also attach to the Only-begotten: and whatever they believe of Him, this they will also conceive of the creation: so that, if they confess the Lord as God, they will also deify the rest of the creation. On the other hand, if they define these things to be without share in the Divine nature, they will not reject the same conception touching the Only-begotten also. Moreover no sane man asserts Godhead of the creation. Then neither — I do not utter the rest, lest I lend my tongue to the blasphemy of the enemy. Let those say what consequence follows, whose mouth is well trained in blasphemy. But their doctrine is evident even if they hold their peace. For one of two things must necessarily happen:– either they will depose the Only-begotten God, so that with them He will no more either be, or be called so: or, if they assert Godhead of Him, they will equally assert it of all creation: — or, (for this is still left to them,) they will shun the impiety that appears on either side, and take refuge in the orthodox doctrine, and will assuredly agree with us that He is not created, that they may confess Him to be truly God.

What need is there to spend time listing all the other blasphemies that flow from this starting point? Anyone who considers the logical consequences of what we have quoted will understand that the father of lies, the creator of death, the inventor of evil—though created with an intellectual and incorporeal nature—was not prevented by that nature from becoming what he is through change. For when the mutability of ousia can move in either direction according to will, this implies a capacity in nature that follows the impulse of choice, so that it becomes whatever its choice directs it toward. Therefore they will define the Lord as being capable even of opposite states, dragging Him down to a rank equal with the angels through the concept of being created. But let them listen to the great voice of Paul. Why does he say that He alone has been called Son? Because He is not of the nature of angels, but of something far more excellent. For to which of the angels did He ever say, 'You are My Son, This day have I begotten You'? And when again He brings the firstborn into the world He says, 'And let all the angels of God worship Him.' And of the angels He says, 'Who makes His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire,' but of the Son He says, 'Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Your kingdom,' and everything else that the prophecy recites along with these words in declaring His Godhead. And he also adds from another Psalm the fitting words, You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of Your hands, and the rest, up to But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail, by which he describes the immutability and eternity of His nature. If, then, the Godhead of the Only-begotten is as far above the angelic nature as a master is superior to his slaves, how do they make Him common either with the sensible creation—when He is Lord of creation—or with the nature of angels—when He is worshiped by them? They do this by applying to the manner of His existence statements that properly belong to the individual things we observe in creation, just as we have already shown that the heretical account concerning the Lord closely and fittingly matches the making of the earth.

What need is there to take time to recount all the other blasphemies that underlie his doctrine, starting from this beginning? For by what we have quoted, one who considers the inference to be drawn will understand that the father of falsehood, the maker of death, the inventor of wickedness, being created in a nature intellectual and incorporeal, was not by that nature hindered from becoming what he is by way of change. For the mutability of essence, moved either way at will, involves a capacity of nature that follows the impulse of determination, so as to become that to which its determination leads it. Accordingly they will define the Lord as being capable even of contrary dispositions, drawing Him down as it were to a rank equal with the angels, by the conception of creation. But let them listen to the great voice of Paul. Why is it that he says that He alone has been called Son? Because He is not of the nature of angels, but of that which is more excellent. For unto which of the angels said He at any time, 'You are My Son, This day have I begotten You'? And when again He brings the first-begotten into the world He says, 'And let all the angels of God worship Him.' And of the angels He says, 'Who makes His angels spirits, and His ministers a flame of fire': but of the Son He says, 'Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Your kingdom,' and all else that the prophecy recites together with these words in declaring His Godhead. And he adds also from another Psalm the appropriate words, You, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of Your hands, and the rest, as far as But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail, whereby he describes the immutability and eternity of His nature. If, then, the Godhead of the Only-begotten is as far above the angelic nature as a master is superior to his slaves, how do they make common either with the sensible creation Him Who is Lord of the creation, or with the nature of the angels Him Who is worshipped by them, by detailing, concerning the manner of His existence, statements which will properly apply to the individual things we contemplate in creation, even as we already showed the account given by heresy, touching the Lord, to be closely and appropriately applicable to the making of the earth?

But so that readers of our work may find no remaining ambiguity that could support heretical doctrines, it may be worthwhile to add this point from Holy Scripture to the passages we have already examined. They will perhaps raise a question from the very apostolic writings we quoted: How could He be called 'the first-born of creation' if He were not what creation is? For every first-born is the first-born not of another kind, but of its own kind: just as Reuben, having precedence in birth over those counted after him, was the first-born, a man the first-born of men; and many others are called the first-born of the brothers counted with them. They say then, We assert that He who is 'the first-born of creation' is of the same ousia that we consider to be the ousia of all creation. Now if the whole creation is of one ousia with the Father of all, we will not deny that the first-born of creation is this also: but if the God of all differs in ousia from creation, we must necessarily say that neither does the first-born of creation share in ousia with God. The structure of this objection is not, I think, any less imposing in the form we have stated it than in the form our adversaries would probably bring it against us. But what we ought to know regarding this point shall now, as far as we are able, be plainly set forth in our discussion.

But that the readers of our work may find no ambiguity left of such a kind as to afford any support to the heretical doctrines, it may be worth while to add to the passages examined by us this point also from Holy Scripture. They will perhaps raise a question from the very apostolic writings which we quoted: How could He be called 'the first-born of creation ' if He were not what creation is? For every first-born is the first-born not of another kind, but of its own: as Reuben, having precedence in respect of birth of those who are counted after him, was the first-born, a man the first-born of men; and many others are called the first-born of the brothers who are reckoned with them. They say then, We assert that He Who is 'the first-born of creation' is of that same essence which we consider the essence of all creation. Now if the whole creation is of one essence with the Father of all, we will not deny that the first-born of creation is this also: but if the God of all differs in essence from the creation, we must of necessity say that neither has the first-born of creation community in essence with God. The structure of this objection is not, I think, at all less imposing in the form in which it is alleged by us, than in the form in which it would probably be brought against us by our adversaries. But what we ought to know as regards this point shall now, so far as we are able, be plainly set forth in our discourse.

The Apostle uses the term first-born or first-begotten four times throughout all his writings, but he employs the term in different senses rather than in the same way. In one place he speaks of the first-born of all creation, in another of the first-born among many brethren (Romans 8:29), then of the first-born from the dead (Colossians 1:18), and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the term first-begotten stands absolute, being mentioned by itself. He writes, "When again He brings the first-begotten into the world, He says, 'Let all the angels worship Him.'" Since these passages are distinct, it would be good to interpret each one separately: how He is the first-born of creation, how He is the first-born among many brethren, how He is the first-born from the dead, and how, when spoken of by Himself apart from each of these, He is worshipped by all His angels when He is again brought into the world. Let us begin, then, if you agree, our examination of these passages with the last one mentioned.

Four times the name of first-born or first-begotten is used by the Apostle in all his writings: but he has made mention of the name in different senses and not in the same manner. For now he speaks of the first-born of all creation, and again of the first-born among many brethren Romans 8:29, then of the first-born from the dead Colossians 1:18; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the name of first-begotten is absolute, being mentioned by itself: for he speaks thus, When again He brings the first-begotten into the world, He says, 'Let all the angels worship Him. ' As these passages are thus distinct, it may be well to interpret each of them separately by itself, how He is the first-born of creation, how among many brethren, how from the dead, and how, spoken of by Himself apart from each of these, when He is again brought into the world, He is worshipped by all His angels. Let us begin then, if you will, our survey of the passages before us with the last-mentioned.

When scripture says "He brings in the first-begotten into the world again," the word "again" shows through its force that this event is not happening for the first time. We use this word when something that happened once is repeated. Therefore, the phrase refers to the fearsome appearance of the Judge at the end of the ages, when He is no longer seen in the form of a servant but seated in glory upon the throne of His kingdom and worshipped by all the angels around Him. So the One who once entered the world, becoming the first-born from the dead, of His brothers, and of all creation, does not abandon the name of first-begotten that He once received for our sake when He comes again into the world to judge the world in righteousness, as the prophecy says. Just as every knee bows at the name of Jesus, which is above every name, so also all the angels worship Him who comes in the name of the First-begotten. They rejoice over the restoration of humanity, which He accomplished by becoming the first-born among us and restoring us to the grace we had in the beginning. Since there is joy among the angels over those rescued from sin—because until now creation groans and suffers in pain at the vanity that affects us, considering our destruction to be their own loss—when the manifestation of the sons of God that they await and expect takes place, and when the sheep is brought safely to complete the hundred above (and we, humanity, are surely that sheep which the Good Shepherd saved by becoming the first-begotten), then especially will they offer their worship to God with intense thanksgiving on our behalf, because by being first-begotten He restored the one who had wandered from his Father's home.

When again He brings in, he says, the first-begotten into the world. The addition of again shows, by the force of this word, that this event happens not for the first time: for we use this word of the repetition of things which have once happened. He signifies, therefore, by the phrase, the dread appearing of the Judge at the end of the ages, when He is seen no more in the form of a servant, but seated in glory upon the throne of His kingdom, and worshipped by all the angels that are around Him. Therefore He Who once entered into the world, becoming the first-born from the dead, and of His brethren, and of all creation, does not, when He comes again into the world as He that judges the world in righteousness, as the prophecy says, cast off the name of the first-begotten, which He once received for our sakes; but as at the name of Jesus, which is above every name, every knee bows, so also the company of all the angels worships Him Who comes in the name of the First-begotten, in their rejoicing over the restoration of men, wherewith, by becoming the first-born among us, He restored us again to the grace which we had at the beginning. For since there is joy among the angels over those who are rescued from sin, (because until now that creation groans and travails in pain at the vanity that affects us Romans 8:19-23, judging our perdition to be their own loss,) when that manifestation of the sons of God takes place which they look for and expect, and when the sheep is brought safe to the hundred above, (and we surely — humanity that is to say — are that sheep which the Good Shepherd saved by becoming the first-begotten,) then especially will they offer, in their intense thanksgiving on our behalf, their worship to God, Who by being first-begotten restored him that had wandered from his Father's home.

Now that we have reached this understanding of these words, no one could still be uncertain about the other passages that explain why He is the πρωτότοκος, either of the dead, or of the creation, or among many brethren. All these passages point to the same truth, though each one expresses a particular aspect. He is the πρωτότοκος from the dead, because He first by Himself broke the power of death (Acts 2:24), so that He might also make that birth of the resurrection a path for all people. Again, He becomes the πρωτότοκος among many brethren, because He is born before us through the new birth of regeneration in water, for whose labor the hovering of the Dove served as midwife. Through this He makes those who share with Him in this same birth to be His own brethren, and He becomes the πρωτότοκος of those who after Him are born of water and of the Spirit. To put it briefly, since there are three births in us by which human nature is given life—one of the body, another in the sacrament of regeneration, and another by the resurrection of the dead for which we wait—He is πρωτότοκος in all three. He is πρωτότοκος of the twofold regeneration that is accomplished by two means (by baptism and by the resurrection), by being Himself the leader in each of them. And in the flesh He is πρωτότοκος, having first and alone devised in His own case that birth unknown to nature, which no one in all the generations of humanity had originated. If these passages have been correctly understood, then the meaning of the creation, of which He is πρωτότοκος, will not be unknown to us either. For we recognize a twofold creation of our nature: the first by which we were made, and the second by which we were made anew. But there would have been no need of the second creation if we had not made the first useless through our disobedience. Therefore, when the first creation had grown old and vanished away, it was necessary that there should be a new creation in Christ (as the Apostle says, who insists that we should no longer see in the second creation any trace of what has grown old, saying, "Having put off the old man with his deeds and his lusts, put on the new man which is created according to God," and "If anyone is in Christ," he says, "he is a new creature: the old things have passed away, behold all things have become new"). The maker of human nature at first and afterward is one and the same. First He took dust from the earth and formed man; again, He took dust from the Virgin, and did not merely form man, but formed man around Himself. First, He created; afterward, He was created. First, the Word made flesh; afterward, the Word became flesh, so that He might transform our flesh to spirit by being made a partaker with us in flesh and blood. Of this new creation in Christ, which He Himself began, He was called the πρωτότοκος, being the firstfruits of all, both of those begotten into life and of those brought to life by resurrection of the dead, so that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living (Romans 14:9), and might sanctify the whole lump by means of its firstfruits in Himself. Now the fact that the character of πρωτότοκος does not apply to the Son with respect to His pre-temporal existence is confirmed by the title Only-begotten. For one who is truly only-begotten has no brethren, since how could anyone be only-begotten if numbered among brethren? But just as He is called God and man, Son of God and Son of man—for He has the form of God and the form of a servant, being some things according to His supreme nature and becoming other things in His plan of love for humanity—so too, being the Only-begotten God, He becomes the πρωτότοκος of all creation. He is the Only-begotten, the one who is in the bosom of the Father, yet among those who are saved by the new creation, both becoming and being called the πρωτότοκος of the creation. But if, as heresy claims, He is called πρωτότοκος because He was made before the rest of creation, then the name does not fit with what they maintain about the Only-begotten God. For they do not say that the Son and the universe came from the Father in the same way—rather, they say that the Only-begotten God was made by the Father, and that everything else was made by the Only-begotten. Therefore, on the same basis on which, while they maintain that the Son was created, they call God the Father of the created Being, on that same basis, while they say that all things were made by the Only-begotten God, they should give Him the name not of the πρωτότοκος of the things that were made by Him, but more properly of their Father, since the same relationship exists in both cases toward the things created, which logically gives rise to the same title. For if God, who is over all, is not properly called the πρωτότοκος but the Father of the Being He Himself created, then the Only-begotten God will surely also be called, by the same reasoning, the father and not properly the πρωτότοκος of His own creatures, so that the title of πρωτότοκος will be altogether improper and unnecessary, having no place in the heretical conception.

