Confessions — Book III

Student years at Carthage: the theatre, Cicero’s Hortensius awakens the love of wisdom, and he falls in with the Manichees.

Of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth years of his age, passed at Carthage, when, having completed his course of studies, he is caught in the snares of a licentious passion, and falls into the errors of the Manichæans.

Source: Translated by J.G. Pilkington. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 1. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110103.htm>.

Contents · 12 chapters
  1. Chapter 1. Deluded by an Insane Love, He, Though Foul and Dishonourable, Desires to Be Thought Elegant and Urbane.
  2. Chapter 2. In Public Spectacles He is Moved by an Empty Compassion. He is Attacked by a Troublesome Spiritual Disease.
  3. Chapter 3. Not Even When at Church Does He Suppress His Desires. In the School of Rhetoric He Abhors the Acts of the Subverters.
  4. Chapter 4. In the Nineteenth Year of His Age (His Father Having Died Two Years Before) He is Led by the Hortensius Of Cicero to Philosophy, To God, and a Better Mode of Thinking.
  5. Chapter 5. He Rejects the Sacred Scriptures as Too Simple, and as Not to Be Compared with the Dignity of Tully.
  6. Chapter 6. Deceived by His Own Fault, He Falls into the Errors of the Manichæans, Who Gloried in the True Knowledge of God and in a Thorough Examination of Things.
  7. Chapter 7. He Attacks the Doctrine of the Manichæans Concerning Evil, God, and the Righteousness of the Patriarchs.
  8. Chapter 8. He Argues Against the Same as to the Reason of Offences.
  9. Chapter 9. That the Judgment of God and Men as to Human Acts of Violence, is Different.
  10. Chapter 10. He Reproves the Triflings of the Manichæans as to the Fruits of the Earth.
  11. Chapter 11. He Refers to the Tears, and the Memorable Dream Concerning Her Son, Granted by God to His Mother.
  12. Chapter 12. The Excellent Answer of the Bishop When Referred to by His Mother as to the Conversion of Her Son.

Chapter 1. Deluded by an Insane Love, He, Though Foul and Dishonourable, Desires to Be Thought Elegant and Urbane.

I came to Carthage, where a cauldron of unholy loves boiled up all around me. I did not yet love, but I loved the idea of loving, and from a hidden need, I hated myself for not wanting anything. I searched for something to love because I was in love with loving, and I hated security and any path that had no traps. Within me there was a lack of that inward food—You, my God—though this lack caused me no hunger. I had no desire for incorruptible food, not because I was already full of it, but the emptier I was, the more I despised it. For this reason my soul was sick, and covered with sores, it miserably threw itself outward, craving to be stimulated by contact with physical things. Yet if these things had no soul, they surely would not inspire love. To love and to be loved was sweet to me, especially when I succeeded in enjoying the person I loved. So I polluted the spring of friendship with the filth of lust, and I darkened its brightness with the hell of sexual desire. And yet, though I was foul and dishonorable, I wanted, because of excessive vanity, to be thought elegant and refined. So I fell headlong into the love I longed to be trapped in. My God, my mercy, with how much bitterness did You, out of Your infinite goodness, mix into that sweetness for me! For I was both loved and secretly reached the point of enjoying that bond, and I was joyfully bound with troublesome chains, so that I might be whipped with the burning iron rods of jealousy, suspicion, fear, anger, and conflict.

1. To Carthage I came, where a cauldron of unholy loves bubbled up all around me. I loved not as yet, yet I loved to love; and with a hidden want, I abhorred myself that I wanted not. I searched about for something to love, in love with loving, and hating security, and a way not beset with snares. For within me I had a dearth of that inward food, Yourself, my God, though that dearth caused me no hunger; but I remained without all desire for incorruptible food, not because I was already filled thereby, but the more empty I was the more I loathed it. For this reason my soul was far from well, and, full of ulcers, it miserably cast itself forth, craving to be excited by contact with objects of sense. Yet, had these no soul, they would not surely inspire love. To love and to be loved was sweet to me, and all the more when I succeeded in enjoying the person I loved. I befouled, therefore, the spring of friendship with the filth of concupiscence, and I dimmed its lustre with the hell of lustfulness; and yet, foul and dishonourable as I was, I craved, through an excess of vanity, to be thought elegant and urbane. I fell precipitately, then, into the love in which I longed to be ensnared. My God, my mercy, with how much bitterness did You, out of Your infinite goodness, besprinkle for me that sweetness! For I was both beloved, and secretly arrived at the bond of enjoying; and was joyfully bound with troublesome ties, that I might be scourged with the burning iron rods of jealousy, suspicion, fear, anger, and strife.

Chapter 2. In Public Spectacles He is Moved by an Empty Compassion. He is Attacked by a Troublesome Spiritual Disease.

Stage-plays also attracted me, full of images of my miseries and fuel for my fire. Why does a person enjoy feeling sad when watching sorrowful and tragic scenes that he would never want to experience himself? Yet as a spectator, he wants to feel grief from them, and his pleasure consists in this very grief. What is this but miserable insanity? For a person is more deeply affected by these actions the less free he is from such emotions. However, when he suffers in his own life, we call it misery, but when he feels compassion for others, we call it mercy. But what kind of mercy arises from fictional and theatrical emotions? The audience member is not called to provide help, but merely invited to feel grief. And the more he grieves, the more he applauds the actor performing these fictions. And if the misfortunes of the characters—whether from ancient times or purely imaginary—are presented in a way that doesn't move the spectator's feelings, he leaves disgusted and critical. But if his feelings are moved, he stays watching attentively and sheds tears of joy.

2. Stage-plays also drew me away, full of representations of my miseries and of fuel to my fire. Why does man like to be made sad when viewing doleful and tragical scenes, which yet he himself would by no means suffer? And yet he wishes, as a spectator, to experience from them a sense of grief, and in this very grief his pleasure consists. What is this but wretched insanity? For a man is more affected with these actions, the less free he is from such affections. Howsoever, when he suffers in his own person, it is the custom to style it misery but when he compassionates others, then it is styled mercy. But what kind of mercy is it that arises from fictitious and scenic passions? The hearer is not expected to relieve, but merely invited to grieve; and the more he grieves, the more he applauds the actor of these fictions. And if the misfortunes of the characters (whether of olden times or merely imaginary) be so represented as not to touch the feelings of the spectator, he goes away disgusted and censorious; but if his feelings be touched, he sits it out attentively, and sheds tears of joy.

Do we actually love sorrows, then? Surely everyone wants to be happy? Or is it that while man wishes to be miserable, he still takes pleasure in being merciful—and because mercy cannot exist without suffering, is that the only reason we love such feelings? This also comes from that spring of friendship. But where does it go? Where does it flow? Why does it run into that stream of boiling tar, churning out those massive waves of foul desires, into which it is changed and transformed, willingly cast down and corrupted from its heavenly purity? Should mercy be rejected, then? Absolutely not. Let us therefore sometimes love sorrows. But guard against impurity, O my soul, under the protection of my God, the God of our fathers, who is to be praised and exalted above all forever—guard against impurity. For I have not now stopped having compassion, but back then in the theaters I sympathized with lovers when they sinfully enjoyed each other, even though this was merely fictional in the play. And when they lost each other, I grieved with them as if pitying them, yet I took pleasure in both situations. But nowadays I feel much more pity for the one who delights in his wickedness than for the one who is thought to be suffering hardship by failing to obtain some destructive pleasure and losing some wretched happiness. This, surely, is the truer mercy, but it takes no delight in grief. For though the one who grieves with the unhappy is commended for his work of charity, the one who has real compassion would rather there be nothing for him to grieve about. For if goodwill could be ill-willed (which it cannot), then the person who is truly and sincerely feeling compassion could wish for there to be some unhappy people so that he might feel compassion for them. Some grief may be justified, then, but none should be loved. For this is how You do it, O Lord God, who loves souls far more purely than we do and are more incorruptibly compassionate, though You are wounded by no sorrow. And who is sufficient for these things?

3. Are sorrows, then, also loved? Surely all men desire to rejoice? Or, as man wishes to be miserable, is he, nevertheless, glad to be merciful, which, because it cannot exist without passion, for this cause alone are passions loved? This also is from that vein of friendship. But where does it go? Where does it flow? Wherefore runs it into that torrent of pitch, seething forth those huge tides of loathsome lusts into which it is changed and transformed, being of its own will cast away and corrupted from its celestial clearness? Shall, then, mercy be repudiated? By no means. Let us, therefore, love sorrows sometimes. But beware of uncleanness, O my soul, under the protection of my God, the God of our fathers, who is to be praised and exalted above all for ever, beware of uncleanness. For I have not now ceased to have compassion; but then in the theatres I sympathized with lovers when they sinfully enjoyed one another, although this was done fictitiously in the play. And when they lost one another, I grieved with them, as if pitying them, and yet had delight in both. But now-a-days I feel much more pity for him that delights in his wickedness, than for him who is counted as enduring hardships by failing to obtain some pernicious pleasure, and the loss of some miserable felicity. This, surely, is the truer mercy, but grief has no delight in it. For though he that condoles with the unhappy be approved for his office of charity, yet would he who had real compassion rather there were nothing for him to grieve about. For if goodwill be ill-willed (which it cannot), then can he who is truly and sincerely commiserating wish that there should be some unhappy ones, that he might commiserate them. Some grief may then be justified, none loved. For thus do You, O Lord God, who loves souls far more purely than do we, and art more incorruptibly compassionate, although You are wounded by no sorrow. And who is sufficient for these things? 2 Corinthians 2:16

But I, wretched as I was, loved to feel grief back then, and I looked for things to grieve over. When watching a play, the actor's performance pleased me most and gripped me most powerfully when it portrayed another person's misery—even though that misery was staged and fake—and when it moved me to tears. What wonder was it that I, an unhappy sheep wandering away from Your flock and resisting Your care, became infected with a foul disease? This is where my love of griefs came from—not the kind that would cut me too deeply, for I didn't love to actually suffer the things I loved to watch. Instead, I loved griefs that would lightly touch only the surface when I heard these fictional stories. Yet even these surface scratches, like wounds from poisoned fingernails, were followed by burning, swelling, rotting, and horrible corruption. This was my life! But was it really life, O my God?

4. But I, wretched one, then loved to grieve, and sought out what to grieve at, as when, in another man's misery, though reigned and counterfeited, that delivery of the actor best pleased me, and attracted me the most powerfully, which moved me to tears. What marvel was it that an unhappy sheep, straying from Your flock, and impatient of Your care, I became infected with a foul disease? And hence came my love of griefs — not such as should probe me too deeply, for I loved not to suffer such things as I loved to look upon, but such as, when hearing their fictions, should lightly affect the surface; upon which, like as with poisoned nails, followed burning, swelling, putrefaction, and horrible corruption. Such was my life! But was it life, O my God?

Chapter 3. Not Even When at Church Does He Suppress His Desires. In the School of Rhetoric He Abhors the Acts of the Subverters.

Your faithful mercy hovered over me from afar. I wore myself out pursuing unseemly iniquities and following a sacrilegious curiosity that, having abandoned You, dragged me into the treacherous abyss and into the deceiving obedience of devils, to whom I sacrificed my wicked deeds. In all of this You punished me. I even dared, while Your solemn rites were being celebrated within the walls of Your church, to desire and to plan actions sufficient to bring me the fruits of death. For this You disciplined me with severe punishments, though they were nothing compared to my fault, O You who are my greatest mercy, my God, my refuge from those terrible dangers among which I wandered with arrogant stubbornness, moving farther away from You, loving my own ways and not Yours, loving a wandering freedom.

5. And Your faithful mercy hovered over me afar. Upon what unseemly iniquities did I wear myself out, following a sacrilegious curiosity, that, having deserted You, it might drag me into the treacherous abyss, and to the beguiling obedience of devils, unto whom I immolated my wicked deeds, and in all which You scourged me! I dared, even while Your solemn rites were being celebrated within the walls of Your church, to desire, and to plan a business sufficient to procure me the fruits of death; for which You chastised me with grievous punishments, but nothing in comparison with my fault, O Thou my greatest mercy, my God, my refuge from those terrible hurts, among which I wandered with presumptuous neck, receding farther from You, loving my own ways, and not Yours — loving a vagrant liberty.

These studies, which were considered respectable, were aimed at legal careers. The more cunning I became in them, the more praise I would receive. Such is human blindness that people even take pride in their blindness. By this time I had become head of the School of Rhetoric, which filled me with proud joy and swelled my arrogance, though I was more restrained, O Lord, as You know, and kept completely away from the disruptions caused by those subverters (for this foolish and devilish name was regarded as the very mark of sophistication). I lived among them with a brazen shame that I was not like them. I associated with them and sometimes enjoyed their friendship, yet I always despised their actions—their subverting—through which they arrogantly attacked the dignity of strangers, disturbing it with unprovoked mockery and satisfying their malicious amusement. Nothing more closely resembles the behavior of devils than this. What name could more accurately describe them than subverters, since they themselves were first subverted and completely perverted, being secretly mocked and deceived by lying spirits in the very things they delighted to mock and deceive others about.

6. Those studies, also, which were accounted honourable, were directed towards the courts of law; to excel in which, the more crafty I was, the more I should be praised. Such is the blindness of men, that they even glory in their blindness. And now I was head in the School of Rhetoric, whereat I rejoiced proudly, and became inflated with arrogance, though more sedate, O Lord, as You know, and altogether removed from the subvertings of those subverters (for this stupid and diabolical name was held to be the very brand of gallantry) among whom I lived, with an impudent shamefacedness that I was not even as they were. And with them I was, and at times I was delighted with their friendship whose acts I ever abhorred, that is, their subverting, wherewith they insolently attacked the modesty of strangers, which they disturbed by uncalled for jeers, gratifying thereby their mischievous mirth. Nothing can more nearly resemble the actions of devils than these. By what name, therefore, could they be more truly called than subverters?– being themselves subverted first, and altogether perverted — being secretly mocked at and seduced by the deceiving spirits, in what they themselves delight to jeer at and deceive others.

Chapter 4. In the Nineteenth Year of His Age (His Father Having Died Two Years Before) He is Led by the Hortensius Of Cicero to Philosophy, To God, and a Better Mode of Thinking.

During that unstable period of my life, I studied books on eloquence among people like these. I was eager to excel in this field for a damnable and inflated reason—namely, delight in human vanity. In the normal course of my studies, I came across a certain book by Cicero, whose language nearly everyone admires, though not his heart. This book contains an exhortation to philosophy and is called the Hortensius. This book truly changed my affections and turned my prayers to You, O Lord, and gave me different hopes and desires. Every vain hope suddenly became worthless to me, and with an incredible warmth of heart, I longed for an immortality of wisdom and began to arise so that I might return to You. I did not turn to that book, then, to improve my language—which I seemed to be obtaining with my mother's resources in my nineteenth year, two years after my father had died. Nor did it persuade me by its style, but by its content.

7. Among such as these, at that unstable period of my life, I studied books of eloquence, wherein I was eager to be eminent from a damnable and inflated purpose, even a delight in human vanity. In the ordinary course of study, I lighted upon a certain book of Cicero, whose language, though not his heart, almost all admire. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called Hortensius. This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned my prayers to Yourself, O Lord, and made me have other hopes and desires. Worthless suddenly became every vain hope to me; and, with an incredible warmth of heart, I yearned for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise Luke 15:18 that I might return to You. Not, then, to improve my language — which I appeared to be purchasing with my mother's means, in that my nineteenth year, my father having died two years before — not to improve my language did I have recourse to that book; nor did it persuade me by its style, but its matter.

How eager I was then, my God, how eager to fly from earthly things to You! But I didn't know what You would do with me. For wisdom is with You. In Greek, the love of wisdom is called philosophy, and that book set me on fire with it. There are some who use philosophy to deceive people, coloring and decorating their own errors under a great, attractive, and respectable name. Almost all who did this in that time and before are criticized and identified in that book. The book also reveals that most healthy warning from Your Spirit, through Your good and devout servant: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ: for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily." And at that time—as You know, O Light of my heart—I didn't know the apostle's words. I was delighted with that exhortation only insofar as it stirred me up, kindled me, and set me on fire to love, seek, obtain, hold, and embrace not this sect or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it might be. And this one thing held me back in my eagerness: the name of Christ was not in it. For this name, according to Your mercy, O Lord, this name of my Savior Your Son, my tender heart had devoutly drunk in and deeply treasured even with my mother's milk. And whatever lacked that name, however learned, polished, and true it might be, did not fully take hold of me.

8. How ardent was I then, my God, how ardent to fly from earthly things to You! Nor did I know how You would deal with me. For with You is wisdom. In Greek the love of wisdom is called philosophy, with which that book inflamed me. There be some who seduce through philosophy, under a great, and alluring, and honourable name coloring and adorning their own errors. And almost all who in that and former times were such, are in that book censured and pointed out. There is also disclosed that most salutary admonition of Your Spirit, by Your good and pious servant: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ: for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. Colossians 2:8-9 And since at that time (as Thou, O Light of my heart, know) the words of the apostle were unknown to me, I was delighted with that exhortation, in so far only as I was thereby stimulated, and enkindled, and inflamed to love, seek, obtain, hold, and embrace, not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it were; and this alone checked me thus ardent, that the name of Christ was not in it. For this name, according to Your mercy, O Lord, this name of my Saviour Your Son, had my tender heart piously drunk in, deeply treasured even with my mother's milk; and whatsoever was without that name, though never so erudite, polished, and truthful, took not complete hold of me.

Chapter 5. He Rejects the Sacred Scriptures as Too Simple, and as Not to Be Compared with the Dignity of Tully.

I decided, therefore, to turn my attention to the Holy Scriptures to see what they were. And look, I perceive something not understood by the proud, not revealed to children, but humble as you come near, lofty as you go deeper, and covered in mysteries. I was not among those who could enter into it or humble myself to follow its path. For I did not feel the way I do now when I speak about it, but when I turned to those Scriptures, they seemed to me unworthy to be compared with the excellence of Cicero. My puffed-up pride rejected their style, and the keenness of my intelligence could not penetrate their inner meaning. Yet truly, they were the kind that would grow in little ones. But I refused to be a little one, and, swollen with pride, I looked upon myself as a great one.

9. I resolved, therefore, to direct my mind to the Holy Scriptures, that I might see what they were. And behold, I perceive something not comprehended by the proud, not disclosed to children, but lowly as you approach, sublime as you advance, and veiled in mysteries; and I was not of the number of those who could enter into it, or bend my neck to follow its steps. For not as when now I speak did I feel when I tuned towards those Scriptures, but they appeared to me to be unworthy to be compared with the dignity of Tully; for my inflated pride shunned their style, nor could the sharpness of my wit pierce their inner meaning. Yet, truly, were they such as would develope in little ones; but I scorned to be a little one, and, swollen with pride, I looked upon myself as a great one.

Chapter 6. Deceived by His Own Fault, He Falls into the Errors of the Manichæans, Who Gloried in the True Knowledge of God and in a Thorough Examination of Things.

Therefore I fell in with men who were arrogant and raving, very worldly-minded and full of talk. In their mouths were the devil's traps—the sticky snare made from a mixture of syllables of Your name, and of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, the Comforter. These names never left their mouths, but only as sounds and noisy chatter of the tongue, for their hearts were empty of truth. Still they cried out, "Truth, Truth," and spoke much about it to me, yet it was not in them. They spoke falsely not only about You—who truly are the Truth—but also about the elements of this world, Your creatures. And I, truly, should have ignored philosophers even when they spoke truth about these things, for love of You, my Father, supremely good, beauty of all beautiful things. O Truth, Truth! How deeply even then did the very core of my soul yearn for You, when they frequently and in many different ways and in numerous enormous books proclaimed Your name to me, though it was only a sound! And these were the dishes on which they served up to me, hungering for You, the sun and moon—Your beautiful works—but yet only Your works, not You Yourself, and not even Your first works. For before these physical works are Your spiritual ones, heavenly and radiant though they are. But I did not hunger and thirst even for those first works of Yours, but for You Yourself, the Truth, with whom there is no variation or shadow of change. Yet they still served up to me in those dishes glowing fantasies, when it would have been better to love this very sun (which at least is real to our sight) than those illusions which deceive the mind through the eye. And yet, because I thought them to be You, I fed on them—not eagerly, for You did not taste in my mouth as You truly are, for You were not these empty fictions. Neither was I nourished by them, but rather exhausted. Food in our sleep looks like our waking food, yet sleepers are not nourished by it because they are asleep. But those things were not in any way like You as You have now revealed to me, in that they were physical fantasies, false bodies, compared to which these true bodies, whether heavenly or earthly, which we perceive with our physical sight, are far more certain. These things even the beasts and birds perceive as we do, and they are more certain than when we imagine them. And again, we imagine them with more certainty than we use them to conceive of other greater and infinite bodies which do not exist. With such empty husks I was then fed, and was not fed. But You, my Love, for whom I long so that I may be strong, are not those bodies that we see, even in heaven, nor are You those which we do not see there; for You have created them, and You do not count them among Your greatest works. How far, then, are You from those fantasies of mine, fantasies of bodies which do not exist at all—compared to which the mental images of bodies that do exist are more certain, and still more certain are the bodies themselves, which yet You are not. Nor are You even the soul, which is the life of bodies. Better and more certain, then, is the life of bodies than the bodies themselves. But You are the life of souls, the life of lives, having life in Yourself; and You do not change, O Life of my soul.

10. Therefore I fell among men proudly raving, very carnal, and voluble, in whose mouths were the snares of the devil — the birdlime being composed of a mixture of the syllables of Your name, and of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, the Comforter. These names departed not out of their mouths, but so far forth as the sound only and the clatter of the tongue, for the heart was empty of truth. Still they cried, Truth, Truth, and spoke much about it to me, yet was it not in them; 1 John 2:4 but they spoke falsely not of You only — who, verily, art the Truth — but also of these elements of this world, Your creatures. And I, in truth, should have passed by philosophers, even when speaking truth concerning them, for love of You, my Father, supremely good, beauty of all things beautiful. O Truth, Truth! How inwardly even then did the marrow of my soul pant after You, when they frequently, and in a multiplicity of ways, and in numerous and huge books, sounded out Your name to me, though it was but a voice! And these were the dishes in which to me, hungering for You, they, instead of You, served up the sun and moon, Your beauteous works — but yet Your works, not Yourself, nay, nor Your first works. For before these corporeal works are Your spiritual ones, celestial and shining though they be. But I hungered and thirsted not even after those first works of Yours, but after You Yourself, the Truth, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning; James 1:17 yet they still served up to me in those dishes glowing phantasies, than which better were it to love this very sun (which, at least, is true to our sight), than those illusions which deceive the mind through the eye. And yet, because I supposed them to be You, I fed upon them; not with avidity, for You did not taste to my mouth as You are, for You were not these empty fictions; neither was I nourished by them, but the rather exhausted. Food in our sleep appears like our food awake; yet the sleepers are not nourished by it, for they are asleep. But those things were not in any way like You as You have now spoken unto me, in that those were corporeal phantasies, false bodies, than which these true bodies, whether celestial or terrestrial, which we perceive with our fleshly sight, are much more certain. These things the very beasts and birds perceive as well as we, and they are more certain than when we imagine them. And again, we do with more certainty imagine them, than by them conceive of other greater and infinite bodies which have no existence. With such empty husks was I then fed, and was not fed. But You, my Love, in looking for whom I fail that I may be strong, art neither those bodies that we see, although in heaven, nor are You those which we see not there; for You have created them, nor do You reckon them among Your greatest works. How far, then, are You from those phantasies of mine, phantasies of bodies which are not at all, than which the images of those bodies which are, are more certain, and still more certain the bodies themselves, which yet You are not; nay, nor yet the soul, which is the life of the bodies. Better, then, and more certain is the life of bodies than the bodies themselves. But You are the life of souls, the life of lives, having life in Yourself; and You change not, O Life of my soul.

Where, then, were You to me, and how far away from me? I was wandering very far from You, even shut out from the husks of the pigs that I was feeding with husks. How much better are the stories of the grammarians and poets than these traps! Verses and poems, even the story of Medea flying, are truly more useful than these men's five elements, painted in various colors to correspond to the five caves of darkness—none of which actually exist, yet they kill the believer. Verses and poems I can turn into real nourishment, but though I sang about Medea flying, I did not uphold it as true, and though I heard it sung, I did not believe it. But those Manichean things I did believe. How terrible—by what steps was I dragged down to the depths of hell, laboring and struggling because I lacked the Truth! I sought after You, my God—I confess this to You, who showed me mercy even when I had not yet confessed—but I sought You not according to the understanding of the mind, in which You wanted me to surpass the animals, but according to the perception of the flesh. You were more inward to me than my innermost part, and higher than my highest point. I encountered that reckless woman who is foolish and knows nothing, the riddle from Solomon, sitting at the door of the house on a seat and saying, "Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant." This woman seduced me because she found my soul outside its proper dwelling, living in the eye of my flesh and thinking about the kind of food I had consumed through it.

11. Where, then, were You then to me, and how far from me? Far, indeed, was I wandering away from You, being even shut out from the very husks of the swine, whom with husks I fed. For how much better, then, are the fables of the grammarians and poets than these snares! For verses, and poems, and Medea flying, are more profitable truly than these men's five elements, variously painted, to answer to the five caves of darkness, none of which exist, and which slay the believer. For verses and poems I can turn into true food, but the Medea flying, though I sang, I maintained it not; though I heard it sung, I believed it not; but those things I did believe. Woe, woe, by what steps was I dragged down to the depths of hell! Proverbs 9:18 — toiling and turmoiling through want of Truth, when I sought after You, my God — to You I confess it, who had mercy on me when I had not yet confessed, — sought after You not according to the understanding of the mind, in which You desired that I should excel the beasts, but according to the sense of the flesh! You were more inward to me than my most inward part; and higher than my highest. I came upon that bold woman, who is simple, and knows nothing, Proverbs 9:13 the enigma of Solomon, sitting at the door of the house on a seat, and saying, Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant. This woman seduced me, because she found my soul beyond its portals, dwelling in the eye of my flesh, and thinking on such food as through it I had devoured.

Chapter 7. He Attacks the Doctrine of the Manichæans Concerning Evil, God, and the Righteousness of the Patriarchs.

I did not understand what truly exists, and I was almost driven to support foolish deceivers when they asked me questions like "Where does evil come from?" and "Is God limited by a physical form, and does He have hair and nails?" and "Should we consider those righteous who had many wives at the same time, who killed people, and who sacrificed living animals?" Because of my ignorance, I was deeply troubled by these questions, and while pulling away from the truth, I thought I was moving toward it. This was because I did not yet know that evil is nothing but the absence of good, which eventually ceases to exist altogether. How could I understand this when my physical eyes could see no further than physical bodies, and my mind could see no further than mental images? I did not know that God is a Spirit, not one who has parts that extend in length and width, and whose being is not physical mass. For any physical mass is smaller in its parts than in its whole, and if it were infinite, any part limited to a certain space would be smaller than its infinity, and it could not be fully present everywhere the way Spirit is, the way God is. And I had absolutely no understanding of what it was in us that made us like God and allowed Scripture to rightly say we were made in the image of God.

12. For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, as it were, violently moved to give my support to foolish deceivers, when they asked me, Whence is evil? — and, Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs and nails? — and, Are they to be esteemed righteous who had many wives at once and did kill men, and sacrificed living creatures? 1 Kings 18:40 At which things I, in my ignorance, was much disturbed, and, retreating from the truth, I appeared to myself to be going towards it; because as yet I knew not that evil was naught but a privation of good, until in the end it ceases altogether to be; which how should I see, the sight of whose eyes saw no further than bodies, and of my mind no further than a phantasm? And I knew not God to be a Spirit, John 4:24 not one who has parts extended in length and breadth, nor whose being was bulk; for every bulk is less in a part than in the whole, and, if it be infinite, it must be less in such part as is limited by a certain space than in its infinity; and cannot be wholly everywhere, as Spirit, as God is. And what that should be in us, by which we were like God, and might rightly in Scripture be said to be after the image of God, I was entirely ignorant.

I didn't understand that true inner righteousness, which doesn't judge according to custom but according to God Almighty's most perfect law. By this law, the customs of different places and times were adapted to those places and times, while the law itself remained always and everywhere the same—not one thing in one place and another thing in another. According to this law, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, and all those commended by God were righteous, but foolish men judged them unrighteous. These foolish men judged by human standards and measured the customs of the entire human race by the narrow standard of their own customs. It's like someone in an armory who doesn't know what piece of armor fits which body part, so he puts leg armor on his head or tries to wear a helmet on his feet, and then complains that they don't fit. Or it's like someone who gets angry on a day when business is forbidden in the afternoon because he's not allowed to sell, even though it was lawful for him to do so in the morning. Or it's like someone who sees a servant in a house handle something that the butler isn't allowed to touch, or sees something done behind the stable that would be forbidden in the dining room, and then becomes indignant that the same thing isn't allowed everywhere and to everyone in one house and one family. Such are those who cannot accept that something was lawful for righteous people in former times that is not lawful now, or that God commanded one thing to them and another thing to us for certain reasons related to those times—even though both groups obeyed the same righteousness. Yet these same people can see that in one person, one day, and one house, different things are appropriate for different members, and that something formerly lawful can later become unlawful, and that something permitted or commanded in one corner may be justly forbidden and punished in another corner. Is justice, then, changeable and inconsistent? No, but the times over which she presides are not all the same, because they are times. But people whose days on earth are few cannot harmonize the circumstances of former ages and other nations—which they have not experienced—with the circumstances they do experience, even though within one body, day, or family they can easily see what is suitable for each member, season, part, and person. They object to the one but submit to the other.

13. Nor had I knowledge of that true inner righteousness, which does not judge according to custom, but out of the most perfect law of God Almighty, by which the manners of places and times were adapted to those places and times — being itself the while the same always and everywhere, not one thing in one place, and another in another; according to which Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and Moses, and David, and all those commended by the mouth of God were righteous, Hebrews 11:8-40 but were judged unrighteous by foolish men, judging out of man's judgment, 1 Corinthians 4:3 and gauging by the petty standard of their own manners the manners of the whole human race. Like as if in an armoury, one knowing not what were adapted to the several members should put greaves on his head, or boot himself with a helmet, and then complain because they would not fit. Or as if, on some day when in the afternoon business was forbidden, one were to fume at not being allowed to sell as it was lawful to him in the forenoon. Or when in some house he sees a servant take something in his hand which the butler is not permitted to touch, or something done behind a stable which would be prohibited in the dining-room, and should be indignant that in one house, and one family, the same thing is not distributed everywhere to all. Such are they who cannot endure to hear something to have been lawful for righteous men in former times which is not so now; or that God, for certain temporal reasons, commanded them one thing, and these another, but both obeying the same righteousness; though they see, in one man, one day, and one house, different things to be fit for different members, and a thing which was formerly lawful after a time unlawful — that permitted or commanded in one corner, which done in another is justly prohibited and punished. Is justice, then, various and changeable? Nay, but the times over which she presides are not all alike, because they are times. But men, whose days upon the earth are few, Job 14:1 because by their own perception they cannot harmonize the causes of former ages and other nations, of which they had no experience, with these of which they have experience, though in one and the same body, day, or family, they can readily see what is suitable for each member, season, part, and person — to the one they take exception, to the other they submit.

I did not understand these things at that time, nor did I pay attention to them. They were before my eyes everywhere, yet I did not see them. When I wrote poetry, I was not allowed to place every metrical foot anywhere I wanted, but in one meter it worked one way, and in another meter a different way. Even within a single verse, the same foot could not appear in just any position. Yet the art of poetry itself, by which I composed, did not have different principles for these different situations but encompassed them all in one system. Still, I did not see how that righteousness to which good and holy people submitted was far more excellently and sublimely unified, comprehending in one all those things which God commanded. It never varied in essence, though in changing times it did not prescribe everything at once but distributed and commanded what was appropriate for each period. And I, in my blindness, criticized those faithful patriarchs not only for using things in their own time as God commanded and inspired them to do, but also for foretelling future things as God was revealing them.

14. These things I then knew not, nor observed. They met my eyes on every side, and I saw them not. I composed poems, in which it was not permitted me to place every foot everywhere, but in one metre one way, and in another, nor even in any one verse the same foot in all places. Yet the art itself by which I composed had not different principles for these different cases, but comprised all in one. Still I saw not how that righteousness, which good and holy men submitted to, far more excellently and sublimely comprehended in one all those things which God commanded, and in no part varied, though in varying times it did not prescribe all things at once, but distributed and enjoined what was proper for each. And I, being blind, blamed those pious fathers, not only for making use of present things as God commanded and inspired them to do, but also for foreshowing things to come as God was revealing them.

Chapter 8. He Argues Against the Same as to the Reason of Offences.

Can it ever, at any time or place, be an unrighteous thing for a person to love God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his mind, and his neighbor as himself? Therefore those offenses that are contrary to nature must be detested and punished everywhere and at all times. Such were those of the Sodomites. If all nations were to commit them, they would all be guilty of the same crime by divine law, which has not made human beings to abuse one another in that way. For even the fellowship that should exist between God and us is violated when that same nature of which He is the author is polluted by perverted lust. But those offenses that are contrary to human customs must be avoided according to the particular customs that prevail. An agreement that has been made and confirmed by the custom or law of any city or nation must not be violated by the lawless pleasure of anyone, whether citizen or stranger. For any part that is not consistent with its whole is unseemly. But when God commands something to be done that is contrary to the customs or agreements of any nation, even if it has never been done by them before, it must be done. If it has been discontinued, it must be restored, and if never established, it must be established. For if it is lawful for a king to command something in the state over which he reigns that neither he himself nor anyone before him had commanded, and if obeying him cannot be considered harmful to the public interest—indeed, it would be harmful if he were not obeyed, since obedience to princes is a general agreement of human society—how much more, then, ought we to obey God without hesitation, the Governor of all His creatures! For just as among human authorities the greater authority is obeyed before the lesser, so must God be obeyed above all.

15. Can it at any time or place be an unrighteous thing for a man to love God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his mind, and his neighbour as himself? Therefore those offenses which be contrary to nature are everywhere and at all times to be held in detestation and punished; such were those of the Sodomites, which should all nations commit, they should all be held guilty of the same crime by the divine law, which has not so made men that they should in that way abuse one another. For even that fellowship which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature of which He is author is polluted by the perversity of lust. But those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men are to be avoided according to the customs severally prevailing; so that an agreement made, and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation, may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or stranger. For any part which is not consistent with its whole is unseemly. But when God commands anything contrary to the customs or compacts of any nation to be done, though it were never done by them before, it is to be done; and if intermitted it is to be restored, and, if never established, to be established. For if it be lawful for a king, in the state over which he reigns, to command that which neither he himself nor any one before him had commanded, and to obey him cannot be held to be inimical to the public interest, — nay, it were so if he were not obeyed (for obedience to princes is a general compact of human society) — how much more, then, ought we unhesitatingly to obey God, the Governor of all His creatures! For as among the authorities of human society the greater authority is obeyed before the lesser, so must God above all.

So also with acts of violence, where there is a desire to harm, whether through insult or injury. Both of these arise either from a desire for revenge, as one enemy against another; or to gain some advantage over another, as a robber against a traveler; or to avoid some evil, as with someone who fears another; or through envy, as an unfortunate person toward one who is happy; or as someone who is prosperous in something toward a person he fears will become his equal, or whose equality he resents; or for the mere pleasure in another's suffering, as spectators of gladiators or those who ridicule and mock others. These are the main evils that spring from the lust of the flesh, of the eye, and of power, whether individually, or two combined, or all at once. And so people live in opposition to the three and seven, that ten-stringed harp, Your ten commandments, O God most high and most sweet. But what foul offenses can there be against You who cannot be defiled? Or what acts of violence against You who cannot be harmed? Yet You punish what people do against themselves, since when they sin against You, they act wickedly against their own souls. And evil contradicts itself, either by corrupting or perverting their nature, which You have made and ordered, or by using permitted things excessively, or by burning with lust for things forbidden for that use which is against nature, or when found guilty, raging with heart and voice against You, kicking against the goads, or when breaking through the boundaries of human society, they boldly take pleasure in secret alliances or divisions, depending on whether they have been pleased or offended. And these things happen whenever You are abandoned, O Fountain of Life, who are the only and true Creator and Ruler of the universe, and through self-willed pride any single false thing is chosen from it and loved. So then, through humble devotion we return to You, and You cleanse us from our evil habits, and are merciful to the sins of those who confess to You, and hear the groaning of the prisoner, and release us from those chains which we have made for ourselves, if we do not lift up against You the horns of a false freedom, losing everything through desiring more, by loving our own private good more than You, the good of all.

16. So also in deeds of violence, where there is a desire to harm, whether by contumely or injury; and both of these either by reason of revenge, as one enemy against another; or to obtain some advantage over another, as the highwayman to the traveller; or for the avoiding of some evil, as with him who is in fear of another; or through envy, as the unfortunate man to one who is happy; or as he that is prosperous in anything to him who he fears will become equal to himself, or whose equality he grieves at; or for the mere pleasure in another's pains, as the spectators of gladiators, or the deriders and mockers of others. These be the chief iniquities which spring forth from the lust of the flesh, of the eye, and of power, whether singly, or two together, or all at once. And so do men live in opposition to the three and seven, that psaltery of ten strings, Your ten commandments, O God most high and most sweet. But what foul offenses can there be against You who cannot be defiled? Or what deeds of violence against you who cannot be harmed? But You avenge that which men perpetrate against themselves, seeing also that when they sin against You, they do wickedly against their own souls; and iniquity gives itself the lie, either by corrupting or perverting their nature, which You have made and ordained, or by an immoderate use of things permitted, or in burning in things forbidden to that use which is against nature; Romans 1:24-29 or when convicted, raging with heart and voice against You, kicking against the pricks; Acts 9:5 or when, breaking through the pale of human society, they audaciously rejoice in private combinations or divisions, according as they have been pleased or offended. And these things are done whenever You are forsaken, O Fountain of Life, who art the only and true Creator and Ruler of the universe, and by a self-willed pride any one false thing is selected therefrom and loved. So, then, by a humble piety we return to You; and you purge us from our evil customs, and art merciful unto the sins of those who confess unto You, and hears the groaning of the prisoner, and loosens us from those fetters which we have forged for ourselves, if we lift not up against You the horns of a false liberty –losing all through craving more, by loving more our own private good than You, the good of all.

Chapter 9. That the Judgment of God and Men as to Human Acts of Violence, is Different.

Among these scandalous and violent offenses and many other wrongs, there are the sins of people who are generally making spiritual progress. Those who judge correctly and according to the standard of perfection criticize these sins, yet also commend them because of the hope of future growth, like the green shoots of growing grain. And there are some actions that look like scandalous or violent offenses but are not actually sins, because they neither offend you, our Lord God, nor offend social custom. For example, when resources appropriate for the circumstances are acquired for living, and we're not sure whether it comes from a lust for possessions; or when actions are punished by established authority for the purpose of correction, and we're not sure whether it comes from a lust for causing harm. Many deeds, then, that are condemned in people's sight are approved by your testimony, and many that are praised by people are condemned with you as witness. This is because often the appearance of the deed, the intention of the doer, and the hidden needs of the moment each differ from one another. But when you unexpectedly command something unusual and unexpected—indeed, even if you have previously forbidden it, and still keep the reason for your command secret for the time being, and it is even contrary to the established rules of some human society—who can doubt that it must be done, since that society is righteous only when it serves you? But blessed are those who know your commands! For everything done by those who served you was done either to demonstrate something necessary at the time or to foreshadow things to come.

17. But amidst these offenses of infamy and violence, and so many iniquities, are the sins of men who are, on the whole, making progress; which, by those who judge rightly, and after the rule of perfection, are censured, yet commended withal, upon the hope of bearing fruit, like as in the green blade of the growing grain. And there are some which resemble offenses of infamy or violence, and yet are not sins, because they neither offend You, our Lord God, nor social custom: when, for example, things suitable for the times are provided for the use of life, and we are uncertain whether it be out of a lust of having; or when acts are punished by constituted authority for the sake of correction, and we are uncertain whether it be out of a lust of hurting. Many a deed, then, which in the sight of men is disapproved, is approved by Your testimony; and many a one who is praised by men is, Thou being witness, condemned; because frequently the view of the deed, and the mind of the doer, and the hidden exigency of the period, severally vary. But when You unexpectedly command an unusual and unthought-of thing — yea, even if You have formerly forbidden it, and still for the time keep secret the reason of Your command, and it even be contrary to the ordinance of some society of men, who doubts but it is to be done, inasmuch as that society is righteous which serves You? But blessed are they who know Your commands! For all things were done by them who served You either to exhibit something necessary at the time, or to foreshow things to come.

Chapter 10. He Reproves the Triflings of the Manichæans as to the Fruits of the Earth.

I was ignorant of these things, and I mocked those holy servants and prophets of Yours. But what did I gain by mocking them except to be mocked by You? Without realizing it, I was gradually led into such foolish beliefs as thinking that a fig tree wept when it was picked, and that the mother tree shed milky tears. They taught that if some saint ate this fig—which was plucked not by his own sin but by another's wickedness—and it mixed with his insides, he would breathe out angels from it. Yes, in his prayers he would definitely groan and sigh forth particles of God. These particles of the most high and true God would have remained trapped in that fig unless they had been freed by the teeth and stomach of some chosen saint! And I, wretched as I was, believed that more mercy should be shown to the fruits of the earth than to the human beings for whom they were created. For if a hungry person—who was not a Manichean—asked for some food, the piece that would be given to him would seem as if it were being condemned to death.

18. These things being ignorant of, I derided those holy servants and prophets of Yours. And what did I gain by deriding them but to be derided by You, being insensibly, and little by little, led on to those follies, as to credit that a fig-tree wept when it was plucked, and that the mother-tree shed milky tears? Which fig notwithstanding, plucked not by his own but another's wickedness, had some saint eaten and mingled with his entrails, he should breathe out of it angels; yea, in his prayers he shall assuredly groan and sigh forth particles of God, which particles of the most high and true God should have remained bound in that fig unless they had been set free by the teeth and belly of some elect saint! And I, miserable one, believed that more mercy was to be shown to the fruits of the earth than unto men, for whom they were created; for if a hungry man — who was not a Manichæan — should beg for any, that morsel which should be given him would appear, as it were, condemned to capital punishment.

Chapter 11. He Refers to the Tears, and the Memorable Dream Concerning Her Son, Granted by God to His Mother.

You stretched out Your hand from above and pulled my soul out of that deep darkness, when my mother, Your faithful servant, wept to You for me more than mothers typically weep over the physical death of their children. She saw that I was dead through the faith and spirit she had received from You, and You heard her, O Lord. You heard her and did not despise her tears when they poured down and watered the ground beneath her eyes in every place where she prayed—yes, You heard her. Where else did that dream come from by which You comforted her, so that she allowed me to continue living with her and eating at the same table in the house, which she had started to avoid because she hated and detested the blasphemies of my errors? In the dream she saw herself standing on a wooden ruler, and a radiant young man came toward her, joyful and smiling at her, while she was grieving and bent down with sorrow. He asked her why she was sorrowful and weeping every day (wanting to teach her, as is their custom, not to be taught by her), and when she answered that she was mourning my spiritual ruin, he told her to be at peace and instructed her to look and see that where she was, I was also. When she looked, she saw me standing near her on the same ruler. Where did this come from except that Your ears were turned toward her heart? O Good Almighty One, who cares for each one of us as if You cared for him alone, and for all as if they were just one!

19. And You sent Your hand from above, and drew my soul out of that profound darkness, when my mother, Your faithful one, wept to you on my behalf more than mothers are wont to weep the bodily death of their children. For she saw that I was dead by that faith and spirit which she had from You, and You heard her, O Lord. You heard her, and despised not her tears, when, pouring down, they watered the earth under her eyes in every place where she prayed; yea, You heard her. For whence was that dream with which You consoled her, so that she permitted me to live with her, and to have my meals at the same table in the house, which she had begun to avoid, hating and detesting the blasphemies of my error? For she saw herself standing on a certain wooden rule, and a bright youth advancing towards her, joyous and smiling upon her, while she was grieving and bowed down with sorrow. But he having inquired of her the cause of her sorrow and daily weeping (he wishing to teach, as is their wont, and not to be taught), and she answering that it was my perdition she was lamenting, he bade her rest contented, and told her to behold and see that where she was, there was I also. And when she looked she saw me standing near her on the same rule. Whence was this, unless that Your ears were inclined towards her heart? O Thou Good Omnipotent, who so carest for every one of us as if You cared for him only, and so for all as if they were but one!

Why was it also that when she told me about this vision, and I tried to interpret it to mean that she should not lose hope of one day becoming what I was, she immediately replied without any hesitation, "No, because I was not told 'where he is, there you will be,' but 'where you are, there he will be'"? I confess to You, Lord, that as far as I can remember (and I have often spoken about this), Your answer through my alert mother—that she was not troubled by the plausibility of my false interpretation and saw instantly what needed to be seen, which I had not truly understood before she spoke—moved me even more than the dream itself. Through that dream, the joy destined for that devout woman, to be fulfilled so long afterward, was predicted so long in advance to ease her present distress. For nearly nine years passed during which I wallowed in the mud of that deep pit and the darkness of lies, often trying to get up but being knocked down all the harder each time. Yet that chaste, devout, and self-controlled widow (the kind You love), though now more encouraged by hope, was no less persistent in her weeping and grief. She never stopped lamenting my situation to You at every hour of her prayers. Her prayers came into Your presence, yet You still allowed me to be tangled and retangled in that darkness.

20. Whence was this, also, that when she had narrated this vision to me, and I tried to put this construction on it, That she rather should not despair of being some day what I was, she immediately, without hesitation, replied, No; for it was not told me that 'where he is, there shall you be,' but 'where you are, there shall he be'? I confess to You, O Lord, that, to the best of my remembrance (and I have oft spoken of this), Your answer through my watchful mother — that she was not disquieted by the speciousness of my false interpretation, and saw in a moment what was to be seen, and which I myself had not in truth perceived before she spoke — even then moved me more than the dream itself, by which the happiness to that pious woman, to be realized so long after, was, for the alleviation of her present anxiety, so long before predicted. For nearly nine years passed in which I wallowed in the slime of that deep pit and the darkness of falsehood, striving often to rise, but being all the more heavily dashed down. But yet that chaste, pious, and sober widow (such as You love), now more buoyed up with hope, though no whit less zealous in her weeping and mourning, desisted not, at all the hours of her supplications, to bewail my case unto You. And her prayers entered into Your presence, and yet You still allowed me to be involved and re-involved in that darkness.

Chapter 12. The Excellent Answer of the Bishop When Referred to by His Mother as to the Conversion of Her Son.

Meanwhile, you gave her another answer that I remember—though I'm leaving out much as I hurry toward the things that more strongly compel me to confess to you, and much I simply don't remember. You gave her another answer through one of your priests, a certain bishop who had been raised in your Church and was well trained in your books. When this woman begged him to agree to talk with me, correct my errors, rid me of false teachings, and instruct me in good ones—something he was accustomed to doing when he found people ready to receive it—he refused, very wisely as I later came to understand. He told her I was still unteachable because I was puffed up with the novelty of that heresy, and that I had already confused several inexperienced people with troublesome questions, as she had told him. But leave him alone for now, he said, just pray to God for him. Through reading, he will discover on his own what that error is and how great its impiety. At the same time, he revealed to her how he himself, when he was a small child, had been handed over to the Manicheans by his misguided mother, and had not only read but actually copied out almost all their books, and had come to see—without argument or proof from anyone—how much that sect should be avoided, and had avoided it. After he said this, she would not accept it but repeated her pleas more urgently, pouring out abundant tears, begging him to see me and talk with me. Somewhat annoyed by her persistence, he exclaimed, Go on your way, and God bless you, for it is impossible that the son of these tears should perish. She received this answer—as she often mentioned in her conversations with me—as if it were a voice from heaven.

21. And meanwhile You granted her another answer, which I recall; for much I pass over, hastening on to those things which the more strongly impel me to confess unto You, and much I do not remember. You granted her then another answer, by a priest of Yours, a certain bishop, reared in Your Church and well versed in Your books. He, when this woman had entreated that he would vouchsafe to have some talk with me, refute my errors, unteach me evil things, and teach me good (for this he was in the habit of doing when he found people fitted to receive it), refused, very prudently, as I afterwards came to see. For he answered that I was still unteachable, being inflated with the novelty of that heresy, and that I had already perplexed various inexperienced persons with vexatious questions, as she had informed him. But leave him alone for a time, says he, only pray God for him; he will of himself, by reading, discover what that error is, and how great its impiety. He disclosed to her at the same time how he himself, when a little one, had, by his misguided mother, been given over to the Manichæans, and had not only read, but even written out almost all their books, and had come to see (without argument or proof from any one) how much that sect was to be shunned, and had shunned it. Which when he had said, and she would not be satisfied, but repeated more earnestly her entreaties, shedding copious tears, that he would see and discourse with me, he, a little vexed at her importunity, exclaimed, Go your way, and God bless you, for it is not possible that the son of these tears should perish. Which answer (as she often mentioned in her conversations with me) she accepted as though it were a voice from heaven.


Confessions — Book II

His sixteenth year: the disorder of youthful desire, and the theft of the pears done for the love of wrongdoing.

He advances to puberty, and indeed to the early part of the sixteenth year of his age, in which, having abandoned his studies, he indulged in lustful pleasures, and, with his companions, committed theft.

Source: Translated by J.G. Pilkington. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 1. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110102.htm>.

Contents · 10 chapters
  1. Chapter 1. He Deplores the Wickedness of His Youth.
  2. Chapter 2. Stricken with Exceeding Grief, He Remembers the Dissolute Passions in Which, in His Sixteenth Year, He Used to Indulge.
  3. Chapter 3. Concerning His Father, a Freeman of Thagaste, the Assister of His Son's Studies, and on the Admonitions of His Mother on the Preservation of Chastity.
  4. Chapter 4. He Commits Theft with His Companions, Not Urged on by Poverty, But from a Certain Distaste of Well-Doing.
  5. Chapter 5. Concerning the Motives to Sin, Which are Not in the Love of Evil, But in the Desire of Obtaining the Property of Others.
  6. Chapter 6. Why He Delighted in that Theft, When All Things Which Under the Appearance of Good Invite to Vice are True and Perfect in God Alone.
  7. Chapter 7. He Gives Thanks to God for the Remission of His Sins, and Reminds Every One that the Supreme God May Have Preserved Us from Greater Sins.
  8. Chapter 8. In His Theft He Loved the Company of His Fellow-Sinners.
  9. Chapter 9. It Was a Pleasure to Him Also to Laugh When Seriously Deceiving Others.
  10. Chapter 10. With God There is True Rest and Life Unchanging.

Chapter 1. He Deplores the Wickedness of His Youth.

I will now remember my past wickedness and the fleshly corruptions of my soul, not because I love them, but so that I may love You, O my God. I do this for love of Your love, recalling in the very bitterness of my memory my most sinful ways, so that You may become sweet to me—You who are sweetness without deception, sweetness that is happy and secure—and gathering myself back together from that state of being scattered, in which I was torn apart while I turned away from You, the One, and lost myself among many empty things. For in my youth I even longed to be satisfied with worldly things, and I dared to run wild again with various false loves that were mere shadows. My beauty wasted away, and I became corrupt in Your eyes, pleasing myself and eager to please in the eyes of other people.

1. I Will now call to mind my past foulness, and the carnal corruptions of my soul, not because I love them, but that I may love You, O my God. For love of Your love do I it, recalling, in the very bitterness of my remembrance, my most vicious ways, that You may grow sweet to me — Thou sweetness without deception! Thou sweetness happy and assured!– and re-collecting myself out of that my dissipation, in which I was torn to pieces, while, turned away from You the One, I lost myself among many vanities. For I even longed in my youth formerly to be satisfied with worldly things, and I dared to grow wild again with various and shadowy loves; my form consumed away, and I became corrupt in Your eyes, pleasing myself, and eager to please in the eyes of men.

Chapter 2. Stricken with Exceeding Grief, He Remembers the Dissolute Passions in Which, in His Sixteenth Year, He Used to Indulge.

What did I delight in except loving and being loved? But I did not keep it within proper limits, from one mind to another along the bright path of friendship. Instead, from the dark concupiscence of the flesh and the bubbling over of youth, vapors arose that clouded and darkened my heart, so that I could not tell the difference between pure affection and unholy desire. Both churned together confusedly within me and dragged my unstable youth into the rough places of impure desires, plunging me into a pit of disgrace. Your anger had cast its shadow over me, and I did not know it. I had become deaf from the clanking of the chains of my mortality, the punishment for my soul's pride, and I wandered farther from You, and You allowed me to do so. I was tossed about, wasted away, poured out, and boiled over in my sexual sins, and You kept silent, O my slow-coming joy! You kept silent then, and I wandered even farther from You into increasingly barren fields of sorrow, with proud misery and restless weariness.

2. But what was it that I delighted in save to love and to be beloved? But I held it not in moderation, mind to mind, the bright path of friendship, but out of the dark concupiscence of the flesh and the effervescence of youth exhalations came forth which obscured and overcast my heart, so that I was unable to discern pure affection from unholy desire. Both boiled confusedly within me, and dragged away my unstable youth into the rough places of unchaste desires, and plunged me into a gulf of infamy. Your anger had overshadowed me, and I knew it not. I was become deaf by the rattling of the chains of my mortality, the punishment for my soul's pride; and I wandered farther from You, and You suffered Matthew 17:17 me; and I was tossed to and fro, and wasted, and poured out, and boiled over in my fornications, and You held Your peace, O Thou my tardy joy! Thou then held Your peace, and I wandered still farther from You, into more and more barren seed-plots of sorrows, with proud dejection and restless lassitude.

If only someone had brought order to my chaos and turned the fleeting beauties around me to good use, setting limits on their appeal so that the surging passions of my youth could have spent themselves within the boundaries of marriage—if they couldn't be calmed and satisfied within the purpose of family life, as your law ordains, O Lord. For you shape the offspring that come from our mortal nature, and you can with a gentle hand blunt the thorns that were shut out from your paradise. Your almighty power is not far from us even when we are far from you. Otherwise, I truly should have paid closer attention to the voice from the clouds: "Nevertheless, such shall have trouble in the flesh, but I spare you," and "It is good for a man not to touch a woman," and "He that is unmarried cares for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord; but he that is married cares for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife." I should have listened more carefully to these words, and having made myself a eunuch for the kingdom of heaven's sake, I would have awaited your embrace with greater joy.

3. Oh for one to have regulated my disorder, and turned to my profit the fleeting beauties of the things around me, and fixed a bound to their sweetness, so that the tides of my youth might have spent themselves upon the conjugal shore, if so be they could not be tranquillized and satisfied within the object of a family, as Your law appoints, O Lord, — who thus formest the offspring of our death, being able also with a tender hand to blunt the thorns which were excluded from Your paradise! For Your omnipotency is not far from us even when we are far from You, else in truth ought I more vigilantly to have given heed to the voice from the clouds: Nevertheless, such shall have trouble in the flesh, but I spare you; 1 Corinthians 7:28 and, It is good for a man not to touch a woman; 1 Corinthians 7:1 and, He that is unmarried cares for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord; but he that is married cares for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife. 1 Corinthians 7:32-33 I should, therefore, have listened more attentively to these words, and, being severed for the kingdom of heaven's sake, Matthew 19:12 I would with greater happiness have expected Your embraces.

But I, poor fool, churned like the sea and, abandoning You, followed the violent rush of my own current and broke through all Your limits. Yet I did not escape Your discipline. For what mortal can do so? But You were always near me, mercifully angry, and striking all my unlawful pleasures with the bitterest troubles, so that I might seek pleasures free from trouble. But where I could find such pleasures except in You, O Lord, I could not discover—except in You, who teach through sorrow, and wound us to heal us, and kill us so that we may not die away from You. You make trouble itself into a lesson for us, so that trouble becomes instruction to us. You have chosen to discipline and teach Your children this way, so they will not be without fear, lest they love something else and forget You, their true good. Where was I, and how far was I banished from the joys of Your house, in that sixteenth year of my physical life, when the madness of lust—which human shamelessness allows complete freedom, even though Your laws forbid it—ruled over me completely, and I surrendered myself entirely to it? Meanwhile, those around me took no care to save me from ruin through marriage. Their only concern was that I should learn to deliver a powerful speech and become a persuasive public speaker.

4. But I, poor fool, seethed as does the sea, and, forsaking You, followed the violent course of my own stream, and exceeded all Your limitations; nor did I escape Your scourges. Isaiah 10:26 For what mortal can do so? But You were always by me, mercifully angry, and dashing with the bitterest vexations all my illicit pleasures, in order that I might seek pleasures free from vexation. But where I could meet with such except in You, O Lord, I could not find — except in You, who teachest by sorrow, Deuteronomy 32:39 and woundest us to heal us, and killest us that we may not die from You. 'Formest trouble in or as a precept.' Thou makest to us a precept out of trouble, so that trouble itself shall be a precept to us, i.e. hast willed so to discipline and instruct those Thy sons, that they should not be without fear, lest they should love something else, and forget Thee, their true good."–S. ad loc. –E. B. P }}–> Where was I, and how far was I exiled from the delights of Your house, in that sixteenth year of the age of my flesh, when the madness of lust — to the which human shamelessness grants full freedom, although forbidden by Your laws — held complete sway over me, and I resigned myself entirely to it? Those about me meanwhile took no care to save me from ruin by marriage, their sole care being that I should learn to make a powerful speech, and become a persuasive orator.

Chapter 3. Concerning His Father, a Freeman of Thagaste, the Assister of His Son's Studies, and on the Admonitions of His Mother on the Preservation of Chastity.

For that year my studies were interrupted. After I returned from Madaura, a nearby city where I had started going to learn grammar and rhetoric, the money needed for further study at Carthage was arranged for me. This happened more through my father's determination than through his financial means, since he was only a poor freeman of Thagaste. To whom am I telling this story? Not to You, my God, but in Your presence to my own kind—to whatever small portion of the human race might happen to come across these writings of mine. And why? So that I and all who read this may consider from what depths we must cry out to You. For what reaches Your ears more readily than a confessing heart and a life of faith? Everyone praised and commended my father because he went beyond his financial ability to provide his son with everything necessary for a long journey for the sake of education. Many far wealthier citizens did not do the same for their children. Yet this same father did not concern himself with how I was growing toward You, or how chaste I was, as long as I was skilled in speaking—no matter how barren I was for Your cultivation, O God, who are the only true and good Lord of my heart, which is Your field.

5. And for that year my studies were intermitted, while after my return from Madaura (a neighbouring city, whither I had begun to go in order to learn grammar and rhetoric), the expenses for a further residence at Carthage were provided for me; and that was rather by the determination than the means of my father, who was but a poor freeman of Thagaste. To whom do I narrate this? Not unto You, my God; but before You unto my own kind, even to that small part of the human race who may chance to light upon these my writings. And to what end? That I and all who read the same may reflect out of what depths we are to cry unto You. For what comes nearer to Your ears than a confessing heart and a life of faith? For who did not extol and praise my father, in that he went even beyond his means to supply his son with all the necessaries for a far journey for the sake of his studies? For many far richer citizens did not the like for their children. But yet this same father did not trouble himself how I grew towards You, nor how chaste I was, so long as I was skilful in speaking — however barren I was to Your tilling, O God, who art the sole true and good Lord of my heart, which is Your field.

When I was sixteen years old, I stayed at home with my parents, taking time off from school because my parents couldn't afford to send me. During this period of idleness, the thorns of lust grew wild over me, and there was no one to root them out. When my father saw me at the public baths and noticed that I was becoming a man, stirred by restless youth, he gladly told my mother about it, as if already anticipating future grandchildren. He rejoiced in that intoxication by which the world so often forgets You, its Creator, and loves Your creation instead of You—drinking the invisible wine of its own perverse will and bowing down to the most shameful things. But in my mother's heart You had already begun building Your temple and starting Your holy dwelling place, while my father was only a recent catechumen. She reacted with godly fear and trembling. Even though I had not yet been baptized, she was afraid of those crooked paths walked by those who turn their backs to You instead of their faces.

6. But while, in that sixteenth year of my age, I resided with my parents, having holiday from school for a time (this idleness being imposed upon me by my parents' necessitous circumstances), the thorns of lust grew rank over my head, and there was no hand to pluck them out. Moreover when my father, seeing me at the baths, perceived that I was becoming a man, and was stirred with a restless youthfulness, he, as if from this anticipating future descendants, joyfully told it to my mother; rejoicing in that intoxication wherein the world so often forgets You, its Creator, and falls in love with Your creature instead of You, from the invisible wine of its own perversity turning and bowing down to the most infamous things. But in my mother's breast You had even now begun Your temple, and the commencement of Your holy habitation, whereas my father was only a catechumen as yet, and that but recently. She then started up with a pious fear and trembling; and, although I had not yet been baptized, she feared those crooked ways in which they walk who turn their back to You, and not their face. Jeremiah 2:27

How wretched I am! Do I dare to say that You remained silent, O my God, while I wandered farther from You? Did You really remain silent toward me? Whose words were those except Yours, which You spoke into my ears through my mother, Your faithful servant? Yet none of them penetrated my heart to make me obey. For she wanted—and I remember how she privately warned me with great concern—not to commit sexual immorality, but especially never to violate another man's wife. These seemed to me nothing but womanly advice that I would be embarrassed to follow. But they were Your words, and I did not know it. I thought You remained silent and that it was only she who was speaking. Yet through her You did not remain silent to me, and when I despised her, I was despising You—I, her son, the son of Your handmaid, Your servant. But I did not know this, and I rushed headlong with such blindness that among my peers I was ashamed to be less shameless. When I heard them boasting about their disgraceful actions and glorying even more as their wickedness increased, I took pleasure in doing the same—not only for the pleasure itself, but for the praise. What deserves blame except vice? Yet I made myself out to be worse than I was so that I would not be criticized. And when I had not actually sinned like the most corrupt ones, I would claim that I had done what I had not done, so that I would not appear contemptible for being more innocent or less respected for being more chaste.

7. Woe is me! And dare I affirm that You held Your peace, O my God, while I strayed farther from You? Did You then hold Your peace to me? And whose words were they but Yours which by my mother, Your faithful handmaid, You poured into my ears, none of which sank into my heart to make me do it? For she desired, and I remember privately warned me, with great solicitude, not to commit fornication; but above all things never to defile another man's wife. These appeared to me but womanish counsels, which I should blush to obey. But they were Yours, and I knew it not, and I thought that You held Your peace, and that it was she who spoke, through whom You held not Your peace to me, and in her person wast despised by me, her son, the son of Your handmaid, Your servant. But this I knew not; and rushed on headlong with such blindness, that among my equals I was ashamed to be less shameless, when I heard them pluming themselves upon their disgraceful acts, yea, and glorying all the more in proportion to the greatness of their baseness; and I took pleasure in doing it, not for the pleasure's sake only, but for the praise. What is worthy of dispraise but vice? But I made myself out worse than I was, in order that I might not be dispraised; and when in anything I had not sinned as the abandoned ones, I would affirm that I had done what I had not, that I might not appear abject for being more innocent, or of less esteem for being more chaste.

Here I am, walking the streets of Babylon with such companions, wallowing in its filth as though it were cinnamon and precious perfumes. To bind me even more tightly to the very heart of it, my unseen enemy trampled me down and seduced me—and I was easily seduced. My mother, though she herself had already fled from the midst of Babylon, but was still moving slowly through its outskirts, did not take to heart what her husband had told her about me when she advised me to be chaste. She did not keep within the bounds of married love (if she could not cut it away completely) what she knew was harmful in the present and dangerous for the future. She ignored this because she was afraid that a wife would be an obstacle and hindrance to my prospects. Not the hopes of the future world that my mother placed in You, but the hope of education, which both my parents were overly eager for me to gain—my father because he thought little or nothing of You and had only empty ambitions for me, my mother because she believed that the usual course of studies would not hinder but would actually help me in reaching You. This is what I gather, recalling as best I can my parents' attitudes. Meanwhile, I was given free rein beyond proper discipline, so that I could indulge in whatever I wanted, even to the point of excess. And over everything there was a fog that blocked the brightness of Your truth from my sight, O my God, and my sin bulged out as if from sheer fatness.

8. Behold with what companions I walked the streets of Babylon, in whose filth I was rolled, as if in cinnamon and precious ointments. And that I might cleave the more tenaciously to its very centre, my invisible enemy trod me down, and seduced me, I being easily seduced. Nor did the mother of my flesh, although she herself had ere this fled out of the midst of Babylon, Jeremiah 51:6 — progressing, however, but slowly in the skirts of it — in counselling me to chastity, so bear in mind what she had been told about me by her husband as to restrain in the limits of conjugal affection (if it could not be cut away to the quick) what she knew to be destructive in the present and dangerous in the future. But she took no heed of this, for she was afraid lest a wife should prove a hindrance and a clog to my hopes. Not those hopes of the future world, which my mother had in You; but the hope of learning, which both my parents were too anxious that I should acquire — he, because he had little or no thought of You, and but vain thoughts for me — she, because she calculated that those usual courses of learning would not only be no drawback, but rather a furtherance towards my attaining You. For thus I conjecture, recalling as well as I can the dispositions of my parents. The reins, meantime, were slackened towards me beyond the restraint of due severity, that I might play, yea, even to dissoluteness, in whatsoever I fancied. And in all there was a mist, shutting out from my sight the brightness of Your truth, O my God; and my iniquity displayed itself as from very fatness.

Chapter 4. He Commits Theft with His Companions, Not Urged on by Poverty, But from a Certain Distaste of Well-Doing.

Theft is punished by Your law, O Lord, and by the law written in human hearts, which sin itself cannot erase. For what thief will tolerate another thief? Even a wealthy thief will not tolerate one who steals because he is driven by need. Yet I wanted to commit robbery, and I did so, driven neither by hunger nor poverty but by a distaste for doing good and a desire for wrongdoing. For I stole something I already had enough of, and much better. I didn't want to enjoy what I stole, but rather the theft and sin itself. There was a pear tree near our vineyard, heavily loaded with fruit that was appealing neither for its appearance nor its taste. Some of us reckless young men went late one night to shake and rob this tree (having prolonged our games in the streets until then, according to our shameful habit), and we carried away large amounts, not to eat ourselves, but to throw to the pigs, having eaten only a few of them ourselves. Doing this pleased us all the more because it was forbidden. Look at my heart, O my God; look at my heart, which You had pity on when it was in the bottomless pit. Look, now, let my heart tell You what it was seeking there, that I should be needlessly wicked, having no motivation for evil except the evil itself. It was disgusting, and I loved it. I loved to perish. I loved my own error—not the thing for which I erred, but the error itself. Corrupt soul, falling from Your firmament to complete destruction—not seeking anything through the shame except the shame itself!

9. Theft is punished by Your law, O Lord, and by the law written in men's hearts, which iniquity itself cannot blot out. For what thief will suffer a thief? Even a rich thief will not allow him who is driven to it by want. Yet had I a desire to commit robbery, and did so, compelled neither by hunger, nor poverty through a distaste for well-doing, and a lustiness of iniquity. For I pilfered that of which I had already sufficient, and much better. Nor did I desire to enjoy what I pilfered, but the theft and sin itself. There was a pear-tree close to our vineyard, heavily laden with fruit, which was tempting neither for its color nor its flavour. To shake and rob this some of us wanton young fellows went, late one night (having, according to our disgraceful habit, prolonged our games in the streets until then), and carried away great loads, not to eat ourselves, but to fling to the very swine, having only eaten some of them; and to do this pleased us all the more because it was not permitted. Behold my heart, O my God; behold my heart, which You had pity upon when in the bottomless pit. Behold, now, let my heart tell You what it was seeking there, that I should be gratuitously wanton, having no inducement to evil but the evil itself. It was foul, and I loved it. I loved to perish. I loved my own error — not that for which I erred, but the error itself. Base soul, falling from Your firmament to utter destruction — not seeking anything through the shame but the shame itself!

Chapter 5. Concerning the Motives to Sin, Which are Not in the Love of Evil, But in the Desire of Obtaining the Property of Others.

There is desirability in all beautiful bodies, and in gold and silver and all things, and in bodily contact sympathy is powerful, and each sense has its proper correspondence with physical objects. Worldly honor also has its glory, and the power of command and of overcoming, from which comes also the desire for revenge. And yet to acquire all these things, we must not depart from You, O Lord, nor turn away from Your law. The life we live here also has its particular attractiveness, through a certain measure of beauty of its own and harmony with all earthly things. The friendships of men are also made dear by a sweet bond, in the unity of many souls. Because of all these things, and others like them, sin is committed, while through an excessive preference for these lower goods, the better and higher ones are neglected—even You, our Lord God, Your truth, and Your law. For these lesser things have their pleasures, but not like my God, who has created all things; for in Him the righteous delight, and He is the sweetness of the upright in heart.

10. There is a desirableness in all beautiful bodies, and in gold, and silver, and all things; and in bodily contact sympathy is powerful, and each other sense has his proper adaptation of body. Worldly honour has also its glory, and the power of command, and of overcoming; whence proceeds also the desire for revenge. And yet to acquire all these, we must not depart from You, O Lord, nor deviate from Your law. The life which we live here has also its peculiar attractiveness, through a certain measure of comeliness of its own, and harmony with all things here below. The friendships of men also are endeared by a sweet bond, in the oneness of many souls. On account of all these, and such as these, is sin committed; while through an inordinate preference for these goods of a lower kind, the better and higher are neglected — even You, our Lord God, Your truth, and Your law. For these meaner things have their delights, but not like my God, who has created all things; for in Him does the righteous delight, and He is the sweetness of the upright in heart.

When we investigate why a crime was committed, we only believe it happened if it appears there was a desire to obtain some of those things we called lesser goods, or a fear of losing them. For truly these things are beautiful and attractive, although compared to those higher and heavenly goods they are lowly and worthless. A man has murdered another; what was his motive? He wanted his wife or his property, or he would steal to support himself, or he was afraid of losing something of that kind to him, or having been wronged, he was burning to take revenge. Would he commit murder without a motive, simply delighting in the act of murder itself? Who would believe it? For even regarding that savage and brutal man who is said to have been gratuitously wicked and cruel, a motive is still given. Lest through idleness, he says, his hand or heart should grow inactive. And for what purpose? Why, so that by practicing that wickedness, he might eventually take possession of the city and attain honors, power, and wealth, and be free from the fear of the laws, and his difficult circumstances from the needs of his family, and the consciousness of his own wickedness. So it seems that even Catiline himself did not love his own crimes, but something else, which gave him the motive for committing them.

11. When, therefore, we inquire why a crime was committed, we do not believe it, unless it appear that there might have been the wish to obtain some of those which we designated meaner things, or else a fear of losing them. For truly they are beautiful and comely, although in comparison with those higher and celestial goods they be abject and contemptible. A man has murdered another; what was his motive? He desired his wife or his estate; or would steal to support himself; or he was afraid of losing something of the kind by him; or, being injured, he was burning to be revenged. Would he commit murder without a motive, taking delight simply in the act of murder? Who would credit it? For as for that savage and brutal man, of whom it is declared that he was gratuitously wicked and cruel, there is yet a motive assigned. Lest through idleness, he says, hand or heart should grow inactive. And to what purpose? Why, even that, having once got possession of the city through that practice of wickedness, he might attain unto honours, empire, and wealth, and be exempt from the fear of the laws, and his difficult circumstances from the needs of his family, and the consciousness of his own wickedness. So it seems that even Catiline himself loved not his own villanies, but something else, which gave him the motive for committing them.

Chapter 6. Why He Delighted in that Theft, When All Things Which Under the Appearance of Good Invite to Vice are True and Perfect in God Alone.

What was it, then, that I—miserable as I was—loved so much about you, my theft, my deed done in darkness, in that sixteenth year of my life? You were not beautiful, since you were theft. But are you even anything at all, so that I can discuss this matter with you? Those pears we stole were beautiful to look at because they were Your creation, You who are the most beautiful of all, Creator of all, You good God—God, the highest good, and my true good. Those pears truly were pleasant to see, but it was not for them that my miserable soul longed, since I had plenty of better ones. I picked those pears simply so that I might steal. After I picked them, I threw them away—my only satisfaction in them was my own sin, which I enjoyed. If any of those pears went into my mouth, what sweetened it was my sin in eating it. And now, O Lord my God, I ask what it was in that theft of mine that gave me such pleasure. Look, it has no beauty in it—not the kind that exists in justice and wisdom, nor the kind that is in the mind, memory, senses, and bodily life of man, nor even the kind that is the glory and beauty of the stars in their paths, or the earth, or the sea, full of newly forming life that replaces what dies as it is born, nor indeed that false and shadowy beauty that belongs to deceptive vices.

12. What was it, then, that I, miserable one, so doted on in you, you theft of mine, you deed of darkness, in that sixteenth year of my age? Beautiful you were not, since you were theft. But are you anything, that so I may argue the case with you? Those pears that we stole were fair to the sight, because they were Your creation, You fairest of all, Creator of all, You good God — God, the highest good, and my true good. Those pears truly were pleasant to the sight; but it was not for them that my miserable soul lusted, for I had abundance of better, but those I plucked simply that I might steal. For, having plucked them, I threw them away, my sole gratification in them being my own sin, which I was pleased to enjoy. For if any of these pears entered my mouth, the sweetener of it was my sin in eating it. And now, O Lord my God, I ask what it was in that theft of mine that caused me such delight; and behold it has no beauty in it — not such, I mean, as exists in justice and wisdom; nor such as is in the mind, memory, senses, and animal life of man; nor yet such as is the glory and beauty of the stars in their courses; or the earth, or the sea, teeming with incipient life, to replace, as it is born, that which decays; nor, indeed, that false and shadowy beauty which pertains to deceptive vices.