Now that we have arrived at the understanding of these words, no one could any longer hesitate as to the other passages, for what reason He is the first-born, either of the dead, or of the creation, or among many brethren. For all these passages refer to the same point, although each of them sets forth some special conception. He is the first-born from the dead, Who first by Himself loosed the pains of death Acts 2:24, that He might also make that birth of the resurrection a way for all men. Again, He becomes the first-born among many brethren, Who is born before us by the new birth of regeneration in water, for the travail whereof the hovering of the Dove was the midwife, whereby He makes those who share with Him in the like birth to be His own brethren, and becomes the first-born of those who after Him are born of water and of the Spirit: and to speak briefly, as there are in us three births, whereby human nature is quickened, one of the body, another in the sacrament of regeneration, another by that resurrection of the dead for which we look, He is first-born in all three:– of the twofold regeneration which is wrought by two (by baptism and by the resurrection), by being Himself the leader in each of them; while in the flesh He is first-born, as having first and alone devised in His own case that birth unknown to nature, which no one in the many generations of men had originated. If these passages, then, have been rightly understood, neither will the signification of the creation, of which He is first-born, be unknown to us. For we recognize a twofold creation of our nature, the first that whereby we were made, the second that whereby we were made anew. But there would have been no need of the second creation had we not made the first unavailing by our disobedience. Accordingly, when the first creation had waxed old and vanished away, it was needful that there should be a new creation in Christ, (as the Apostle says, who asserts that we should no longer see in the second creation any trace of that which has waxed old, saying, Having put off the old man with his deeds and his lusts, put on the new man which is created according to God, and If any man be in Christ, he says, he is a new creature: the old things are passed away, behold all things have become new:) — for the maker of human nature at the first and afterwards is one and the same. Then He took dust from the earth and formed man: again, He took dust from the Virgin, and did not merely form man, but formed man about Himself: then, He created; afterwards, He was created: then, the Word made flesh; afterwards, the Word became flesh, that He might change our flesh to spirit, by being made partaker with us in flesh and blood. Of this new creation therefore in Christ, which He Himself began, He was called the first-born, being the first-fruits of all, both of those begotten into life, and of those quickened by resurrection of the dead, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living Romans 14:9, and might sanctify the whole lump by means of its first-fruits in Himself. Now that the character of first-born does not apply to the Son in respect of His pre-temporal existence the appellation of Only-begotten testifies. For he who is truly only-begotten has no brethren, for how could any one be only-begotten if numbered among brethren? But as He is called God and man, Son of God and Son of man — for He has the form of God and the form of a servant, being some things according to His supreme nature, becoming other things in His dispensation of love to man — so too, being the Only-begotten God, He becomes the first-born of all creation, — the Only-begotten, He that is in the bosom of the Father, yet, among those who are saved by the new creation, both becoming and being called the first born of the creation. But if, as heresy will have it, He is called first-born because He was made before the rest of the creation, the name does not agree with what they maintain concerning the Only-begotten God. For they do not say this — that the Son and the universe were from the Father in like manner — but they say, that the Only-begotten God was made by the Father, and that all else was made by the Only-begotten. Therefore on the same ground on which, while they hold that the Son was created, they call God the Father of the created Being, on the same ground, while they say that all things were made by the Only-begotten God, they give Him the name not of the first-born of the things that were made by Him, but more properly of their Father, as the same relation existing in both cases towards the things created, logically gives rise to the same appellation. For if God, Who is over all, is not properly called the First-born, but the Father of the Being He Himself created, the Only-begotten God will surely also be called, by the same reasoning, the father, and not properly the first-born of His own creatures, so that the appellation of first-born will be altogether improper and superfluous, having no place in the heretical conception.

We must return to those who connect passion with the divine generation and therefore deny that the Lord is truly begotten in order to avoid the idea of passion. To say that passion is absolutely linked with generation, and that for this reason—so that the divine nature may remain pure and beyond the reach of passion—we ought to consider that the Son is alien to the idea of generation, may perhaps seem reasonable to those who are easily deceived. But those who are instructed in the divine mysteries have an answer ready at hand, based on accepted facts. Who does not know that it is generation that leads us back to the true and blessed life—not the same generation that comes from blood and the will of the flesh, which involves flux and change, gradual growth to perfection, and everything else we observe in our earthly generation? Rather, the other kind is believed to be from God and heavenly and, as the Gospel says, from above, which excludes the passions of flesh and blood. I assume that they admit the existence of this generation and find no passion in it. Therefore, not all generation is naturally connected with passion. Material generation is subject to passion, while immaterial generation is pure from passion. What forces him then to attribute to the incorruptible generation of the Son what properly belongs to the flesh, and, by ridiculing the lower form of generation with his unseemly physiology, to exclude the Son from relationship with the Father? For if even in our own case it is generation that is the beginning of each life—the generation through the flesh producing a life of passion, and the spiritual one producing a life of purity (and no one who is counted among Christians would contradict this)—how is it permissible to entertain the idea of passion when thinking about generation as it concerns the incorruptible nature? Let us also examine this additional point. If they disbelieve the passionless character of the divine generation because of the passion that affects the flesh, let them also, from the same evidence (that is, what is found in ourselves), refuse to believe that God acts as a Maker without passion. For if they judge the Godhead by comparing it to our own conditions, they must not confess that God either begets or creates, since neither of these operations is exercised by us without passion. Let them therefore either separate both creation and generation from the divine nature so that they may guard God's impassibility on both sides—and let them, so that the Father may be kept safely beyond the reach of passion, neither growing weary by creation nor being defiled by generation, entirely reject from their doctrine the belief in the Only-begotten—or, if they agree that the one activity is exercised by the divine power without passion, let them not quarrel about the other. For if he creates without labor or matter, he surely also begets without labor or flux.

We must, however, return to those who connect passion with the Divine generation, and on this account deny that the Lord is truly begotten, in order to avoid the conception of passion. To say that passion is absolutely linked with generation, and that on this account, in order that the Divine nature may continue in purity beyond the reach of passion, we ought to consider that the Son is alien to the idea of generation, may perhaps appear reasonable in the eyes of those who are easily deceived, but those who are instructed in the Divine mysteries have an answer ready to hand, based upon admitted facts. For who knows not that it is generation that leads us back to the true and blessed life, not being the same with that which takes place of blood and of the will of the flesh, in which are flux and change, and gradual growth to perfection, and all else that we observe in our earthly generation: but the other kind is believed to be from God, and heavenly, and, as the Gospel says, from above, which excludes the passions of flesh and blood? I presume that they both admit the existence of this generation, and find no passion in it. Therefore not all generation is naturally connected with passion, but the material generation is subject to passion, the immaterial pure from passion. What constrains him then to attribute to the incorruptible generation of the Son what properly belongs to the flesh, and, by ridiculing the lower form of generation with his unseemly physiology, to exclude the Son from affinity with the Father? For if, even in our own case, it is generation that is the beginning of either life — that generation which is through the flesh of a life of passion, that which is spiritual of a life of purity, (and no one who is in any sense numbered among Christians would contradict this statement,)– how is it allowable to entertain the idea of passion in thinking of generation as it concerns the incorruptible Nature? Let us moreover examine this point in addition to those we have mentioned. If they disbelieve the passionless character of the Divine generation on the ground of the passion that affects the flesh, let them also, from the same tokens, (those, I mean, to be found in ourselves,) refuse to believe that God acts as a Maker without passion. For if they judge of the Godhead by comparison of our own conditions, they must not confess that God either begets or creates; for neither of these operations is exercised by ourselves without passion. Let them therefore either separate from the Divine nature both creation and generation, that they may guard the impassibility of God on either side, and let them, that the Father may be kept safely beyond the range of passion, neither growing weary by creation, nor being defiled by generation, entirely reject from their doctrine the belief in the Only-begotten, or, if they agree that the one activity is exercised by the Divine power without passion, let them not quarrel about the other: for if He creates without labour or matter, He surely also begets without labour or flux.

Here I have the support of Eunomius in this argument once again. I will state his nonsense concisely and briefly, summarizing his whole meaning. He says that craftsmen do not make materials for us, but only add form to matter through their art—this is the point of what he says amid a great deal of nonsensical language. If he understands conception and formation to be included in lower generation, and on this basis forbids the pure notion of generation, then by the same reasoning, since earthly creation works with form but cannot supply matter along with form, he should also forbid us to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on the other hand, he refuses to conceive of creation in God's case according to the measure of human power, let him also stop slandering divine generation by comparing it to human imperfections. But to make his precision and carefulness in argument even clearer, I will return once more to a small point in his statements. He claims that things which are respectively active and passive share one another's nature, and mentions, after bodily generation, the work of the craftsman as displayed in materials. Now let the careful listener notice how he fails to achieve his proper aim here, and wanders about among whatever statements he happens to invent. He sees in things that come into being through the flesh the active and passive conceived with the same essence, one imparting the essence, the other receiving it. Thus he knows how to discern the truth precisely regarding the nature of existing things, separating the giver and receiver from the essence, and saying that each of these is distinct in himself apart from the essence. For surely the one who receives or imparts is someone other than what is given or received, so that we must first conceive of someone by himself, viewed in his own separate existence, and then speak of him as giving what he has or receiving what he lacks. And when he has sputtered out this argument in such a ridiculous way, our wise friend does not realize that in his next step he overthrows himself once more. For someone who by his art forms the material before him at will surely acts in this operation, and the material, in receiving its form at the hand of the one who exercises the art, is passively affected—for the material does not receive its form by remaining unaffected and unimpressionable. If then, even in the case of things made by art, nothing can come into being without passivity and action working together to produce it, how can our author think that he is being consistent with his own words here? Since, in declaring that community of essence is involved in the relation of action and passion, he seems not only to affirm in some sense a community of essence between the One who is begotten and the One who begot Him, but also to make the whole creation of one essence with its Maker—if, as he says, the active and the passive are to be defined as mutually related in respect of nature. Thus, by the very arguments through which he establishes what he wants, he overthrows the main goal of his effort, and makes the glory of the coessential Son more secure by his own argument. For if the fact of originating from something shows the essence of the generator to be in the generated, and if artificial fabrication (being accomplished through action and passion) reduces both what makes and what is produced to community of essence according to his account, our author maintains in many places in his own writings that the Lord has been begotten. Thus by the very arguments by which he seeks to prove the Lord alien from the essence of the Father, he asserts His intimate connection. For if, according to his account, separation in essence is not observed either in generation or in fabrication, then whatever he allows the Lord to be—whether created or a product of generation—he asserts, by both names alike, the affinity of essence, since he makes community of nature in active and passive, in generator and generated, part of his system.

And here once more I have in this argument the support of Eunomius. I will state his nonsense concisely and briefly, epitomizing his whole meaning. That men do not make materials for us, but only by their art add form to matter, — this is the drift of what he says in the course of a great quantity of nonsensical language. If, then, understanding conception and formation to be included in the lower generation, he forbids on this ground the pure notion of generation, by consequence, on the same reasoning, since earthly creation is busied with the form, but cannot furnish matter together with the form, let him forbid us also, on this ground, to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on the other hand, he refuses to conceive creation in the case of God according to man's measure of power, let him also cease to slander Divine generation by human imperfections. But, that his accuracy and circumspection in argument may be more clearly established, I will again return to a small point in his statements. He asserts that things which are respectively active and passive share one another's nature, and mentions, after bodily generation, the work of the craftsman as displayed in materials. Now let the acute hearer mark how he here fails in his proper aim, and wanders about among whatever statements he happens to invent. He sees in things that come into being by way of the flesh the active and passive conceived, with the same essence, the one imparting the essence, the other receiving it. Thus he knows how to discern the truth with accuracy as regards the nature of existing things, so as to separate the imparter and the receiver from the essence, and to say that each of these is distinct in himself apart from the essence. For he that receives or imparts is surely another besides that which is given or received, so that we must first conceive some one by himself, viewed in his own separate existence, and then speak of him as giving that which he has, or receiving that which he has not. And when he has sputtered out this argument in such a ridiculous fashion, our sage friend does not perceive that by the next step he overthrows himself once more. For he who by his art forms at his will the material before him, surely in this operation acts; and the material, in receiving its form at the hand of him who exercises the art, is passively affected: for it is not by remaining unaffected and unimpressionable that the material receives its form. If then, even in the case of things wrought by art, nothing can come into being without passivity and action concurring to produce it, how can our author think that he here abides by his own words? Seeing that, in declaring community of essence to be involved in the relation of action and passion, he seems not only to attest in some sense community of essence in Him that is begotten with Him that begot Him, but also to make the whole creation of one essence with its Maker, if, as he says, the active and the passive are to be defined as mutually akin in respect of nature. Thus, by the very arguments by which he establishes what he wishes, he overthrows the main object of his effort, and makes the glory of the coessential Son more secure by his own contention. For if the fact of origination from anything shows the essence of the generator to be in the generated, and if artificial fabrication (being accomplished by means of action and passion) reduces both that which makes and that which is produced to community of essence, according to his account, our author in many places of his own writings maintains that the Lord has been begotten. Thus by the very arguments whereby he seeks to prove the Lord alien from the essence of the Father, he asserts for Him intimate connection. For if, according to his account, separation in essence is not observed either in generation or in fabrication, then, whatever he allows the Lord to be, whether created or a product of generation, he asserts, by both names alike, the affinity of essence, seeing that he makes community of nature in active and passive, in generator and generated, a part of his system.