Pride imitates greatness, but You alone are God, high above all. Ambition seeks honors and fame, but You alone are to be honored above all and renowned forever. The cruelty of the powerful wants to be feared, but who should be feared except God alone? What can be forced away or taken from His power—when, where, how, or by whom? The allurements of lust pretend to be love, yet nothing is more alluring than Your love, nor is anything loved more beneficially than Your truth, bright and beautiful above all. Curiosity pretends to desire knowledge, but You supremely know all things. Yes, even ignorance and foolishness hide themselves under the names of simplicity and innocence, because nothing can be found more simple than You, and what is more innocent, since it is a sinner's own works that harm him? Laziness seems to long for rest, but what certain rest is there except in the Lord? Self-indulgence wants to be called plenty and abundance, but You are the fullness and never-failing abundance of pleasures that never fade. Wastefulness presents a shadow of generosity, but You are the most generous giver of all good things. Greed wants to possess much, but You are the possessor of all things. Envy competes for excellence, but what is so excellent as You? Anger seeks revenge, but who takes revenge more justly than You? Fear reacts to unusual and sudden events that threaten beloved things, and is cautious for their safety, but what can happen that is unusual or sudden to You? Or who can take from You what You love? Or where is there unshakable security except with You? Grief pines for things lost in which desire had found pleasure, wanting nothing taken from it, just as nothing can be taken from You.

13. For thus does pride imitate high estate, whereas You alone art God, high above all. And what does ambition seek but honours and renown, whereas You alone are to be honoured above all, and renowned for evermore? The cruelty of the powerful wishes to be feared; but who is to be feared but God only, out of whose power what can be forced away or withdrawn — when, or where, or whither, or by whom? The enticements of the wanton would fain be deemed love; and yet is naught more enticing than Your charity, nor is anything loved more healthfully than that, Your truth, bright and beautiful above all. Curiosity affects a desire for knowledge, whereas it is You who supremely knows all things. Yea, ignorance and foolishness themselves are concealed under the names of ingenuousness and harmlessness, because nothing can be found more ingenuous than You; and what is more harmless, since it is a sinner's own works by which he is harmed? And sloth seems to long for rest; but what sure rest is there besides the Lord? Luxury would fain be called plenty and abundance; but You are the fullness and unfailing plenteousness of unfading joys. Prodigality presents a shadow of liberality; but You are the most lavish giver of all good. Covetousness desires to possess much; and You are the Possessor of all things. Envy contends for excellence; but what so excellent as You? Anger seeks revenge; who avenges more justly than You? Fear starts at unwonted and sudden chances which threaten things beloved, and is wary for their security; but what can happen that is unwonted or sudden to You? Or who can deprive You of what You love? Or where is there unshaken security save with You? Grief languishes for things lost in which desire had delighted itself, even because it would have nothing taken from it, as nothing can be from You.

The soul commits adultery when it turns away from You and looks for outside of You what it cannot find pure and untainted until it returns to You. This is how all who distance themselves far from You and rebel against You perversely imitate You. But even by imitating You in this way, they acknowledge that You are the Creator of all nature, and therefore there is no place where they can completely withdraw from You. What, then, did I love in that theft? And in what way did I, even in a corrupt and perverted manner, imitate my Lord? Did I want, even if only through deceit, to act against Your law, because I could not do so by power, so that as a prisoner I might imitate an incomplete freedom by doing with impunity things I was not permitted to do, in a darkened likeness of Your omnipotence? Look at this servant of Yours, fleeing from his Lord and chasing a shadow! O corruption! O monstrosity of life and depth of death! Could I have liked what was unlawful only because it was unlawful?

14. Thus does the soul commit fornication when she turns away from You, and seeks without You what she cannot find pure and untainted until she returns to You. Thus all pervertedly imitate You who separate themselves far from You and raise themselves up against You. But even by thus imitating You they acknowledge You to be the Creator of all nature, and so that there is no place whither they can altogether retire from You. What, then, was it that I loved in that theft? And wherein did I, even corruptedly and pervertedly, imitate my Lord? Did I wish, if only by artifice, to act contrary to Your law, because by power I could not, so that, being a captive, I might imitate an imperfect liberty by doing with impunity things which I was not allowed to do, in obscured likeness of Your omnipotency? Behold this servant of Yours, fleeing from his Lord, and following a shadow! O rottenness! O monstrosity of life and profundity of death! Could I like that which was unlawful only because it was unlawful?

Chapter 7. He Gives Thanks to God for the Remission of His Sins, and Reminds Every One that the Supreme God May Have Preserved Us from Greater Sins.

What shall I give back to the Lord, for while my memory brings these things to mind, my soul is not horrified by them? I will love You, O Lord, and thank You, and confess to Your name, because You have removed from me these wicked and evil deeds of mine. I credit it to Your grace and to Your mercy that You have melted away my sin like ice. I also credit to Your grace whatever evil I did not commit, for what might I not have done, since I loved sin for sin's own sake? Yes, I confess that all has been forgiven me, both the sins I committed through my own perversity and those which I did not commit because of Your guidance. Who is the person who, thinking about his own weakness, dares to attribute his purity and innocence to his own strength, so that he would love You less, as if he had less need of Your mercy, by which You forgive the sins of those who turn to You? For whoever, being called by You, obeyed Your voice and avoided those things which he reads me recalling and confessing about myself, let him not look down on me, who, being sick, was healed by that same Physician by whose help he himself was not sick, or rather was less sick. And for this reason let him love You as much, indeed all the more, since the one by whom he sees me restored from such great weakness of sin is the same one by whom he sees himself preserved from a similar weakness.

15. What shall I render unto the Lord, that while my memory recalls these things my soul is not appalled at them? I will love You, O Lord, and thank You, and confess unto Your name, Revelation 3:5 because You have put away from me these so wicked and nefarious acts of mine. To Your grace I attribute it, and to Your mercy, that You have melted away my sin as it were ice. To Your grace also I attribute whatsoever of evil I have not committed; for what might I not have committed, loving as I did the sin for the sin's sake? Yea, all I confess to have been pardoned me, both those which I committed by my own perverseness, and those which, by Your guidance, I committed not. Where is he who, reflecting upon his own infirmity, dares to ascribe his chastity and innocency to his own strength, so that he should love You the less, as if he had been in less need of Your mercy, whereby You forgive the transgressions of those that turn to You? For whosoever, called by You, obeyed Your voice, and shunned those things which he reads me recalling and confessing of myself, let him not despise me, who, being sick, was healed by that same Physician Luke 4:23 by whose aid it was that he was not sick, or rather was less sick. And for this let him love You as much, yea, all the more, since by whom he sees me to have been restored from so great a feebleness of sin, by Him he sees himself from a like feebleness to have been preserved.

Chapter 8. In His Theft He Loved the Company of His Fellow-Sinners.

What benefit did I gain then, Romans 6:21, miserable as I was, from those things that now make me ashamed when I remember them—especially that theft, which I loved only for the sake of the theft itself? And since the theft itself was nothing, I was even more miserable for loving it. Yet I would not have done it by myself alone—I remember what was in my heart—I could not have done it alone. So I loved the companionship of my accomplices with whom I did it. Therefore, I did not love the theft alone—no, rather, it was only that which I loved, for the companionship meant nothing. What is the truth here? Who can teach me except the One who illuminates my heart and searches out its dark corners? What has prompted me to inquire about this, discuss it, and think it over? If I had loved the pears I stole at that time and wanted to enjoy them, I could have done it alone, if the mere act of theft had been enough to give me pleasure; I would not have needed to stir up that itching in my passions through the encouragement of accomplices. But since my enjoyment was not in those pears, it was in the crime itself, which the company of my fellow-sinners produced.

16. What fruit had I then, Romans 6:21 wretched one, in those things which, when I remember them, cause me shame — above all in that theft, which I loved only for the theft's sake? And as the theft itself was nothing, all the more wretched was I who loved it. Yet by myself alone I would not have done it — I recall what my heart was — alone I could not have done it. I loved, then, in it the companionship of my accomplices with whom I did it. I did not, therefore, love the theft alone — yea, rather, it was that alone that I loved, for the companionship was nothing. What is the fact? Who is it that can teach me, but He who illuminates mine heart and searches out the dark corners thereof? What is it that has come into my mind to inquire about, to discuss, and to reflect upon? For had I at that time loved the pears I stole, and wished to enjoy them, I might have done so alone, if I could have been satisfied with the mere commission of the theft by which my pleasure was secured; nor needed I have provoked that itching of my own passions, by the encouragement of accomplices. But as my enjoyment was not in those pears, it was in the crime itself, which the company of my fellow-sinners produced.

Chapter 9. It Was a Pleasure to Him Also to Laugh When Seriously Deceiving Others.

What feelings drove me then? It was truly too shameful, and woe to me for having it. But still, what was it? Who can understand his errors? We laughed because our hearts were tickled at the thought of deceiving those who had no idea what we were doing and would have strongly disapproved. Yet why did I take such joy in this, especially since I didn't do it alone? Is it that no one easily laughs alone? No one does so easily. Yet sometimes when people are by themselves with no one around, a fit of laughter overcomes them when something very funny presents itself to their senses or mind. But I would not have done it alone—I could not have done it at all by myself. Look, my God, the vivid memory of my soul is laid bare before You—I would not have committed that theft alone, in which what I stole did not please me, but rather the act of stealing itself. I would not have liked doing it alone nearly as much, nor would I have done it. O friendship that is so unfriendly! You mysterious seducer of the soul, you greed to do harm out of amusement and playfulness, you desire for others' loss without any desire for my own gain or revenge. But when they say, "Let us go, let us do it," we are ashamed not to be shameless.

17. By what feelings, then, was I animated? For it was in truth too shameful; and woe was me who had it. But still what was it? Who can understand his errors? We laughed, because our hearts were tickled at the thought of deceiving those who little imagined what we were doing, and would have vehemently disapproved of it. Yet, again, why did I so rejoice in this, that I did it not alone? Is it that no one readily laughs alone? No one does so readily; but yet sometimes, when men are alone by themselves, nobody being by, a fit of laughter overcomes them when anything very droll presents itself to their senses or mind. Yet alone I would not have done it — alone I could not at all have done it. Behold, my God, the lively recollection of my soul is laid bare before You — alone I had not committed that theft, wherein what I stole pleased me not, but rather the act of stealing; nor to have done it alone would I have liked so well, neither would I have done it. O Friendship too unfriendly! You mysterious seducer of the soul, you greediness to do mischief out of mirth and wantonness, you craving for others' loss, without desire for my own profit or revenge; but when they say, Let us go, let us do it, we are ashamed not to be shameless.

Chapter 10. With God There is True Rest and Life Unchanging.

Who can untangle that twisted and knotted mess? It is disgusting. I hate to think about it. I hate to look at it. But I long for you, O righteousness and innocence, beautiful and attractive to all virtuous eyes, and offering a satisfaction that never grows stale! With you is perfect rest, and life unchanging. Whoever enters into you enters into the joy of his Lord, and will have no fear, and will do excellently in the most Excellent. I fell away from you, O my God, and I wandered too far from you, my support, in my youth, and became to myself a barren land.

18. Who can unravel that twisted and tangled knottiness? It is foul. I hate to reflect on it. I hate to look on it. But you do I long for, O righteousness and innocency, fair and comely to all virtuous eyes, and of a satisfaction that never palls! With you is perfect rest, and life unchanging. He who enters into you enters into the joy of his Lord, Matthew 25:21 and shall have no fear, and shall do excellently in the most Excellent. I sank away from You, O my God, and I wandered too far from You, my stay, in my youth, and became to myself an unfruitful land.


Confessions — Book I

Praise of God and Augustine’s infancy and boyhood: learning to speak, school, and the sins of childhood.

Commencing with the invocation of God, Augustine relates in detail the beginning of his life, his infancy and boyhood, up to his fifteenth year; at which age he acknowledges that he was more inclined to all youthful pleasures and vices than to the study of letters.

Source: Translated by J.G. Pilkington. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 1. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110101.htm>.

Contents · 18 chapters
  1. Chapter 1. He Proclaims the Greatness of God, Whom He Desires to Seek and Invoke, Being Awakened by Him.
  2. Chapter 2. That the God Whom We Invoke is in Us, and We in Him.
  3. Chapter 3. Everywhere God Wholly Fills All Things, But Neither Heaven Nor Earth Contains Him.
  4. Chapter 4. The Majesty of God is Supreme, and His Virtues Inexplicable.
  5. Chapter 5. He Seeks Rest in God, and Pardon of His Sins.
  6. Chapter 6. He Describes His Infancy, and Lauds the Protection and Eternal Providence of God.
  7. Chapter 7. He Shows by Example that Even Infancy is Prone to Sin.
  8. Chapter 8. That When a Boy He Learned to Speak, Not by Any Set Method, But from the Acts and Words of His Parents.
  9. Chapter 9. Concerning the Hatred of Learning, the Love of Play, and the Fear of Being Whipped Noticeable in Boys: and of the Folly of Our Elders and Masters.
  10. Chapter 10. Through a Love of Ball-Playing and Shows, He Neglects His Studies and the Injunctions of His Parents.
  11. Chapter 11. Seized by Disease, His Mother Being Troubled, He Earnestly Demands Baptism, Which on Recovery is Postponed — His Father Not as Yet Believing in Christ.
  12. Chapter 12. Being Compelled, He Gave His Attention to Learning; But Fully Acknowledges that This Was the Work of God.
  13. Chapter 13. He Delighted in Latin Studies and the Empty Fables of the Poets, But Hated the Elements of Literature and the Greek Language.
  14. Chapter 14. Why He Despised Greek Literature, and Easily Learned Latin.
  15. Chapter 15. He Entreats God, that Whatever Useful Things He Learned as a Boy May Be Dedicated to Him.
  16. Chapter 16. He Disapproves of the Mode of Educating Youth, and He Points Out Why Wickedness is Attributed to the Gods by the Poets.
  17. Chapter 17. He Continues on the Unhappy Method of Training Youth in Literary Subjects.
  18. Chapter 18. Men Desire to Observe the Rules of Learning, But Neglect the Eternal Rules of Everlasting Safety.

Chapter 1. He Proclaims the Greatness of God, Whom He Desires to Seek and Invoke, Being Awakened by Him.

Great are You, O Lord, and greatly to be praised. Your power is great, and Your wisdom has no end. And man, being part of Your creation, desires to praise You—man, who carries with him his mortality, the evidence of his sin, and the evidence that You resist the proud. Yet man, this part of Your creation, still desires to praise You. You move us to delight in praising You, for You have made us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You. Lord, teach me to know and understand which should come first: to call on You, or to praise You; and likewise to know You, or to call on You. But who calls on You without knowing You? For someone who does not know You may call on You as something other than what You are. Or perhaps we call on You so that we may know You. But how will they call on Him in whom they have not believed? Or how will they believe without a preacher? And those who seek the Lord will praise Him. For those who seek will find Him, and those who find Him will praise Him. Let me seek You, Lord, by calling on You, and call on You by believing in You, for You have been preached to us. O Lord, my faith calls on You—that faith which You have given to me, which You have breathed into me through the incarnation of Your Son, through the ministry of Your preacher.

1. Great are You, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is Your power, and of Your wisdom there is no end. And man, being a part of Your creation, desires to praise You — man, who bears about with him his mortality, the witness of his sin, even the witness that You resist the proud, — yet man, this part of Your creation, desires to praise You. You move us to delight in praising You; for You have made us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You. [cor nostrum inquietum est donec requiescat in Te] Lord, teach me to know and understand which of these should be first: to call on You, or to praise You; and likewise to know You, or to call on You. But who calls upon You without knowing You? For he that knows You not may call upon You as other than You are. Or perhaps we call on You that we may know You. But how shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe without a preacher? Romans 10:14 And those who seek the Lord shall praise Him. For those who seek shall find Him, Matthew 7:7 and those who find Him shall praise Him. Let me seek You, Lord, in calling on You, and call on You in believing in You; for You have been preached unto us. O Lord, my faith calls on You — that faith which You have imparted to me, which You have breathed into me through the incarnation of Your Son, through the ministry of Your preacher.

Chapter 2. That the God Whom We Invoke is in Us, and We in Him.

And how shall I call upon my God—my God and my Lord? For when I call on Him I ask Him to come into me. And what place is there in me into which my God can come—into which God can come, even He who made heaven and earth? Is there anything in me, O Lord my God, that can contain You? Do indeed the very heaven and the earth, which You have made, and in which You have made me, contain You? Or, since nothing could exist without You, does whatever exists contain You? Why, then, do I ask You to come into me, since I indeed exist, and could not exist if You were not in me? Because I am not yet in hell, though You are even there; for if I go down into hell You are there. I could not therefore exist, could not exist at all, O my God, unless You were in me. Or should I not rather say, that I could not exist unless I were in You from whom are all things, by whom are all things, in whom are all things? Even so, Lord; even so. Where do I call You to, since You are in me, or from where can You come into me? For where outside heaven and earth can I go so that from there my God may come into me who has said, I fill heaven and earth?

2. And how shall I call upon my God — my God and my Lord? For when I call on Him I ask Him to come into me. And what place is there in me into which my God can come — into which God can come, even He who made heaven and earth? Is there anything in me, O Lord my God, that can contain You? Do indeed the very heaven and the earth, which You have made, and in which You have made me, contain You? Or, as nothing could exist without You, does whatever exists contain You? Why, then, do I ask You to come into me, since I indeed exist, and could not exist if You were not in me? Because I am not yet in hell, though You are even there; for if I go down into hell You are there. I could not therefore exist, could not exist at all, O my God, unless You were in me. Or should I not rather say, that I could not exist unless I were in You from whom are all things, by whom are all things, in whom are all things? Romans 11:36 Even so, Lord; even so. Where do I call You to, since You are in me, or whence can You come into me? For where outside heaven and earth can I go that from thence my God may come into me who has said, I fill heaven and earth? Jeremiah 23:24

Chapter 3. Everywhere God Wholly Fills All Things, But Neither Heaven Nor Earth Contains Him.

Since You fill heaven and earth, do they contain You? Or, because they do not contain You, do You fill them and yet something remains over? And where do You pour out what remains of You after heaven and earth are filled? Or is there really no need for You, who contains all things, to be contained by anything, since the things You fill, You fill by containing them? For the vessels You fill do not support You, because even if they were broken, You would not be poured out. And when You are poured out on us, You are not brought down, but we are lifted up; You are not scattered, but we are gathered together. But when You fill all things, do You fill them with Your whole self, or, since even all things cannot completely contain You, do they contain a part, and do all things at once contain the same part? Or does each have its own particular part—the greater things receiving more, the smaller things less? Is one part of You greater and another less, then? Or are You wholly present everywhere while nothing completely contains You?

3. Since, then, You fill heaven and earth, do they contain You? Or, as they contain You not, do You fill them, and yet there remains something over? And where do You pour forth that which remains of You when the heaven and earth are filled? Or, indeed, is there no need that You who contains all things should be contained of any, since those things which You fill You fill by containing them? For the vessels which You fill do not sustain You, since should they even be broken You will not be poured forth. And when You are poured forth on us, Acts 2:18 You are not cast down, but we are uplifted; nor are You dissipated, but we are drawn together. But, as You fill all things, fill them with Your whole self, or, as even all things cannot altogether contain You, do they contain a part, and do all at once contain the same part? Or has each its own proper part — the greater more, the smaller less? Is, then, one part of You greater, another less? Or is it that You are wholly everywhere while nothing altogether contains You? [In this section, and constantly throughout the Confessions, he refers to the materialistic views concerning God held by the Manichæans.]

Chapter 4. The Majesty of God is Supreme, and His Virtues Inexplicable.

What, then, are You, O my God—what, I ask, but the Lord God? For who is Lord but the Lord? Or who is God except our God? Most high, most excellent, most powerful, most all-powerful; most merciful and most just; most hidden and most present; most beautiful and most strong, stable yet contained by nothing; unchangeable, yet changing all things; never new, never old; making all things new, yet bringing old age upon the proud without their knowing it; always working, yet always at rest; gathering, yet needing nothing; sustaining, filling, and protecting; creating, nourishing, and bringing to maturity; seeking, yet already possessing all things. You love, and are not consumed; You are jealous, yet free from anxiety; You repent, and have no grief; You are angry, yet calm; You change Your works, leaving Your plans unchanged; You recover what You find, though You never lost it; You are never in need, while You rejoice in gain; You are never greedy, though You demand interest. So that You may be in debt, more than enough is given to You, yet who has anything that is not Yours? You pay debts while owing nothing; and when You forgive debts, You lose nothing. Yet, O my God, my life, my holy joy, what is this that I have said? And what does anyone say when he speaks of You? Yet woe to those who keep silent, seeing that even those who say the most are like the mute.

4. What, then, are You, O my God — what, I ask, but the Lord God? For who is Lord but the Lord? Or who is God save our God? Most high, most excellent, most potent, most omnipotent; most piteous and most just; most hidden and most near; most beauteous and most strong, stable, yet contained of none; unchangeable, yet changing all things; never new, never old; making all things new, yet bringing old age upon the proud and they know it not; always working, yet ever at rest; gathering, yet needing nothing; sustaining, pervading, and protecting; creating, nourishing, and developing; seeking, and yet possessing all things. You love, and burn not; You are jealous, yet free from care; You repent, and have no sorrow; You are angry, yet serene; You change Your ways, leaving unchanged Your plans; You recover what You find, having yet never lost; You are never in want, while You rejoice in gain; You are never covetous, though requiring usury. Matthew 25:27 That You may owe, more than enough is given to You, [ Supererogatur tibi, ut debeas] yet who has anything that is not Yours? You pay debts while owing nothing; and when You forgive debts, lose nothing. Yet, O my God, my life, my holy joy, what is this that I have said? And what says any man when He speaks of You? Yet woe to those who keep silence, seeing that even they who say most are as the dumb.

Chapter 5. He Seeks Rest in God, and Pardon of His Sins.

Oh! How will I find rest in You? Who will send You into my heart to intoxicate it, so that I may forget my troubles and embrace You, my only good? What are You to me? Have mercy on me, so that I may speak. What am I to You that You demand my love, and unless I give it, You are angry and threaten me with great sorrows? Is it, then, a small sorrow not to love You? Alas! Alas! Tell me of Your mercy, O Lord my God, what You are to me. Say to my soul, I am your salvation. Speak so that I may hear. Look, Lord, the ears of my heart are before You; open them, and say to my soul, I am your salvation. When I hear, may I run and take hold of You. Do not hide Your face from me. Let me die, lest I die, if only I may see Your face.

5. Oh! How shall I find rest in You? Who will send You into my heart to inebriate it, so that I may forget my woes, and embrace You my only good? What are You to me? Have compassion on me, that I may speak. What am I to You that You demand my love, and unless I give it You art angry, and threaten me with great sorrows? Is it, then, a light sorrow not to love You? Alas! Alas! Tell me of Your compassion, O Lord my God, what You are to me. Say unto my soul, I am your salvation. So speak that I may hear. Behold, Lord, the ears of my heart are before You; open them, and say unto my soul, I am your salvation. When I hear, may I run and lay hold on You. Hide not Your face from me. Let me die, lest I die, if only I may see Your face.

My soul's dwelling is too cramped; expand it so that You may enter in. It is in ruins, restore it. There are things about it that must offend Your eyes; I confess and know this, but who will cleanse it? Or to whom shall I cry except to You? Cleanse me from my secret sins, O Lord, and keep Your servant from the sins of others. I believe, and therefore I speak; Lord, You know. Have I not confessed my transgressions to You, O my God, and You have put away the iniquity of my heart? I do not contend in judgment with You, who are the Truth, and I would not deceive myself, or my iniquity would lie against itself. Therefore I do not contend in judgment with You, for if You, Lord, should mark iniquities, O Lord, who could stand?

6. Cramped is the dwelling of my soul; expand it, that You may enter in. It is in ruins, restore it. There is that about it which must offend Your eyes; I confess and know it, but who will cleanse it? Or to whom shall I cry but to You? Cleanse me from my secret sins, O Lord, and keep Your servant from those of other men. I believe, and therefore do I speak; Lord, You know. Have I not confessed my transgressions unto You, O my God; and You have put away the iniquity of my heart? I do not contend in judgment with You, Job 9:3 who art the Truth; and I would not deceive myself, lest my iniquity lie against itself. I do not, therefore, contend in judgment with You, for if You, Lord, should mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?

Chapter 6. He Describes His Infancy, and Lauds the Protection and Eternal Providence of God.

Allow me to speak before Your mercy—me, dust and ashes. Let me speak, for look, it is Your mercy I am addressing, not some mocking person. Yet perhaps even You mock me, but when You turn toward me You will have compassion on me. For what do I want to say, O Lord my God, except that I don't know where I came from when I entered this—should I call it dying life or living death? Yet, as I have heard from my parents, from whose substance You formed me—since I myself cannot remember it—Your merciful comforts sustained me. So it was that the comforts of a woman's milk nourished me, though neither my mother nor my nurses filled their own breasts. Rather, You gave me the nourishment of infancy through them according to Your plan and that generosity of Yours which underlies all things. For You made me not want more than You gave, and You made those who nursed me willing to give me what You had given them. For they, through a natural instinct, were eager to give me what You had abundantly supplied. It was truly good for them that my good should come through them, though in fact it was not from them but through them. For from You, O God, come all good things, and from my God comes all my safety. This is what I have since learned, as You have revealed Yourself to me through the blessings both inside me and outside me which You have given me. For at that time I knew only how to nurse, to be content when comfortable, and to cry when in pain—nothing more.

7. Still suffer me to speak before Your mercy — me, dust and ashes. Genesis 18:27 Allow me to speak, for, behold, it is Your mercy I address, and not derisive man. Yet perhaps even You deride me; but when You are turned to me You will have compassion on me. Jeremiah 12:15 For what do I wish to say, O Lord my God, but that I know not whence I came hither into this — shall I call it dying life or living death? Yet, as I have heard from my parents, from whose substance You formed me — for I myself cannot remember it — Your merciful comforts sustained me. Thus it was that the comforts of a woman's milk entertained me; for neither my mother nor my nurses filled their own breasts, but You by them gave me the nourishment of infancy according to Your ordinance and that bounty of Yours which underlies all things. For You caused me not to want more than You gave, and those who nourished me willingly to give me what You gave them. For they, by an instinctive affection, were anxious to give me what You had abundantly supplied. It was, in truth, good for them that my good should come from them, though, indeed, it was not from them, but by them; for from You, O God, are all good things, and from my God is all my safety. Proverbs 21:31 This is what I have since discovered, as You have declared Yourself to me by the blessings both within me and without me which You have bestowed upon me. For at that time I knew how to suck, to be satisfied when comfortable, and to cry when in pain — nothing beyond.

After that, I began to laugh—first while sleeping, then while awake. I've been told this about myself and I believe it (though I can't remember it), because we see the same thing in other infants. And then, little by little, I became aware of where I was and wanted to communicate my desires to those who could fulfill them, but I couldn't. My needs were inside me, while they were outside, and they had no way to enter into my soul. So I flailed my limbs and voice, making the few weak signs I could—signs that were somewhat like, though not really much like, what I actually wanted. When I wasn't satisfied—either because I wasn't understood or because what I wanted would have been harmful to me—I became angry that my elders weren't subject to me and that people who owed me nothing didn't serve me, and I took revenge on them by crying. I've been able to learn that infants are like this by observing them, and they, even without knowing it, have shown me better that I was such a child than my nurses who did know it.

8. Afterwards I began to laugh — at first in sleep, then when waking. For this I have heard mentioned of myself, and I believe it (though I cannot remember it), for we see the same in other infants. And now little by little I realized where I was, and wished to tell my wishes to those who might satisfy them, but I could not; for my wants were within me, while they were without, and could not by any faculty of theirs enter into my soul. So I cast about limbs and voice, making the few and feeble signs I could, like, though indeed not much like, unto what I wished; and when I was not satisfied — either not being understood, or because it would have been injurious to me — I grew indignant that my elders were not subject unto me, and that those on whom I had no claim did not wait on me, and avenged myself on them by tears. That infants are such I have been able to learn by watching them; and they, though unknowing, have better shown me that I was such an one than my nurses who knew it.

And look, my infancy died long ago, and I am still alive. But You, O Lord, who live forever, and in whom nothing dies (since before the world existed, and indeed before anything that can be called "before," You exist, and are the God and Lord of all Your creatures; and with You the causes of all unstable things remain fixed, the unchanging sources of all changeable things, and the eternal reasons of all unreasoning and temporal things), tell me, Your suppliant, O God; tell, O merciful One, Your miserable servant—tell me whether my infancy followed after another age of mine that had already perished at that time. Was it the time I spent in my mother's womb? For I have learned something about that, and I have myself seen pregnant women. And what, O God, my joy, came before that life? Was I anywhere at all, or anyone at all? For no one can tell me these things—neither father nor mother, nor the experience of others, nor my own memory. Do you laugh at me for asking such questions, and command me to praise and confess You for what I do know?

9. And, behold, my infancy died long ago, and I live. But You, O Lord, who ever livest, and in whom nothing dies (since before the world was, and indeed before all that can be called before, You exist, and are the God and Lord of all Your creatures; and with You fixedly abide the causes of all unstable things, the unchanging sources of all things changeable, and the eternal reasons of all things unreasoning and temporal), tell me, Your suppliant, O God; tell, O merciful One, Your miserable servant — tell me whether my infancy succeeded another age of mine which had at that time perished. Was it that which I passed in my mother's womb? For of that something has been made known to me, and I have myself seen women with child. And what, O God, my joy, preceded that life? Was I, indeed, anywhere, or anybody? For no one can tell me these things, neither father nor mother, nor the experience of others, nor my own memory. Do you laugh at me for asking such things, and command me to praise and confess You for what I know?

I give thanks to You, Lord of heaven and earth, and I praise You for my first existence and my infancy, which I cannot remember. You have granted to human beings the ability to draw conclusions about themselves from what others tell them, and to believe many things about themselves based on the testimony of weak women. Even then I had life and being, and as my infancy was ending I was already searching for signs to make my feelings known to others. Where could such a creature come from except from You, O Lord? Can anyone be skillful enough to create himself? Is there any other channel through which being and life flow into us except this: that You, O Lord, have made us—You with whom being and life are one, because You Yourself are supreme being and life? You are the highest, You do not change, and this present day does not end in You, though it does end through You, since all such things exist in You. They would have no way of passing away unless You sustained them. And since Your years will have no end, Your years are an ever-present day. How many of our days and our fathers' days have passed through this day of Yours and received from it their measure and form of existence, and others still to come will likewise receive and pass away! But You are the same, and all the things of tomorrow and the days yet to come, and all of yesterday and the days that are past—You will do today, You have done today. What does it matter to me if someone does not understand this? Let him still rejoice and say, "What is this?" Let him rejoice even so, and prefer to discover You while failing to understand fully, rather than to understand fully but fail to discover You.

10. I give thanks to You, Lord of heaven and earth, giving praise to You for that my first being and infancy, of which I have no memory; for You have granted to man that from others he should come to conclusions as to himself, and that he should believe many things concerning himself on the authority of feeble women. Even then I had life and being; and as my infancy closed I was already seeking for signs by which my feelings might be made known to others. Whence could such a creature come but from You, O Lord? Or shall any man be skilful enough to fashion himself? Or is there any other vein by which being and life runs into us save this, that You, O Lord, hast made us, with whom being and life are one, because You Yourself art being and life in the highest? You are the highest, You change not, Malachi 3:6 neither in You does this present day come to an end, though it does end in You, since in You all such things are; for they would have no way of passing away unless You sustained them. And since Your years shall have no end, Your years are an ever present day. And how many of ours and our fathers' days have passed through this Your day, and received from it their measure and fashion of being, and others yet to come shall so receive and pass away! But You are the same; and all the things of tomorrow and the days yet to come, and all of yesterday and the days that are past, You will do today, You have done today. What is it to me if any understand not? Let him still rejoice and say, What is this? Let him rejoice even so, and rather love to discover in failing to discover, than in discovering not to discover You.

Chapter 7. He Shows by Example that Even Infancy is Prone to Sin.

Listen, O God! How terrible are the sins of humanity! When a person says this, you have compassion on him, because you created him but did not create the sin that is in him. Who reminds me of the sin of my infancy? For before you, no one is free from sin—not even an infant who has lived only one day on earth. Who reminds me of this? Doesn't every small child, in whom I see what I cannot remember about myself? How then did I sin? Was it because I cried for the breast? If I cried that way now—not for the breast, but for food appropriate to my age—I would be quite rightly laughed at and criticized. What I did then deserved criticism, but since I could not understand those who criticized me, neither custom nor reason allowed me to be criticized. For as we grow, we uproot and cast away such habits. I have never seen anyone wise who, when pruning something, throws away what is good. Or was it good, even for a short time, to try by crying to get what would be harmful if given? To be bitterly angry that free people and elders, and those to whom I owed my existence, along with many others wiser than I, were not subject to me and would not yield to my willful desires? To try to hurt them by struggling as hard as I could because commands were not obeyed that could only have harmed me if they had been obeyed? So the innocence lies in the weakness of the infant's body, not in its will. I myself have seen and observed an infant being jealous even though it could not speak. It turned pale and looked bitterly at its nursing companion. Who doesn't know this? Mothers and nurses tell us they soothe these things by various remedies. Can this really be considered innocence—that when the fountain of milk is flowing fresh and plentiful, one who needs it should not be allowed to share it, even though that nourishment is needed to sustain life? Yet we regard these things leniently, not because they are not faults, or because the faults are small, but because they will disappear as the child grows older. For though you may tolerate these things now, you could not bear them calmly if found in an older person.

11. Hearken, O God! Alas for the sins of men! Man says this, and You have compassion on him; for You created him, but did not create the sin that is in him. Who brings to my remembrance the sin of my infancy? For before You none is free from sin, not even the infant which has lived but a day upon the earth. Who brings this to my remembrance? Does not each little one, in whom I behold that which I do not remember of myself? In what, then, did I sin? Is it that I cried for the breast? If I should now so cry — not indeed for the breast, but for the food suitable to my years — I should be most justly laughed at and rebuked. What I then did deserved rebuke; but as I could not understand those who rebuked me, neither custom nor reason suffered me to be rebuked. For as we grow we root out and cast from us such habits. I have not seen any one who is wise, when purging John 15:2 anything cast away the good. Or was it good, even for a time, to strive to get by crying that which, if given, would be hurtful — to be bitterly indignant that those who were free and its elders, and those to whom it owed its being, besides many others wiser than it, who would not give way to the nod of its good pleasure, were not subject unto it — to endeavour to harm, by struggling as much as it could, because those commands were not obeyed which only could have been obeyed to its hurt? Then, in the weakness of the infant's limbs, and not in its will, lies its innocency. I myself have seen and known an infant to be jealous though it could not speak. It became pale, and cast bitter looks on its foster-brother. Who is ignorant of this? Mothers and nurses tell us that they appease these things by I know not what remedies; and may this be taken for innocence, that when the fountain of milk is flowing fresh and abundant, one who has need should not be allowed to share it, though needing that nourishment to sustain life? Yet we look leniently on these things, not because they are not faults, nor because the faults are small, but because they will vanish as age increases. For although you may allow these things now, you could not bear them with equanimity if found in an older person.

You, therefore, O Lord my God, who gave life to the infant and a body which, as we see, You have equipped with senses, joined together with limbs, made beautiful with shape, and for its complete well-being and safety have put in all vital powers—You command me to praise You for these things, to give thanks to the Lord, and to sing praise to Your name, O Most High. For You are an almighty and good God, even if You had done nothing but these things, which no one else can do but You, who alone made all things, O You most beautiful, who made all things beautiful and orders all things according to Your law. This period of my life, then, O Lord, of which I have no memory, which I accept based on what others tell me and which I infer from observing other infants—it troubles me, even though my inference is true, to count it as part of this life of mine that I live in this world, since it is like the time I spent in my mother's womb, hidden in the darkness of my forgetfulness. But if I was shaped in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me, where, I ask You, O my God, where, Lord, or when was I, Your servant, innocent? But look, I pass over that time, for what do I have to do with it, since I cannot recall any memories of it?

12. You, therefore, O Lord my God, who gave life to the infant, and a frame which, as we see, You have endowed with senses, compacted with limbs, beautified with form, and, for its general good and safety, hast introduced all vital energies — You command me to praise You for these things, to give thanks unto the Lord, and to sing praise unto Your name, O Most High; for You are a God omnipotent and good, though You had done nought but these things, which none other can do but You, who alone made all things, O You most fair, who made all things fair, and orders all according to Your law. This period, then, of my life, O Lord, of which I have no remembrance, which I believe in the word of others, and which I guess from other infants, it chagrins me — true though the guess be — to reckon in this life of mine which I lead in this world; inasmuch as, in the darkness of my forgetfulness, it is like to that which I passed in my mother's womb. But if I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me, where, I pray you, O my God, where, Lord, or when was I, Your servant, innocent? But behold, I pass by that time, for what have I to do with that, the memories of which I cannot recall?

Chapter 8. That When a Boy He Learned to Speak, Not by Any Set Method, But from the Acts and Words of His Parents.

Did I not then, growing out of infancy, come to boyhood, or rather did boyhood not come to me and replace infancy? My infancy did not depart (for where would it go?), and yet it no longer remained, for I was no longer an infant who could not speak, but a talking boy. I remember this, and I later observed how I first learned to speak. My elders did not teach me words by any set method, as they later did with letters. Rather, I myself, when I was unable to say everything I wished and to whomever I wanted, by means of whimpering and broken sounds and various movements of my limbs—which I used to enforce my wishes—repeated the sounds in my memory by the mind, O my God, which You gave me. When they called something by name and moved their body toward it while they spoke, I saw and understood that the thing they wished to point out was called by the name they then spoke, and that they meant this was made clear by the movement of the body, even by the natural language of all nations expressed through facial expression, the glance of the eye, movement of other limbs, and by the sound of the voice indicating the affections of the mind as it seeks, possesses, rejects, or avoids. So it was that by frequently hearing words in properly arranged sentences, I gradually learned what things they were the signs of. And having trained my mouth to pronounce these signs, I expressed my will through them. In this way I exchanged with those around me the signs by which we express our wishes, and advanced deeper into the stormy fellowship of human life, depending meanwhile on the authority of parents and the direction of elders.

13. Did I not, then, growing out of the state of infancy, come to boyhood, or rather did it not come to me, and succeed to infancy? Nor did my infancy depart (for whither went it?); and yet it did no longer abide, for I was no longer an infant that could not speak, but a chattering boy. I remember this, and I afterwards observed how I first learned to speak, for my elders did not teach me words in any set method, as they did letters afterwards; but myself, when I was unable to say all I wished and to whomsoever I desired, by means of the whimperings and broken utterances and various motions of my limbs, which I used to enforce my wishes, repeated the sounds in my memory by the mind, O my God, which You gave me. When they called anything by name, and moved the body towards it while they spoke, I saw and gathered that the thing they wished to point out was called by the name they then uttered; and that they did mean this was made plain by the motion of the body, even by the natural language of all nations expressed by the countenance, glance of the eye, movement of other members, and by the sound of the voice indicating the affections of the mind, as it seeks, possesses, rejects, or avoids. So it was that by frequently hearing words, in duly placed sentences, I gradually gathered what things they were the signs of; and having formed my mouth to the utterance of these signs, I thereby expressed my will. Thus I exchanged with those about me the signs by which we express our wishes, and advanced deeper into the stormy fellowship of human life, depending the while on the authority of parents, and the beck of elders.

Chapter 9. Concerning the Hatred of Learning, the Love of Play, and the Fear of Being Whipped Noticeable in Boys: and of the Folly of Our Elders and Masters.

O my God! What miseries and mockeries I experienced then, when obedience to my teachers was presented to me as the right thing for my boyhood, so that I might succeed in this world and excel in the study of rhetoric, which would bring me honor among people and deceptive wealth! Then I was sent to school to get an education, though I (worthless as I was) did not know what use it had. Yet if I was slow to learn, I was beaten! For our ancestors considered this praiseworthy, and many who had gone before us, following the same path, had already established these difficult paths through which we were forced to go, multiplying toil and suffering upon the sons of Adam. But we found, O Lord, people praying to You, and we learned from them to think of You, according to our capacity, as some Great One who was able (though not visible to our senses) to hear and help us. For as a boy I began to pray to You, my help and my refuge, and in calling upon You I loosened the restraints of my tongue and begged You, though I was small, with considerable earnestness, that I might not be beaten at school. And when You did not hear me—not thereby giving me over to foolishness—my elders, and even my own parents who wished me no harm, laughed at my beatings, which were then a great and serious trouble to me.

14. O my God! What miseries and mockeries did I then experience, when obedience to my teachers was set before me as proper to my boyhood, that I might flourish in this world, and distinguish myself in the science of speech, which should get me honour among men, and deceitful riches! After that I was put to school to get learning, of which I (worthless as I was) knew not what use there was; and yet, if slow to learn, I was flogged! For this was deemed praiseworthy by our forefathers; and many before us, passing the same course, had appointed beforehand for us these troublesome ways by which we were compelled to pass, multiplying labour and sorrow upon the sons of Adam. But we found, O Lord, men praying to You, and we learned from them to conceive of You, according to our ability, to be some Great One, who was able (though not visible to our senses) to hear and help us. For as a boy I began to pray to You, my help and my refuge, and in invoking You broke the bands of my tongue, and entreated You though little, with no little earnestness, that I might not be beaten at school. And when You heard me not, giving me not over to folly thereby, my elders, yea, and my own parents too, who wished me no ill, laughed at my stripes, my then great and grievous ill.

Is there anyone, Lord, with such a strong spirit and such deep devotion to You—for even a kind of dullness can produce that much—but is there, I ask, anyone who by devoutly clinging to You is given such great courage that he can treat lightly those racks and hooks and various tortures of that kind? Throughout the whole world, people beg You with great fear to save them from these things, mocking those who fear them most intensely—just as our parents mocked the punishments our teachers inflicted on us when we were boys. We feared our punishments no less than they feared theirs, and we prayed to You no less earnestly to escape them. Yet we still sinned by writing, reading, or studying our lessons less than what was demanded of us. It wasn't that we lacked memory or ability, O Lord—by Your will we had enough of both for our age—but our only delight was in play. We were punished for this by those who were doing exactly the same things themselves. But the idleness of adults is called business, while boys who do the same are punished by those very adults, and yet neither boys nor adults find any sympathy. Would any reasonable person approve of my being whipped because, as a boy, I played ball and was therefore kept from quickly learning those lessons by which, as a man, I would play even more shamefully? And did the man who beat me do anything different? When he was defeated in some minor argument with a fellow teacher, he was tortured more by anger and envy than I was when beaten by a playmate in a ball game.

15. Is there any one, Lord, with so high a spirit, cleaving to You with so strong an affection — for even a kind of obtuseness may do that much — but is there, I say, any one who, by cleaving devoutly to You, is endowed with so great a courage that he can esteem lightly those racks and hooks, and varied tortures of the same sort, against which, throughout the whole world, men supplicate You with great fear, deriding those who most bitterly fear them, just as our parents derided the torments with which our masters punished us when we were boys? For we were no less afraid of our pains, nor did we pray less to You to avoid them; and yet we sinned, in writing, or reading, or reflecting upon our lessons less than was required of us. For we wanted not, O Lord, memory or capacity, of which, by Your will, we possessed enough for our age — but we delighted only in play; and we were punished for this by those who were doing the same things themselves. But the idleness of our elders they call business, while boys who do the like are punished by those same elders, and yet neither boys nor men find any pity. For will any one of good sense approve of my being whipped because, as a boy, I played ball, and so was hindered from learning quickly those lessons by means of which, as a man, I should play more unbecomingly? And did he by whom I was beaten do other than this, who, when he was overcome in any little controversy with a co-tutor, was more tormented by anger and envy than I when beaten by a playmate in a match at ball?

Chapter 10. Through a Love of Ball-Playing and Shows, He Neglects His Studies and the Injunctions of His Parents.

I sinned, O Lord God, the Creator and Arranger of all things in nature—but only the Arranger of sin—I sinned, O Lord my God, by acting against the wishes of my parents and teachers. The learning they wanted me to gain, whatever their reasons, I could have used well later on. I disobeyed them not because I had chosen something better, but because I loved playing games. I loved winning in competitions and having my ears filled with made-up stories so they would itch for more. The same curiosity blazed more and more in my eyes for the shows and entertainments of adults. Yet those who put on these entertainments are held in such high regard that nearly everyone wants the same for their own children, even though they are still willing to have those children beaten if these same games distract them from the studies that would enable them to become the ones giving such entertainments. Look upon these things with compassion, O Lord, and deliver us who now call upon You. Deliver also those who do not call upon You, so that they may call upon You, and so that You may deliver them.

16. And yet I erred, O Lord God, the Creator and Disposer of all things in Nature, — but of sin the Disposer only — I erred, O Lord my God, in doing contrary to the wishes of my parents and of those masters; for this learning which they (no matter for what motive) wished me to acquire, I might have put to good account afterwards. For I disobeyed them not because I had chosen a better way, but from a fondness for play, loving the honour of victory in the matches, and to have my ears tickled with lying fables, in order that they might itch the more furiously — the same curiosity beaming more and more in my eyes for the shows and sports of my elders. Yet those who give these entertainments are held in such high repute, that almost all desire the same for their children, whom they are still willing should be beaten, if so be these same games keep them from the studies by which they desire them to arrive at being the givers of them. Look down upon these things, O Lord, with compassion, and deliver us who now call upon You; deliver those also who do not call upon You, that they may call upon You, and that You may deliver them.

Chapter 11. Seized by Disease, His Mother Being Troubled, He Earnestly Demands Baptism, Which on Recovery is Postponed — His Father Not as Yet Believing in Christ.

Even as a boy I had heard of eternal life promised to us through the humility of the Lord our God stooping down to our pride, and I was marked with the sign of the cross and seasoned with His salt even from my mother's womb, for she greatly trusted in You. You saw, O Lord, how once when I was still a boy, I was suddenly seized with stomach pains and was near death—You saw, O my God, for even then You were my protector, with what feeling and with what faith I begged from my mother's devotion, and from Your Church, the mother of us all, for baptism in Your Christ, my Lord and my God. At this, my physical mother became greatly troubled, for she, with a heart pure in Your faith, labored in birth more lovingly for my eternal salvation than she had for my physical life. Had I not quickly recovered, she would have immediately arranged for my initiation and washing through Your life-giving sacraments, confessing You, O Lord Jesus, for the forgiveness of sins. So my cleansing was postponed, as if it were necessary that, should I live, I would inevitably be further polluted; because indeed, the guilt from sin would be greater and more dangerous after baptism. At that time I believed along with my mother and the whole household, except my father; yet he did not overcome my mother's godly influence over me so as to stop me from believing in Christ, since he had not yet believed in Him himself. For she desired that You, O my God, should be my Father rather than he; and in this You helped her to prevail over her husband, to whom, though she was the better of the two, she remained obedient, because in this she was being obedient to You, who command it.

17. Even as a boy I had heard of eternal life promised to us through the humility of the Lord our God condescending to our pride, and I was signed with the sign of the cross, and was seasoned with His salt even from the womb of my mother, who greatly trusted in You. You saw, O Lord, how at one time, while yet a boy, being suddenly seized with pains in the stomach, and being at the point of death — You saw, O my God, for even then You were my keeper, with what emotion of mind and with what faith I solicited from the piety of my mother, and of Your Church, the mother of us all, the baptism of Your Christ, my Lord and my God. On which, the mother of my flesh being much troubled — since she, with a heart pure in Your faith, travailed in birth Galatians 4:19 more lovingly for my eternal salvation — would, had I not quickly recovered, have without delay provided for my initiation and washing by Your life-giving sacraments, confessing You, O Lord Jesus, for the remission of sins. So my cleansing was deferred, as if I must needs, should I live, be further polluted; because, indeed, the guilt contracted by sin would, after baptism, be greater and more perilous. Thus I at that time believed with my mother and the whole house, except my father; yet he did not overcome the influence of my mother's piety in me so as to prevent my believing in Christ, as he had not yet believed in Him. For she was desirous that You, O my God, should be my Father rather than he; and in this You aided her to overcome her husband, to whom, though the better of the two, she yielded obedience, because in this she yielded obedience to You, who so commands.

I beg You, my God, I would like to know, if it is Your will, why my baptism was delayed at that time. Was it for my benefit that the restraints were loosened on me, allowing me to sin? Or were they not actually loosened? If not, then why do we still hear people saying everywhere, "Leave him alone, let him do what he wants, he's not baptized yet"? But when it comes to physical health, no one says, "Let him be wounded more severely, since he's not cured yet!" How much better it would have been for me to be healed right away, and then through my own efforts and my friends' care, my soul's restored health could have been kept safe under Your protection, who gave it. That truly would have been better. But many great waves of temptation were expected to come upon me after childhood. My mother foresaw these, and she preferred that the unformed clay be exposed to them rather than the image itself.

18. I beseech You, my God, I would gladly know, if it be Your will, to what end my baptism was then deferred? Was it for my good that the reins were slackened, as it were, upon me for me to sin? Or were they not slackened? If not, whence comes it that it is still dinned into our ears on all sides, Let him alone, let him act as he likes, for he is not yet baptized? But as regards bodily health, no one exclaims, Let him be more seriously wounded, for he is not yet cured! How much better, then, had it been for me to have been cured at once; and then, by my own and my friends' diligence, my soul's restored health had been kept safe in Your keeping, who gave it! Better, in truth. But how numerous and great waves of temptation appeared to hang over me after my childhood! These were foreseen by my mother; and she preferred that the unformed clay should be exposed to them rather than the image itself.

Chapter 12. Being Compelled, He Gave His Attention to Learning; But Fully Acknowledges that This Was the Work of God.

But in my childhood (which I feared far less than adolescence) I had no love of learning and hated being forced to study. Yet I was forced to it anyway, and this was good for me, though I myself did not do well, because I would not have learned if I had not been compelled. For no one does well when acting against his will, even if what he does is itself good. Those who forced me did not act with good motives either, but the good that came to me was from You, my God. They did not consider how I should use what they forced me to learn, except to satisfy the excessive desires of a wealthy poverty and a disgraceful glory. But You, by whom even the hairs of our heads are numbered, used the error of all who pressured me to learn for my good. And my own error in not wanting to learn, You used for my punishment—a punishment I deserved, being such a small boy yet such a great sinner. So through those who did not act well, You did well for me, and through my own sin You justly punished me. For it is exactly as You have ordained, that every disordered desire should bring its own punishment.

19. But in this my childhood (which was far less dreaded for me than youth) I had no love of learning, and hated to be forced to it, yet was I forced to it notwithstanding; and this was well done towards me, but I did not well, for I would not have learned had I not been compelled. For no man does well against his will, even if that which he does be well. Neither did they who forced me do well, but the good that was done to me came from You, my God. For they considered not in what way I should employ what they forced me to learn, unless to satisfy the inordinate desires of a rich beggary and a shameful glory. But You, by whom the very hairs of our heads are numbered, Matthew 10:30 used for my good the error of all who pressed me to learn; and my own error in willing not to learn, You made use of for my punishment — of which I, being so small a boy and so great a sinner, was not unworthy. Thus by the instrumentality of those who did not well did You do well for me; and by my own sin You justly punished me. For it is even as You have appointed, that every inordinate affection should bring its own punishment.

Chapter 13. He Delighted in Latin Studies and the Empty Fables of the Poets, But Hated the Elements of Literature and the Greek Language.

But I still cannot understand what caused me to dislike Greek literature, which I studied from my boyhood. For I loved Latin exceedingly—not what our first teachers taught, but what the grammarians teach. Those primary lessons of reading, writing, and arithmetic I considered no less a burden and punishment than Greek. Yet where did this attitude come from, if not from the sin and vanity of this life? For I was but flesh, a wind that passes away and does not return. For those primary lessons were certainly better because more reliable, since through them I acquired, and still retain, the ability to read what I find written and to write whatever I wish. In the other studies, however, I was forced to learn about the wanderings of a certain Aeneas, forgetting my own wanderings, and to weep for Dido dead because she killed herself for love, while at the same time I endured with dry eyes my own wretched self dying far from You, in the midst of those things, O God, my life.

20. But what was the cause of my dislike of Greek literature, which I studied from my boyhood, I cannot even now understand. For the Latin I loved exceedingly — not what our first masters, but what the grammarians teach; for those primary lessons of reading, writing, and ciphering, I considered no less of a burden and a punishment than Greek. Yet whence was this unless from the sin and vanity of this life? For I was but flesh, a wind that passes away and comes not again. For those primary lessons were better, assuredly, because more certain; seeing that by their agency I acquired, and still retain, the power of reading what I find written, and writing myself what I will; while in the others I was compelled to learn about the wanderings of a certain Æneas, oblivious of my own, and to weep for Biab dead, because she slew herself for love; while at the same time I brooked with dry eyes my wretched self dying far from You, in the midst of those things, O God, my life.

What could be more miserable than a miserable person who does not pity himself, weeping over Dido's death for love of Aeneas, but not weeping over his own death from failing to love You, O God, light of my heart, bread of my soul's inner mouth, and the power that unites my mind with my deepest thoughts? I did not love You, and I committed fornication against You. Those around me who were sinning in the same way shouted, "Well done! Well done!" For friendship with this world is fornication against You, and "Well done! Well done!" is shouted until a person feels ashamed not to be that kind of man. I shed no tears for this, yet I wept for Dido, who killed herself with a sword, while I myself was seeking the lowest of Your creatures—having abandoned You—earth moving toward earth. And if I had been forbidden to read these things, how upset I would have been that I could not read what caused me grief. This kind of madness is considered a more honorable and beneficial kind of learning than the one by which I learned to read and write.

21. For what can be more wretched than the wretch who pities not himself shedding tears over the death of Dido for love of Æneas, but shedding no tears over his own death in not loving You, O God, light of my heart, and bread of the inner mouth of my soul, and the power that weddest my mind with my innermost thoughts? I did not love You, and committed fornication against You; and those around me thus sinning cried, Well done! Well done! For the friendship of this world is fornication against You; James 4:4 and Well done! Well done! is cried until one feels ashamed not to be such a man. And for this I shed no tears, though I wept for Dido, who sought death at the sword's point, myself the while seeking the lowest of Your creatures — having forsaken You — earth tending to the earth; and if forbidden to read these things, how grieved would I feel that I was not permitted to read what grieved me. This sort of madness is considered a more honourable and more fruitful learning than that by which I learned to read and write.

But now, O my God, cry out to my soul, and let your truth say to me: It is not so; it is not so. That first teaching was far better. Look, I would rather forget the wanderings of Aeneas and all such things than how to write and read. It is true that a curtain hangs over the entrance of the grammar school, but this is not so much a sign of the dignity of sacred mystery as a covering for error. Do not let those people cry out against me whom I no longer fear, while I confess to you, my God, what my soul desires, and while I accept the rebuke of my evil ways so that I may love your good ways. Do not let those who buy or sell grammar-learning cry out against me either. For if I ask them whether it is true, as the poet says, that Aeneas once came to Carthage, the uneducated will reply that they do not know, while the educated will deny it is true. But if I ask with what letters the name Aeneas is written, all who have learned this will answer truly, according to the conventional understanding people have reached about these symbols. Again, if I should ask which, if forgotten, would cause the greatest inconvenience in our life—reading and writing, or these poetical fictions—who does not see what everyone would answer who had not entirely lost his senses? I erred, then, when as a boy I preferred those empty studies to those more profitable ones, or rather loved the one and hated the other. One and one are two, two and two are four—this was truly a hateful song to me, while the wooden horse full of armed men, and the burning of Troy, and the ghostly image of Creusa were a most pleasant spectacle of vanity.

22. But now, O my God, cry unto my soul; and let Your Truth say unto me, It is not so; it is not so; better much was that first teaching. For behold, I would rather forget the wanderings of Æneas, and all such things, than how to write and read. But it is true that over the entrance of the grammar school there hangs a veil; but this is not so much a sign of the majesty of the mystery, as of a covering for error. Let not them exclaim against me of whom I am no longer in fear, while I confess to You, my God, that which my soul desires, and acquiesce in reprehending my evil ways, that I may love Your good ways. Neither let those cry out against me who buy or sell grammar-learning. For if I ask them whether it be true, as the poet says, that Æneas once came to Carthage, the unlearned will reply that they do not know, the learned will deny it to be true. But if I ask with what letters the name Æneas is written, all who have learned this will answer truly, in accordance with the conventional understanding men have arrived at as to these signs. Again, if I should ask which, if forgotten, would cause the greatest inconvenience in our life, reading and writing, or these poetical fictions, who does not see what every one would answer who had not entirely forgotten himself? I erred, then, when as a boy I preferred those vain studies to those more profitable ones, or rather loved the one and hated the other. One and one are two, two and two are four, this was then in truth a hateful song to me; while the wooden horse full of armed men, and the burning of Troy, and the spectral image of Creusa were a most pleasant spectacle of vanity.

Chapter 14. Why He Despised Greek Literature, and Easily Learned Latin.

But why, then, did I dislike Greek learning, which was full of similar tales? Homer was also skilled at inventing such stories and is pleasantly frivolous, yet he was disagreeable to me as a boy. I believe Virgil would be the same to Greek children if they were forced to learn him as I was Homer. The difficulty—truly, the difficulty—of learning a foreign language mixed bitterness into all the sweetness of those fabulous Greek stories. I didn't understand a single word of it, and they pushed me violently with cruel threats and punishments to make me do so. There was also a time when, as an infant, I knew no Latin, but I learned it without any fear or torment, simply by paying attention amid my nurses' affectionate care, the jokes of those who smiled at me, and the playfulness of those who entertained me. I learned all this without being driven by any threat of punishment, because my own heart drove me to express my own thoughts, which I could not do without learning words—not from those who taught me, but from those who talked to me, into whose ears I also expressed whatever I understood. From this it is clear enough that free curiosity has more power in our learning these things than fear-driven necessity. But this necessity restrains the excesses of that freedom through Your laws, O God—Your laws, from the schoolmaster's rod to the martyr's trials, which work to mix a healthy bitterness for us, calling us back to Yourself from the harmful pleasures that draw us away from You.

23. But why, then, did I dislike Greek learning which was full of like tales? For Homer also was skilled in inventing similar stories, and is most sweetly vain, yet was he disagreeable to me as a boy. I believe Virgil, indeed, would be the same to Grecian children, if compelled to learn him, as I was Homer. The difficulty, in truth, the difficulty of learning a foreign language mingled as it were with gall all the sweetness of those fabulous Grecian stories. For not a single word of it did I understand, and to make me do so, they vehemently urged me with cruel threatenings and punishments. There was a time also when (as an infant) I knew no Latin; but this I acquired without any fear or tormenting, by merely taking notice, amid the blandishments of my nurses, the jests of those who smiled on me, and the sportiveness of those who toyed with me. I learned all this, indeed, without being urged by any pressure of punishment, for my own heart urged me to bring forth its own conceptions, which I could not do unless by learning words, not of those who taught me, but of those who talked to me; into whose ears, also, I brought forth whatever I discerned. From this it is sufficiently clear that a free curiosity has more influence in our learning these things than a necessity full of fear. But this last restrains the overflowings of that freedom, through Your laws, O God — Your laws, from the ferule of the schoolmaster to the trials of the martyr, being effective to mingle for us a salutary bitter, calling us back to Yourself from the pernicious delights which allure us from You.

Chapter 15. He Entreats God, that Whatever Useful Things He Learned as a Boy May Be Dedicated to Him.

Hear my prayer, O Lord; do not let my soul grow weak under your discipline, and do not let me grow weak in confessing to you your mercies, by which you have saved me from all my most destructive ways. I pray this so that you might become sweeter to me than all the temptations I used to pursue, and so that I may love you completely, and grasp your hand with my whole heart, and so that you may deliver me from every temptation, even to the end. For look, O Lord, my King and my God, let whatever useful thing I learned as a boy be dedicated to your service—let what I speak, and write, and calculate be for your service. For when I learned worthless things, you disciplined me; and my sin in taking pleasure in those worthless things, you have forgiven me. I did indeed learn many useful words through them; but these can be learned through things that are not worthless, and that is the safe path for young people to walk on.

24. Hear my prayer, O Lord; let not my soul faint under Your discipline, nor let me faint in confessing unto You Your mercies, whereby You have saved me from all my most mischievous ways, that You might become sweet to me beyond all the seductions which I used to follow; and that I may love You entirely, and grasp Your hand with my whole heart, and that You may deliver me from every temptation, even unto the end. For lo, O Lord, my King and my God, for Your service be whatever useful thing I learned as a boy — for Your service what I speak, and write, and count. For when I learned vain things, You granted me Your discipline; and my sin in taking delight in those vanities, You have forgiven me. I learned, indeed, in them many useful words; but these may be learned in things not vain, and that is the safe way for youths to walk in.

Chapter 16. He Disapproves of the Mode of Educating Youth, and He Points Out Why Wickedness is Attributed to the Gods by the Poets.

But woe to you, you stream of human custom! Who will stop your course? How long will it be before you dry up? How long will you sweep the sons of Eve into that huge and terrifying ocean, which even those who are embarked on the wood can barely cross? Do I not read in you of Jupiter both as the thunderer and as an adulterer? And truly he could not be both, but the fictitious thunder served as a cover so that he might have permission to imitate real adultery. Yet which of our toga-wearing teachers can listen with moderation to a man from his own school who cries out and says: These were Homer's inventions; he transfers human things to the gods. I could have wished he would transfer divine things to us. But it would have been more truthful if he had said: These are indeed his inventions, but he attributed divine qualities to sinful men, so that crimes might not be considered crimes, and so that whoever committed any crime might appear to be imitating the heavenly gods and not depraved men.

25. But woe unto you, you stream of human custom! Who shall stay your course? How long shall it be before you are dried up? How long will you carry down the sons of Eve into that huge and formidable ocean, which even they who are embarked on the cross ( lignum) can scarce pass over? Do I not read in you of Jove the thunderer and adulterer? And the two verily he could not be; but it was that, while the fictitious thunder served as a cloak, he might have warrant to imitate real adultery. Yet which of our gowned masters can lend a temperate ear to a man of his school who cries out and says: These were Homer's fictions; he transfers things human to the gods. I could have wished him to transfer divine things to us. But it would have been more true had he said: These are, indeed, his fictions, but he attributed divine attributes to sinful men, that crimes might not be accounted crimes, and that whosoever committed any might appear to imitate the celestial gods and not abandoned men.

And yet, you hellish stream, the sons of men are thrown into you with rewards offered for learning these things, and it is considered a great achievement when this happens publicly in the forum, under laws that provide payment beyond these rewards. And you crash against your rocks and roar out, saying, "This is how words are learned; this is how eloquence is acquired, which is absolutely necessary for persuading people to accept your views and for expressing your opinions." So in fact, we would never have understood these words—"golden shower," "bosom," "intrigue," "highest heavens," and other words written in that same passage—if Terence had not brought a worthless young man onto the stage, holding up Jupiter as his model for immoral behavior:

26. And yet, you stream of hell, into you are cast the sons of men, with rewards for learning these things; and much is made of it when this is going on in the forum in the sight of laws which grant a salary over and above the rewards. And you beat against your rocks and roar, saying, Hence words are learned; hence eloquence is to be attained, most necessary to persuade people to your way of thinking, and to unfold your opinions. So, in truth, we should never have understood these words, golden shower, bosom, intrigue, highest heavens, and other words written in the same place, unless Terence had introduced a good-for-nothing youth upon the stage, setting up Jove as his example of lewdness:–

Looking at a picture where the story was painted of Jove descending in a golden shower to Danaë's bosom… to seduce a woman. And see how he works himself up to lust, as if by heavenly authority, when he says: Great Jove, who shakes the highest heavens with his thunder, did this, and I, a poor mortal man, should not do the same! I did it, and with all my heart I did it.

Viewing a picture, where the tale was drawn, Of Jove's descending in a golden shower To Danaë's bosom… with a woman to intrigue. And see how he excites himself to lust, as if by celestial authority, when he says:– Great Jove, Who shakes the highest heavens with his thunder, And I, poor mortal man, not do the same! I did it, and with all my heart I did it.

The words themselves are not learned any more easily because of this shameful content, but through them the shameful behavior is carried out with greater confidence. I do not blame the words themselves, which are like fine and valuable vessels, but rather the wine of error that was poured into them for us by drunken teachers. And if we did not drink, we were beaten, with no right to appeal to any sober judge. And yet, O my God—in whose presence I can now safely recall this—I, wretched as I was, learned these things willingly and with pleasure, and because of this I was called a boy of great promise.

Not one whit more easily are the words learned for this vileness, but by their means is the vileness perpetrated with more confidence. I do not blame the words, they being, as it were, choice and precious vessels, but the wine of error which was drunk in them to us by inebriated teachers; and unless we drank, we were beaten, without liberty of appeal to any sober judge. And yet, O my God — in whose presence I can now with security recall this — did I, unhappy one, learn these things willingly, and with delight, and for this was I called a boy of good promise.

Chapter 17. He Continues on the Unhappy Method of Training Youth in Literary Subjects.

Bear with me, my God, while I speak a little about the talents You have given me and the foolish things I wasted them on. A lesson that was disturbing enough to my soul was assigned to me, motivated by hope of praise and fear of shame or beatings, to speak the words of Juno as she raged and grieved that she could not

27. Bear with me, my God, while I speak a little of those talents You have bestowed upon me, and on what follies I wasted them. For a lesson sufficiently disquieting to my soul was given me, in hope of praise, and fear of shame or stripes, to speak the words of Juno, as she raged and sorrowed that she could not

Latium bar from all approaches of the Dardan king,

Latium bar From all approaches of the Dardan king,

which I had heard Juno never uttered. Yet we were forced to follow in the footsteps of these poetic inventions and to turn into prose what the poet had said in verse. The student whose speaking was most praised was the one who most vividly reproduced the emotions of anger and sorrow, matching the character of the persons portrayed, and expressed them in the most fitting language. But what does it matter to me, O my true Life, my God, that my speaking was praised more than that of many of my contemporaries and fellow-students? Look, isn't all this just smoke and wind? Was there nothing else on which I could exercise my intelligence and speech? Your praises, Lord, Your praises could have supported the tendrils of my heart through Your Scriptures, so that it would not have been carried away by these worthless trivialities, a shameful prey for the birds of the air. For there is more than one way in which people sacrifice to the fallen angels.

which I had heard Juno never uttered. Yet were we compelled to stray in the footsteps of these poetic fictions, and to turn that into prose which the poet had said in verse. And his speaking was most applauded in whom, according to the reputation of the persons delineated, the passions of anger and sorrow were most strikingly reproduced, and clothed in the most suitable language. But what is it to me, O my true Life, my God, that my declaiming was applauded above that of many who were my contemporaries and fellow-students? Behold, is not all this smoke and wind? Was there nothing else, too, on which I could exercise my wit and tongue? Your praise, Lord, Your praises might have supported the tendrils of my heart by Your Scriptures; so had it not been dragged away by these empty trifles, a shameful prey of the fowls of the air. For there is more than one way in which men sacrifice to the fallen angels.

Chapter 18. Men Desire to Observe the Rules of Learning, But Neglect the Eternal Rules of Everlasting Safety.

But why should it surprise me that I was drawn toward empty things and moved away from You, my God, when the people presented to me as role models were men who, if they made a grammatical error or mispronounced a word while recounting their deeds—deeds not themselves wicked—would become embarrassed when criticized for it, but when they delivered a polished and eloquent speech using refined language about their own immoral behavior and were praised for it, they took pride in themselves? You see this, O Lord, and remain silent, being patient and full of mercy and truth, as You are. Will You remain silent forever? And yet even now You draw from this great abyss the soul that seeks You and thirsts for Your joys, whose heart said to You, I have sought Your face, Your face, Lord, will I seek. For I was far from Your face because of my darkened affections. It is not by walking with our feet or changing our location that we either turn away from You or return to You. Did the younger son need to find horses, or chariots, or ships, or fly away with actual wings, or travel by moving his body, in order to go to a distant country and wastefully squander everything You gave him when he departed? You were a kind Father when You gave those gifts, and even kinder when he returned with nothing. So then, distance from Your face consists in lustful, that is to say, in darkened affections.

28. But what matter of surprise is it that I was thus carried towards vanity, and went forth from You, O my God, when men were proposed to me to imitate, who, should they in relating any acts of theirs — not in themselves evil — be guilty of a barbarism or solecism, when censured for it became confounded; but when they made a full and ornate oration, in well-chosen words, concerning their own licentiousness, and were applauded for it, they boasted? You see this, O Lord, and keepest silence, long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy and truth, as You are. Will You keep silence for ever? And even now You draw out of this vast deep the soul that seeks You and thirsts after Your delights, whose heart said to You, I have sought Your face, Your face, Lord, will I seek. For I was far from Your face, through my darkened Romans 1:21 affections. For it is not by our feet, nor by change of place, that we either turn from You or return to You. Or, indeed, did that younger son look out for horses, or chariots, or ships, or fly away with visible wings, or journey by the motion of his limbs, that he might, in a far country, prodigally waste all that You gave him when he set out? A kind Father when You gave, and kinder still when he returned destitute! Luke 15:11-32 So, then, in wanton, that is to say, in darkened affections, lies distance from Your face.

Look, Lord God, and see with your usual patience how carefully people follow the traditional rules of letters and syllables that they received from earlier speakers, yet they ignore the eternal rules of lasting salvation received from you. Someone who practices or teaches the inherited rules of pronunciation will offend people more if he says "a uman being" without the h-sound, breaking grammar rules, than if he—being a human being—hates another human being in violation of your commandments. It's as if someone could think that an enemy could harm him more than the hatred he feels toward that enemy, or that he could destroy the person he persecutes more completely than he destroys his own soul through his hostility. And truly, no knowledge of letters is more deeply ingrained than what conscience writes—that he is doing to another what he would not want done to himself. How mysterious you are, dwelling on high in silence, the one great God who by your tireless law inflict the punishment of blindness on wrongful desires. When someone seeking a reputation for eloquence stands before a human judge, surrounded by a crowd, and attacks his enemy with the fiercest hatred, he carefully watches that his tongue doesn't make a grammatical error, but he doesn't care that through his rage he might cut off a man from his fellow human beings.

29. Behold, O Lord God, and behold patiently, as You are wont to do, how diligently the sons of men observe the conventional rules of letters and syllables, received from those who spoke prior to them, and yet neglect the eternal rules of everlasting salvation received from You, insomuch that he who practises or teaches the hereditary rules of pronunciation, if, contrary to grammatical usage, he should say, without aspirating the first letter, a uman being, will offend men more than if, in opposition to Your commandments, he, a human being, were to hate a human being. As if, indeed, any man should feel that an enemy could be more destructive to him than that hatred with which he is excited against him, or that he could destroy more utterly him whom he persecutes than he destroys his own soul by his enmity. And of a truth, there is no science of letters more innate than the writing of conscience — that he is doing unto another what he himself would not suffer. How mysterious are You, who in silence dwellest on high, Isaiah 33:5 Thou God, the only great, who by an unwearied law dealest out the punishment of blindness to illicit desires! When a man seeking for the reputation of eloquence stands before a human judge while a thronging multitude surrounds him, inveighs against his enemy with the most fierce hatred, he takes most vigilant heed that his tongue slips not into grammatical error, but takes no heed lest through the fury of his spirit he cut off a man from his fellow-men.

These were the customs in which I, an unhappy boy, was placed, and on that playing field I was more afraid of making a grammatical error than I was of envying those who had not made one, when I had. I declare and confess these things to You, my God, for which I was praised by those whom I then thought it was my whole duty to please, because I did not see the pit of disgrace into which I was thrown away from Your eyes. For in Your eyes what was more disgraceful than I already was, displeasing even people like myself, deceiving my tutor, masters, and parents with countless lies, all from love of games, desire to see foolish shows, and a restless obsession with imitating stage performances? I stole from my parents' storage room and table, either driven by gluttony or so I would have something to give to boys who sold me their play—though they sold it, they enjoyed it as much as I did. In this play, I also often sought dishonest victories, being myself conquered by the vain desire to be superior. And what could I endure less, or what did I condemn more harshly when I noticed it, than the very things I did to others? And when I was caught and criticized, I preferred to argue rather than to give in. Is this the innocence of childhood? No, Lord, no, Lord; I beg Your mercy, O my God. For these same sins, as we grow older, are transferred from tutors and teachers, from nuts and balls and sparrows, to magistrates and kings, to gold and lands and slaves, just as the rod is replaced by more severe punishments. It was, then, the small stature of childhood that You, O our King, approved of as a symbol of humility when You said: Of such is the kingdom of heaven.

30. These were the customs in the midst of which I, unhappy boy, was cast, and on that arena it was that I was more fearful of perpetrating a barbarism than, having done so, of envying those who had not. These things I declare and confess unto You, my God, for which I was applauded by them whom I then thought it my whole duty to please, for I did not perceive the gulf of infamy wherein I was cast away from Your eyes. For in Your eyes what was more infamous than I was already, displeasing even those like myself, deceiving with innumerable lies both tutor, and masters, and parents, from love of play, a desire to see frivolous spectacles, and a stage-stuck restlessness, to imitate them? Pilferings I committed from my parents' cellar and table, either enslaved by gluttony, or that I might have something to give to boys who sold me their play, who, though they sold it, liked it as well as I In this play, likewise, I often sought dishonest victories, I myself being conquered by the vain desire of pre-eminence. And what could I so little endure, or, if I detected it, censured I so violently, as the very things I did to others, and, when myself detected I was censured, preferred rather to quarrel than to yield? Is this the innocence of childhood? Nay, Lord, nay, Lord; I entreat Your mercy, O my God. For these same sins, as we grow older, are transferred from governors and masters, from nuts, and balls, and sparrows, to magistrates and kings, to gold, and lands, and slaves, just as the rod is succeeded by more severe chastisements. It was, then, the stature of childhood that You, O our King, approved of as an emblem of humility when You said: Of such is the kingdom of heaven.

Yet, O Lord, I still owed thanks to You—the most excellent and good, the Architect and Governor of the universe—even if You had willed that I not survive my boyhood. For I existed even then; I lived, felt, and cared about my own well-being—a trace of that most mysterious unity from which I came. Through my inner sense, I watched over the integrity of my senses, and in these small pursuits and thoughts about small things, I learned to take pleasure in truth. I hated being deceived, I had a strong memory, I could speak, I was moved by friendship, and I avoided sorrow, pettiness, and ignorance. What about such a being was not wonderful and praiseworthy? But all these things are gifts from my God; I did not give them to myself. They are good, and together they make up who I am. Good, then, is He who made me, and He is my God. I will rejoice greatly before Him for every good gift I had as a boy. For my sin lay in this: that I sought pleasures, honors, and truths not in Him, but in His creatures—in myself and in other things—and so I fell into sorrows, troubles, and errors. Thanks be to You, my joy, my pride, my confidence, my God—thanks be to You for Your gifts. But preserve them in me. For in doing so You will preserve me, and the things You have given me will be developed and perfected, and I myself will be with You, for my being comes from You.

31. But yet, O Lord, to You, most excellent and most good, Thou Architect and Governor of the universe, thanks had been due unto You, our God, even had You willed that I should not survive my boyhood. For I existed even then; I lived, and felt, and was solicitous about my own well-being — a trace of that most mysterious unity from whence I had my being; I kept watch by my inner sense over the wholeness of my senses, and in these insignificant pursuits, and also in my thoughts on things insignificant, I learned to take pleasure in truth. I was averse to being deceived, I had a vigorous memory, was provided with the power of speech, was softened by friendship, shunned sorrow, meanness, ignorance. In such a being what was not wonderful and praiseworthy? But all these are gifts of my God; I did not give them to myself; and they are good, and all these constitute myself. Good, then, is He that made me, and He is my God; and before Him will I rejoice exceedingly for every good gift which, as a boy, I had. For in this lay my sin, that not in Him, but in His creatures — myself and the rest — I sought for pleasures, honours, and truths, falling thereby into sorrows, troubles, and errors. Thanks be to You, my joy, my pride, my confidence, my God — thanks be to You for Your gifts; but preserve them to me. For thus will You preserve me; and those things which You have given me shall be developed and perfected, and I myself shall be with You, for from You is my being.


On the Trinity — Book XV

A summary of the whole work, and how far every image falls short of the Trinity itself; the Holy Spirit as Gift and Love.

Begins by setting forth briefly and in sum the contents of the previous fourteen books. The argument is then shown to have reached so far as to allow of our now inquiring concerning the Trinity, which is God, in those eternal, incorporeal, and unchangeable things themselves, in the perfect contemplation of which a blessed life is promised to us. But this Trinity, as he shows, is here seen by us as by a mirror and in an enigma, in that it is seen by means of the image of God, which we are, as in a likeness that is obscure and hard of discernment. In like manner, it is shown, that some kind of conjecture and explanation may be gathered respecting the generation of the divine Word, from the word of our own mind, but only with difficulty, on account of the exceeding disparity which is discernible between the two words; and, again, respecting the procession of the Holy Spirit, from the love that is joined thereto by the will.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130115.htm>.

Contents · 28 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– God is Above the Mind.
  2. Chapter 2.– God, Although Incomprehensible, is Ever to Be Sought. The Traces of the Trinity are Not Vainly Sought in the Creature.
  3. Chapter 3.– A Brief Recapitulation of All the Previous Books.
  4. Chapter 4.– What Universal Nature Teaches Us Concerning God.
  5. Chapter 5.– How Difficult It is to Demonstrate the Trinity by Natural Reason.
  6. Chapter 6.– How There is a Trinity in the Very Simplicity of God. Whether and How the Trinity that is God is Manifested from the Trinities Which Have Been Shown to Be in Men.
  7. Chapter 7.– That It is Not Easy to Discover the Trinity that is God from the Trinities We Have Spoken of.
  8. Chapter 8.– How the Apostle Says that God is Now Seen by Us Through a Glass.
  9. Chapter 9.– Of the Term Enigma, And of Tropical Modes of Speech.
  10. Chapter 10.– Concerning the Word of the Mind, in Which We See the Word of God, as in a Glass and an Enigma.
  11. Chapter 11.– The Likeness of the Divine Word, Such as It Is, is to Be Sought, Not in Our Own Outer and Sensible Word, But in the Inner and Mental One. There is the Greatest Possible Unlikeness Between Our Word and Knowledge and the Divine Word and Knowledge.
  12. Chapter 12.– The Academic Philosophy.
  13. Chapter 13.– Still Further of the Difference Between the Knowledge and Word of Our Mind, and the Knowledge and Word of God.
  14. Chapter 14.– The Word of God is in All Things Equal to the Father, from Whom It is.
  15. Chapter 15.– How Great is the Unlikeness Between Our Word and the Divine Word. Our Word Cannot Be or Be Called Eternal.
  16. Chapter 16.– Our Word is Never to Be Equalled to the Divine Word, Not Even When We Shall Be Like God.
  17. Chapter 17.– How the Holy Spirit is Called Love, and Whether He Alone is So Called. That the Holy Spirit is in the Scriptures Properly Called by the Name of Love.
  18. Chapter 18.– No Gift of God is More Excellent Than Love.
  19. Chapter 19.– The Holy Spirit is Called the Gift of God in the Scriptures. By the Gift of the Holy Spirit is Meant the Gift Which is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is Specially Called Love, Although Not Only the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is Love.
  20. Chapter 20.– Against Eunomius, Saying that the Son of God is the Son, Not of His Nature, But of His Will. Epilogue to What Has Been Said Already.
  21. Chapter 21.– Of the Likeness of the Father and of the Son Alleged to Be in Our Memory and Understanding. Of the Likeness of the Holy Spirit in Our Will or Love.
  22. Chapter 22.– How Great the Unlikeness is Between the Image of the Trinity Which We Have Found in Ourselves, and the Trinity Itself.
  23. Chapter 23.– Augustine Dwells Still Further on the Disparity Between the Trinity Which is in Man, and the Trinity Which is God. The Trinity is Now Seen Through a Glass by the Help of Faith, that It May Hereafter Be More Clearly Seen in the Promised Sight Face to Face.
  24. Chapter 24.– The Infirmity of the Human Mind.
  25. Chapter 25.– The Question Why the Holy Spirit is Not Begotten, and How He Proceeds from the Father and the Son, Will Only Be Understood When We are in Bliss.
  26. Chapter 26.– The Holy Spirit Twice Given by Christ. The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and from the Son is Apart from Time, Nor Can He Be Called the Son of Both.
  27. Chapter 27.– What It is that Suffices Here to Solve the Question Why the Spirit is Not Said to Be Begotten, and Why the Father Alone is Unbegotten. What They Ought to Do Who Do Not Understand These Things.
  28. Chapter 28.– The Conclusion of the Book with a Prayer, and an Apology for Multitude of Words.

Chapter 1.– God is Above the Mind.

Desiring to train the reader in the things that are made, so that he may know Him by whom they are made, we have now advanced as far as His image, which is man, in that wherein he excels the other animals—that is, in reason or intelligence, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul that pertains to what is called the mind. For by this name some Latin writers, according to their own particular way of speaking, distinguish what excels in man and is not in the beast from the soul, which is in the beast as well. If, then, we seek anything that is above this nature, and seek truly, it is God—namely, a nature not created but creating. And whether this is the Trinity, it is now our task to demonstrate not only to believers by the authority of divine Scripture, but also to those who understand by some kind of reason, if we can. And why I say "if we can," the thing itself will show better when we have begun to argue about it in our inquiry.

1. Desiring to exercise the reader in the things that are made, in order that he may know Him by whom they are made, we have now advanced so far as to His image, which is man, in that wherein he excels the other animals, i.e. in reason or intelligence, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul that pertains to what is called the mind. For by this name some Latin writers, after their own peculiar mode of speech, distinguish that which excels in man, and is not in the beast, from the soul, which is in the beast as well. If, then, we seek anything that is above this nature, and seek truly, it is God — namely, a nature not created, but creating. And whether this is the Trinity, it is now our business to demonstrate not only to believers, by authority of divine Scripture, but also to such as understand, by some kind of reason, if we can. And why I say, if we can, the thing itself will show better when we have begun to argue about it in our inquiry.

Chapter 2.– God, Although Incomprehensible, is Ever to Be Sought. The Traces of the Trinity are Not Vainly Sought in the Creature.

God Himself, whom we seek, will, I hope, help our efforts so they will not be fruitless, and so we may understand what is said in the holy Psalm: Let the heart of them rejoice that seek the Lord. Seek the Lord, and be strengthened: seek His face evermore. For what is always being sought seems as though it is never found. How then will the heart of those who seek rejoice, and not rather be made sad, if they cannot find what they seek? For it does not say, The heart shall rejoice of those who find, but of those who seek, the Lord. And yet the prophet Isaiah testifies that the Lord God can be found when He is sought, saying: Seek the Lord, and as soon as you have found Him, call upon Him, and when He has drawn near to you, let the wicked man forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts. If, then, when sought, He can be found, why is it said, Seek His face evermore? Is He perhaps to be sought even when found? For things incomprehensible must be investigated in such a way that no one may think he has found nothing when he has been able to find how incomprehensible that is which he was seeking. Why then does he continue seeking, if he comprehends that what he seeks is incomprehensible, unless it is because he may not stop seeking so long as he makes progress in the inquiry itself into incomprehensible things, and becomes ever better and better while seeking so great a good, which is both sought in order to be found, and found in order to be sought? For it is both sought in order that it may be found more sweetly, and found in order that it may be sought more eagerly. The words of Wisdom in the book of Ecclesiasticus may be understood in this way: They who eat me shall still be hungry, and they who drink me shall still be thirsty. For they eat and drink because they find, and they still continue seeking because they are hungry and thirsty. Faith seeks, understanding finds. This is why the prophet says, Unless you believe, you shall not understand. And yet, again, understanding still seeks Him whom it finds, for God looked down upon the sons of men, as it is sung in the holy Psalm, to see if there were any that would understand, and seek after God. And therefore man ought to have understanding for this purpose: that he may seek after God.

2. For God Himself, whom we seek, will, as I hope, help our labors, that they may not be unfruitful, and that we may understand how it is said in the holy Psalm, Let the heart of them rejoice that seek the Lord. Seek the Lord, and be strengthened: seek His face evermore. For that which is always being sought seems as though it were never found; and how then will the heart of them that seek rejoice, and not rather be made sad, if they cannot find what they seek? For it is not said, The heart shall rejoice of them that find, but of them that seek, the Lord. And yet the prophet Isaiah testifies, that the Lord God can be found when He is sought, when he says: Seek the Lord; and as soon as you have found Him, call upon Him: and when He has drawn near to you, let the wicked man forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts. If, then, when sought, He can be found, why is it said, Seek ye His face evermore? Is He perhaps to be sought even when found? For things incomprehensible must so be investigated, as that no one may think he has found nothing, when he has been able to find how incomprehensible that is which he was seeking. Why then does he so seek, if he comprehends that which he seeks to be incomprehensible, unless because he may not give over seeking so long as he makes progress in the inquiry itself into things incomprehensible, and becomes ever better and better while seeking so great a good, which is both sought in order to be found, and found in order to be sought? For it is both sought in order that it may be found more sweetly, and found in order that it may be sought more eagerly. The words of Wisdom in the book of Ecclesiasticus may be taken in this meaning: They who eat me shall still be hungry, and they who drink me shall still be thirsty. For they eat and drink because they find; and they still continue seeking because they are hungry and thirst. Faith seeks, understanding finds; whence the prophet says, Unless ye believe, you shall not understand. And yet, again, understanding still seeks Him, whom it finds; for God looked down upon the sons of men, as it is sung in the holy Psalm, to see if there were any that would understand, and seek after God. And man, therefore, ought for this purpose to have understanding, that he may seek after God.

We have spent enough time among the things God has made so that through them we may come to know Him who made them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. And for this reason they are rebuked in the book of Wisdom who could not know Him that is from the good things that are seen, and who did not acknowledge the workmaster by considering the works. Instead they thought that the gods governing the world were either fire, or wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the lights of heaven. If they were delighted with the beauty of these things and took them to be gods, let them know how much better the Lord of them is, for the first Author of beauty has created them. But if they were amazed at their power and virtue, let them understand by them how much mightier He is that made them. For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures, the Maker of them is seen proportionally. I have quoted these words from the book of Wisdom for this reason: so that no one of the faithful may think I have searched vainly and emptily for traces of that highest Trinity which we seek when we seek God by first looking in the creature, step by step through certain trinities, each of their own appropriate kind, until I came at last to the mind of man.

3. We shall have tarried then long enough among those things that God has made, in order that by them He Himself may be known that made them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. And hence they are rebuked in the book of Wisdom, who could not out of the good things that are seen know Him that is: neither by considering the works did they acknowledge the workmaster; but deemed either fire, or wind, or the swift air or the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the lights of heaven, to be the gods which govern the world: with whose beauty if they, being delighted, took them to be gods, let them know how much better the Lord of them is; for the first Author of beauty has created them. But if they were astonished at their power and virtue, let them understand by them how much mightier He is that made them. For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen. I have quoted these words from the book of Wisdom for this reason, that no one of the faithful may think me vainly and emptily to have sought first in the creature, step by step through certain trinities, each of their own appropriate kind, until I came at last to the mind of man, traces of that highest Trinity which we seek when we seek God.

Chapter 3.– A Brief Recapitulation of All the Previous Books.

Since the requirements of our discussion and argument have forced us to say many things over the course of fourteen books, which we cannot see all at once in a single glance so that we can quickly bring them to mind in relation to what we want to understand, I will try, with God's help and to the best of my ability, to briefly gather together—without arguing—whatever I have established through argument in each book as something known, and to place it, so to speak, under one mental view. This will present not the way we have been convinced of each point, but the points themselves of which we have been convinced. My purpose is to prevent what follows from being so far removed from what precedes that reading the later material produces forgetfulness of the earlier material. Or if such forgetfulness has already occurred, what has slipped from memory can be quickly recovered by reading again.

4. But since the necessities of our discussion and argument have compelled us to say a great many things in the course of fourteen books, which we cannot view at once in one glance, so as to be able to refer them quickly in thought to that which we desire to grasp, I will attempt, by the help of God, to the best of my power, to put briefly together, without arguing, whatever I have established in the several books by argument as known, and to place, as it were, under one mental view, not the way in which we have been convinced of each point, but the points themselves of which we have been convinced; in order that what follows may not be so far separated from that which precedes, as that the perusal of the former shall produce forgetfulness of the latter; or at any rate, if it have produced such forgetfulness, that what has escaped the memory may be speedily recalled by re-perusal.

In the first book, the unity and equality of the highest Trinity is shown from Holy Scripture. In the second, third, and fourth books, the same point is made. But a careful handling of the question about the sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit has resulted in three books. We have demonstrated that He who is sent is not therefore less than He who sends, simply because one sent and the other was sent. The Trinity, which is equal in all things and equally unchangeable, invisible, and present everywhere in its own nature, works indivisibly. In the fifth book, we address those who think the substance of the Father and of the Son is not the same because they suppose everything predicated of God is predicated according to substance. They therefore argue that to beget and to be begotten, or to be begotten and unbegotten, being different, are different substances. We demonstrate that not everything predicated of God is predicated according to substance, as He is called good and great according to substance, or anything else predicated of Him in respect to Himself. But some things are also predicated relatively—that is, not in respect to Himself, but in respect to something which is not Himself. For example, He is called the Father in respect to the Son, or the Lord in respect to the creature that serves Him. And when anything predicated relatively, that is, predicated in respect to something that is not Himself, is also predicated in time—as when it is said, "Lord, You have become our refuge"—nothing happens to Him that works a change in Him. He continues altogether unchangeable in His own nature or essence. In the sixth book, the question of how Christ is called by the apostle the power of God and the wisdom of God is argued to the point where more careful handling of that question is deferred. Namely, whether He from whom Christ is begotten is not wisdom Himself, but only the father of His own wisdom, or whether wisdom begot wisdom. But whichever it may be, the equality of the Trinity became apparent in this book also, and that God was not triple, but a Trinity. And the Father and the Son are not, as it were, a double as opposed to the single Holy Spirit, for in this Trinity three are not anything more than one. We also considered how to understand the words of Bishop Hilary: Eternity in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift. In the seventh book, the question that had been deferred is explained: in what way God who begot the Son is not only Father of His own power and wisdom, but is Himself also power and wisdom. So too the Holy Spirit. And yet they are not three powers or three wisdoms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence. It was next inquired in what way they are called one essence, three persons, or by some Greeks one essence, three substances. We found that these words were used because of the needs of speech, so that there might be one term by which to answer when it is asked what the three are, whom we truly confess to be three, namely Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. In the eighth book, it is made plain by reason also to those who understand, that not only is the Father not greater than the Son in the substance of truth, but that both together are not anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone. Nor are any two at all in the same Trinity anything greater than one, nor all three together anything greater than each separately. Next, I have pointed out that by means of the truth, which is beheld by the understanding, and by means of the highest good, from which is all good, and by means of the righteousness for which a righteous mind is loved even by a mind not yet righteous, we might understand, so far as it is possible to understand, that not only incorporeal but also unchangeable nature which is God. And by means, too, of love, which in the Holy Scriptures is called God, those who have understanding begin also, however feebly, to discern the Trinity: namely, one that loves, and that which is loved, and love. In the ninth book, the argument advances as far as to the image of God, namely man in respect to his mind. In this we found a kind of trinity, that is, the mind, and the knowledge whereby the mind knows itself, and the love whereby it loves both itself and its knowledge of itself. And these three are shown to be mutually equal and of one essence. In the tenth book, the same subject is more carefully and subtly handled and is brought to this point: we found in the mind a still more manifest trinity of the mind, namely in memory, and understanding, and will. But since it turned out also that the mind could never be in such a case as not to remember, understand, and love itself, although it did not always think of itself—and that when it did think of itself, it did not in the same act of thought distinguish itself from things corporeal—the argument concerning the Trinity, of which this is an image, was deferred, in order to find a trinity also in the things themselves that are seen with the body, and to exercise the reader's attention more distinctly in that. Accordingly, in the eleventh book, we chose the sense of sight, wherein what should have been found to hold good there might be recognized also in the other four bodily senses, although not expressly mentioned. And so a trinity of the outer man first showed itself in those things which are discerned from without, namely from the bodily object which is seen, and from the form which is thence impressed upon the eye of the beholder, and from the purpose of the will combining the two. But these three things, as was evident, were not mutually equal and of one substance. Next, we found yet another trinity in the mind itself, introduced into it, as it were, by the things perceived from without. Here the same three things, as it appeared, were of one substance: the image of the bodily object which is in the memory, and the form thence impressed when the mind's eye of the thinker is turned to it, and the purpose of the will combining the two. But we found this trinity to pertain to the outer man, because it was introduced into the mind from bodily objects which are perceived from without. In the twelfth book, we thought good to distinguish wisdom from knowledge, and to seek first, as being the lower of the two, a kind of appropriate and special trinity in that which is specially called knowledge. But although we have now in this reached something pertaining to the inner man, yet it is not yet to be either called or thought an image of God. And this is discussed in the thirteenth book by the commendation of Christian faith. In the fourteenth book we discuss the true wisdom of man, namely that which is granted him by God's gift in the partaking of that very God Himself, which is distinct from knowledge. The discussion reached this point, that a trinity is discovered in the image of God, which is man in respect to his mind, which mind is renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created man after His own image, and so obtains wisdom, wherein is the contemplation of things eternal.

5. In the first book, the unity and equality of that highest Trinity is shown from Holy Scripture. In the second, and third, and fourth, the same: but a careful handling of the question respecting the sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit has resulted in three books; and we have demonstrated, that He who is sent is not therefore less than He who sends because the one sent, the other was sent; since the Trinity, which is in all things equal, being also equally in its own nature unchangeable, and invisible, and everywhere present, works indivisibly. In the fifth — with a view to those who think that the substance of the Father and of the Son is therefore not the same, because they suppose everything that is predicated of God to be predicated according to substance, and therefore contend that to beget and to be begotten, or to be begotten and unbegotten, as being diverse, are diverse substances, — it is demonstrated that not everything that is predicated of God is predicated according to substance, as He is called good and great according to substance, or anything else that is predicated of Him in respect to Himself, but that some things also are predicated relatively, i.e. not in respect to Himself, but in respect to something which is not Himself; as He is called the Father in respect to the Son, or the Lord in respect to the creature that serves Him; and that here, if anything thus relatively predicated, i.e. predicated in respect to something that is not Himself, is predicated also as in time, as, e.g., Lord, You have become our refuge, then nothing happens to Him so as to work a change in Him, but He Himself continues altogether unchangeable in His own nature or essence. In the sixth, the question how Christ is called by the mouth of the apostle the power of God and the wisdom of God, is so far argued that the more careful handling of that question is deferred, viz. whether He from whom Christ is begotten is not wisdom Himself, but only the father of His own wisdom, or whether wisdom begot wisdom. But be it which it may, the equality of the Trinity became apparent in this book also, and that God was not triple, but a Trinity; and that the Father and the Son are not, as it were, a double as opposed to the single Holy Spirit: for therein three are not anything more than one. We considered, too, how to understand the words of Bishop Hilary, Eternity in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift. In the seventh, the question is explained which had been deferred: in what way that God who begot the Son is not only Father of His own power and wisdom, but is Himself also power and wisdom; so, too, the Holy Spirit; and yet that they are not three powers or three wisdoms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence. It was next inquired, in what way they are called one essence, three persons, or by some Greeks one essence, three substances; and we found that the words were so used through the needs of speech, that there might be one term by which to answer, when it is asked what the three are, whom we truly confess to be three, viz. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. In the eighth, it is made plain by reason also to those who understand, that not only the Father is not greater than the Son in the substance of truth, but that both together are not anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone, nor that any two at all in the same Trinity are anything greater than one, nor all three together anything greater than each severally. Next, I have pointed out, that by means of the truth, which is beheld by the understanding, and by means of the highest good, from which is all good, and by means of the righteousness for which a righteous mind is loved even by a mind not yet righteous, we might understand, so far as it is possible to understand, that not only incorporeal but also unchangeable nature which is God; and by means, too, of love, which in the Holy Scriptures is called God, by which, first of all, those who have understanding begin also, however feebly, to discern the Trinity, to wit, one that loves, and that which is loved, and love. In the ninth, the argument advances as far as to the image of God, viz. man in respect to his mind; and in this we found a kind of trinity, i.e. the mind, and the knowledge whereby the mind knows itself, and the love whereby it loves both itself and its knowledge of itself; and these three are shown to be mutually equal, and of one essence. In the tenth, the same subject is more carefully and subtly handled, and is brought to this point, that we found in the mind a still more manifest trinity of the mind, viz. in memory, and understanding, and will. But since it turned out also, that the mind could never be in such a case as not to remember, understand, and love itself, although it did not always think of itself; but that when it did think of itself, it did not in the same act of thought distinguish itself from things corporeal; the argument respecting the Trinity, of which this is an image, was deferred, in order to find a trinity also in the things themselves that are seen with the body, and to exercise the reader's attention more distinctly in that. Accordingly, in the eleventh, we chose the sense of sight, wherein that which should have been there found to hold good might be recognized also in the other four bodily senses, although not expressly mentioned; and so a trinity of the outer man first showed itself in those things which are discerned from without, to wit, from the bodily object which is seen, and from the form which is thence impressed upon the eye of the beholder, and from the purpose of the will combining the two. But these three things, as was patent, were not mutually equal and of one substance. Next, we found yet another trinity in the mind itself, introduced into it, as it were, by the things perceived from without; wherein the same three things, as it appeared, were of one substance: the image of the bodily object which is in the memory, and the form thence impressed when the mind's eye of the thinker is turned to it, and the purpose of the will combining the two. But we found this trinity to pertain to the outer man, on this account, that it was introduced into the mind from bodily objects which are perceived from without. In the twelfth, we thought good to distinguish wisdom from knowledge, and to seek first, as being the lower of the two, a kind of appropriate and special trinity in that which is specially called knowledge; but that although we have got now in this to something pertaining to the inner man, yet it is not yet to be either called or thought an image of God. And this is discussed in the thirteenth book by the commendation of Christian faith. In the fourteenth we discuss the true wisdom of man, viz. that which is granted him by God's gift in the partaking of that very God Himself, which is distinct from knowledge; and the discussion reached this point, that a trinity is discovered in the image of God, which is man in respect to his mind, which mind is renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created man; after His own image; and so obtains wisdom, wherein is the contemplation of things eternal.

Chapter 4.– What Universal Nature Teaches Us Concerning God.

Let us now search for the Trinity who is God in those things that are eternal, incorporeal, and unchangeable. In the perfect contemplation of these, a blessed life is promised to us, which can only be eternal. Not only does the authority of the divine books declare that God exists, but the whole nature of the universe surrounding us—to which we also belong—proclaims that it has a most excellent Creator. This Creator has given us a mind and natural reason so that we can see certain truths: living things are to be preferred to non-living things; things with sensation to things without it; things with understanding to things without it; immortal things to mortal things; powerful things to powerless things; righteous things to unrighteous things; beautiful things to deformed things; good things to evil things; incorruptible things to corruptible things; unchangeable things to changeable things; invisible things to visible things; incorporeal things to corporeal things; blessed things to miserable things. Therefore, since we certainly place the Creator above created things, we must confess that the Creator lives in the highest sense, perceives and understands all things, cannot die or suffer decay or be changed, and is not a body but a spirit—the most powerful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, and most blessed of all.

6. Let us, then, now seek the Trinity which is God, in the things themselves that are eternal, incorporeal, and unchangeable; in the perfect contemplation of which a blessed life is promised us, which cannot be other than eternal. For not only does the authority of the divine books declare that God is; but the whole nature of the universe itself which surrounds us, and to which we also belong, proclaims that it has a most excellent Creator, who has given to us a mind and natural reason, whereby to see that things living are to be preferred to things that are not living; things that have sense to things that have not; things that have understanding to things that have not; things immortal to things mortal; things powerful to things impotent; things righteous to things unrighteous; things beautiful to things deformed; things good to things evil; things incorruptible to things corruptible; things unchangeable to things changeable; things invisible to things visible; things incorporeal to things corporeal; things blessed to things miserable. And hence, since without doubt we place the Creator above things created, we must needs confess that the Creator both lives in the highest sense, and perceives and understands all things, and that He cannot die, or suffer decay, or be changed; and that He is not a body, but a spirit, of all the most powerful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed.

Chapter 5.– How Difficult It is to Demonstrate the Trinity by Natural Reason.

But everything I have said, and whatever else seems to be worthily said of God in the manner of human speech, applies to the whole Trinity, which is one God, and to the individual Persons in that Trinity. For who would dare to say either of the one God, which is the Trinity itself, or of the Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit, that He is not living, or is without sense or intelligence? Or that, in that nature in which they are affirmed to be mutually equal, any one of them is mortal, or corruptible, or changeable, or corporeal? Or is there anyone who would deny that any one in the Trinity is most powerful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed? If, then, these things and all others like them can be predicated both of the Trinity itself and of each individual one in that Trinity, where or how shall the Trinity show itself distinct? Let us therefore first reduce these numerous predicates to some limited number. For what is called life in God is itself His essence and nature. God, therefore, does not live unless by the life which He is to Himself. And this life is not like that which is in a tree, which has neither understanding nor sense, nor like that which is in a beast, for the life of a beast possesses the fivefold sense but has no understanding. But the life which is God perceives and understands all things, and perceives by mind, not by body, because God is a spirit. And God does not perceive through a body as animals do, which have bodies, for He does not consist of soul and body. And hence that single nature perceives as it understands, and understands as it perceives, and its sense and understanding are one and the same. Nor is it so that at any time He should either cease or begin to be, for He is immortal. And it is not said of Him in vain that He alone has immortality. For immortality is true immortality in His case whose nature admits no change. That is also true eternity by which God is unchangeable, without beginning, without end, and consequently also incorruptible. It is one and the same thing, therefore, to call God eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or unchangeable, and it is likewise one and the same thing to say that He is living and that He is intelligent, that is, truly wise. For He did not receive wisdom by which to be wise, but He is Himself wisdom. And this is life, and again is power or might, and yet again beauty, by which He is called powerful and beautiful. For what is more powerful and more beautiful than wisdom, which reaches from end to end mightily and sweetly disposes all things? Or do goodness and righteousness differ from each other in the nature of God as they differ in His works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God—goodness one and righteousness another? Certainly not. But that which is righteousness is also itself goodness, and that which is goodness is also itself blessedness. And God is therefore called incorporeal, that He may be believed and understood to be a spirit, not a body.

7. But all that I have said, and whatever else seems to be worthily said of God after the like fashion of human speech, applies to the whole Trinity, which is one God, and to the several Persons in that Trinity. For who would dare to say either of the one God, which is the Trinity itself, or of the Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit, either that He is not living, or is without sense or intelligence; or that, in that nature in which they are affirmed to be mutually equal, any one of them is mortal, or corruptible, or changeable, or corporeal? Or is there any one who would deny that any one in the Trinity is most powerful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed? If, then, these things, and all others of the kind, can be predicated both of the Trinity itself, and of each several one in that Trinity, where or how shall the Trinity manifest itself? Let us therefore first reduce these numerous predicates to some limited number. For that which is called life in God, is itself His essence and nature. God, therefore, does not live, unless by the life which He is to Himself. And this life is not such as that which is in a tree, wherein is neither understanding nor sense; nor such as is in a beast, for the life of a beast possesses the fivefold sense, but has no understanding. But the life which is God perceives and understands all things, and perceives by mind, not by body, because God is a spirit. And God does not perceive through a body, as animals do, which have bodies, for He does not consist of soul and body. And hence that single nature perceives as it understands, and understands as it perceives, and its sense and understanding are one and the same. Nor yet so, that at any time He should either cease or begin to be; for He is immortal. And it is not said of Him in vain, that He only has immortality. For immortality is true immortality in His case whose nature admits no change. That is also true eternity by which God is unchangeable, without beginning, without end; consequently also incorruptible. It is one and the same thing, therefore, to call God eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or unchangeable; and it is likewise one and the same thing to say that He is living, and that He is intelligent, that is, in truth, wise. For He did not receive wisdom whereby to be wise, but He is Himself wisdom. And this is life, and again is power or might, and yet again beauty, whereby He is called powerful and beautiful. For what is more powerful and more beautiful than wisdom, which reaches from end to end mightily, and sweetly disposes all things? Or do goodness, again, and righteousness, differ from each other in the nature of God, as they differ in His works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God — goodness one, and righteousness another? Certainly not; but that which is righteousness is also itself goodness; and that which is goodness is also itself blessedness. And God is therefore called incorporeal, that He may be believed and understood to be a spirit, not a body.

Further, if we say eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, righteous, good, blessed spirit, only the last item in this list seems to signify substance, while the rest seem to signify qualities of that substance. But this is not the case with that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever seems to be predicated of it according to quality must be understood according to substance or essence. We must reject the idea of predicating spirit of God according to substance and good according to quality. Rather, both are predicated according to substance. The same applies to all the other terms we have mentioned, which we have already discussed at length in the earlier books. Let us then choose one from the first four in our list, that is, eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable. Since these four have the same meaning, as I have already argued, choosing one will prevent our attention from being scattered across multiple objects. Let us take the first one, eternal. Let us follow the same approach with the next four: living, wise, powerful, beautiful. Life in some form also belongs to animals, which lack wisdom. The next two, wisdom and might, are compared to each other in the case of humans, as Scripture says, Better is he that is wise than he that is strong. Beauty is also commonly attributed to physical objects. From these four, let us choose wise. This is not because these four are unequal when speaking of God, for they are four names but one reality. Regarding the third and final set of four, although being righteous is the same thing in God as being good or blessed, and being a spirit is the same as being righteous, good, and blessed, there is a difference in human beings. In humans there can be a spirit that is not blessed, and there can be one who is both righteous and good but not yet blessed. However, whatever is blessed is certainly righteous, good, and a spirit. Therefore, let us choose the one that cannot exist even in humans without the other three, namely blessed.

8. Further, if we say, Eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, righteous, good, blessed spirit; only the last of this list as it were seems to signify substance, but the rest to signify qualities of that substance; but it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever seems to be predicated therein according to quality, is to be understood according to substance or essence. For far be it from us to predicate spirit of God according to substance, and good according to quality; but both according to substance. And so in like manner of all those we have mentioned, of which we have already spoken at length in the former books. Let us choose, then, one of the first four of those in our enumeration and arrangement, i.e. eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable; since these four, as I have argued already, have one meaning; in order that our aim may not be distracted by a multiplicity of objects. And let it be rather that which was placed first, viz. eternal. Let us follow the same course with the four that come next, viz. living, wise, powerful, beautiful. And since life of some sort belongs also to the beast, which has not wisdom; while the next two, viz. wisdom and might, are so compared to one another in the case of man, as that Scripture says, Better is he that is wise than he that is strong; and beauty, again, is commonly attributed to bodily objects also: out of these four that we have chosen, let Wise be the one we take. Although these four are not to be called unequal in speaking of God; for they are four names, but one thing. But of the third and last four — although it is the same thing in God to be righteous that it is to be good or to be blessed; and the same thing to be a spirit that it is to be righteous, and good, and blessed; yet, because in men there can be a spirit that is not blessed, and there can be one both righteous and good, but not yet blessed; but that which is blessed is doubtless both just, and good, and a spirit, — let us rather choose that one which cannot exist even in men without the three others, viz. blessed.

Chapter 6.– How There is a Trinity in the Very Simplicity of God. Whether and How the Trinity that is God is Manifested from the Trinities Which Have Been Shown to Be in Men.

When we say God is eternal, wise, and blessed, are these three the Trinity that is called God? We have reduced those twelve to this small number of three; but perhaps we can go further and reduce these three to one of them. For if wisdom and might, or life and wisdom, can be one and the same thing in the physis of God, why cannot eternity and wisdom, or blessedness and wisdom, be one and the same thing in the physis of God? And so, just as it made no difference whether we spoke of those twelve or those three when we reduced the many to the small number, it makes no difference whether we speak of those three or of that one, to which we have shown that the other two of the three may be reduced. What form of argument, what possible force and power of understanding, what liveliness of reason, what sharp-sightedness of thought, will set forth how (to pass over the others for now) this one thing, that God is called wisdom, is a trinity? For God does not receive wisdom from anyone as we receive it from Him, but He is Himself His own wisdom; because His wisdom is not one thing and His ousia another, seeing that for Him to be wise is to be. Christ, indeed, is called in the Holy Scriptures the power of God and the wisdom of God. But we have discussed in the seventh book how this is to be understood, so that the Son may not seem to make the Father wise; and our explanation came to this: that the Son is wisdom of wisdom, in the same way as He is light of light, God of God. Nor could we find the Holy Spirit to be in any other way than that He Himself also is wisdom, and altogether one wisdom, as one God, one ousia. How, then, do we understand this wisdom, which is God, to be a trinity? I do not say, How do we believe this? For among the faithful this ought to admit no question. But supposing there is any way by which we can see with the understanding what we believe, what is that way?

9. When, then, we say, Eternal, wise, blessed, are these three the Trinity that is called God? We reduce, indeed, those twelve to this small number of three; but perhaps we can go further, and reduce these three also to one of them. For if wisdom and might, or life and wisdom, can be one and the same thing in the nature of God, why cannot eternity and wisdom, or blessedness and wisdom, be one and the same thing in the nature of God? And hence, as it made no difference whether we spoke of these twelve or of those three when we reduced the many to the small number; so does it make no difference whether we speak of those three, or of that one, to the singularity of which we have shown that the other two of the three may be reduced. What fashion, then, of argument, what possible force and might of understanding, what liveliness of reason, what sharp-sightedness of thought, will set forth how (to pass over now the others) this one thing, that God is called wisdom, is a trinity? For God does not receive wisdom from any one as we receive it from Him, but He is Himself His own wisdom; because His wisdom is not one thing, and His essence another, seeing that to Him to be wise is to be. Christ, indeed, is called in the Holy Scriptures, the power of God, and the wisdom of God. But we have discussed in the seventh book how this is to be understood, so that the Son may not seem to make the Father wise; and our explanation came to this, that the Son is wisdom of wisdom, in the same way as He is light of light, God of God. Nor could we find the Holy Spirit to be in any other way than that He Himself also is wisdom, and altogether one wisdom, as one God, one essence. How, then, do we understand this wisdom, which is God, to be a trinity? I do not say, How do we believe this? For among the faithful this ought to admit no question. But supposing there is any way by which we can see with the understanding what we believe, what is that way?

When we think back to where a trinity first began to reveal itself to our understanding in these books, the eighth book comes to mind. There we tried our best to direct the mind's attention toward understanding that most excellent and unchangeable nature, which our mind is not. We contemplated this nature as being not far from us and yet above us—not in physical location but through its own awe-inspiring and wonderful excellence—in such a way that it seemed to be with us by its own present light. Yet even there, no trinity was yet clear to us, because in that blaze of light we did not keep the mind's eye steadily fixed on seeking it. We only perceived in a general way that there was no physical mass in which we would have to think that the size of two or three is greater than that of one. But when we came to discuss love, which in the Holy Scriptures is called God, then a trinity began to appear to us faintly: one who loves, that which is loved, and love itself. But because that ineffable light pushed back our gaze, and it became somewhat clear that the weakness of our mind could not yet be adjusted to it, we turned back in the middle of the course we had begun. We decided to follow the more familiar consideration of our own mind, according to which man is made after the image of God, in order to relieve our overstrained attention. From the ninth to the fourteenth book we dwelt on the consideration of the creature that we are, so that we might be able to understand and see the invisible things of God through the things that are made. Now that we have exercised our understanding in lower things as much as was needed, or perhaps more than was needed, we wish to raise ourselves to see that highest Trinity which is God, but we lack the strength. We see absolutely certain trinities—whether those produced from outside by physical things, or when these same things are thought about after being perceived from outside; or when things that originate in the mind and do not relate to the body's senses, such as faith or the virtues that make up the art of living, are discerned by clear reason and held fast by knowledge; or when the mind itself, by which we know whatever we truly say we know, knows itself or thinks about itself; or when the mind sees something eternal and unchangeable that it itself is not. But do we see the Trinity that is God in the same way we see these absolutely certain trinities (because they are produced in us or are in us when we remember, observe, or desire these things)? Do we see the Trinity that is God because there too we perceive through understanding both Him as if speaking and His Word (that is, the Father and the Son), and then, following from there, the love common to both, namely the Holy Spirit? Do we actually see these trinities that belong to our senses or our mind, or do we rather believe them? And do we rather believe than see that God is a trinity? But if this is the case, then either we do not at all understand and see the invisible things of God through the things that are made, or if we see them at all, we do not see the Trinity in them. In this there is something to see and something we ought to believe, even if not seen. Just as the eighth book showed that we see the unchangeable good which we are not, so the fourteenth book reminded us of this when we discussed the wisdom that man has from God. Why then do we not recognize the Trinity in it? Does that wisdom which God is said to be not perceive itself and not love itself? Who would say this? Who does not see that where there is no knowledge, there is certainly no wisdom? Or are we really to think that the Wisdom which is God knows other things but does not know itself, or loves other things but does not love itself? But if this is a foolish and impious thing to say or believe, then look, we have a trinity: wisdom, the knowledge wisdom has of itself, and its love of itself. For we also find a trinity in man in the same way: mind, the knowledge by which the mind knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself.

10. For if we recall where it was in these books that a trinity first began to show itself to our understanding, the eighth book is that which occurs to us; since it was there that to the best of our power we tried to raise the aim of the mind to understand that most excellent and unchangeable nature, which our mind is not. And we so contemplated this nature as to think of it as not far from us, and as above us, not in place, but by its own awful and wonderful excellence, and in such wise that it appeared to be with us by its own present light. Yet in this no trinity was yet manifest to us, because in that blaze of light we did not keep the eye of the mind steadfastly bent upon seeking it; only we discerned it in a sense, because there was no bulk wherein we must needs think the magnitude of two or three to be more than that of one. But when we came to treat of love, which in the Holy Scriptures is called God, then a trinity began to dawn upon us a little, i.e. one that loves, and that which is loved, and love. But because that ineffable light beat back our gaze, and it became in some degree plain that the weakness of our mind could not as yet be tempered to it, we turned back in the midst of the course we had begun, and planned according to the (as it were) more familiar consideration of our own mind, according to which man is made after the image of God, in order to relieve our overstrained attention; and thereupon we dwelt from the ninth to the fourteenth book upon the consideration of the creature, which we are, that we might be able to understand and behold the invisible things of God by those things which are made. And now that we have exercised the understanding, as far as was needful, or perhaps more than was needful, in lower things, lo! We wish, but have not strength, to raise ourselves to behold that highest Trinity which is God. For in such manner as we see most undoubted trinities, whether those which are wrought from without by corporeal things, or when these same things are thought of which were perceived from without; or when those things which take their rise in the mind, and do not pertain to the senses of the body, as faith, or as the virtues which comprise the art of living, are discerned by manifest reason, and, held fast by knowledge; or when the mind itself, by which we know whatever we truly say that we know, is known to itself, or thinks of itself; or when that mind beholds anything eternal and unchangeable, which itself is not — in such way, then, I say, as we see in all these instances most undoubted trinities, because they are wrought in ourselves, or are in ourselves, when we remember, look at, or desire these things — do we, I say, in such manner also see the Trinity that is God; because there also, by the understanding, we behold both Him as it were speaking, and His Word, i.e. the Father and the Son; and then, proceeding thence, the love common to both, namely, the Holy Spirit? These trinities that pertain to our senses or to our mind, do we rather see than believe them, but rather believe than see that God is a trinity? But if this is so, then doubtless we either do not at all understand and behold the invisible things of God by those things that are made, or if we behold them at all, we do not behold the Trinity in them; and there is therein somewhat to behold, and somewhat also which we ought to believe, even though not beheld. And as the eighth book showed that we behold the unchangeable good which we are not, so the fourteenth reminded us thereof, when we spoke of the wisdom that man has from God. Why, then, do we not recognize the Trinity therein? Does that wisdom which God is said to be, not perceive itself, and not love itself? Who would say this? Or who is there that does not see, that where there is no knowledge, there in no way is there wisdom? Or are we, in truth, to think that the Wisdom which is God knows other things, and does not know itself; or loves other things, and does not love itself? But if this is a foolish and impious thing to say or believe, then behold we have a trinity — to wit, wisdom, and the knowledge wisdom has of itself, and its love of itself. For so, too, we find a trinity in man also, i.e. mind, and the knowledge wherewith mind knows itself, and the love wherewith it loves itself.

Chapter 7.– That It is Not Easy to Discover the Trinity that is God from the Trinities We Have Spoken of.

But these three exist in a person in such a way that they are not themselves the person. For a human being, as the ancients defined it, is a rational mortal animal. These three things, therefore, are the chief things in a human being, but they are not the human being itself. And any one person, that is, each individual human being, has these three things in his mind. But if, again, we were to define a human being by saying that a human being is a rational substance consisting of mind and body, then without doubt a human being has a soul that is not body, and a body that is not soul. And so these three things are not the human being, but belong to the human being, or are in the human being. If, again, we set aside the body and think of the soul by itself, the mind is something belonging to the soul, as though its head, or eye, or face; but these things are not to be regarded as bodies. It is not then the soul, but that which is chief in the soul, that is called the mind. But can we say that the Trinity exists in God in such a way as to be something belonging to God, and not itself God? And so each individual human being, who is called the image of God, not according to all things that pertain to his nature, but according to his mind alone, is one person, and is an image of the Trinity in his mind. But that Trinity of which he is the image is nothing else in its totality than God, is nothing else in its totality than the Trinity. Nor does anything pertain to the nature of God so as not to pertain to that Trinity; and the Three Persons are of one essence, not as each individual human being is one person.

11. But these three are in such way in man, that they are not themselves man. For man, as the ancients defined him, is a rational mortal animal. These things, therefore, are the chief things in man, but are not man themselves. And any one person, i.e. each individual man, has these three things in his mind. But if, again, we were so to define man as to say, Man is a rational substance consisting of mind and body, then without doubt man has a soul that is not body, and a body that is not soul. And hence these three things are not man, but belong to man, or are in man. If, again, we put aside the body, and think of the soul by itself, the mind is somewhat belonging to the soul, as though its head, or eye, or countenance; but these things are not to be regarded as bodies. It is not then the soul, but that which is chief in the soul, that is called the mind. But can we say that the Trinity is in such way in God, as to be somewhat belonging to God, and not itself God? And hence each individual man, who is called the image of God, not according to all things that pertain to his nature, but according to his mind alone, is one person, and is an image of the Trinity in his mind. But that Trinity of which he is the image is nothing else in its totality than God, is nothing else in its totality than the Trinity. Nor does anything pertain to the nature of God so as not to pertain to that Trinity; and the Three Persons are of one essence, not as each individual man is one person.

There is also a significant difference in another respect: whether we speak of the mind in a human being along with its knowledge and love, or of memory, understanding, and will, we remember nothing of the mind except through memory, understand nothing except through understanding, and love nothing except through will. But in that Trinity, who would dare to say that the Father understands neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Son, or loves them except through the Holy Spirit, and that he remembers only through himself either himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit? And likewise, that the Son remembers neither himself nor the Father except through the Father, and loves them only through the Holy Spirit, but through himself only understands both the Father and Son and Holy Spirit? And similarly, that the Holy Spirit through the Father remembers both the Father and the Son and himself, and through the Son understands both the Father and the Son and himself, but through himself only loves both himself and the Father and the Son—as though the Father were both his own memory and that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the Son were the understanding of both himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit were the love both of himself and of the Father and of the Son? Who would dare to think or affirm this about that Trinity? For if in it the Son alone understands both for himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, we have returned to the old absurdity that the Father is not wise from himself but from the Son, and that wisdom has not begotten wisdom, but that the Father is called wise by the wisdom which he begot. For where there is no understanding there can be no wisdom. Therefore, if the Father does not understand himself for himself, but the Son understands for the Father, then clearly the Son makes the Father wise. But if for God to be is to be wise, and essence is the same to him as wisdom, then it is not the Son who has his essence from the Father (which is the truth), but rather the Father from the Son (which is a completely absurd falsehood). We have certainly discussed, disproved, and rejected this absurdity in the seventh book. Therefore, God the Father is wise by that wisdom by which he is his own wisdom, and the Son is the wisdom of the Father from the wisdom which is the Father, from whom the Son is begotten. It follows that the Father also understands by that understanding by which he is his own understanding (for he could not be wise if he did not understand), and that the Son is the understanding of the Father, begotten of the understanding which is the Father. The same may also be appropriately said of memory. For how is someone wise who remembers nothing or does not remember himself? Accordingly, since the Father is wisdom and the Son is wisdom, therefore just as the Father remembers himself, so does the Son also remember himself. And just as the Father remembers both himself and the Son not by the memory of the Son but by his own, so does the Son remember both himself and the Father not by the memory of the Father but by his own. Again, where there is no love, who would say there is any wisdom? Therefore we must conclude that the Father is his own love in the same way that he is his own understanding and memory. Consequently, these three—memory, understanding, and love or will—in that highest and unchangeable essence which is God are not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone. And because the Son too is wisdom begotten of wisdom, just as neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit understands for him but he understands for himself, so neither does the Father remember for him nor does the Holy Spirit love for him, but he remembers and loves for himself, for he is himself also his own memory, his own understanding, and his own love. But that he is so comes to him from the Father, from whom he is born. And because the Holy Spirit also is wisdom proceeding from wisdom, he too does not have the Father as a memory, the Son as an understanding, and himself as love. For he would not be wisdom if another remembered for him and yet another understood for him while he only loved for himself. Rather, he himself has all three things, and has them in such a way that they are himself. But that he is so comes to him from the source from which he proceeds.

12. There is, again, a wide difference in this point likewise, that whether we speak of the mind in a man, and of its knowledge and love; or of memory, understanding, will, — we remember nothing of the mind except by memory, nor understand anything except by understanding, nor love anything except by will. But in that Trinity, who would dare to say that the Father understands neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, except by the Son, or loves them except by the Holy Spirit; and that He remembers only by Himself either Himself, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit; and in the same way that the Son remembers neither Himself nor the Father, except by the Father, nor loves them except by the Holy Spirit; but that by Himself He only understands both the Father and Son and Holy Spirit: and in like manner, that the Holy Spirit by the Father remembers both the Father and the Son and Himself, and by the Son understands both the Father and the Son and Himself; but by Himself only loves both Himself and the Father and the Son;– as though the Father were both His own memory, and that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; and the Son were the understanding of both Himself, and the Father and the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spirit were the love both of Himself, and of the Father and of the Son? Who would presume to think or affirm this of that Trinity? For if therein the Son alone understands both for Himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, we have returned to the old absurdity, that the Father is not wise from Himself, but from the Son, and that wisdom has not begotten wisdom, but that the Father is said to be wise by that wisdom which He begot. For where there is no understanding there can be no wisdom; and hence, if the Father does not understand Himself for Himself, but the Son understands for the Father, assuredly the Son makes the Father wise. But if to God to be is to be wise, and essence is to Him the same as wisdom, then it is not the Son that has His essence from the Father, which is the truth, but rather the Father from the Son, which is a most absurd falsehood. And this absurdity, beyond all doubt, we have discussed, disproved, and rejected, in the seventh book. Therefore God the Father is wise by that wisdom by which He is His own wisdom, and the Son is the wisdom of the Father from the wisdom which is the Father, from whom the Son is begotten; whence it follows that the Father understands also by that understanding by which He is His own understanding (for he could not be Wise that did not understand); and that the Son is the understanding of the Father, begotten of the understanding which is the Father. And this same may not be unfitly said of memory also. For how is he wise, that remembers nothing, or does not remember himself? Accordingly, since the Father is wisdom, and the Son is wisdom, therefore, as the Father remembers Himself, so does the Son also remember Himself; and as the Father remembers both Himself and the Son, not by the memory of the Son, but by His own, so does the Son remember both Himself and the Father, not by the memory of the Father, but by His own. Where, again, there is no love, who would say there was any wisdom? And hence we must infer that the Father is in such way His own love, as He is His own understanding and memory. And therefore these three, i.e. memory, understanding, love or will in that highest and unchangeable essence which is God, are, we see, not the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone. And because the Son too is wisdom begotten of wisdom, as neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit understands for Him, but He understands for Himself; so neither does the Father remember for Him, nor the Holy Spirit love for Him, but He remembers and loves for Himself: for He is Himself also His own memory, His own understanding, and His own love. But that He is so comes to Him from the Father, of whom He is born. And because the Holy Spirit also is wisdom proceeding from wisdom, He too has not the Father for a memory, and the Son for an understanding, and Himself for love: for He would not be wisdom if another remembered for Him, and yet another understood for Him, and He only loved for Himself; but Himself has all three things, and has them in such way that they are Himself. But that He is so comes to Him thence, whence He proceeds.

What person, then, can understand that wisdom by which God knows all things in such a way that neither what we call past things are past in it, nor what we call future things are awaited in it as though they were absent, but both past and future together with present things are all present? Nor are things thought about one at a time, so that thought moves from one thing to another, but all things are simultaneously present in one single act of seeing. What person, I ask, can understand this wisdom, and the equivalent prudence, and the equivalent knowledge, when even our own wisdom is beyond our understanding? For somehow we are able to perceive things that are present to our senses or to our understanding. But things that are absent, yet were once present, we know through memory, if we haven't forgotten them. We also make guesses—not about the past from the future, but about the future from the past—yet through entirely unstable knowledge. For there are some of our thoughts about future things that we look ahead to with greater clarity and certainty because they are very near. We do this by means of memory when we are able to, as much as we ever can, even though memory seems to relate not to the future but to the past. This can be tested with any words or songs whose proper sequence we are producing from memory. We certainly wouldn't speak each part in order unless we anticipated in thought what comes next. Yet it isn't foresight but memory that enables us to foresee it, because right up to the end of the words or song, nothing is spoken except as anticipated and looked forward to. Yet in doing this, we aren't said to speak or sing by foresight, but by memory. And if anyone is unusually capable of delivering many pieces this way, he is typically praised not for his foresight but for his memory. We know and are absolutely certain that all this happens in our mind or through our mind. But the more carefully we try to examine how it happens, the more both our very words fail and our purpose itself collapses when we try to reach some clarity through our understanding, if not our tongue. And do people like us think that in such great weakness of mind we can understand whether God's foresight is the same as His memory and His understanding—He who does not consider each individual thing in thought, but holds everything He knows in one eternal, unchangeable, and inexpressible vision? In this difficulty and tight place, then, we may well cry out to the living God: Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is too high, I cannot reach it. For I understand from my own experience how wonderful and incomprehensible is Your knowledge by which You made me, when I cannot even understand myself whom You have made! And yet, while I was meditating, the fire burned, so that I seek Your face always.

13. What man, then, is there who can comprehend that wisdom by which God knows all things, in such wise that neither what we call things past are past therein, nor what we call things future are therein waited for as coming, as though they were absent, but both past and future with things present are all present; nor yet are things thought severally, so that thought passes from one to another, but all things simultaneously are at hand in one glance — what man, I say, is there that comprehends that wisdom, and the like prudence, and the like knowledge, since in truth even our own wisdom is beyond our comprehension? For somehow we are able to behold the things that are present to our senses or to our understanding; but the things that are absent, and yet have once been present, we know by memory, if we have not forgotten them. And we conjecture, too, not the past from the future, but the future from the past, yet by all unstable knowledge. For there are some of our thoughts to which, although future, we, as it were, look onward with greater plainness and certainty as being very near; and we do this by the means of memory when we are able to do it, as much as we ever are able, although memory seems to belong not to the future, but to the past. And this may be tried in the case of any words or songs, the due order of which we are rendering by memory; for we certainly should not utter each in succession, unless we foresaw in thought what came next. And yet it is not foresight, but memory, that enables us to foresee it; for up to the very end of the words or the song, nothing is uttered except as foreseen and looked forward to. And yet in doing this, we are not said to speak or sing by foresight, but by memory; and if any one is more than commonly capable of uttering many pieces in this way, he is usually praised, not for his foresight, but for his memory. We know, and are absolutely certain, that all this takes place in our mind or by our mind; but how it takes place, the more attentively we desire to scrutinize, the more do both our very words break down, and our purpose itself fails, when by our understanding, if not our tongue, we would reach to something of clearness. And do such as we are, think, that in so great infirmity of mind we can comprehend whether the foresight of God is the same as His memory and His understanding, who does not regard in thought each several thing, but embraces all that He knows in one eternal and unchangeable and ineffable vision? In this difficulty, then, and strait, we may well cry out to the living God, Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is high, I cannot attain unto it. For I understand by myself how wonderful and incomprehensible is Your knowledge, by which You made me, when I cannot even comprehend myself whom You have made! And yet, while I was musing, the fire burned, so that I seek Your face evermore.

Chapter 8.– How the Apostle Says that God is Now Seen by Us Through a Glass.

I know that wisdom is an incorporeal substance, and that it is the light by which things not seen by physical eyes are seen. Yet a man as great and spiritual as Paul says, We see now through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face. If we ask what this glass is and what it is like, this surely comes to mind: that in a glass nothing is seen except an image. We have tried, then, to see in some way through this image that we are, the One by whom we were made, as through a glass. This is also indicated in the words of the same apostle: But we with unveiled face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. He says beholding as in a glass, meaning seeing by means of a glass, not looking from a watchtower—an ambiguity that does not exist in Greek, from which the apostolic letters have been translated into Latin. In Greek, a glass in which images of things are visible is completely distinct in sound from a watchtower, from whose height we can see farther. It is quite clear that the apostle, in using the word speculantes regarding the glory of the Lord, meant it to come from speculum and not from specula. But where he says, We are transformed into the same image, he certainly means the image of God. By calling it the same, he means that very image which we see in the glass, because that same image is also the glory of the Lord. As he says elsewhere, For a man ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God—a text already discussed in the twelfth book. By We are transformed, he means we are changed from one form to another, and we pass from an obscure form to a bright form. The obscure form is also the image of God, and if an image, then certainly also glory, in which we are created as human beings, superior to other animals. For it is said of human nature itself, The man ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God. This nature, being the most excellent among created things, is transformed from a defaced form to a beautiful form when it is justified by its Creator from ungodliness. Even in ungodliness itself, the more the fault deserves condemnation, the more certainly the nature deserves praise. Therefore he has added, from glory to glory: from the glory of creation to the glory of justification. Although these words, from glory to glory, can also be understood in other ways—from the glory of faith to the glory of sight, from the glory by which we are sons of God to the glory by which we will be like Him, because we will see Him as He is. But in adding as from the Spirit of the Lord, he declares that the blessing of such a desirable transformation is given to us by the grace of God.

14. I know that wisdom is an incorporeal substance, and that it is the light by which those things are seen that are not seen by carnal eyes; and yet a man so great and so spiritual [as Paul] says, We see now through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face. If we ask what and of what sort is this glass, this assuredly occurs to our minds, that in a glass nothing is discerned but an image. We have endeavored, then, so to do; in order that we might see in some way or other by this image which we are, Him by whom we are made, as by a glass. And this is intimated also in the words of the same apostle: But we with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. Beholding as in a glass, he has said, i.e. seeing by means of a glass, not looking from a watchtower: an ambiguity that does not exist in the Greek language, whence the apostolic epistles have been rendered into Latin. For in Greek, a glass, in which the images of things are visible, is wholly distinct in the sound of the word also from a watchtower, from the height of which we command a more distant view. And it is quite plain that the apostle, in using the word speculantes in respect to the glory of the Lord, meant it to come from speculum, not from specula. But where he says, We are transformed into the same image, he assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it the same, he means that very image which we see in the glass, because that same image is also the glory of the Lord; as he says elsewhere, For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God, — a text already discussed in the twelfth book. He means, then, by We are transformed, that we are changed from one form to another, and that we pass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright: since the obscure form, too, is the image of God; and if an image, then assuredly also glory, in which we are created as men, being better than the other animals. For it is said of human nature in itself, The man ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God. And this nature, being the most excellent among things created, is transformed from a form that is defaced into a form that is beautiful, when it is justified by its own Creator from ungodliness. Since even in ungodliness itself, the more the faultiness is to be condemned, the more certainly is the nature to be praised. And therefore he has added, from glory to glory: from the glory of creation to the glory of justification. Although these words, from glory to glory, may be understood also in other ways — from the glory of faith to the glory of sight, from the glory whereby we are sons of God to the glory whereby we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is. But in that he has added as from the Spirit of the Lord, he declares that the blessing of so desirable a transformation is conferred upon us by the grace of God.

Chapter 9.– Of the Term Enigma, And of Tropical Modes of Speech.

What has been said relates to the apostle's words that we now see through a glass. But regarding his addition "in an enigma," the meaning of this phrase is unknown to anyone unfamiliar with the books that contain the teaching about those modes of speech that the Greeks call Tropes—a Greek word we also use in Latin. Just as we more commonly speak of schemata rather than figures, we more commonly speak of tropes rather than modes. It is very difficult and unusual to express the names of the various modes or tropes in Latin in a way that assigns the proper name to each one. Some Latin translators, unwilling to use a Greek word where the apostle says "Which things are an allegory," have rendered it through a roundabout expression: "Which things signify one thing by another." But there are several species of this kind of trope called allegory, and one of them is what is called enigma. Now the definition of the general term must necessarily include all its species. Therefore, just as every horse is an animal but not every animal is a horse, every enigma is an allegory, but not every allegory is an enigma. What then is an allegory except a trope in which one thing is understood from another? For example, in the Epistle to the Thessalonians: "Let us not therefore sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober: for they who sleep, sleep in the night; and they who are drunken, are drunken in the night: but let us who are of the day, be sober." This allegory is not an enigma, for here the meaning is clear to everyone except the very dull. But an enigma is, to explain briefly, an obscure allegory, such as "The horseleech had three daughters" and other similar instances. However, when the apostle spoke of an allegory, he does not find it in the words but in the fact, since he has shown that the two Testaments are to be understood through the two sons of Abraham—one by a bondmaid and the other by a free woman—which was something not merely said but actually done. Before this was explained, it was obscure, and accordingly such an allegory, which is the general name, could be specifically called an enigma.

15. What has been said relates to the words of the apostle, that we see now through a glass; but whereas he has added, in an enigma, the meaning of this addition is unknown to any who are unacquainted with the books that contain the doctrine of those modes of speech, which the Greeks call Tropes, which Greek word we also use in Latin. For as we more commonly speak of schemata than of figures, so we more commonly speak of tropes than of modes. And it is a very difficult and uncommon thing to express the names of the several modes or tropes in Latin, so as to refer its appropriate name to each. And hence some Latin translators, through unwillingness to employ a Greek word, where the apostle says, Which things are an allegory, have rendered it by a circumlocution — Which things signify one thing by another. But there are several species of this kind of trope that is called allegory, and one of them is that which is called enigma. Now the definition of the generic term must necessarily embrace also all its species; and hence, as every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse, so every enigma is an allegory, but every allegory is not an enigma. What then is an allegory, but a trope wherein one thing is understood from another? As in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, Let us not therefore sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober: for they who sleep, sleep in the night; and they who are drunken, are drunken in the night: but let us who are of the day, be sober. But this allegory is not an enigma. for here the meaning is patent to all but the very dull; but an enigma is, to explain it briefly, an obscure allegory, as, e.g., The horseleech had three daughters, and other like instances. But when the apostle spoke of an allegory, he does not find it in the words, but in the fact; since he has shown that the two Testaments are to be understood by the two sons of Abraham, one by a bondmaid, and the other by a free woman, which was a thing not said, but also done. And before this was explained, it was obscure; and accordingly such an allegory, which is the generic name, could be specifically called an enigma.

But it's not only those who are unfamiliar with books about tropes who want to know what the apostle meant when he said we now see in an enigma—even those who know about tropes still want to understand what that enigma is in which we now see. We need to find one unified meaning for both phrases: "we see now through a glass" and "in an enigma." These form one complete sentence when spoken together as "We see now through a glass in an enigma." As I understand it, just as the word "glass" signifies an image, so "enigma" signifies any kind of likeness you choose, but one that is obscure and difficult to perceive. Therefore, while the apostle's mention of glass and enigma can refer to any likenesses that help us understand God as far as He can be understood, nothing serves this purpose better than what is rightly called His image. No one should be surprised that we struggle to see in whatever way is granted to us in this life—that is, through a glass, in an enigma. We wouldn't be told about an enigma here if seeing were easy. And this is an even greater enigma: that we do not see what we cannot help but see. For who does not see his own thought? And yet who does see his own thought—I don't mean with physical eyes, but with inner sight itself? Who doesn't see it, and who does see it? Thought is a kind of seeing by the mind, whether it involves things that are also seen by bodily eyes or perceived by other senses, or things that are absent but whose likenesses are grasped by thought, or things that are neither bodily nor likenesses of bodily things (such as virtues and vices, or indeed thought itself), or things that are the subjects of instruction and the liberal sciences, or the higher causes and principles of all these things in the unchangeable nature, or even evil, vain, and false things we think about, whether our senses withhold consent or mistakenly give it.

16. But because it is not only those that are ignorant of the books that contain the doctrine of tropes, who inquire the apostle's meaning, when he said that we see now in an enigma, but those, too, who are acquainted with the doctrine, but yet desire to know what that enigma is in which we now see; we must find a single meaning for the two phrases, viz. for that which says, we see now through a glass, and for that which adds, in an enigma. For it makes but one sentence, when the whole is so uttered, We see now through a glass in an enigma. Accordingly, as far as my judgment goes, as by the word glass he meant to signify an image, so by that of enigma any likeness you will, but yet one obscure, and difficult to see through. While, therefore, any likenesses whatever may be understood as signified by the apostle when he speaks of a glass and an enigma, so that they are adapted to the understanding of God, in such way as He can be understood; yet nothing is better adapted to this purpose than that which is not vainly called His image. Let no one, then, wonder, that we labor to see in any way at all, even in that fashion of seeing which is granted to us in this life, viz. through a glass, in an enigma. For we should not hear of an enigma in this place if sight were easy. And this is a yet greater enigma, that we do not see what we cannot but see. For who does not see his own thought? And yet who does see his own thought, I do not say with the eye of the flesh, but with the inner sight itself? Who does not see it, and who does see it? Since thought is a kind of sight of the mind; whether those things are present which are seen also by the bodily eyes, or perceived by the other senses; or whether they are not present, but their likenesses are discerned by thought; or whether neither of these is the case, but things are thought of that are neither bodily things nor likenesses of bodily things, as the virtues and vices; or as, indeed, thought itself is thought of; or whether it be those things which are the subjects of instruction and of liberal sciences; or whether the higher causes and reasons themselves of all these things in the unchangeable nature are thought of; or whether it be even evil, and vain, and false things that we are thinking of, with either the sense not consenting, or erring in its consent.

Chapter 10.– Concerning the Word of the Mind, in Which We See the Word of God, as in a Glass and an Enigma.

But let us now speak of those things we think of as known and have in our knowledge even when we do not think of them. Whether they belong to contemplative knowledge, which, as I have argued, is properly called wisdom, or to active knowledge, which is properly called knowledge—both together belong to one mind and are one image of God. But when we treat the lower of the two distinctly and separately, it is not to be called an image of God, although even then some likeness of that Trinity may be found in it, as we showed in the thirteenth book. We speak now, therefore, of the entire knowledge of man altogether, in which whatever is known to us is known—that, at any rate, which is true. Otherwise it would not be known. For no one knows what is false, except when he knows it to be false, and if he knows this, then he knows what is true, for it is true that that is false. We treat, therefore, now of those things we think of as known and which are known to us even if they are not being thought of. But certainly, if we wish to express them in words, we can only do so by thinking them. For although no words are spoken, at any rate, he who thinks speaks in his heart. And hence that passage in the book of Wisdom: "They said within themselves, thinking not aright." For the words "They said within themselves" are explained by the addition of "thinking." A similar passage to this is that in the Gospel—when certain scribes heard the Lord's words to the paralytic man, "Be of good cheer, my son, your sins are forgiven you," they said within themselves, "This man blasphemes." For how did they say within themselves, except by thinking? Then follows, "And when Jesus saw their thoughts, He said, Why do you think evil in your thoughts?" So far Matthew. But Luke narrates the same thing thus: "The scribes and Pharisees began to think, saying, Who is this that speaks blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but God alone? But when Jesus perceived their thoughts, He, answering, said to them, What do you think in your hearts?" What in the book of Wisdom is "They said, thinking" is the same here with "They thought, saying." For both there and here it is declared that they spoke within themselves and in their own heart, that is, spoke by thinking. For they spoke within themselves, and it was said to them, "What do you think?" And the Lord Himself says of that rich man whose ground brought forth plentifully, "And he thought within himself, saying."

17. But let us now speak of those things of which we think as known, and have in our knowledge even if we do not think of them; whether they belong to the contemplative knowledge, which, as I have argued, is properly to be called wisdom, or to the active which is properly to be called knowledge. For both together belong to one mind, and are one image of God. But when we treat of the lower of the two distinctly and separately, then it is not to be called an image of God, although even then, too, some likeness of that Trinity may be found in it; as we showed in the thirteenth book. We speak now, therefore, of the entire knowledge of man altogether, in which whatever is known to us is known; that, at any rate, which is true; otherwise it would not be known. For no one knows what is false, except when he knows it to be false; and if he knows this, then he knows what is true: for it is true that that is false. We treat, therefore, now of those things which we think as known, and which are known to us even if they are not being thought of. But certainly, if we would utter them in words, we can only do so by thinking them. For although there were no words spoken, at any rate, he who thinks speaks in his heart. And hence that passage in the book of Wisdom: They said within themselves, thinking not aright. For the words, They said within themselves, are explained by the addition of thinking. A like passage to this is that in the Gospel — that certain scribes, when they heard the Lord's words to the paralytic man, Be of good cheer, my son, your sins are forgiven you, said within themselves, This man blasphemes. For how did they say within themselves, except by thinking? Then follows, And when Jesus saw their thoughts, He said, Why do you think evil in your thoughts? So far Matthew. But Luke narrates the same thing thus: The scribes and Pharisees began to think, saying, Who is this that speaks blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but God alone? But when Jesus perceived their thoughts, He, answering, said to them, What think ye in your hearts? That which in the book of Wisdom is, They said, thinking, is the same here with, They thought, saying. For both there and here it is declared, that they spoke within themselves, and in their own heart, i.e. spoke by thinking. For they spoke within themselves, and it was said to them, What do you think? And the Lord Himself says of that rich man whose ground brought forth plentifully, And he thought within himself, saying.

Some thoughts, then, are speeches of the heart, and here the Lord also shows that there is a mouth when He says, "Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man, but that which proceeds out of the mouth, that defiles a man." In one sentence He has included two different mouths of the man—one of the body, one of the heart. For certainly, that from which they thought the man would be defiled enters into the mouth of the body, but that from which the Lord said the man was defiled proceeds out of the mouth of the heart. He Himself clearly explained what He had said. A little later, He also says to His disciples concerning the same thing: "Are you also yet without understanding? Do you not understand that whatever enters in at the mouth goes into the belly and is cast out into the draught?" Here He most certainly pointed to the mouth of the body. But in what follows He plainly speaks of the mouth of the heart, where He says, "But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart, and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts," and so on. What could be clearer than this explanation? Yet when we call thoughts speeches of the heart, it does not follow that they are not also acts of sight arising from the sight of knowledge when they are true. For when these things are done outwardly by means of the body, then speech and sight are different things. But when we think inwardly, the two are one—just as sight and hearing are two things mutually distinct in the bodily senses, but to see and to hear are the same thing in the mind. And so, while speech is not seen but rather heard outwardly, yet the inward speeches—that is, thoughts—are said by the holy Gospel to have been seen, not heard, by the Lord. "They said within themselves, 'This man blasphemes,'" says the Gospel, and then it adds, "And when Jesus saw their thoughts." Therefore He saw what they said, for by His own thought He saw their thoughts, which they supposed no one saw but themselves.

18. Some thoughts, then, are speeches of the heart, wherein the Lord also shows that there is a mouth, when He says, Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man; but that which proceeds out of the mouth, that defiles a man. In one sentence He has comprised two diverse mouths of the man, one of the body, one of the heart. For assuredly, that from which they thought the man to be defiled, enters into the mouth of the body; but that from which the Lord said the man was defiled, proceeds out of the mouth of the heart. So certainly He Himself explained what He had said. For a little after, He says also to His disciples concerning the same thing: Are ye also yet without understanding? Do you not understand, that whatever enters in at the mouth goes into the belly, and is cast out into the draught? Here He most certainly pointed to the mouth of the body. But in that which follows He plainly speaks of the mouth of the heart, where He says, But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, etc. What is clearer than this explanation? And yet, when we call thoughts speeches of the heart, it does not follow that they are not also acts of sight, arising from the sight of knowledge, when they are true. For when these things are done outwardly by means of the body, then speech and sight are different things; but when we think inwardly, the two are one — just as sight and hearing are two things mutually distinct in the bodily senses, but to see and hear are the same thing in the mind; and hence, while speech is not seen but rather heard outwardly, yet the inward speeches, i.e. thoughts, are said by the holy Gospel to have been seen, not heard, by the Lord. They said within themselves, This man blasphemes, says the Gospel; and then subjoined, And when Jesus saw their thoughts. Therefore He saw, what they said. For by His own thought He saw their thoughts, which they supposed no one saw but themselves.

Anyone who can grasp what a word is, not only before it is spoken aloud, but even before the mental images of its sounds are contemplated in thought—for this belongs to no particular language, including those called the languages of nations, of which our Latin is one—anyone, I say, who can grasp this is now able to see through this glass and in this enigma some likeness of that Word about whom it is said, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." For necessarily, when we speak the truth, that is, when we speak what we know, a word is born from the very knowledge that the memory holds, and this word is entirely of the same kind as the knowledge from which it is born. The thought that is formed from the thing we know is the word we speak in our heart, and this word is neither Greek nor Latin nor of any other language. But when we need to communicate this to those we are speaking with, we adopt some sign to convey it. Usually a sound, sometimes a gesture, is presented—the former to the ears, the latter to the eyes—so that the word we carry in our mind may also become known through bodily signs to the bodily senses. For what is nodding or gesturing except a kind of speaking to the sight? Holy Scripture confirms this, for we read in the Gospel according to John: "Verily, verily, I say to you, that one of you will betray me. Then the disciples looked at one another, uncertain of whom he spoke. Now one of his disciples, whom Jesus loved, was reclining on Jesus' breast. Simon Peter therefore gestures to him and says to him, 'Who is it of whom he speaks?'" Here he spoke by gesturing what he did not dare to speak with sounds. But whereas we present these and similar bodily signs to the ears or eyes of people who are present when we speak, letters have been invented so that we might also communicate with those who are absent; but these are signs of words, just as words themselves are signs in our speech of the things we think.

19. Whoever, then, is able to understand a word, not only before it is uttered in sound, but also before the images of its sounds are considered in thought — for this it is which belongs to no tongue, to wit, of those which are called the tongues of nations, of which our Latin tongue is one — whoever, I say, is able to understand this, is able now to see through this glass and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of whom it is said, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. For of necessity, when we speak what is true, i.e. speak what we know, there is born from the knowledge itself which the memory retains, a word that is altogether of the same kind with that knowledge from which it is born. For the thought that is formed by the thing which we know, is the word which we speak in the heart: which word is neither Greek nor Latin, nor of any other tongue. But when it is needful to convey this to the knowledge of those to whom we speak, then some sign is assumed whereby to signify it. And generally a sound, sometimes a nod, is exhibited, the former to the ears, the latter to the eyes, that the word which we bear in our mind may become known also by bodily signs to the bodily senses. For what is to nod or beckon, except to speak in some way to the sight? And Holy Scripture gives its testimony to this; for we read in the Gospel according to John: Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you shall betray me. Then the disciples looked one upon another, doubting of whom He spoke. Now there was leaning on Jesus' breast one of His disciples whom Jesus loved. Simon Peter therefore beckons to him, and says to him, Who is it of whom He speaks? Here he spoke by beckoning what he did not venture to speak by sounds. But whereas we exhibit these and the like bodily signs either to ears or eyes of persons present to whom we speak, letters have been invented that we might be able to converse also with the absent; but these are signs of words, as words themselves are signs in our conversation of those things which we think.