Let's move on to the next point of the argument. I ask my readers not to become impatient with the detailed examination that makes our argument longer than we would like. We are not dealing with trivial matters where the loss would be minor if we rushed past something requiring more careful attention. Rather, what is at stake is the very foundation of our hope. The choice before us is whether we should be Christians, not led astray by the destructive tricks of heresy, or whether we should be completely swept away into the beliefs of Jews or pagans. So that we may avoid both of these forbidden outcomes—that we may neither agree with Jewish teaching by denying the truly begotten Son, nor fall into the same ruin as idolaters by worshiping the creature—let us necessarily spend some time discussing these matters and present the exact words of Eunomius, which are as follows:

Let us turn however to the next point of the argument. I beg my readers not to be impatient at the minuteness of examination which extends our argument to a length beyond what we would desire. For it is not any ordinary matters on which we stand in danger, so that our loss would be slight if we should hurry past any point that required more careful attention, but it is the very sum of our hope that we have at stake. For the alternative before us is, whether we should be Christians, not led astray by the destructive wiles of heresy, or whether we should be completely swept away into the conceptions of Jews or heathen. To the end, then, that we may not suffer either of these things forbidden, that we may neither agree with the doctrine of the Jews by a denial of the verily begotten Son, nor be involved in the downfall of the idolaters by the adoration of the creature, let us perforce spend some time in the discussion of these matters, and set forth the very words of Eunomius, which run thus:–

Since these matters are divided in this way, one might reasonably say that the most proper and primary ousia, which alone exists by the operation of the Father, properly receives for itself the names 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation.' A little further on he says, "But the Son alone, existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begot Him, without sharing it with others." These are his words. But let us, like people watching their enemies fighting among themselves, first consider how our adversaries contradict themselves, and then proceed to present the true doctrine of godliness on the other side. He says, "The Son alone, existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begot Him, without sharing it with others." But in his earlier statements, he says that he does not refuse to call the one who is begotten a 'product of generation,' since the generated ousia itself, and the name 'Son,' make such a way of speaking appropriate.

Now as these things are thus divided, one might reasonably say that the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation': and a little further on he says, But the Son alone, existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begot Him, without community. Such are his words. But let us, like men who look on at their enemies engaged in a factious struggle among themselves, consider first our adversaries' contention against themselves, and so proceed to set forth on the other side the true doctrine of godliness. The Son alone, he says, existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begot Him, without community. But in his previous statements, he says that he does not refuse to call Him, that is begotten a 'product of generation,' as the generated essence itself, and the appellation of Son, make such a relation of words appropriate.

The contradiction in these passages is obvious, so I have to admire the sharp thinking of those who praise this teaching. It would be difficult to say which of his statements they could accept without contradicting the rest. His earlier statement said that the generated ousia and the title of Son made such a relationship of terms appropriate. His current system says the opposite: that the Son possesses His relation to the one who begot Him without sharing anything in common. If they believe the first statement, they surely cannot accept the second. If they prefer the latter, they will find themselves opposing the earlier idea. Who will stop this fight? Who will mediate in this civil war? Who will bring this discord into harmony when the very soul is divided against itself by these opposing statements and pulled in different directions toward contrary teachings? Perhaps we see here that dark prophetic saying which David speaks about the Jews: "They were divided but were not pricked at heart." Look, even when they are divided among contradictory teachings, they have no sense of their inconsistency. Instead, they are carried about by their ears like wine jars, moved around at the will of whoever shifts them. It pleased him to say that the generated ousia was closely connected with the title of Son. Immediately, like sleeping men, they nodded in agreement with his remarks. He changed his statement again to the opposite and denies the relation of the Son to the one who begot Him. Again his devoted friends agree with this too, shifting in whatever direction he chooses, just as the shadows of bodies spontaneously change their form to mimic the motion of the moving figure. Even if he contradicts himself, they accept that as well. This is another form of the potion that Homer tells us about, not changing the bodies of those who drink its poison into the shapes of animals, but acting on their souls to produce in them a change to an irrational state. In that story, their minds remained sound while their form was changed to that of beasts, but here, while their bodies remain in their natural state, their souls are transformed to the condition of brutes. Just as in that story the poet's tale of wonder says that those who drank the drug were changed into the forms of various beasts according to the pleasure of the one who deceived their nature, the same thing happens now from this Circe's cup. Those who drink the deceit of sorcery from the same writing are changed into different forms of teaching, transformed now to one, now to another. Meanwhile, these ridiculous people, according to this revised version of the fable, are still pleased with the one who leads them to such absurdity. They stoop to gather the words he scatters about as if they were cornel berries or acorns, running greedily like pigs to the teachings that are thrown on the ground, being naturally incapable of fixing their gaze on those things which are lofty and heavenly. For this reason they do not see how his argument tends toward contrary positions, but snatch without examination whatever comes their way. Just as they say that the bodies of people stupefied with mandrake are held in a kind of sleep and inability to move, so the senses of these men's souls are affected, being made numb regarding the perception of deceit. It is certainly a terrible thing to be held in unconsciousness by hidden deception as the result of some fallacious argument. Yet where it is involuntary, the misfortune is excusable. But to be brought to experience evil as the result of a kind of deliberation and eager desire, not in ignorance of what will happen, surpasses every extreme of misery. Surely we may well complain when we hear that even greedy fish avoid the hook when it comes near them unbaited and swallow the hook only when the hope of food lures them to bait. But where the evil is obvious, to go over to this destruction of their own accord is more wretched than the foolishness of the fish. Fish are led by their greed to a destruction that is hidden from them, but these people swallow with open mouth the naked hook of impiety, content with destruction under the influence of some irrational passion. What could be clearer than this contradiction: to say that the same Person was begotten and is a created thing, and that something is closely connected with the name of Son and, again, is alien from the meaning of Son? But enough of these matters.

The contradiction existing in these passages being thus evident, I am inclined to admire for their acuteness those who praise this doctrine. For it would be hard to say to which of his statements they could turn without finding themselves at variance with the remainder. His earlier statement represented that the generated essence, and the appellation of Son, made such a relation of words appropriate. His present system says the contrary:– that the Son possesses His relation to Him that begot Him without community. If they believe the first statement, they will surely not accept the second: if they incline to the latter, they will find themselves opposed to the earlier conception. Who will stay the combat? Who will mediate in this civil war? Who will bring this discord into agreement, when the very soul is divided against itself by the opposing statements, and drawn in different ways to contrary doctrines? Perhaps we may see here that dark saying of prophecy which David speaks of the Jews — They were divided but were not pricked at heart. For lo, not even when they are divided among contrariety of doctrines have they a sense of their discordancy, but they are carried about by their ears like wine-jars, borne around at the will of him who shifts them. It pleased him to say that the generated essence was closely connected with the appellation of Son: straightway, like men asleep, they nodded assent to his remarks. He changed his statement again to the contrary one, and denies the relation of the Son to Him that begot Him: again his well-beloved friends join in assent to this also, shifting in whatever direction he chooses, as the shadows of bodies change their form by spontaneous mimicry with the motion of the advancing figure, and even if he contradicts himself, accepting that also. This is another form of the drought that Homer tells us of, not changing the bodies of those who drink its poison into the forms of brutes, but acting on their souls to produce in them a change to a state void of reason. For of those men, the tale tells that their mind was sound, while their form was changed to that of beasts, but here, while their bodies remain in their natural state, their souls are transformed to the condition of brutes. And as there the poet's tale of wonder says that those who drank the drug were changed into the forms of various beasts, at the pleasure of her who beguiled their nature, the same thing happens now also from this Circe's cup. For they who drink the deceit of sorcery from the same writing are changed to different forms of doctrine, transformed now to one, now to another. And meanwhile these very ridiculous people, according to the revised edition of the fable, are still well pleased with him who leads them to such absurdity, and stoop to gather the words he scatters about, as if they were cornel fruit or acorns, running greedily like swine to the doctrines that are shed on the ground, not being naturally capable of fixing their gaze on those which are lofty and heavenly. For this reason it is that they do not see the tendency of his argument to contrary positions, but snatch without examination what comes in their way: and as they say that the bodies of men stupefied with mandrake are held in a sort of slumber and inability to move, so are the senses of these men's souls affected, being made torpid as regards the apprehension of deceit. It is certainly a terrible thing to be held in unconsciousness by hidden guile, as the result of some fallacious argument: yet where it is involuntary the misfortune is excusable: but to be brought to make trial of evil as the result of a kind of forethought and zealous desire, not in ignorance of what will befall, surpasses every extreme of misery. Surely we may well complain, when we hear that even greedy fish avoid the steel when it comes near them unbaited, and take down the hook only when hope of food decoys them to a bait: but where the evil is apparent, to go over of their own accord to this destruction is a more wretched thing than the folly of the fish: for these are led by their greediness to a destruction that is concealed from them, but the others swallow with open mouth the hook of impiety in its bareness, satisfied with destruction under the influence of some unreasoning passion. For what could be clearer than this contradiction — than to say that the same Person was begotten and is a thing created, and that something is closely connected with the name of Son, and, again, is alien from the sense of Son? But enough of these matters.

It might be useful, however, to examine the meaning of Eunomius's statement that is presented to us in orderly sequence, by returning to the beginning of what he said. For the points we have just examined clearly provoked us to begin our response with his final passage, because of the obvious contradiction involved in his words.

It might, however, be useful to look at the sense of the utterance of Eunomius that is set before us in orderly sequence, recurring to the beginning of his statement. For the points we have now examined were an obvious incitement to us to begin our reply with the last passage, on account of the evident character of the contradiction involved in his words.

Here is what Eunomius says at the beginning:

This, then, is what Eunomius says at the beginning:–

Since these things are divided in this way, one could reasonably say that the most proper and primary ousia, which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the names 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation.' First, I would ask those who are listening to this argument to remember that in his first work he says the ousia of the Father is also most proper, introducing his statement with these words: "The whole account of our teaching is completed with the supreme and most proper ousia." And here he calls the ousia of the Only-begotten most proper and primary. So by putting together Eunomius' phrases from each of his books, we can call him as a witness to the shared ousia, since in another place he declares that things which have the same names also have a physis that is not different in any way. Our self-contradictory friend would not indicate things that differ in physis by using identical names. Rather, it is surely because the definition of ousia in Father and Son is one that he says the one is most proper and the other also is most proper. Common human usage supports our argument, since we do not apply the term "most proper" where the name does not truly match the physis. For example, we call a likeness inexactly a man, but what we properly designate by this name is the actual living being presented to us in physis. Similarly, the language of Scripture recognizes the name god for an idol, for a demon, and for the belly, but here too the name does not have its proper sense—and the same applies in all other cases. A man is said to have eaten food in a dream's imagination, but we cannot call this imagined thing food in the proper sense of the term. Therefore, in the case of two men existing naturally, we properly call both equally by the name of man, while if someone should include an inanimate portrait in his count along with a real man, one might perhaps speak of the one who really exists and the likeness as two men, but would no longer attribute the proper meaning of the word to both. So, if the physis of the Only-begotten were conceived as something other than the ousia of the Father, our author would not have called each of the ousiai most proper. How could anyone signify things differing in physis by identical names? Surely the truth seems to be made plain even by those who fight against it, since falsehood is unable, even when expressed in the words of the enemy, to completely overcome truth. Hence the doctrine of orthodoxy is proclaimed by the mouth of its opponents without their knowing what they say, just as the saving Passion of the Lord for us was foretold through Caiaphas, who did not know what he was saying. Therefore, if true propriety of ousia is common to both—I mean to the Father and the Son—what room is there for saying that their ousiai are mutually different? Or how is a difference in superior power, or greatness, or honor contemplated in them, since the most proper ousia admits no diminution? For whatever is imperfectly what it is, is not that thing most properly, whether it be physis, or power, or rank, or any other individual object of contemplation, so that the superiority of the Father's ousia, as heresy claims, proves the imperfection of the ousia of the Son. If it is imperfect, then it is not proper; but if it is most proper, then it is also surely perfect. It is not possible to call what is deficient perfect. But neither is it possible, when comparing them, to perceive any difference by way of excess or defect when what is perfect is set beside what is perfect. Perfection is one in both cases, like a straight edge showing no hollow from defect nor any bulge from excess. Thus, from these passages Eunomius' advocacy for our doctrine can be clearly seen—I should rather say, not his earnestness on our behalf, but his conflict with himself. He turns against himself those devices by which he establishes our doctrines with his own arguments. Let us, however, once more follow his writings word for word, so it may be clear to everyone that their argument has no power for evil except the desire to do harm.