Chapter 11.– The Likeness of the Divine Word, Such as It Is, is to Be Sought, Not in Our Own Outer and Sensible Word, But in the Inner and Mental One. There is the Greatest Possible Unlikeness Between Our Word and Knowledge and the Divine Word and Knowledge.

The word that sounds outwardly is a sign of the word that shines inwardly, and this inner word has a stronger claim to be called a word. What we speak with our physical mouth is simply the vocal sound of a word, and it's also called a word because of the inner word it assumes in order to manifest itself outwardly. Our word becomes a bodily vocal sound by taking on that sound through which it can be revealed to human senses, just as the Word of God became flesh by taking on flesh through which He could be revealed to human senses. And just as our word becomes a vocal sound yet isn't changed into one, so the Word of God became flesh—but we must reject any idea that He was changed into flesh. Our word became a vocal sound, and that other Word became flesh, by assuming it, not by being consumed or changed into it. Therefore, whoever wants to find some likeness, whatever kind it may be, to the Word of God—however unlike in many ways—must not focus on our word that sounds in the ears, either when spoken aloud or when silently thought. Words of all languages that are spoken aloud are also thought silently, and the mind runs through verses while the physical mouth is silent. Not only the number of syllables but also musical melodies, being physical and belonging to the bodily sense called hearing, are present through certain non-physical images in those who think about them and silently turn these things over in their minds. But we must pass beyond this to reach that word of man through whose likeness, whatever it may be, the Word of God can somehow be seen as in a riddle. Not the word that was spoken to this or that prophet, about which Scripture says "Now the word of God grew and multiplied," and again "Faith then comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ," and again "When you received the word of God which you heard from us, you received it not as the word of men but, as it truly is, the word of God"—and there are countless other similar scriptural references to the word of God, which is spread through the sounds of many different languages and through the hearts and mouths of people, and is called the word of God because the teaching delivered is divine, not human. Rather, we are now seeking to see, in whatever way we can through this likeness, that Word of God of whom it is said "The Word was God," of whom it is said "All things were made by Him," of whom it is said "The Word became flesh," of whom it is said "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom." We must proceed to that word of man, the word of the rational creature, the word of that image of God which was not born of God but made by God. This word cannot be spoken in sound or thought of as resembling sound, as must happen with words in any language, but precedes all the signs by which it is expressed and is generated from the knowledge that remains in the mind when that same knowledge is spoken inwardly as it truly is. The vision of thinking is remarkably like the vision of knowledge. When knowledge is expressed through sound or any bodily sign, it isn't expressed as it truly is, but as it can be perceived by the physical senses. Therefore, when what is in the knowledge is also in the word, then there is a true word and truth of the kind expected from humans—where what is in the knowledge is also in the word, and what is not in the knowledge is also not in the word. Here we can recognize "Yes, yes; no, no." And so this likeness of the created image approaches as closely as possible to that likeness of the begotten image, by which God the Son is declared to be like the Father in all things regarding ousia. We must also notice in this riddle another likeness to the word of God: just as it is said of that Word "All things were made by Him," declaring that God made the universe through His only-begotten Son, so no human works exist that were not first spoken in the heart. Scripture says "A word is the beginning of every work." But only when the word is true is it the beginning of a good work. A word is true when it is generated from the knowledge of doing good works, so that "yes, yes; no, no" is preserved there too—so that whatever is in the knowledge by which we should live is also in the word by which we should act, and whatever is not in one is not in the other. Otherwise such a word will be a lie, not truth, and what comes from it will be sin, not a good work. There is yet another likeness of the Word of God in this likeness of our word: we can have a word with no work following it, but we cannot have any work unless a word precedes it, just as the Word of God could have existed even if no creature existed, but no creature could exist except through that Word by which all things are made. Therefore, not God the Father, not the Holy Spirit, not the Trinity itself, but the Son alone, who is the Word of God, became flesh, although the Trinity was the maker. This happened so that we might live rightly by our word following and imitating His example—that is, by having no lie in either the thought or the work of our word. But this perfection of this image is something to be achieved in the future. To attain this, the good teacher instructs us through Christian faith and holy teaching that, with faces unveiled from the veil of the law (which is the shadow of things to come), beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord—that is, gazing at it through a mirror—we may be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord, as we explained above.

20. Accordingly, the word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light inwardly; which latter has the greater claim to be called a word. For that which is uttered with the mouth of the flesh, is the articulate sound of a word; and is itself also called a word, on account of that to make which outwardly apparent it is itself assumed. For our word is so made in some way into an articulate sound of the body, by assuming that articulate sound by which it may be manifested to men's senses, as the Word of God was made flesh, by assuming that flesh in which itself also might be manifested to men's senses. And as our word becomes an articulate sound, yet is not changed into one; so the Word of God became flesh, but far be it from us to say He was changed into flesh. For both that word of ours became an articulate sound, and that other Word became flesh, by assuming it, not by consuming itself so as to be changed into it. And therefore whoever desires to arrive at any likeness, be it of what sort it may, of the Word of God, however in many respects unlike, must not regard the word of ours that sounds in the ears, either when it is uttered in an articulate sound or when it is silently thought. For the words of all tongues that are uttered in sound are also silently thought, and the mind runs over verses while the bodily mouth is silent. And not only the numbers of syllables, but the tunes also of songs, since they are corporeal, and pertain to that sense of the body which is called hearing, are at hand by certain incorporeal images appropriate to them, to those who think of them, and who silently revolve all these things. But we must pass by this, in order to arrive at that word of man, by the likeness of which, be it of what sort it may, the Word of God may be somehow seen as in an enigma. Not that word which was spoken to this or that prophet, and of which it is said, Now the word of God grew and multiplied; and again, Faith then comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ; and again, When ye received the word of God which you heard of us, you received it not as the word of men but, as it is in truth, the word of God (and there are countless other like sayings in the Scriptures respecting the word of God, which is disseminated in the sounds of many and diverse languages through the hearts and mouths of men; and which is therefore called the word of God, because the doctrine that is delivered is not human, but divine);– but we are now seeking to see, in whatsoever way we can, by means of this likeness, that Word of God of which it is said, The Word was God; of which it is said, All things were made by Him; of which it is said, The Word became flesh; of which it is said The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom. We must go on, then, to that word of man, to the word of the rational animal, to the word of that image of God, that is not born of God, but made by God; which is neither utterable in sound nor capable of being thought under the likeness of sound such as must needs be with the word of any tongue; but which precedes all the signs by which it is signified, and is begotten from the knowledge that continues in the mind, when that same knowledge is spoken inwardly according as it really is. For the sight of thinking is exceedingly like the sight of knowledge. For when it is uttered by sound, or by any bodily sign, it is not uttered according as it really is, but as it can be seen or heard by the body. When, therefore, that is in the word which is in the knowledge, then there is a true word, and truth, such as is looked for from man; such that what is in the knowledge is also in the word, and what is not in the knowledge is also not in the word. Here may be recognized, Yea, yea; nay, nay. And so this likeness of the image that is made, approaches as nearly as is possible to that likeness of the image that is born, by which God the Son is declared to be in all things like in substance to the Father. We must notice in this enigma also another likeness of the word of God; viz. that, as it is said of that Word, All things were made by Him, where God is declared to have made the universe by His only-begotten Son, so there are no works of man that are not first spoken in his heart: whence it is written, A word is the beginning of every work. But here also, it is when the word is true, that then it is the beginning of a good work. And a word is true when it is begotten from the knowledge of working good works, so that there too may be preserved the yea yea, nay nay; in order that whatever is in that knowledge by which we are to live, may be also in the word by which we are to work, and whatever is not in the one may not be in the other. Otherwise such a word will be a lie, not truth; and what comes thence will be a sin, and not a good work. There is yet this other likeness of the Word of God in this likeness of our word, that there can be a word of ours with no work following it, but there cannot be any work unless a word precedes; just as the Word of God could have existed though no creature existed, but no creature could exist unless by that Word by which all things are made. And therefore not God the Father, not the Holy Spirit, not the Trinity itself, but the Son only, which is the Word of God, was made flesh; although the Trinity was the maker: in order that we might live rightly through our word following and imitating His example, i.e. by having no lie in either the thought or the work of our word. But this perfection of this image is one to be at some time hereafter. In order to attain this it is that the good master teaches us by Christian faith, and by pious doctrine, that with face unveiled from the veil of the law, which is the shadow of things to come, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, i.e. gazing at it through a glass, we may be transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord; as we explained above.

When this image has been perfectly renewed through this transformation, we will be like God because we will see Him not through a glass but as He is. This is what the Apostle Paul means by "face to face." But for now, who can explain how great the unlikeness also is in this glass, in this enigma, in this likeness such as it is? Yet I will touch on some points as I am able, in order to show it.

21. When, therefore, this image shall have been renewed to perfection by this transformation, then we shall be like God, because we shall see Him, not through a glass, but as He is; which the Apostle Paul expresses by face to face. But now, who can explain how great is the unlikeness also, in this glass, in this enigma, in this likeness such as it is? Yet I will touch upon some points, as I can, by which to indicate it.

Chapter 12.– The Academic Philosophy.

First, what kind of knowledge can a person attain, no matter how skilled and learned, by which our thinking is formed with truth when we speak what we know? Setting aside those things that come into the mind from the bodily senses–among which so many things are different from how they appear that anyone who is too much influenced by their resemblance to truth thinks himself sane but really is not (which is why the Academic philosophy has become so dominant that it is even more wretchedly insane by doubting everything)–setting aside, then, those things that come into the mind through the bodily senses, how much is left of things that we know in the same way we know that we live? About this, indeed, we have absolutely no fear that we might be deceived by some resemblance of truth, since it is certain that whoever is deceived is still alive. And this knowledge is not counted among those visual objects that are presented from outside, where the eye might be deceived–such as when an oar in water looks bent, towers seem to move as you sail past them, and a thousand other things that are different from how they appear. This is not something discerned by the physical eye. The knowledge by which we know that we live is the most inward of all knowledge, against which even the Academic cannot suggest: Perhaps you are asleep and don't know it, and you see things in your dreams. For who doesn't know that what people see in dreams looks exactly like what they see when awake? But the person who is certain of the knowledge of his own life does not say, I know I am awake, but rather, I know I am alive. Therefore, whether he is asleep or awake, he is alive. Nor can he be deceived in that knowledge by dreams, since both sleeping and seeing things in sleep belong to a living person. Nor can the Academic say in refutation of this knowledge: Perhaps you are mad and don't know it–for what mad people see looks exactly like what sane people see; but whoever is mad is alive. He does not answer the Academic by saying, I know I am not mad, but rather, I know I am alive. Therefore, whoever says he knows he is alive can neither be deceived nor lie. Let a thousand kinds of deceptive visual objects be presented to someone who says, I know I am alive–he will fear none of them, for whoever is deceived is still alive. But if only such things belong to human knowledge, they are very few indeed–unless they can be so multiplied in each kind as not only to be many, but to reach infinity as a result. For whoever says, I know I am alive, says he knows one single thing. Furthermore, if he says, I know that I know I am alive, now there are two things; and that he knows these two is a third thing to know. And so he can add a fourth and a fifth, and countless others, if he continues. But since he cannot comprehend an infinite number by adding units one by one, or say something an infinite number of times, he does at least comprehend this with perfect certainty: that this is both true and so infinite that he cannot truly comprehend and state its infinite number. This same thing can be noticed also in the case of a certain act of will. For it would be an impudent answer to make to anyone who says, I will to be happy, that perhaps you are deceived. And if he says, I know that I will this, and I know that I know it, he can add yet a third to these two–namely, that he knows these two; and a fourth, that he knows that he knows these two; and so on to infinity. Likewise, if anyone says, I do not will to be mistaken, will it not be true, whether he is mistaken or not, that nevertheless he does will not to be mistaken? Would it not be most impudent to say to him, Perhaps you are deceived? When beyond doubt, in whatever way he may be deceived, he is nevertheless not deceived in thinking that he wills not to be deceived. And if he says he knows this, he can add any number of things known that he chooses, and perceives that number to be infinite. For whoever says, I do not will to be deceived, and I know that I do not will this, and I know that I know it, is now able to set forth an infinite number here also, however awkward the expression of it may be. And other things too can be found capable of refuting the Academics, who contend that a person can know nothing. But we must restrain ourselves, especially since this is not the subject we have undertaken in the present work. There are three books of ours on that subject, written early in our conversion, which anyone who can and will read, and who understands them, will doubtless not be much troubled by any of the many arguments they have devised against the discovery of truth. For since there are two kinds of knowable things–one, of those things which the mind perceives through the bodily senses; the other, of those things which it perceives by itself–these philosophers have babbled much against the bodily senses, but have never been able to cast doubt upon those most certain perceptions of true things that the mind knows by itself, such as the one I have mentioned, I know that I am alive. But far be it from us to doubt the truth of what we have learned through the bodily senses, since through them we have learned to know the heaven and the earth, and those things in them that are known to us, insofar as He who created both us and them has willed them to be within our knowledge. Far be it from us too to deny that we know what we have learned by the testimony of others: otherwise we do not know that there is an ocean; we do not know that the lands and cities exist which abundant reports tell us about; we do not know that those men existed, and their works, which we have learned by reading history; we do not know the news that is daily brought to us from various places and confirmed by consistent and agreeing evidence; lastly, we do not know at what place or from whom we were born, since in all these things we have believed the testimony of others. And if it is most absurd to say this, then we must confess that not only our own senses, but those of other people as well, have added very much indeed to our knowledge.

First, of what sort and how great is the very knowledge itself that a man can attain, be he ever so skillful and learned, by which our thought is formed with truth, when we speak what we know? For to pass by those things that come into the mind from the bodily senses, among which so many are otherwise than they seem to be, that he who is overmuch pressed down by their resemblance to truth, seems sane to himself, but really is not sane — whence it is that the Academic philosophy has so prevailed as to be still more wretchedly insane by doubting all things — passing by, then, those things that come into the mind by the bodily senses, how large a proportion is left of things which we know in such manner as we know that we live? In regard to this, indeed, we are absolutely without any fear lest perchance we are being deceived by some resemblance of the truth; since it is certain, that he who is deceived, yet lives. And this again is not reckoned among those objects of sight that are presented from without, so that the eye may be deceived in it; in such way as it is when an oar in the water looks bent, and towers seem to move as you sail past them, and a thousand other things that are otherwise than they seem to be: for this is not a thing that is discerned by the eye of the flesh. The knowledge by which we know that we live is the most inward of all knowledge, of which even the Academic cannot insinuate: Perhaps you are asleep, and do not know it, and you see things in your sleep. For who does not know that what people see in dreams is precisely like what they see when awake? But he who is certain of the knowledge of his own life, does not therein say, I know I am awake, but, I know I am alive; therefore, whether he be asleep or awake, he is alive. Nor can he be deceived in that knowledge by dreams; since it belongs to a living man both to sleep and to see in sleep. Nor can the Academic again say, in confutation of this knowledge: Perhaps you are mad, and do not know it: for what madmen see is precisely like what they also see who are sane; but he who is mad is alive. Nor does he answer the Academic by saying, I know I am not mad, but, I know I am alive. Therefore he who says he knows he is alive, can neither be deceived nor lie. Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of sight be presented to him who says, I know I am alive; yet he will fear none of them, for he who is deceived yet is alive. But if such things alone pertain to human knowledge, they are very few indeed; unless that they can be so multiplied in each kind, as not only not to be few, but to reach in the result to infinity. For he who says, I know I am alive, says that he knows one single thing. Further, if he says, I know that I know I am alive, now there are two; but that he knows these two is a third thing to know. And so he can add a fourth and a fifth, and innumerable others, if he holds out. But since he cannot either comprehend an innumerable number by additions of units, or say a thing innumerable times, he comprehends this at least, and with perfect certainty, viz. that this is both true and so innumerable that he cannot truly comprehend and say its infinite number. This same thing may be noticed also in the case of a will that is certain. For it would be an impudent answer to make to any one who should say, I will to be happy, that perhaps you are deceived. And if he should say, I know that I will this, and I know that I know it, he can add yet a third to these two, viz. that he knows these two; and a fourth, that he knows that he knows these two; and so on ad infinitum. Likewise, if any one were to say, I will not to be mistaken; will it not be true, whether he is mistaken or whether he is not, that nevertheless he does will not to be mistaken? Would it not be most impudent to say to him, Perhaps you are deceived? When beyond doubt, whereinsoever he may be deceived, he is nevertheless not deceived in thinking that he wills not to be deceived. And if he says he knows this, he adds any number he chooses of things known, and perceives that number to be infinite. For he who says, I will not to be deceived, and I know that I will not to be so, and I know that I know it, is able now to set forth an infinite number here also, however awkward may be the expression of it. And other things too are to be found capable of refuting the Academics, who contend that man can know nothing. But we must restrict ourselves, especially as this is not the subject we have undertaken in the present work. There are three books of ours on that subject, written in the early time of our conversion, which he who can and will read, and who understands them, will doubtless not be much moved by any of the many arguments which they have found out against the discovery of truth. For whereas there are two kinds of knowable things — one, of those things which the mind perceives by the bodily senses; the other, of those which it perceives by itself — these philosophers have babbled much against the bodily senses, but have never been able to throw doubt upon those most certain perceptions of things true, which the mind knows by itself, such as is that which I have mentioned, I know that I am alive. But far be it from us to doubt the truth of what we have learned by the bodily senses; since by them we have learned to know the heaven and the earth, and those things in them which are known to us, so far as He who created both us and them has willed them to be within our knowledge. Far be it from us too to deny, that we know what we have learned by the testimony of others: otherwise we know not that there is an ocean; we know not that the lands and cities exist which most copious report commends to us; we know not that those men were, and their works, which we have learned by reading history; we know not the news that is daily brought us from this quarter or that, and confirmed by consistent and conspiring evidence; lastly, we know not at what place or from whom we have been born: since in all these things we have believed the testimony of others. And if it is most absurd to say this, then we must confess, that not only our own senses, but those of other persons also, have added very much indeed to our knowledge.

All these things, then—both those which the human mind knows by itself, and those which it knows by the bodily senses, and those which it has received and knows by the testimony of others—are stored up and retained in the storehouse of the memory. From these is begotten a word that is true when we speak what we know, but a word that exists before all sound, before all thought of a sound. For the word is then most like to the thing known, from which its image is also begotten, since the sight of thinking arises from the sight of knowledge. This word belongs to no particular language but is a true word concerning a true thing, having nothing of its own, but wholly derived from that knowledge from which it is born. Nor does it matter when the person who speaks what he knows learned it, for sometimes he says it immediately upon learning it, provided only that the word is true—that is, sprung from things that are known.

22. All these things, then, both those which the human mind knows by itself, and those which it knows by the bodily senses, and those which it has received and knows by the testimony of others, are laid up and retained in the storehouse of the memory; and from these is begotten a word that is true when we speak what we know, but a word that is before all sound, before all thought of a sound. For the word is then most like to the thing known, from which also its image is begotten, since the sight of thinking arises from the sight of knowledge; when it is a word belonging to no tongue, but is a true word concerning a true thing, having nothing of its own, but wholly derived from that knowledge from which it is born. Nor does it signify when he learned it, who speaks what he knows; for sometimes he says it immediately upon learning it; provided only that the word is true, i.e. sprung from things that are known.

Chapter 13.– Still Further of the Difference Between the Knowledge and Word of Our Mind, and the Knowledge and Word of God.

But is it the case that God the Father, from whom is born the Word that is God of God—is it the case that God the Father, regarding the wisdom which He is to Himself, has learned some things through bodily senses and others by Himself? Who could say this, whoever thinks of God not as a rational animal but as One above the rational soul? At least as far as He can be thought of by those who place Him above all animals and all souls, even though they see Him by conjecture through a glass and in a riddle, not yet face to face as He is. Is it that God the Father has learned those very things which He knows, not through the body (for He has none), but by Himself from somewhere else or from someone? Or has He needed messengers or witnesses in order to know them? Certainly not, since His own perfection enables Him to know all things that He knows. He does have messengers, namely the angels, but not to report to Him things He does not know, for there is nothing He does not know. Rather, their good consists in consulting the truth about their own works. This is what is meant by saying that they bring Him word of some things—not that He may learn from them, but that they may learn from Him through His word without bodily sound. They also bring Him word of what He wills, being sent by Him to whomever He wills, and hearing all from Him through that word of His, that is, finding in His truth what they themselves are to do: what, to whom, and when they are to bring word. For we too pray to Him, yet we do not inform Him what our needs are. For your Father knows, says His Word, what things you need before you ask Him. Nor did He become acquainted with them so as to know them at any particular time, but He knew beforehand, without any beginning, all things to come in time, and among them both what we would ask of Him and when, and to whom He would either listen or not listen, and about what matters. And with respect to all His creatures, both spiritual and bodily, He does not know them because they exist, but they exist because He knows them. For He was not ignorant of what He was about to create; therefore He created because He knew; He did not know because He created. Nor did He know them when created in any different way than He knew them when they were still to be created, for nothing was added to His wisdom from them; rather, that wisdom remained as it was, while they came into existence as was fitting and when it was fitting. So too it is written in the book of Ecclesiasticus: All things are known to Him before they were created, and likewise after they were perfected. So, he says, not otherwise—they were known to Him in the same way, both before they were created and after they were perfected. This knowledge, therefore, is completely unlike our knowledge. And the knowledge of God is itself also His wisdom, and His wisdom is itself His essence or substance. Because in the marvelous simplicity of that nature, it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but to be wise is to be—as we have already said many times in the earlier books. But our knowledge is in most things capable both of being lost and of being recovered, because for us to be is not the same as to know or to be wise; since it is possible for us to be even though we do not know and are not wise in what we have learned from elsewhere. Therefore, just as our knowledge is unlike that knowledge of God, so is our word, which is born from our knowledge, unlike that Word of God which is born from the essence of the Father. And this is as if I should say, born from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom; or even more precisely, from the Father who is knowledge, from the Father who is wisdom.

But is it so, that God the Father, from whom is born the Word that is God of God — is it so, then, that God the Father, in respect to that wisdom which He is to Himself, has learned some things by His bodily senses, and others by Himself? Who could say this, who thinks of God, not as a rational animal, but as One above the rational soul? So far at least as He can be thought of, by those who place Him above all animals and all souls, although they see Him by conjecture through a glass and in an enigma, not yet face to face as He is. Is it that God the Father has learned those very things which He knows, not by the body, for He has none, but by Himself, from elsewhere from some one? Or has stood in need of messengers or witnesses that He might know them? Certainly not; since His own perfection enables Him to know all things that He knows. No doubt He has messengers, viz. the angels; but not to announce to Him things that He knows not, for there is nothing He does not know. But their good lies in consulting the truth about their own works. And this it is which is meant by saying that they bring Him word of some things, not that He may learn of them, but they of Him by His word without bodily sound. They bring Him word, too, of that which He wills, being sent by Him to whomever He wills, and hearing all from Him by that word of His, i.e. finding in His truth what themselves are to do: what, to whom, and when, they are to bring word. For we too pray to Him, yet do not inform Him what our necessities are. For your Father knows, says His Word, what things you have need of, before you ask Him. Nor did He become acquainted with them, so as to know them, at any definite time; but He knew beforehand, without any beginning, all things to come in time, and among them also both what we should ask of Him, and when; and to whom He would either listen or not listen, and on what subjects. And with respect to all His creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, He does not know them because they are, but they are because He knows them. For He was not ignorant of what He was about to create; therefore He created because He knew; He did not know because He created. Nor did He know them when created in any other way than He knew them when still to be created, for nothing accrued to His wisdom from them; but that wisdom remained as it was, while they came into existence as it was fitting and when it was fitting. So, too, it is written in the book of Ecclesiasticus: All things are known to Him ere ever they were created: so also after they were perfected. So, he says, not otherwise; so were they known to Him, both ere ever they were created, and after they were perfected. This knowledge, therefore, is far unlike our knowledge. And the knowledge of God is itself also His wisdom, and His wisdom is itself His essence or substance. Because in the marvellous simplicity of that nature, it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but to be wise is to be; as we have often said already also in the earlier books. But our knowledge is in most things capable both of being lost and of being recovered, because to us to be is not the same as to know or to be wise; since it is possible for us to be, even although we know not, neither are wise in that which we have learned from elsewhere. Therefore, as our knowledge is unlike that knowledge of God, so is our word also, which is born from our knowledge, unlike that Word of God which is born from the essence of the Father. And this is as if I should say, born from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom; or still more exactly, from the Father who is knowledge, from the Father who is wisdom.

Chapter 14.– The Word of God is in All Things Equal to the Father, from Whom It is.

The Word of God, then, the only-begotten Son of the Father, in all things like and equal to the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, Essence of Essence, is completely what the Father is, yet is not the Father, because one is Son and the other is Father. Therefore He knows everything the Father knows. But for Him, both knowing and being come from the Father, since knowing and being are one and the same there. Just as the Father's being does not come from the Son, neither does His knowing. Consequently, as if speaking Himself forth, the Father begot the Word equal to Himself in all things. For He would not have expressed Himself completely and perfectly if there were anything more or less in His Word than in Himself. Here we truly recognize the highest sense of "Yes, yes; no, no." This Word is therefore truly truth, since whatever exists in that knowledge from which it is born also exists in the Word itself, and whatever is not in that knowledge is not in the Word. This Word can never contain anything false, because it is unchangeable, just as the one from whom it comes is unchangeable. For the Son can do nothing by Himself, but only what He sees the Father do. This is not because He lacks the power to do otherwise—it is not weakness but strength by which truth cannot be false. Therefore God the Father knows all things in Himself and knows all things in the Son: in Himself as Himself, and in the Son as His own Word, which Word is spoken concerning all those things that are in Himself. Similarly, the Son knows all things: in Himself, as things born from what the Father knows in Himself, and in the Father, as those things from which what the Son knows in Himself is born. The Father and the Son know each other mutually, but one through begetting and the other through being begotten. Each of them sees simultaneously all things that are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their ousia (essence): not partially or one thing at a time, as if looking back and forth from this to that and from that to this, or from one object to another, so as to be unable to see some things without simultaneously not seeing others. Rather, as I said, He sees all things simultaneously, and there is not one thing that He does not always see.

23. The Word of God, then, the only-begotten Son of the Father, in all things like and equal to the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, Essence of Essence, is altogether that which the Father is, yet is not the Father, because the one is Son, the other is Father. And hence He knows all that the Father knows; but to Him to know, as to be, is from the Father, for to know and to be is there one. And therefore, as to be is not to the Father from the Son, so neither is to know. Accordingly, as though uttering Himself, the Father begot the Word equal to Himself in all things; for He would not have uttered Himself wholly and perfectly, if there were in His Word anything more or less than in Himself. And here that is recognized in the highest sense, Yea, yea; nay, nay. And therefore this Word is truly truth, since whatever is in that knowledge from which it is born is also in itself and whatever is not in that knowledge is not in the Word. And this Word can never have anything false, because it is unchangeable, as He is from whom it is. For the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He sees the Father do. Through power He cannot do this; nor is it infirmity, but strength, by which truth cannot be false. Therefore God the Father knows all things in Himself, knows all things in the Son; but in Himself as though Himself, in the Son as though His own Word which Word is spoken concerning all those things that are in Himself. Similarly the Son knows all things, viz. in Himself, as things which are born of those which the Father knows in Himself, and in the Father, as those of which they are born, which the Son Himself knows in Himself. The Father then, and the Son know mutually; but the one by begetting, the other by being born. And each of them sees simultaneously all things that are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence: not by parts or singly, as though by alternately looking from this side to that, and from that side to this, and again from this or that object to this or that object, so as not to be able to see some things without at the same time not seeing others; but, as I said, sees all things simultaneously, whereof there is not one that He does not always see.

And that word of ours which has neither sound nor thought of sound, but concerns the thing we speak of inwardly when we see it—and which therefore belongs to no particular language—is in some way like, in this enigma, to that Word of God which is also God. For our word is born from our knowledge in a manner similar to how that Word is born from the knowledge of the Father. Yet while we find this word of ours to be in some way like that Word, let us not hesitate to consider how unlike it also is, to the extent that we are able to express it.

24. And that word, then, of ours which has neither sound nor thought of sound, but is of that thing in seeing which we speak inwardly, and which therefore belongs to no tongue; and hence is in some sort like, in this enigma, to that Word of God which is also God; since this too is born of our knowledge, in such manner as that also is born of the knowledge of the Father: such a word, I say, of ours, which we find to be in some way like that Word, let us not be slow to consider how unlike also it is, as it may be in our power to utter it.

Chapter 15.– How Great is the Unlikeness Between Our Word and the Divine Word. Our Word Cannot Be or Be Called Eternal.

Does our word come only from what we know? Don't we also say many things that we do not know? And we say them not with doubt, but thinking they are true. Yet even if these things happen to be true in reality, they are not true in our word, because a word is not true unless it comes from something that is known. In this sense, our word is false—not when we lie, but when we are mistaken. And when we doubt, our word is not yet about the thing we doubt, but is a word about the doubt itself. For although we do not know whether the thing we doubt is true, we do know that we doubt. Therefore, when we say we doubt, we speak a true word, because we say what we know. And what about the fact that we can lie? When we do, we deliberately and knowingly have a false word, although there is still a true word in it—namely, that we are lying, for we know this. And when we admit that we have lied, we speak what is true, because we say what we know, for we know that we lied. But that Word which is God, though it can do more than we can, cannot do this. For it can do nothing except what it sees the Father do, and it does not speak of itself, but has from the Father all that it speaks, since the Father speaks it in a unique way. The great power of that Word is that it cannot lie, because there cannot be both yes and no in it, but yes is yes and no is no. Now, should something that is not true even be called a word? I readily agree if that is so. But what if our word is true and therefore rightly called a word? Can we speak of essence from essence, just as we can speak of sight from sight and knowledge from knowledge, as that Word of God is uniquely spoken of and should be spoken of? Why not? Because for us, to be is not the same as to know. We know many things that live in some way through memory and in some way die through being forgotten. So when those things are no longer in our knowledge, we still exist. And even when our knowledge has slipped away and perished from our mind, we are still alive.

Is our word, then, born of our knowledge only? Do we not say many things also that we do not know? And say them not with doubt, but thinking them to be true; while if perchance they are true in respect to the things themselves of which we speak, they are yet not true in respect to our word, because a word is not true unless it is born of a thing that is known. In this sense, then, our word is false, not when we lie, but when we are deceived. And when we doubt, our word is not yet of the thing of which we doubt, but it is a word concerning the doubt itself. For although we do not know whether that is true of which we doubt, yet we do know that we doubt; and hence, when we say we doubt, we say a word that is true, for we say what we know. And what, too, of its being possible for us to lie? And when we do, certainly we both willingly and knowingly have a word that is false, wherein there is a word that is true, viz. that we lie, for this we know. And when we confess that we have lied, we speak that which is true; for we say what we know, for we know that we lied. But that Word which is God, and can do more than we, cannot do this. For it can do nothing except what it sees the Father do; and it speaks not of itself, but it has from the Father all that it speaks, since the Father speaks it in a special way; and the great might of that Word is that it cannot lie, because there cannot be there yea and nay, but yea yea, nay nay. Well, but that is not even to be called a word, which is not true. I willingly assent, if so it be. What, then, if our word is true and therefore is rightly called a word? Is it the case that, as we can speak of sight of sight, and knowledge of knowledge, so we can speak of essence of essence, as that Word of God is especially spoken of, and is especially to be spoken of? Why so? Because to us, to be is not the same as to know; since we know many things which in some sense live by memory, and so in some sense die by being forgotten: and so, when those things are no longer in our knowledge, yet we still are: and while our knowledge has slipped away and perished out of our mind, we are still alive.

In those things that are so firmly known they can never slip from memory because they are always present and belong to the very nature of the mind itself — for example, knowing that we are alive (this continues as long as the mind continues, and because the mind always continues, this knowledge also always continues) — I say regarding this and similar cases, where we can better observe the image of God, it is hard to explain how an eternal word can be spoken about them, even though they are always known but not always being thought about, since our word exists in our thought. For it is eternal to the soul to live and eternal to know that it lives. Yet it is not eternal for the soul to be thinking about its own life or to be thinking about its own knowledge of its own life. When the soul turns to this or that activity, it will stop thinking about this, though it never stops knowing it. This means that if there can be any eternal knowledge in the mind, while the thought of that knowledge cannot be eternal, and if any inner and true word of ours is spoken only through our thought, then God alone can be understood to have a Word that is eternal and co-eternal with himself. Unless perhaps we should say that the very possibility of thought — since what is known can be truly thought even when it is not actually being thought — makes a word as perpetual as the knowledge itself is perpetual. But how is that a word if it is not yet formed in the vision of thought? How will it be like the knowledge from which it is born if it does not have the form of that knowledge, and is called a word only because it can have that form? This would be like saying something should be called a word because it can be a word. But what is this thing that can be a word and is therefore already considered worthy of the name word? What is this thing that is formable but not yet formed, except something in our mind that we toss back and forth by turning it this way and that while we think of one thing and then another, as they are discovered by us or come to us? The true word comes into being when, as I said, what we toss back and forth arrives at what we know and is formed by it, taking on its complete likeness, so that in whatever manner something is known, in that same manner it is also thought, that is, it is spoken in this way in the heart without articulate sound, without thought of articulate sound, such as certainly belongs to some particular language. So even if we grant, to avoid laborious argument over a name, that this something in our mind which can be formed from our knowledge should already be called a word even before it is formed, because it is, so to speak, already formable, who would not see how great the unlikeness would be between it and that Word of God, which exists in such a way in the form of God that it was never formable before being formed or ever capable of being formless, but is a simple form, simply equal to the one from whom it comes, and with whom it is wonderfully co-eternal?

25. In respect to those things also which are so known that they can never escape the memory, because they are present, and belong to the nature of the mind itself — as, e.g., the knowing that we are alive (for this continues so long as the mind continues; and because the mind continues always, this also continues always) — I say, in respect to this and to any other like instances, in which we are the rather to contemplate the image of God, it is difficult to make out in what way, although they are always known, yet because they are not always also thought of, an eternal word can be spoken respecting them, when our word is spoken in our thought. For it is eternal to the soul to live; it is eternal to know that it lives. Yet it is not eternal to it to be thinking of its own life, or to be thinking of its own knowledge of its own life; since, in entering upon this or that occupation, it will cease to think of this, although it does not cease from knowing it. And hence it comes to pass, that if there can be in the mind any knowledge that is eternal, while the thought of that knowledge cannot be eternal, and any inner and true word of ours is only said by our thought, then God alone can be understood to have a Word that is eternal, and co-eternal with Himself. Unless, perhaps, we are to say that the very possibility of thought — since that which is known is capable of being truly thought, even at the time when it is not being thought — constitutes a word as perpetual as the knowledge itself is perpetual. But how is that a word which is not yet formed in the vision of the thought? How will it be like the knowledge of which it is born, if it has not the form of that knowledge, and is only now called a word because it can have it? For it is much as if one were to say that a word is to be so called because it can be a word. But what is this that can be a word, and is therefore already held worthy of the name of a word? What, I say, is this thing that is formable, but not yet formed, except a something in our mind, which we toss to and fro by revolving it this way or that, while we think of first one thing and then another, according as they are found by or occur to us? And the true word then comes into being, when, as I said, that which we toss to and fro by revolving it arrives at that which we know, and is formed by that, in taking its entire likeness; so that in what manner each thing is known, in that manner also it is thought, i.e. is said in this manner in the heart, without articulate sound, without thought of articulate sound, such as no doubt belongs to some particular tongue. And hence if we even admit, in order not to dispute laboriously about a name, that this something of our mind, which can be formed from our knowledge, is to be already called a word, even before it is so formed, because it is, so to say, already formable, who would not see how great would be the unlikeness between it and that Word of God, which is so in the form of God, as not to have been formable before it was formed, or to have been capable at any time of being formless, but is a simple form, and simply equal to Him from whom it is, and with whom it is wonderfully co-eternal?

Chapter 16.– Our Word is Never to Be Equalled to the Divine Word, Not Even When We Shall Be Like God.

Therefore, the Word of God is called this in such a way that it should not be called a thought of God. This prevents us from believing that there is anything in God that can be turned over in the mind—something that at one time receives and at another recovers a form so as to be a word, and that can lose that form again and be turned over in some formless way. Certainly that excellent master of language knew well the power of words and had examined the nature of thought when he said in his poem, "And revolves with himself the varying issues of war," that is, thinks about them. Therefore, that Son of God is not called the Thought of God, but the Word of God. For our own thought, reaching what we know and being formed by it, is our true word. So the Word of God ought to be understood without any thought on God's part, so that it is understood as the simple form itself, containing nothing formable that can also be unformed. There are, indeed, passages of Holy Scripture that speak of God's thoughts, but this follows the same manner of speaking by which the forgetfulness of God is also mentioned there, whereas strictly speaking there is certainly no forgetfulness in Him.

Wherefore that Word of God is in such wise so called, as not to be called a thought of God, lest we believe that there is anything in God which can be revolved, so that it at one time receives and at another recovers a form, so as to be a word, and again can lose that form and be revolved in some sense formlessly. Certainly that excellent master of speech knew well the force of words, and had looked into the nature of thought, who said in his poem, And revolves with himself the varying issues of war, i.e. thinks of them. That Son of God, then, is not called the Thought of God, but the Word of God. For our own thought, attaining to what we know, and formed thereby, is our true word. And so the Word of God ought to be understood without any thought on the part of God, so that it be understood as the simple form itself, but containing nothing formable that can be also unformed. There are, indeed, passages of Holy Scripture that speak of God's thoughts; but this is after the same mode of speech by which the forgetfulness of God is also there spoken of, whereas in strict propriety of language there is in Him certainly no forgetfulness.

Since we have found in this enigma such great unlikeness to God and the Word of God, even though we found some likeness earlier, we must also admit this: even when we shall be like Him, when we shall see Him as He is (and certainly the one who said this was fully aware of our present unlikeness), not even then shall we be equal to Him in nature. For the nature that is created is always less than the nature that creates. At that time our word will not be false, because we shall neither lie nor be deceived. Perhaps, too, our thoughts will no longer revolve by passing back and forth from one thing to another, but we shall see all our knowledge at once and at a single glance. Still, when even this happens, if indeed it does happen, the creature that was formable will have been formed, so that nothing will be lacking from the form it ought to attain. Nevertheless, it will not be equal to that simplicity in which there is nothing formable, nothing that has been formed or reformed, but only form itself—which, being neither formless nor formed, is eternal and unchangeable substance.

26. Wherefore, since we have found now in this enigma so great an unlikeness to God and the Word of God, wherein yet there was found before some likeness, this, too, must be admitted, that even when we shall be like Him, when we shall see Him as He is (and certainly he who said this was aware beyond doubt of our present unlikeness), not even then shall we be equal to Him in nature. For that nature which is made is ever less than that which makes. And at that time our word will not indeed be false, because we shall neither lie nor be deceived. Perhaps, too, our thoughts will no longer revolve by passing and repassing from one thing to another, but we shall see all our knowledge at once, and at one glance. Still, when even this shall have come to pass, if indeed it shall come to pass, the creature which was formable will indeed have been formed, so that nothing will be wanting of that form to which it ought to attain; yet nevertheless it will not be to be equalled to that simplicity wherein there is not anything formable, which has been formed or reformed, but only form; and which being neither formless nor formed, itself is eternal and unchangeable substance.

Chapter 17.– How the Holy Spirit is Called Love, and Whether He Alone is So Called. That the Holy Spirit is in the Scriptures Properly Called by the Name of Love.

We have spoken sufficiently about the Father and the Son, as much as we are able to see through this glass and in this enigma. We must now discuss the Holy Spirit, as far as God's gift allows us to see Him. According to the Holy Scriptures, the Holy Spirit belongs neither to the Father alone nor to the Son alone, but to both. In this way He suggests to us a mutual love by which the Father and the Son love one another. But the language of the Word of God, in order to train us, has made us search with greater effort for those things that do not lie on the surface but must be examined in hidden depths and drawn out from there. The Scriptures have not said "The Holy Spirit is Love." If they had said this, they would have eliminated a significant part of this investigation. Instead, they have said "God is love," so it remains uncertain and open to inquiry whether God the Father is love, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself which is God. For we are not going to say that God is called Love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name God, but because it is a gift of God, just as it is said to God "You are my patience." This is not said because our patience is God's substance, but because He Himself gives it to us, as we read elsewhere "Since from Him is my patience." The way Scripture itself uses words sufficiently refutes this interpretation, for "You are my patience" is the same kind of expression as "You, Lord, are my hope" and "The Lord my God is my mercy," along with many similar texts. It does not say "O Lord my love" or "You are my love" or "God my love," but rather "God is love," just as it is said "God is a Spirit." Anyone who does not understand this must ask the Lord for understanding, not ask us for an explanation, for we cannot say anything more clearly.

27. We have sufficiently spoken of the Father and of the Son, so far as was possible for us to see through this glass and in this enigma. We must now treat of the Holy Spirit, so far as by God's gift it is permitted to see Him. And the Holy Spirit, according to the Holy Scriptures, is neither of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but of both; and so intimates to us a mutual love, wherewith the Father and the Son reciprocally love one another. But the language of the Word of God, in order to exercise us, has caused those things to be sought into with the greater zeal, which do not lie on the surface, but are to be scrutinized in hidden depths, and to be drawn out from thence. The Scriptures, accordingly, have not said, The Holy Spirit is Love. If they had said so, they would have done away with no small part of this inquiry. But they have said, God is love; so that it is uncertain and remains to be inquired whether God the Father is love, or God the Son, or God the Holy Ghost, or the Trinity itself which is God. For we are not going to say that God is called Love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God, as it is said to God, You are my patience. For this is not said because our patience is God's substance, but in that He Himself gives it to us; as it is elsewhere read, Since from Him is my patience. For the usage of words itself in Scripture sufficiently refutes this interpretation; for You are my patience is of the same kind as You, Lord, art my hope, and The Lord my God is my mercy, and many like texts. And it is not said, O Lord my love, or, You are my love, or, God my love; but it is said thus, God is love, as it is said, God is a Spirit. And he who does not discern this, must ask understanding from the Lord, not an explanation from us; for we cannot say anything more clearly.

God, then, is love. But the question is whether this refers to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself, since the Trinity is not three Gods but one God. However, I have already argued earlier in this book that the Trinity, which is God, should not be understood from those three aspects we found in the trinity of our mind in such a way that the Father would be the memory of all three, the Son the understanding of all three, and the Holy Spirit the love of all three. This would mean the Father would neither understand nor love for Himself, but the Son would understand for Him and the Holy Spirit love for Him, while He Himself would only remember both for Himself and for them. Likewise, the Son would neither remember nor love for Himself, but the Father would remember for Him and the Holy Spirit love for Him, while He Himself would only understand both for Himself and for them. Similarly, the Holy Spirit would neither remember nor understand for Himself, but the Father would remember for Him and the Son understand for Him, while He Himself would only love both for Himself and for them. Rather, it works this way: each and all of them have all three qualities in His own nature. These qualities are not distinct in them as they are in us, where memory is one thing, understanding another, and love or charity yet another. Instead, they are one single thing that is equivalent to all of them, namely wisdom itself. This is contained in the nature of each Person in such a way that the one who has it is identical with what He has, since He is an unchangeable and simple substance. If all this has been understood and made clearly true, so far as we are granted to see or conclude about such great matters, I do not know why both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit should not be called Love, and all together one love, just as both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is called Wisdom, and all together not three wisdoms but one wisdom. For in the same way, both the Father is God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, and all three together one God.

28. God, then, is love; but the question is, whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity itself: because the Trinity is not three Gods, but one God. But I have already argued above in this book, that the Trinity, which is God, is not so to be understood from those three things which have been set forth in the trinity of our mind, as that the Father should be the memory of all three, and the Son the understanding of all three, and the Holy Spirit the love of all three; as though the Father should neither understand nor love for Himself, but the Son should understand for Him, and the Holy Spirit love for Him, but He Himself should remember only both for Himself and for them; nor the Son remember nor love for Himself, but the Father should remember for Him, and the Holy Spirit love for Him, but He Himself understand only both for Himself and them; nor likewise that the Holy Spirit should neither remember nor understand for Himself, but the Father should remember for Him, and the Son understand for Him, while He Himself should love only both for Himself and for them; but rather in this way, that both all and each have all three each in His own nature. Nor that these things should differ in them, as in us memory is one thing, understanding another, love or charity another, but should be some one thing that is equivalent to all, as wisdom itself; and should be so contained in the nature of each, as that He who has it is that which He has, as being an unchangeable and simple substance. If all this, then, has been understood, and so far as is granted to us to see or conjecture in things so great, has been made patently true, I know not why both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit should not be called Love, and all together one love, just as both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is called Wisdom, and all together not three, but one wisdom. For so also both the Father is God, and the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and all three together one God.

Yet it is not without purpose that in this Trinity the Son and no other is called the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit and no other the Gift of God, and God the Father alone is the one from whom the Word is born and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds. I have added the word "principally" because we find that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well. But the Father gave him this too, not by giving it to one who already existed and did not yet have it, but rather whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word, he gave by begetting him. Therefore he begot him in such a way that the common Gift should proceed from him also, and the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both. This distinction within the inseparable Trinity is not to be merely accepted in passing but to be carefully considered. For this is why the Word of God was specially called also the Wisdom of God, even though both Father and Holy Spirit are wisdom. If, then, any one of the three is to be specially called Love, what could be more fitting than that it should be the Holy Spirit? For in that simple and highest nature, substance is not one thing and love another, but substance itself is love, and love itself is substance, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit. Yet the Holy Spirit is specially called Love.

29. And yet it is not to no purpose that in this Trinity the Son and none other is called the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit and none other the Gift of God, and God the Father alone is He from whom the Word is born, and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds. And therefore I have added the word principally, because we find that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son also. But the Father gave Him this too, not as to one already existing, and not yet having it; but whatever He gave to the only-begotten Word, He gave by begetting Him. Therefore He so begot Him as that the common Gift should proceed from Him also, and the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both. This distinction, then, of the inseparable Trinity is not to be merely accepted in passing, but to be carefully considered; for hence it was that the Word of God was specially called also the Wisdom of God, although both Father and Holy Spirit are wisdom. If, then, any one of the three is to be specially called Love, what more fitting than that it should be the Holy Spirit?– namely, that in that simple and highest nature, substance should not be one thing and love another, but that substance itself should be love, and love itself should be substance, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit; and yet that the Holy Spirit should be specially called Love.

Just as all the writings of the Old Testament together in Holy Scripture are sometimes indicated by the name "the Law"—for example, when the apostle quotes a text from the prophet Isaiah that says, "With various tongues and with various lips will I speak to this people," he introduces it by saying, "It is written in the Law." And the Lord Himself says, "It is written in their Law, They hated me without a cause," even though this is found in the Psalms. Sometimes, however, what was given through Moses is specifically called the Law, as in "The Law and the Prophets were until John" and "On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." Here, what is specifically called the Law is clearly what came from Mount Sinai. The Psalms are also included under the name of the Prophets, yet in another place the Savior Himself says, "All things must be fulfilled which are written in the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms concerning me." Here, by contrast, He intended the name Prophets to be understood as not including the Psalms. Therefore, the Law together with the Prophets and the Psalms is called the Law in a general sense, but the Law is also specifically called what was given through Moses. Similarly, the Prophets are referred to generally along with the Psalms, and they are also referred to specifically without the Psalms. Many other examples could be given to show that many names of things are used both in a general way and also specifically applied to particular things, but there is no need for a long discussion about something so clear. I have said this much so that no one should think it inappropriate for us to call the Holy Spirit Love just because both God the Father and God the Son can be called Love.

30. Just as sometimes all the utterances of the Old Testament together in the Holy Scriptures are signified by the name of the Law. For the apostle, in citing a text from the prophet Isaiah, where he says, With various tongues and with various lips will I speak to this people, yet prefaced it by, It is written in the Law. And the Lord Himself says, It is written in their Law, They hated me without a cause, whereas this is read in the Psalm. And sometimes that which was given by Moses is specially called the Law: as it is said, The Law and the Prophets were until John; and, On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. Here, certainly, that is specially called the Law which was from Mount Sinai. And the Psalms, too, are signified under the name of the Prophets; and yet in another place the Saviour Himself says, All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the Law, and the Prophets, and the Psalms concerning me. Here, on the other side, He meant the name of Prophets to be taken as not including the Psalms. Therefore the Law with the Prophets and the Psalms taken together is called the Law universally, and the Law is also specially so called which was given by Moses. Likewise the Prophets are so called in common together with the Psalms, and they are also specially so called exclusive of the Psalms. And many other instances might be adduced to teach us, that many names of things are both put universally, and also specially applied to particular things, were it not that a long discourse is to be avoided in a plain case. I have said so much, lest any one should think that it was therefore unsuitable for us to call the Holy Spirit Love, because both God the Father and God the Son can be called Love.

Just as we call the only Word of God specifically by the name of Wisdom, even though the Holy Spirit and the Father Himself are also universally wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is specifically called by the name of Love, even though both the Father and the Son are also universally love. The Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son of God, is explicitly called the Wisdom of God by the apostle, where he says, "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." But where the Holy Spirit is called Love must be discovered by careful examination of the language of the apostle John, who, after saying, "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God," went on to say, "And everyone that loves is born of God, and knows God. He that loves not, knows not God; for God is love." Here, clearly, he has called that love God, which he said was of God; therefore God of God is love. But since both the Son is born of God the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, it is rightly asked which of them we ought to think is more properly called the love that is God. For the Father alone is God in such a way as not to be of God; and therefore the love that is God in such a way as to be of God is either the Son or the Holy Spirit. But when, in what follows, the apostle had mentioned the love of God, not the love by which we love Him, but the love by which He loved us and sent His Son to be a propitiation for our sins, and then had exhorted us also to love one another, and that so God would abide in us—because, that is, he had called God Love—immediately, in his wish to speak yet more clearly on the subject, "Hereby," he says, "we know that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit." Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom He has given us, makes us to abide in God, and Him in us; and this is what love does. Therefore He is the God that is love. Finally, a little later, when he had repeated the same thing, and had said "God is love," he immediately added, "And he who abides in love, abides in God, and God abides in him"; which corresponds to what he had said above, "Hereby we know that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit." He therefore is signified where we read that God is love. Therefore God the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, when He has been given to man, inflames him to the love of God and of his neighbor, and is Himself love. For man has no source from which to love God, unless from God; and therefore he says a little later, "Let us love Him, because He first loved us." The apostle Paul, too, says, "The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us."

31. As, then, we call the only Word of God specially by the name of Wisdom, although universally both the Holy Spirit and the Father Himself is wisdom; so the Holy Spirit is specially called by the name of Love, although universally both the Father and the Son are love. But the Word of God, i.e. the only-begotten Son of God, is expressly called the Wisdom of God by the mouth of the apostle, where he says, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. But where the Holy Spirit is called Love, is to be found by careful scrutiny of the language of John the apostle, who, after saying, Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God, has gone on to say, And every one that loves is born of God, and knows God. He that loves not, knows not God; for God is love. Here, manifestly, he has called that love God, which he said was of God; therefore God of God is love. But because both the Son is born of God the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, it is rightly asked which of them we ought here to think is the rather called the love that is God. For the Father only is so God as not to be of God; and hence the love that is so God as to be of God, is either the Son or the Holy Spirit. But when, in what follows, the apostle had mentioned the love of God, not that by which we love Him, but that by which He loved us, and sent His Son to be a propitiator for our sins, and thereupon had exhorted us also to love one another, and that so God would abide in us — because, namely, he had called God Love; immediately, in his wish to speak yet more expressly on the subject, Hereby, he says, know we that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit. Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom He has given us, makes us to abide in God, and Him in us; and this it is that love does. Therefore He is the God that is love. Lastly, a little after, when he had repeated the same thing, and had said God is love, he immediately subjoined, And he who abides in love, abides in God, and God abides in him; whence he had said above, Hereby we know that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit. He therefore is signified, where we read that God is love. Therefore God the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, when He has been given to man, inflames him to the love of God and of his neighbor, and is Himself love. For man has not whence to love God, unless from God; and therefore he says a little after, Let us love Him, because He first loved us. The Apostle Paul, too, says, The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us.

Chapter 18.– No Gift of God is More Excellent Than Love.

There is no gift of God more excellent than this. It alone distinguishes the sons of the eternal kingdom from the sons of eternal perdition. Other gifts are also given by the Holy Spirit, but without love they are worthless. Therefore, unless the Holy Spirit is given to each person in such a way that it makes him love God and his neighbor, he is not moved from the left hand to the right. The Spirit is specifically called the Gift only because of love. And whoever does not have this love, even if he speaks with the tongues of men and angels, is just sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. And even if he has the gift of prophecy and knows all mysteries and all knowledge, and even if he has all faith so that he can remove mountains, he is nothing. And even if he gives all his possessions to feed the poor, and even if he gives his body to be burned, it profits him nothing. How great a good, then, is that without which such great goods bring no one to eternal life! But love or charity itself—for they are two names for one thing—if someone has it who does not speak with tongues, nor has the gift of prophecy, nor knows all mysteries and all knowledge, nor gives all his possessions to the poor (either because he has none to give or because some necessity prevents it), nor delivers his body to be burned (if no trial of such suffering comes to him), brings that person to the kingdom. In this way, even faith itself is only made profitable by love, since faith without love can indeed exist but cannot profit. Therefore the Apostle Paul also says, "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that works by love," thus distinguishing it from that faith by which even the devils believe and tremble. Love, therefore, which is of God and is God, is specially the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, and by this love the whole Trinity dwells in us. Therefore, most rightly the Holy Spirit, although He is God, is also called the gift of God. And by that gift what else can properly be understood except love, which brings us to God, and without which any other gift of God whatsoever does not bring us to God?

32. There is no gift of God more excellent than this. It alone distinguishes the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal perdition. Other gifts, too, are given by the Holy Spirit; but without love they profit nothing. Unless, therefore, the Holy Spirit is so far imparted to each, as to make him one who loves God and his neighbor, he is not removed from the left hand to the right. Nor is the Spirit specially called the Gift, unless on account of love. And he who has not this love, though he speak with the tongues of men and angels, is sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal; and though he have the gift of prophecy, and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and though he have all faith, so that he can remove mountains, he is nothing; and though he bestow all his goods to feed the poor, and though he give his body to be burned, it profits him nothing. How great a good, then, is that without which goods so great bring no one to eternal life! But love or charity itself — for they are two names for one thing — if he have it that does not speak with tongues, nor has the gift of prophecy, nor knows all mysteries and all knowledge, nor gives all his goods to the poor, either because he has none to give or because some necessity hinders, nor delivers his body to be burned, if no trial of such a suffering overtakes him, brings that man to the kingdom, so that faith itself is only rendered profitable by love, since faith without love can indeed exist, but cannot profit. And therefore also the Apostle Paul says, In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that works by love: so distinguishing it from that faith by which even the devils believe and tremble. Love, therefore, which is of God and is God, is specially the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, by which love the whole Trinity dwells in us. And therefore most rightly is the Holy Spirit, although He is God, called also the gift of God. And by that gift what else can properly be understood except love, which brings to God, and without which any other gift of God whatsoever does not bring to God?

Chapter 19.– The Holy Spirit is Called the Gift of God in the Scriptures. By the Gift of the Holy Spirit is Meant the Gift Which is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is Specially Called Love, Although Not Only the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is Love.

Does this also need to be proven, that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God in the sacred books? If people need this demonstrated, we have in the Gospel of John the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, who says, If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink: whoever believes in me, as the Scripture says, out of his belly will flow rivers of living water. The evangelist then adds, And this He spoke of the Spirit, which those who believe in Him would receive. Hence the apostle Paul also says, And we have all been made to drink into one Spirit. The question is whether that water which is the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God. Just as we find here that this water is the Holy Spirit, so we find elsewhere in the same Gospel that this water is called the gift of God. When the same Lord was talking with the Samaritan woman at the well, to whom He had said, Give me to drink, and she had answered that the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans, Jesus replied to her, If you had known the gift of God, and who it is that says to you, Give me to drink, you would have asked of Him, and He would have given you living water. The woman says to Him, Sir, you have nothing to draw with, and the well is deep: where then do you get this living water, etc.? Jesus answered and said to her, Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again; but whoever drinks of the water that I will give him will never thirst; but the water that I will give him will be in him a fountain of water springing up to eternal life. Since this living water, as the evangelist has explained to us, is the Holy Spirit, without doubt the Spirit is the gift of God, of which the Lord says here, If you had known the gift of God, and who it is that says to you, Give me to drink, you would have asked of Him, and He would have given you living water. For what is in the one passage, Out of his belly will flow rivers of living water, is in the other, will be in him a fountain of water springing up to eternal life.

33. Is this too to be proved, that the Holy Spirit is called in the sacred books the gift of God? If people look for this too, we have in the Gospel according to John the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, who says, If any one thirst, let him come to me and drink: he that believes in me, as the Scripture says, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. And the evangelist has gone on further to add, And this He spoke of the Spirit, which they should receive who believe in Him. And hence Paul the apostle also says, And we have all been made to drink into one Spirit. The question then is, whether that water is called the gift of God which is the Holy Spirit. But as we find here that this water is the Holy Spirit, so we find elsewhere in the Gospel itself that this water is called the gift of God. For when the same Lord was talking with the woman of Samaria at the well, to whom He had said, Give me to drink, and she had answered that the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans, Jesus answered and said to her, If you had known the gift of God, and who it is that says to you, Give me to drink, you would have asked of Him, and He would have given you living water. The woman says unto Him, Sir, you have nothing to draw with, and the well is deep: whence then have you this living water, etc.? Jesus answered and said to her, Every one that drinks of this water shall thirst again; but whose shall drink of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him, shall be in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life. Because this living water, then, as the evangelist has explained to us, is the Holy Spirit, without doubt the Spirit is the gift of God, of which the Lord says here, If you had known the gift of God, and who it is that says unto you, Give me to drink, you would have asked of Him, and He would have given you living water. For that which is in the one passage, Out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water, is in the other, shall be in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life.

The apostle Paul also says, "To each of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ." Then, to show that by the gift of Christ he meant the Holy Spirit, he continues, "Therefore He says, 'He has ascended up on high, He has led captivity captive, and has given gifts to men.'" Everyone knows that the Lord Jesus, after ascending into heaven following His resurrection from the dead, gave the Holy Spirit. Those who believed were filled with Him and spoke in the tongues of all nations. Let no one object that Paul says "gifts" and not "gift," because he was quoting from the Psalm. In the Psalm it reads: "You have ascended up on high, You have led captivity captive, You have received gifts in men." This is how it appears in many manuscripts, especially the Greek ones, and this is how we have it translated from the Hebrew. The apostle therefore said "gifts" as the prophet did, not "gift." But whereas the prophet said "You have received gifts in men," the apostle preferred to say "He gave gifts to men." This allows the fullest meaning to be gathered from both expressions, one prophetic and one apostolic, because both possess the authority of divine utterance. Both are true: that He gave to men and that He received in men. He gave to men as the head to His own members. He Himself who gave also received in men, certainly as in His own members. Because of His own members, He cried from heaven, "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" And concerning His own members He says, "Since you have done it to one of the least of these that are mine, you have done it unto me." Christ Himself therefore both gave from heaven and received on earth. Furthermore, both prophet and apostle have said "gifts" because many gifts, which are proper to each individual, are distributed in common to all the members of Christ by the Gift, which is the Holy Spirit. Each person does not have all gifts separately, but some have these and some have those, although all have the Gift itself by which what is proper to each is distributed to them, that is, the Holy Spirit. Elsewhere too, after mentioning many gifts, Paul says, "All these works that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to each severally as He will." This language is also found in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is written, "God also bearing witness both with signs and wonders, and with various miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost." So here, when Paul had said, "He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, He gave gifts to men," he continues, "But that He ascended, what is it but that He also first descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that He might fill all things. And He gave some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and doctors." This is why gifts are spoken of, because as he says elsewhere, "Are all apostles? Are all prophets?" and so on. Here he has added, "For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ." This is the house which, as the Psalm sings, is built up after the captivity, since the house of Christ, which is called His Church, is built up of those who have been rescued from the devil by whom they were held captive. He Himself led this captivity captive, who conquered the devil. To prevent the devil from drawing into eternal punishment those who were to become members of the Holy Head, He bound him first by the bonds of righteousness and then by those of might. The devil himself therefore is called captivity, which He led captive who ascended up on high and gave gifts to men, or received gifts in men.

34. Paul the apostle also says, To each of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ; and then, that he might show that by the gift of Christ he meant the Holy Spirit, he has gone on to add, Wherefore He says, He has ascended up on high, He has led captivity captive, and has given gifts to men. And every one knows that the Lord Jesus, when He had ascended into heaven after the resurrection from the dead, gave the Holy Spirit, with whom they who believed were filled, and spoke with the tongues of all nations. And let no one object that he says gifts, not gift: for he quoted the text from the Psalm. And in the Psalm it is read thus, You have ascended up on high, You have led captivity captive, You have received gifts in men. For so it stands in many mss., especially in the Greek mss., and so we have it translated from the Hebrew. The apostle therefore said gifts, as the prophet did, not gift. But whereas the prophet said, You have received gifts in men, the apostle has preferred saying, He gave gifts to men: and this in order that the fullest sense may be gathered from both expressions, the one prophetic, the other apostolic; because both possess the authority of a divine utterance. For both are true, as well that He gave to men, as that He received in men. He gave to men, as the head to His own members: He Himself that gave, received in men, no doubt as in His own members; on account of which, namely, His own members, He cried from heaven, Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? And of which, namely, His own members, He says, Since you have done it to one of the least of these that are mine, you have done it unto me. Christ Himself, therefore, both gave from heaven and received on earth. And further, both prophet and apostle have said gifts for this reason, because many gifts, which are proper to each, are divided in common to all the members of Christ, by the Gift, which is the Holy Spirit. For each severally has not all, but some have these and some have those; although all have the Gift itself by which that which is proper to each is divided to Him, i.e. the Holy Spirit. For elsewhere also, when he had mentioned many gifts, All these, he says, works that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to each severally as He will. And this word is found also in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is written, God also bearing witness both with signs and wonders, and with various miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost. And so here, when he had said, He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, He gave gifts to men, he says further, But that He ascended, what is it but that He also first descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that He might fill all things. And He gave some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and doctors. (This we see is the reason why gifts are spoken of; because, as he says elsewhere, Are all apostles? Are all prophets? etc.) And here he has added, For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ. This is the house which, as the Psalm sings, is built up after the captivity; since the house of Christ, which house is called His Church, is built up of those who have been rescued from the devil, by whom they were held captive. But He Himself led this captivity captive, who conquered the devil. And that he might not draw with him into eternal punishment those who were to become the members of the Holy Head, He bound him first by the bonds of righteousness, and then by those of might. The devil himself, therefore, is called captivity, which He led captive who ascended up on high, and gave gifts to men, or received gifts in men.

The apostle Peter, as we read in the canonical book that records the Acts of the Apostles, spoke to troubled Jews about Christ. When they asked, "Brothers, what shall we do? Tell us," he said to them, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." We also read in the same book that Simon Magus wanted to give the apostles money so that he might receive power from them to give the Holy Spirit through laying on of hands. Peter said to him, "May your money perish with you, because you thought you could buy the gift of God with money." In another place in the same book, when Peter was speaking to Cornelius and those with him, announcing and preaching Christ, Scripture says, "While Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who heard the word, and the believers from among the circumcised who came with Peter were astonished, because the gift of the Holy Spirit was poured out even on the Gentiles. For they heard them speaking in tongues and praising God." When Peter later gave an account to the brothers in Jerusalem about his act of baptizing the uncircumcised, because the Holy Spirit had come upon them before baptism to settle the question, and the brothers in Jerusalem were troubled when they heard it, he said, after the rest of his words, "When I began to speak to them, the Holy Spirit fell upon them just as upon us in the beginning. And I remembered the word of the Lord, how He said, 'John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit.' If therefore God gave them the same gift as He gave us who believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was I that I could hinder God from giving them the Holy Spirit?" There are many other scriptural testimonies that unanimously confirm that the Holy Spirit is the gift of God, insofar as He is given to those who through Him love God. But to collect them all would take too long. And what would be enough to satisfy those who are not satisfied with the ones we have already cited?

35. And Peter the apostle, as we read in that canonical book, wherein the Acts of the Apostles are recorded — when the hearts of the Jews were troubled as he spoke of Christ, and they said, Brethren, what shall we do? Tell us, — said to them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins: and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. And we read likewise in the same book, that Simon Magus desired to give money to the apostles, that he might receive power from them, whereby the Holy Spirit might be given by the laying on of his hands. And the same Peter said to him, Your money perish with you: because you have thought to purchase for money the gift of God. And in another place of the same book, when Peter was speaking to Cornelius, and to those who were with him, and was announcing and preaching Christ, the Scripture says, While Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all them that heard the word; and they of the circumcision that believed, as many as came with Peter, were astonished, because that upon the Gentiles also the gift of the Holy Spirit was poured out. For they heard them speak with tongues, and magnify God. And when Peter afterwards was giving an account to the brethren that were at Jerusalem of this act of his, that he had baptized those who were not circumcised, because the Holy Spirit, to cut the knot of the question, had come upon them before they were baptized, and the brethren at Jerusalem were moved when they heard it, he says, after the rest of his words, And when I began to speak to them, the Holy Spirit fell upon them, as upon us in the beginning. And I remembered the word of the Lord, how He said, that John indeed baptized with water, but you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit. If, therefore, He gave a like gift to them, as also to us who believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was I, that I could hinder God from giving to them the Holy Spirit? And there are many other testimonies of the Scriptures, which unanimously attest that the Holy Spirit is the gift of God, in so far as He is given to those who by Him love God. But it is too long a task to collect them all. And what is enough to satisfy those who are not satisfied with those we have alleged?

Certainly they must be warned, since they now see that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God, that when they hear of the gift of the Holy Spirit, they should understand this as the same kind of expression found in the phrase "the body of the flesh." Just as the body of the flesh is nothing other than the flesh itself, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit himself. He is the gift of God insofar as he is given to those who receive him. But in himself he is God, even if he had never been given to anyone, because he was God co-eternal with the Father and the Son before he was given to anyone. Nor is he less than they are simply because they give and he is given. For he is given as God's gift in such a way that he also gives himself, being God. He cannot be said to lack his own power, since it is written of him, "The Spirit blows where it wills," and the apostle says, as I have already mentioned above, "All these things are the work of that same Spirit, distributing to each person individually as he wills." What we have here is not the creation of the one who is given and the authority of those who give, but the harmony of the given and the givers.

36. Certainly they must be warned, since they now see that the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God, that when they hear of the gift of the Holy Spirit, they should recognize therein that mode of speech which is found in the words, In the spoiling of the body of the flesh. For as the body of the flesh is nothing else but the flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing else but the Holy Spirit. He is then the gift of God, so far as He is given to those to whom He is given. But in Himself He is God, although He were given to no one, because He was God co-eternal with the Father and the Son before He was given to any one. Nor is He less than they, because they give, and He is given. For He is given as a gift of God in such way that He Himself also gives Himself as being God. For He cannot be said not to be in His own power, of whom it is said, The Spirit blows where it lists; and the apostle says, as I have already mentioned above, All these things works that selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will. We have not here the creating of Him that is given, and the rule of them that give, but the concord of the given and the givers.

If Holy Scripture declares that God is love, and that love is from God, and works in us so that we remain in God and he in us, and we know this because he has given us his Spirit, then the Spirit himself is God, who is love. Furthermore, if there is no greater gift of God than love, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what follows more naturally than that he himself is love, who is called both God and from God? And if the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, ineffably shows the communion of both, what is more fitting than that he should be specially called love, who is the Spirit common to both? For this is the sounder view both to believe and to understand: that the Holy Spirit is not the only love in that Trinity, yet he is not called love specially without reason, for the reasons we have given. Just as he is not the only Spirit or the only holy one in that Trinity, since both the Father is a Spirit and the Son is a Spirit, and both the Father is holy and the Son is holy—as piety does not doubt. Yet it is not without reason that he is specially called the Holy Spirit, because he is common to both, he is specially called what both are in common. Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, then surely the Son too turns out to be the Son not only of the Father but also of the Holy Spirit. For he is both said and read in countless places to be the only-begotten Son of God the Father. So what the apostle says of God the Father is also true: "Who has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his own love." He did not say "of his own Son." If he had said that, he would have spoken most truly, just as he did speak most truly because he has often said it. But he says "the Son of his own love." Therefore the Son is also the Son of the Holy Spirit, if in that Trinity there is no love in God except the Holy Spirit. But since this is most absurd, it follows that the Holy Spirit is not the only love there, but is specially called so for the reasons I have sufficiently explained. And the words "Son of his own love" mean nothing else than his own beloved Son—the Son, in short, of his own substance. For the love in the Father, which exists in his ineffably simple nature, is nothing else than his very nature and substance itself—as we have already often said and are not ashamed to repeat often. And therefore the Son of his love is none other than he who is born of his substance.

37. Wherefore, if Holy Scripture proclaims that God is love, and that love is of God, and works this in us that we abide in God and He in us, and that hereby we know this, because He has given us of His Spirit, then the Spirit Himself is God, who is love. Next, if there be among the gifts of God none greater than love, and there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what follows more naturally than that He is Himself love, who is called both God and of God? And if the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father, ineffably demonstrates the communion of both, what is more suitable than that He should be specially called love, who is the Spirit common to both? For this is the sounder thing both to believe and to understand, that the Holy Spirit is not alone love in that Trinity, yet is not specially called love to no purpose, for the reasons we have alleged; just as He is not alone in that Trinity either a Spirit or holy, since both the Father is a Spirit, and the Son is a Spirit; and both the Father is holy, and the Son is holy — as piety doubts not. And yet it is not to no purpose that He is specially called the Holy Spirit; for because He is common to both, He is specially called that which both are in common. Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, then doubtless the Son too turns out to be the Son, not of the Father only, but also of the Holy Spirit. For He is both said and read in countless places to be so — the only-begotten Son of God the Father; as that what the apostle says of God the Father is true too: Who has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His own love. He did not say, of His own Son. If He had so said, He would have said it most truly, just as He did say it most truly, because He has often said it; but He says, the Son of His own love. Therefore He is the Son also of the Holy Spirit, if there is in that Trinity no love in God except the Holy Spirit. And if this is most absurd, it remains that the Holy Spirit is not alone therein love, but is specially so called for the reasons I have sufficiently set forth; and that the words, Son of His own love, mean nothing else than His own beloved Son — the Son, in short, of His own substance. For the love in the Father, which is in His ineffably simple nature, is nothing else than His very nature and substance itself — as we have already often said, and are not ashamed of often repeating. And hence the Son of His love, is none other than He who is born of His substance.

Chapter 20.– Against Eunomius, Saying that the Son of God is the Son, Not of His Nature, But of His Will. Epilogue to What Has Been Said Already.

Wherefore the logic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics sprang, is ridiculous. For when he could not understand, and would not believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by which all things were made, is the Son of God by nature — that is, born of the ousia (substance) of the Father — he claimed that He was not the Son according to His own nature or ousia or essence, but the Son of the will of God. He meant to assert that the will by which God begot the Son was something accidental and optional to God — meaning it in the same way that we ourselves sometimes will something which we did not will before, as though it were not for these very reasons that our nature is seen to be changeable — a thing which God forbid we should believe about God. For it is written, Many are the thoughts in the heart of man, but the counsel of the Lord abides forever, for no other reason except that we may understand or believe that as God is eternal, so is His counsel for eternity, and therefore unchangeable, as He himself is. And what is said of thoughts can most truly be said also of the will: there are many wills in the heart of man, but the will of the Lord abides forever. Some, again, to escape saying that the only-begotten Word is the Son of the counsel or will of God, have affirmed that the same Word is the counsel or will itself of the Father. But it is better in my judgment to say counsel of counsel, and will of will, as ousia of ousia, wisdom of wisdom, so that we may not be led into that absurdity, which we have already refuted, and say that the Son makes the Father wise or willing, if the Father does not have in His own ousia either counsel or will. It was certainly a sharp answer that somebody gave to the heretic, who very cleverly asked him whether God begot the Son willingly or unwillingly, so that if he said unwillingly, it would follow most absurdly that God was miserable; but if willingly, he would immediately infer, as though by an unbeatable argument, what he was aiming at, namely that He was the Son, not of His nature, but of His will. But that other person, with great alertness, asked him in return whether God the Father was God willingly or unwillingly; so that if he answered unwillingly, that misery would follow, which to believe of God is sheer madness; and if he said willingly, it would be replied to him, Then He is God too by His own will, not by His nature. What remained, then, except that he should be silent and recognize that he was himself bound by his own question in an unsolvable knot? But if any person in the Trinity is also to be specially called the will of God, this name, like love, is better suited to the Holy Spirit; for what else is love, except will?

38. Wherefore the logic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics sprang, is ridiculous. For when he could not understand, and would not believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by which all things were made is the Son of God by nature, — i.e. born of the substance of the Father — he alleged that He was not the Son of His own nature or substance or essence, but the Son of the will of God; so as to mean to assert that the will by which he begot the Son was something accidental [and optional] to God — to wit, in that way that we ourselves sometimes will something which before we did not will, as though it was not for these very things that our nature is perceived to be changeable — a thing which far be it from us to believe of God. For it is written, Many are the thoughts in the heart of man, but the counsel of the Lord abides for ever, for no other reason except that we may understand or believe that as God is eternal, so is His counsel for eternity, and therefore unchangeable, as He himself is. And what is said of thoughts can most truly be said also of the will: there are many wills in the heart of man, but the will of the Lord abides forever. Some, again, to escape saying that the only-begotten Word is the Son of the counsel or will of God, have affirmed the same Word to be the counsel or will itself of the Father. But it is better in my judgment to say counsel of counsel, and will of will, as substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom, that we may not be led into that absurdity, which we have refuted already, and say that the Son makes the Father wise or willing, if the Father has not in His own substance either counsel or will. It was certainly a sharp answer that somebody gave to the heretic, who most subtly asked him whether God begot the Son willingly or unwillingly, in order that if he said unwillingly, it would follow most absurdly that God was miserable; but if willingly, he would immediately infer, as though by an invincible reason, that at which he was aiming, viz. that He was the Son, not of His nature, but of His will. But that other, with great wakefulness, demanded of him in turn, whether God the Father was God willingly or unwillingly; in order that if he answered unwillingly, that misery would follow, which to believe of God is sheer madness; and if he said willingly, it would be replied to him, Then He is God too by His own will, not by His nature. What remained, then, except that he should hold his peace, and discern that he was himself bound by his own question in an insoluble bond? But if any person in the Trinity is also to be specially called the will of God, this name, like love, is better suited to the Holy Spirit; for what else is love, except will?

I see that my argument in this book about the Holy Spirit, based on Holy Scripture, is quite sufficient for faithful people who already know that the Holy Spirit is God and is not of a different ousia, nor inferior to the Father and the Son—as we have demonstrated to be true in earlier books, according to the same Scriptures. We have also reasoned from the created order that God made, and, as far as we were able, have urged those who demand rational explanation on such matters to see and understand His invisible things, as far as they can, through those things which are made, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature which is made according to the image of God. Through this, so to speak, as through a glass, they might discern as far as they are able—if they are able—the Trinity which is God, in our own memory, understanding, and will. If anyone thoughtfully considers these three things as divinely established by nature in his own mind, and remembers through memory, contemplates through understanding, and embraces through love how great a reality exists in the mind by which even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be remembered, seen, and desired, that person certainly discovers an image of that supreme Trinity. And he ought to direct his whole life toward remembering, seeing, and loving that supreme Trinity, so that he may recollect, contemplate, and delight in it. But I have warned him, as much as seemed adequate, that he must not compare this image—fashioned by that Trinity yet corrupted for the worse by his own fault—to that same Trinity in such a way as to think it resembles it in every respect. Rather, he should recognize in that likeness, whatever its quality, a great unlikeness as well.

39. I see that my argument in this book respecting the Holy Spirit, according to the Holy Scripture, is quite enough for faithful men who know already that the Holy Spirit is God, and not of another substance, nor less than the Father and the Son — as we have shown to be true in the former books, according to the same Scriptures. We have reasoned also from the creature which God made, and, as far as we could, have warned those who demand a reason on such subjects to behold and understand His invisible things, so far as they could, by those things which are made and especially by the rational or intellectual creature which is made after the image of God; through which glass, so to say, they might discern as far as they could, if they could, the Trinity which is God, in our own memory, understanding, will. Which three things, if any one intelligently regards as by nature divinely appointed in his own mind, and remembers by memory, contemplates by understanding, embraces by love, how great a thing that is in the mind, whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recollected, beheld, desired, doubtless that man finds an image of that highest Trinity. And he ought to refer the whole of his life to the remembering, seeing, loving that highest Trinity, in order that he may recollect, contemplate, be delighted by it. But I have warned him, so far as seemed sufficient, that he must not so compare this image thus wrought by that Trinity, and by his own fault changed for the worse, to that same Trinity as to think it in all points like to it, but rather that he should discern in that likeness, of whatever sort it be, a great unlikeness also.

Chapter 21.– Of the Likeness of the Father and of the Son Alleged to Be in Our Memory and Understanding. Of the Likeness of the Holy Spirit in Our Will or Love.

I have certainly done my best, not to make the thing visible face to face, but rather to show it through this likeness in an enigma, however slightly, by inference, in our memory and understanding, to suggest God the Father and God the Son: that is, God the begetter, who has in some way spoken through His own co-eternal Word everything that He has in His substance; and God His Word Himself, who Himself has nothing either more or less in substance than is in the Father, who has begotten the Word not falsely but truly. I have assigned to memory everything we know, even when we are not thinking about it, but to understanding I have assigned the formation of thought according to a certain particular mode. For we usually say we understand something when, by thinking about it, we have discovered it to be true; and this is what we then store again in memory. But there is an even more hidden depth of our memory, where we first discovered this also when we thought about it, and where an inner word is begotten that belongs to no language—like knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, and understanding that appears in reflective thought; understanding that had already existed beforehand in the memory but was hidden there, although unless thought itself also had some kind of memory of its own, it would not return to those things it had left in memory while it turned to think about other things.

40. I have undoubtedly taken pains so far as I could, not indeed so that the thing might be seen face to face, but that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how small a degree soever, by conjecture, in our memory and understanding, to intimate God the Father and God the Son: i.e. God the begetter, who has in some way spoken by His own co-eternal Word all things that He has in His substance; and God His Word Himself, who Himself has nothing either more or less in substance than is in Him, who, not lyingly but truly, has begotten the Word; and I have assigned to memory everything that we know, even if we were not thinking of it, but to understanding the formation after a certain special mode of the thought. For we are usually said to understand what, by thinking of it, we have found to be true; and this it is again that we leave in the memory. But that is a still more hidden depth of our memory, wherein we found this also first when we thought of it, and wherein an inner word is begotten such as belongs to no tongue — as it were, knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, and understanding which appears in [reflective] thought; of understanding which had indeed existed before in the memory, but was latent there, although, unless the thought itself had also some sort of memory of its own, it would not return to those things which it had left in the memory while it turned to think of other things.

I have shown nothing in this enigma about the Holy Spirit that might seem like Him, except our own will, or love, or affection, which is a stronger form of will. Our natural will is affected in various ways depending on what objects are near us or come to our attention, which either attract or repel us. What does this mean? Should we say that when our will is right, it doesn't know what to desire or what to avoid? Moreover, if it does know, then it clearly has its own kind of knowledge, which cannot exist without memory and understanding. Or should we listen to anyone who claims that love doesn't know what it's doing, when it acts rightly? Just as there are both understanding and love in that primary memory where we find stored what we can think about—because we also find these two things there when we discover through thinking that we both understand and love something, which were already there even when we weren't thinking about them—and just as there are memory and love in that understanding which is formed by thought (the true word we speak inwardly without using any human language when we express what we know, because our thought's focus only returns to something by remembering it and only wants to return by loving it), so too love, which combines the vision present in memory and the vision of thought formed from it like parent and offspring, would not know what to love rightly unless it had knowledge of what it desired, which it cannot have without memory and understanding.

41. But I have shown nothing in this enigma respecting the Holy Spirit such as might appear to be like Him, except our own will, or love, or affection, which is a stronger will, since our will which we have naturally is variously affected, according as various objects are adjacent or occur to it, by which we are attracted or offended. What, then, is this? Are we to say that our will, when it is right, knows not what to desire, what to avoid? Further, if it knows, doubtless then it has a kind of knowledge of its own, such as cannot be without memory and understanding. Or are we to listen to any one who should say that love knows not what it does, which does not do wrongly? As, then, there are both understanding and love in that primary memory wherein we find provided and stored up that to which we can come in thought, because we find also those two things there, when we find by thinking that we both understand and love anything; which things were there too when we were not thinking of them: and as there are memory and love in that understanding, which is formed by thought, which true word we say inwardly without the tongue of any nation when we say what we know; for the gaze of our thought does not return to anything except by remembering it, and does not care to return unless by loving it: so love, which combines the vision brought about in the memory, and the vision of the thought formed thereby, as if parent and offspring, would not know what to love rightly unless it had a knowledge of what it desired, which it cannot have without memory and understanding.

Chapter 22.– How Great the Unlikeness is Between the Image of the Trinity Which We Have Found in Ourselves, and the Trinity Itself.

But since these things exist in one person, as they do in a human being, someone might say to us: These three things—memory, understanding, and love—are mine, not their own. They don't act for themselves, but for me; or rather, I act through them. I am the one who remembers through memory, understands through understanding, and loves through love. When I direct my mind's eye to my memory and speak in my heart about something I know, a true word is born from my knowledge. Both of these are mine—both the knowledge and the word. I am the one who knows, and I am the one who speaks in my heart about what I know. When I search my memory by thinking and discover that I understand and love something—an understanding and love that were already there before I thought about them—it is my own understanding and my own love that I find in my own memory. I am the one who understands, and I am the one who loves, not those things themselves. Similarly, when my thought is mindful and wants to return to things it had left in memory, and to understand and observe them and speak them inwardly, it is my own memory that is mindful, and it is my own will, not its will, by which it wants these things. When my love itself remembers and understands what it should desire and what it should avoid, it remembers by my memory, not its own, and it understands what it intelligently loves by my understanding, not its own. In short, through all these three things, it is I who remember, I who understand, I who love—I who am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but who possess them. These things, then, can be said by a single person who has these three things but is not these three things. But in the simplicity of that Highest Nature, which is God, although there is one God, there are three persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

42. But since these are in one person, as man is, some one may say to us, These three things, memory, understanding, and love, are mine, not their own; neither do they do that which they do for themselves, but for me, or rather I do it by them. For it is I who remember by memory, and understand by understanding, and love by love: and when I direct the mind's eye to my memory, and so say in my heart the thing I know, and a true word is begotten of my knowledge, both are mine, both the knowledge certainly and the word. For it is I who know, and it is I who say in my heart the thing I know. And when I come to find in my memory by thinking that I understand and love anything, which understanding and love were there also before I thought thereon, it is my own understanding and my own love that I find in my own memory, whereby it is I that understand, and I that love, not those things themselves. Likewise, when my thought is mindful, and wills to return to those things which it had left in the memory, and to understand and behold them, and say them inwardly, it is my own memory that is mindful, and it is my own, not its will, wherewith it wills. When my very love itself, too, remembers and understands what it ought to desire and what to avoid, it remembers by my, not by its own memory; and understands that which it intelligently loves by my, not by its own, understanding. In brief, by all these three things, it is I that remember, I that understand, I that love, who am neither memory, nor understanding, nor love, but who have them. These things, then, can be said by a single person, which has these three, but is not these three. But in the simplicity of that Highest Nature, which is God, although there is one God, there are three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 23.– Augustine Dwells Still Further on the Disparity Between the Trinity Which is in Man, and the Trinity Which is God. The Trinity is Now Seen Through a Glass by the Help of Faith, that It May Hereafter Be More Clearly Seen in the Promised Sight Face to Face.

This trinity itself, then, is different from the image of a trinity in something else. Because of this image, the thing that contains these three things is also called an image, just as both a wooden panel and the picture painted on it are together called an image. But because of the picture painted on it, the panel itself is also called an image. However, in that Highest Trinity, which is incomparably above all things, there is such great indivisibility that while a trinity of three people cannot be called one person, in that Trinity there both is said to be and truly is one God. That Trinity is not in one God, but is one God. Also, unlike this image in the case of man, which has these three things but is one person, it is not the same with the Trinity. Instead, there are three persons: the Father of the Son, the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of both Father and Son. For although memory in man—especially that memory which animals do not have, namely the memory by which intelligible things are contained without having entered through the bodily senses—has in this image of the Trinity, according to its own small measure, some kind of likeness to the Father, though incomparably unequal; and likewise understanding in man, which is formed through the intention of thought when what is known is spoken and there is a word of the heart belonging to no tongue, has in its great disparity some likeness to the Son; and love in man, which proceeds from knowledge and joins memory and understanding as something common to parent and offspring and is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in that image some extremely unequal likeness to the Holy Spirit—nevertheless, it is not the case that, as in that image of the Trinity these three are not one man but belong to one man, so in the Highest Trinity itself, of which this is an image, these three belong to one God. Rather, they are one God, and these are three persons, not one. This is certainly a wonderfully inexpressible thing, or inexpressibly wonderful, that while this image of the Trinity is one person, the Highest Trinity itself is three persons, yet that Trinity of three persons is more indivisible than this Trinity of one person. For that Trinity, in the nature of Divinity, or perhaps better, Deity, is what it is, and is mutually and always unchangeably equal. There was no time when it was not or when it was otherwise, and there will be no time when it will not be or when it will be otherwise. But these three things that exist in the inadequate image, although they are not separated in space (for they are not bodies), are nevertheless in this present life separated from each other in magnitude. For even though there are no separate masses in them, this does not prevent us from seeing that memory is greater than understanding in one person, but the opposite in another, and that in yet another person these two are surpassed by the greatness of love—and this is true whether the two themselves are equal to one another or not. And so each two compared to each one, each one compared to each two, and each one compared to each one: the lesser are surpassed by the greater. And when they have been healed of all infirmity and are mutually equal, not even then will that thing which by grace will not be changed be made equal to that which by nature cannot change, because the creature cannot be made equal to the Creator. Even when it is healed from all infirmity, it will still be subject to change.

43. A thing itself, then, which is a trinity is different from the image of a trinity in some other thing; by reason of which image, at the same time that also in which these three things are is called an image; just as both the panel, and the picture painted on it, are at the same time called an image; but by reason of the picture painted on it, the panel also is called by the name of image. But in that Highest Trinity, which is incomparably above all things, there is so great an indivisibility, that whereas a trinity of men cannot be called one man, in that, there both is said to be and is one God, nor is that Trinity in one God, but it is one God. Nor, again, as that image in the case of man has these three things but is one person, so is it with the Trinity; but therein are three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of both Father and Son. For although the memory in the case of man, and especially that memory which beasts have not — viz. the memory by which things intelligible are so contained as that they have not entered that memory through the bodily senses — has in this image of the Trinity, in proportion to its own small measure, a likeness of the Father, incomparably unequal, yet of some sort, whatever it be: and likewise the understanding in the case of man, which by the purpose of the thought is formed thereby, when that which is known is said, and there is a word of the heart belonging to no tongue, has in its own great disparity some likeness of the Son; and love in the case of man proceeding from knowledge, and combining memory and understanding, as though common to parent and offspring, whereby it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in that image, some, however exceedingly unequal, likeness of the Holy Spirit: it is nevertheless not the case, that, as in that image of the Trinity, these three are not one man, but belong to one man, so in the Highest Trinity itself, of which this is an image, these three belong to one God, but they are one God, and these are three persons, not one. A thing certainly wonderfully ineffable, or ineffably wonderful, that while this image of the Trinity is one person, but the Highest Trinity itself is three persons, yet that Trinity of three persons is more indivisible than this of one. For that [Trinity], in the nature of the Divinity, or perhaps better Deity, is that which it is, and is mutually and always unchangeably equal: and there was no time when it was not, or when it was otherwise; and there will be no time when it will not be, or when it will be otherwise. But these three that are in the inadequate image, although they are not separate in place, for they are not bodies, yet are now in this life mutually separate in magnitude. For that there are therein no several bulks, does not hinder our seeing that memory is greater than understanding in one man, but the contrary in another; and that in yet another these two are overpassed by the greatness of love; and this whether the two themselves are or are not equal to one another. And so each two by each one, and each one by each two, and each one by each one: the less are surpassed by the greater. And when they have been healed of all infirmity, and are mutually equal, not even then will that thing which by grace will not be changed, be made equal to that which by nature cannot change, because the creature cannot be equalled to the Creator, and when it shall be healed from all infirmity, will be changed.

When the promised sight comes to us face to face, we will see this not only incorporeal but also absolutely indivisible and truly unchangeable Trinity far more clearly and certainly than we now see its image, which we ourselves are. Yet those who see through this glass and in this enigma, as is permitted in this life, are not those who merely observe in their own mind the things we have arranged and emphasized for them. Rather, they are those who see this as an image, so that they can refer what they see—in whatever way possible—to Him whose image it is, and to see that reality also by inference, which they see through the image by observation, since they cannot yet see face to face. For the apostle does not say "We see now a glass," but "We see now through a glass."

44. But when the sight shall have come which is promised anew to us face to face, we shall see this not only incorporeal but also absolutely indivisible and truly unchangeable Trinity far more clearly and certainly than we now see its image which we ourselves are: and yet they who see through this glass and in this enigma, as it is permitted in this life to see, are not those who behold in their own mind the things which we have set in order and pressed upon them; but those who see this as if an image, so as to be able to refer what they see, in some way be it what it may, to Him whose image it is, and to see that also by conjecturing, which they see through the image by beholding, since they cannot yet see face to face. For the apostle does not say, We see now a glass, but, We see now through a glass.

Chapter 24.– The Infirmity of the Human Mind.

Those who see their own mind, in whatever way that is possible, and in it the Trinity I have discussed in many ways as best I could, yet do not believe or understand it to be an image of God, do indeed see a mirror, but they do not see through the mirror the One who is now to be seen through the mirror. They do not even recognize that the mirror they see is a mirror—that is, an image. If they knew this, perhaps they would understand that the One whose mirror this is should be sought through it, and somehow provisionally seen, with genuine faith purifying their hearts, so that the One who is now seen through a mirror may be able to be seen face to face. But if they reject this faith that purifies the heart, what do they gain by understanding the most intricate arguments about the nature of the human mind, except that they are condemned by the witness of their own understanding? They certainly would not struggle so much in understanding and scarcely arrive at anything certain if they were not trapped in the darkness of punishment and weighed down by the corruptible body that presses down the soul. And for what fault other than sin is this evil inflicted on them? Therefore, being warned by the severity of such a great evil, they ought to follow the Lamb who takes away the sins of the world.

They, then, who see their own mind, in whatever way that is possible, and in it that Trinity of which I have treated as I could in many ways, and yet do not believe or understand it to be an image of God, see indeed a glass, but do not so far see through the glass Him who is now to be seen through the glass, that they do not even know the glass itself which they see to be a glass, i.e. an image. And if they knew this, perhaps they would feel that He too whose glass this is, should by it be sought, and somehow provisionally be seen, an unfeigned faith purging their hearts, that He who is now seen through a glass may be able to be seen face to face. And if they despise this faith that purifies the heart, what do they accomplish by understanding the most subtle disputes concerning the nature of the human mind, unless that they be condemned also by the witness of their own understanding? And they would certainly not so fail in understanding, and hardly arrive at anything certain, were they not involved in penal darkness, and burdened with the corruptible body that presses down the soul. And for what demerit save that of sin is this evil inflicted on them? Wherefore, being warned by the magnitude of so great an evil, they ought to follow the Lamb that takes away the sins of the world.

Chapter 25.– The Question Why the Holy Spirit is Not Begotten, and How He Proceeds from the Father and the Son, Will Only Be Understood When We are in Bliss.

For if any belong to Him, although they are far less intelligent than those others, yet when they are freed from the body at the end of this life, the hostile powers have no right to hold them. For that Lamb who was slain by them without owing any debt of sin has conquered them, but not by the strength of power before He had done so by the righteousness of blood. And freed accordingly from the power of the devil, they are carried up by holy angels, being set free from all evils by the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus. Since by the harmonious testimony of the Divine Scriptures, both Old and New, both those by which Christ was foretold and those by which He was proclaimed, there is no other name under heaven by which men must be saved. And when cleansed from all contamination of corruption, they are placed in peaceful dwelling places until they take their bodies again—their own bodies, but now incorruptible—to adorn, not to burden them. For this is the will of the best and most wise Creator, that the spirit of a man, when piously subject to God, should have a body happily subject to it, and that this happiness should last forever.

For if any belong to Him, although far duller in intellect than those, yet when they are freed from the body at the end of this life, the envious powers have no right to hold them. For that Lamb that was slain by them without any debt of sin has conquered them; but not by the might of power before He had done so by the righteousness of blood. And free accordingly from the power of the devil, they are borne up by holy angels, being set free from all evils by the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus. Since by the harmonious testimony of the Divine Scriptures, both Old and New, both those by which Christ was foretold, and those by which He was announced, there is no other name under heaven whereby men must be saved. And when purged from all contagion of corruption, they are placed in peaceful abodes until they take their bodies again, their own, but now incorruptible, to adorn, not to burden them. For this is the will of the best and most wise Creator, that the spirit of a man, when piously subject to God, should have a body happily subject, and that this happiness should last forever.

Chapter 25.– The Question Why the Holy Spirit is Not Begotten, and How He Proceeds from the Father and the Son, Will Only Be Understood When We are in Bliss.

There we will see the truth without any difficulty and will enjoy it completely, in the clearest and most certain way. We will no longer be searching for answers with a reasoning mind, but will understand through contemplation why the Holy Spirit is not a Son, even though He proceeds from the Father. In that light there will be no room for questions. But here, my own experience has shown me how difficult this is—and it will certainly also appear so to those who carefully and thoughtfully read what I have written. In the second book I promised that I would discuss this matter elsewhere, yet whenever I have tried to explain it by means of the created image of it that we ourselves are, no matter what I meant to say, adequate words completely failed me. In fact, even in my very understanding I felt that I had achieved effort rather than accomplishment. I did find in one person, such as a human being, an image of that highest Trinity, and I wanted, especially in the ninth book, to illustrate and make clearer the relationship of the Three Persons through what is subject to time and change. But three things belonging to one person cannot properly correspond to those Three Persons, as human reasoning requires; and this we have demonstrated in this fifteenth book.

45. There we shall see the truth without any difficulty, and shall enjoy it to the full, most clear and most certain. Nor shall we be inquiring into anything by a mind that reasons, but shall discern by a mind that contemplates, why the Holy Spirit is not a Son, although He proceeds from the Father. In that light there will be no place for inquiry: but here, by experience itself it has appeared to me so difficult — as beyond doubt it will likewise appear to them also who shall carefully and intelligently read what I have written — that although in the second book I promised that I would speak thereof in another place, yet as often as I have desired to illustrate it by the creaturely image of it which we ourselves are, so often, let my meaning be of what sort it might, did adequate utterance entirely fail me; nay, even in my very meaning I felt that I had attained to endeavor rather than accomplishment. I had indeed found in one person, such as is a man, an image of that Highest Trinity, and had desired, especially in the ninth book, to illustrate and render more intelligible the relation of the Three Persons by that which is subject to time and change. But three things belonging to one person cannot suit those Three Persons, as man's purpose demands; and this we have demonstrated in this fifteenth book.

Chapter 26.– The Holy Spirit Twice Given by Christ. The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and from the Son is Apart from Time, Nor Can He Be Called the Son of Both.

In the highest Trinity, which is God, there are no intervals of time by which it could be shown or even investigated whether the Son was born from the Father first and then afterward the Holy Spirit proceeded from both, since Holy Scripture calls Him the Spirit of both. For He is the one of whom the apostle says, "But because you are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts," and He is the one of whom the same Son says, "For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." Many other testimonies of the Divine Word prove that the Spirit, who is specifically called the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, is of the Father and of the Son. The Son Himself likewise says of Him, "Whom I will send to you from the Father," and in another place, "Whom the Father will send in my name." We are taught that He proceeds from both, because the Son Himself says, "He proceeds from the Father." And when He had risen from the dead and appeared to His disciples, He breathed on them and said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," thereby showing that He proceeded also from Himself. And the Spirit is that very power that went out from Him, as we read in the Gospel, and healed them all.

Further, in that Highest Trinity which is God, there are no intervals of time, by which it could be shown, or at least inquired, whether the Son was born of the Father first and then afterwards the Holy Spirit proceeded from both; since Holy Scripture calls Him the Spirit of both. For it is He of whom the apostle says, But because you are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts: and it is He of whom the same Son says, For it is not ye who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you. And it is proved by many other testimonies of the Divine Word, that the Spirit, who is specially called in the Trinity the Holy Spirit, is of the Father and of the Son: of whom likewise the Son Himself says, Whom I will send unto you from the Father; and in another place, Whom the Father will send in my name. And we are so taught that He proceeds from both, because the Son Himself says, He proceeds from the Father. And when He had risen from the dead, and had appeared to His disciples, He breathed upon them, and said, Receive the Holy Ghost, so as to show that He proceeded also from Himself. And Itself is that very power that went out from Him, as we read in the Gospel, and healed them all.

But the reason why, after His resurrection, He gave the Holy Spirit twice—first on earth and then sent Him from heaven—is, in my judgment, this: love is poured into our hearts through that very Gift, by which we love God and our neighbors according to those two commandments on which all the law and the prophets depend. And Jesus Christ, to signify this, gave the Holy Spirit once on earth for the love of neighbor, and a second time from heaven for the love of God. And if some other reason might perhaps be given for this double gift of the Holy Spirit, we should not doubt in any case that the same Holy Spirit was given when Jesus breathed on them—the one of whom He soon says, "Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," where this Trinity is especially revealed to us. It is therefore He who was also given from heaven on the day of Pentecost, that is, ten days after the Lord ascended into heaven. How, then, is He not God who gives the Holy Spirit? Indeed, how great a God is He who gives God! For none of His disciples gave the Holy Spirit, since they prayed that He might come upon those on whom they laid their hands; they did not give Him themselves. And the Church preserves this custom even now with her leaders. Finally, Simon Magus also, when he offered the apostles money, does not say, "Give me also this power, that I may give the Holy Spirit," but "that on whomever I lay my hands, he may receive the Holy Spirit." Because Scripture had not said before, "And Simon, seeing that the apostles gave the Holy Spirit," but had said, "And Simon, seeing that the Holy Spirit was given by the laying on of the apostles' hands." Therefore the Lord Jesus Christ Himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received it as man, and therefore He is said to be full of grace and of the Holy Spirit. And in the Acts of the Apostles it is written more plainly of Him, "Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit"—certainly not with visible oil but with the gift of grace that is signified by the visible ointment with which the Church anoints the baptized. And Christ was certainly not anointed with the Holy Spirit at that moment when He, as a dove, descended upon Him at His baptism. For at that time He chose to prefigure His body, that is, His Church, in which especially the baptized receive the Holy Spirit. But He is to be understood to have been anointed with that mystical and invisible anointing when the Word of God was made flesh, that is, when human nature, without any preceding merits from good works, was joined to God the Word in the womb of the Virgin, so that together with it He became one person. Therefore we confess that He was born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary. For it is completely absurd to believe that He received the Holy Spirit when He was nearly thirty years old—for He was baptized by John at that age—but rather that He came to baptism not only without any sin at all, but also not without the Holy Spirit. For if it was written of His servant and forerunner John himself, "He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb," because, although generated by his father, he received the Holy Spirit when formed in the womb, what must be understood and believed about the man Christ, whose very conception in the flesh was not carnal but spiritual? Both natures, the human as well as the divine, are shown in what is also written of Him: that He received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, and poured forth the Holy Spirit—seeing that He received as man and poured forth as God. And we indeed can receive that gift according to our small measure, but we certainly cannot pour it forth upon others; but for this to happen, we invoke over them God, by whom this is accomplished.

46. But the reason why, after His resurrection, He both gave the Holy Spirit, first on earth, and afterwards sent Him from heaven, is in my judgment this: that love is shed abroad in our hearts, by that Gift itself, whereby we love God and our neighbors, according to those two commandments, on which hang all the law and the prophets. And Jesus Christ, in order to signify this, gave to them the Holy Spirit, once upon earth, on account of the love of our neighbor, and a second time from heaven, on account of the love of God. And if some other reason may perhaps be given for this double gift of the Holy Spirit, at any rate we ought not to doubt that the same Holy Spirit was given when Jesus breathed upon them, of whom He by and by says, Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, where this Trinity is especially commended to us. It is therefore He who was also given from heaven on the day of Pentecost, i.e. ten days after the Lord ascended into heaven. How, therefore, is He not God, who gives the Holy Spirit? Nay, how great a God is He who gives God! For no one of His disciples gave the Holy Spirit, since they prayed that He might come upon those upon whom they laid their hands: they did not give Him themselves. And the Church preserves this custom even now in the case of her rulers. Lastly, Simon Magus also, when he offered the apostles money, does not say, Give me also this power, that I may give the Holy Spirit; but, that on whomsoever I may lay my hands, he may receive the Holy Spirit. Because neither had the Scriptures said before, And Simon, seeing that the apostles gave the Holy Spirit; but it had said, And Simon, seeing that the Holy Spirit was given by the laying on of the apostles' hands. Therefore also the Lord Jesus Christ Himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received it as man, and therefore He is said to be full of grace, and of the Holy Spirit. And in the Acts of the Apostles it is more plainly written of Him, Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit. Certainly not with visible oil but with the gift of grace which is signified by the visible ointment wherewith the Church anoints the baptized. And Christ was certainly not then anointed with the Holy Spirit, when He, as a dove, descended upon Him at His baptism. For at that time He deigned to prefigure His body, i.e. His Church, in which especially the baptized receive the Holy Spirit. But He is to be understood to have been then anointed with that mystical and invisible unction, when the Word of God was made flesh, i.e. when human nature, without any precedent merits of good works, was joined to God the Word in the womb of the Virgin, so that with it it became one person. Therefore it is that we confess Him to have been born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary. For it is most absurd to believe Him to have received the Holy Spirit when He was near thirty years old: for at that age He was baptized by John; but that He came to baptism as without any sin at all, so not without the Holy Spirit. For if it was written of His servant and forerunner John himself, He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb, because, although generated by his father, yet he received the Holy Spirit when formed in the womb; what must be understood and believed of the man Christ, of whose flesh the very conception was not carnal, but spiritual? Both natures, too, as well the human as the divine, are shown in that also that is written of Him, that He received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, and shed forth the Holy Spirit: seeing that He received as man, and shed forth as God. And we indeed can receive that gift according to our small measure, but assuredly we cannot shed it forth upon others; but, that this may be done, we invoke over them God, by whom this is accomplished.

Are we then able to ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or had not yet proceeded, and when He was born, proceeded from both—where there is no such thing as distinct times? We can ask this just as we have been able to ask, in a case where we do find times, how the will proceeds from the human mind first, in order to seek something which, when found, may be called offspring. When that offspring has already been brought forth or born, that will is made perfect, resting in this goal, so that what had been its desire when seeking becomes its love when enjoying. This love now proceeds from both—that is, from the mind that begets and from the notion that is begotten, as if from parent and offspring. But these things are absolutely impossible to ask in this case, where nothing is begun in time so as to be perfected in a following time. Therefore, let anyone who can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time also understand the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time. And let anyone who can understand, in what the Son says—"As the Father has life in Himself, so has He given to the Son to have life in Himself"—not that the Father gave life to the Son who already existed without life, but that He begot Him apart from time, so that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting Him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it—let him, I say, understand that as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, so has He given to the Son that the same Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, and both are apart from time. The Holy Spirit is so said to proceed from the Father that it is understood that His proceeding also from the Son is a property derived by the Son from the Father. For if the Son has of the Father whatever He has, then certainly He has of the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him. But let no one think of any times in this which imply a before and after, because these things are not there at all. How, then, would it not be completely absurd to call Him the Son of both? For just as generation from the Father, without any changeableness of nature, gives to the Son essence without beginning of time, so procession from both, without any changeableness of nature, gives to the Holy Spirit essence without beginning of time. While we do not say that the Holy Spirit is begotten, yet we do not therefore dare to say that He is unbegotten, lest anyone suspect in this word either two Fathers in that Trinity or two who are not from another. For the Father alone is not from another, and therefore He alone is called unbegotten—not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the usage of disputants who employ such language as they can on so great a subject. And the Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, the Father giving the procession without any interval of time, yet in common from both Father and Son. But He would be called the Son of the Father and of the Son if—a thing repugnant to the feeling of all sound minds—both had begotten Him. Therefore the Spirit of both is not begotten of both, but proceeds from both.

47. Are we therefore able to ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or had not yet proceeded; and when He was born, proceeded from both, wherein there is no such thing as distinct times: just as we have been able to ask, in a case where we do find times, that the will proceeds from the human mind first, in order that that may be sought which, when found, may be called offspring; which offspring being already brought forth or born, that will is made perfect, resting in this end, so that what had been its desire when seeking, is its love when enjoying; which love now proceeds from both, i.e. from the mind that begets, and from the notion that is begotten, as if from parent and offspring? These things it is absolutely impossible to ask in this case, where nothing is begun in time, so as to be perfected in a time following. Wherefore let him who can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, understand also the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time. And let him who can understand, in that which the Son says, As the Father has life in Himself, so has He given to the Son to have life in Himself, not that the Father gave life to the Son already existing without life, but that He so begot Him apart from time, that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting Him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it: let him, I say, understand, that as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, so has He given to the Son that the same Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, and be both apart from time: and that the Holy Spirit is so said to proceed from the Father as that it be understood that His proceeding also from the Son, is a property derived by the Son from the Father. For if the Son has of the Father whatever He has, then certainly He has of the Father, that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him. But let no one think of any times therein which imply a sooner and a later; because these things are not there at all. How, then, would it not be most absurd to call Him the Son of both: when, just as generation from the Father, without any changeableness of nature, gives to the Son essence, without beginning of time; so procession from both, without any changeableness of nature, gives to the Holy Spirit essence without beginning of time? For while we do not say that the Holy Spirit is begotten, yet we do not therefore dare to say that He is unbegotten, lest any one suspect in this word either two Fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not from another. For the Father alone is not from another, and therefore He alone is called unbegotten, not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the usage of disputants, who employ such language as they can on so great a subject. And the Son is born of the Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father principally, the Father giving the procession without any interval of time, yet in common from both [Father and Son]. But He would be called the Son of the Father and of the Son, if — a thing abhorrent to the feeling of all sound minds — both had begotten Him. Therefore the Spirit of both is not begotten of both, but proceeds from both.

Chapter 27.– What It is that Suffices Here to Solve the Question Why the Spirit is Not Said to Be Begotten, and Why the Father Alone is Unbegotten. What They Ought to Do Who Do Not Understand These Things.

But because it is extremely difficult to distinguish generation from procession in that co-eternal, equal, incorporeal, ineffably unchangeable and indivisible Trinity, let it be enough for now to set before those who cannot go further what I said on this subject in a sermon delivered to the ears of Christian people, which I then wrote down. For when, among other things, I had taught them through testimonies of the Holy Scriptures that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, I continue: If, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, why did the Son say, 'He proceeds from the Father'? Why do you think, except that He customarily refers to the Father even that which is His own, from whom He Himself also exists? This is also like what He says: 'My doctrine is not my own, but His who sent me.' If, therefore, the doctrine here understood is His, yet He said it was not His own but belonged to Him who sent Him, how much more should we understand there that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Himself, where He says, 'He proceeds from the Father,' without saying, 'He does not proceed from me'? From the Father, certainly, from whom the Son has His divine nature—for He is God of God—He also has this: that from Him too the Holy Spirit proceeds. And so the Holy Spirit has from the Father Himself that He should proceed from the Son also, just as He proceeds from the Father. Here also, in some way, this can be understood, as far as people like us can understand it, why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, but rather to proceed. For if He too were called a Son, He would certainly be called the Son of both, which is completely absurd, since no one is the son of two persons except of father and mother. But far be it from us to imagine anything like this between God the Father and God the Son. For not even a human son proceeds at the same time from both father and mother; when he proceeds from the father into the mother, he does not at that time proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds from the mother into this present light, he does not at that time proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creature, but proceeds at once from both. Yet the Father has given this to the Son, that He should proceed from Him just as He proceeds from the Father Himself. For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, while the Father is life and the Son is life. And so, just as the Father, who has life in Himself, has also given to the Son to have life in Himself, so He has also given to Him that life should proceed from Him, just as it also proceeds from Himself. I have transferred this from that sermon into this book, but I was speaking to believers, not to unbelievers.

48. But because it is most difficult to distinguish generation from procession in that co-eternal, and equal, and incorporeal, and ineffably unchangeable and indivisible Trinity, let it suffice meanwhile to put before those who are not able to be drawn on further, what we said upon this subject in a sermon to be delivered in the ears of Christian people, and after saying wrote it down. For when, among other things, I had taught them by testimonies of the Holy Scriptures that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, I continue: If, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, why did the Son say, 'He proceeds from the Father.' Why, think you, except as He is wont to refer to Him, that also which is His own, from whom also He Himself is? Whence also is that which He says, 'My doctrine is not my own, but His that sent me?' If, therefore, it is His doctrine that is here understood, which yet He said was not His own, but His that sent Him, how much more is it there to be understood that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Himself, where He so says, He proceeds from the Father, as not to say, He proceeds not from me? From Him, certainly, from whom the Son had his Divine nature, for He is God of God, He has also, that from Him too proceeds the Holy Spirit; and hence the Holy Spirit has from the Father Himself, that He should proceed from the Son also, as He proceeds from the Father. Here, too, in some way may this also be understood, so far as it can be understood by such as we are, why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, but rather to proceed; since if He, too, was called a Son, He would certainly be called the Son of both, which is most absurd, since no one is son of two, save of father and mother. But far be it from us to surmise any such thing as this between God the Father and God the Son. Because not even the son of men proceeds at the same time from both father and mother; but when he proceeds from the father into the mother, he does not at that time proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds from the mother into this present light, he does not at that time proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son proceed to sanctify the creature, but proceeds at once from both; although the Father has given this to the Son, that He should proceed, as from Himself, so also from Him. For we cannot say that the Holy Spirit is not life, while the Father is life, and the Son is life: and hence as the Father, while He has life in Himself, has given also to the Son to have life in Himself; so has He given also to Him that life should proceed from Him, as it also proceeds from Himself. I have transferred this from that sermon into this book, but I was speaking to believers, not to unbelievers.

But if they are not capable of looking at this image and seeing how true these things are that exist in their mind—things that are not so three as to be three persons, but all three belong to a person who is one—why do they not believe what they find in the sacred books about that highest Trinity which is God, rather than demanding the clearest reasoning, which cannot be grasped by the human mind, dull and weak as it is? And certainly, once they have firmly believed the Holy Scriptures as most trustworthy witnesses, they should strive—by praying, seeking, and living well—to understand, that is, so that what is held by faith may be seen by the mind, to the extent it can be seen. Who would forbid this? In fact, who would not rather urge them toward it? But if they think they should deny these things exist because they cannot discern them with their blind minds, then those who are blind from birth should also deny that the sun exists. The light, then, shines in darkness; but if the darkness does not comprehend it, let them first be enlightened by the gift of God so they may become believers, and let them begin to be light compared to unbelievers. Once this foundation is laid, let them be built up to see what they believe, so that at some point they may be able to see. For some things are believed in such a way that they cannot be seen at all. Christ is not going to be seen a second time on the cross; but unless what has been done and seen is believed—that it is not now to be hoped for as something still to come and be seen—there is no coming to Christ as he is to be seen without end. But regarding the discerning in some way by the understanding of that highest, ineffable, incorporeal, and unchangeable nature, the sight of the human mind can nowhere better exercise itself—provided that the rule of faith governs it—than in what a person has in his own nature that is superior to the other animals and also to the other parts of his own soul, which is the mind itself. To the mind has been assigned a certain sight of invisible things, and to it, as though presiding honorably in a higher and inner place, the bodily senses also bring reports of all things so they may be judged. There is nothing higher than the mind except what it must be subject to and governed by, which is God.

49. But if they are not competent to gaze upon this image, and to see how true these things are which are in their mind, and yet which are not so three as to be three persons, but all three belong to a man who is one person; why do they not believe what they find in the sacred books respecting that highest Trinity which is God, rather than insist on the clearest reason being rendered them, which cannot be comprehended by the human mind, dull and infirm as it is? And to be sure, when they have steadfastly believed the Holy Scriptures as most true witnesses, let them strive, by praying and seeking and living well, that they may understand, i.e. that so far as it can be seen, that may be seen by the mind which is held fast by faith. Who would forbid this? Nay, who would not rather exhort them to it? But if they think they ought to deny that these things are, because they, with their blind minds, cannot discern them, they, too, who are blind from their birth, ought to deny that there is a sun. The light then shines in darkness; but if the darkness comprehend it not, let them first be illuminated by the gift of God, that they may be believers, and let them begin to be light in comparison with the unbelievers; and when this foundation is first laid, let them be built up to see what they believe, that at some time they may be able to see. For some things are so believed, that they cannot be seen at all. For Christ is not to be seen a second time on the cross; but unless this be believed which has been so done and seen, that it is not now to be hoped for as about to be and to be seen, there is no coming to Christ, such as without end He is to be seen. But as far as relates to the discerning in some way by the understanding that highest, ineffable, incorporeal, and unchangeable nature the sight of the human mind can nowhere better exercise itself, so only that the rule of faith govern it, than in that which man himself has in his own nature better than the other animals, better also than the other parts of his own soul, which is the mind itself, to which has been assigned a certain sight of things invisible, and to which, as though honorably presiding in a higher and inner place, the bodily senses also bring word of all things, that they may be judged, and than which there is no higher, to which it is to be subject, and by which it is to be governed, except God.

Among all the many things I have said here, there is nothing I would dare claim is worthy of the ineffableness of that highest Trinity. Rather, I must confess that the wonderful knowledge of Him is too great for me, and I cannot attain to it. O my soul, where do you sense yourself to be? Where do you lie? Where do you stand? This will be so until all your weaknesses are healed by Him who has forgiven all your sins. You surely perceive that you are in the inn where that Samaritan brought the man he found half-dead, wounded many times by thieves. Yet you have seen many true things, not with those eyes that see colored objects, but with the eyes for which the one prayed who said, "Let my eyes behold the things that are equal." You have certainly seen many true things and have distinguished them from that light by the light through which you saw them. Lift up your eyes to that light itself and fix them on it if you can. For in this way you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God—which is why the only-begotten Son did not say that the Holy Spirit is begotten of the Father, otherwise He would be His brother, but rather that He proceeds from Him. Therefore, since the Spirit of both is a kind of consubstantial communion of Father and Son, He is not called—far be it from us to say so—the Son of both. But you cannot fix your gaze there so as to discern this clearly and lucidly; I know you cannot. I speak the truth to myself; I know what I cannot do. Yet that light itself shows you three things in yourself, in which you may recognize an image of the highest Trinity itself, which you cannot yet contemplate with steady eye. That light shows you that there is in you a true word when it is born from your knowledge—that is, when we say what we know, even though we neither speak nor think of any articulate word that has meaning in any language of any nation, but our thought is formed by what we know. And in the mind's eye of the thinker there is an image resembling that thought which the memory contained, with will or love as a third thing combining these two as parent and offspring. Whoever can, sees and discerns that this will does indeed proceed from thought (for no one wills something of which he is completely ignorant regarding what it is or what sort of thing it is), yet it is not an image of the thought. And so there is suggested in this intelligible thing a kind of difference between birth and procession, since to behold by thought is not the same as to desire, or even to enjoy by will. You too have been able to discern this, although you have not been able, nor are you now able, to unfold with adequate speech what you have barely seen amidst the clouds of bodily likenesses that constantly flit back and forth before human thoughts. But that light which is not yourself also shows you that these incorporeal likenesses of bodies are different from the truth, which we contemplate with the understanding by rejecting them. That light has shown these and other similarly certain things to your inner eyes. What reason is there, then, why you cannot see that light itself with steady eye, except certainly weakness? And what has produced this in you, except sin? Who then is it that heals all your weaknesses, unless it is He who forgives all your sins? And therefore I will now at last finish this book with a prayer rather than with an argument.

50. But among these many things which I have now said, and of which there is nothing that I dare to profess myself to have said worthy of the ineffableness of that highest Trinity, but rather to confess that the wonderful knowledge of Him is too great for me, and that I cannot attain to it: O you, my soul, where do you feel yourself to be? Where do you lie? Where do you stand? Until all your infirmities be healed by Him who has forgiven all your iniquities. You perceive yourself assuredly to be in that inn whither that Samaritan brought him whom he found with many wounds inflicted by thieves, half-dead. And yet you have seen many things that are true, not by those eyes by which colored objects are seen, but by those for which he prayed who said, Let my eyes behold the things that are equal. Certainly, then, you have seen many things that are true, and hast distinguished them from that light by the light of which you have seen them. Lift up your eyes to the light itself, and fix them upon it if you can. For so you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God, on account of which the only-begotten Son did not say that the Holy Spirit is begotten of the Father, otherwise He would be His brother, but that He proceeds from Him. Whence, since the Spirit of both is a kind of consubstantial communion of Father and Son, He is not called, far be it from us to say so, the Son of both. But you can not fix your sight there, so as to discern this lucidly and clearly; I know you can not. I say the truth, I say to myself, I know what I cannot do; yet that light itself shows to you these three things in yourself, wherein you may recognize an image of the highest Trinity itself, which you can not yet contemplate with steady eye. Itself shows to you that there is in you a true word, when it is born of your knowledge, i.e. when we say what we know: although we neither utter nor think of any articulate word that is significant in any tongue of any nation, but our thought is formed by that which we know; and there is in the mind's eye of the thinker an image resembling that thought which the memory contained, will or love as a third combining these two as parent and offspring. And he who can, sees and discerns that this will proceeds indeed from thought (for no one wills that of which he is absolutely ignorant what or of what sort it is), yet is not an image of the thought: and so that there is insinuated in this intelligible thing a sort of difference between birth and procession, since to behold by thought is not the same as to desire, or even to enjoy will. You, too, hast been able [to discern this], although you have not been, neither art, able to unfold with adequate speech what, amidst the clouds of bodily likenesses, which cease not to flit up and down before human thoughts, you have scarcely seen. But that light which is not yourself shows you this too, that these incorporeal likenesses of bodies are different from the truth, which, by rejecting them, we contemplate with the understanding. These, and other things similarly certain, that light has shown to your inner eyes. What reason, then, is there why you can not see that light itself with steady eye, except certainly infirmity? And what has produced this in you, except iniquity? Who, then, is it that heals all your infirmities, unless it be He that forgives all your iniquities? And therefore I will now at length finish this book by a prayer better than by an argument.

Chapter 28.– The Conclusion of the Book with a Prayer, and an Apology for Multitude of Words.

O Lord our God, we believe in You, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the Truth would not say, "Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," unless You were a Trinity. Nor would You, O Lord God, command us to be baptized in the name of someone who is not the Lord God. Nor would the divine voice have said, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God," unless You were both a Trinity and one Lord God. And if You, O God, were the Father and were also the Son, Your Word Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit Your gift, we would not read in the book of truth, "God sent His Son"; nor would You, O Only-begotten, say of the Holy Spirit, "Whom the Father will send in my name," and "Whom I will send to you from the Father." Guided by this rule of faith, as much as I have been able, as much as You have enabled me to be able, I have sought You, and have desired to see with my understanding what I believed; and I have argued and worked hard. O Lord my God, my one hope, listen to me, so that I may not grow weary and stop seeking You, but may always earnestly seek Your face. Give me strength to seek, since You have made me find You and have given the hope of finding You more and more. My strength and my weakness are before Your sight: preserve the one and heal the other. My knowledge and my ignorance are before Your sight; where You have opened to me, receive me as I enter; where You have closed, open to me as I knock. May I remember You, understand You, love You. Increase these things in me until You renew me completely. I know it is written, "In the multitude of speech, you shall not escape sin." But if only I might speak only in preaching Your word and in praising You! Not only would I avoid sin this way, but I would earn good merit, however much I spoke. For a man blessed by You would not command a sin upon his own true son in the faith, to whom he wrote, "Preach the word: be urgent in season and out of season." Are we to say that he spoke too much, when he was not silent about Your word, O Lord, not only in season but out of season? But it was not too much, because it was only what was necessary. Set me free, O God, from that multitude of speech which I suffer inwardly in my soul, wretched as it is in Your sight, and fleeing for refuge to Your mercy; for I am not silent in thoughts even when silent in words. And if I thought of nothing except what pleased You, I certainly would not ask You to set me free from such multitude of speech. But my thoughts are many, such as You know, thoughts of man, since they are vain. Grant me not to consent to them; and if they ever delight me, nevertheless to condemn them and not to dwell in them as though I were asleep. Nor let them so prevail in me that anything in my actions should come from them; but at least let my opinions, let my conscience, be safe from them under Your protection. When the wise man spoke of You in his book, which is now called by the special name of Ecclesiasticus, he said, "We speak much and yet come short; and in sum of words, He is all." When we shall have come to You, these very many things that we speak and yet come short will cease; and You, as One, will remain all in all. And we shall say one thing without end, in praising You in One, ourselves also made one in You. O Lord the one God, God the Trinity, whatever I have said in these books that is of Yours, may those who are Yours acknowledge it; if anything is of my own, may it be pardoned both by You and by those who are Yours. Amen.

51. O Lord our God, we believe in You, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the Truth would not say, Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, unless You were a Trinity. Nor would you, O Lord God, bid us to be baptized in the name of Him who is not the Lord God. Nor would the divine voice have said, Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God, unless You were so a Trinity as to be one Lord God. And if You, O God, were Yourself the Father, and were Yourself the Son, Your Word Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit your gift, we should not read in the book of truth, God sent His Son; nor would You, O Only-begotten, say of the Holy Spirit, Whom the Father will send in my name; and, Whom I will send to you from the Father. Directing my purpose by this rule of faith, so far as I have been able, so far as You have made me to be able, I have sought You, and have desired to see with my understanding what I believed; and I have argued and labored much. O Lord my God, my one hope, hearken to me, lest through weariness I be unwilling to seek You, but that I may always ardently seek Your face. Do Thou give strength to seek, who has made me find You, and has given the hope of finding You more and more. My strength and my infirmity are in Your sight: preserve the one, and heal the other. My knowledge and my ignorance are in Your sight; where You have opened to me, receive me as I enter; where You have closed, open to me as I knock. May I remember You, understand You, love You. Increase these things in me, until You renew me wholly. I know it is written, In the multitude of speech, you shall not escape sin. But O that I might speak only in preaching Your word, and in praising You! Not only should I so flee from sin, but I should earn good desert, however much I so spoke. For a man blessed of You would not enjoin a sin upon his own true son in the faith, to whom he wrote, Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season. Are we to say that he has not spoken much, who was not silent about Your word, O Lord, not only in season, but out of season? But therefore it was not much, because it was only what was necessary. Set me free, O God, from that multitude of speech which I suffer inwardly in my soul, wretched as it is in Your sight, and flying for refuge to Your mercy; for I am not silent in thoughts, even when silent in words. And if, indeed, I thought of nothing save what pleased You, certainly I would not ask You to set me free from such multitude of speech. But many are my thoughts, such as You know, thoughts of man, since they are vain. Grant to me not to consent to them; and if ever they delight me, nevertheless to condemn them, and not to dwell in them, as though I slumbered. Nor let them so prevail in me, as that anything in my acts should proceed from them; but at least let my opinions, let my conscience, be safe from them, under Your protection. When the wise man spoke of You in his book, which is now called by the special name of Ecclesiasticus, We speak, he said, much, and yet come short; and in sum of words, He is all. When, therefore, we shall have come to You, these very many things that we speak, and yet come short, will cease; and You, as One, will remain all in all. And we shall say one thing without end, in praising You in One, ourselves also made one in You. O Lord the one God, God the Trinity, whatever I have said in these books that is of Yours, may they acknowledge who are Yours; if anything of my own, may it be pardoned both by You and by those who are Yours. Amen.


On the Trinity — Book XIV

True wisdom: the image of God in the mind that remembers, understands and loves God, and its renewal day by day.

The true wisdom of man is treated of; and it is shown that the image of God, which man is in respect to his mind, is not placed properly in transitory things, as in memory, understanding, and love, whether of faith itself as existing in time, or even of the mind as busied with itself, but in things that are permanent; and that this wisdom is then perfected, when the mind is renewed in the knowledge of God, according to the image of Him who created man after His own Image, and thus attains to wisdom, wherein that which is contemplated is eternal.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130114.htm>.

Contents · 19 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– What the Wisdom is of Which We are Here to Treat. Whence the Name of Philosopher Arose. What Has Been Already Said Concerning the Distinction of Knowledge and Wisdom.
  2. Chapter 2.– There is a Kind of Trinity in the Holding, Contemplating, and Loving of Faith Temporal, But One that Does Not Yet Attain to Being Properly an Image of God.
  3. Chapter 3.– A Difficulty Removed, Which Lies in the Way of What Has Just Been Said.
  4. Chapter 4.– The Image of God is to Be Sought in the Immortality of the Rational Soul. How a Trinity is Demonstrated in the Mind.
  5. Chapter 5.– Whether the Mind of Infants Knows Itself.
  6. Chapter 6.– How a Kind of Trinity Exists in the Mind Thinking of Itself. What is the Part of Thought in This Trinity.
  7. Chapter 7.– The Thing is Made Plain by an Example. In What Way the Matter is Handled in Order to Help the Reader.
  8. Chapter 8.– The Trinity Which is the Image of God is Now to Be Sought in the Noblest Part of the Mind.
  9. Chapter 9.– Whether Justice and the Other Virtues Cease to Exist in the Future Life.
  10. Chapter 10.– How a Trinity is Produced by the Mind Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself.
  11. Chapter 11.– Whether Memory is Also of Things Present.
  12. Chapter 12.– The Trinity in the Mind is the Image of God, in that It Remembers, Understands, and Loves God, Which to Do is Wisdom.
  13. Chapter 13.– How Any One Can Forget and Remember God.
  14. Chapter 14.– The Mind Loves God in Rightly Loving Itself; And If It Love Not God, It Must Be Said to Hate Itself. Even a Weak and Erring Mind is Always Strong in Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself. Let It Be Turned to God, that It May Be Blessed by Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Him.
  15. Chapter 15.– Although the Soul Hopes for Blessedness, Yet It Does Not Remember Lost Blessedness, But Remembers God and the Rules of Righteousness. The Unchangeable Rules of Right Living are Known Even to the Ungodly.
  16. Chapter 16.– How the Image of God is Formed Anew in Man.
  17. Chapter 17.– How the Image of God in the Mind is Renewed Until the Likeness of God is Perfected in It in Blessedness.
  18. Chapter 18.– Whether the Sentence of John is to Be Understood of Our Future Likeness with the Son of God in the Immortality Itself Also of the Body.
  19. Chapter 19.– John is Rather to Be Understood of Our Perfect Likeness with the Trinity in Life Eternal. Wisdom is Perfected in Happiness.

Chapter 1.– What the Wisdom is of Which We are Here to Treat. Whence the Name of Philosopher Arose. What Has Been Already Said Concerning the Distinction of Knowledge and Wisdom.

We must now discuss wisdom—not the wisdom of God, which without doubt is God, since His only-begotten Son is called the wisdom of God—but we will speak of human wisdom, yet true wisdom that is according to God and is His true and chief worship, which is called in Greek by one term, theosebeia. And this term, as we have already observed, when our own countrymen wished to translate it by a single term, was rendered as "piety," whereas "piety" more commonly means what the Greeks call eusebeia. But because theosebeia cannot be translated perfectly by any one word, it is better translated by two words, so as to render it as "the worship of God." That this is human wisdom, as we have already established in the twelfth book of this work, is shown by the authority of Holy Scripture in the book of God's servant Job, where we read that the Wisdom of God said to man, "Behold, piety, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is knowledge"—or, as some have translated the Greek word epistemen, "learning," which certainly takes its name from learning, which is why it may also be called knowledge. For everything is learned so that it may be known. Although the same word is indeed used in a different sense, where someone suffers evils for his sins so that he may be corrected. This is the source of that passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "For what son is he to whom the father gives not discipline?" And this is even more apparent in the same epistle: "Now no chastening for the present seems to be joyous, but grievous: nevertheless afterward it yields the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby." Therefore God Himself is the highest wisdom, but the worship of God is human wisdom, of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. It is with respect to this wisdom, therefore, which is the worship of God, that Holy Scripture says, "The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the world."

1. We must now discourse concerning wisdom; not the wisdom of God, which without doubt is God, for His only-begotten Son is called the wisdom of God; but we will speak of the wisdom of man, yet of true wisdom, which is according to God, and is His true and chief worship, which is called in Greek by one term, θεοσέβεια. And this term, as we have already observed, when our own countrymen themselves also wished to interpret it by a single term, was by them rendered piety, whereas piety means more commonly what the Greeks call εὐσέβεια. But because θεοσέβεια cannot be translated perfectly by any one word, it is better translated by two, so as to render it rather by the worship of God. That this is the wisdom of man, as we have already laid down in the twelfth book of this work, is shown by the authority of Holy Scripture, in the book of God's servant Job, where we read that the Wisdom of God said to man, Behold piety, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is knowledge; or, as some have translated the Greek word ἐπιστήμην, learning, which certainly takes its name from learning, whence also it may be called knowledge. For everything is learned in order that it may be known. Although the same word, indeed, is employed in a different sense, where any one suffers evils for his sins, that he may be corrected. Whence is that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, For what son is he to whom the father gives not discipline? And this is still more apparent in the same epistle: Now no chastening for the present seems to be joyous, but grievous: nevertheless afterward it yields the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby. Therefore God Himself is the chiefest wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom of man, of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. It is in respect to this wisdom, therefore, which is the worship of God, that Holy Scripture says, The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the world.

But if discussing wisdom belongs to wise men, what should we do? Should we dare to claim we are wise, or would that be simply impudent of us to discuss it? Should we not be warned by the example of Pythagoras, who did not dare to claim he was a wise man, but answered that he was a philosopher—that is, a lover of wisdom? From this arose the name that became so popular from then on that no matter how great someone's learning was, whether in his own opinion or that of others, in matters pertaining to wisdom, he was still called nothing more than a philosopher. Or was the reason that no one, even among such people, dared to claim to be a wise man because they thought a wise man was one without sin? But our Scriptures do not say this, for they say, "Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you." For clearly, whoever thinks a man ought to be rebuked judges him to have sin. However, for my part, I do not dare to claim I am a wise man even in this sense. It is enough for me to claim what they themselves cannot deny: that discussing wisdom also belongs to the philosopher—that is, the lover of wisdom. For those who have claimed to be lovers of wisdom rather than wise men have not stopped discussing it.

2. But if to dispute of wisdom belongs to wise men, what shall we do? Shall we dare indeed to profess wisdom, lest it should be mere impudence for ourselves to dispute about it? Shall we not be alarmed by the example of Pythagoras?– who dared not profess to be a wise man, but answered that he was a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom; whence arose the name, that became thenceforth so much the popular name, that no matter how great the learning wherein any one excelled, either in his own opinion or that of others, in things pertaining to wisdom, he was still called nothing more than philosopher. Or was it for this reason that no one, even of such as these, dared to profess himself a wise man — because they imagined that a wise man was one without sin? But our Scriptures do not say this, which say, Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you. For doubtless he who thinks a man ought to be rebuked, judges him to have sin. However, for my part, I dare not profess myself a wise man even in this sense; it is enough for me to assume, what they themselves cannot deny, that to dispute of wisdom belongs also to the philosopher, i.e., the lover of wisdom. For they have not given over so disputing who have professed to be lovers of wisdom rather than wise men.

When discussing wisdom, philosophers have defined it as the knowledge of both divine and human things. In my previous book, I acknowledged that understanding both areas—divine and human—can be called either knowledge or wisdom. However, based on the apostle's distinction where he says "to one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge," we need to divide this definition so that knowledge of divine things is called wisdom, while knowledge of human things properly receives the name knowledge. I dealt with the latter in book thirteen, though not by including everything humans can know about human affairs—since much of that is empty vanity and harmful curiosity—but only those things that generate, nourish, defend, and strengthen the wholesome faith that leads to true blessedness. Many of the faithful are not strong in this knowledge, even though they are very strong in faith itself. It is one thing simply to know what a person must believe to attain the blessed life, which must be eternal, but another thing to know how this belief helps the devout and can be defended against the ungodly—which the apostle seems to call specifically by the name knowledge. When I discussed this knowledge before, my main purpose was to commend faith, first by briefly distinguishing eternal things from temporal ones, then by discussing temporal things. While postponing discussion of eternal things to this present book, I also showed that faith regarding eternal things is itself temporal, dwelling in the hearts of believers during time, yet necessary for attaining the eternal things themselves. I also argued that faith concerning the temporal things that the Eternal One did and suffered for us as a man—the manhood he took on in time and carried to eternal things—is also beneficial for obtaining eternal things. Furthermore, the virtues by which people live prudently, courageously, moderately, and justly in this temporal and mortal life are not true virtues unless they are directed toward that same faith, which though temporal, nevertheless leads to eternal things.

3. In disputing, then, about wisdom, they have defined it thus: Wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine. And hence, in the last book, I have not withheld the admission, that the cognizance of both subjects, whether divine or human, may be called both knowledge and wisdom. But according to the distinction made in the apostle's words, To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, this definition is to be divided, so that the knowledge of things divine shall be called wisdom, and that of things human appropriate to itself the name of knowledge; and of the latter I have treated in the thirteenth book, not indeed so as to attribute to this knowledge everything whatever that can be known by man about things human, wherein there is exceeding much of empty vanity and mischievous curiosity, but only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not strong, however exceeding strong in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain to a blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended against the impious, which last the apostle seems to call by the special name of knowledge. And when I was speaking of this knowledge before, my special business was to commend faith, first briefly distinguishing things eternal from things temporal, and there discoursing of things temporal; but while deferring things eternal to the present book, I showed also that faith respecting things eternal is itself a thing temporal, and dwells in time in the hearts of believers, and yet is necessary in order to attain the things eternal themselves. I argued also, that faith respecting the things temporal which He that is eternal did and suffered for us as man, which manhood He bare in time and carried on to things eternal, is profitable also for the obtaining of things eternal; and that the virtues themselves, whereby in this temporal and mortal life men live prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly, are not true virtues, unless they are referred to that same faith, temporal though it is, which leads on nevertheless to things eternal.

Chapter 2.– There is a Kind of Trinity in the Holding, Contemplating, and Loving of Faith Temporal, But One that Does Not Yet Attain to Being Properly an Image of God.

Since Scripture says, "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight," and the just person lives by faith, even when living according to the inner person and aiming at truth and reaching toward eternal things through this temporal faith, we have not yet reached the kind of trinity that should be called an image of God in the holding, contemplating, and loving of this temporal faith. Otherwise, what ought to be constituted in eternal things would seem to be constituted in temporal things. When the human mind sees its own faith—by which it believes what it does not see—it does not see something eternal. For faith will not always exist; it will certainly no longer exist when this pilgrimage, during which we are absent from God and must walk by faith, has ended and sight has succeeded it, enabling us to see face to face. Just as now we believe though we do not see, and will thereby deserve to see and rejoice at having been brought through faith to sight, faith will then no longer be believing what is not seen but sight by which what is believed is seen. At that time, even if we remember this past mortal life and recall that we once believed what we did not see, that faith will be counted among past and finished things, not among present and continuing things. Therefore, the trinity that now consists in remembering, contemplating, and loving this same faith while it is present and continuing will then be found to be finished and past, not still enduring. From this we can conclude that if that trinity is indeed an image of God, then this image itself would have to be counted not among things that exist always, but among transient things.

4. Wherefore since, as it is written, While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight; undoubtedly, so long as the just man lives by faith, howsoever he lives according to the inner man, although he aims at truth and reaches on to things eternal by this same temporal faith, nevertheless in the holding, contemplating, and loving this temporal faith, we have not yet reached such a trinity as is to be called an image of God; lest that should seem to be constituted in things temporal which ought to be so in things eternal. For when the human mind sees its own faith, whereby it believes what it does not see, it does not see a thing eternal. For that will not always exist, which certainly will not then exist, when this pilgrimage, whereby we are absent from God, in such way that we must needs walk by faith, shall be ended, and that sight shall have succeeded it whereby we shall see face to face; just as now, because we believe although we do not see, we shall deserve to see, and shall rejoice at having been brought through faith to sight. For then it will be no longer faith, by which that is believed which is not seen; but sight, by which that is seen which is believed. And then, therefore, although we remember this past mortal life, and call to mind by recollection that we once believed what we did not see, yet that faith will be reckoned among things past and done with, not among things present and always continuing. And hence also that trinity which now consists in the remembering, contemplating, and loving this same faith while present and continuing, will then be found to be done with and past, and not still enduring. And hence it is to be gathered, that if that trinity is indeed an image of God, then this image itself would have to be reckoned, not among things that exist always, but among things transient.

Chapter 3.– A Difficulty Removed, Which Lies in the Way of What Has Just Been Said.

But we must not think that while the soul's nature is immortal and never ceases to exist from the very first beginning of its creation, the best thing the soul possesses would not endure forever along with its immortality. Yet what is better in the soul's created nature than the fact that it is made after the image of its Creator? We must therefore identify what can fittingly be called the image of God, not in the holding, contemplating, and loving of that faith which will not exist forever, but in that which will exist forever.

But far be it from us to think, that while the nature of the soul is immortal, and from the first beginning of its creation thenceforth never ceases to be, yet that that which is the best thing it has should not endure for ever with its own immortality. Yet what is there in its nature as created, better than that it is made after the image of its Creator? We must find then what may be fittingly called the image of God, not in the holding, contemplating, and loving that faith which will not exist always, but in that which will exist always.

Should we examine this matter more carefully and deeply to see if this is really the case? Someone might argue that this trinity does not perish even when faith itself passes away. Just as now we hold it in memory, discern it with thought, and love it with will, so also in the future when we both hold in memory and recall that we once had it, and unite these two through a third element (namely will), the same trinity will still remain. After all, if faith left no trace in us as it passed, we would certainly have nothing of it even in our memory to return to when recalling it as something past, and we would have nothing to couple by a third element (that is, purpose) joining both the content that was in our memory though we were not thinking about it, and what is formed from it by conception. But anyone who argues this way fails to recognize that when we hold, see, and love our present faith in ourselves, we are dealing with a different trinity existing now from the trinity that will exist when we contemplate through recollection not faith itself, but rather the imagined trace of it stored in memory, and unite by will as a third element these two things: what was in the memory of the one who retains it, and what is impressed from it upon the vision of the mind of the one who recollects. To understand this, let us take an example from bodily things, which we discussed sufficiently in the eleventh book. As we ascend from lower to higher things, or pass inward from outer to inner things, we first find a trinity in the bodily object that is seen, in the vision of the one who sees (which is formed by the object when he sees it), and in the purpose of the will which combines both. Let us consider a trinity like this: when the faith now in ourselves is established in our memory just as that bodily object we mentioned was in a place, from this faith is formed the conception in recollection, just as from that bodily object was formed the vision of the beholder. To complete the trinity, will must be counted as a third element, which connects and combines the faith established in memory and a kind of image of that faith impressed upon the vision of recollection, just as in that trinity of bodily vision, the form of the bodily object that is seen and the corresponding form produced in the vision of the beholder are combined by the purpose of the will. Now suppose that this bodily object which was seen dissolved and perished, and nothing at all of it remained anywhere for the gaze to return to. Should we then say that because the image of this now past and finished bodily object remains in memory, from which to form the conception in recollecting and to have the two united by will as a third element, therefore it is the same trinity as that former one when the appearance of the bodily object positioned in place was seen? Certainly not, but rather an altogether different one. Not to mention that the former was from without while this is from within, the former was certainly produced by the appearance of a present bodily object, while the latter is produced by the image of that now past object. So too in the case we are now treating, to illustrate which we thought it good to present this example, the faith which even now exists in our mind, just as that bodily object was in place, while held, looked at, and loved, produces a kind of trinity. But that trinity will exist no more when this faith in the mind, like that bodily object in place, no longer exists. The one that will then exist, when we remember it to have been in us but not to be present now, will surely be a different one. For the trinity that now exists is produced by the thing itself, actually present and attached to the mind of one who believes, but the one that will then exist will be produced by the imagination of a past thing left in the memory of one who recollects.

5. Shall we then scrutinize somewhat more carefully and deeply whether the case is really thus? For it may be said that this trinity does not perish even when faith itself shall have passed away; because, as now we both hold it by memory, and discern it by thought, and love it by will; so then also, when we shall both hold in memory, and shall recollect, that we once had it, and shall unite these two by the third, namely will, the same trinity will still continue. Since, if it have left in its passage as it were no trace in us, doubtless we shall not have ought of it even in our memory, whereto to recur when recollecting it as past, and by the third, viz. purpose, coupling both these, to wit, what was in our memory though we were not thinking about it, and what is formed thence by conception. But he who speaks thus, does not perceive, that when we hold, see, and love in ourselves our present faith, we are concerned with a different trinity as now existing, from that trinity which will exist, when we shall contemplate by recollection, not the faith itself, but as it were the imagined trace of it laid up in the memory, and shall unite by the will, as by a third, these two things, viz. that which was in the memory of him who retains, and that which is impressed thence upon the vision of the mind of him who recollects. And that we may understand this, let us take an example from things corporeal, of which we have sufficiently spoken in the eleventh book. For as we ascend from lower to higher things, or pass inward from outer to inner things, we first find a trinity in the bodily object which is seen, and in the vision of the seer, which, when he sees it, is informed thereby, and in the purpose of the will which combines both. Let us assume a trinity like this, when the faith which is now in ourselves is so established in our memory as the bodily object we spoke of was in place, from which faith is formed the conception in recollection, as from that bodily object was formed the vision of the beholder; and to these two, to complete the trinity, will is to be reckoned as a third, which connects and combines the faith established in the memory, and a sort of effigy of that faith impressed upon the vision of recollection; just as in that trinity of corporeal vision, the form of the bodily object that is seen, and the corresponding form wrought in the vision of the beholder, are combined by the purpose of the will. Suppose, then, that this bodily object which was beheld was dissolved and had perished, and that nothing at all of it remained anywhere, to the vision of which the gaze might have recourse; are we then to say, that because the image of the bodily object thus now past and done with remains in the memory, whence to form the conception in recollecting, and to have the two united by will as a third, therefore it is the same trinity as that former one, when the appearance of the bodily object posited in place was seen? Certainly not, but altogether a different one: for, not to say that that was from without, while this is from within; the former certainly was produced by the appearance of a present bodily object, the latter by the image of that object now past. So, too, in the case of which we are now treating, to illustrate which we have thought good to adduce this example, the faith which is even now in our mind, as that bodily object was in place, while held, looked at, loved, produces a sort of trinity; but that trinity will exist no more, when this faith in the mind, like that bodily object in place, shall no longer exist. But that which will then exist, when we shall remember it to have been, but not now to be, in us, will doubtless be a different one. For that which now is, is wrought by the thing itself, actually present and attached to the mind of one who believes; but that which shall then be, will be wrought by the imagination of a past thing left in the memory of one who recollects.

Chapter 4.– The Image of God is to Be Sought in the Immortality of the Rational Soul. How a Trinity is Demonstrated in the Mind.

Therefore, this trinity is not an image of God if it does not exist now, nor is that other trinity an image of God if it will not exist then. Instead, we must find in the human soul—that is, the rational or intellectual soul—that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality. For just as the soul's immortality is spoken of with qualification (since the soul also has its own kind of death when it lacks the blessed life, which should be called the soul's true life; yet it is called immortal because it never stops living with some kind of life, even when it is most miserable), so too, although reason or intellect is sometimes dormant in the soul, sometimes appears small, and sometimes great, the human soul is never anything but rational or intellectual. Therefore, if the soul is made after the image of God in this respect—that it is able to use reason and intellect to understand and behold God—then from the moment this marvelous and great nature began to exist, this image always is, whether it has become so worn out as to be almost nothing at all, or whether it is obscure and defaced, or bright and beautiful. Furthermore, pitying the defaced condition of its dignity, divine Scripture tells us that although man walks in an image, yet he troubles himself in vain; he heaps up riches and cannot tell who will gather them. Scripture would not attribute vanity to the image of God unless it recognized that the image had been defaced. Yet it clearly shows that such defacing does not extend to removing its character as an image, by saying, "Although man walks in an image." Therefore this sentence can be truly stated in both ways: just as it is said, "Although man walks in an image, yet he troubles himself in vain," so it may be said, "Although man troubles himself in vain, yet he walks in an image." For although the soul's nature is great, it can be corrupted because it is not the highest; and although it can be corrupted because it is not the highest, yet because it is capable of and can participate in the highest nature, it is a great nature. Let us therefore seek in this image of God a certain trinity of a special kind, with the help of Him who Himself made us after His own image. For we cannot healthfully investigate this subject or reach any conclusion according to the wisdom that comes from Him in any other way. But if the reader either remembers and recalls what we have said about the human soul or mind in earlier books, especially in the tenth, or will carefully reread the passages where it is contained, he will not require any longer discussion here about investigating so great a matter.

6. Therefore neither is that trinity an image of God, which is not now, nor is that other an image of God, which then will not be; but we must find in the soul of man, i.e., the rational or intellectual soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality. For as the immortality itself of the soul is spoken with a qualification; since the soul too has its proper death, when it lacks a blessed life, which is to be called the true life of the soul; but it is therefore called immortal, because it never ceases to live with some life or other, even when it is most miserable — so, although reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at another appears small, and at another great, yet the human soul is never anything save rational or intellectual; and hence, if it is made after the image of God in respect to this, that it is able to use reason and intellect in order to understand and behold God, then from the moment when that nature so marvellous and so great began to be, whether this image be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether it be obscure and defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is. Further, too, pitying the defaced condition of its dignity, divine Scripture tells us, that although man walks in an image, yet he disquiets himself in vain; he heaps up riches, and cannot tell who shall gather them. It would not therefore attribute vanity to the image of God, unless it perceived it to have been defaced. Yet it sufficiently shows that such defacing does not extend to the taking away its being an image, by saying, Although man walks in an image. Wherefore in both ways that sentence can be truly enunciated; in that, as it is said, Although man walks in an image, yet he disquiets himself in vain, so it may be said, Although man disquiets himself in vain, yet he walks in an image. For although the nature of the soul is great, yet it can be corrupted, because it is not the highest; and although it can be corrupted, because it is not the highest, yet because it is capable and can be partaker of the highest nature, it is a great nature. Let us seek, then, in this image of God a certain trinity of a special kind, with the aid of Him who Himself made us after His own image. For no otherwise can we healthfully investigate this subject, or arrive at any result according to the wisdom which is from Him. But if the reader will either hold in remembrance and recollect what we have said of the human soul or mind in former books, and especially in the tenth, or will carefully re-peruse it in the passages wherein it is contained, he will not require here any more lengthy discourse respecting the inquiry into so great a thing.