Now, as these things are thus divided, one might reasonably say that the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation.' First, then, I would ask those who are attending to this discourse to bear in mind, that in his first composition he says that the essence of the Father also is most proper, introducing his statement with these words, The whole account of our teaching is completed with the supreme and most proper essence. And here he calls the essence of the Only-begotten most proper and primary. Thus putting together Eunomius' phrases from each of his books, we shall call him himself as a witness of the community of essence, who in another place makes a declaration to this effect, that of things which have the same appellations, the nature also is not different in any way. For our self-contradictory friend would not indicate things differing in nature by identity of appellation, but it is surely for this reason, that the definition of essence in Father and Son is one, that he says that the one is most proper, and that the other also is most proper. And the general usage of men bears witness to our argument, which does not apply the term most proper where the name does not truly agree with the nature. For instance, we call a likeness, inexactly, a man, but what we properly designate by this name is the animal presented to us in nature. And similarly, the language of Scripture recognizes the appellation of god for an idol, and for a demon, and for the belly: but here too the name has not its proper sense; and in the same way with all other cases. A man is said to have eaten food in the fancy of a dream, but we cannot call this fancy food, in the proper sense of the term. As, then, in the case of two men existing naturally, we properly call both equally by the name of man, while if any one should join an inanimate portrait in his enumeration with a real man, one might perhaps speak of him who really exists and of the likeness, as two men, but would no longer attribute to both the proper meaning of the word, so, on the supposition that the nature of the Only-begotten was conceived as something else than the essence of the Father, our author would not have called each of the essences most proper. For how could any one signify things differing in nature by identity of names? Surely the truth seems to be made plain even by those who fight against it, as falsehood is unable, even when expressed in the words of the enemy, utterly to prevail over truth. Hence the doctrine of orthodoxy is proclaimed by the mouth of its opponents, without their knowing what they say, as the saving Passion of the Lord for us had been foretold in the case of Caiaphas, not knowing what he said. If, therefore, true propriety of essence is common to both (I mean to the Father and the Son), what room is there for saying that their essences are mutually divergent? Or how is a difference by way of superior power, or greatness, or honour, contemplated in them, seeing that the most proper essence admits of no diminution? For that which is whatever it is imperfectly, is not that thing most properly, be it nature, or power, or rank, or any other individual object of contemplation, so that the superiority of the Father's essence, as heresy will have it, proves the imperfection of the essence of the Son. If then it is imperfect, it is not proper; but if it is most proper it is also surely perfect. For it is not possible to call that which is deficient perfect. But neither is it possible, when, in comparing them, that which is perfect is set beside that which is perfect, to perceive any difference by way of excess or defect: for perfection is one in both cases, as in a rule, not showing a hollow by defect, nor a projection by excess. Thus, from these passages Eunomius' advocacy in favour of our doctrine may be sufficiently seen — I should rather say, not his earnestness on our behalf, but his conflict with himself. For he turns against himself those devices whereby he establishes our doctrines by his own arguments. Let us, however, once more follow his writings word for word, that it may be clear to all that their argument has no power for evil except the desire to do mischief.

Let us listen, then, to what he says. One might reasonably say that the most proper and primary ousia, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the names 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation.' Everyone knows that what separates the Church from heresy is this term, product of creation, when applied to the Son. Since the doctrinal difference is universally recognized, what would be the reasonable course for someone who tries to show that his opinions are truer than ours? Clearly, to establish his own statement by demonstrating, with whatever proofs he can, that we ought to consider the Lord as created. Or instead of this, should he simply lay down a rule for his readers that they should speak of controversial matters as if they were established facts? For my part, I think he should take the former course, and perhaps everyone who possesses any share of intelligence demands this of their opponents: that they should first establish the starting point of their argument on some unquestionable foundation, and then proceed to develop their theory through logical inferences. But our writer ignores the task of establishing the view that we should think He is created, and moves on to the next steps, attaching the inferential process of his argument to this unproven assumption. He is just like those people whose minds are caught up in foolish desires, with their thoughts wandering on a kingdom or some other object of pursuit. They do not consider how any of the things they set their hearts on could possibly happen, but they arrange and plan their good fortune for themselves as they please, as if it were already theirs, wandering with a kind of pleasure among things that do not exist. In the same way, our clever author somehow puts his own renowned dialectic to sleep, and before giving a demonstration of the point in question, he tells this tale of his deceitful and illogical foolishness about his own doctrine as if to children, setting it forth like a story told at a drinking party. For he says that the ousia which exists by the operation of the Father admits the name of product of generation, and of product of making, and of product of creation. What reasoning showed us that the Son exists by any constructive operation, and that the physis of the Father remains inactive with regard to the personal existence of the Son? This was the very point at issue in the controversy: whether the ousia of the Father begot the Son, or whether it made Him as one of the external things that accompany His nature. Now since the Church, according to Divine teaching, believes the Only-begotten to be truly God, and abhors the superstition of polytheism, and for this reason does not admit difference of ousiai, so that the Godheads may not, by divergence of ousia, fall under the concept of number (for this is nothing else than to introduce polytheism into our life)—since, I say, the Church teaches this in plain language, that the Only-begotten is essentially God, very God of the ousia of the very God, how ought one who opposes her decisions to overthrow the received opinion? Should he not do so by establishing the opposing statement, demonstrating the disputed point from some acknowledged principle? I think no sensible person would look for anything else than this. But our author starts from the disputed points and takes, as though it were admitted, material which is controversial as a principle for the succeeding argument. If it had first been shown that the Son had His existence through some operation, what complaint should we have with what follows, that he should say that the ousia which exists through an operation admits for itself the name of product of making? But let the advocates of error tell us how the consequence has any force, so long as the antecedent remains unestablished. For supposing one were to grant by way of hypothesis that man is winged, there will be no question of concession about what comes next: for he who becomes winged will fly in some way or other, and lift himself up on high above the earth, soaring through the air on his wings. But we have to see how he whose physis is not aerial could become winged, and if this condition does not exist, it is pointless to discuss the next point. Let our author, then, show this to begin with: that the Church has believed in vain that the Only-begotten Son truly exists, not adopted by a Father falsely so called, but existing according to nature, by generation from Him Who is, not alienated from the ousia of Him that begot Him. But so long as his primary proposition remains unproven, it is pointless to dwell on those which are secondary. And let no one interrupt me by saying that what we confess should also be confirmed by constructive reasoning: for it is sufficient proof of our statement that the tradition has come down to us from our fathers, handed on like some inheritance by succession from the apostles and the saints who came after them. They, on the other hand, who change their doctrines to this novelty would need the support of arguments in abundance if they were going to bring over to their views not men light as dust and unstable, but men of weight and steadiness. But so long as their statement is advanced without being established and without being proven, who is so foolish and so brutish as to consider the teaching of the evangelists and apostles, and of those who have successively shone like lights in the churches, of less authority than this undemonstrated nonsense?

Let us listen, then, to what he says. One might reasonably say that the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation.' Who knows not that what separates the Church from heresy is this term, product of creation, applied to the Son? Accordingly, the doctrinal difference being universally acknowledged, what would be the reasonable course for a man to take who endeavours to show that his opinions are more true than ours? Clearly, to establish his own statement, by showing, by such proofs as he could, that we ought to consider that the Lord is created. Or omitting this, should he rather lay down a law for his readers that they should speak of matters of controversy as if they were acknowledged facts? For my own part, I think he should take the former course, and perhaps all who possess any share of intelligence demand this of their opponents, that they should, to begin with, establish upon some incontrovertible basis the first principle of their argument, and so proceed to press their theory by inferences. Now our writer leaves alone the task of establishing the view that we should think He is created, and goes on to the next steps, fitting on the inferential process of his argument to this unproved assumption, being just in the condition of those men whose minds are deep in foolish desires, with their thoughts wandering upon a kingdom, or upon some other object of pursuit. They do not think how any of the things on which they set their hearts could possibly be, but they arrange and order their good fortune for themselves at their pleasure, as if it were theirs already, straying with a kind of pleasure among non-existent things. So, too, our clever author somehow or other lulls his own renowned dialectic to sleep, and before giving a demonstration of the point at issue, he tells, as if to children, the tale of this deceitful and inconsequent folly of his own doctrine, setting it forth like a story told at a drinking-party. For he says that the essence which exists by the operation of the Father admits the appellation of product of generation, and of product of making, and of product of creation. What reasoning showed us that the Son exists by any constructive operation, and that the nature of the Father remains inoperative with regard to the Personal existence of the Son? This was the very point at issue in the controversy, whether the essence of the Father begot the Son, or whether it made Him as one of the external things which accompany His nature. Now seeing that the Church, according to the Divine teaching, believes the Only-begotten to be verily God, and abhors the superstition of polytheism, and for this cause does not admit the difference of essences, in order that the Godheads may not, by divergence of essence, fall under the conception of number (for this is nothing else than to introduce polytheism into our life)– seeing, I say, that the Church teaches this in plain language, that the Only-begotten is essentially God, very God of the essence of the very God, how ought one who opposes her decisions to overthrow the preconceived opinion? Should he not do so by establishing the opposing statement, demonstrating the disputed point from some acknowledged principle? I think no sensible man would look for anything else than this. But our author starts from the disputed points, and takes, as though it were admitted, matter which is in controversy as a principle for the succeeding argument. If it had first been shown that the Son had His existence through some operation, what quarrel should we have with what follows, that he should say that the essence which exists through an operation admits for itself the name of product of making? But let the advocates of error tell us how the consequence has any force, so long as the antecedent remains unestablished. For supposing one were to grant by way of hypothesis that man is winged, there will be no question of concession about what comes next: for he who becomes winged will fly in some way or other, and lift himself up on high above the earth, soaring through the air on his wings. But we have to see how he whose nature is not aerial could become winged, and if this condition does not exist, it is vain to discuss the next point. Let our author, then, show this to begin with, that it is in vain that the Church has believed that the Only-begotten Son truly exists, not adopted by a Father falsely so called, but existing according to nature, by generation from Him Who is, not alienated from the essence of Him that begot Him. But so long as his primary proposition remains unproved, it is idle to dwell on those which are secondary. And let no one interrupt me, by saying that what we confess should also be confirmed by constructive reasoning: for it is enough for proof of our statement, that the tradition has come down to us from our fathers, handed on, like some inheritance, by succession from the apostles and the saints who came after them. They, on the other hand, who change their doctrines to this novelty, would need the support of arguments in abundance, if they were about to bring over to their views, not men light as dust, and unstable, but men of weight and steadiness: but so long as their statement is advanced without being established, and without being proved, who is so foolish and so brutish as to account the teaching of the evangelists and apostles, and of those who have successively shone like lights in the churches, of less force than this undemonstrated nonsense?

Let us now look at the most remarkable example of our author's cleverness: how, through his abundance of dialectical skill, he ingeniously leads simpler people over to the opposite view. He adds to the titles "product of making" and "product of creation" the further phrase "product of generation," saying that the essence of the Son accepts these names for itself. He thinks that, as long as he speaks as if he were addressing some gathering of drunks, no one will detect his fraudulent handling of doctrine. For by joining "product of generation" with "product of making" and "product of creation," he thinks he secretly eliminates the difference in meaning between the names by putting together things that have nothing in common. These are his clever dialectical tricks. But we who are mere laymen in argument do not deny that, as far as voice and tongue are concerned, we are what his speech portrays us to be, but we also maintain that our ears, as the prophet says, are prepared for intelligent hearing. Therefore, we are not moved by the joining together of names that have nothing in common to confuse the things they signify. Even if the great Apostle names together wood, hay, stubble, gold, silver, and precious stones, we count up the total number of things he mentions, yet we do not fail to recognize separately the physis of each of the substances named. So here too, when "product of generation" and "product of making" are named together, we move from the sounds to the meaning, and we do not see the same sense in each of the names. For "product of creation" means one thing, and "product of generation" another. So even if he tries to mix what cannot be mixed, the intelligent hearer will listen with discernment and will point out that it is impossible for any one physis to accept for itself both the name "product of generation" and the name "product of creation." For if one of these were true, the other would necessarily be false, so that if the thing were a product of creation, it would not be a product of generation, and conversely, if it were called a product of generation, it would be separated from the title "product of creation." Yet Eunomius tells us that the essence of the Son accepts for itself the names "product of generation," "product of making," and "product of creation"!