We said, then, among other things in the tenth book, that the human mind knows itself. For the mind knows nothing as well as what is close to it, and nothing is closer to the mind than itself. We also brought forward other proofs, as many as seemed sufficient, by which this could be most certainly demonstrated.

7. We said, then, among other things in the tenth book, that the mind of man knows itself. For the mind knows nothing so much as that which is close to itself; and nothing is more close to the mind than itself. We adduced also other evidences, as much as seemed sufficient, whereby this might be most certainly proved.

Chapter 5.– Whether the Mind of Infants Knows Itself.

What, then, should we say about the mind of an infant, which is still so small and buried in such deep ignorance of things that the mind of any adult who knows anything shrinks from its darkness? Should we believe that the infant's mind also knows itself, but that because it is so focused on the things it has begun to perceive through the bodily senses—with greater delight because they are new—it is indeed unable to be ignorant of itself, yet also unable to think about itself? Furthermore, how intently it is focused on sensible things outside itself can be guessed from this single fact: it is so eager for sensible light that if someone carelessly or ignorantly places a light at night near where an infant is lying, on the side toward which the child's eyes can turn but its neck cannot, the child's gaze will be so fixed in that direction that we have known some children to become cross-eyed this way, because their eyes retained the form that habit somehow impressed on them while they were still tender and soft. Likewise, with the other bodily senses, the souls of infants, as far as their age allows, narrow themselves and focus on these senses to such a degree that they either strongly reject or strongly desire only what offends or attracts through the flesh, but they do not think about their own inner self and cannot be made to do so by instruction, because they do not yet know the signs that convey instruction—of which words are the primary ones—and of these, as of other things, they are completely ignorant. And that it is one thing not to know oneself and another thing not to think about oneself, we have already shown in the same book.

What, then, is to be said of the mind of an infant, which is still so small, and buried in such profound ignorance of things, that the mind of a man which knows anything shrinks from the darkness of it? Is that too to be believed to know itself; but that, as being too intent upon those things which it has begun to perceive through the bodily senses, with the greater delight in proportion to their novelty, it is not able indeed to be ignorant of itself, but is also not able to think of itself? Moreover, how intently it is bent upon sensible things that are without it, may be conjectured from this one fact, that it is so greedy of sensible light, that if any one through carelessness, or ignorance of the possible consequences, place a light at nighttime where an infant is lying down, on that side to which the eyes of the child so lying down can be bent, but its neck cannot be turned, the gaze of that child will be so fixed in that direction, that we have known some to have come to squint by this means, in that the eyes retained that form which habit in some way impressed upon them while tender and soft. In the case, too, of the other bodily senses, the souls of infants, as far as their age permits, so narrow themselves as it were, and are bent upon them, that they either vehemently detest or vehemently desire that only which offends or allures through the flesh, but do not think of their own inward self, nor can be made to do so by admonition; because they do not yet know the signs that express admonition, whereof words are the chief, of which as of other things they are wholly ignorant. And that it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself, we have shown already in the same book.

We can set aside infancy, since we cannot ask infants about what is happening inside them, and we ourselves have largely forgotten that stage. It is enough for us to be certain of this: when a person becomes capable of thinking about the nature of his own mind and discovering what is true, he will find it nowhere but in himself. And what he finds will not be something he never knew, but something he had not yet thought about. For what do we know if we do not know what is in our own mind, when we can know nothing at all that we do know except through the mind?

8. But let us pass by the infantine age, since we cannot question it as to what goes on within itself, while we have ourselves pretty well forgotten it. Let it suffice only for us hence to be certain, that when man has come to be able to think of the nature of his own mind, and to find out what is the truth, he will find it nowhere else but in himself. And he will find, not what he did not know, but that of which he did not think. For what do we know, if we do not know what is in our own mind; when we can know nothing at all of what we do know, unless by the mind?

Chapter 6.– How a Kind of Trinity Exists in the Mind Thinking of Itself. What is the Part of Thought in This Trinity.

The function of thought is so powerful that the mind itself cannot place itself within its own sight unless it thinks of itself. In fact, nothing is in the sight of the mind except what is being thought of. This means that not even the mind itself, by which we think whatever we think, can be in its own sight except by thinking of itself. But I cannot explain how the mind is not in its own sight when it is not thinking of itself, while it can never be without itself—as if the mind were one thing and the sight of itself were another. This kind of statement makes sense when speaking of the bodily eye. The bodily eye is fixed in its proper place in the body, but its sight extends to external things and reaches even to the stars. The eye is not in its own sight unless it looks at itself by means of a mirror, as mentioned above. This certainly does not happen when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Does the mind see one part of itself by means of another part when it looks at itself in thought, the way we look at some of our bodily members with our eyes? What could be more absurd? For what can remove the mind except itself? Or where can it be placed so as to be in its own sight, except before itself? Therefore it will not be where it was when it was not in its own sight, because it has been put down in one place after being taken away from another. But if it migrated in order to be beheld, where will it remain in order to behold? Is it doubled, so as to be in two places at the same time—both where it can behold and where it can be beheld—so that in itself it may be beholding, and before itself beheld? If we ask the truth, it will tell us nothing of the sort, since these are merely imagined images of bodily objects that we conceive when we conceive in this way. That the mind is not such is very certain to the few minds capable of inquiring into the truth on such a subject. Therefore, the beholding of the mind is something pertaining to its nature and is recalled to that nature when it conceives of itself—not by moving through space, but by an incorporeal conversion. When it is not conceiving of itself, it is not in its own sight, nor is its own perception formed from it, yet it still knows itself as though it were to itself a remembrance of itself. This is like someone skilled in many branches of learning: the things he knows are contained in his memory, but nothing is in the sight of his mind except what he is conceiving, while all the rest are stored up in a kind of secret knowledge called memory. The trinity we were setting forth was constituted in this way: first, we placed in the memory the object by which the perception of the perceiver was formed; next, the conformation or image which is impressed by it; lastly, love or will as that which combines the two. When the mind beholds itself in conception, it understands and knows itself; therefore it begets this understanding and knowledge of itself. For an incorporeal thing is understood when it is beheld and is known when understood. Yet the mind does not beget this knowledge of itself when it beholds itself as understood by conception as though it had been unknown to itself before; rather, it was known to itself in the way that things contained in the memory but not being thought of are known—just as we say that a person knows letters even when he is thinking of something else and not of letters. These two, the begetter and the begotten, are coupled together by love as by a third, which is nothing else than will, seeking or holding fast the enjoyment of something. We held, therefore, that a trinity of the mind is to be indicated also by these three terms: memory, intelligence, will.

The function of thought, however, is so great, that not even the mind itself can, so to say, place itself in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself; and hence it is so far the case, that nothing is in the sight of the mind, except that which is being thought of, that not even the mind itself, whereby we think whatever we do think, can be in its own sight otherwise than by thinking of itself. But in what way it is not in its own sight when it is not thinking of itself, while it can never be without itself, as though itself were one thing, and the sight of itself another, it is not in my power to discover. For this is not unreasonably said of the eye of the body; for the eye itself of the body is fixed in its own proper place in the body, but its sight extends to things external to itself, and reaches even to the stars. And the eye is not in its own sight, since it does not look at itself, unless by means of a mirror, as is said above; a thing that certainly does not happen when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Does it then see one part of itself by means of another part of itself, when it looks at itself in thought, as we look at some of our members, which can be in our sight, with other also of our members, viz. with our eyes? What can be said or thought more absurd? For by what is the mind removed, except by itself? Or where is it placed so as to be in its own sight, except before itself? Therefore it will not be there, where it was, when it was not in its own sight; because it has been put down in one place, after being taken away from another. But if it migrated in order to be beheld, where will it remain in order to behold? Is it as it were doubled, so as to be in this and in that place at the same time, viz. both where it can behold, and where it can be beheld; that in itself it may be beholding, and before itself beheld? If we ask the truth, it will tell us nothing of the sort since it is but feigned images of bodily objects of which we conceive when we conceive thus; and that the mind is not such, is very certain to the few minds by which the truth on such a subject can be inquired. It appears, therefore, that the beholding of the mind is something pertaining to its nature, and is recalled to that nature when it conceives of itself, not as if by moving through space, but by an incorporeal conversion; but when it is not conceiving of itself, it appears that it is not indeed in its own sight, nor is its own perception formed from it, but yet that it knows itself as though it were to itself a remembrance of itself. Like one who is skilled in many branches of learning: the things which he knows are contained in his memory, but nothing thereof is in the sight of his mind except that of which he is conceiving; while all the rest are stored up in a kind of secret knowledge, which is called memory. The trinity, then, which we were setting forth, was constituted in this way: first, we placed in the memory the object by which the perception of the percipient was formed; next, the conformation, or as it were the image which is impressed thereby; lastly, love or will as that which combines the two. When the mind, then, beholds itself in conception, it understands and cognizes itself; it begets, therefore, this its own understanding and cognition. For an incorporeal thing is understood when it is beheld, and is cognized when understood. Yet certainly the mind does not so beget this knowledge of itself, when it beholds itself as understood by conception, as though it had before been unknown to itself; but it was known to itself, in the way in which things are known which are contained in the memory, but of which one is not thinking; since we say that a man knows letters even when he is thinking of something else, and not of letters. And these two, the begetter and the begotten, are coupled together by love, as by a third, which is nothing else than will, seeking or holding fast the enjoyment of something. We held, therefore, that a trinity of the mind is to be intimated also by these three terms, memory, intelligence, will.

But since the mind, as we said near the end of the tenth book, always remembers itself and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinct from things that are not itself, we must ask how understanding (intellectus) relates to conception, while the notion (notitia) of each thing in the mind, even when one is not thinking of it, is said to belong only to memory. For if this is so, then the mind did not have these three things: namely, the remembrance, the understanding, and the love of itself; rather, it only remembered itself, and afterward, when it began to think of itself, only then did it understand and love itself.

9. But since the mind, as we said near the end of the same tenth book, always remembers itself, and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinguished from those things which are not itself; we must inquire in what way understanding ( intellectus) belongs to conception, while the notion ( notitia) of each thing that is in the mind, even when one is not thinking of it, is said to belong only to the memory. For if this is so, then the mind had not these three things: viz. the remembrance, the understanding, and the love of itself; but it only remembered itself, and afterwards, when it began to think of itself, then it understood and loved itself.

Chapter 7.– The Thing is Made Plain by an Example. In What Way the Matter is Handled in Order to Help the Reader.

Let us look more carefully at the example we presented, which showed that not knowing something is different from not thinking about it. It may happen that a person knows something even though he is not thinking about it, when he is thinking about something else instead. When someone who is skilled in two or more areas of knowledge is thinking about one of them, he is not thinking about the other or others, yet he still knows them. But can we rightly say, "This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now understand it because he is not thinking about it; however, he does now understand geometry because that is what he is now thinking about"? Such a statement is clearly absurd. What if we were to say, "This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now love it while he is not thinking about it; however, he does now love geometry because that is what he is now thinking about"—is this not equally absurd? But we correctly say, "This person whom you see debating about geometry is also a skilled musician, for he remembers, understands, and loves music; but although he both knows and loves it, he is not now thinking about it, since he is thinking about geometry, which he is discussing." From this we learn that we have a kind of knowledge of certain things stored in the depths of the mind, and when we think about it, it steps forward into the open and is placed in plain view before the mind. Then the mind discovers that it remembers, understands, and loves itself, even when it was not thinking about itself because it was thinking about something else. But in the case of something we have not thought about for a long time and cannot think about unless reminded, we somehow, in a strange way if the expression is permitted, do not know that we know it. In short, it is rightly said by the person who reminds another, "You know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will discover that you know what you thought you did not know." Books produce the same results—those books written about subjects which the reader finds to be true under reason's guidance, not subjects he believes to be true based on the narrator's account, as in history, but those which he himself also finds to be true, either in himself or in that truth itself which is the light of the mind. But whoever cannot grasp these things, even when reminded, is buried too deeply in the darkness of ignorance through great blindness of heart and desperately needs divine help to be able to reach true wisdom.

Wherefore let us consider more carefully that example which we have adduced, wherein it was shown that not knowing a thing is different from not thinking [conceiving] of it; and that it may so happen that a man knows something of which he is not thinking, when he is thinking of something else, not of that. When any one, then, who is skilled in two or more branches of knowledge is thinking of one of them, though he is not thinking of the other or others, yet he knows them. But can we rightly say, This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now understand it, because he is not thinking of it; but he does now understand geometry, for of that he is now thinking? Such an assertion, as far as appears, is absurd. What, again, if we were to say, This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now love it, while he is not now thinking of it; but he does now love geometry, because of that he is now thinking — is not this similarly absurd? But we say quite correctly, This person whom you perceive disputing about geometry is also a perfect musician, for he both remembers music, and understands, and loves it; but although he both knows and loves it, he is not now thinking of it, since he is thinking of geometry, of which he is disputing. And hence we are warned that we have a kind of knowledge of certain things stored up in the recesses of the mind, and that this, when it is thought of, as it were, steps forth in public, and is placed as if openly in the sight of the mind; for then the mind itself finds that it both remembers, and understands, and loves itself, even although it was not thinking of itself, when it was thinking of something else. But in the case of that of which we have not thought for a long time, and cannot think of it unless reminded; that, if the phrase is allowable, in some wonderful way I know not how, we do not know that we know. In short, it is rightly said by him who reminds, to him whom he reminds, You know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will find that you know what you had thought you did not know. Books, too, lead to the same results, viz. those that are written upon subjects which the reader under the guidance of reason finds to be true; not those subjects which he believes to be true on the faith of the narrator, as in the case of history; but those which he himself also finds to be true, either of himself, or in that truth itself which is the light of the mind. But he who cannot contemplate these things, even when reminded, is too deeply buried in the darkness of ignorance, through great blindness of heart and too wonderfully needs divine help, to be able to attain to true wisdom.

For this reason I have wanted to provide some kind of proof about the act of conceiving that might show how the mind's eye is informed from the things contained in memory when recollecting, and how something is begotten when a person conceives that was already in him when, before he conceived it, he remembered it. This is easier to distinguish when things happen at different times, where the parent precedes the offspring by an interval of time. But if we look at the inner memory by which the mind remembers itself, the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and the inner will by which it loves itself—where these three always exist together and always have existed together since they first began to be, whether they were being thought of or not—the image of this trinity will indeed appear to belong even to memory alone. However, in this case a word cannot exist without a thought (for we think everything we say, even when it is said by that inner word which belongs to no particular language), so this image is better discerned in these three things: memory, intelligence, and will. By intelligence I now mean that by which we understand in thought, that is, when our thought is formed by discovering those things that were present to memory but were not being thought of. By will I mean that will, or love, or preference which joins this offspring and parent together and is in some way common to both. This is why I also tried, in the eleventh book, to guide slower readers by means of outward sensible things that are seen by the eyes of the flesh. I then proceeded to lead them into that power of the inner man by which he reasons about temporal things, while postponing consideration of the higher power by which he contemplates eternal things. I discussed this in two books, distinguishing in the twelfth book between these two—the higher and the lower—and showing that the lower ought to be subject to the higher. In the thirteenth book I discussed, as truthfully and briefly as I could, the function of the lower power, which contains the wholesome knowledge of human things, so that we may act in this temporal life in such a way as to attain what is eternal. I have briefly covered in a single book a subject so complex and extensive, and one so well explored by the many and great arguments of many and great men, while showing that a trinity also exists in it, but not yet one that can be called an image of God.

10. For this reason I have wished to adduce some kind of proof, be it what it might, respecting the act of conceiving, such as might serve to show in what way, out of the things contained in the memory, the mind's eye is informed in recollecting, and some such thing is begotten, when a man conceives, as was already in him when, before he conceived, he remembered; because it is easier to distinguish things that take place at successive times, and where the parent precedes the offspring by an interval of time. For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three always are together, and always have been together since they began to be at all, whether they were being thought of or not; the image of this trinity will indeed appear to pertain even to the memory alone; but because in this case a word cannot be without a thought (for we think all that we say, even if it be said by that inner word which belongs to no separate language), this image is rather to be discerned in these three things, viz. memory, intelligence, will. And I mean now by intelligence that by which we understand in thought, that is, when our thought is formed by the finding of those things, which had been at hand to the memory but were not being thought of; and I mean that will, or love, or preference which combines this offspring and parent, and is in some way common to both. Hence it was that I tried also, viz. in the eleventh book, to lead on the slowness of readers by means of outward sensible things which are seen by the eyes of the flesh; and that I then proceeded to enter with them upon that power of the inner man whereby he reasons of things temporal, deferring the consideration of that which dominates as the higher power, by which he contemplates things eternal. And I discussed this in two books, distinguishing the two in the twelfth, the one of them being higher and the other lower, and that the lower ought to be subject to the higher; and in the thirteenth I discussed, with what truth and brevity I could, the office of the lower, in which the wholesome knowledge of things human is contained, in order that we may so act in this temporal life as to attain that which is eternal; since, indeed, I have cursorily included in a single book a subject so manifold and copious, and one so well known by the many and great arguments of many and great men, while manifesting that a trinity exists also in it, but not yet one that can be called an image of God.

Chapter 8.– The Trinity Which is the Image of God is Now to Be Sought in the Noblest Part of the Mind.

We have now arrived at the point where we need to examine the noblest part of the human mind—the part by which it knows or can know God—so that we may find in it the image of God. Although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, the image of that nature (than which none is better) must be sought and found in the best part of our own nature. But the mind must first be considered as it exists in itself, before it participates in God, and God's image must be found in it. As we have said, even though the mind may be worn out and defaced by losing its participation in God, the image of God still remains. It is God's image precisely in this: that it is capable of God and can participate in Him. This great capacity is only possible because the mind is His image. So then, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself. If we recognize this, we recognize a trinity—not yet God Himself, but finally an image of God. The memory does not receive from outside what it holds. The understanding does not find outside itself what it contemplates, as the eye of the body does. The will has not joined these two from outside, as it joins the form of a physical object with what is produced in the vision of someone looking at it. Nor has the act of thinking, in turning toward something, found an image of something seen outside that was somehow grasped and stored in memory, from which the mental picture of someone remembering was formed, with the will joining the two as a third element. We showed that this happens in those trinities discovered in physical things, or which were somehow drawn inward from bodily objects through the bodily senses—all of which we discussed in the eleventh book. Nor does it happen as it did (or appeared to) when we went further to discuss that knowledge belonging to the operations of the inner man, which had to be distinguished from wisdom. The subject matter of that knowledge was, in a sense, external to the mind. It was either brought to the mind through historical information—such as deeds and words that occur in time and pass away, or that are established in the natural order of things in their own times and places—or it arises in the person himself without being there before, whether through others teaching him or through his own thinking. Examples include faith, which we discussed at length in the thirteenth book, or the virtues, by which (if they are true) a person lives well in this mortal life so as to live blessedly in that immortality which God promises. These and similar things have their proper order in time, and in that order we more easily discerned a trinity of memory, sight, and love. Some such things exist before the learner's knowledge of them. They are knowable even before they are known, and they generate knowledge of themselves in the learner. They either exist in their own proper places or have happened in the past. Although things that are past no longer exist themselves, certain signs of them as past do exist, and seeing or hearing these signs makes it known that they happened and have passed away. These signs are either located in the places themselves (such as monuments of the dead or similar things), or they exist in trustworthy written books (like all weighty and approved history), or they are in the minds of those who already know them. What is already known to them is certainly knowable to others as well, whose knowledge it preceded, and who are able to know it through the information of those who already know it. When all these things are learned, they produce a kind of trinity: the thing's own proper form (which was knowable even before it was known), the application of the learner's knowledge to this form (which begins to exist when he learns it), and the will as a third element combining the two. When they are known, yet another trinity is produced in recollecting them, and this trinity now exists inwardly in the mind itself. It consists of the images that were impressed on the memory when the things were learned, the shaping of thought when attention is directed to these images through recollection, and the will as a third element combining these two. But those things that arise in the mind without having been there before—such as faith and similar things—although they appear to come from outside because they are implanted through teaching, are not located outside or performed outside like the things that are believed. Rather, they began to exist entirely within the mind itself. For faith is not what is believed, but that by which one believes. The former is believed, the latter is seen. Nevertheless, because faith began to exist in a mind that was already a mind before these things began to be in it, it seems to be something external, and it will be counted among past things when sight succeeds it and faith itself ceases to be. As long as faith is present, retained, beheld, and loved, it creates one trinity. But later, through some trace of itself that it will have left in the memory as it passes away, it will create a different trinity—as has already been said above.

11. But we have come now to that argument in which we have undertaken to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better. But the mind must first be considered as it is in itself, before it becomes partaker of God; and His image must be found in it. For, as we have said, although worn out and defaced by losing the participation of God, yet the image of God still remains. For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable of Him, and can be partaker of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His image. Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at last an image of God. The memory does not receive from without that which it is to hold; nor does the understanding find without that which it is to regard, as the eye of the body does; nor has will joined these two from without, as it joins the form of the bodily object and that which is thence wrought in the vision of the beholder; nor has conception, in being turned to it, found an image of a thing seen without, which has been somehow seized and laid up in the memory, whence the intuition of him that recollects has been formed, will as a third joining the two: as we showed to take place in those trinities which were discovered in things corporeal, or which were somehow drawn within from bodily objects by the bodily sense; of all which we have discoursed in the eleventh book. Nor, again, as it took place, or appeared to do so, when we went on further to discuss that knowledge, which had its place now in the workings of the inner man, and which was to be distinguished from wisdom; of which knowledge the subject-matter was, as it were, adventitious to the mind, and either was brought there by historical information — as deeds and words, which are performed in time and pass away, or which again are established in the nature of things in their own times and places — or arises in the man himself not being there before, whether on the information of others, or by his own thinking — as faith, which we commended at length in the thirteenth book, or as the virtues, by which, if they are true, one so lives well in this mortality as to live blessedly in that immortality which God promises. These and other things of the kind have their proper order in time, and in that order we discerned more easily a trinity of memory, sight, and love. For some of such things anticipate the knowledge of learners. For they are knowable also before they are known, and beget in the learner a knowledge of themselves. And they either exist in their own proper places, or have happened in time past; although things that are past do not themselves exist, but only certain signs of them as past, the sight or hearing of which makes it known that they have been and have passed away. And these signs are either situate in the places themselves, as e.g. monuments of the dead or the like; or exist in written books worthy of credit, as is all history that is of weight and approved authority; or are in the minds of those who already know them; since what is already known to them is knowable certainly to others also, whose knowledge it has anticipated, and who are able to know it on the information of those who do know it. And all these things, when they are learned, produce a certain kind of trinity, viz. by their own proper species, which was knowable also before it was known, and by the application to this of the knowledge of the learner, which then begins to exist when he learns them, and by will as a third which combines both; and when they are known, yet another trinity is produced in the recollecting of them, and this now inwardly in the mind itself, from those images which, when they were learned, were impressed upon the memory, and from the informing of the thought when the look has been turned upon these by recollection, and from the will which as a third combines these two. But those things which arise in the mind, not having been there before, as faith and other things of that kind, although they appear to be adventitious, since they are implanted by teaching, yet are not situate without or transacted without, as are those things which are believed; but began to be altogether within in the mind itself. For faith is not that which is believed, but that by which it is believed; and the former is believed, the latter seen. Nevertheless, because it began to be in the mind, which was a mind also before these things began to be in it, it seems to be somewhat adventitious, and will be reckoned among things past, when sight shall have succeeded, and itself shall have ceased to be. And it makes now by its presence, retained as it is, and beheld, and loved, a different trinity from that which it will then make by means of some trace of itself, which in passing it will have left in the memory: as has been already said above.

Chapter 9.– Whether Justice and the Other Virtues Cease to Exist in the Future Life.

There is some question, however, whether the virtues by which one lives well in this present mortal life, seeing that they also begin to exist in the mind (which was still a mind even when it existed before without them), likewise cease to exist when they have brought us to eternal things. Some have thought that they will cease, and in the case of three virtues—prudence, fortitude, and temperance—such a claim seems to have some merit. But justice is immortal and will be made perfect in us rather than cease to be. Yet Tullius, the great master of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: If we were allowed, when we departed from this life, to live forever in the islands of the blessed, as myths tell us, what need would there be of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need even of the virtues themselves? For we would not need fortitude when nothing involving toil or danger was set before us; nor justice, when there was nothing belonging to another to be desired; nor temperance, to govern desires that would not exist; nor indeed would we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We would be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and knowing nature, by which alone the life of the gods is also praiseworthy. And from this we may understand that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is a matter of free choice. This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy and going over again all that he had learned from philosophers and explaining it excellently and pleasantly, has affirmed that all four virtues are necessary only in this life, which we see to be full of troubles and mistakes. But not one of them is necessary when we have departed from this life, if we are permitted to live where there is a blessed life. Rather, blessed souls are blessed only in learning and knowing, that is, in the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better and more lovable. It is that nature which created and appointed all other natures. And if it belongs to justice to be subject to the government of this nature, then justice is certainly immortal and will not cease to be in that blessedness, but will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater. Perhaps, too, the other three virtues will exist in that blessedness—prudence though no longer with any risk of error, and fortitude without the burden of bearing evils, and temperance without the resistance of desire. So it may be the role of prudence to prefer or equate no good thing to God; and of fortitude, to cling to him most steadfastly; and of temperance, to take pleasure in no harmful defect. But what justice is now concerned with in helping the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treachery, and fortitude in bearing troubles patiently, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not exist there, where there will be no evil at all. And therefore those acts of the virtues which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred, will be counted among things past. And they form now a different trinity, while we hold, look at, and love them as present, from what they will form then, when we shall discover them not to be, but to have been, by certain traces of them which they will have left in passing in the memory. For then, too, there will be a trinity, when that trace, whatever it may be, is retained in the memory and truly recognized, and then these two are joined by will as a third.

12. There is, however, some question raised, whether the virtues likewise by which one lives well in this present mortality, seeing that they themselves begin also to be in the mind, which was a mind none the less when it existed before without them, cease also to exist at that time when they have brought us to things eternal. For some have thought that they will cease, and in the case of three — prudence, fortitude, temperance — such an assertion seems to have something in it; but justice is immortal, and will rather then be made perfect in us than cease to be. Yet Tullius, the great author of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: If we were allowed, when we migrated from this life, to live forever in the islands of the blessed, as fables tell, what need were there of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need, indeed, of the very virtues themselves? For we should not need fortitude when nothing of either toil or danger was proposed to us; nor justice, when there was nothing of anybody else's to be coveted; nor temperance, to govern lasts that would not exist; nor, indeed, should we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and knowing nature, by which alone also the life of the gods is praiseworthy. And hence we may perceive that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is one of free choice. This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy, going over again all that he had learned from philosophers, and excellently and pleasantly explaining it, has affirmed all four virtues to be necessary in this life only, which we see to be full of troubles and mistakes; but not one of them when we shall have migrated from this life, if we are permitted to live there where is a blessed life; but that blessed souls are blessed only in learning and knowing, i.e. in the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better and more lovable. It is that nature which created and appointed all other natures. And if it belongs to justice to be subject to the government of this nature then justice is certainly immortal; nor will it cease to be in that blessedness, but will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater. Perhaps, too, the other three virtues — prudence although no longer with any risk of error, and fortitude without the vexation of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust — will exist in that blessedness: so that it may be the part of prudence to prefer or equal no good thing to God; and of fortitude, to cleave to Him most steadfastly; and of temperance, to be pleased by no harmful defect. But that which justice is now concerned with in helping the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treachery, and fortitude in bearing troubles patiently, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not exist there, where there will be no evil at all. And hence those acts of the virtues which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred, will be reckoned among things past; and they make now a different trinity, while we hold, look at, and love them as present, from that which they will then make, when we shall discover them not to be, but to have been, by certain traces of them which they will have left in passing in the memory; since then, too, there will be a trinity, when that trace, be it of what sort it may, shall be retained in the memory, and truly recognized, and then these two be joined by will as a third.

Chapter 10.– How a Trinity is Produced by the Mind Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself.

In all these temporary things we've mentioned, sometimes the things we can know exist before we know them—like objects we perceive with our senses that were already there before we knew about them, or anything we learn through history. But sometimes things come into existence at the exact same moment we know them—for instance, if something visible that never existed before suddenly appears before our eyes, it obviously doesn't exist before we know it. Or if a sound is made where someone can hear it, clearly the sound and the hearing of it begin and end at the same time. But whether they come before in time or start existing simultaneously, knowable things produce knowledge—they aren't produced by knowledge. Yet once knowledge has happened, when things that have been learned and stored in memory are recalled through recollection, everyone can see that holding them in memory comes before in time to seeing them in recollection, and to the will joining these two things as a third element. In the mind, however, it's not like this. The mind doesn't come to itself from outside, as if the self came to the already-existing self from somewhere else when that self didn't already exist, or didn't come from somewhere else but rather within the already-existing mind that same mind was born when it didn't already exist—like how faith, which wasn't there before, arises in a mind that already existed. Nor does the mind see itself as if it were placed in its own memory through recollection after knowing itself, as though it wasn't there before it knew itself. Rather, from the moment it began to exist, it has never stopped remembering, understanding, and loving itself, as we've already shown. So when the mind turns toward itself in thought, a trinity arises, in which we can now finally also discern a word, since it is formed from the thought itself, with the will joining both. Here, then, we can recognize the image we're searching for better than we have up to now.

13. In the knowledge of all these temporal things which we have mentioned, there are some knowable things which precede the acquisition of the knowledge of them by an interval of time, as in the case of those sensible objects which were already real before they were known, or of all those things that are learned through history; but some things begin to be at the same time with the knowing of them — just as, if any visible object, which did not exist before at all, were to rise up before our eyes, certainly it does not precede our knowing it; or if there be any sound made where there is some one to hear, no doubt the sound and the hearing that sound begin and end simultaneously. Yet none the less, whether preceding in time or beginning to exist simultaneously, knowable things generate knowledge, and are not generated by knowledge. But when knowledge has come to pass, whenever the things known and laid up in memory are reviewed by recollection, who does not see that the retaining them in the memory is prior in time to the sight of them in recollection, and to the uniting of the two things by will as a third? In the mind, however, it is not so. For the mind is not adventitious to itself, as though there came to itself already existing, that same self not already existing, from somewhere else, or did not indeed come from somewhere else, but that in the mind itself already existing, there was born that same mind not already existing; just as faith, which before was not, arises in the mind which already was. Nor does the mind see itself, as it were, set up in its own memory by recollection subsequently to the knowing of itself, as though it was not there before it knew itself; whereas,doubtless, from the time when it began to be, it has never ceased to remember, to understand, and to love itself, as we have already shown. And hence, when it is turned to itself by thought, there arises a trinity, in which now at length we can discern also a word; since it is formed from thought itself, will uniting both. Here, then, we may recognize, more than we have hitherto done, the image of which we are in search.

Chapter 11.– Whether Memory is Also of Things Present.

However, someone might say: What the mind uses to remember itself—since the mind is always present to itself—is not actually memory, because memory deals with things past, not things present. Some people, including Cicero, when discussing the virtues, have divided prudence into three parts: memory, understanding, and forethought. They assigned memory to things past, understanding to things present, and forethought to things future. This last one is certain only for those who can predict the future, which is not a human ability unless granted from above, as it was to the prophets. The book of Wisdom, speaking about human beings, says: "The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our forethought uncertain." But memory of things past and understanding of things present are certain—certain, I mean, regarding incorporeal things that are present, since corporeal things are present to the sight of bodily eyes. But anyone who denies that there is memory of things present should pay attention to language used even in secular literature, where precise wording was valued more than factual truth. Ulysses did not suffer such things, nor did the Ithacan forget himself in such great danger. When Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what else did he mean except that he remembered himself? And since he was present to himself, he could not possibly remember himself unless memory applied to things present. Therefore, just as what is called memory regarding past things enables us to recall and remember them, so also in the case of something present—as the mind is to itself—what enables the mind to be available to itself so it can be understood by its own thought and then both be joined together by self-love can reasonably be called memory.

14. But some one will say, That is not memory by which the mind, which is ever present to itself, is affirmed to remember itself; for memory is of things past, not of things present. For there are some, and among them Cicero, who, in treating of the virtues, have divided prudence into these three — memory, understanding, forethought: to wit, assigning memory to things past, understanding to things present, forethought to things future; which last is certain only in the case of those who are prescient of the future; and this is no gift of men, unless it be granted from above, as to the prophets. And hence the book of Wisdom, speaking of men, The thoughts of mortals, it says, are fearful, and our forethought uncertain. But memory of things past, and understanding of things present, are certain: certain, I mean, respecting things incorporeal, which are present; for things corporeal are present to the sight of the corporeal eyes. But let any one who denies that there is any memory of things present, attend to the language used even in profane literature, where exactness of words was more looked for than truth of things. Nor did Ulysses suffer such things, nor did the Ithacan forget himself in so great a peril. For when Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what else did he mean, except that he remembered himself? And since he was present to himself, he could not possibly remember himself, unless memory pertained to things present. And, therefore, as that is called memory in things past which makes it possible to recall and remember them; so in a thing present, as the mind is to itself, that is not unreasonably to be called memory, which makes the mind at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thought, and then both be joined together by love of itself.

Chapter 12.– The Trinity in the Mind is the Image of God, in that It Remembers, Understands, and Loves God, Which to Do is Wisdom.

This trinity of the mind is not the image of God simply because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. Rather, it is the image of God because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. When it does this, it becomes wise. But if it does not do this—even when it remembers, understands, and loves itself—then it is foolish. Let it therefore remember its God, according to whose image it was made, and let it understand and love Him. Or to say the same thing more briefly: let it worship God, who was not made, by whom it was made and through whom it is capable of partaking in Him. Therefore it is written, "Behold, the worship of God, that is wisdom." And then it will be wise, not by its own light, but by participating in that supreme Light. And because it is eternal, it will reign in blessedness. For this wisdom of man is so called because it is also from God. Then it is true wisdom; for if it is merely human, it is empty. Yet we do not say it is "of God" in the same way we say that God is wise by His own wisdom. For God is not wise by participating in Himself, as the mind is wise by participating in God. Just as we speak of "the righteousness of God" not only when referring to that by which He Himself is righteous, but also to that which He gives to man when He justifies the ungodly—which latter righteousness the apostle commends by saying of some that, not knowing the righteousness of God and seeking to establish their own righteousness, they are not subject to the righteousness of God—so also it may be said of some that, not knowing the wisdom of God and seeking to establish their own wisdom, they are not subject to the wisdom of God.

15. This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in so doing it is made wise itself. But if it does not do so, even when it remembers, understands, and loves itself, then it is foolish. Let it then remember its God, after whose image it is made, and let it understand and love Him. Or to say the same thing more briefly, let it worship God, who is not made, by whom because itself was made, it is capable and can be partaker of Him; wherefore it is written, Behold, the worship of God, that is wisdom. And then it will be wise, not by its own light, but by participation of that supreme Light; and wherein it is eternal, therein shall reign in blessedness. For this wisdom of man is so called, in that it is also of God. For then it is true wisdom; for if it is human, it is vain. Yet not so of God, as is that wherewith God is wise. For He is not wise by partaking of Himself, as the mind is by partaking of God. But as we call it the righteousness of God, not only when we speak of that by which He Himself is righteous, but also of that which He gives to man when He justifies the ungodly, which latter righteousness the apostle commending, says of some, that not knowing the righteousness of God and going about to establish their own righteousness,they are not subject to the righteousness of God; so also it may be said of some, that not knowing the wisdom of God and going about to establish their own wisdom, they are not subject to the wisdom of God.

There is, then, a nature that is not made, which made all other natures, both great and small. This nature is without doubt more excellent than those it has made, and therefore also more excellent than the rational and intellectual nature that we are discussing—the mind of man, which is made after the image of the One who made it. That nature, which is more excellent than all the rest, is God. He is not far from any of us, as the apostle says, and he adds: For in Him we live, and are moved, and have our being. If this were said with respect to the body, it could be understood even of this physical world, for in it too, with respect to the body, we live and are moved and have our being. Therefore it should be understood in a more excellent and spiritual way, not visible, with respect to the mind, which is made after His image. For what is there that is not in Him, of whom it is divinely written: For of Him, and through Him, and in Him, are all things? If all things are in Him, then in whom can those who live possibly live, or those who are moved be moved, except in Him in whom they exist? Yet not all are with Him in the way that it is said to Him: I am continually with You. Nor is He with all in the way we say: The Lord be with you. So it is the special misery of man not to be with Him, without whom he cannot exist. For without a doubt, man is not without Him in whom he exists. And yet if he does not remember, understand, and love Him, he is not with Him. And when anyone completely forgets something, it is certainly impossible even to remind him of it.

16. There is, then, a nature not made, which made all other natures, great and small, and is without doubt more excellent than those which it has made, and therefore also than that of which we are speaking; viz. than the rational and intellectual nature, which is the mind of man, made after the image of Him who made it. And that nature, more excellent than the rest, is God. And indeed He is not far from every one of us, as the apostle says, who adds, For in Him we live, and are moved, and have our being. And if this were said in respect to the body, it might be understood even of this corporeal world; for in it too in respect to the body, we live, and are moved, and have our being. And therefore it ought to be taken in a more excellent way, and one that is spiritual, not visible, in respect to the mind, which is made after His image. For what is there that is not in Him, of whom it is divinely written, For of Him, and through Him, and in Him, are all things? If, then, all things are in Him, in whom can any possibly live that do live, or be moved that are moved, except in Him in whom they are? Yet all are not with Him in that way in which it is said to Him, I am continually with You. Nor is He with all in that way in which we say, The Lord be with you. And so it is the special wretchedness of man not to be with Him, without whom he cannot be. For, beyond a doubt, he is not without Him in whom he is; and yet if he does not remember, and understand, and love Him, he is not with Him. And when any one absolutely forgets a thing, certainly it is impossible even to remind him of it.

Chapter 13.– How Any One Can Forget and Remember God.

Let's use an example from everyday life. Someone you don't recognize says to you, "You know me." To help you remember, he tells you where, when, and how you met him. If, after he mentions every detail that might help you recall, you still don't recognize him, then you have forgotten so completely that all knowledge of him has been erased from your mind. Nothing remains except that you might take his word for it that you once knew him—or you might not even do that if you don't think the person speaking to you is trustworthy. But if you do remember him, then you go back into your own memory and find there something that had not been completely erased by forgetfulness. Let's return to what led us to use this example from human interaction. Among other things, Psalm 9 says, "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God," and again Psalm 22 says, "All the ends of the world shall be reminded, and turned unto the Lord." These nations will not have forgotten God so completely that they cannot remember Him when reminded of Him. Yet by forgetting God, as if forgetting their own life, they had been turned into death, that is, into hell. But when reminded, they are turned to the Lord, as if coming back to life by remembering their proper life which they had forgotten. It is also written in Psalm 94, "Perceive now, you who are unwise among the people; and you fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear?" This is spoken to those who said vain things about God because they did not understand Him.

17. Let us take an instance for the purpose from visible things. Somebody whom you do not recognize, says to you, You know me; and in order to remind you, tells you where, when, and how he became known to you; and if, after the mention of every sign by which you might be recalled to remembrance, you still do not recognize him, then you have so come to forget, as that the whole of that knowledge is altogether blotted out of your mind; and nothing else remains, but that you take his word for it who tells you that you once knew him; or do not even do that, if you do not think the person who speaks to you to be worthy of credit. But if you do remember him, then no doubt you return to your own memory, and find in it that which had not been altogether blotted out by forgetfulness. Let us return to that which led us to adduce this instance from the intercourse of men. Among other things, the 9th Psalm says, The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations. that forget God; and again the 22d Psalm, All the ends of the world shall be reminded, and turned unto the Lord. These nations, then, will not so have forgotten God as to be unable to remember Him when reminded of Him; yet, by forgetting God, as though forgetting their own life, they had been turned into death, i.e. into hell. But when reminded they are turned to the Lord, as though coming to life again by remembering their proper life which they had forgotten. It is read also in the 94th Psalm, Perceive now, you who are unwise among the people; and you fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? etc. For this is spoken to those, who said vain things concerning God through not understanding Him.

Chapter 14.– The Mind Loves God in Rightly Loving Itself; And If It Love Not God, It Must Be Said to Hate Itself. Even a Weak and Erring Mind is Always Strong in Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself. Let It Be Turned to God, that It May Be Blessed by Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Him.

But there are even more testimonies in the divine Scriptures concerning the love of God. In the love of God, those other two—namely, memory and understanding—are understood by consequence, since no one loves what he does not remember or what he is wholly ignorant of. And from this comes that well-known and primary commandment: You shall love the Lord your God. The human mind is so constituted that at no time does it fail to remember, understand, and love itself. But since anyone who hates someone seeks to injure him, the mind of man can rightly be said to hate itself when it injures itself. For it wills harm to itself through ignorance, not thinking that what it wills is harmful to it; but it nonetheless does will harm to itself when it wills what would be harmful to it. And so it is written: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul. Therefore, he who knows how to love himself loves God; but he who does not love God, even if he does love himself—something planted in him by nature—is rightly said to hate himself, because he does what is harmful to himself and attacks himself as though he were his own enemy. And this is certainly a terrible delusion: that whereas all wish to benefit themselves, many do nothing but what is most destructive to themselves. When the poet was describing a similar disease of dumb animals, he says: May the gods grant better things to the pious, and assign that delusion to enemies. They were tearing with bare teeth their own torn limbs. Since he was speaking of a disease of the body, why did he call it a delusion, unless because while nature inclines every animal to take all the care it can of itself, that disease was such that those animals tore the very limbs of theirs which they wanted to be safe and sound? But when the mind loves God, and by consequence, as has been said, remembers and understands Him, then it is rightly commanded also to love its neighbor as itself; for it has now come to love itself rightly and not perversely when it loves God, by partaking of whom that image not only exists, but is also renewed so as to be no longer old, and restored so as to be no longer defaced, and beatified so as to be no longer unhappy. For although it loves itself so much that, if the alternative were proposed to it, it would lose all things which it loves less than itself rather than perish, still, by abandoning Him who is above it, in dependence upon whom alone it could guard its own strength, and enjoy Him as its light, to whom it is sung in the Psalm: I will guard my strength in dependence upon You, and again: Draw near to Him, and be enlightened—it has been made so weak and so dark that it has fallen away unhappily from itself too, to those things that are not what itself is and which are beneath itself, by affections that it cannot conquer and delusions from which it sees no way to return. And so, when by God's mercy now penitent, it cries out in the Psalms: My strength fails me; as for the light of my eyes, it also is gone from me.

18. But there are yet more testimonies in the divine Scriptures concerning the love of God. For in it, those other two [namely, memory and understanding] are understood by consequence, inasmuch as no one loves that which he does not remember, or of which he is wholly ignorant. And hence is that well known and primary commandment, You shall love the Lord your God. The human mind, then, is so constituted, that at no time does it not remember, and understand, and love itself. But since he who hates any one is anxious to injure him, not undeservedly is the mind of man also said to hate itself when it injures itself. For it wills ill to itself through ignorance, in that it does not think that what it wills is prejudicial to it; but it none the less does will ill to itself, when it wills what would be prejudicial to it. And hence it is written, He that loves iniquity, hates his own soul. He, therefore, who knows how to love himself, loves God; but he who does not love God, even if he does love himself — a thing implanted in him by nature, — yet is not unsuitably said to hate himself, inasmuch as he does that which is adverse to himself, and assails himself as though he were his own enemy. And this is no doubt a terrible delusion, that whereas all will to profit themselves, many do nothing but that which is most pernicious to themselves. When the poet was describing a like disease of dumb animals, May the gods, says he, grant better things to the pious, and assign that delusion to enemies. They were rending with bare teeth their own torn limbs. Since it was a disease of the body he was speaking of, why has he called it a delusion, unless because, while nature inclines every animal to take all the care it can of itself, that disease was such that those animals rent those very limbs of theirs which they desired should be safe and sound? But when the mind loves God, and by consequence, as has been said remembers and understands Him, then it is rightly enjoined also to love its neighbor as itself; for it has now come to love itself rightly and not perversely when it loves God, by partaking of whom that image not only exists, but is also renewed so as to be no longer old, and restored so as to be no longer defaced, and beatified so as to be no longer unhappy. For although it so love itself, that, supposing the alternative to be proposed to it, it would lose all things which it loves less than itself rather than perish; still, by abandoning Him who is above it, in dependence upon whom alone it could guard its own strength, and enjoy Him as its light, to whom it is sung in the Psalm, I will guard my strength in dependence upon You, and again, Draw near to Him, and be enlightened, — it has been made so weak and so dark, that it has fallen away unhappily from itself too, to those things that are not what itself is, and which are beneath itself, by affections that it cannot conquer, and delusions from which it sees no way to return. And hence, when by God's mercy now penitent, it cries out in the Psalms, My strength fails me; as for the light of my eyes, it also is gone from me.

Even amid these great evils of weakness and delusion, the human mind could not lose its natural ability to remember, understand, and love itself. That's why what I quoted earlier can rightly be said: "Although man walks in an image, surely he is troubled in vain. He heaps up treasures and doesn't know who will gather them." Why does he heap up treasures? Because he has lost the strength he once had to possess God and lack nothing. And why can't he tell for whom he gathers them? Because the light has been taken from his eyes. So he doesn't see what Truth says: "You fool, this very night your soul will be required of you. Then who will get what you've stored up?" Yet because even such a person walks in an image, and because his mind has memory, understanding, and love of itself—if it were made clear to him that he couldn't have both, and he was allowed to choose one and lose the other (either the treasures he's heaped up or his mind), who would be so utterly mindless as to prefer having the treasures over having his mind? Treasures can often corrupt the mind, but a mind not corrupted by treasures can live more easily and freely without any treasures. But who could possess treasures except through the mind? If an infant, born as wealthy as possible, is lord of everything rightfully his but possesses nothing because his mind is unconscious, how could anyone whose mind is completely lost possibly possess anything? But why talk about treasures—that anyone given the choice would prefer going without them rather than going without a mind—when no one prefers, indeed no one even compares them, to the eyes of the body? With those eyes, not just one person here and there (as with gold), but everyone possesses the very heaven. Everyone possesses through bodily eyes whatever he gladly sees. Who, then, if he couldn't keep both but had to lose one, wouldn't prefer to lose his treasures rather than his eyes? Yet if he were given the same choice between losing his eyes or losing his mind, who with a mind doesn't see he'd rather lose the former than the latter? A mind without fleshly eyes is still human, but fleshly eyes without a mind are bestial. And who wouldn't prefer to be human, even blind in bodily sight, rather than a seeing beast?

19. Yet, in the midst of these evils of weakness and delusion, great as they are, it could not lose its natural memory, understanding and love of itself. And therefore what I quoted above can be rightly said, Although man walks in an image, surely he is disquieted in vain: he heaps up treasures, and knows not who shall gather them. For why does he heap up treasures, unless because his strength has deserted him, through which he would have God, and so lack nothing? And why cannot he tell for whom he shall gather them, unless because the light of his eyes is taken from him? And so he does not see what the Truth says, You fool, this night your soul shall be required of you. Then whose shall those things be which you have provided? Yet because even such a man walks in an image, and the man's mind has remembrance, understanding, and love of itself; if it were made plain to it that it could not have both, while it was permitted to choose one and lose the other, viz. either the treasures it has heaped up, or the mind; who is so utterly without mind, as to prefer to have the treasures rather than the mind? For treasures commonly are able to subvert the mind, but the mind that is not subverted by treasures can live more easily and unencumberedly without any treasures. But who will be able to possess treasures unless it be by means of the mind? For if an infant, born as rich as you please, although lord of everything that is rightfully his, yet possesses nothing if his mind be unconscious, how can any one possibly possess anything whose mind is wholly lost? But why say of treasures, that anybody, if the choice be given him, prefers going without them to going without a mind; when there is no one that prefers, nay, no one that compares them, to those lights of the body, by which not one man only here and there, as in the case of gold, but every man, possesses the very heaven? For every one possesses by the eyes of the body whatever he gladly sees. Who then is there, who, if he could not keep both, but must lose one, would not rather lose his treasures than his eyes? And yet if it were put to him on the same condition, whether he would rather lose eyes than mind, who is there with a mind that does not see that he would rather lose the former than the latter? For a mind without the eyes of the flesh is still human, but the eyes of the flesh without a mind are bestial. And who would not rather be a man, even though blind in fleshly sight, than a beast that can see?

I have said this so that even readers who are slower to understand might be briefly reminded how deeply even a weak and erring mind loves itself, even when it wrongly loves and pursues things inferior to itself. It could not love itself if it were completely ignorant of itself—that is, if it did not remember itself or understand itself. Through the image of God within itself, it has the power to cling to Him whose image it is. The mind is positioned in the order of natures (not of physical place) such that nothing exists above it except God alone. When it finally clings completely to Him, it will become one spirit, as the apostle testifies: "He who clings to the Lord is one spirit." This happens as the mind draws near to share in God's nature, truth, and blessedness—though this does not increase God's own nature, truth, and blessedness. When the mind happily clings to that nature, it will live unchangeably and will see everything it sees as unchangeable. Then, as Scripture promises, its desire will be satisfied with good things—unchangeable good things, the very Trinity itself, its own God, whose image it is. So that it may never again suffer harm, it will dwell in the hidden place of His presence, filled with such great fullness of Him that sin will never again delight it. But now, when the mind sees itself, it sees something that is not unchangeable.

20. I have said thus much, that even those who are slower of understanding, to whose eyes or ears this book may come, might be admonished, however briefly, how greatly even a weak and erring mind loves itself, in wrongly loving and pursuing things beneath itself. Now it could not love itself if it were altogether ignorant of itself, i.e. if it did not remember itself, nor understand itself by which image of God within itself it has such power as to be able to cleave to Him whose image it is. For it is so reckoned in the order, not of place, but of natures, as that there is none above it save Him. When, finally, it shall altogether cleave to Him, then it will be one spirit, as the apostle testifies, saying, But he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit. And this by its drawing near to partake of His nature, truth, and blessedness, yet not by His increasing in His own nature, truth and blessedness. In that nature, then, when it happily has cleaved to it, it will live unchangeably, and will see as unchangeable all that it does see. Then, as divine Scripture promises, His desire will be satisfied with good things, good things unchangeable — the very Trinity itself, its own God, whose image it is. And that it may not ever thenceforward suffer wrong, it will be in the hidden place of His presence, filled with so great fullness of Him, that sin thenceforth will never delight it. But now, when it sees itself, it sees something not unchangeable.

Chapter 15.– Although the Soul Hopes for Blessedness, Yet It Does Not Remember Lost Blessedness, But Remembers God and the Rules of Righteousness. The Unchangeable Rules of Right Living are Known Even to the Ungodly.

The soul certainly has no doubt that it is miserable and longs to be blessed. It can only hope for this possibility because it is changeable. If it were not changeable, then just as it could not become miserable after being blessed, neither could it become blessed after being miserable. What could have made it miserable under an all-powerful and good God, except its own sin and its Lord's righteousness? And what will make it blessed, except its own merit and its Lord's reward? But its merit is also His grace, and His reward will be its blessedness. The soul cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost and no longer possesses. It received this righteousness when humanity was created, and certainly lost it through sin. Therefore it receives righteousness so that because of this it may deserve to receive blessedness. This is why the apostle truly says to it, when it begins to take pride as though in its own good, "What do you have that you did not receive? Now if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?" But when the soul rightly remembers its own Lord, having received His Spirit, then, because it is taught by an inward teaching, it understands completely that it cannot rise except by His freely given affection, nor could it have fallen except by its own freely chosen defection. Certainly it does not remember its own blessedness, since that blessedness existed but exists no longer, and the soul has utterly forgotten it and therefore cannot even be reminded of it. But it believes what the trustworthy Scriptures of its God say about that blessedness—Scriptures written by His prophet that tell of the blessedness of Paradise and pass down to us historical information about humanity's first good and evil. And the soul remembers the Lord its God, for He always exists. He has not merely existed but ceased to exist, nor does He merely exist now but not before. Just as He will never cease to be, so He never failed to be. And He is wholly present everywhere. Therefore the soul lives, moves, and exists in Him, and so it can remember Him. Not because it recalls having known Him in Adam or anywhere else before the life of this present body, or when it was first made to be placed in this body—for it remembers nothing at all of this. Whatever there was of this has been erased by forgetfulness. But the soul is reminded so that it may turn to God, as though to that light by which it was somehow touched even when turned away from Him. This is why even the ungodly think about eternity and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in human morals. By what rules do they judge, except by those in which they see how people ought to live, even though they themselves do not live that way? And where do they see these rules? They do not see them in their own nature, since these things are clearly seen by the mind, and their minds are admittedly changeable, but these rules are seen as unchangeable by whoever can see them at all. Nor are they seen in the character of their own mind, since these rules are rules of righteousness and their minds are admittedly unrighteous. Where indeed are these rules written, where even the unrighteous person recognizes what is righteous and discerns that he ought to have what he himself does not have? Where are they written, if not in the book of that Light which is called Truth? From there every righteous law is copied and transferred—not by moving to it, but by being impressed upon it—to the heart of the person who works righteousness, just as the impression from a ring passes into wax yet does not leave the ring. But the person who does not work yet still sees how he ought to work is the one who is turned away from that light, which nevertheless still touches him. But the person who does not even see how he ought to live does indeed sin with more excuse, because he is not a transgressor of a law that he knows. Yet even he is sometimes touched by the splendor of the everywhere-present truth, when upon being admonished he confesses.

21. And of this certainly it feels no doubt, that it is wretched, and longs to be blessed nor can it hope for the possibility of this on any other ground than its own changeableness for if it were not changeable, then, as it could not become wretched after being blessed, so neither could it become blessed after being wretched. And what could have made it wretched under an omnipotent and good God, except its own sin and the righteousness of its Lord? And what will make it blessed, unless its own merit, and its Lord's reward? But its merit, too, is His grace, whose reward will be its blessedness; for it cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost, and so has not. For this it received when man was created, and assuredly lost it by sinning. Therefore it receives righteousness, that on account of this it may deserve to receive blessedness; and hence the apostle truly says to it, when beginning to be proud as it were of its own good, For what have you that you did not receive? Now if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? But when it rightly remembers its own Lord, having received His Spirit, then, because it is so taught by an inward teaching, it feels wholly that it cannot rise save by His affection freely given, nor has been able to fall save by its own defection freely chosen. Certainly it does not remember its own blessedness; since that has been, but is not, and it has utterly forgotten it, and therefore cannot even be reminded of it. But it believes what the trustworthy Scriptures of its God tell of that blessedness, which were written by His prophet, and tell of the blessedness of Paradise, and hand down to us historical information of that first both good and ill of man. And it remembers the Lord its God; for He always is, nor has been and is not, nor is but has not been; but as He never will not be, so He never was not. And He is whole everywhere. And hence it both lives, and is moved, and is in Him; and so it can remember Him. Not because it recollects the having known Him in Adam or anywhere else before the life of this present body, or when it was first made in order to be implanted in this body; for it remembers nothing at all of all this. Whatever there is of this, it has been blotted out by forgetfulness. But it is reminded, that it may be turned to God, as though to that light by which it was in some way touched, even when turned away from Him. For hence it is that even the ungodly think of eternity, and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in the morals of men. And by what rules do they thus judge, except by those wherein they see how men ought to live, even though they themselves do not so live? And where do they see these rules? For they do not see them in their own [moral] nature; since no doubt these things are to be seen by the mind, and their minds are confessedly changeable, but these rules are seen as unchangeable by him who can see them at all; nor yet in the character of their own mind, since these rules are rules of righteousness, and their minds are confessedly unrighteous. Where indeed are these rules written, wherein even the unrighteous recognizes what is righteous, wherein he discerns that he ought to have what he himself has not? Where, then, are they written, unless in the book of that Light which is called Truth? Whence every righteous law is copied and transferred (not by migrating to it, but by being as it were impressed upon it) to the heart of the man that works righteousness; as the impression from a ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring. But he who works not, and yet sees how he ought to work, he is the man that is turned away from that light, which yet touches him. But he who does not even see how he ought to live, sins indeed with more excuse, because he is not a transgressor of a law that he knows; but even he too is just touched sometimes by the splendor of the everywhere present truth, when upon admonition he confesses.

Chapter 16.– How the Image of God is Formed Anew in Man.

Those who are reminded and turn to the Lord from that deformity by which they were conformed to this world through worldly desires are formed anew from the world when they listen to the apostle saying, "Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed in the renewing of your mind." In this way, that image may begin to be formed again by the one who first formed it. For that image cannot form itself again, though it could deform itself. He says elsewhere: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God in righteousness and true holiness." What is meant by "created after God" is expressed in another place as "after the image of God." But the image lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, and through this that image became defaced and tarnished. It recovers these when it is formed again and renewed. But when he says "in the spirit of your mind," he does not mean two separate things, as if mind were one thing and the spirit of the mind another. He speaks this way because all mind is spirit, but not all spirit is mind. For there is also a Spirit who is God, which cannot be renewed because it cannot grow old. We also speak of a spirit in man that is distinct from the mind. To this spirit belong the images that are formed after the likeness of bodies. The apostle speaks of this to the Corinthians when he says, "But if I pray with a tongue, my spirit prays, but my understanding is unfruitful." He speaks this way when what is said is not understood, since it cannot even be said unless the images of bodily articulate sounds come before the oral sound through the thought of the spirit. The soul of man is also called spirit, as shown by the words in the Gospel, "And he bowed his head and gave up his spirit," which signifies the body's death through the spirit leaving it. We also speak of the spirit of an animal, as is clearly written in the book of Solomon called Ecclesiastes: "Who knows the spirit of man that goes upward, and the spirit of the beast that goes downward to the earth?" It is also written in Genesis that by the flood all flesh died which had in it the spirit of life. We also speak of spirit meaning the wind, which is clearly a bodily thing, as in the Psalms: "Fire and hail, snow and ice, the spirit of the storm." Since spirit is a word with so many meanings, the apostle intended to express by "the spirit of the mind" that spirit which is called the mind. Just as the same apostle, when he says, "In putting off the body of the flesh," certainly did not mean two things, as though flesh were one thing and the body of the flesh another. But because body is a name for many things that have no flesh (for besides flesh, there are many celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies), he expressed by "the body of the flesh" that body which is flesh. In the same way, therefore, by "the spirit of the mind" he meant that spirit which is mind. Elsewhere he has even more plainly called it an image, while teaching the same thing in other words. He says, "Putting off the old man with his deeds, put on the new man, which is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of him who created him." Where one passage reads, "Put on the new man, which is created after God," the other has, "Put on the new man, which is renewed after the image of him who created him."

22. But those who, by being reminded, are turned to the Lord from that deformity whereby they were through worldly lusts conformed to this world, are formed anew from the world, when they hearken to the apostle, saying, Be not conformed to this world, but be formed again in the renewing of your mind; that that image may begin to be formed again by Him by whom it had been formed at first. For that image cannot form itself again, as it could deform itself. He says again elsewhere: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put ye on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness. That which is meant by created after God, is expressed in another place by after the image of God. But it lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and tarnished; and this it recovers when it is formed again and renewed. But when he says, In the spirit of your mind, he does not intend to be understood of two things, as though mind were one, and the spirit of the mind another; but he speaks thus, because all mind is spirit, but all spirit is not mind. For there is a Spirit also that is God, which cannot be renewed, because it cannot grow old. And we speak also of a spirit in man distinct from the mind, to which spirit belong the images that are formed after the likeness of bodies; and of this the apostle speaks to the Corinthians, where he says, But if I shall have prayed with a tongue, my spirit prays, but my understanding is unfruitful. For he speaks thus, when that which is said is not understood; since it cannot even be said, unless the images of the corporeal articulate sounds anticipate the oral sound by the thought of the spirit. The soul of man is also called spirit, whence are the words in the Gospel, And He bowed His head, and gave up His spirit; by which the death of the body, through the spirit's leaving it, is signified. We speak also of the spirit of a beast, as it is expressly written in the book of Solomon called Ecclesiastes; Who knows the spirit of man that goes upward, and the spirit of the beast that goes downward to the earth? It is written too in Genesis, where it is said that by the deluge all flesh died which had in it the spirit of life. We speak also of the spirit, meaning the wind, a thing most manifestly corporeal; whence is that in the Psalms, Fire and hail, snow and ice, the spirit of the storm. Since spirit, then, is a word of so many meanings, the apostle intended to express by the spirit of the mind that spirit which is called the mind. As the same apostle also, when he says, In putting off the body of the flesh, certainly did not intend two things, as though flesh were one, and the body of the flesh another; but because body is the name of many things that have no flesh (for besides the flesh, there are many bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial), he expressed by the body of the flesh that body which is flesh. In like manner, therefore, by the spirit of the mind, that spirit which is mind. Elsewhere, too, he has even more plainly called it an image, while enforcing the same thing in other words. Do you, he says, putting off the old man with his deeds, put on the new man, which is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him. Where the one passage reads, Put on the new man, which is created after God, the other has, Put on the new man, which is renewed after the image of Him that created him.

In one place Paul says, "After God," and in another, "After the image of Him that created him." But instead of saying, as in the earlier passages, "In righteousness and true holiness," he later says, "In the knowledge of God." This renewal and reshaping of the mind happens either after God or after the image of God. It is said to be after God so that we don't mistakenly think it happens after some other creature. And it is said to be after the image of God so that we understand this renewal takes place in that part of us where God's image exists—that is, in the mind. It's like when we say that someone who has died as a faithful and righteous person is dead after the body, not after the spirit. What do we mean by "dead after the body" except dead as to the body or in the body, and not dead as to the soul or in the soul? Or if we want to say someone is handsome after the body or strong after the body, not after the mind, what else does this mean except that he is handsome or strong in body, not in mind? The same applies to countless other examples. So we should not understand the words "After the image of Him that created him" as though there were a different image according to which a person is renewed, rather than the very same image which is itself being renewed.

In the one place he says, After God; in the other, After the image of Him that created him. But instead of saying, as in the former passages In righteousness and true holiness, he has put in the latter, In the knowledge of God. This renewal, then, and forming again of the mind, is wrought either after God, or after the image of God. But it is said to be after God, in order that it may not be supposed to be after another creature; and to be after the image of God, in order that this renewing may be understood to take place in that wherein is the image of God, i.e. in the mind. Just as we say, that he who has departed from the body a faithful and righteous man, is dead after the body, not after the spirit. For what do we mean by dead after the body, unless as to the body or in the body, and not dead as to the soul or in the soul? Or if we want to say he is handsome after the body, or strong after the body, not after the mind; what else is this, than that he is handsome or strong in body, not in mind? And the same is the case with numberless other instances. Let us not therefore so understand the words, After the image of Him that created him, as though it were a different image after which he is renewed, and not the very same which is itself renewed.

Chapter 17.– How the Image of God in the Mind is Renewed Until the Likeness of God is Perfected in It in Blessedness.

This renewal certainly does not happen in the single moment of conversion itself, the way renewal in baptism happens in a single moment through the forgiveness of all sins, where not even the smallest sin remains unforgiven. But it is one thing to be freed from a fever, and another to regain strength from the weakness the fever caused. Similarly, it is one thing to pull a weapon out of the body, and another to heal the wound it made through successful treatment. So the first healing is to remove the cause of illness, and this is done by forgiving all sins. But the second healing is to cure the illness itself, and this happens gradually by making progress in renewing that image. These two things are clearly shown in the Psalm where we read, Who forgives all your iniquities, which happens in baptism, and then follows, and heals all your infirmities, and this happens through daily growth as this image is being renewed. The apostle spoke of this very clearly, saying, And though our outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day. And it is renewed in the knowledge of God, that is, in righteousness and true holiness, according to the apostle's testimonies quoted earlier. Therefore, whoever is renewed day by day by making progress in the knowledge of God and in righteousness and true holiness, transfers his love from temporal things to eternal things, from visible things to intelligible things, from fleshly things to spiritual things. And he diligently perseveres in restraining and diminishing his desire for the former and in binding himself by love to the latter. And he does this to the extent that God helps him. For it is God's own statement, Without me you can do nothing. And when the last day of life finds anyone holding fast to faith in the Mediator while making such progress and growth, he will be welcomed by the holy angels to be led to God, whom he has worshipped, and to be perfected by Him. And so he will receive at the end of the world an incorruptible body, not for punishment but for glory. For the likeness of God will then be perfected in this image when the vision of God is perfected. And the Apostle Paul speaks of this: Now we see through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face. And again: But we with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the spirit of the Lord. And this is what happens day by day in those who make good progress.

23. Certainly this renewal does not take place in the single moment of conversion itself, as that renewal in baptism takes place in a single moment by the remission of all sins; for not one, be it ever so small, remains unremitted. But as it is one thing to be free from fever, and another to grow strong again from the infirmity which the fever produced; and one thing again to pluck out of the body a weapon thrust into it, and another to heal the wound thereby made by a prosperous cure; so the first cure is to remove the cause of infirmity, and this is wrought by the forgiving of all sins; but the second cure is to heal the infirmity itself, and this takes place gradually by making progress in the renewal of that image: which two things are plainly shown in the Psalm, where we read, Who forgives all your iniquities, which takes place in baptism; and then follows, and heals all your infirmities; and this takes place by daily additions, while this image is being renewed. And the apostle has spoken of this most expressly, saying, And though our outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day. And it is renewed in the knowledge of God, i.e. in righteousness and true holiness, according to the testimonies of the apostle cited a little before. He, then, who is day by day renewed by making progress in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and true holiness, transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual; and diligently perseveres in bridling and lessening his desire for the former, and in binding himself by love to the latter. And he does this in proportion as he is helped by God. For it is the sentence of God Himself, Without me you can do nothing. And when the last day of life shall have found any one holding fast faith in the Mediator in such progress and growth as this, he will be welcomed by the holy angels, to be led to God, whom he has worshipped, and to be made perfect by Him; and so will receive in the end of the world an incorruptible body, in order not to punishment, but to glory. For the likeness of God will then be perfected in this image, when the sight of God shall be perfected. And of this the Apostle Paul speaks: Now we see through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face. And again: But we with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the spirit of the Lord. And this is what happens from day to day in those that make good progress.

Chapter 18.– Whether the Sentence of John is to Be Understood of Our Future Likeness with the Son of God in the Immortality Itself Also of the Body.

The Apostle John says, "Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He appears, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." From this it appears that the full likeness of God will occur in that image of God when it receives the full sight of God. However, this statement by the Apostle John may also possibly be understood as referring to the immortality of the body. For we shall be like God in this way too, but only like the Son, because He alone in the Trinity took a body in which He died, rose again, and which He carried with Him to heaven above. This is also called an image of the Son of God, in which we shall have an immortal body just as He has, being conformed in this respect not to the image of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Son, because only of Him is it read and received by sound faith that the Word became flesh. For this reason the apostle says, "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren." He is the firstborn certainly from the dead, according to the same apostle, by which death His flesh was sown in dishonor and rose again in glory. According to this image of the Son, to which we are conformed in the body through immortality, we also do what the same apostle speaks of: "As we have borne the image of the earthy, so shall we also bear the image of the heavenly," meaning that we who are mortal after Adam may hold by true faith and sure and certain hope that we shall be immortal after Christ. For we can now bear this same image, not yet in sight but in faith, not yet in fact but in hope. For when the apostle said this, he was speaking of the resurrection of the body.

24. But the Apostle John says, Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it does not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. Hence it appears, that the full likeness of God is to take place in that image of God at that time when it shall receive the full sight of God. And yet this may also possibly seem to be said by the Apostle John of the immortality of the body. For we shall be like to God in this too, but only to the Son, because He only in the Trinity took a body, in which He died and rose again, and which He carried with Him to heaven above. For this, too, is called an image of the Son of God, in which we shall have, as He has, an immortal body, being conformed in this respect not to the image of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Son, because of Him alone is it read and received by a sound faith, that the Word was made flesh. And for this reason the apostle says, Whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren. The first-born certainly from the dead, according to the same apostle; by which death His flesh was sown in dishonor, and rose again in glory. According to this image of the Son, to which we are conformed in the body by immortality, we also do that of which the same apostle speaks, As we have borne the image of the earthy, so shall we also bear the image of the heavenly; to wit, that we who are mortal after Adam, may hold by a true faith, and a sure and certain hope, that we shall be immortal after Christ. For so can we now bear the same image, not yet in sight, but in faith; not yet in fact, but in hope. For the apostle, when he said this, was speaking of the resurrection of the body.

Chapter 19.– John is Rather to Be Understood of Our Perfect Likeness with the Trinity in Life Eternal. Wisdom is Perfected in Happiness.

Chapter 19 – John is Rather to Be Understood of Our Perfect Likeness with the Trinity in Life Eternal. Wisdom is Perfected in Happiness.

25. But regarding that image mentioned in the words "Let us make man after our image and likeness," we believe—and after the most thorough investigation we have been able to make, we understand—that man was made after the image of the Trinity, because the text does not say "After my image" or "After your image." Therefore, that passage of the Apostle John must also be understood according to this image, when he says, "We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is," because he was speaking of the one about whom he had said, "We are the sons of God." The immortality of the flesh will be completed at that moment of the resurrection which the Apostle Paul describes: "In the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." For in that very instant, before the judgment, the spiritual body shall rise in power, in incorruption, in glory—the same body that is now sown as a natural body in weakness, in corruption, in dishonor. But the image that is being renewed in the spirit of the mind through the knowledge of God—not outwardly but inwardly, day by day—shall be perfected by that very vision, which after the judgment will be face to face, but which now progresses as through a glass in an enigma. And we must understand that it is because of this perfection that it is said "we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." For this gift will be given to us at that time when the words "Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you" are spoken. For then the ungodly will be taken away so that they will not see the glory of the Lord, when those on the left hand go into eternal punishment while those on the right go into eternal life. But this is eternal life, as the Truth tells us: "To know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent."

25. But in respect to that image indeed, of which it is said, Let us make man after our image and likeness, we believe — and, after the utmost search we have been able to make, understand — that man was made after the image of the Trinity, because it is not said, After my, or After your image. And therefore that place too of the Apostle John must be understood rather according to this image, when he says, We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is; because he spoke too of Him of whom he had said, We are the sons of God. And the immortality of the flesh will be perfected in that moment of the resurrection, of which the Apostle Paul says, In the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For in that very twinkling of an eye, before the judgment, the spiritual body shall rise again in power, in incorruption, in glory, which is now sown a natural body in weakness, in corruption, in dishonor. But the image which is renewed in the spirit of the mind in the knowledge of God, not outwardly, but inwardly, from day to day, shall be perfected by that sight itself; which then after the judgment shall be face to face, but now makes progress as through a glass in an enigma. And we must understand it to be said on account of this perfection, that we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. For this gift will be given to us at that time, when it shall have been said, Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you. For then will the ungodly be taken away, so that he shall not see the glory of the Lord, when those on the left hand shall go into eternal punishment, while those on the right go into life eternal. But this is eternal life, as the Truth tells us; to know You, He says, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.

This contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom as distinct from knowledge in sacred Scripture — though it is only human wisdom, which man can possess only by receiving it from God, through sharing in whom a rational and intellectual mind can become truly wise — this contemplative wisdom, I say, is what Cicero praises at the end of his dialogue Hortensius. He writes: "While we think about these things night and day, and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, making sure it never grows dull — that is, while we live in philosophy — we who do this have great hope. If this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable, we will still, after fulfilling our human duties, have a pleasant ending, a painless extinction, and something like a rest from life. Or if, on the other hand, as ancient philosophers believed (and the greatest and most famous ones at that), we have eternal and divine souls, then we must surely think that the more they have always stayed in their proper course — that is, in reason and in the desire for inquiry — and the less they have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of human beings, the easier their ascent and return to heaven will be." Then he adds this brief statement and finishes his argument by repeating it: "Therefore, to finally end my discourse, whether we wish for a tranquil extinction after living in pursuit of these subjects, or to migrate without delay from this present home to another far better one, we must devote all our labor and effort to these pursuits." Here I am amazed that such an intelligent man would promise people living in philosophy (which makes humanity blessed through contemplation of truth) a pleasant ending after completing their human duties, if this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable. It's as if something we did not love, or rather fiercely hated, would then die and come to nothing, making its ending pleasant for us! But he had not actually learned this from the philosophers he praises so highly. Rather, this view smells of the New Academy, where he was pleased to doubt even the most obvious things. But from the philosophers who were the greatest and most famous, as he himself admits, he had learned that souls are eternal. For eternal souls are rightly encouraged to be found in their proper course when the end of this life comes — that is, in reason and in the desire for inquiry — and to mix and entangle themselves less in the vices and errors of human beings, so they may have an easier return to God. But this course consisting in the love and investigation of truth is not sufficient for the wretched, that is, for all mortals who have only this kind of reason and lack faith in the Mediator. I have taken pains to prove this, as much as I could, in earlier books of this work, especially in the fourth and thirteenth.

26. This contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom as distinct from knowledge in the sacred writings; but wisdom only of man, which yet man has not except from Him, by partaking of whom a rational and intellectual mind can be made truly wise — this contemplative wisdom, I say, it is that Cicero commends, in the end of the dialogue Hortensius, when he says: While, then, we consider these things night and day, and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, taking care that it be not ever dulled, that is, while we live in philosophy; we, I say, in so doing, have great hope that, if, on the one hand, this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable, we shall still, when we have discharged our human offices, have a pleasant setting, and a not painful extinction, and as it were a rest from life: or if, on the other, as ancient philosophers thought — and those, too, the greatest and far the most celebrated — we have souls eternal and divine, then must we needs think, that the more these shall have always kept in their own proper course, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and the less they shall have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the more easy ascent and return they will have to heaven. And then he says, adding this short sentence, and finishing his discourse by repeating it: Wherefore, to end my discourse at last, if we wish either for a tranquil extinction, after living in the pursuit of these subjects, or if to migrate without delay from this present home to another in no little measure better, we must bestow all our labor and care upon these pursuits. And here I marvel, that a man of such great ability should promise to men living in philosophy, which makes man blessed by contemplation of truth, a pleasant setting after the discharge of human offices, if this our sentiment and wisdom is mortal and perishable; as if that which we did not love, or rather which we fiercely hated, were then to die and come to nothing, so that its setting would be pleasant to us! But indeed he had not learned this from the philosophers, whom he extols with great praise; but this sentiment is redolent of that New Academy, wherein it pleased him to doubt of even the plainest things. But from the philosophers that were greatest and far most celebrated, as he himself confesses, he had learned that souls are eternal. For souls that are eternal are not unsuitably stirred up by the exhortation to be found in their own proper course, when the end of this life shall have come, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and to mix and entangle themselves the less in the vices and errors of men, in order that they may have an easier return to God. But that course which consists in the love and investigation of truth does not suffice for the wretched, i.e. for all mortals who have only this kind of reason, and are without faith in the Mediator; as I have taken pains to prove, as much as I could, in former books of this work, especially in the fourth and thirteenth.