Let us further look at the most remarkable instance of our author's cleverness; how, by the abundance of his dialectic skill, he ingeniously draws over to the contrary view the more simple sort. He throws in, as an addition to the title of product of making, and that of product of creation, the further phrase, product of generation, saying that the essence of the Son admits these names for itself; and thinks that, so long as he harangues as if he were in some gathering of topers, his knavery in dealing with doctrine will not be detected by any one. For in joining product of generation with product of making, and product of creation, he thinks that he stealthily makes away with the difference in significance between the names, by putting together what have nothing in common. These are his clever tricks of dialectic; but we mere laymen in argument do not deny that, so far as voice and tongue are concerned, we are what his speech sets forth about us, but we allow also that our ears, as the prophet says, are made ready for intelligent hearing. Accordingly, we are not moved, by the conjunction of names that have nothing in common, to make a confusion between the things they signify: but even if the great Apostle names together wood, hay, stubble, gold, silver, and precious stones 1 Corinthians 3:12, we reckon up summarily the number of things he mentions, and yet do not fail to recognize separately the nature of each of the substances named. So here, too, when product of generation and product of making are named together, we pass from the sounds to the sense, and do not behold the same meaning in each of the names; for product of creation means one thing, and product of generation another: so that even if he tries to mingle what will not blend, the intelligent hearer will listen with discrimination, and will point out that it is an impossibility for any one nature to admit for itself the appellation of product of generation, and that of product of creation. For, if one of these were true, the other would necessarily be false, so that, if the thing were a product of creation, it would not be a product of generation, and conversely, if it were called a product of generation, it would be alienated from the title of product of creation. Yet Eunomius tells us that the essence of the Son admits for itself the appellations of 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation'!

Does he make this headless and rootless statement of his any more secure through what comes next? At the very beginning, he didn't establish anything that actually supports the point he's trying to prove. The rest clings to the same foolishness, not drawing its strength from any argumentative support, but simply presenting his exposition of blasphemy through vague details like someone recounting dreams. He says (and he adds this to what I've already quoted): "Having its generation without intervention, and preserving indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator." Well, if we set aside the absence of intervention and division and look at the plain meaning of the words themselves, we'll find that everywhere his absurd teaching is cast upon the ears of those he deceives without support from a single argument. Its Generator, and Maker, and Creator, he says. Although these appear to be three names, they contain the sense of only two concepts, since two of the words have equivalent meanings. For to make is the same as to create, but generation is something distinct from those. Now, since the way these words signify divides people's ordinary understanding into different ideas, what argument shows us that making is the same thing as generation, so that we could apply the one essence to this difference of terms? As long as the ordinary meaning of the words stands, and no argument is found to transfer the sense of the terms to an opposite meaning, it's impossible that any one nature could be divided between the concept of product of making and that of product of generation. Since each of these terms, used by itself, has its own meaning, we must also suppose the relative connection in which they stand is appropriate and naturally suited to the terms. All other relative terms have their connection not with what is foreign and different in kind, but even if the correlative term is left unspoken, we spontaneously hear, along with the primary word, that which is linked to it—as in the case of maker, slave, friend, son, and so on. All names that are considered as relative to another present to us, through their mention, each its proper and closely connected relationship with what it declares, while they avoid any mixture with what is different in kind. The name of maker is not linked with the word son, nor is the term slave referred to the term maker, nor does friend present to us a slave, nor son a master, but we recognize clearly and distinctly the connection of each of these with its correlative: understanding by the word friend another friend; by slave, a master; by maker, a work; by son, a father. In the same way, then, product of generation has its proper relative sense. With the product of generation is surely linked the generator, and with the product of creation the creator. We must certainly, if we're not prepared through a substitution of names to introduce a confusion of things, preserve for each of the relative terms what it properly signifies.

Does he, by what still remains, make at all more secure this headless and rootless statement of his, in which, in its earliest stage, nothing was laid down that had any force with regard to the point he is trying to establish? Or does the rest also cling to the same folly, not deriving its strength from any support it gets from argument, but setting out its exposition of blasphemy with vague details like the recital of dreams? He says (and this he subjoins to what I have already quoted)– Having its generation without intervention, and preserving indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. Well, if we were to leave alone the absence of intervention and of division, and look at the meaning of the words as it stands by itself, we shall find that everywhere his absurd teaching is cast upon the ears of those whom he deceives, without corroboration from a single argument. Its Generator, and Maker, and Creator, he says. These names, though they seem to be three, include the sense of but two concepts, since two of the words are equivalent in meaning. For to make is the same as to create, but generation is another thing distinct from those spoken of. Now, seeing that the result of the signification of the words is to divide the ordinary apprehension of men into different ideas, what argument demonstrates to us that making is the same thing with generation, to the end that we may accommodate the one essence to this difference of terms? For so long as the ordinary significance of the words holds, and no argument is found to transfer the sense of the terms to an opposite meaning, it is not possible that any one nature should be divided between the conception of product of making, and that of product of generation. Since each of these terms, used by itself, has a meaning of its own, we must also suppose the relative conjunction in which they stand to be appropriate and germane to the terms. For all other relative terms have their connection, not with what is foreign and heterogeneous, but, even if the correlative term be suppressed, we hear spontaneously, together with the primary word, that which is linked with it, as in the case of maker, slave, friend, son, and so forth. For all names that are considered as relative to another, present to us, by the mention of them, each its proper and closely connected relationship with that which it declares, while they avoid all mixture of that which is heterogeneous. For neither is the name of maker linked with the word son, nor the term slave referred to the term maker, nor does friend present to us a slave, nor son a master, but we recognize clearly and distinctly the connection of each of these with its correlative, conceiving by the word friend another friend; by slave, a master; by maker, work; by son, a father. In the same way, then, product of generation has its proper relative sense; with the product of generation, surely, is linked the generator, and with the product of creation the creator; and we must certainly, if we are not prepared by a substitution of names to introduce a confusion of things, preserve for each of the relative terms that which it properly connotes.

Since the meaning of these words is clearly evident, how is it that someone who develops his doctrine using logical method failed to recognize the proper relational sense of these terms? Yet he thinks he is connecting the product of generation to maker, and the product of making to generator, by claiming that the ousia of the Son accepts for itself the names 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation,' while maintaining an undivided relationship to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. For it is contrary to nature that a single thing should be divided into different relations. But the Son is properly related to the Father, and that which is begotten to the one who begot it, while the product of making has its relation to its maker—unless one might consider some loose usage in ordinary, undiscriminating speech to override the strict meaning.

Now, seeing that the tendency of the meaning of these words is manifest, how comes it that one who advances his doctrine by the aid of logical system failed to perceive in these names their proper relative sense? But he thinks that he is linking on the product of generation to maker, and the product of making to generator, by saying that the essence of the Son admits for itself the appellations of 'product of generation,' 'product of making,' and 'product of creation,' and preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. For it is contrary to nature, that a single thing should be split up into different relations. But the Son is properly related to the Father, and that which is begotten to him that begot it, while the product of making has its relation to its maker; save if one might consider some inexact use, in some undistinguishing way of common parlance, to overrule the strict signification.

By what reasoning and arguments does he, according to his supposedly invincible logic, try to persuade most people and pursue this line of thinking as he pleases: that since the God who is over all is conceived and spoken of as both Creator and Father, the Son is closely connected with both titles and is equally called both product of creation and product of generation? For since customary precision of speech distinguishes between names of this kind and applies the term generation to things generated from the ousia itself, while understanding the term creation to refer to things external to the physis of their maker, and since on this account the divine teachings, in handing down the knowledge of God, have given us the names of Father and Son rather than Creator and work—so that no error leading to blasphemy might arise (as could happen if a designation of the latter kind pushed the Son into the position of an alien and stranger), and so that impious doctrines that sever the Only-begotten from essential kinship with the Father might find no entrance—seeing all this, I say, whoever declares that the designation product of making is fitting for the Son will logically have to say as well that the name of Son properly applies to that which is the product of making. Thus, if the Son is a product of making, then the heaven is called Son, and all the individual things that have been made are, according to this author, properly designated by the title Son. For if he has this name not because he shares in physis with the one who begot him, but is called Son because he is created, then the same argument will allow that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the will of their maker should be named by the title Son. If, on the other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not called God because it is external to the physis of the Son, it follows surely that he who is truly Son is Son and is confessed to be God because he is of the very physis of the one who begot him. But Eunomius abhors the idea of generation and excludes it from divine teaching, slandering the term through his fleshly speculations. Well, our discourse in what preceded showed sufficiently on this point that, as the Psalmist says, they are afraid where no fear is. For if it was shown in the case of human beings that not all generation exists by way of passion, but that material generation is by passion while spiritual generation is pure and incorruptible (for what is begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not flesh, and in spirit we see no condition subject to passion), since our author thought it necessary to estimate divine power by means of examples from ourselves, let him persuade himself to conceive the passionless character of the divine generation from this other mode of generation. Moreover, by mixing together these three terms, two of which are equivalent, he thinks that his readers, because of the shared meaning in the two phrases, will jump to the conclusion that the third is also equivalent. For since the designation product of making and product of creation indicate that the thing made is external to the physis of the maker, he couples with these the phrase product of generation, so that this too may be interpreted along with those mentioned above. But reasoning of this sort is called fraud and falsehood and deception, not a thoughtful and skillful demonstration. For only that is called demonstration which shows what is unknown from what is acknowledged; but to reason fraudulently and fallaciously, to conceal your own reproach, and to confound by superficial deceits the understanding of people, as the Apostle says, of corrupt minds, this no sane person would call a skillful demonstration.

By what reasoning then is it, and by what arguments, according to that invincible logic of his, that he wins back the opinion of the mass of men, and follows out at his pleasure this line of thought, that as the God Who is over all is conceived and spoken of both as Creator and as Father, the Son has a close connection with both titles, being equally called both product of creation and product of generation? For as customary accuracy of speech distinguishes between names of this kind, and applies the name of generation in the case of things generated from the essence itself, and understands that of creation of those things which are external to the nature of their maker, and as on this account the Divine doctrines, in handing down the knowledge of God, have delivered to us the names of Father and Son, not those of Creator and work, that there might arise no error tending to blasphemy (as might happen if an appellation of the latter kind repelled the Son to the position of an alien and a stranger), and that the impious doctrines which sever the Only-begotten from essential affinity with the Father might find no entrance — seeing all this, I say, he who declares that the appellation of product of making is one befitting the Son, will safely say by consequence that the name of Son is properly applicable to that which is the product of making; so that, if the Son is a product of making, the heaven is called Son, and the individual things that have been made are, according to our author, properly named by the appellation of Son. For if He has this name, not because He shares in nature with Him that begot Him, but is called Son for this reason, that He is created, the same argument will permit that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the will of their maker, should be named by the title of Son. If, on the other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not called God, by reason of its being external to the nature of the Son, it follows, surely, that He Who is truly Son is Son, and is confessed to be God by reason of His being of the very nature of Him that begot Him. But Eunomius abhors the idea of generation, and excludes it from the Divine doctrine, slandering the term by his fleshly speculations. Well, our discourse, in what precedes, showed sufficiently on this point that, as the Psalmist says, they are afraid where no fear is. For if it was shown in the case of men that not all generation exists by way of passion, but that that which is material is by passion, while that which is spiritual is pure and incorruptible, (for that which is begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not flesh, and in spirit we see no condition that is subject to passion,) since our author thought it necessary to estimate the Divine power by means of examples among ourselves, let him persuade himself to conceive from the other mode of generation the passionless character of the Divine generation. Moreover, by mixing up together these three names, of which two are equivalent, he thinks that his readers, by reason of the community of sense in the two phrases, will jump to the conclusion that the third is equivalent also. For since the appellation of product of making, and product of creation, indicate that the thing made is external to the nature of the maker, he couples with these the phrase, product of generation, that this too may be interpreted along with those above mentioned. But argument of this sort is termed fraud and falsehood and imposition, not a thoughtful and skilful demonstration. For that only is called demonstration which shows what is unknown from what is acknowledged; but to reason fraudulently and fallaciously, to conceal your own reproach, and to confound by superficial deceits the understanding of men, as the Apostle says, of corrupt minds 2 Timothy 3:8, this no sane man would call a skilful demonstration.

Let us move on to what comes next in order. He says that the generation of the essence is without intervention, and that it preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. Now, if he had spoken only of the immediate and indivisible character of the essence and stopped there, his statement would not have departed from the orthodox view, since we also confess the close connection and relation of the Son with the Father. We affirm that nothing is inserted between them that could intervene in the connection of the Son with the Father—no concept of interval, not even that tiny and indivisible one which, when time is divided into past, present, and future, is conceived by itself indivisibly as the present, since it cannot be considered part of either the past or the future because it is completely without dimensions, incapable of division, and undetectable no matter which side you might add it to. What is perfectly immediate, we say, admits no such intervention, because anything separated by any interval would no longer be immediate. Therefore, if our author, in saying that the generation of the Son is without intervention, excluded all these ideas, then he would have laid down the orthodox doctrine of the union of the Son with the Father. However, as if repenting immediately, he went on to add to his statement that the essence preserves its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. By doing this, he polluted his first statement with his second, vomiting his blasphemous utterance onto the pure doctrine. It is clear that his use of "without intervention" has no orthodox intention. One might say that the hammer is intermediate between the smith and the nail, but the making of the hammer itself is without intervention because, when tools had not yet been invented by the craft, the hammer came first directly from the craftsman's hands through some inventive process, not by means of any other tool, and then the other tools were made by it. In the same way, the phrase "without intervention" indicates that this is also our author's conception regarding the Only-begotten. Eunomius is not alone in his error regarding the enormity of his doctrine—you can also find a parallel in the works of Theognostus, who says that God, wishing to make this universe, first brought the Son into existence as a kind of model for creation. He does not realize that his statement involves this absurdity: that what exists not for its own sake but for the sake of something else is surely of less value than that for which it exists. Just as we provide a farming tool for the sake of life, yet the plough is surely not valued as equal to life itself. So if the Lord also exists for the sake of the world, and not all things for His sake, then the whole collection of things for which they say He exists would be more valuable than the Lord. This is what they are establishing by their argument when they insist that the Son has His relation to His Creator and Maker without intervention.

Let us proceed, however, to what follows in order. He says that the generation of the essence is without intervention, and that it preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator. Well, if he had spoken of the immediate and indivisible character of the essence, and stopped his discourse there, it would not have swerved from the orthodox view, since we too confess the close connection and relation of the Son with the Father, so that there is nothing inserted between them which is found to intervene in the connection of the Son with the Father, no conception of interval, not even that minute and indivisible one, which, when time is divided into past, present, and future, is conceived indivisibly by itself as the present, as it cannot be considered as a part either of the past or of the future, by reason of its being quite without dimensions and incapable of division, and unobservable, to whichever side it might be added. That, then, which is perfectly immediate, admits we say, of no such intervention; for that which is separated by any interval would cease to be immediate. If, therefore, our author, likewise, in saying that the generation of the Son is without intervention, excluded all these ideas, then he laid down the orthodox doctrine of the conjunction of Him Who is with the Father. When, however, as though in a fit of repentance, he straightway proceeded to add to what he had said that the essence preserves its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator, he polluted his first statement by his second, vomiting forth his blasphemous utterance upon the pure doctrine. For it is clear that there too his without intervention has no orthodox intention, but, as one might say that the hammer is mediate between the smith and the nail, but its own making is without intervention, because, when tools had not yet been found out by the craft, the hammer came first from the craftsman's hands by some inventive process, not by means of any other tool, and so by it the others were made; so the phrase, without intervention, indicates that this is also our author's conception touching the Only-begotten. And here Eunomius is not alone in his error as regards the enormity of his doctrine, but you may find a parallel also in the works of Theognostus, who says that God, wishing to make this universe, first brought the Son into existence as a sort of standard of the creation; not perceiving that in his statement there is involved this absurdity, that what exists, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, is surely of less value than that for the sake of which it exists: as we provide an implement of husbandry for the sake of life, yet the plough is surely not reckoned as equally valuable with life. So, if the Lord also exists on account of the world, and not all things on account of Him, the whole of the things for the sake of which they say He exists, would be more valuable than the Lord. And this is what they are here establishing by their argument, where they insist that the Son has His relation to His Creator and Maker without intervention.

In the rest of the passage, however, he becomes more agreeable and says that the essence is not compared with any of the things that were made by it and after it. These are the gifts that the enemies of the truth offer to the Lord, by which their blasphemy becomes even more obvious. Tell me, what else exists in all of creation that can be compared with something different from itself, since the characteristic nature that appears in each thing completely rejects having anything in common with things of a different kind? Heaven cannot be compared with earth, nor earth with the stars, nor the stars with the seas, nor water with stone, nor animals with trees, nor land animals with winged creatures, nor four-footed beasts with those that swim, nor irrational creatures with rational ones. In fact, why should anyone waste time on individual examples, showing that we can say about every single thing we see in creation exactly what was said about the Only-begotten, as if it were something special—that He cannot be compared with any of the things that have been produced after Him and by Him? For it is clear that everything you consider by itself cannot be compared with the universe or with the individual things that make it up. And this, which can be truly said of any creature you choose, is what the enemies of the truth assign to the Only-begotten God as adequate and sufficient for His honor and glory! And again, putting together similar phrases in the rest of the passage, he honors Him with empty titles, calling Him Lord and Only-begotten. But to prevent any orthodox meaning from being conveyed to his readers by these names, he quickly mixes blasphemy in with the more distinguished of them. His phrase goes like this: Since, he says, the generated essence leaves no room for anything else to share in it (for it is only-begotten), nor is the operation of the Maker contemplated as common. What amazing insolence! As though he were addressing animals or senseless beings without understanding, he twists his argument in contradictory ways as he pleases. Or rather, he suffers like people who are deprived of sight, for they too often behave in unseemly ways before the eyes of those who can see, supposing that because they themselves cannot see, they are also unseen. For what kind of person doesn't see the contradiction in his words? Because it is generated, he says, the essence leaves other things no room to share in it, for it is only-begotten. And then, when he has said these words, really as though he cannot see or doesn't think he is being seen, he adds on, as if they correspond to what he has said, things that have nothing in common with them, coupling the operation of the maker with the essence of the Only-begotten. What is generated is correlative to the generator, and the Only-begotten, surely, by consequence, to the Father. And someone who looks to the truth sees, in coordination with the Son, not the operation of the maker, but the physis of the One who begot Him. But he, as if he were talking about plants or seeds or some other created thing, places the operation of the maker alongside the existence of the Only-begotten. Why, if a stone or a stick or something of that sort were being discussed, it would be logical to presuppose the operation of the maker. But if the Only-begotten God is confessed, even by His adversaries, to be a Son and to exist by way of generation, how do the same words fit Him that fit the lowest parts of creation? How do they think it pious to say about the Lord the very same thing that can be truly said of an ant or a gnat? For if anyone understood the nature of an ant and its peculiarities in relation to other living things, he would not be wrong in saying that the operation of its maker is not contemplated as common in reference to other things. What is affirmed about such things as these, they also say about the Only-begotten. And just as hunters are said to block the path of their prey with holes and conceal their design by covering the mouths of the holes with some unsound and insubstantial material, so that the pit seems level with the surrounding ground, so heresy contrives something similar against people. They cover over the hole of their impiety with these fine-sounding and pious names, as it were with a level covering, so that those who are rather unintelligent, thinking that these men's preaching is the same as the true faith because their words agree, hasten toward the mere name of the Son and the Only-begotten and step into the emptiness of the hole, since the significance of these titles will not support the weight of their tread but lets them down into the pitfall of denying Christ. This is why he speaks of the generated essence that leaves nothing room to share in it and calls it Only-begotten. These are the coverings of the hole. But when anyone stops before being caught in the gulf and puts forth the test of argument, like a hand, upon his discourse, he sees the dangerous downfall of idolatry lying beneath the doctrine. For when he draws near, as though to God and the Son of God, he finds a creature of God set forth for his worship. This is why they loudly proclaim the name of the Only-begotten, so that the destruction may be readily accepted by the victims of their deceit—just as someone might mix poison into bread and give a deadly meal to those who asked for food, who would not have been willing to take the poison by itself if they had not been enticed by what they saw. So he has a sharp eye for the goal of his efforts, at least in his own opinion. For if he had entirely rejected the name of the Son from his teaching, his falsehood would not have been acceptable to people when his denial was openly stated in a clear proclamation. But now, leaving only the name and changing its meaning to express creation, he both sets up his idolatry and fraudulently hides its disgrace. But since we are commanded not to honor God with our lips, and piety is not tested by the sound of a word, but the Son must first be the object of belief in the heart unto righteousness and then be confessed with the mouth unto salvation, and those who say in their hearts that He is not God, even though with their mouths they confess Him as Lord, are corrupt and became abominable, as the prophet says—for this reason, I say, we must look to the mind of those who put forward, supposedly, the words of the faith, and not be enticed to follow their sound. If, then, someone who speaks of the Son does not by that word refer to a creature, he is on our side and not on the enemy's. But if anyone applies the name of Son to creation, he is to be ranked among idolaters. For they too gave the name of God to Dagon and Bel and the Dragon, but they did not on that account worship God. For the wood and the brass and the monster were not God.

In the remainder of the passage, however, he becomes conciliatory, and says that the essence is not compared with any of the things that were made by it and after it. Such are the gifts which the enemies of the truth offer to the Lord, by which their blasphemy is made more manifest. Tell me what else is there of all things in creation that admits of comparison with a different thing, seeing that the characteristic nature that appears in each absolutely rejects community with things of a different kind? The heaven admits no comparison with the earth, nor this with the stars, nor the stars with the seas, nor water with stone, nor animals with trees, nor land animals with winged creatures, nor four-footed beasts with those that swim, nor irrational with rational creatures. Indeed, why should one take up time with individual instances, in showing that we may say of every single thing that we behold in the creation, precisely what was thrown to the Only-begotten, as if it were something special — that He admits of comparison with none of the things that have been produced after Him and by Him? For it is clear that everything which you conceive by itself is incapable of comparison with the universe, and with the individual things which compose it; and it is this, which may be truly said of any creature you please, which is allotted by the enemies of the truth, as adequate and sufficient for His honour and glory, to the Only-begotten God! And once more, putting together phrases of the same sort in the remainder of the passage, he dignifies Him with his empty honours, calling Him Lord and Only-begotten: but that no orthodox meaning may be conveyed to his readers by these names, he promptly mixes up blasphemy with the more notable of them. His phrase runs thus:– Inasmuch, he says, as the generated essence leaves no room for community to anything else (for it is only-begotten), nor is the operation of the Maker contemplated as common. O marvellous insolence! As though he were addressing his harangue to brutes, or senseless beings which have no understanding, he twists his argument about in contrary ways, as he pleases; or rather he suffers as men do who are deprived of sight; for they too behave often in unseemly ways before the eyes of those who see, supposing, because they themselves cannot see, that they are also unseen. For what sort of man is it who does not see the contradiction in his words? Because it is generated, he says, the essence leaves other things no room for community, for it is only-begotten; and then when he has uttered these words, really as though he did not see or did not suppose himself to be seen, he tacks on, as if corresponding to what he has said, things that have nothing in common with them, coupling the operation of the maker with the essence of the Only-begotten. That which is generated is correlative to the generator, and the Only-begotten, surely, by consequence, to the Father; and he who looks to the truth beholds, in co-ordination with the Son, not the operation of the maker, but the nature of Him that begot Him. But he, as if he were talking about plants or seeds, or some other thing in the order of creation, sets the operation of the maker by the side of the existence of the Only-begotten. Why, if a stone or a stick, or something of that sort, were the subject of consideration, it would be logical to pre-suppose the operation of the maker; but if the Only-begotten God is confessed, even by His adversaries, to be a Son, and to exist by way of generation, how do the same words befit Him that befit the lowest portions of the creation? How do they think it pious to say concerning the Lord the very thing which may be truly said of an ant or a gnat? For if any one understood the nature of an ant, and its peculiar ties in reference to other living things, he would not be beyond the truth in saying that the operation of its maker is not contemplated as common with reference to the other things. What, therefore, is affirmed of such things as these, this they predicate also of the Only-begotten, and as hunters are said to intercept the passage of their game with holes, and to conceal their design by covering over the mouths of the holes with some unsound and unsubstantial material, in order that the pit may seem level with the ground about it, so heresy contrives against men something of the same sort, covering over the hole of their impiety with these fine-sounding and pious names, as it were with a level thatch, so that those who are rather unintelligent, thinking that these men's preaching is the same with the true faith, because of the agreement of their words, hasten towards the mere name of the Son and the Only-begotten, and step into emptiness in the hole, since the significance of these titles will not sustain the weight of their tread, but lets them down into the pitfall of the denial of Christ. This is why he speaks of the generated essence that leaves nothing room for community, and calls it Only-begotten. These are the coverings of the hole. But when any one stops before he is caught in the gulf, and puts forth the test of argument, like a hand, upon his discourse, he sees the dangerous downfall of idolatry lying beneath the doctrine. For when he draws near, as though to God and the Son of God, he finds a creature of God set forth for his worship. This is why they proclaim high and low the name of the Only-begotten, that the destruction may be readily accepted by the victims of their deceit, as though one were to mix up poison in bread, and give a deadly greeting to those who asked for food, who would not have been willing to take the poison by itself, had they not been enticed to what they saw. Thus he has a sharp eye to the object of his efforts, at least so far as his own opinion goes. For if he had entirely rejected from his teaching the name of the Son, his falsehood would not have been acceptable to men, when his denial was openly stated in a definite proclamation; but now leaving only the name, and changing the signification of it to express creation, he at once sets up his idolatry, and fraudulently hides its reproach. But since we are bidden not to honour God with our lips, and piety is not tested by the sound of a word, but the Son must first be the object of belief in the heart unto righteousness, and then be confessed with the mouth unto salvation, and those who say in their hearts that He is not God, even though with their mouths they confess Him as Lord, are corrupt and became abominable, as the prophet says — for this cause, I say, we must look to the mind of those who put forward, forsooth, the words of the faith, and not be enticed to follow their sound. If, then, one who speaks of the Son does not by that word refer to a creature, he is on our side and not on the enemy's; but if any one applies the name of Son to the creation, he is to be ranked among idolaters. For they too gave the name of God to Dagon and Bel and the Dragon, but they did not on that account worship God. For the wood and the brass and the monster were not God.