On the Trinity — Book XIII

Faith, knowledge of temporal things and the work of redemption: why God freed us by the justice of Christ’s death rather than by power alone.

The inquiry is prosecuted respecting knowledge, in which, as distinguished from wisdom, Augustine had begun in the former book to look for a kind of trinity. And occasion is taken of commending Christian faith, and of explaining how the faith of believers is one and common. Next, that all desire blessedness, yet that all have not the faith whereby we arrive at blessedness; and that this faith is defined in Christ, who in the flesh rose from the dead; and that no one is set free from the dominion of the devil through forgiveness of sins, save through Him. It is shown also at length that it was needful that the devil should be conquered by Christ, not by power, but by righteousness. Finally, that when the words of this faith are committed to memory, there is in the mind a kind of trinity, since there are, first, in the memory the sounds of the words, and this even when the man is not thinking of them; and next, the mind's eye of his recollection is formed thereupon when he thinks of them; and, lastly, the will, when he so thinks and remembers, combines both.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130113.htm>.

Contents · 20 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– The Attempt is Made to Distinguish Out of the Scriptures the Offices of Wisdom and of Knowledge. That in the Beginning of John Some Things that are Said Belong to Wisdom, Some to Knowledge. Some Things There are Only Known by the Help of Faith. How We See the Faith that is in Us. In the Same Narrative of John, Some Things are Known by the Sense of the Body, Others Only by the Reason of the Mind.
  2. Chapter 2.– Faith a Thing of the Heart, Not of the Body; How It is Common and One and the Same in All Believers. The Faith of Believers is One, No Otherwise than the Will of Those Who Will is One.
  3. Chapter 3.– Some Desires Being the Same in All, are Known to Each. The Poet Ennius.
  4. Chapter 4.– The Will to Possess Blessedness is One in All, But the Variety of Wills is Very Great Concerning that Blessedness Itself.
  5. Chapter 5.– Of the Same Thing.
  6. Chapter 6.– Why, When All Will to Be Blessed, that is Rather Chosen by Which One Withdraws from Being So.
  7. Chapter 7.– Faith is Necessary, that Man May at Some Time Be Blessed, Which He Will Only Attain in the Future Life. The Blessedness of Proud Philosophers Ridiculous and Pitiable.
  8. Chapter 8.– Blessedness Cannot Exist Without Immortality.
  9. Chapter 9.– We Say that Future Blessedness is Truly Eternal, Not Through Human Reasonings, But by the Help of Faith. The Immortality of Blessedness Becomes Credible from the Incarnation of the Son of God.
  10. Chapter 10.– There Was No Other More Suitable Way of Freeing Man from the Misery of Mortality Than The Incarnation of the Word. The Merits Which are Called Ours are the Gifts of God.
  11. Chapter 11.– A Difficulty, How We are Justitified in the Blood of the Son of God.
  12. Chapter 12.– All, on Account of the Sin of Adam, Were Delivered into the Power of the Devil.
  13. Chapter 13.– Man Was to Be Rescued from the Power of the Devil, Not by Power, But by Righteousness.
  14. Chapter 14.– The Unobligated Death of Christ Has Freed Those Who Were Liable to Death.
  15. Chapter 15.– Of the Same Subject.
  16. Chapter 16.– The Remains of Death and the Evil Things of the World Turn to Good for the Elect. How Fitly the Death of Christ Was Chosen, that We Might Be Justified in His Blood. What the Anger of God is.
  17. Chapter 17.– Other Advantages of the Incarnation.
  18. Chapter 18.– Why the Son of God Took Man Upon Himself from the Race of Adam, and from a Virgin.
  19. Chapter 19.– What in the Incarnate Word Belongs to Knowledge, What to Wisdom.
  20. Chapter 20.– What Has Been Treated of in This Book. How We Have Reached by Steps to a Certain Trinity, Which is Found in Practical Knowledge and True Faith.

Chapter 1.– The Attempt is Made to Distinguish Out of the Scriptures the Offices of Wisdom and of Knowledge. That in the Beginning of John Some Things that are Said Belong to Wisdom, Some to Knowledge. Some Things There are Only Known by the Help of Faith. How We See the Faith that is in Us. In the Same Narrative of John, Some Things are Known by the Sense of the Body, Others Only by the Reason of the Mind.

In the previous book, the twelfth of this work, we sufficiently distinguished between the rational mind's function in temporal matters, where both our knowing and our action are involved, and the same mind's more excellent function, which is used in contemplating eternal things and is limited to knowing alone. However, I think it would be more helpful if I included something from the Holy Scriptures that would make it easier to distinguish between these two functions.

1. In the book before this, viz. the twelfth of this work, we have done enough to distinguish the office of the rational mind in temporal things, wherein not only our knowing but our action is concerned, from the more excellent office of the same mind, which is employed in contemplating eternal things, and is limited to knowing alone. But I think it more convenient that I should insert somewhat out of the Holy Scriptures, by which the two may more easily be distinguished.

John the Evangelist began his Gospel this way: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father), full of grace and truth. This entire passage I have quoted from the Gospel contains in its earlier parts what is unchangeable and eternal, the contemplation of which makes us blessed. But in the later parts, eternal things are mentioned together with temporal things. Therefore, some things here belong to knowledge, and some to wisdom, according to the distinction we made in the twelfth book. The words In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not require the contemplative life and must be understood by the intellectual mind. The more anyone has advanced in this, the wiser he will undoubtedly become. But because of the verse The light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not, faith was certainly necessary so that what was not seen might be believed. By darkness John meant the hearts of mortals turned away from this kind of light and scarcely able to see it. For this reason he adds, There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. Here we come to something that happened in time and belongs to knowledge, which deals with understanding facts. We think of the man John according to the mental image impressed on our memory from our concept of human nature. Whether people believe or not, they think of this in the same way. Both alike know what a man is. They have learned about the outer part, the body, through their bodily eyes. They possess knowledge of the inner part, the soul, within themselves because they are also human and through interaction with other people. Thus they are able to understand what is said, There was a man, whose name was John, because they also know names through the exchange of speech. But the phrase sent from God is held by those who accept it at all through faith. Those who do not hold it by faith either waver in doubt or dismiss it with unbelief. Yet both groups, if they are not among those extremely foolish ones who say in their heart There is no God, think about both things when they hear these words—both what God is and what it means to be sent from God. If they do not think about these things as they truly are, they at least do so as best they can.

2. John the Evangelist has thus begun his Gospel: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father), full of grace and truth. This entire passage, which I have here taken from the Gospel, contains in its earlier portions what is immutable and eternal, the contemplation of which makes us blessed; but in those which follow, eternal things are mentioned in conjunction with temporal things. And hence some things there belong to knowledge, some to wisdom, according to our previous distinction in the twelfth book. For the words — In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not: — require a contemplative life, and must be discerned by the intellectual mind; and the more any one has profited in this, the wiser without doubt will he become. But on account of the verse, The light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not, faith certainly was necessary, whereby that which was not seen might be believed. For by darkness he intended to signify the hearts of mortals turned away from light of this kind, and hardly able to behold it; for which reason he subjoins, There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. But here we come to a thing that was done in time, and belongs to knowledge, which is comprised in the cognizance of facts. And we think of the man John under that phantasy which is impressed on our memory from the notion of human nature. And whether men believe or not, they think this in the same manner. For both alike know what man is, the outer part of whom, that is, his body, they have learned through the eyes of the body; but of the inner, that is, the soul, they possess the knowledge in themselves, because they also themselves are men, and through intercourse with men; so that they are able to think what is said, There was a man, whose name was John, because they know the names also by interchange of speech. But that which is there also, viz. sent from God, they who hold at all, hold by faith; and they who do not hold it by faith, either hesitate through doubt, or deride it through unbelief. Yet both, if they are not in the number of those over-foolish ones, who say in their heart There is no God, when they hear these words, think both things, viz. both what God is, and what it is to be sent from God; and if they do not do this as the things themselves really are, they do it at any rate as they can.

We also know the faith itself that exists in our own heart through sources other than Scripture. A person sees whether faith is present in their heart if they believe, or not present if they don't believe. But we don't know it the way we know physical objects that we see with our bodily eyes and can still think about when they're absent by using the mental images of them stored in memory. Nor do we know it like things we haven't seen but somehow construct in our minds from things we have seen, storing them in memory so we can recall them whenever we want and similarly recognize them through recollection—or rather recognize the mental images of them, whatever sort of images we've fixed in our memory. Nor again do we know it like we know a living person, whose soul we don't actually see but infer from our own soul, and from their bodily movements we mentally gaze upon the living person as we have learned to do through sight. Faith is not seen this way in the heart where it exists, by the person whose faith it is. Rather, completely certain knowledge grasps it, and conscience declares it. So even though we are commanded to believe this account because we cannot see what we're commanded to believe, we do see faith itself within ourselves when that faith is in us. This is because faith in absent things is present, faith in things outside us is within us, and faith in things not seen is itself seen. Yet faith still comes into people's hearts in time. And if some people stop being faithful and become unbelievers, faith perishes from them. Sometimes faith is even placed in false things, as when we say "I put faith in him, and he deceived me." This kind of faith, if it should even be called faith, rightly perishes from the heart without blame when truth is found and drives it out. But faith in things that are true passes, as one would wish, into the things themselves. For we shouldn't say that faith perishes when the things that were believed are seen. Can it still be called faith when, according to the definition in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith is the evidence of things not seen?

3. Further, we know from other sources the faith itself which a man sees to be in his own heart, if he believes, or not to be there, if he does not believe: but not as we know bodies, which we see with the bodily eyes, and think of even when absent through the images of themselves which we retain in memory; nor yet as those things which we have not seen, and which we frame howsoever we can in thought from those which we have seen, and commit them to memory, that we may recur to them when we will, in order that therein we may similarly by recollection discern them, or rather discern the images of them, of whatever sort these are which we have fixed there; nor again as a living man, whose soul we do not indeed see, but conjecture from our own, and from corporeal motions gaze also in thought upon the living man, as we have learned him by sight. Faith as not so seen in the heart in which it is, by him whose it is; but most certain knowledge holds it fast, and conscience proclaims it. Although therefore we are bidden to believe in this account, because we cannot see what we are bidden to believe; nevertheless we see faith itself in ourselves, when that faith is in us; because faith even in absent things is present, and faith in things which are without us is within, and faith in things which are not seen is itself seen, and itself none the less comes into the hearts of men in time; and if any cease to be faithful and become unbelievers, then it perishes from them. And sometimes faith is accommodated even to falsehoods; for we sometimes so speak as to say, I put faith in him, and he deceived me. And this kind of faith, if indeed it too is to be called faith, perishes from the heart without blame, when truth is found and expels it. But faith in things that are true, passes, as one should wish it to pass, into the things themselves. For we must not say that faith perishes, when those things which were believed are seen. For is it indeed still to be called faith, when faith, according to the definition in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is the evidence of things not seen?

In the words that follow, "The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe," the action, as we have said, takes place in time. For bearing witness even to something that is eternal, like that light which is intelligible, is something done in time. John came to bear witness to this, though he was not that Light but was sent to bear witness of that Light. For he adds, "That was the true Light that lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not." Now those who know the Latin language understand all these words from things they already know. Some of these things have become known to us through the senses of the body, such as man, or the world itself, whose vastness is so evident to our sight. The sounds of the words themselves also come through hearing, which is a bodily sense. Other things come through the reason of the mind, such as what is said in "And His own received Him not," for this means they did not believe in Him. What belief is, we do not know by any bodily sense but by the reason of the mind. We have learned the meanings of these words, not just their sounds, partly through the sense of the body and partly through the reason of the mind. We have not heard these words for the first time now but had heard them before. We were retaining them in our memory as known things, and we recognized here not only the words themselves but also what they meant. When the two-syllable word "mundus" is uttered, something that is certainly corporeal—a sound—becomes known through the body, that is, through the ear. But what it means has also become known through the body, that is, through the eyes of the flesh. For insofar as the world is known to us at all, it is known through sight. But the four-syllable word "crediderunt" reaches us as a sound through the ear of the flesh, since sound is a corporeal thing. But its meaning cannot be discovered by any bodily sense, only by the reason of the mind. For unless we knew through the mind what the word "crediderunt" meant, we would not understand what they did not do, those of whom it is said, "And His own received Him not." The sound of the word rings upon the ears of the body from outside and reaches the sense called hearing. The form of man is both known to us in ourselves and is presented to the bodily senses from outside in other men: to the eyes when it is seen, to the ears when it is heard, to the touch when it is held and touched. It also has its image in our memory, incorporeal indeed but like the body. Finally, the wonderful beauty of the world itself is present from outside both to our gaze and to that sense called touch when we come in contact with any part of it. This also has its image within our memory, to which we return when we think of it either enclosed in a room or in darkness. But we have already spoken sufficiently in the eleventh book about these images of corporeal things, which are incorporeal yet have the likeness of bodies and belong to the life of the outer man. But we are now treating of the inner man and of his knowledge, namely that knowledge which concerns things temporal and changeable. When anything is taken up for the purpose and scope of this knowledge, even from things belonging to the outer man, it must be taken up so that something may be taught from it which helps rational knowledge. Therefore the rational use of those things which we have in common with irrational animals belongs to the inner man, nor can it rightly be said that this is common to us with the irrational animals.

4. In the words which follow next, The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe; the action, as we have said, is one done in time. For to bear witness even to that which is eternal, as is that light that is intelligible, is a thing done in time. And of this it was that John came to bear witness who was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. For he adds That was the true Light that lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. Now they who know the Latin language, understand all these words, from those things which they know: and of these, some have become known to us through the senses of the body, as man, as the world itself, of which the greatness is so evident to our sight; as again the sounds of the words themselves, for hearing also is a sense of the body; and some through the reason of the mind, as that which is said, And His own received Him not; for this means, that they did not believe in Him; and what belief is, we do not know by any sense of the body, but by the reason of the mind. We have learned, too, not the sounds, but the meanings of the words themselves, partly through the sense of the body, partly through the reason of the mind. Nor have we now heard those words for the first time, but they are words we had heard before. And we were retaining in our memory as things known, and we here recognized, not only the words themselves, but also what they meant. For when the bisyllabic word mundus is uttered, then something that is certainly corporeal, for it is a sound, has become known through the body, that is, through the ear. But that which it means also, has become known through the body, that is, through the eyes of the flesh. For so far as the world is known to us at all, it is known through sight. But the quadri-syllabic word crediderunt reaches us, so far as its sound, since that is a corporeal thing, through the ear of the flesh; but its meaning is discoverable by no sense of the body, but by the reason of the mind. For unless we knew through the mind what the word crediderunt meant, we should not understand what they did not do, of whom it is said, And His own received Him not. The sound then of the word rings upon the ears of the body from without, and reaches the sense which is called hearing. The species also of man is both known to us in ourselves, and is presented to the senses of the body from without, in other men; to the eyes, when it is seen; to the ears, when it is heard; to the touch, when it is held and touched; and it has, too, its image in our memory, incorporeal indeed, but like the body. Lastly, the wonderful beauty of the world itself is at hand from without, both to our gaze, and to that sense which is called touch, if we come in contact with any of it: and this also has its image within in our memory, to which we revert, when we think of it either in the enclosure of a room, or again in darkness. But we have already sufficiently spoken in the eleventh book of these images of corporeal things; incorporeal indeed, yet having the likeness of bodies, and belonging to the life of the outer man. But we are treating now of the inner man, and of his knowledge, namely, that knowledge which is of things temporal and changeable; into the purpose and scope of which, when anything is assumed, even of things belonging to the outer man, it must be assumed for this end, that something may thence be taught which may help rational knowledge. And hence the rational use of those things which we have in common with irrational animals belongs to the inner man; neither can it rightly be said that this is common to us with the irrational animals.

Chapter 2.– Faith a Thing of the Heart, Not of the Body; How It is Common and One and the Same in All Believers. The Faith of Believers is One, No Otherwise than the Will of Those Who Will is One.

Faith, which we must discuss at greater length in this book because of how we've arranged our subject, is what distinguishes the faithful from unbelievers—those who did not receive the Son of God when He came to His own people. Although faith comes to us through hearing, it does not belong to the bodily sense called hearing, since it is not a sound. It does not belong to the eyes of our flesh, since it is neither color nor bodily form. It does not belong to touch, since it has no physical substance. In fact, it does not belong to any bodily sense at all, since it is a thing of the heart, not of the body. It is not outside us but deeply within us. No one sees it in another person, but each person sees it only in himself. Finally, faith can be faked through pretense and can be thought to exist in someone who does not actually have it. Therefore, everyone sees his own faith in himself but does not see—rather, believes—that it exists in another. He believes this more firmly the more he recognizes the fruits that faith produces through love. This faith is common to all of whom the evangelist adds: "But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name, which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." It is common, I say, not in the way a bodily object's form is common to the eyes of all who see it—where somehow the gaze of all who look at it is shaped by the same single form—but rather as the human face can be said to be common to all humans. We say this even though each person certainly has his own face. We can say with complete truth that the faith of believers is impressed from one teaching upon the heart of each individual person who believes the same thing. But what is believed is different from the faith by which it is believed. What is believed concerns things that are said either to exist, to have existed, or to be going to exist. But faith itself is in the mind of the believer and is visible only to the one who possesses it. Although faith itself is not visible in others, a faith similar to it exists in them. It is not numerically one but one in kind. Yet because of the similarity and absence of any difference, we call it one rather than many. When we see two people who look remarkably alike, we marvel and say that both have one face. Likewise, it is easier to say that the souls were many—a separate soul for each person, of course—of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they were of one soul, than it would be for anyone to dare say, where the apostle speaks of one faith, that there are as many faiths as there are faithful people. Yet He who says "O woman, great is your faith" and to another "O you of little faith, why did you doubt?" indicates that each person has his own faith. But the similar faith of believers is called one in the same way that the similar will of those who will the same thing is called one. In the case of those who have the same will, each person's will is visible to himself but not to the other, even though they will the same thing. If one person's will reveals itself through any signs, it is believed rather than seen. But each person, being conscious of his own mind, certainly does not believe but clearly sees directly that this is his own will.

5. But faith, of which we are compelled, by reason of the arrangement of our subject, to dispute somewhat more at length in this book: faith I say, which they who have are called the faithful, and they who have not, unbelievers, as were those who did not receive the Son of God coming to His own; although it is wrought in us by hearing, yet does not belong to that sense of the body which is called hearing, since it is not a sound; nor to the eyes of this our flesh, since it is neither color nor bodily form; nor to that which is called touch, since it has nothing of bulk; nor to any sense of the body at all, since it is a thing of the heart, not of the body; nor is it without apart from us, but deeply seated within us; nor does any man see it in another, but each one in himself. Lastly, it is a thing that can both be feigned by pretence, and be thought to be in him in whom it is not. Therefore every one sees his own faith in himself; but does not see, but believes, that it is in another; and believes this the more firmly, the more he knows the fruits of it, which faith is wont to work by love. And therefore this faith is common to all of whom the evangelist subjoins, But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; common I say, not as any form of a bodily object is common, as regards sight, to the eyes of all to whom it is present, for in some way the gaze of all that behold it is informed by the same one form; but as the human countenance can be said to be common to all men; for this is so said that yet each certainly has his own. We say certainly with perfect truth, that the faith of believers is impressed from one doctrine upon the heart of each several person who believes the same thing. But that which is believed is a different thing from the faith by which it is believed. For the former is in things which are said either to be, or to have been or to be about to be; but the latter is in the mind of the believer, and is visible to him only whose it is; although not indeed itself but a faith like it, is also in others. For it is not one in number, but in kind; yet on account of the likeness, and the absence of all difference, we rather call it one than many. For when, too, we see two men exceedingly alike, we wonder, and say that both have one countenance. It is therefore more easily said that the souls were many — a several soul, of course, for each several person — of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles, that they were of one soul, — than it is, where the apostle speaks of one faith, for any one to venture to say that there are as many faiths as there are faithful. And yet He who says, O woman, great is your faith; and to another, O you of little faith, wherefore did you doubt? intimates that each has his own faith. But the like faith of believers is said to be one, in the same way as a like will of those who will is said to be one; since in the case also of those who have the same will, the will of each is visible to himself, but that of the other is not visible, although he wills the same thing; and if it intimate itself by any signs, it is believed rather than seen. But each being conscious of his own mind certainly does not believe, but manifestly sees outright, that this is his own will.

Chapter 3.– Some Desires Being the Same in All, are Known to Each. The Poet Ennius.

There is such a closely harmonizing agreement in the same nature living and using reason that although one person does not know what another person wills, there are still some wills common to all which are also known to each individual. And although each person does not know what any other single person wills, yet in some matters he may know what everyone wills. This explains the story of the comic actor's clever joke. He promised that he would say in the theater, during some other play, what everyone had in their minds and what everyone willed. When an even larger crowd had gathered on the appointed day, filled with great expectation, everyone waiting in suspense and silence, he is said to have declared: You will to buy cheap and sell dear. Though he was merely an actor, everyone recognized in his words what they themselves were conscious of, and they applauded him with remarkable goodwill for saying publicly before everyone what was admittedly true, yet what no one had expected. And why was such great expectation raised by his promise to say what the will of all was, unless because no one knows the wills of other people? But did he not know that will? Is there anyone who does not know it? Yet why is this so, unless because there are some things which each person can reasonably infer to be in others from himself, through sympathy or agreement either in vice or virtue? But it is one thing to see one's own will; it is another thing to infer, however certainly, what another person's will is. For in human affairs, I am as certain that Rome was built as that Constantinople was, although I have seen Rome with my own eyes but know nothing of the other city except what I have believed on the testimony of others. And truly that comic actor believed it to be common to all to will to buy cheap and sell dear, either by observing himself or by testing it on others as well. But since such a will is in truth a fault, everyone can attain the opposing virtue, or fall into the mischief of some other fault which is contrary to it, by which to resist and conquer it. For I myself know of a case where a manuscript was offered to a man for purchase, who perceived that the seller was ignorant of its value and was therefore asking a very small price, and who then gave him, though he was not expecting it, the just price, which was much greater. Consider even the case of a man possessed by such great wickedness that he sells cheap what his parents left to him and buys dear in order to waste it on his own lusts. Such reckless extravagance, I think, is not unbelievable. If such men are sought, they may be found, or even encountered without being sought—men who, by a wickedness greater than that of the theater, mock the theatrical proposition or declaration by buying dishonor at a great price while selling lands at a small one. We have also heard of people who, for the sake of distribution, have bought grain at a higher price and sold it to their fellow citizens at a lower one. And notice also what the old poet Ennius has said: that all mortals wish themselves to be praised. In this, doubtless, he inferred what was in others both from himself and from those whom he knew by experience, and so seems to have declared what all people will. Finally, if that comic actor himself had also said, You all will to be praised, none of you wills to be abused, he would have seemed likewise to have expressed what all will. Yet there are some who hate their own faults and do not desire to be praised by others for that for which they are displeased with themselves, and who thank the kindness of those who rebuke them when the purpose of that rebuke is their own correction. But if he had said, You all will to be blessed, you do not will to be wretched, he would have said something which there is no one who would not recognize in his own will. For whatever else a person may will secretly, he does not withdraw from that will which is well known to all people and well known to be in all people.

6. There is, indeed, so closely conspiring a harmony in the same nature living and using reason, that although one knows not what the other wills, yet there are some wills of all which are also known to each; and although each man does not know what any other one man wills, yet in some things he may know what all will. And hence comes that story of the comic actor's witty joke, who promised that he would say in the theatre, in some other play, what all had in their minds, and what all willed; and when a still greater crowd had come together on the day appointed, with great expectation, all being in suspense and silent, is affirmed to have said: You will to buy cheap, and sell dear. And mean actor though he was, yet all in his words recognized what themselves were conscious of, and applauded him with wonderful goodwill, for saying before the eyes of all what was confessedly true, yet what no one looked for. And why was so great expectation raised by his promising that he would say what was the will of all, unless because no man knows the wills of other men? But did not he know that will? Is there any one who does not know it? Yet why, unless because there are some things which not unfitly each conjectures from himself to be in others, through sympathy or agreement either in vice or virtue? But it is one thing to see one's own will; another to conjecture, however certainly, what is another's. For, in human affairs, I am as certain that Rome was built as that Constantinople was, although I have seen Rome with my eyes, but know nothing of the other city, except what I have believed on the testimony of others. And truly that comic actor believed it to be common to all to will to buy cheap and sell dear, either by observing himself or by making experiment also of others. But since such a will is in truth a fault, every one can attain the counter virtue, or run into the mischief of some other fault which is contrary to it, whereby to resist and conquer it. For I myself know a case where a manuscript was offered to a man for purchase, who perceived that the vendor was ignorant of its value, and was therefore asking something very small, and who thereupon gave him, though not expecting it, the just price, which was much more. Suppose even the case of a man possessed with wickedness so great as to sell cheap what his parents left to him, and to buy dear, in order to waste it on his own lusts? Such wanton extravagance, I fancy, is not incredible; and if such men are sought, they may be found, or even fall in one's way although not sought; who, by a wickedness more than that of the theatre, make a mock of the theatrical proposition or declaration, by buying dishonor at a great price, while selling lands at a small one. We have heard, too, of persons that, for the sake of distribution, have bought grain at a higher price, and sold it to their fellow citizens at a lower one. And note also what the old poet Ennius has said: that all mortals wish themselves to be praised; wherein, doubtless, he conjectured what was in others, both by himself, and by those whom he knew by experience; and so seems to have declared what it is that all men will. Lastly, if that comic actor himself, too, had said, You all will to be praised, no one of you wills to be abused; he would have seemed in like manner to have expressed what all will. Yet there are some who hate their own faults, and do not desire to be praised by others for that for which they are displeased with themselves; and who thank the kindness of those who rebuke them, when the purpose of that rebuke is their own amendment. But if he had said, You all will to be blessed, you do not will to be wretched; he would have said something which there is no one that would not recognize in his own will. For whatever else a man may will secretly, he does not withdraw from that will, which is well known to all men, and well known to be in all men.

Chapter 4.– The Will to Possess Blessedness is One in All, But the Variety of Wills is Very Great Concerning that Blessedness Itself.

It is remarkable that while the desire to obtain and keep blessedness is the same in everyone, there exists such great variety and diversity of opinions about what blessedness actually is. It's not that anyone is unwilling to have it, but rather that not everyone knows what it is. If everyone knew it, some wouldn't think it consists in goodness of mind, others in bodily pleasure, others in both, with some placing it in one thing and others in another. People locate the blessed life in whatever they find particularly delightful. How then can everyone love so intensely something that not everyone knows? Who can love what he doesn't know? I've already addressed this question in the previous books. Why, then, is blessedness loved by everyone when it isn't known by everyone? Perhaps everyone knows what it is in itself, but not everyone knows where it is to be found, and this is where the disagreement comes from? It's as if we were talking about some location in this world where anyone who wants to live blessedly should want to live, and as if the question of where blessedness is found weren't part of the question of what it is. Certainly, if it's in bodily pleasure, then the person who enjoys bodily pleasure is blessed; if in goodness of mind, then the one who enjoys this is blessed; if in both, then the one who enjoys both. So when one person says that living blessedly means enjoying bodily pleasure, and another says it means enjoying goodness of mind, don't both either know or not know what the blessed life is? How then can both love it if no one can love what he doesn't know? Or is perhaps that assumption false which we took to be most true and certain, namely that all people want to live blessedly? For if living blessedly means, for example, living according to goodness of mind, how does someone who doesn't want this still want to live blessedly? Shouldn't we say more truthfully that such a person doesn't want to live blessedly, because he doesn't wish to live according to goodness, which alone is living blessedly? Therefore not all people want to live blessedly; on the contrary, few want it, if living blessedly is nothing other than living according to goodness of mind, which many don't want to do. Should we then consider false that statement which even the Academic Cicero himself didn't doubt (though Academics doubt everything)? When he wanted in his dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing that no one doubted, from which to begin his argument, he says, "We certainly all want to be blessed." I certainly won't say this is false. But what then? Should we say that, although there is no other way of living blessedly than living according to goodness of mind, even someone who doesn't want this still wants to live blessedly? This indeed seems too absurd. It would be like saying, "Even someone who doesn't want to live blessedly wants to live blessedly." Who could listen to or tolerate such a contradiction? And yet logic forces us into this tight spot if it's both true that everyone wants to live blessedly and yet not everyone wants to live in the only way that one can live blessedly.

7. It is wonderful, however, since the will to obtain and retain blessedness is one in all, whence comes, on the other hand, such a variety and diversity of wills concerning that blessedness itself; not that any one is unwilling to have it, but that all do not know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to be in goodness of mind; by others, in pleasure of body; by others, in both; and by some in one thing, by others in another. For as men find special delight in this thing or that, so have they placed in it their idea of a blessed life. How, then, do all love so warmly what not all know? Who can love what he does not know?– a subject which I have already discussed in the preceding books. Why, therefore, is blessedness loved by all, when it is not known by all? Is it perhaps that all know what it is itself, but all do not know where it is to be found, and that the dispute arises from this?– as if, forsooth, the business was about some place in this world, where every one ought to will to live who wills to live blessedly; and as if the question where blessedness is were not implied in the question what it is. For certainly, if it is in the pleasure of the body, he is blessed who enjoys the pleasure of the body; if in goodness of mind, he has it who enjoys this; if in both, he who enjoys both. When, therefore, one says, to live blessedly is to enjoy the pleasure of the body; but another, to live blessedly is to enjoy goodness of mind; is it not, that either both know, or both do not know, what a blessed life is? How, then, do both love it, if no one can love what he does not know? Or is that perhaps false which we have assumed to be most true and most certain, viz. that all men will to live blessedly? For if to live blessedly is, for argument's sake, to live according to goodness of mind, how does he will to live blessedly who does not will this? Should we not say more truly, That man does not will to live blessedly, because he does not wish to live according to goodness, which alone is to live blessedly? Therefore all men do not will to live blessedly; on the contrary, few wish it; if to live blessedly is nothing else but to live according to goodness of mind, which many do not will to do. Shall we, then, hold that to be false of which the Academic Cicero himself did not doubt (although Academics doubt every thing), who, when he wanted in the dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing, of which no one doubted, from which to start his argument, says, We certainly all will to be blessed? Far be it from me to say this is false. But what then? Are we to say that, although there is no other way of living blessedly than living according to goodness of mind, yet even he who does not will this, wills to live blessedly? This, indeed, seems too absurd. For it is much as if we should say, Even he who does not will to live blessedly, wills to live blessedly. Who could listen to, who could endure, such a contradiction? And yet necessity thrusts us into this strait, if it is both true that all will to live blessedly, and yet all do not will to live in that way in which alone one can live blessedly.

Chapter 5.– Of the Same Thing.

Or perhaps the solution to our problem is this: since we have said that everyone places his idea of a blessed life in whatever has pleased him most—as pleasure pleased Epicurus, and goodness pleased Zeno, and something else pleased other people—we might say that to live blessedly is nothing other than to live according to one's own pleasure, so that it is not false that all people will to live blessedly, because all will whatever pleases each person. If this too had been announced to the people in the theatre, all would have found it in their own wills. But when Cicero also proposed this as an objection to himself, he refuted it in such a way as to make those who thought this blush with shame. For he says: But look, people who are not philosophers, but who are nevertheless ready to argue, say that all are blessed whoever live as they will—which is what we mean by "as pleases each." But shortly afterward he added: But this is indeed false. For to will what is not fitting is itself most miserable; nor is it so miserable not to obtain what one wills, as to will to obtain what one ought not. He speaks most excellently and altogether most truly. For who can be so blind in his mind, so alienated from all light of decency, and wrapped up in the darkness of indecency, as to call someone blessed because he lives as he wills, who lives wickedly and disgracefully; and with no one restraining him, no one punishing, and no one even daring to blame him—indeed, with most people even praising him, since, as divine Scripture says, "The wicked is praised in his heart's desire, and he who works iniquity is blessed"—gratifies all his most criminal and flagitious desires? Surely, although even so he would be wretched, yet he would be less wretched if he could have had none of those things which he had wrongly willed. For everyone is made wretched by a wicked will alone, even if it remains only a will; but he is made more wretched by the power through which the longing of a wicked will is fulfilled. And therefore, since it is true that all people will to be blessed, and that they seek this one thing with the most ardent love, and for the sake of this seek everything else which they seek; nor can anyone love that of which he knows nothing at all, what it is or what sort it is, nor can he be ignorant of what that is which he knows he wills; it follows that all people know a blessed life. But all who are blessed have what they will, although not all who have what they will are therefore blessed. But those are immediately wretched who either do not have what they will, or have what they do not rightly will. Therefore he alone is a blessed man who both has all things which he wills and wills nothing ill.

8. Or is, perhaps, the deliverance from our difficulties to be found in this, that, since we have said that every one places his idea of a blessed life in that which has most pleased him, as pleasure pleased Epicurus, and goodness Zeno, and something else pleased other people, we say that to live blessedly is nothing else but to live according to one's own pleasure: so that it is not false that all will to live blessedly, because all will that which pleases each? For if this, too, had been proclaimed to the people in the theatre, all would have found it in their own wills. But when Cicero, too, had propounded this in opposition to himself, he so refuted it as to make them blush who thought so. For he says: But, behold! people who are not indeed philosophers, but who yet are prompt to dispute, say that all are blessed, whoever live as they will; which is what we mean by, as pleases each. But by and by he has subjoined: But this is indeed false. For to will what is not fitting, is itself most miserable; neither is it so miserable not to obtain what one wills, as to will to obtain what one ought not. Most excellently and altogether most truly does he speak. For who can be so blind in his mind, so alienated from all light of decency, and wrapped up in the darkness of indecency, as to call him blessed, because he lives as he will, who lives wickedly and disgracefully; and with no one restraining him, no one punishing, and no one daring even to blame him, nay more, too, with most people praising him, since, as divine Scripture says, The wicked is praised in his heart's desire: and he who works iniquity is blessed, gratifies all his most criminal and flagitious desires; when, doubtless, although even so he would be wretched, yet he would be less wretched, if he could have had nothing of those things which he had wrongly willed? For every one is made wretched by a wicked will also, even though it stop short with will but more wretched by the power by which the longing of a wicked will is fulfilled. And, therefore, since it is true that all men will to be blessed, and that they seek for this one thing with the most ardent love, and on account of this seek everything which they do seek; nor can any one love that of which he does not know at all what or of what sort it is, nor can be ignorant what that is which he knows that he wills; it follows that all know a blessed life. But all that are blessed have what they will, although not all who have what they will are forewith blessed. But they are forewith wretched, who either have not what they will, or have that which they do not rightly will. Therefore he only is a blessed man, who both has all things which he wills, and wills nothing ill.

Chapter 6.– Why, When All Will to Be Blessed, that is Rather Chosen by Which One Withdraws from Being So.

Since a blessed life consists of these two things and is known and loved by everyone, what can we think is the reason why people, when they cannot have both, choose to have all things that they want rather than to want all things rightly, even if they do not have them? Is it the corruption of the human race itself, such that even though people are aware that neither the person who does not have what he wants nor the person who has what he wrongly wants is blessed, but only the person who both has whatever good things he wants and wants no evil things—yet when both parts of what makes up the blessed life are not available, they choose the one that withdraws them further from a blessed life? For certainly the person who obtains things he wickedly desired is further from blessedness than the person who simply does not obtain the things he desired. The good will ought instead to be chosen and preferred, even if it does not obtain the things it seeks. For the person who rightly wills whatever he wills and wills things that will make him blessed when he obtains them comes near to being a blessed man. And certainly it is not bad things but good things that make people blessed, when they do make them blessed. And the person who longs to rejoice in those good things of which human nature is capable, and not in the performance or attainment of any evil, and who diligently pursues and attains as much as he can with a prudent, temperate, courageous, and right mind such good things as are possible in the present miserable life—he already has something good, and indeed something not to be lightly esteemed: namely, the very good will itself. Such a person is good even in the midst of evils, and when all evils have been ended and all good things fulfilled, he will then be blessed.

9. Since, then, a blessed life consists of these two things, and is known to all, and dear to all; what can we think to be the cause why, when they cannot have both, men choose, out of these two, to have all things that they will, rather than to will all things well, even although they do not have them? Is it the depravity itself of the human race, in such wise that, while they are not unaware that neither is he blessed who has not what he wills, nor he who has what he wills wrongly, but he who both has whatsoever good things he wills, and wills no evil ones, yet, when both are not granted of those two things in which the blessed life consists, that is rather chosen by which one is withdrawn the more from a blessed life (since he certainly is further from it who obtains things which he wickedly desired, than he who only does not obtain the things which he desired); whereas the good will ought rather to be chosen, and to be preferred, even if it do not obtain the things which it seeks? For he comes near to being a blessed man, who wills well whatsoever he wills, and wills things, which when he obtains, he will be blessed. And certainly not bad things, but good, make men blessed, when they do so make them. And of good things he already has something, and that, too, a something not to be lightly esteemed — namely, the very good will itself; who longs to rejoice in those good things of which human nature is capable, and not in the performance or the attainment of any evil; and who follows diligently, and attains as much as he can, with a prudent, temperate, courageous, and right mind, such good things as are possible in the present miserable life; so as to be good even in evils, and when all evils have been put an end to, and all good things fulfilled, then to be blessed.

Chapter 7.– Faith is Necessary, that Man May at Some Time Be Blessed, Which He Will Only Attain in the Future Life. The Blessedness of Proud Philosophers Ridiculous and Pitiable.

On this account, faith by which people believe in God is above all things necessary in this mortal life, which is filled with errors and hardships. There are no good things whatsoever, and especially not those by which anyone is made good or by which he will become blessed, that can be found coming to man or being added to man from any other source except God. But when someone who is good and faithful in these miseries passes from this life to the blessed life, then what is now absolutely impossible will truly come to pass: that a person may live as he wills. For he will not will to live badly in the midst of that felicity, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will anything be lacking that he has willed. Whatever is loved will be present, nor will that be longed for which is not present. Everything that will be there will be good, and the supreme God will be the supreme good and will be present for those who love Him to enjoy. What is altogether most blessed is that it will be certain that it will be so forever. But now, indeed, philosophers have made for themselves, according to each one's pleasure, their own ideals of a blessed life, so that they might be able, as if by their own power, to do what they were not able to do by the common conditions of mortals: namely, to live as they would. For they felt that no one could be blessed except by having what he would and by suffering nothing that he would not. And who would not will that whatever life delights him, and which he therefore calls blessed, were so in his own power that he could have it continually? And yet who is in this condition? Who wills to suffer troubles in order that he may endure them manfully, although he both wills and is able to endure them if he does suffer them? Who would will to live in torments, even though he is able to live laudably by holding fast to righteousness in the midst of them through patience? Those who have endured these evils, either in wishing to have or in fearing to lose what they loved, whether wickedly or laudably, have thought of them as transitory. For many have stretched boldly through transitory evils to good things which will last. And these, doubtless, are blessed through hope, even while actually suffering such transitory evils, through which they arrive at good things which will not be transitory. But he who is blessed through hope is not yet blessed, for he expects through patience a blessedness which he does not yet grasp. Whereas he, on the other hand, who is tormented without any such hope, without any such reward, may use as much endurance as he pleases, but is not truly blessed, only bravely miserable. For he is not thereby not miserable, because he would be more so if he also bore misery impatiently. Further, even if he does not suffer those things which he would not will to suffer in his own body, not even then is he to be esteemed blessed, inasmuch as he does not live as he wills. For to omit other things which, while the body remains unhurt, belong to those annoyances of the mind without which we should will to live, and which are innumerable, he would will, at any rate, if he were able, so to have his body safe and sound, and so to suffer no inconveniences from it, as to have it within his own control, or even to have it with an imperishableness of the body itself. And because he does not possess this, and hangs in doubt about it, he certainly does not live as he wills. For although he may be ready from fortitude to accept and bear with an equal mind whatever adversities may happen to him, yet he had rather they should not happen, and prevents them if he is able. And he is ready for both alternatives in such a way that, as much as is in him, he wishes for the one and shuns the other. And if he has fallen into that which he shuns, he therefore bears it willingly because that could not happen which he willed. He bears it, therefore, in order that he may not be crushed, but he would not willingly be even burdened. How, then, does he live as he wills? Is it because he is willingly strong to bear what he would not will to be put upon him? Then he only wills what he can, because he cannot have what he wills. And here is the sum total of the blessedness of proud mortals, I know not whether to be laughed at, or rather to be pitied, who boast that they live as they will because they willingly bear patiently what they are unwilling should happen to them. For this, they say, is like Terence's wise saying–

10. And on this account, faith, by which men believe in God, is above all things necessary in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships. For there are no good things whatever, and above all, not those by which any one is made good, or those by which he will become blessed, of which any other source can be found whence they come to man, and are added to man, unless it be from God. But when he who is good and faithful in these miseries shall have come from this life to the blessed life, then will truly come to pass what now is absolutely impossible — namely, that a man may live as he will. For he will not will to live badly in the midst of that felicity, nor will he will anything that will be wanting, nor will there be wanting anything which he shall have willed. Whatever shall be loved, will be present; nor will that be longed for, which shall not be present. Everything which will be there will be good, and the supreme God will be the supreme good and will be present for those to enjoy who love Him; and what altogether is most blessed, it will be certain that it will be so forever. But now, indeed, philosophers have made for themselves, according to the pleasure of each, their own ideals of a blessed life; that they might be able, as it were by their own power, to do that, which by the common conditions of mortals they were not able to do — namely, to live as they would. For they felt that no one could be blessed otherwise than by having what he would, and by suffering nothing which he would not. And who would not will, that the life whatsoever it be, with which he is delighted, and which he therefore calls blessed, were so in his own power, that he could have it continually? And yet who is in this condition? Who wills to suffer troubles in order that he may endure them manfully, although he both wills and is able to endure them if he does suffer them? Who would will to live in torments, even although he is able to live laudably by holding fast to righteousness in the midst of them through patience? They who have endured these evils, either in wishing to have or in fearing to lose what they loved, whether wickedly or laudably, have thought of them as transitory. For many have stretched boldly through transitory evils to good things which will last. And these, doubtless, are blessed through hope, even while actually suffering such transitory evils, through which they arrive at good things which will not be transitory. But he who is blessed through hope is not yet blessed: for he expects, through patience, a blessedness which he does not yet grasp. Whereas he, on the other hand, who is tormented without any such hope, without any such reward, let him use as much endurance as he pleases, is not truly blessed, but bravely miserable. For he is not on that account not miserable, because he would be more so if he also bore misery impatiently. Further, even if he does not suffer those things which he would not will to suffer in his own body, not even then is he to be esteemed blessed, inasmuch as he does not live as he wills. For to omit other things, which, while the body remains unhurt, belong to those annoyances of the mind, without which we should will to live, and which are innumerable; he would will, at any rate, if he were able, so to have his body safe and sound, and so to suffer no inconveniences from it, as to have it within his own control, or even to have it with an imperishableness of the body itself; and because he does not possess this, and hangs in doubt about it, he certainly does not live as he wills. For although he may be ready from fortitude to accept, and bear with an equal mind, whatever adversities may happen to him, yet he had rather they should not happen, and prevents them if he is able; and he is in such way ready for both alternatives, that, as much as is in him, he wishes for the one and shuns the other; and if he have fallen into that which he shuns, he therefore bears it willingly, because that could not happen which he willed. He bears it, therefore, in order that he may not be crushed; but he would not willingly be even burdened. How, then, does he live as he wills? Is it because he is willingly strong to bear what he would not will to be put upon him? Then he only wills what he can, because he cannot have what he wills. And here is the sum-total of the blessedness of proud mortals, I know not whether to be laughed at, or not rather to be pitied, who boast that they live as they will, because they willingly bear patiently what they are unwilling should happen to them. For this, they say, is like Terence's wise saying —

Since that cannot be which you will, will that which you can.

Since that cannot be which you will, will that which you can.

This advice is sound—who would deny it? But it's given to someone who is miserable, so that they won't become even more miserable. However, it doesn't rightly or truly apply to the blessed person, which everyone wishes to be. For if someone is blessed, whatever they will can be, since they do not will what cannot be. But such a life doesn't belong to this mortal condition, nor will it come about unless immortality also comes about. And if immortality could not be given to man at all, then blessedness too would be sought in vain, since it cannot exist without immortality.

That this is aptly said, who denies? But it is advice given to the miserable man, that he may not be more miserable. And it is not rightly or truly said to the blessed man, such as all wish themselves to be, That cannot be which you will. For if he is blessed, whatever he wills can be; since he does not will that which cannot be. But such a life is not for this mortal state, neither will it come to pass unless when immortality also shall come to pass. And if this could not be given at all to man, blessedness too would be sought in vain, since it cannot be without immortality.

Chapter 8.– Blessedness Cannot Exist Without Immortality.

Since all people want to be blessed, if they truly want this, they must also want to be immortal. Otherwise they could not be blessed. Furthermore, if you ask them about immortality, just as you asked about blessedness, everyone says they want it. But whatever kind of blessedness people seek in this life—which is not really blessedness but only called that—is something made up, while immortality is considered impossible, though true blessedness cannot exist without it. A person lives blessedly, as we have already said and sufficiently proven, when he lives as he wants and wants nothing wrong. No one wrongly wants immortality if human nature is capable of it by God's gift. And if human nature is not capable of it, then it is not capable of blessedness either. For a person to live blessedly, he must necessarily live. And if life leaves him through death, how can a blessed life remain with him? When it leaves him, it certainly leaves him either unwillingly, willingly, or neither. If unwillingly, how can that life be blessed which depends on his will but not on his power? And since no one is blessed who wants something he does not have, how much less blessed is someone who loses against his will—not honor, possessions, or anything else, but the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all? Therefore, although no feeling remains for his life to be miserable (because the blessed life leaves him when life itself leaves him completely), yet he is wretched as long as he can feel, because he knows that what he loves more than everything else, and for the sake of which he loves everything else, is being destroyed against his will. So a life cannot be both blessed and leave a person against his will, since no one becomes blessed against his will. How much more does life make a person miserable by leaving him against his will, when it would make him miserable if he had it against his will? But if it leaves him with his consent, how could that be a blessed life when the person who had it wanted it to perish? The only remaining option is to say that the blessed person has neither of these attitudes—that he is neither unwilling nor willing to have the blessed life leave him when death takes away his life completely, but that he stands firm with an even heart, prepared equally for either outcome. But that is not a blessed life if it is unworthy of being loved by the person it makes blessed. For how can that be a blessed life if the blessed person does not love it? Or how can something be loved if a person receives it indifferently, not caring whether it flourishes or perishes? Unless perhaps the virtues, which we love only for the sake of blessedness, dare to persuade us that we should not love blessedness itself. But if they did that, we would certainly stop loving the virtues themselves, since we would not love the thing for which alone we loved them. Furthermore, how can that well-tested, examined, thoroughly scrutinized, and certain opinion be true—that all people want to be blessed—if those who are already blessed neither want nor don't want to be blessed? Or if they do want it, as truth proclaims and nature demands (in which the supremely good and unchangeably blessed Creator has planted that desire), if blessed people want to be blessed, then certainly they do not want to be not blessed. And if they do not want to be not blessed, then without doubt they do not want to be destroyed and perish with respect to their blessedness. But they cannot be blessed unless they are alive. Therefore they do not want to perish with respect to their life. Therefore, whoever are either truly blessed or desire to be so want to be immortal. But a person does not live blessedly if he does not have what he wants. Therefore it follows that life cannot in any way be truly blessed unless it is eternal.

11. As, therefore, all men will to be blessed, certainly, if they will truly, they will also to be immortal; for otherwise they could not be blessed. And further, if questioned also concerning immortality, as before concerning blessedness, all reply that they will it. But blessedness of what quality soever, such as is not so, but rather is so called, is sought, nay indeed is feigned in this life, while immortality is despaired of, without which true blessedness cannot be. Since he lives blessedly, as we have already said before, and have sufficiently proved and concluded, who lives as he wills, and wills nothing wrongly. But no one wrongly wills immortality, if human nature is by God's gift capable of it; and if it is not capable of it, it is not capable of blessedness. For, that a man may live blessedly, he must needs live. And if life quits him by his dying, how can a blessed life remain with him? And when it quits him, without doubt it either quits him unwilling, or willing, or neither. If unwilling, how is the life blessed which is so within his will as not to be within his power? And whereas no one is blessed who wills something that he does not have, how much less is he blessed who is quitted against his will, not by honor, nor by possessions, nor by any other thing, but by the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all? And hence, although no feeling is left for his life to be thereby miserable (for the blessed life quits him, because life altogether quits him), yet he is wretched as long as he feels, because he knows that against his will that is being destroyed for the sake of which he loves all else, and which he loves beyond all else. A life therefore cannot both be blessed, and yet quit a man against his will, since no one becomes blessed against his will; and hence how much more does it make a man miserable by quitting him against his will, when it would make him miserable if he had it against his will! But if it quit him with his will, even so how was that a blessed life, which he who had it willed should perish? It remains then for them to say, that neither of these is in the mind of the blessed man; that is, that he is neither unwilling nor willing to be quitted by a blessed life, when through death life quits him altogether; for that he stands firm with an even heart, prepared alike for either alternative. But neither is that a blessed life which is such as to be unworthy of his love whom it makes blessed. For how is that a blessed life which the blessed man does not love? Or how is that loved, of which it is received indifferently, whether it is to flourish or to perish? Unless perhaps the virtues, which we love in this way on account of blessedness alone, venture to persuade us that we do not love blessedness itself. Yet if they did this, we should certainly leave off loving the virtues themselves, when we do not love that on account of which alone we loved them. And further, how will that opinion be true, which has been so tried, and sifted, and thoroughly strained, and is so certain, viz. that all men will to be blessed, if they themselves who are already blessed neither will nor do not will to be blessed? Or if they will it, as truth proclaims, as nature constrains, in which indeed the supremely good and unchangeably blessed Creator has implanted that will: if, I say, they will to be blessed who are blessed, certainly they do not will to be not blessed. But if they do not will not to be blessed, without doubt they do not will to be annihilated and perish in regard to their blessedness. But they cannot be blessed except they are alive; therefore they do not will so to perish in regard to their life. Therefore, whoever are either truly blessed or desire to be so, will to be immortal. But he does not live blessedly who has not that which he wills. Therefore it follows that in no way can life be truly blessed unless it be eternal.

Chapter 9.– We Say that Future Blessedness is Truly Eternal, Not Through Human Reasonings, But by the Help of Faith. The Immortality of Blessedness Becomes Credible from the Incarnation of the Son of God.

Whether human nature can receive this blessing, which it admits is desirable, is no small question. But if faith is present—the faith that belongs to those to whom Jesus has given the power to become the sons of God—then there is no question. Certainly, among those who try to discover this through human reasoning, scarcely a few have been able to investigate even the immortality of the soul alone, and these are people gifted with great abilities, abundant leisure, and trained in the most subtle learning. And even for the soul, they have not found a blessed life that is stable—that is, true—since they have said that the soul returns to the miseries of this life even after blessedness. Those among them who are ashamed of this view and have believed that the purified soul will be placed in eternal happiness without a body hold such opinions about the past eternity of the world that their own opinion about the soul is refuted. It would take too long to demonstrate this here, but I think I have explained it sufficiently in the twelfth book of the City of God. But faith promises, not through human reasoning but by divine authority, that the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body, will be immortal and for this reason truly blessed. And so, when it was said in the Gospel that Jesus has given power to become the sons of God to those who received Him, and what it means to have received Him was briefly explained by saying, "to those who believe in His name," and it was further added in what way they are to become sons of God—namely, "who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God"—lest that human weakness which we all see and bear should despair of attaining such great excellence, it is added in the same place, "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." This was added so that, on the contrary, people might be convinced of what seemed incredible. For if He who is by nature the Son of God was made the Son of man through mercy for the sake of the sons of men—for this is what is meant by "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us men"—how much more credible is it that the sons of men by nature should be made the sons of God by the grace of God, and should dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone the blessed can be made partakers of that immortality? That we might be convinced of this, the Son of God was made a partaker of our mortality.

12. Whether human nature can receive this, which yet it confesses to be desirable, is no small question. But if faith be present, which is in those to whom Jesus has given power to become the sons of God, then there is no question. Assuredly, of those who endeavor to discover it from human reasonings, scarcely a few, and they endued with great abilities, and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone. And even for the soul they have not found a blessed life that is stable, that is, true; since they have said that it returns to the miseries of this life even after blessedness. And they among them who are ashamed of this opinion, and have thought that the purified soul is to be placed in eternal happiness without a body, hold such opinions concerning the past eternity of the world, as to confute this opinion of theirs concerning the soul; a thing which here it is too long to demonstrate; but it has been, as I think, sufficiently explained by us in the twelfth book of the City of God. But that faith promises, not by human reasoning, but by divine authority, that the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body, shall be immortal, and on this account truly blessed. And so, when it had been said in the Gospel, that Jesus has given power to become the sons of God to them who received Him; and what it is to have received Him had been shortly explained by saying, To them that believe in His name; and it was further added in what way they are to become sons of God, viz., Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; — lest that infirmity of men which we all see and bear should despair of attaining so great excellence, it is added in the same place, And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; that, on the contrary, men might be convinced of that which seemed incredible. For if He who is by nature the Son of God was made the Son of man through mercy for the sake of the sons of men — for this is what is meant by The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us men, — how much more credible is it that the sons of men by nature should be made the sons of God by the grace of God, and should dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone the blessed can be made partakers of that immortality; of which that we might be convinced, the Son of God was made partaker of our mortality?

Chapter 10.– There Was No Other More Suitable Way of Freeing Man from the Misery of Mortality Than The Incarnation of the Word. The Merits Which are Called Ours are the Gifts of God.

Those who ask, "Didn't God have any other way to free people from the misery of mortality besides willing that his only-begotten Son, God co-eternal with himself, should become human by taking on a human soul and flesh, and being made mortal to endure death?"—these people cannot be refuted simply by asserting that the way God chose to free us through the Mediator between God and humanity, the man Christ Jesus, is good and fitting for God's dignity. We must also show not that no other way was possible for God, since all things are equally subject to his power, but that there was not and need not have been any other way more appropriate for healing our misery. For what was so necessary for building up our hope and for freeing the minds of mortals, cast down by the very condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how high a price God valued us and how greatly he loved us? But what is more clear and evident as proof of this than that the Son of God, unchangeably good, remaining what he was in himself and receiving from us and for us what he was not, without any loss of his own nature, and choosing to enter into fellowship with our nature, should first, without any evil deserving of his own, bear our evils, and then with unobligated generosity bestow his own gifts upon us—we who now believe how much God loves us and who now hope for that of which we used to despair, without any good deserving of our own and even with our evil deserving going before?

13. Those then who say, What, had God no other way by which He might free men from the misery of this mortality, that He should will the only-begotten Son, God co-eternal with Himself, to become man, by putting on a human soul and flesh, and being made mortal to endure death?– these, I say, it is not enough so to refute, as to assert that that mode by which God deigns to free us through the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is good and suitable to the dignity of God; but we must show also, not indeed that no other mode was possible to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there neither was nor need have been any other mode more appropriate for curing our misery. For what was so necessary for the building up of our hope, and for the freeing the minds of mortals cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how great a price God rated us, and how greatly He loved us? But what is more manifest and evident in this so great proof hereof, than that the Son of God, unchangeably good, remaining what He was in Himself, and receiving from us and for us what He was not, apart from any loss of His own nature, and deigning to enter into the fellowship of ours, should first, without any evil desert of His own, bear our evils; and so with unobligated munificence should bestow His own gifts upon us, who now believe how much God loves us, and who now hope that of which we used to despair, without any good deserts of our own, nay, with our evil deserts too going before?

Even what we call our own merits are actually God's gifts to us. For in order that faith may work through love, God's love is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us. The Spirit was given when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection. At that time Jesus promised that He Himself would send the Spirit, and He did send Him, because then, as Scripture had written and foretold about Him, He ascended on high, led captivity captive, and gave gifts to people. These gifts make up our merits, through which we reach the highest good of immortal blessedness. But as the apostle says, God demonstrates His love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. He continues: Much more then, having now been justified by His blood, we will be saved from wrath through Him. He then adds to this: For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, having been reconciled, we will be saved by His life. Those he first calls sinners he later calls enemies of God, and those he first describes as justified by His blood he later describes as reconciled by the death of God's Son, and those he first says will be saved from wrath through Him he later says will be saved by His life. Therefore before receiving that grace, we were not just sinners in some casual way, but we were in such sin that we were enemies of God. The same apostle refers to us repeatedly by two names: sinners and enemies of God—one seeming quite mild, the other clearly very harsh—saying, For if while we were still weak, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. Those he called weak are the same ones he called ungodly. Weakness seems like something minor, but sometimes it is so serious as to be called ungodliness. Yet unless it were weakness, it would not need a physician, who in Hebrew is called Jesus, in Greek Soter, but in our language Savior. Latin did not have this word before, but it could have it since it was able to have it when it needed it. This earlier statement of the apostle where he says, For while we were still weak, in due time He died for the ungodly, connects with those two following statements, in one of which he spoke of sinners and in the other of enemies of God, as if he matched each one to each—that is, matching sinners to the weak, and enemies of God to the ungodly.

14. Since those also which are called our deserts, are His gifts. For, that faith may work by love, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us. And He was then given, when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection. For then He promised that He Himself would send Him, and He sent Him; because then, as it was written and foretold of Him, He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. These gifts constitute our deserts, by which we arrive at the chief good of an immortal blessedness. But God, says the apostle, commends His love towards as, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. To this he goes on to add, For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. Those whom he first calls sinners he afterwards calls the enemies of God; and those whom he first speaks of as justified by His blood, he afterwards speaks of as reconciled by the death of the Son of God; and those whom he speaks of first as saved from wrath through Him, he afterwards speaks of as saved by His life. We were not, therefore, before that grace merely anyhow sinners, but in such sins that we were enemies of God. But the same apostle calls us above several times by two appellations, viz. sinners and enemies of God — one as if the most mild, the other plainly the most harsh — saying, For if when we were yet weak, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. Those whom he called weak, the same he called ungodly. Weakness seems something slight; but sometimes it is such as to be called impiety. Yet except it were weakness, it would not need a physician, who is in the Hebrew Jesus, in the Greek Σωτήρ, but in our speech Saviour. And this word the Latin language had not previously, but could have seeing that it could have it when it wanted it. And this foregoing sentence of the apostle, where he says, For when we were yet weak, in due time He died for the ungodly, coheres with those two following sentences; in the one of which he spoke of sinners, in the other of enemies of God, as though he referred each severally to each, viz. sinners to the weak, the enemies of God to the ungodly.

Chapter 11.– A Difficulty, How We are Justitified in the Blood of the Son of God.

But what does it mean to be justified in His blood? What power exists in this blood, I ask you, that those who believe should be justified in it? And what does it mean to be reconciled by the death of His Son? Was it really the case that when God the Father was angry with us, He saw the death of His Son on our behalf and was appeased toward us? Was His Son already so appeased toward us that He even chose to die for us, while the Father was still so angry that unless His Son died for us, He would not be appeased? And what about what this same teacher of the Gentiles says in another place: What shall we then say to these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? He who did not spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all—how will He not with Him also freely give us all things? Tell me, unless the Father had already been appeased, would He have delivered up His own Son, not sparing Him for us? Doesn't this opinion seem to contradict the other? In one view, the Son dies for us and the Father is reconciled to us by His death; in the other, as if the Father first loved us, He Himself does not spare the Son on our account, He Himself delivers Him up to death for us. But I see that the Father loved us even before—not only before the Son died for us, but before He created the world. The apostle himself witnesses to this when he says, According as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world. Nor was the Son delivered up for us unwillingly, with the Father not sparing Him; for it is also said concerning Him, Who loved me and delivered up Himself for me. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Spirit of both work all things together equally and harmoniously; yet we are justified in the blood of Christ, and we are reconciled to God by the death of His Son. And I will explain, as I am able, how this was accomplished, as much as may seem sufficient.

15. But what is meant by justified in His blood? What power is there in this blood, I beseech you, that they who believe should be justified in it? And what is meant by being reconciled by the death of His Son? Was it indeed so, that when God the Father was angry with us, He saw the death of His Son for us, and was appeased towards us? Was then His Son already so far appeased towards us, that He even deigned to die for us; while the Father was still so far angry, that except His Son died for us, He would not be appeased? And what, then, is that which the same teacher of the Gentiles himself says in another place: What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; how has He not with Him also freely given us all things? Pray, unless the Father had been already appeased, would He have delivered up His own Son, not sparing Him for us? Does not this opinion seem to be as it were contrary to that? In the one, the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us by His death; in the other, as though the Father first loved us, He Himself on our account does not spare the Son, He Himself for us delivers Him up to death. But I see that the Father loved us also before, not only before the Son died for us, but before He created the world; the apostle himself being witness, who says, According as He has chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world. Nor was the Son delivered up for us as it were unwillingly, the Father Himself not sparing Him; for it is said also concerning Him, Who loved me, and delivered up Himself for me. Therefore together both the Father and the Son, and the Spirit of both, work all things equally and harmoniously; yet we are justified in the blood of Christ, and we are reconciled to God by the death of His Son. And I will explain, as I shall be able, here also, how this was done, as much as may seem sufficient.

Chapter 12.– All, on Account of the Sin of Adam, Were Delivered into the Power of the Devil.

By God's justice in a certain sense, the human race was handed over to the power of the devil. The sin of the first man passes over originally into all people of both sexes at their birth through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binds their entire posterity. This handing over is first indicated in Genesis, where after it was said to the serpent, "Dust shall you eat," it was said to the man, "Dust you are, and to dust you shall return." In the words "To dust you shall return," the death of the body is announced in advance, because man would not have experienced that either if he had remained upright as he was made until the end. But in that it is said to him while he is still living, "Dust you are," it is shown that the whole man was changed for the worse. For "Dust you are" is much the same as "My spirit shall not always remain in these men, for they also are flesh." Therefore it was shown at that time that he was delivered to him, in that it had been said to him, "Dust shall you eat." But the apostle declares this more clearly where he says: "And you who were dead in trespasses and sins, in which you once walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now works in the children of unfaithfulness; among whom we also once lived in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by physis the children of wrath, even as others." The children of unfaithfulness are the unbelievers, and who is not this before he becomes a believer? And therefore all people are originally under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the children of unfaithfulness. And what I have expressed by "originally" is the same that the apostle expresses when he speaks of themselves who by physis were as others—that is, by physis as it has been corrupted by sin, not as it was created upright from the beginning. But the way in which man was thus delivered into the power of the devil ought not to be understood as if God did this or commanded it to be done, but that He only permitted it, yet justly. For when He abandoned the sinner, the author of the sin immediately entered. Yet God did not abandon His own creature in such a way as not to show Himself to him as God creating and giving life, and among penal evils also bestowing many good things upon the evil. For He has not in anger shut up His tender mercies. Nor did He remove man from the law of His own power when He permitted him to be in the power of the devil, since even the devil himself is not separated from the power of the Omnipotent, nor from His goodness either. For how else do even the evil angels continue to exist in whatever manner of life they have, except through Him who gives life to all things? If, therefore, the committing of sins through the just anger of God subjected man to the devil, doubtless the forgiveness of sins through the merciful reconciliation of God rescues man from the devil.

16. By the justice of God in some sense, the human race was delivered into the power of the devil; the sin of the first man passing over originally into all of both sexes in their birth through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binding their whole posterity. This delivering up is first signified in Genesis, where, when it had been said to the serpent, Dust shall you eat, it was said to the man, Dust you are, and unto dust you shall return. In the words, Unto dust shall you return, the death of the body is fore-announced, because he would not have experienced that either, if he had continued to the end upright as he was made; but in that it is said to him while still living, Dust you are, it is shown that the whole man was changed for the worse. For Dust you are is much the same as, My spirit shall not always remain in these men, for that they also are flesh. Therefore it was at that time shown, that he was delivered to him, in that it had been said to him, Dust shall you eat. But the apostle declares this more clearly, where he says: And you who were dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now works in the children of unfaithfulness; among whom we also had our conversation in times past, in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. The children of unfaithfulness are the unbelievers; and who is not this before he becomes a believer? And therefore all men are originally under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the children of unfaithfulness. And that which I have expressed by originally is the same that the apostle expresses when he speaks of themselves who by nature were as others; viz. by nature as it has been depraved by sin, not as it was created upright from the beginning. But the way in which man was thus delivered into the power of the devil, ought not to be so understood as if God did this, or commanded it to be done; but that He only permitted it, yet that justly. For when He abandoned the sin ner, the author of the sin immediately entered. Yet God did not certainly so abandon His own creature as not to show Himself to him as God creating and quickening, and among penal evils bestowing also many good things upon the evil. For He has not in anger shut up His tender mercies. Nor did He dismiss man from the law of His own power, when He permitted him to be in the power of the devil; since even the devil himself is not separated from the power of the Omnipotent, as neither from His goodness. For whence do even the evil angels subsist in whatever manner of life they have, except through Him who quickens all things? If, therefore, the commission of sins through the just anger of God subjected man to the devil, doubtless the remission of sins through the merciful reconciliation of God rescues man from the devil.

Chapter 13.– Man Was to Be Rescued from the Power of the Devil, Not by Power, But by Righteousness.

The devil had to be overcome not by God's power, but by His righteousness. After all, what could be more powerful than the Omnipotent? What creature's power could compare to the Creator's power? However, because the devil, through his own corrupt choice, became a lover of power and an abandoner and enemy of righteousness—and people imitate him more closely the more they pursue power while neglecting or even hating righteousness, either rejoicing when they gain power or burning with desire for it—God chose to rescue humanity from the devil's grasp by conquering the devil through righteousness, not power. In the same way, people imitating Christ should seek to conquer the devil by righteousness, not by power. This doesn't mean power should be avoided as if it were evil, but the proper order must be maintained: righteousness must come first. How much power can mortal beings really have? Therefore, let mortals hold to righteousness; power will be given to the immortal. Compared to this future power, however great the power of those called powerful on earth may be, it proves to be laughable weakness, and a trap is set for the sinner right where the wicked appear most powerful. The righteous person sings: Blessed is the man whom You chasten, O Lord, and teach out of Your law, that You may give him rest from the days of adversity, until the pit be dug for the wicked. For the Lord will not cast off His people, neither will He forsake His inheritance, until righteousness return unto judgment, and all who follow it are upright in heart. So in this present time, when the might of God's people is delayed, the Lord will not abandon His people or forsake His inheritance, no matter what bitter and unworthy things it suffers in its humility and weakness, until the righteousness that the weakness of the godly now possesses returns to judgment—that is, receives the power to judge. This power is reserved for the righteous at the end, when power in its proper order will follow after righteousness going before it. Power joined with righteousness, or righteousness added to power, creates judicial authority. But righteousness belongs to a good will. That's why the angels said when Christ was born: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will. Power should follow righteousness, not precede it, and so power is placed second—that is, in prosperous fortune—and is called second because it follows. As we argued above, two things make a person blessed: willing rightly and being able to do what one wills. People shouldn't be so perverse, as noted in that same discussion, that they choose from these two things only the ability to do what they will while neglecting to will what they should. Instead, they should first have a good will, and great power afterward. Furthermore, a good will must be cleansed from vices, because if someone is overcome by vices, they are overcome in such a way that they will evil—so how could their will still be good? We should wish for power to be given now, but power against vices. People don't want to be powerful to conquer vices, but they do want to be powerful to conquer other people. Why is this, except that being truly conquered themselves, they only pretend to conquer and are conquerors not in truth but only in opinion? Let a person will to be prudent, will to be strong, will to be temperate, will to be just. To truly have these qualities, let them certainly desire power and seek to be powerful in themselves and—strange as it may seem—against themselves for their own sake. But all the other things they rightly desire yet cannot have, such as immortality and true and complete happiness, let them never stop longing for and patiently await.

17. But the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, but by His righteousness. For what is more powerful than the Omnipotent? Or what creature is there of which the power can be compared to the power of the Creator? But since the devil, by the fault of his own perversity, was made a lover of power, and a forsaker and assailant of righteousness — for thus also men imitate him so much the more in proportion as they set their hearts on power, to the neglect or even hatred of righteousness, and as they either rejoice in the attainment of power, or are inflamed by the lust of it — it pleased God, that in order to the rescuing of man from the grasp of the devil, the devil should be conquered, not by power, but by righteousness; and that so also men, imitating Christ, should seek to conquer the devil by righteousness, not by power. Not that power is to be shunned as as though it were something evil; but the order must be preserved, whereby righteousness is before it. For how great can be the power of mortals? Therefore let mortals cleave to righteousness; power will be given to immortals. And compared to this, the power, how great soever, of those men who are called powerful on earth, is found to be ridiculous weakness, and a pitfall is dug there for the sinner, where the wicked seem to be most powerful. And the righteous man says in his song, Blessed is the man whom You chasten, O Lord, and teach out of Your law: that You may give him rest from the days of adversity, until the pit be dug for the wicked. For the Lord will not cast off His people, neither will He forsake His inheritance, until righteousness return unto judgment, and all who follow it are upright in heart. Psalm 94:12-15 At this present time, then, in which the might of the people of God is delayed, the Lord will not cast off His people, neither will He forsake His inheritance, how bitter and unworthy things soever it may suffer in its humility and weakness; until the righteousness, which the weakness of the pious now possesses, shall return to judgment, that is, shall receive the power of judging; which is preserved in the end for the righteous when power in its due order shall have followed after righteousness going before. For power joined to righteousness, or righteousness added to power, constitutes a judicial authority. But righteousness belongs to a good will; whence it was said by the angels when Christ was born: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will. But power ought to follow righteousness, not to go before it; and accordingly it is placed in second, that is, prosperous fortune; and this is called second, from following. For whereas two things make a man blessed, as we have argued above, to will well, and to be able to do what one wills, people ought not to be so perverse, as has been noted in the same discussion, as that a man should choose from the two things which make him blessed, the being able to do what he wills, and should neglect to will what he ought; whereas he ought first to have a good will, but great power afterwards. Further, a good will must be purged from vices, by which if a man is overcome, he is in such wise overcome as that he wills evil; and then how will his will be still good? It is to be wished, then, that power may now be given, but power against vices, to conquer which men do not wish to be powerful, while they wish to be so in order to conquer men; and why is this, unless that, being in truth conquered, they feignedly conquer, and are conquerors not in truth, but in opinion? Let a man will to be prudent, will to be strong, will to be temperate, will to be just; and that he may be able to have these things truly, let him certainly desire power, and seek to be powerful in himself, and (strange though it be) against himself for himself. But all the other things which he wills rightly, and yet is not able to have, as, for instance, immortality and true and full felicity, let him not cease to long for, and let him patiently expect.

Chapter 14.– The Unobligated Death of Christ Has Freed Those Who Were Liable to Death.

What, then, is the righteousness by which the devil was conquered? What else but the righteousness of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because although the devil found nothing in Christ worthy of death, he still killed Him. And it is certainly just that we who were held as the devil's debtors should be set free by believing in the one whom he killed, even though that one owed no debt. This is how we are said to be justified in the blood of Christ. For that innocent blood was shed for the forgiveness of our sins. This is why He calls Himself in the Psalms "Free among the dead." For only someone who is dead is free from the debt of death. So in another psalm He says, "Then I restored what I did not seize," referring to sin as the thing seized, because sin is a taking hold of what is unlawful. This is also why He says, through His own flesh, as we read in the Gospel: "For the prince of this world comes and has nothing in me"—that is, no sin—"but so that the world may know that I do the commandment of the Father, arise, let us go from here." And from there He proceeds to His passion, so that He might pay on behalf of us debtors what He Himself did not owe. Would the devil have been conquered by this most just right if Christ had chosen to deal with him by power rather than by righteousness? But He held back what was possible for Him, so that He might first do what was fitting. And this is why He had to be both man and God. For unless He had been man, He could not have been killed; unless He had been God, people would not have believed that He chose not to do what He could do, but rather that He could not do what He wanted to do. We would not have thought that He preferred righteousness to power, but that He lacked power. But now He suffered human things for us because He was man; yet if He had been unwilling, He would have had the power not to suffer these things, because He was also God. And righteousness was therefore made more appealing in humility, because the great power that was in His divinity, if He had been unwilling, would have been able to avoid suffering humility. Thus by Him who died while having such power, both righteousness was demonstrated and power was promised to us weak mortals. For He accomplished one of these two things by dying, the other by rising again. For what is more righteous than to go even to the death of the cross for righteousness? And what is more powerful than to rise from the dead and ascend into heaven with the very flesh in which He was killed? And therefore He conquered the devil first by righteousness, and afterward by power: namely, by righteousness, because He had no sin and was most unjustly killed by him; but by power, because having died He lived again, never to die again. But He would have conquered the devil by power even if he could not have been killed by him, although it belongs to a greater power to conquer death itself by rising again than to avoid it by continuing to live. But the real reason why we are justified in the blood of Christ, when we are rescued from the power of the devil through the forgiveness of sins, is this: that the devil is conquered by Christ by righteousness, not by power. For Christ was crucified, not through immortal power, but through the weakness He took upon Himself in mortal flesh—though of this weakness the apostle says that the weakness of God is stronger than men.