But what need is there in our argument to expose his hidden deceit by merely guessing at his intention, and possibly to give our hearers opportunities for objection on the ground that we make these accusations against our enemies falsely? For look, he sets forth his blasphemy to us openly, not concealing his deception with any veil, but speaking boldly in his absurdities with unrestrained voice. What he has written is as follows: We, for our part, he says, since we find nothing else besides the ousia of the Son which admits of the generation, are of the opinion that we must assign these names to the ousia itself, or else we speak of 'Son' and 'begotten' to no purpose, and as a mere verbal matter, if we are really to separate them from the ousia; starting from these names, we also confidently maintain that the ousiai are different from each other.

But what need is there in our discourse to reveal his hidden deceit by mere guesses at his intention, and possibly to give our hearers occasions for objection, on the ground that we make these charges against our enemies untruly? For lo, he sets forth to us his blasphemy in its nakedness, not hiding his guile by any veil, but speaking boldly in his absurdities with unrestrained voice. What he has written runs thus:– We, for our part, he says, as we find nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the generation, are of opinion that we must assign the appellations to the essence itself, or else we speak of 'Son' and 'begotten' to no purpose, and as a mere verbal matter, if we are really to separate them from the essence; starting from these names, we also confidently maintain that the essences are variant from each other.

There is no need, I imagine, for the absurdity he has set forth to be refuted by arguments from us. The mere reading of what he has written is enough to expose his blasphemy. But let us examine it this way. He says that the essences of the Father and the Son are variant. What does variant mean? Let us first examine the force of the term by itself, so that by interpreting the word its blasphemous character may be more clearly revealed. The term variance is used, in the inexact sense sanctioned by custom, of bodies when, by palsy or any other disease, any limb is twisted away from its natural coordination. For we speak, comparing the state of suffering with that of health, of the condition of one who has been subjected to a change for the worse, as being a variation from his usual health. And in the case of those who differ in respect of virtue and vice, comparing the licentious life with that of purity and temperance, or the unjust life with that of justice, or the life which is passionate, warlike, and given over to anger, with that which is mild and peaceful—and generally all that is reproached with vice, as compared with what is more excellent, is said to exhibit variance from it, because the characteristics observed in both—in the good, I mean, and the inferior—do not mutually agree. Again, we say that those qualities observed in the elements are at variance which are mutually opposed as contraries, having a power that is reciprocally destructive, such as heat and cold, or dryness and moisture, or, generally, anything that is opposed to another as a contrary. And the absence of union in these we express by the term variation. And generally everything which is out of harmony with another in their observed characteristics is said to be at variance with it, as health with disease, life with death, war with peace, virtue with vice, and all similar cases.

There is no need, I imagine, that the absurdity here laid down should be refuted by arguments from us. The mere reading of what he has written is enough to pillory his blasphemy. But let us thus examine it. He says that the essences of the Father and the Son are variant. What is meant by variant? Let us first of all examine the force of the term as it is applied by itself, that by the interpretation of the word its blasphemous character may be more clearly revealed. The term variance is used, in the inexact sense sanctioned by custom, of bodies, when, by palsy or any other disease, any limb is perverted from its natural co-ordination. For we speak, comparing the state of suffering with that of health, of the condition of one who has been subjected to a change for the worse, as being a variation from his usual health; and in the case of those who differ in respect of virtue and vice, comparing the licentious life with that of purity and temperance, or the unjust life with that of justice, or the life which is passionate, warlike, and prodigal of anger, with that which is mild and peaceful — and generally all that is reproached with vice, as compared with what is more excellent, is said to exhibit variance from it, because the marks observed in both — in the good, I mean, and the inferior — do not mutually agree. Again, we say that those qualities observed in the elements are at variance which are mutually opposed as contraries, having a power reciprocally destructive, as heat and cold, or dryness and moisture, or, generally, anything that is opposed to another as a contrary; and the absence of union in these we express by the term variation; and generally everything which is out of harmony with another in their observed characteristics, is said to be at variance with it, as health with disease, life with death, war with peace, virtue with vice, and all similar cases.

Now that we have analyzed these expressions, let us also consider in what sense our author says that the essences of the Father and the Son are variant from each other. What does he mean by this? Is it in the sense that the Father exists according to nature, while the Son varies from that nature? Or does he use this word to express the perversion of virtue, separating the evil from the more excellent by the name of variation, so as to regard one essence as good and the other in a contrary aspect? Or does he claim that one divine essence is also variant from another, in the manner of the opposition of the elements? Or just as war stands opposed to peace and life to death, does he also perceive in the essences the conflict that exists among all such things, so that they cannot unite with one another because the mixture of contraries exerts a consuming force upon the things mingled, as the wisdom of Proverbs says of such teaching, that water and fire never say "It is enough," expressing enigmatically the nature of contraries of equal force and equal balance and their mutual destruction? Or does he see variance in the essences in none of these ways? Let him tell us, then, what he conceives besides these. He could not say, I think, even if he were to repeat his usual phrase, "The Son is variant from Him Who begot Him," for this only shows the absurdity of his statements more clearly. For what mutual relation is so closely and harmoniously engrafted and fitted together as the relationship to the Father expressed by the word Son? And proof of this is that even if both of these names are not spoken, the one that is omitted is implied by the one that is uttered, so closely is one implied in the other and concordant with it, and both are so discerned in the one that one cannot be conceived without the other. Now that which is at variance is surely conceived and called such in opposition to that which is in harmony, just as the plumb line is in harmony with the straight line, while what is crooked, when set beside what is straight, does not harmonize with it. Musicians also are accustomed to call the agreement of notes harmony, and that which is out of tune and discordant inharmonious. To speak of things as at variance, then, is the same as to speak of them as out of harmony. If, therefore, the nature of the Only-begotten God is at variance, to use the heretical phrase, with the essence of the Father, it is surely not in harmony with it, and inharmoniousness cannot exist where there is no possibility of harmony. For the case is like when the figure in the wax and in the engraving of the signet are one, the wax that has been stamped by the signet, when it is fitted again to the latter, makes the impression on itself accord with what surrounds it, filling up the hollows and matching the projections of the engraving with its own patterns. But if some strange and different pattern is fitted to the engraving of the signet, it makes its own form rough and confused by rubbing off its figure on an engraved surface that does not correspond with it. But He Who is in the form of God has been formed by no impression different from the Father, seeing that He is the express image of the Father's Person, while the form of God is surely the same thing as His essence. For just as, being made in the form of a servant, He was formed in the essence of a servant, not taking upon Himself the form merely apart from the essence, but the essence is involved in the sense of form, so surely he who says that He is in the form of God signified essence by form. If, therefore, He is in the form of God, and being in the Father is sealed with the Father's glory (as the word of the Gospel declares, which says, "Him has God the Father sealed"—from which also comes "He that has seen Me has seen the Father"), then the image of goodness and the brightness of glory, and all other similar titles, testify that the essence of the Son is not out of harmony with the Father. Thus by the text cited the insubstantial character of the adversaries' blasphemy is shown. For if things at variance are not in harmony, and He Who is sealed by the Father and displays the Father in Himself, both being in the Father and having the Father in Himself, shows in all points His close relation and harmony, then the absurdity of the opposing views is overwhelmingly shown. For just as that which is at variance was shown to be out of harmony, so conversely that which is harmonious is surely confessed beyond dispute not to be at variance. For just as that which is at variance is not harmonious, so the harmonious is not at variance. Moreover, he who says that the nature of the Only-begotten is at variance with the good essence of the Father clearly has in view variation in the good itself. But as for what that is which is at variance with the good—O you simple, as the Proverb says, understand his craftiness!

Now that we have thus analyzed these expressions, let us also consider in regard to our author in what sense he says that the essences of the Father and the Son are variant from each other. What does he mean by it? Is it in the sense that the Father is according to nature, while the Son varies from that nature? Or does he express by this word the perversion of virtue, separating the evil from the more excellent by the name of variation, so as to regard the one essence in a good, the other in a contrary aspect? Or does he assert that one Divine essence also is variant from another, in the manner of the opposition of the elements? Or as war stands to peace, and life to death, does he also perceive in the essences the conflict which so exists among all such things, so that they cannot unite one with another, because the mixture of contraries exerts upon the things mingled a consuming force, as the wisdom of the Proverbs says of such a doctrine, that water and fire never say It is enough, expressing enigmatically the nature of contraries of equal force and equal balance, and their mutual destruction? Or is it in none of these ways that he sees variance in the essences? Let him tell us, then, what he conceives besides these. He could not say, I take it, even if he were to repeat his wonted phrase, The Son is variant from Him Who begot Him; for thereby the absurdity of his statements is yet more clearly shown. For what mutual relation is so closely and concordantly engrafted and fitted together as that meaning of relation to the Father expressed by the word Son? And a proof of this is that even if both of these names be not spoken, that which is omitted is connoted by the one that is uttered, so closely is the one implied in the other, and concordant with it: and both of them are so discerned in the one that one cannot be conceived without the other. Now that which is at variance is surely so conceived and so called, in opposition to that which is in harmony, as the plumb-line is in harmony with the straight line, while that which is crooked, when set beside that which is straight, does not harmonize with it. Musicians also are wont to call the agreement of notes harmony, and that which is out of tune and discordant inharmonious. To speak of things as at variance, then, is the same as to speak of them as out of harmony. If, therefore, the nature of the Only-begotten God is at variance, to use the heretical phrase, with the essence of the Father, it is surely not in harmony with it: and inharmoniousness cannot exist where there is no possibility of harmony. For the case is as when, the figure in the wax and in the graying of the signet being one, the wax that has been stamped by the signet, when it is fitted again to the latter, makes the impression on itself accord with that which surrounds it, filling up the hollows and accommodating the projections of the engraving with its own patterns: but if some strange and different pattern is fitted to the engraving of the signet, it makes its own form rough and confused, by rubbing off its figure on an engraved surface that does not correspond with it. But He Who is in the form of God Philippians 2:6 has been formed by no impression different from the Father, seeing that He is the express image of the Father's Person Hebrews 1:3, while the form of God is surely the same thing as His essence. For as, being made in the form of a servant Philippians 2:7, He was formed in the essence of a servant, not taking upon Him the form merely, apart from the essence, but the essence is involved in the sense of form, so, surely, he who says that He is in the form of God signified essence by form. If, therefore, He is in the form of God, and being in the Father is sealed with the Father's glory, (as the word of the Gospel declares, which says, Him has God the Father sealed, — whence also He that has seen Me has seen the Father,) then the image of goodness and the brightness of glory, and all other similar titles, testify that the essence of the Son is not out of harmony with the Father. Thus by the text cited is shown the insubstantial character of the adversaries' blasphemy. For if things at variance are not in harmony, and He Who is sealed by the Father, and displays the Father in Himself, both being in the Father, and having the Father in Himself, shows in all points His close relation and harmony, then the absurdity of the opposing views is hereby overwhelmingly shown. For as that which is at variance was shown to be out of harmony, so conversely that which is harmonious is surely confessed beyond dispute not to be at variance. For as that which is at variance is not harmonious, so the harmonious is not at variance. Moreover, he who says that the nature of the Only-begotten is at variance with the good essence of the Father, clearly has in view variation in the good itself. But as for what that is which is at variance with the good — O you simple, as the Proverb says, understand his craftiness!

I will pass over these matters, however, since the absurdity involved is obvious. Let us examine what comes before this. He says that nothing else is found, besides the essence of the Son, which admits of the generation. What does he mean when he says this? He distinguishes two names from each other, and by separating in his argument the things signified by them, he sets each of them individually apart by itself. The generation is one name, and the essence is another. The essence, he tells us, admits of the generation, being therefore of course something distinct from the generation. For if the generation were the essence (which is the very thing he is constantly claiming), so that the two terms are equivalent in meaning, he would not have said that the essence admits of the generation. For that would be the same as saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the generation the generation—if, that is, the generation were the same thing as the essence. He understands, then, the generation to be one thing, and the essence to be another, which admits of generation. For that which is received cannot be the same as that which receives it. Well, this is what the wise and systematic statement of our author says. But as to whether there is any sense in his words, let the person who is expert in judging consider this. I will now quote his actual words.

I will pass by these matters, however, as the absurdity involved is evident; let us examine what precedes. He says that nothing else is found, besides the essence of the Son, which admits of the generation. What does he mean when he says this? He distinguishes two names from each other, and separating by his discourse the things signified by them, he sets each of them individually apart by itself. The generation is one name, and the essence is another. The essence, he tells us, admits of the generation, being therefore of course something distinct from the generation. For if the generation were the essence (which is the very thing he is constantly declaring), so that the two appellations are equivalent in sense, he would not have said that the essence admits of the generation: for that would amount to saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the generation the generation — if, that is, the generation were the same thing as the essence. He understands, then, the generation to be one thing, and the essence to be another, which admits of generation: for that which is taken cannot be the same with that which admits it. Well, this is what the sage and systematic statement of our author says: but as to whether there is any sense in his words, let him consider who is expert in judging. I will resume his actual words.

He says that he finds nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the generation. However, it is clear to everyone who hears his statement that his words make no sense. The remaining task seems to be to expose the blasphemy he is trying to construct with the help of these meaningless words. For he wants, even if he cannot accomplish his purpose, to create in his listeners through this careless way of speaking the idea that the essence of the Son is the result of construction. But he calls this construction generation, dressing up his horrible blasphemy with the most attractive language, so that if construction is what the word generation means, the idea that the Lord was created may be readily accepted. He says, then, that the essence admits of generation, so that every construction may be viewed as happening in some underlying material. For no one would say that something which has no existence is constructed—thus he extends making in his argument, as if it were some constructed object, to the physis of the Only-begotten God. If, then, he says it admits of this generation, he wishes to convey some meaning like this: that it would not have existed had it not been constructed. But what else is there among the things we observe in creation that exists without being made? Heaven, earth, air, sea, everything whatever that exists, surely exists by being made. How, then, does he consider it a distinctive feature of the physis of the Only-begotten that it admits generation (for this is his term for making) into its actual ousia, as though the bumblebee or the gnat did not admit generation into itself, but into something else besides itself? It is therefore acknowledged by his own writings that through them the ousia of the Only-begotten is placed on the same level as the smallest parts of creation, and every argument by which he attempts to establish the alienation of the Son from the Father has the same force also in the case of individual things. What need does he have, then, for this elaborate cleverness to establish the diversity of physis, when he ought to have taken the direct route of denial by openly declaring that the name of the Son ought not to be confessed, or the Only-begotten God to be preached in the churches, but that we ought to regard Jewish worship as superior to the faith of Christians, and, while we confess the Father as being alone Creator and Maker of the world, to reduce all other things to the name and concept of creation, and among these to speak of that work which preceded the rest as a thing made, which came into being by some constructive operation, and to give him the title of First-created, instead of Only-begotten and Very Son? For when these opinions have won the day, it will be very easy to bring doctrines to a conclusion in agreement with the goal they have in view, when all are guided, as you would expect from such a principle, to the conclusion that it is impossible for him who is neither begotten nor a Son, but has his existence through some energy, to share in ousia with God. However, as long as the declarations of the Gospel prevail, by which he is proclaimed as Son, and Only-begotten, and of the Father, and of God, and the like, Eunomius will talk his nonsense to no purpose, leading himself and his followers astray by such idle chatter. For while the title of Son speaks aloud the true relation to the Father, who is so foolish that, while John and Paul and the rest of the choir of the saints proclaim these words—words of truth, and words that point to the close affinity—he does not look to them, but is led by the empty rattle of Eunomius's sophisms to think that Eunomius is a truer guide than the teaching of those who by the Spirit speak mysteries, and who bear Christ in themselves? Why, who is this Eunomius? From where was he raised up to be the guide of Christians?

He says that he finds nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the generation; that there is no sense in his words however, is clear to every one who hears his statement at all: the task which remains seems to be to bring to light the blasphemy which he is trying to construct by aid of these meaningless words. For he desires, even if he cannot effect his purpose, to produce in his hearers by this slackness of expression, the notion that the essence of the Son is the result of construction: but he calls its construction generation, decking out his horrible blasphemy with the fairest phrase, that if construction is the meaning conveyed by the word generation, the idea of the creation of the Lord may receive a ready assent. He says, then, that the essence admits of generation, so that every construction may be viewed, as it were, in some subject matter. For no one would say that that is constructed which has no existence, so extending making in his discourse, as if it were some constructed fabric, to the nature of the Only-begotten God. If, then, he says, it admits of this generation, — wishing to convey some such meaning as this, that it would not have been, had it not been constructed. But what else is there among the things we contemplate in the creation which is without being made? Heaven, earth, air, sea, everything whatever that is, surely is by being made. How, then, comes it that he considered it a peculiarity in the nature of the Only begotten, that it admits generation (for this is his name for making) into its actual essence, as though the humble-bee or the gnat did not admit generation into itself, but into something else besides itself. It is therefore acknowledged by his own writings, that by them the essence of the Only-begotten is placed on the same level with the smallest parts of the creation: and every proof by which he attempts to establish the alienation of the Son from the Father has the same force also in the case of individual things. What need has he, then, for this varied acuteness to establish the diversity of nature, when he ought to have taken the short cut of denial, by openly declaring that the name of the Son ought not to be confessed, or the Only-begotten God to be preached in the churches, but that we ought to esteem the Jewish worship as superior to the faith of Christians, and, while we confess the Father as being alone Creator and Maker of the world, to reduce all other things to the name and conception of the creation, and among these to speak of that work which preceded the rest as a thing made, which came into being by some constructive operation, and to give Him the title of First created, instead of Only-begotten and Very Son. For when these opinions have carried the day, it will be a very easy matter to bring doctrines to a conclusion in agreement with the aim they have in view, when all are guided, as you might expect from such a principle, to the consequence that it is impossible that He Who is neither begotten nor a Son, but has His existence through some energy, should share in essence with God. So long, however, as the declarations of the Gospel prevail, by which He is proclaimed as Son, and Only-begotten, and of the Father, and of God, and the like, Eunomius will talk his nonsense to no purpose, leading himself and his followers astray by such idle chatter. For while the title of Son speaks aloud the true relation to the Father, who is so foolish that, while John and Paul and the rest of the choir of the Saints proclaim these words — words of truth, and words that point to the close affinity — he does not look to them, but is led by the empty rattle of Eunomius' sophisms to think that Eunomius is a truer guide than the teaching of these who by the Spirit speak mysteries 1 Corinthians 14:2, and who bear Christ in themselves? Why, who is this Eunomius? Whence was he raised up to be the guide of Christians?

But let all this pass, and let our concern for what lies ahead calm down our heart, which is swollen with zeal on behalf of the faith against the blasphemers. For how is it possible not to be moved to anger and hatred while our God, and Lord, and Life-giver, and Savior is insulted by these wretched men? If he had insulted my father according to the flesh, or been hostile to my benefactor, would it have been possible to bear without emotion his anger against those I love? And if the Lord of my soul, who gave it being when it was not, and redeemed it when in bondage, and gave me to taste of this present life, and prepared for me the life to come, who calls us to a kingdom, and gives us his commands that we may escape the damnation of hell—these are small things that I speak of, and not worthy to express the greatness of our common Lord—he who is worshipped by all creation, by things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, by whom stand the unnumbered myriads of the heavenly ministers, to whom is turned all that is under rule here and that has the desire of good—if he is exposed to insults by men, for whom it is not enough to associate themselves with the party of the apostate, but who count it loss not to draw others by their writings into the same gulf with themselves, so that those who come after may not lack a hand to lead them to destruction, is there anyone who blames us for our anger against these men? But let us return to the sequence of his discourse.

But let all this pass, and let our earnestness about what lies before us calm down our heart, that is swollen with jealousy on behalf of the faith against the blasphemers. For how is it possible not to be moved to wrath and hatred, while our God, and Lord, and Life-giver, and Saviour is insulted by these wretched men? If he had reviled my father according to the flesh, or been at enmity with my benefactor, would it have been possible to bear without emotion his anger against those I love? And if the Lord of my soul, Who gave it being when it was not, and redeemed it when in bondage, and gave me to taste of this present life, and prepared for me the life to come, Who calls us to a kingdom, and gives us His commands that we may escape the damnation of hell — these are small things that I speak of, and not worthy to express the greatness of our common Lord — He that is worshipped by all creation, by things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, by Whom stand the unnumbered myriads of the heavenly ministers, to Whom is turned all that is under rule here, and that has the desire of good — if He is exposed to reviling by men, for whom it is not enough to associate themselves with the party of the apostate, but who count it loss not to draw others by their scribbling into the same gulf with themselves, that those who come after may not lack a hand to lead them to destruction, is there any one who blames us for our anger against these men? But let us return to the sequence of his discourse.

He then proceeds once more to slander us as dishonoring the generation of the Son through human comparisons, and mentions what was written on these points by our father, where he says that while the word "Son" signifies two things—being formed through passion and the true relationship to the one who begets—he does not accept in discussions about divine things the former sense, which is unseemly and fleshly, but insofar as the latter serves to testify to the glory of the Only-begotten, this alone has a place in the sublime doctrines. Who, then, dishonors the generation of the Son through human notions? The one who removes far from the divine generation what belongs to passion and to humanity, and joins the Son impassibly to the one who begot him? Or the one who places him who brought all things into being on the same level as the lower creation? Such an idea, however, it seems—that of associating the Son with the majesty of the Father—this new wisdom seems to regard as dishonoring, while it considers as great and sublime the act of bringing him down to equality with the creation that is in bondage with us. Empty complaints! Basil is slandered as dishonoring the Son, who honors him even as he honors the Father, and Eunomius is the champion of the Only-begotten, who severs him from the good physis of the Father! Such a reproach Paul also once incurred with the Athenians, being charged by them as a setter forth of strange gods, when he was reproving the wandering among their gods of those who were mad in their idolatry and was leading them to the truth, preaching the resurrection by the Son. These charges are now brought against Paul's follower by the new Stoics and Epicureans, who spend their time in nothing else, as the history says of the Athenians, but either to tell or to hear some new thing. For what could be found newer than this—a Son of an energy, and a Father of a creature, and a new God springing up from nothing, and good at variance with good? These are they who claim to honor him with due honor by saying that he is not what the physis of the one who begot him is. Is Eunomius not ashamed of the form of such honor, if one were to say that he himself is not akin in physis to his father, but has community with something of another kind? If he who brings the Lord of the creation into community with the creation declares that he honors him by doing so, let him also himself be honored by having community assigned to him with what is brute and senseless. But if he finds community with an inferior physis harsh and insolent treatment, how is it honor for him who, as the prophet says, rules with his power forever, to be ranked with that physis which is in subjection and bondage? But enough of this.

He next proceeds once more to slander us as dishonouring the generation of the Son by human similitudes, and mentions what was written on these points by our father, where he says that while by the word Son two things are signified, the being formed by passion, and the true relationship to the begetter, he does not admit in discourses upon things divine the former sense, which is unseemly and carnal, but in so far as the latter tends to testify to the glory of the Only-begotten, this alone finds a place in the sublime doctrines. Who, then, dishonours the generation of the Son by human notions? He who sets far from the Divine generation what belongs to passion and to man, and joins the Son impassibly to Him that begot Him? Or he who places Him Who brought all things into being on a common level with the lower creation? Such an idea, however, as it seems — that of associating the Son in the majesty of the Father — this new wisdom seems to regard as dishonouring; while it considers as great and sublime the act of bringing Him down to equality with the creation that is in bondage with us. Empty complaints! Basil is slandered as dishonouring the Son, who honours Him even as he honours the Father, and Eunomius is the champion of the Only-begotten, who severs Him from the good nature of the Father! Such a reproach Paul also once incurred with the Athenians, being charged therewith by them as a setter forth of strange gods Acts 17:18, when he was reproving the wandering among their gods of those who were mad in their idolatry, and was leading them to the truth, preaching the resurrection by the Son. These charges are now brought against Paul's follower by the new Stoics and Epicureans, who spend their time in nothing else, as the history says of the Athenians, but either to tell or to hear some new thing Acts 17:21. For what could be found newer than this — a Son of an energy, and a Father of a creature, and a new God springing up from nothing, and good at variance with good? These are they who profess to honour Him with due honour by saying that He is not that which the nature of Him that begot Him is. Is Eunomius not ashamed of the form of such honour, if one were to say that he himself is not akin in nature to his father, but has community with something of another kind? If he who brings the Lord of the creation into community with the creation declares that he honours Him by so doing, let him also himself be honoured by having community assigned him with what is brute and senseless: but, if he finds community with an inferior nature hard and insolent treatment, how is it honour for Him Who, as the prophet says, rules with His power for ever, to be ranked with that nature which is in subjection and bondage? But enough of this.