18. What, then, is the righteousness by which the devil was conquered? What, except the righteousness of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because, when he found in Him nothing worthy of death, yet he slew Him. And certainly it is just, that we whom he held as debtors, should be dismissed free by believing in Him whom he slew without any debt. In this way it is that we are said to be justified in the blood of Christ. For so that innocent blood was shed for the remission of our sins. Whence He calls Himself in the Psalms, Free among the dead. For he only that is dead is free from the debt of death. Hence also in another psalm He says, Then I restored that which I seized not; meaning sin by the thing seized, because sin is laid hold of against what is lawful. Whence also He says, by the mouth of His own Flesh, as is read in the Gospel: For the prince of this world comes, and has nothing in me, that is, no sin; but that the world may know, He says, that I do the commandment of the Father; arise, let us go hence. And hence He proceeds to His passion, that He might pay for us debtors that which He Himself did not owe. Would then the devil be conquered by this most just right, if Christ had willed to deal with him by power, not by righteousness? But He held back what was possible to Him, in order that He might first do what was fitting. And hence it was necessary that He should be both man and God. For unless He had been man, He could not have been slain; unless He had been God, men would not have believed that He would not do what He could, but that He could not do what He would; nor should we have thought that righteousness was preferred by Him to power, but that He lacked power. But now He suffered for us things belonging to man, because He was man; but if He had been unwilling, it would have been in His power to not so to suffer, because He was also God. And righteousness was therefore made more acceptable in humility, because so great power as was in His Divinity, if He had been unwilling, would have been able not to suffer humility; and thus by Him who died, being thus powerful, both righteousness was commended, and power promised, to us, weak mortals. For He did one of these two things by dying, the other by rising again. For what is more righteous, than to come even to the death of the cross for righteousness? And what more powerful, than to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven with that very flesh in which He was slain? And therefore He conquered the devil first by righteousness, and afterwards by power: namely, by righteousness, because He had no sin, and was slain by him most unjustly; but by power, because having been dead He lived again, never afterwards to die. But He would have conquered the devil by power, even though He could not have been slain by him: although it belongs to a greater power to conquer death itself also by rising again, than to avoid it by living. But the reason is really a different one, why we are justified in the blood of Christ, when we are rescued from the power of the devil through the remission of sins: it pertains to this, that the devil is conquered by Christ by righteousness, not by power. For Christ was crucified, not through immortal power, but through the weakness which He took upon Him in mortal flesh; of which weakness nevertheless the apostle says, that the weakness of God is stronger than men.

Chapter 15.– Of the Same Subject.

It is not difficult to see that the devil was defeated when the one he killed rose again. But there is something greater and more profound to understand: the devil was actually defeated at the very moment when he thought he had won, that is, when Christ was killed. For then Christ's blood, since He had no sin at all, was poured out for the forgiveness of our sins. The devil deservedly held captive those whom, as guilty of sin, he bound under the condition of death. But he was forced to deservedly release them through Christ, whom the punishment of death undeservedly afflicted, since Christ was guilty of no sin. The strong man was conquered by this righteousness and bound with this chain, so that his vessels might be taken from him. These vessels had been vessels of wrath along with him and his angels while they were with him, but now they could be turned into vessels of mercy. The Apostle Paul tells us that these very words of our Lord Jesus Christ were spoken from heaven to him when he was first called. Among the other things he heard, Paul also reports this as being said to him: "For I have appeared to you for this purpose, to make you a minister and a witness both of these things which you have seen from me, and of those things in which I will appear to you; delivering you from the people and from the Gentiles, to whom now I send you, to open the eyes of the blind, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified, and faith that is in me." And so the same apostle, urging believers to give thanks to God the Father, says: "Who has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son, in whom we have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins." In this redemption, the blood of Christ was given as a kind of price for us. By accepting this price, the devil was not enriched but bound, so that we might be freed from his bonds. Now he cannot drag into the snares of sin and hand over to the destruction of the second and eternal death anyone whom Christ, free from all debt, had redeemed by pouring out His own blood without any debt. Rather, those who belong to the grace of Christ—who were foreknown, predestinated, and elected before the foundation of the world—should only die to the extent that Christ Himself died for them, that is, only by the death of the flesh, not of the spirit.

19. It is not then difficult to see that the devil was conquered, when he who was slain by Him rose again. It is something more, and more profound of comprehension, to see that the devil was conquered when he thought himself to have conquered, that is, when Christ was slain. For then that blood, since it was His who had no sin at all, was poured out for the remission of our sins; that, because the devil deservedly held those whom, as guilty of sin, he bound by the condition of death, he might deservedly loose them through Him, whom, as guilty of no sin, the punishment of death undeservedly affected. The strong man was conquered by this righteousness, and bound with this chain, that his vessels might be spoiled, which with himself and his angels had been vessels of wrath while with him, and might be turned into vessels of mercy. For the Apostle Paul tells us, that these words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself were spoken from heaven to him when he was first called. For among the other things which he heard, he speaks also of this as said to him thus: For I have appeared unto you for this purpose, to make you a minister and a witness both of these things which you have seen from me, and of those things in the which I will appear unto you; delivering you from the people, and from the Gentiles, unto whom now I send you, to open the eyes of the blind, and to turn them from darkness [to light], and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified, and faith that is in me. And hence the same apostle also, exhorting believers to the giving of thanks to God the Father, says: Who has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son: in whom we have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins. In this redemption, the blood of Christ was given, as it were, as a price for us, by accepting which the devil was not enriched, but bound: that we might be loosened from his bonds, and that he might not with himself involve in the meshes of sins, and so deliver to the destruction of the second and eternal death, any one of those whom Christ, free from all debt, had redeemed by pouring out His own blood unindebtedly; but that they who belong to the grace of Christ, foreknown, and predestinated, and elected before the foundation of the world should only so far die as Christ Himself died for them, i.e. only by the death of the flesh, not of the spirit.

Chapter 16.– The Remains of Death and the Evil Things of the World Turn to Good for the Elect. How Fitly the Death of Christ Was Chosen, that We Might Be Justified in His Blood. What the Anger of God is.

Although the physical death of the body came originally from the sin of the first man, the good use of it has produced the most glorious martyrs. In the same way, not only death itself, but all the evils of this world and the griefs and labors of humanity, even though they come from what sins deserve, especially from original sin—which is why life itself became bound by the bond of death—have fittingly remained even after sin is forgiven. This gives people something to contend with for the sake of truth, and a means by which the goodness of the faithful can be exercised. The purpose is that the new man, through the new covenant, might be prepared among the evils of this world for a new world by wisely bearing the misery that this condemned life deserved, by soberly rejoicing because it will end, and by faithfully and patiently expecting the blessedness that the future life, once set free, will possess forever. For the devil has been cast out from his dominion and from the hearts of the faithful—he had reigned, though himself condemned, through the condemnation and faithlessness of those hearts—and is now only permitted to be an adversary according to the conditions of this mortal state, to the extent that God knows is beneficial for them. The sacred writings speak of this through the apostle's words: God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, so that you may be able to bear it. The evils that the faithful endure piously serve either to correct sins, to exercise and prove righteousness, or to show the misery of this life so that the life where true and eternal blessedness will exist may be desired more ardently and sought more earnestly. These evils are still kept in existence on account of those of whom the apostle says: For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called to be holy according to His purpose. For those He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover, those He predestined, He also called; and those He called, He also justified; and those He justified, He also glorified. Of these who are predestined, not one will perish with the devil; not one will remain even until death under the devil's power. And then follows what I have already cited above: What shall we then say to these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; how has He not with Him also freely given us all things?

20. For although the death, too, of the flesh itself came originally from the sin of the first man, yet the good use of it has made most glorious martyrs. And so not only that death itself, but all the evils of this world, and the griefs and labors of men, although they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence life itself too became bound by the bond of death, yet have fitly remained, even when sin is forgiven; that man might have wherewith to contend for truth, and whereby the goodness of the faithful might be exercised; in order that the new man through the new covenant might be made ready among the evils of this world for a new world, by bearing wisely the misery which this condemned life deserved, and by rejoicing soberly because it will be finished, but expecting faithfully and patiently the blessedness which the future life, being set free, will have forever. For the devil being cast forth from his dominion, and from the hearts of the faithful, in the condemnation and faithlessness of whom he, although himself also condemned, yet reigned, is only so far permitted to be an adversary according to the condition of this mortality, as God knows to be expedient for them: concerning which the sacred writings speak through the mouth of the apostle: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that you may be able to bear it. And those evils which the faithful endure piously, are of profit either for the correction of sins, or for the exercising and proving of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of this life, that the life where will be that true and perpetual blessedness may be desired more ardently, and sought out more earnestly. But it is on their account that these evils are still kept in being, of whom the apostle says: For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called to be holy according to His purpose. For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified. It is of these who are predestinated, that not one shall perish with the devil; not one shall remain even to death under the power of the devil. And then follows what I have already cited above: What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; how has He not with Him also freely given us all things?

Why then should the death of Christ not have happened? In fact, why should not that death itself have been chosen above all else to be accomplished, rather than the countless other ways which the omnipotent God could have used to free us? I mean that death in which nothing was diminished or changed from His divinity, and such great benefit was conferred upon humanity from the humanity which He took upon Himself. In that death, a temporal death which was not owed was rendered by the eternal Son of God, who was also the Son of man, so that He might free them from an eternal death which was owed. The devil was holding fast our sins, and through them was fixing us deservedly in death. Christ discharged them, who had none of His own, and who was led by the devil to death undeservedly. That blood was of such value that the devil, who even slew Christ for a time by a death which was not deserved, can now detain no one who has put on Christ in the eternal death which was deserved. Therefore God demonstrates His love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified in His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. Justified, he says, in His blood—justified plainly, in that we are freed from all sin. And we are freed from all sin because the Son of God, who knew no sin, was slain for us. Therefore we shall be saved from wrath through Him—from the wrath certainly of God, which is nothing else but just punishment. For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a disturbance of the mind, but it is the wrath of Him to whom Holy Scripture says in another place, But You, O Lord, mastering Your power, judge with calmness. If, therefore, the just punishment of God has received such a name, what can be the right understanding also of the reconciliation of God, unless that then such wrath comes to an end? Neither were we enemies to God, except as sins are enemies to righteousness. When sins are forgiven, such enmities come to an end, and those whom He Himself justifies are reconciled to the Just One. And yet certainly He loved them even while still enemies, since He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, when we were still enemies. And therefore the apostle has rightly added: For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, by which that forgiveness of sins was made, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved in His life. Saved in life, who were reconciled by death. For who can doubt that He will give His life for His friends, for whom, when enemies, He gave His death? And not only so, he says, but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. Not only, he says, shall we be saved, but we also joy, and not in ourselves, but in God, nor through ourselves, but through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement, as we have argued above. Then the apostle adds, Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned, and so forth. In this passage he disputes at some length concerning the two men. The one is the first Adam, through whose sin and death we, his descendants, are bound by, as it were, inherited evils. And the other is the second Adam, who is not only man, but also God, by whose payment for us of what He owed not, we are freed from the debts both of our first father and of ourselves. Further, since on account of that one the devil held all who were begotten through his corrupted carnal desire, it is just that on account of this one he should release all who are regenerated through His immaculate spiritual grace.

21. Why then should the death of Christ not have come to pass? Nay, rather, why should not that death itself have been chosen above all else to be brought to pass, to the passing by of the other innumerable ways which He who is omnipotent could have employed to free us; that death, I say, wherein neither was anything diminished or changed from His divinity, and so great benefit was conferred upon men, from the humanity which He took upon Him, that a temporal death, which was not due, was rendered by the eternal Son of God, who was also the Son of man, whereby He might free them from an eternal death which was due? The devil was holding fast our sins, and through them was fixing us deservedly in death. He discharged them, who had none of His own, and who was led by him to death undeservedly. That blood was of such price, that he who even slew Christ for a time by a death which was not due, can as his due detain no one, who has put on Christ, in the eternal death which was due. Therefore God commends His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified in His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. Justified, he says, in His blood, — justified plainly, in that we are freed from all sin; and freed from all sin, because the Son of God, who knew no sin, was slain for us. Therefore we shall be saved from wrath through Him; from the wrath certainly of God, which is nothing else but just retribution. For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a perturbation of the mind; but it is the wrath of Him to whom Holy Scripture says in another place, But You, O Lord, mastering Your power, judgest with calmness. If, therefore, the just retribution of God has received such a name, what can be the right understanding also of the reconciliation of God, unless that then such wrath comes to an end? Neither were we enemies to God, except as sins are enemies to righteousness; which being forgiven, such enmities come to an end, and they whom He Himself justifies are reconciled to the Just One. And yet certainly He loved them even while still enemies, since He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, when we were still enemies. And therefore the apostle has rightly added: For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, by which that remission of sins was made, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved in His life. Saved in life, who were reconciled by death. For who can doubt that He will give His life for His friends, for whom, when enemies, He gave His death? And not only so, he says, but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. Not only, he says, shall we be saved, but we also joy; and not in ourselves, but in God; nor through ourselves, but through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement, as we have argued above. Then the apostle adds, Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned; etc.: in which he disputes at some length concerning the two men; the one the first Adam, through whose sin and death we, his descendants, are bound by, as it were, hereditary evils; and the other the second Adam, who is not only man, but also God, by whose payment for us of what He owed not, we are freed from the debts both of our first father and of ourselves. Further, since on account of that one the devil held all who were begotten through his corrupted carnal concupiscence, it is just that on account of this one he should loose all who are regenerated through His immaculate spiritual grace.

Chapter 17.– Other Advantages of the Incarnation.

There are many other things about the incarnation of Christ, though it displeases the proud, that should be observed and considered to our advantage. One is that it has been shown to humanity what place it holds in God's creation, since human nature could be united to God so that one person could be made from two substances, and thereby from three—God, soul, and flesh. In this way, those proud and malicious spirits who present themselves as mediators to deceive, though pretending to help, do not dare to place themselves above humanity just because they lack flesh. And especially because the Son of God also chose to die in that same flesh, they cannot succeed in getting themselves worshiped as gods simply because they appear to be immortal. Furthermore, God's grace toward us is demonstrated in the man Christ without any prior merits, because even Christ himself did not obtain through any prior merits his union in such great unity with the true God, becoming the Son of God, one person with him. Rather, from the moment he began to be human, from that moment he is also God, which is why it is said, The Word was made flesh. Then there is also this: human pride, which is the chief obstacle preventing us from clinging to God, can be refuted and healed through such great humility of God. Humanity also learns how far it has wandered from God, and what pain is worthwhile to cure it when it returns through such a Mediator, who both as God helps people by his divinity, and as human agrees with people by his weakness. For what greater example of obedience could be given to us, who had perished through disobedience, than God the Son being obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross? Moreover, how could the reward of obedience itself be better shown than in the flesh of so great a Mediator, which rose again to eternal life? It also belonged to the justice and goodness of the Creator that the devil should be conquered by the same rational creature that he had rejoiced to conquer, and by one who came from that same race which, through the corruption of its origin in one man, the devil held completely.

22. There are many other things also in the incarnation of Christ, displeasing as it is to the proud, that are to be observed and thought of advantageously. And one of them is, that it has been demonstrated to man what place he has in the things which God has created; since human nature could so be joined to God, that one person could be made of two substances, and thereby indeed of three — God, soul, and flesh: so that those proud malignant spirits, who interpose themselves as mediators to deceive, although as if to help, do not therefore dare to place themselves above man because they have not flesh; and chiefly because the Son of God deigned to die also in the same flesh, lest they, because they seem to be immortal, should therefore succeed in getting themselves worshipped as gods. Further, that the grace of God might be commended to us in the man Christ without any precedent merits; because not even He Himself obtained by any precedent merits that He should be joined in such great unity with the true God, and should become the Son of God, one Person with Him; but from the time when He began to be man, from that time He is also God; whence it is said, The Word was made flesh. Then, again, there is this, that the pride of man, which is the chief hindrance against his cleaving to God, can be confuted and healed through such great humility of God. Man learns also how far he has gone away from God; and what it is worth to him as a pain to cure him, when he returns through such a Mediator, who both as God assists men by His divinity, and as man agrees with men by His weakness. For what greater example of obedience could be given to us, who had perished through disobedience, than God the Son obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross? Nay, wherein could the reward of obedience itself be better shown, than in the flesh of so great a Mediator, which rose again to eternal life? It belonged also to the justice and goodness of the Creator, that the devil should be conquered by the same rational creature which he rejoiced to have conquered, and by one that came from that same race which, by the corruption of its origin through one, he held altogether.

Chapter 18.– Why the Son of God Took Man Upon Himself from the Race of Adam, and from a Virgin.

For God could certainly have taken human nature upon Himself to be the Mediator between God and humanity from some other source rather than from the race of Adam, who bound the human race by his sin—just as He did not create the first man from someone else's race. Therefore, He could have created another person, either in that way or by any other means He chose, through whom the conqueror of the first man might be conquered. But God judged it better to take human nature from the very race that had been conquered in order to conquer the enemy of the human race, and yet to do this from a virgin, whose conception was preceded not by flesh but by spirit, not by lust but by faith. The concupiscence of the flesh, by which all other people who inherit original sin are conceived and born, did not intervene. Instead, holy virginity became pregnant not through sexual union but through faith, with lust completely absent, so that what was born from the root of the first man would inherit only the origin of the race, not the origin of guilt. For what was born was not a nature corrupted by the contagion of transgression, but the one and only remedy for all such corruptions. There was born, I say, a Man having nothing at all of sin and destined to have nothing at all of sin, through whom those who could not be born without sin were to be born again so as to be freed from sin. For although married chastity makes right use of the carnal concupiscence that exists in our bodies, it is still subject to involuntary movements, which show that it either could not have existed at all in paradise before sin, or if it did exist, it was not then of such a nature that it would sometimes resist the will. But now we experience it as something that, in opposition to the law of the mind and even when procreation is not in question, stirs in us the urge toward sexual intercourse. If people yield to it, it is satisfied by an act of sin; if they do not, it is restrained by an act of refusal. Who could doubt that both these things were foreign to paradise before sin? For the chastity that existed then did nothing improper, nor did the pleasure that existed then experience anything disturbing. Therefore, it was necessary that this carnal concupiscence be entirely absent when the offspring of the Virgin was conceived. In Him, the author of death was to find nothing worthy of death, and yet was to kill Him so that he might be conquered by the death of the Author of life. The conqueror of the first Adam, who held the human race captive, was conquered by the second Adam, and losing the Christian race, he lost those freed from the human race's human guilt through Him who was not under the guilt, although He was of the race. This was done so that the deceiver might be conquered by the very race he had conquered through guilt. And this was accomplished so that humanity might not be lifted up, but that whoever boasts should boast in the Lord. For the one who was conquered was only human, and he was conquered because he proudly desired to be a god. But the One who conquered was both human and God, and He conquered in this way by being born of a virgin, because God in humility did not merely govern that Man as He governs other saints, but carried Him as a Son. These great gifts of God, and whatever others there are that would take too long for us now to investigate and discuss on this subject, could not exist unless the Word had been made flesh.

23. For assuredly God could have taken upon Himself to be man, that in that manhood He might be the Mediator between God and men, from some other source, and not from the race of that Adam who bound the human race by his sin; as He did not create him whom He first created, of the race of some one else. Therefore He was able, either so, or in any other mode that He would, to create yet one other, by whom the conqueror of the first might be conquered. But God judged it better both to take upon Him man through whom to conquer the enemy of the human race, from the race itself that had been conquered; and yet to do this of a virgin, whose conception, not flesh but spirit, not lust but faith, preceded. Nor did that concupiscence of the flesh intervene, by which the rest of men, who derive original sin, are propagated and conceived; but holy virginity became pregnant, not by conjugal intercourse, but by faith — lust being utterly absent — so that that which was born from the root of the first man might derive only the origin of race, not also of guilt. For there was born, not a nature corrupted by the contagion of transgression, but the one only remedy of all such corruptions. There was born, I say, a Man having nothing at all, and to have nothing at all, of sin; through whom they were to be born again so as to be freed from sin, who could not be born without sin. For although conjugal chastity makes a right use of the carnal concupiscence which is in our members; yet it is liable to motions not voluntary, by which it shows either that it could not have existed at all in paradise before sin, or if it did, that it was not then such as that sometimes it should resist the will. But now we feel it to be such, that in opposition to the law of the mind, and even if there is no question of begetting, it works in us the incitement of sexual intercourse; and if in this men yield to it, then it is satisfied by an act of sin; if they do not, then it is bridled by an act of refusal: which two things who could doubt to have been alien from paradise before sin? For neither did the chastity that then was do anything indecorous, nor did the pleasure that then was suffer anything unquiet. It was necessary, therefore, that this carnal concupiscence should be entirely absent, when the offspring of the Virgin was conceived; in whom the author of death was to find nothing worthy of death, and yet was to slay Him in order that he might be conquered by the death of the Author of life: the conqueror of the first Adam, who held fast the human race, conquered by the second Adam, and losing the Christian race, freed out of the human race from human guilt, through Him who was not in the guilt, although He was of the race; that that deceiver might be conquered by that race which he had conquered by guilt. And this was so done, in order that man may not be lifted up, but that he that glories should glory in the Lord. For he who was conquered was only man; and he was therefore conquered, because he lusted proudly to be a god. But He who conquered was both man and God; and therefore He so conquered, being born of a virgin, because God in humility did not, as He governs other saints, so govern that Man, but bare Him [as a Son]. These so great gifts of God, and whatever else there are, which it is too long for us now upon this subject both to inquire and to discuss, could not exist unless the Word had been made flesh.

Chapter 19.– What in the Incarnate Word Belongs to Knowledge, What to Wisdom.

All these things which the Word made flesh did and endured for us in time and place belong, according to the distinction we have undertaken to demonstrate, to knowledge, not to wisdom. But the Word itself is without time and without place, is co-eternal with the Father, and in its wholeness is everywhere. If anyone can speak truly concerning this Word, and as much as he can, then his speech will pertain to wisdom. Therefore the Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, has the treasures both of wisdom and of knowledge. The apostle writes to the Colossians: For I want you to know what great conflict I have for you, and for those at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh, that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and reaching all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgment of the mystery of God which is Christ Jesus, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. To what extent the apostle knew all those treasures, how much of them he had penetrated, and to what great things he had reached in them, who can know? Yet for my part, according to what is written, But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit, for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit—if these two are to be distinguished from each other in such a way that wisdom is assigned to divine things and knowledge to human things, I acknowledge both in Christ, and so do all His faithful ones with me. When I read, The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, I understand by the Word the true Son of God, I acknowledge in the flesh the true Son of man, and both together joined into one Person of God and man by an ineffable abundance of grace. Because of this, the apostle goes on to say, And we beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. If we refer grace to knowledge and truth to wisdom, I think we shall not stray from that distinction between these two things which we have commended. For in those things that have their origin in time, this is the highest grace, that man is joined with God in unity of person. But in things eternal the highest truth is rightly attributed to the Word of God. But that the same is Himself the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth—this took place so that He Himself in things done for us in time should be the same one for whom we are cleansed by the same faith, so that we may contemplate Him steadfastly in things eternal. Those distinguished philosophers of the pagans who have been able to understand and discern the invisible things of God by those things which are made have yet, as is said of them, held down the truth in iniquity, because they philosophized without a Mediator, that is, without the man Christ, whom they neither believed to be about to come at the word of the prophets, nor to have come at that of the apostles. For placed as they were in these lowest things, they could not help but seek some intermediaries through which they might attain to those lofty things which they had understood. And so they fell upon deceitful spirits, through whom it came to pass that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. For in such forms also they set up or worshipped idols. Therefore Christ is our knowledge, and the same Christ is also our wisdom. He Himself implants in us faith concerning temporal things, He Himself shows forth the truth concerning eternal things. Through Him we reach on to Himself. We stretch through knowledge to wisdom, yet we do not withdraw from one and the same Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge. But now we speak of knowledge, and will hereafter speak of wisdom as much as He Himself shall grant. And let us not take these two things as if it were not allowable to speak either of the wisdom which is in human things or of the knowledge which is in divine things. For according to a looser custom of speech, both can be called wisdom, and both knowledge. Yet the apostle could not in any way have written, To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, except these several things had also been properly called by the several names, of the distinction between which we are now treating.

24. And all these things which the Word made flesh did and bare for us in time and place, belong, according to the distinction which we have undertaken to demonstrate, to knowledge, not to wisdom. And as the Word is without time and without place, it is co-eternal with the Father, and in its wholeness everywhere; and if any one can, and as much as he can, speak truly concerning this Word, then his discourse will pertain to wisdom. And hence the Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, has the treasures both of wisdom and of knowledge. For the apostle, writing to the Colossians, says: For I would that you knew what great conflict I have for you, and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh; that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgment of the mystery of God which is Christ Jesus: in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. To what extent the apostle knew all those treasures, how much of them he had penetrated, and in them to how great things he had reached, who can know? Yet, for my part, according to that which is written, But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal; for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; if these two are in such way to be distinguished from each other, that wisdom is to be assigned to divine things, knowledge to human, I acknowledge both in Christ, and so with me do all His faithful ones. And when I read, The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, I understand by the Word the true Son of God, I acknowledge in the flesh the true Son of man, and both together joined into one Person of God and man, by an ineffable copiousness of grace. And on account of this, the apostle goes on to say, And we beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. If we refer grace to knowledge, and truth to wisdom, I think we shall not swerve from that distinction between these two things which we have commended. For in those things that have their origin in time, this is the highest grace, that man is joined with God in unity of person; but in things eternal the highest truth is rightly attributed to the Word of God. But that the same is Himself the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth — this took place, in order that He Himself in things done for us in time should be the same for whom we are cleansed by the same faith, that we may contemplate Him steadfastly in things eternal. And those distinguished philosophers of the heathen who have been able to understand and discern the invisible things of God by those things which are made, have yet, as is said of them, held down the truth in iniquity; because they philosophized without a Mediator, that is, without the man Christ, whom they neither believed to be about to come at the word of the prophets, nor to have come at that of the apostles. For, placed as they were in these lowest things, they could not but seek some media through which they might attain to those lofty things which they had understood; and so they fell upon deceitful spirits, through whom it came to pass, that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. For in such forms also they set up or worshipped idols. Therefore Christ is our knowledge, and the same Christ is also our wisdom. He Himself implants in us faith concerning temporal things, He Himself shows forth the truth concerning eternal things. Through Him we reach on to Himself: we stretch through knowledge to wisdom; yet we do not withdraw from one and the same Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge. But now we speak of knowledge, and will hereafter speak of wisdom as much as He Himself shall grant. And let us not so take these two things, as if it were not allowable to speak either of the wisdom which is in human things, or of the knowledge which is in divine. For after a laxer custom of speech, both can be called wisdom, and both knowledge. Yet the apostle could not in any way have written, To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, except also these several things had been properly called by the several names, of the distinction between which we are now treating.

Chapter 20.– What Has Been Treated of in This Book. How We Have Reached by Steps to a Certain Trinity, Which is Found in Practical Knowledge and True Faith.

Now let us see what this lengthy discussion has accomplished, what it has gathered together, and where it has led. It belongs to all people to will to be blessed; yet not all people have faith, by which the heart is cleansed and blessedness is reached. And so it happens that through the faith which not everyone possesses, we must reach the blessedness that everyone desires. All people see in their own heart that they will to be blessed; and human nature agrees so completely on this matter that a person is not mistaken when he guesses this about another person's mind based on his own. In short, we know that all people will this. But many despair of being immortal, even though no one can otherwise be what all desire to be, namely blessed. Yet they would also will to be immortal if they could; but because they do not believe they can, they do not live in such a way that they can. Therefore faith is necessary so that we may attain blessedness in all the good things of human nature, that is, of both soul and body. But this same faith requires that this faith be centered in Christ, who rose in the flesh from the dead, never to die again; and that no one is freed from the dominion of the devil through the forgiveness of sins except by him; and that in the dwelling place of the devil, life must necessarily be both miserable and never-ending, which ought rather to be called death than life. All of this I have also argued, as far as space permitted, in this book, though I have already said much on the subject in the fourth book of this work as well; but in that place for one purpose, here for another—namely, there to show why and how Christ was sent in the fullness of time by the Father, on account of those who say that he who sent and he who was sent cannot be equal in nature; but here to distinguish practical knowledge from contemplative wisdom.

25. Now, therefore, let us see what this prolix discourse has effected, what it has gathered, whereto it has reached. It belongs to all men to will to be blessed; yet all men have not faith, whereby the heart is cleansed, and so blessedness is reached. And thus it comes to pass, that by means of the faith which not all men will, we have to reach on to the blessedness which every one wills. All see in their own heart that they will to be blessed; and so great is the agreement of human nature on this subject, that the man is not deceived who conjectures this concerning another's mind, out of his own: in short, we know ourselves that all will this. But many despair of being immortal, although no otherwise can any one be that which all will, that is, blessed. Yet they will also to be immortal if they could; but through not believing that they can, they do not so live that they can. Therefore faith is necessary, that we may attain blessedness in all the good things of human nature, that is, of both soul and body. But that same faith requires that this faith be limited in Christ, who rose in the flesh from the dead, not to die any more; and that no one is freed from the dominion of the devil, through the forgiveness of sins, save by Him; and that in the abiding place of the devil, life must needs be at once miserable and never-ending, which ought rather to be called death than life. All which I have also argued, so far as space permitted, in this book, while I have already said much on the subject in the fourth book of this work as well; but in that place for one purpose, here for another — namely, there, that I might show why and how Christ was sent in the fullness of time by the Father, on account of those who say that He who sent and He who was sent cannot be equal in nature; but here, in order to distinguish practical knowlege from contemplative wisdom.

We wanted to climb upward step by step and search within the inner man, both in knowledge and in wisdom, for a particular kind of trinity, just as we had previously searched for one in the outer man. Our goal was to train our minds on these lower things so that we might then contemplate that Trinity which is God—according to our limited capacity, if we can even do this at all, and then only in a riddle and as through a glass. If someone has memorized the words of this faith only as sounds, without knowing what they mean—like people who don't know Greek but have memorized Greek words, or likewise Latin words or words from any other language they don't understand—doesn't that person have a kind of trinity in his mind? First, those word-sounds are in his memory even when he's not thinking about them. Second, the sharp edge of his mental recollection is formed from memory when he thinks of them. Third, the will of the one who remembers and thinks unites both. Yet we should certainly not say that such a person is dealing with a trinity of the inner man, but rather of the outer man, because he remembers and, when he chooses, contemplates as much as he wants only what belongs to the bodily sense called hearing. In this act of thinking, he does nothing but deal with images of bodily things—that is, of sounds. But if he grasps and remembers what those words mean, then something of the inner man is indeed brought into action. However, we still shouldn't say or think that he lives according to a trinity of the inner man if he doesn't love what is declared, commanded, and promised there. For he might also grasp and think about these things while supposing them to be false, in order to try to disprove them. Therefore the will, which in this case unites what is held in memory with what is impressed from there onto the mind's eye in thought, does complete some kind of trinity, since it is a third element added to two others. But the person doesn't live according to this trinity when the things thought about are taken to be false and are not accepted. But when those things are believed to be true, and the things that ought to be loved in them are loved, then at last the person does live according to a trinity of the inner man, for everyone lives according to what he loves. But how can things be loved that are not known but only believed? We have already dealt with this question in earlier books, and we found that no one loves what he is completely ignorant of, but when unknown things are said to be loved, they are loved from things that are known. We now conclude this book by urging the righteous to live by faith, which faith works through love, so that the virtues themselves—by which one lives prudently, courageously, moderately, and justly—are all directed toward this same faith, for otherwise they cannot be true virtues. Yet these virtues in this life are not of such great worth that the forgiveness of some kind of sins is not sometimes necessary here, and this forgiveness happens only through Him who by His own blood conquered the prince of sinners. Whatever ideas exist in the mind of the faithful person from this faith and from such a life, when they are held in memory, looked at by recollection, and pleasing to the will, present a kind of trinity of their own sort. But the image of God, about which we will speak later with His help, is not yet in that trinity—something that will become clearer when we show where it is, which the reader may expect in a following book.

26. For we wished to ascend, as it were, by steps, and to seek in the inner man, both in knowledge and in wisdom, a sort of trinity of its own special kind, such as we sought before in the outer man; in order that we may come, with a mind more practised in these lower things, to the contemplation of that Trinity which is God, according to our little measure, if indeed, we can even do this, at least in a riddle and as through a glass. If, then, any one have committed to memory the words of this faith in their sounds alone, not knowing what they mean, as they commonly who do not know Greek hold in memory Greek words, or similarly Latin ones, or those of any other language of which they are ignorant, has not he a sort of trinity in his mind? Because, first, those sounds of words are in his memory, even when he does not think thereupon; and next, the mental vision ( acies) of his act of recollection is formed thence when he conceives of them; and next, the will of him who remembers and thinks unites both. Yet we should by no means say that the man in so doing busies himself with a trinity of the interior man, but rather of the exterior; because he remembers, and when he wills, contemplates as much as he wills, that alone which belongs to the sense of the body, which is called hearing. Nor in such an act of thought does he do anything else than deal with images of corporeal things, that is, of sounds. But if he holds and recollects what those words signify, now indeed something of the inner man is brought into action; not yet, however, ought he to be said or thought to live according to a trinity of the inner man, if he does not love those things which are there declared, enjoined, promised. For it is possible for him also to hold and conceive these things, supposing them to be false, in order that he may endeavor to disprove them. Therefore that will, which in this case unites those things which are held in the memory with those things which are thence impressed on the mind's eye in conception, completes, indeed, some kind of trinity, since itself is a third added to two others; but the man does not live according to this, when those things which are conceived are taken to be false, and are not accepted. But when those things are believed to be true, and those things which therein ought to be loved, are loved, then at last the man does live according to a trinity of the inner man; for every one lives according to that which he loves. But how can things be loved which are not known, but only believed? This question has been already treated of in former books; and we found, that no one loves what he is wholly ignorant of, but that when things not known are said to be loved, they are loved from those things which are known. And now we so conclude this book, that we admonish the just to live by faith, which faith works by love, so that the virtues also themselves, by which one lives prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, be all referred to the same faith; for not otherwise can they be true virtues. And yet these in this life are not of so great worth, as that the remission of sins, of some kind or other, is not sometimes necessary here; and this remission comes not to pass, except through Him, who by His own blood conquered the prince of sinners. Whatsoever ideas are in the mind of the faithful man from this faith, and from such a life, when they are contained in the memory, and are looked at by recollection, and please the will, set forth a kind of trinity of its own sort. But the image of God, of which by His help we shall afterwards speak, is not yet in that trinity; a thing which will then be more apparent, when it shall have been shown where it is, which the reader may expect in a succeeding book.


On the Trinity — Book XII

The higher reason that contemplates eternal things and the lower reason that deals with temporal things; where the image of God is to be found.

Commencing with a distinction between wisdom and knowledge, points out a kind of trinity, of a peculiar sort, in that which is properly called knowledge, and which is the lower of the two; and this trinity, although it certainly pertains to the inner man, is still not yet to be called or thought an image of God.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130112.htm>.

Contents · 15 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– Of What Kind are the Outer and the Inner Man.
  2. Chapter 2.– Man Alone of Animate Creatures Perceives the Eternal Reasons of Things Pertaining to the Body.
  3. Chapter 3.– The Higher Reason Which Belongs to Contemplation, and the Lower Which Belongs to Action, are in One Mind.
  4. Chapter 4.– The Trinity and the Image of God is in that Part of the Mind Alone Which Belongs to the Contemplation of Eternal Things.
  5. Chapter 5.– The Opinion Which Devises an Image of the Trinity in the Marriage of Male and Female, and in Their Offspring.
  6. Chapter 6. — Why This Opinion is to Be Rejected.
  7. Chapter 7.– How Man is the Image of God. Whether the Woman is Not Also the Image of God. How the Saying of the Apostle, that the Man is the Image of God, But the Woman is the Glory of the Man, is to Be Understood Figuratively and Mystically.
  8. Chapter 8.– Turning Aside from the Image of God.
  9. Chapter 9.– The Same Argument is Continued.
  10. Chapter 10.– The Lowest Degradation Reached by Degrees.
  11. Chapter 11.– The Image of the Beast in Man.
  12. Chapter 12.– There is a Kind of Hidden Wedlock in the Inner Man. Unlawful Pleasures of the Thoughts.
  13. Chapter 13.– The Opinion of Those Who Have Thought that the Mind Was Signified by the Man, the Bodily Sense by the Woman.
  14. Chapter 14.– What is the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge. The Worship of God is the Love of Him. How the Intellectual Cognizance of Eternal Things Comes to Pass Through Wisdom.
  15. Chapter 15.– In Opposition to the Reminiscence of Plato and Pythagoras. Pythagoras the Samian. Of the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge, and of Seeking the Trinity in the Knowledge of Temporal Things.

Chapter 1.– Of What Kind are the Outer and the Inner Man.

Come now, let's see where the boundary line lies between the outer and inner man. Whatever we have in our mind that is common with animals rightly belongs to the outer man. The outer man should not be understood as the body alone, but also includes a certain life of the body from which the body's structure gets its strength, along with all the senses we use to perceive outward things. When images of these outward things that we have already perceived are fixed in memory and recalled, this still belongs to the outer man. In all these respects we do not differ from animals, except that our bodily form is not prone but upright. Through this, our Creator warns us not to be like animals in our better part—the mind—even though we differ from them by our upright posture. This doesn't mean we should direct our mind toward elevated bodily things, for seeking rest for the will even in such things debases the mind. Rather, just as the body is naturally raised upright toward the highest bodily things—that is, toward celestial things—so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright toward the highest spiritual things, not through prideful arrogance but through the dutifulness of righteousness.

1. Come now, and let us see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For whatever we have in the mind common with the beasts, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the outer man is not to be considered to be the body only, but with the addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body, whence the structure of the body derives its vigor, and all the senses with which he is equipped for the perception of outward things; and when the images of these outward things already perceived, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, it is still a matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beasts, except that in shape of body we are not prone, but upright. And we are admonished through this, by Him who made us, not to be like the beasts in that which is our better part — that is, the mind — while we differ from them by the uprightness of the body. Not that we are to throw our mind into those bodily things which are exalted; for to seek rest for the will, even in such things, is to prostrate the mind. But as the body is naturally raised upright to those bodily things which are most elevated, that is, to things celestial; so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright to those things which are most elevated in spiritual things, not by the elation of pride, but by the dutifulness of righteousness.

Chapter 2.– Man Alone of Animate Creatures Perceives the Eternal Reasons of Things Pertaining to the Body.

Animals are also able to perceive physical things from outside through their bodily senses, fix them in memory, remember them, and use them to seek what is suitable and avoid what is harmful. However, certain abilities belong to a higher level: to take note of these things and retain them not just through natural instinct but through deliberate commitment to memory; to recall them through recollection and mental conception when they begin slipping into forgetfulness, so that just as conception is formed from what memory contains, the contents of memory itself are also firmly fixed by thought; to combine imaginary visual objects by taking various things that memory recalls and joining them together; to examine how in such matters things resembling truth can be distinguished from actual truth, and this not in spiritual matters but in physical things themselves—these acts and similar ones, although they deal with sensible things that the mind has received through the bodily senses, are connected with reason and therefore are not common to both humans and animals. But it belongs to the higher reason to judge these physical things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons. Unless these reasons were above the human mind, they would certainly not be unchangeable. Yet unless something of our own were joined to them, we could not use them as standards by which to judge physical things. We judge physical things by the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows remain unchangeable.

2. And the beasts, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal from without, through the senses of the body, and to fix them in the memory, and remember them, and in them to seek after things suitable, and shun things inconvenient. But to note these things, and to retain them not only as caught up naturally but also as deliberately committed to memory, and to imprint them again by recollection and conception when now just slipping away into forgetfulness; in order that as conception is formed from that which the memory contains, so also the contents themselves of the memory may be fixed firmly by thought: to combine again imaginary objects of sight, by taking this or that of what the memory remembers, and, as it were, tacking them to one another: to examine after what manner it is that in this kind things like the true are to be distinguished from the true, and this not in things spiritual, but in corporeal things themselves — these acts, and the like, although performed in reference to things sensible, and those which the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet, as they are combined with reason, so are not common to men and beasts. But it is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons; which, unless they were above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet, unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as our measures by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things from the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows to remain unchangeably.

Chapter 3.– The Higher Reason Which Belongs to Contemplation, and the Lower Which Belongs to Action, are in One Mind.

But that part of ourselves that deals with handling bodily and temporal things is indeed rational, since it is not something we share in common with animals. However, it is drawn out, so to speak, from that rational substance of our mind by which we depend upon and cling to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and it is assigned to handle and direct lower things. For just as no helper like him was found for man among all the animals unless one were taken from himself and formed to be his companion, so for that mind by which we contemplate the higher and inward truth, there is no fitting helper for the work that human nature requires among bodily things from those parts of the soul we have in common with animals. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated in a way that breaks unity but rather set aside to provide assistance in partnership, is divided off to perform its specific work. And just as male and female are one flesh, so in the mind one nature embraces our understanding and action, or our deliberation and execution, or our reason and rational desire, or whatever other more precise terms there may be to express them. So just as it was said of the former, "And the two shall be one flesh," it may be said of these that the two are one mind.

3. But that of our own which thus has to do with the handling of corporeal and temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us with the beasts; but it is drawn, as it were, out of that rational substance of our mind, by which we depend upon and cleave to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and which is deputed to handle and direct the inferior things. For as among all the beasts there was not found for the man a help like him, unless one were taken from himself, and formed to be his consort: so for that mind, by which we consult the supernal and inward truth, there is no like help for such employment as man's nature requires among things corporeal out of those parts of the soul which we have in common with the beasts. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated so as to sever unity, but, as it were, diverted so as to be a help to fellowship, is parted off for the performing of its proper work. And as the two is one flesh in the case of male and female, so in the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and performance, or our reason and rational appetite, or whatever other more significant terms there may be by which to express them; so that, as it was said of the former, And they two shall be in one flesh, it may be said of these, they two are in one mind.

Chapter 4.– The Trinity and the Image of God is in that Part of the Mind Alone Which Belongs to the Contemplation of Eternal Things.

When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are discussing a single subject. We do not split it into the two parts I mentioned earlier, except when considering its different functions. Therefore, when we look for the trinity in the mind, we look for it in the whole mind, without separating its rational activity in temporal matters from its contemplation of eternal things. We do not need to search for some third element to complete a trinity. This trinity must be discovered in the complete nature of the mind in such a way that even if activity directed toward temporal things were removed—activity for which assistance is needed and for which part of the mind is turned aside to handle these lower matters—a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is nowhere divided. Furthermore, once this distribution has already been made, not only can a trinity be found, but also an image of God can be found only in that part which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things. In the other part, which is turned away from contemplation to deal with temporal things, although a trinity may exist, an image of God cannot be found there.

4. When, therefore, we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss a single subject, and do not double it into those two which I have mentioned, except in respect to its functions. Therefore, when we seek the trinity in the mind, we seek it in the whole mind, without separating the action of the reason in things temporal from the contemplation of things eternal, so as to have further to seek some third thing, by which a trinity may be completed. But this trinity must needs be so discovered in the whole nature of the mind, as that even if action upon temporal things were to be withdrawn, for which work that help is necessary, with a view to which some part of the mind is diverted in order to deal with these inferior things, yet a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is no where parted off; and that when this distribution has been already made, not only a trinity may be found, but also an image of God, in that alone which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things; while in that other which is diverted from it in the dealing with temporal things, although there may be a trinity, yet there cannot be found an image of God.

Chapter 5.– The Opinion Which Devises an Image of the Trinity in the Marriage of Male and Female, and in Their Offspring.

Therefore, those who propose that an image of God's trinity in three persons can be found in human nature by looking at the marriage of male and female and their offspring do not seem to me to advance a plausible view. According to this theory, the man represents the person of the Father, what proceeds from him and is born represents the Son, and the third person, like the Spirit, is the woman who proceeds from the man in such a way that she is neither son nor daughter, yet the offspring is born through her conception. They point out that the Lord said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, yet he is not a son. In this mistaken opinion, the only point that is probably alleged and sufficiently demonstrated according to the faith of Holy Scripture is this: in the account of the woman's original creation, whatever comes into existence from a person in such a way as to make another person cannot in every case be called a son, since the woman's person came into existence from the man's person, yet she is not called his daughter. Everything else in this opinion is truly so absurd and indeed so false that it is very easy to refute. I will pass over the notion of thinking the Holy Spirit is the mother of God's Son and the Father's wife, since perhaps it could be answered that these things offend us in carnal matters because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure, but to the defiled and unbelieving, whose mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure, so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumbling-block to some of them. Yet in the case of those supreme spiritual realities, after whose likeness even these kinds of lower creation are made, though very remotely, and where there is nothing that can be harmed and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from the formless, or whatever similar expressions there may be—these ought not to disturb anyone's sober judgment, lest in avoiding empty disgust he fall into destructive error. He should accustom himself to find in bodily things the traces of spiritual things, so that when he begins to ascend upward from there, guided by reason, to reach the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he does not carry upward with himself what he despises in lower things. For no one has ever been ashamed to choose wisdom as a wife simply because the term wife brings to mind the corruptible union involved in begetting children, or because wisdom itself is actually a woman in sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin languages by a feminine noun.

5. Accordingly they do not seem to me to advance a probable opinion, who lay it down that a trinity of the image of God in three persons, so far as regards human nature, can so be discovered as to be completed in the marriage of male and female and in their offspring; in that the man himself, as it were, indicates the person of the Father, but that which has so proceeded from him as to be born, that of the Son; and so the third person as of the Spirit, is, they say, the woman, who has so proceeded from the man as not herself to be either son or daughter, although it was by her conception that the offspring was born. For the Lord has said of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from the Father, and yet he is not a son. In this erroneous opinion, then, the only point probably alleged, and indeed sufficiently shown according to the faith of the Holy Scripture, is this — in the account of the original creation of the woman — that what so comes into existence from some person as to make another person, cannot in every case be called a son; since the person of the woman came into existence from the person of the man, and yet she is not called his daughter. All the rest of this opinion is in truth so absurd, nay indeed so false, that it is most easy to refute it. For I pass over such a thing, as to think the Holy Spirit to be the mother of the Son of God, and the wife of the Father; since perhaps it may be answered that these things offend us in carnal things, because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure; but to the defiled and unbelieving, of whom both the mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure; so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumbling-block to some of them. But yet in the case of those supreme spiritual things, after the likeness of which those kinds of the inferior creature also are made although most remotely, and where there is nothing that can be injured and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from that which is formless, or whatever like expressions there may be; yet they ought not to disturb the sober prudence of any one, lest in avoiding empty disgust he run into pernicious error. Let him accustom himself so to find in corporeal things the traces of things spiritual, that when he begins to ascend upwards from thence, under the guidance of reason, in order to attain to the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he may not draw with himself to things above what he despises in things below. For no one ever blushed to choose for himself wisdom as a wife, because the name of wife puts into a man's thoughts the corruptible connection which consists in begetting children; or because in truth wisdom itself is a woman in sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin tongues by a word of the feminine gender.

Chapter 6. — Why This Opinion is to Be Rejected.

We do not reject this opinion because we are afraid to think of that holy, inviolable, and unchangeable Love as the spouse of God the Father, existing from Him but not as offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made. Rather, we reject it because divine Scripture clearly shows it to be false. For God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and shortly afterward it is said, "So God created man in the image of God." Certainly, since the word "our" is plural, it would not be correctly used if man were made in the image of one person alone—whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit. But because man was made in the image of the Trinity, it says "after our image." Yet again, lest we think that three Gods are to be believed in the Trinity, when the same Trinity is one God, it is said, "So God created man in the image of God," instead of saying "In His own image."

6. We do not therefore reject this opinion, because we fear to think of that holy and inviolable and unchangeable Love, as the spouse of God the Father, existing as it does from Him, but not as an offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made; but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and a little after it is said, So God created man in the image of God. Certainly, in that it is of the plural number, the word our would not be rightly used if man were made in the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made in the image of the Trinity, on that account it is said, After our image. But again, lest we should think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, whereas the same Trinity is one God, it is said, So God created man in the image of God, instead of saying, In His own image.

These kinds of expressions are common in the Scriptures, yet some people who hold the Catholic faith do not pay careful attention to them. As a result, they think the words "God made man in the image of God" mean that the Father made man after the image of the Son, and they use this to try to prove that the Son is also called God in the divine Scriptures—as if there were not other completely true and clear proofs where the Son is called not only God but also the true God. In attempting to explain another difficulty in this text, they become so tangled up that they cannot free themselves. For if the Father made man after the image of the Son so that man is not the image of the Father but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if a pious faith teaches us, as it does, that the Son is like the Father in equality of ousia (essence), then whatever is made in the likeness of the Son must also be made in the likeness of the Father. Furthermore, if the Father made man not in His own image but in the image of His Son, why does He not say, "Let us make man after Your image and likeness," when in fact He says "our"—unless it is because the image of the Trinity was made in man, so that in this way man should be the image of the one true God, since the Trinity itself is the one true God? Such expressions are countless in the Scriptures, but it will be enough to have given these examples. In the Psalms it says, "Salvation belongs to the Lord; Your blessing is upon Your people," as if the words were spoken to someone else, not to Him of whom it had been said, "Salvation belongs to the Lord." And again, "For by You," he says, "I shall be delivered from temptation, and by hoping in my God I shall leap over the wall," as if he were saying to someone else, "By You I shall be delivered from temptation." And again, "In the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under You," as if he were saying, "in the heart of Your enemies." For he had said to that King, that is, to our Lord Jesus Christ, "The people fall under You," whom he meant by the word "King" when he said, "In the heart of the king's enemies." Things of this kind are found more rarely in the New Testament. But even so, the apostle says to the Romans, "Concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord," as though he were speaking above of someone else. For what is meant by "the Son of God declared by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ," except the same Jesus Christ who was declared to be Son of God with power? And just as in this passage, when we are told "the Son of God with power of Jesus Christ," or "the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness of Jesus Christ," or "the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ"—whereas it might have been expressed in the ordinary way as "in His own power," or "according to the spirit of His own holiness," or "by the resurrection of His dead," or "of their dead"—we are not compelled to understand another person but one and the same person, that is, the person of the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ; so likewise, when we are told that God made man in the image of God, although it might have been more usual to say "after His own image," we are not compelled to understand any other person in the Trinity, but the one and the same Trinity itself, which is one God, and after whose image man is made.

7. For such expressions are customary in the Scriptures; and yet some persons, while maintaining the Catholic faith, do not carefully attend to them, in such wise that they think the words, God made man in the image of God, to mean that the Father made man after the image of the Son; and they thus desire to assert that the Son also is called God in the divine Scriptures, as if there were not other most true and clear proofs wherein the Son is called not only God, but also the true God. For while they aim at explaining another difficulty in this text, they become so entangled that they cannot extricate themselves. For if the Father made man after the image of the Son, so that he is not the image of the Father, but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if a pious faith teaches us, as it does, that the Son is like the Father after an equality of essence, then that which is made in the likeness of the Son must needs also be made in the likeness of the Father. Further, if the Father made man not in His own image, but in the image of His Son, why does He not say, Let us make man after Your image and likeness, whereas He does say, our; unless it be because the image of the Trinity was made in man, that in this way man should be the image of the one true God, because the Trinity itself is the one true God? Such expressions are innumerable in the Scriptures, but it will suffice to have produced these. It is so said in the Psalms, Salvation belongs unto the Lord; Your blessing is upon Your people; as if the words were spoken to some one else, not to Him of whom it had been said, Salvation belongs unto the Lord. And again, For by You, he says, I shall be delivered from temptation, and by hoping in my God I shall leap over the wall; as if he said to some one else, By You I shall be delivered from temptation. And again, In the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under You; as if he were to say, in the heart of Your enemies. For he had said to that King, that is, to our Lord Jesus Christ, The people fall under You, whom he intended by the word King, when he said, In the heart of the king's enemies. Things of this kind are found more rarely in the New Testament. But yet the apostle says to the Romans, Concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord; as though he were speaking above of some one else. For what is meant by the Son of God declared by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, except of the same Jesus Christ who was declared to be Son of God with power? And as then in this passage, when we are told, the Son of God with power of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, whereas it might have been expressed in the ordinary way, In His own power, or according to the spirit of His own holiness, or by the resurrection of His dead, or of their dead: as, I say, we are not compelled to understand another person, but one and the same, that is, the person of the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ; so, when we are told that God made man in the image of God, although it might have been more usual to say, after His own image, yet we are not compelled to understand any other person in the Trinity, but the one and selfsame Trinity itself, who is one God, and after whose image man is made.

Since this is the case, if we are to accept this same image of the Trinity as existing not in one person but in three human beings—father, mother, and son—then man was not made in the image of God before a wife was made for him and before they had a son, because a trinity did not yet exist. Will anyone say that a trinity already existed because, although not yet in their actual form, both the woman was already present in the man's side and the son in the father's loins according to their original nature? Then why, when Scripture said that God made man in the image of God, did it continue by saying that God created him, male and female He created them, and God blessed them? (Or if the passage should be divided this way: "And God created man," followed by "in the image of God He created him," and then "male and female He created them"—for some have been reluctant to say "He made him male and female" to avoid suggesting something monstrous, like those people called hermaphrodites, although even in that case both could rightly be understood in the singular because of the phrase "the two shall become one flesh.") Why then, as I started to say, when describing the nature of man made in the image of God, does Scripture specify nothing except male and female? Certainly, to complete the image of the Trinity, it should have also added a son, even though still present in his father's loins, just as the woman was in his side. Or was it perhaps that the woman had already been made, and Scripture combined into a brief, condensed statement something it would explain more carefully later—how it actually happened—and therefore a son could not be mentioned because no son had yet been born? As if the Holy Spirit could not have included this too in that brief statement, while planning to narrate the son's birth later in its proper place, just as it narrated later in its proper place that the woman was taken from the man's side, and yet has not failed to mention her here.

8. And since the case stands thus, if we are to accept the same image of the Trinity, as not in one, but in three human beings, father and mother and son, then the man was not made after the image of God before a wife was made for him, and before they procreated a son; because there was not yet a trinity. Will any one say there was already a trinity, because, although not yet in their proper form, yet in their original nature, both the woman was already in the side of the man, and the son in the loins of his father? Why then, when Scripture had said, God made man after the image of God, did it go on to say, God created him; male and female created He them: and God blessed them? (Or if it is to be so divided, And God created man, so that thereupon is to be added, in the image of God created He him, and then subjoined in the third place, male and female created He them; for some have feared to say, He made him male and female, lest something monstrous, as it were, should be understood, as are those whom they call hermaphrodites, although even so both might be understood not falsely in the singular number, on account of that which is said, Two in one flesh.) Why then, as I began by saying, in regard to the nature of man made after the image of God, does Scripture specify nothing except male and female? Certainly, in order to complete the image of the Trinity, it ought to have added also son, although still placed in the loins of his father, as the woman was in his side. Or was it perhaps that the woman also had been already made, and that Scripture had combined in a short and comprehensive statement, that of which it was going to explain afterwards more carefully, how it was done; and that therefore a son could not be mentioned, because no son was yet born? As if the Holy Spirit could not have comprehended this, too, in that brief statement, while about to narrate the birth of the son afterwards in its own place; as it narrated afterwards in its own place, that the woman was taken from the side of the man, and yet has not omitted here to name her.

Chapter 7.– How Man is the Image of God. Whether the Woman is Not Also the Image of God. How the Saying of the Apostle, that the Man is the Image of God, But the Woman is the Glory of the Man, is to Be Understood Figuratively and Mystically.

We should not understand that man is made in the image of the supreme Trinity—that is, in the image of God—in such a way that this same image should be understood as existing in three human beings. This is especially clear since the apostle says that the man is the image of God, and for this reason removes the covering from his head, while he instructs the woman to use a covering, speaking as follows: For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say about this? If the woman completes the image of the trinity according to the measure of her own person, why is the man still called that image after she has been taken out of his side? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God—just as each person also is God in the supreme Trinity itself—why is the woman also not the image of God? For she is instructed for this very reason to cover her head, which he is forbidden to do because he is the image of God.

9. We ought not therefore so to understand that man is made in the image of the supreme Trinity, that is, in the image of God, as that the same image should be understood to be in three human beings; especially when the apostle says that the man is the image of God, and on that account removes the covering from his head, which he warns the woman to use, speaking thus: For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say to this? If the woman fills up the image of the trinity after the measure of her own person, why is the man still called that image after she has been taken out of his side? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God, as each person also is God in the supreme Trinity itself, why is the woman also not the image of God? For she is instructed for this very reason to cover her head, which he is forbidden to do because he is the image of God.

We need to notice how what the apostle says—that the man, not the woman, is the image of God—does not contradict what is written in Genesis: "God created man: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them: and He blessed them." This text says that human nature itself, which is complete only in both sexes, was made in the image of God, and it does not separate the woman from the image of God which it signifies. After saying that God made man in the image of God, "He created him," it says "male and female," or alternatively, with different punctuation, "male and female created He them." How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God and therefore is forbidden to cover his head, but that the woman is not and therefore is commanded to cover hers? The answer is this: according to what I have already said when I was treating the nature of the human mind, the woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that the whole substance may be one image. But when she is considered separately in her role as helper, which concerns the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God. As for the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman is also joined with him in one. We said something similar about the nature of the human mind: when as a whole it contemplates the truth, it is the image of God, and when something is divided from it and directed toward knowledge of temporal things, nevertheless on that side where it beholds and consults truth, it is still the image of God, but on that side where it is directed to knowledge of lower things, it is not the image of God. Since the mind is formed more and more after the image of God the more it extends itself toward what is eternal, and since it should not be restrained from this on that account, therefore the man ought not to cover his head. But because too great a movement toward inferior things is dangerous to that rational knowledge that deals with bodily and temporal things, this ought to have power on its head, which the covering indicates, signifying that it ought to be restrained. For a holy and reverent meaning is pleasing to the holy angels. God does not see in a temporal way, nor does anything new occur in His vision and knowledge when something is done in time and passes away, in the way such things affect the senses—whether the bodily senses of animals and humans, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.

10. But we must notice how that which the apostle says, that not the woman but the man is the image of God, is not contrary to that which is written in Genesis, God created man: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them: and He blessed them. For this text says that human nature itself, which is complete [only] in both sexes, was made in the image of God; and it does not separate the woman from the image of God which it signifies. For after saying that God made man in the image of God, He created him, it says, male and female: or at any rate, punctuating the words otherwise, male and female created He them. How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God, and therefore he is forbidden to cover his head; but that the woman is not so, and therefore is commanded to cover hers? Unless, forsooth, according to that which I have said already, when I was treating of the nature of the human mind, that the woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that that whole substance may be one image; but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, which regards the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined with him in one. As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is divided from it, and diverted in order to the cognition of temporal things; nevertheless on that side on which it beholds and consults truth, here also it is the image of God, but on that side whereby it is directed to the cognition of the lower things, it is not the image of God. And since it is so much the more formed after the image of God, the more it has extended itself to that which is eternal, and is on that account not to be restrained, so as to withhold and refrain itself from thence; therefore the man ought not to cover his head. But because too great a progression towards inferior things is dangerous to that rational cognition that is conversant with things corporeal and temporal; this ought to have power on its head, which the covering indicates, by which it is signified that it ought to be restrained. For a holy and pious meaning is pleasing to the holy angels. For God sees not after the way of time, neither does anything new take place in His vision and knowledge, when anything is done in time and transitorily, after the way in which such things affect the senses, whether the carnal senses of animals and men, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.

The fact that the Apostle Paul, when speaking outwardly about male and female sex, was representing the mystery of some more hidden truth can be understood from this: in another place, when he says that a woman is truly a widow if she is desolate, without children and grandchildren, and yet that she ought to trust in God and continue in prayers night and day, he also indicates that the woman, having been brought into transgression by being deceived, is brought to salvation through childbearing. Then he adds, "If they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety." It would be as if it could possibly harm a good widow either if she had no sons, or if those she had did not choose to continue in good works. But because those things called good works are, so to speak, the children of our life—according to that sense of "life" which answers the question "What is a man's life?" meaning "How does he conduct himself in these temporal things?" (which life the Greeks call not ζωή but βίος)—and because these good works are chiefly performed through acts of mercy, while works of mercy profit neither pagans, nor Jews who do not believe in Christ, nor any heretics or schismatics whatsoever in whom faith and charity and sober holiness are not found: what the apostle meant to signify is plain, and figuratively and mystically so, because he was speaking of covering the head of the woman, which will remain mere empty words unless referred to some hidden sacrament.

11. For that the Apostle Paul, when speaking outwardly of the sex of male and female, figured the mystery of some more hidden truth, may be understood from this, that when he says in another place that she is a widow indeed who is desolate, without children and nephews, and yet that she ought to trust in God, and to continue in prayers night and day, he here indicates, that the woman having been brought into the transgression by being deceived, is brought to salvation by child-bearing; and then he has added, If they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety. As if it could possibly hurt a good widow, if either she had not sons, or if those whom she had did not choose to continue in good works. But because those things which are called good works are, as it were, the sons of our life, according to that sense of life in which it answers to the question, What is a man's life? That is, How does he act in these temporal things? Which life the Greeks do not call ξωή but βίος; and because these good works are chiefly performed in the way of offices of mercy, while works of mercy are of no profit, either to Pagans, or to Jews who do not believe in Christ, or to any heretics or schismstics whatsoever in whom faith and charity and sober holiness are not found: what the apostle meant to signify is plain, and in so far figuratively and mystically, because he was speaking of covering the head of the woman, which will remain mere empty words, unless referred to some hidden sacrament.

For, as both sound reason and the apostle's own authority make clear, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind. The idea that God is confined and limited by the outlines of bodily parts is degraded and worthless. But doesn't this same blessed apostle say, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God; and elsewhere more clearly, Putting off the old man, he says, with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him? If we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and the new man is the one who is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him, then no one can doubt that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor randomly according to some part of the mind, but according to the rational mind, in which the knowledge of God can exist. And it is according to this renewal that we are made sons of God by the baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, we certainly put on Christ through faith. Who then would claim that women are excluded from this fellowship, since they are fellow heirs of grace with us; and since the same apostle says elsewhere, For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus? Have faithful women somehow lost their bodily sex? No, but because they are renewed after the image of God where there is no sex, man is made after the image of God where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why then is the man not required to cover his head because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is required to do so because she is the glory of the man, as if the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was fitting to represent through her bodily covering that part of reason which is directed toward the management of temporal things, so that the image of God may remain on that side of the human mind which clings to the contemplation or consultation of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not only men but also women possess.

12. For, as not only most true reason but also the authority of the apostle himself declares, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind. For the thought is a debased and empty one, which holds God to be circumscribed and limited by the lineaments of bodily members. But further, does not the same blessed apostle say, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God; and in another place more clearly, Putting off the old man, he says, with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him? If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and he is the new man who is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him; no one can doubt, that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor indiscriminately according to any part of the mind, but according to the rational mind, wherein the knowledge of God can exist. And it is according to this renewal, also, that we are made sons of God by the baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, certainly put on Christ through faith. Who is there, then, who will hold women to be alien from this fellowship, whereas they are fellow-heirs of grace with us; and whereas in another place the same apostle says, For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus? Pray, have faithful women then lost their bodily sex? But because they are there renewed after the image of God, where there is no sex; man is there made after the image of God, where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why, then, is the man on that account not bound to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is bound to do so, because she is the glory of the man; as though the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to represent under her bodily covering that part of the reason which is diverted to the government of temporal things; so that the image of God may remain on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not men only, but also women have.

Chapter 8.– Turning Aside from the Image of God.

A common nature, therefore, is recognized in their minds, but in their bodies a division of that one mind itself is represented. As we climb upward through certain steps of thought within ourselves, following the sequence of the mind's parts, the point where we first encounter something not shared with the animals is where reason begins, so that here the inner man can now be recognized. And if this inner man himself, through that reason to which the management of temporal things has been delegated, slips too far by excessive advancement into outward things, with his head also consenting—that is, the masculine part (so to speak) which presides in the watchtower of counsel, failing to restrain or control it—then he grows old because of all his enemies, namely the demons with their prince the devil, who envy virtue. And that vision of eternal things is also withdrawn from the head himself, who eats with his spouse what was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is taken from him. And so both being stripped of that enlightenment of truth, and with the eyes of their conscience opened to see how they were left shameful and indecent, they weave together good words like the leaves of sweet fruits but without the fruits themselves, covering over their disgrace by speaking well while living wickedly.

13. A common nature, therefore, is recognized in their minds, but in their bodies a division of that one mind itself is figured. As we ascend, then, by certain steps of thought within, along the succession of the parts of the mind, there where something first meets us which is not common to ourselves with the beasts reason begins, so that here the inner man can now be recognized. And if this inner man himself, through that reason to which the administering of things temporal has been delegated, slips on too far by over-much progress into outward things, that which is his head moreover consenting, that is, the (so to call it) masculine part which presides in the watchtower of counsel not restraining or bridling it: then he waxes old because of all his enemies, viz. the demons with their prince the devil, who are envious of virtue; and that vision of eternal things is withdrawn also from the head himself, eating with his spouse that which was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is gone from him; and so both being naked from that enlightenment of truth, and with the eyes of their conscience opened to behold how they were left shameful and unseemly, like the leaves of sweet fruits, but without the fruits themselves, they so weave together good words without the fruit of good works, as while living wickedly to cover over their disgrace as it were by speaking well.

Chapter 9.– The Same Argument is Continued.

When the soul loves its own power, it slips away from the whole that is common to all, toward a part that belongs especially to itself. This apostatizing pride, which is called the beginning of sin, could have been most excellently governed by God's laws if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creation. Instead, by seeking something more than the whole and struggling to govern this by its own law, it is thrust onward—since nothing is more than the whole—into caring for a part. Thus, by desiring something more, it becomes less; for this reason covetousness is also called the root of all evil. The soul administers that whole in which it strives to do something of its own against the laws that govern the whole, through its own body, which it possesses only partially. Being delighted by bodily forms and movements, and not having these things themselves within itself, it becomes wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in memory, and is foully polluted by fornication of the phantasy. While it directs all its activities toward those ends for which it eagerly seeks bodily and temporal things through the body's senses, it either swells with arrogance, thinking itself more excellent than other souls given over to the bodily senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of fleshly pleasure.

14. For the soul loving its own power, slips onwards from the whole which is common, to a part, which belongs especially to itself. And that apostatizing pride, which is called the beginning of sin, whereas it might have been most excellently governed by the laws of God, if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creature, by seeking something more than the whole, and struggling to govern this by a law of its own, is thrust on, since nothing is more than the whole, into caring for a part; and thus by lusting after something more, is made less; whence also covetousness is called the root of all evil. And it administers that whole, wherein it strives to do something of its own against the laws by which the whole is governed, by its own body, which it possesses only in part; and so being delighted by corporeal forms and motions, because it has not the things themselves within itself, and because it is wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in the memory, and is foully polluted by fornication of the phantasy, while it refers all its functions to those ends, for which it curiously seeks corporeal and temporal things through the senses of the body, either it affects with swelling arrogance to be more excellent than other souls that are given up to the corporeal senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of carnal pleasure.

Chapter 10.– The Lowest Degradation Reached by Degrees.

When the soul seeks knowledge for itself or others with good intentions, aiming to understand inner and higher realities—the kind that are held in pure embrace, without restriction or jealousy, not privately but shared by all who love such things—then even if it is deceived about temporal matters (since its action in this case is temporal), and even if it fails to maintain the proper way of acting, the temptation is merely one common to humanity. It is a great achievement to journey through this life, which we travel like a road leading home, in such a way that we face only temptations common to humanity. For this is a sin committed without the body and should not be considered fornication, and for that reason is very easily forgiven. But when the soul acts in order to obtain things perceived through the body, driven by the desire to experience, surpass, or manipulate them, so as to make them its ultimate good, then whatever it does is wicked and constitutes fornication, sinning against its own body. By grasping at false images of bodily things from within and combining them through empty thinking, so that nothing seems divine to it unless it resembles these things, it becomes fertile in errors through selfish greed and drained of strength through selfish wastefulness. Yet the soul would not immediately leap into such shameless and wretched fornication from the start, but rather, as Scripture says, whoever despises small things shall fall little by little.

15. When the soul then consults either for itself or for others with a good will towards perceiving the inner and higher things, such as are possessed in a chaste embrace, without any narrowness or envy, not individually, but in common by all who love such things; then even if it be deceived in anything, through ignorance of things temporal (for its action in this case is a temporal one), and if it does not hold fast to that mode of acting which it ought, the temptation is but one common to man. And it is a great thing so to pass through this life, on which we travel, as it were, like a road on our return home, that no temptation may take us, but what is common to man. For this is a sin, without the body, and must not be reckoned fornication, and on that account is very easily pardoned. But when the soul does anything in order to attain those things which are perceived through the body, through lust of proving or of surpassing or of handling them, in order that it may place in them its final good, then whatever it does, it does wickedly, and commits fornication, sinning against its own body: and while snatching from within the deceitful images of corporeal things, and combining them by vain thought, so that nothing seems to it to be divine, unless it be of such a kind as this; by selfish greediness it is made fruitful in errors, and by selfish prodigality it is emptied of strength. Yet it would not leap on at once from the commencement to such shameless and miserable fornication, but, as it is written, He that despises small things, shall fall little by little.

Chapter 11.– The Image of the Beast in Man.

Just as a snake does not move forward with visible steps but advances by the tiny movements of each scale, so the slippery motion of falling away from what is good takes hold of the negligent person only gradually. Beginning from a perverted desire for the likeness of God, it arrives in the end at the likeness of beasts. This is why, being stripped of their first garment, they received coats of skins through mortality. For the true honor of humanity is the image and likeness of God, which cannot be preserved except in relation to Him by whom it is impressed. Therefore, the less a person loves what is his own, the more he clings to God. But through the desire to test his own power, a person falls by his own choice down to himself as to a kind of intermediate level. And so, while he wishes to be as God is—that is, under no one—he is driven as punishment even from his own middle level to the lowest level, that is, to those things in which beasts take pleasure. Thus, while his honor is the likeness of God, his dishonor is the likeness of the beast. A human being in honor does not remain: he is compared to the foolish beasts and is made like them. By what path, then, could he cross such a great distance from the highest to the lowest, except through his own intermediate level? For when he neglects the love of wisdom, which always remains the same, and desires knowledge through experimenting with temporal and changeable things, that knowledge puffs up but does not build up. So the mind is weighed down and thrust out, as it were, by its own weight from blessedness, and learns through its own punishment, through that testing of its own intermediate state, what the difference is between the good it has abandoned and the evil to which it has committed itself. Having thrown away and destroyed its strength, it cannot return unless by the grace of its Maker calling it to repentance and forgiving its sins. For who will deliver the wretched soul from the body of this death, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? We will discuss this grace in its proper place, as far as He Himself enables us.

16. For as a snake does not creep on with open steps, but advances by the very minutest efforts of its several scales; so the slippery motion of falling away [from what is good] takes possession of the negligent only gradually, and beginning from a perverse desire for the likeness of God, arrives in the end at the likeness of beasts. Hence it is that being naked of their first garment, they earned by mortality coats of skins. For the true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in relation to Him by whom it is impressed. The less therefore that one loves what is one's own, the more one cleaves to God. But through the desire of making trial of his own power, man by his own bidding falls down to himself as to a sort of intermediate grade. And so, while he wishes to be as God is, that is, under no one, he is thrust on, even from his own middle grade, by way of punishment, to that which is lowest, that is, to those things in which beasts delight: and thus, while his honor is the likeness of God, but his dishonor is the likeness of the beast, Man being in honor abides not: he is compared to the beasts that are foolish, and is made like to them. By what path, then, could he pass so great a distance from the highest to the lowest, except through his own intermediate grade? For when he neglects the love of wisdom, which remains always after the same fashion, and lusts after knowledge by experiment upon things temporal and mutable, that knowledge puffs up, it does not edify: so the mind is overweighed and thrust out, as it were, by its own weight from blessedness; and learns by its own punishment, through that trial of its own intermediateness, what the difference is between the good it has abandoned and the bad to which it has committed itself; and having thrown away and destroyed its strength, it cannot return, unless by the grace of its Maker calling it to repentance, and forgiving its sins. For who will deliver the unhappy soul from the body of this death, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? of which grace we will discourse in its place, so far as He Himself enables us.

Chapter 12.– There is a Kind of Hidden Wedlock in the Inner Man. Unlawful Pleasures of the Thoughts.

Let us now complete our discussion, with the Lord's help, concerning the part of reason that deals with knowledge—that is, the awareness of temporal and changeable things necessary for managing this life's affairs. Just as with the visible marriage of the first two human beings, where the serpent did not eat the forbidden tree but only persuaded them to eat, and the woman did not eat alone but gave to her husband so they ate together (though she alone spoke with the serpent and was led astray by him)—so also with that hidden and secret kind of marriage that takes place and is discerned within a single human being. The fleshly movement of the soul—or as I might say, since it is directed toward the body's senses, the sensuous movement—which we share with animals, is cut off from the reason of wisdom. Bodily things are certainly perceived by the body's senses, but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. However, the reason of knowledge has desire very close to it, since what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons about bodily things perceived by bodily sense—either properly, in order to direct that knowledge toward the end of the highest good, or improperly, in order to enjoy them as if they were goods in which one finds rest with false happiness. Whenever that carnal or animal sense introduces into the mind's purpose (which deals with temporal and bodily things for managing one's actions through reason's living force) some inducement to enjoy itself—that is, to enjoy itself as though it were some private good of its own rather than the public and common unchangeable good—then the serpent, as it were, speaks with the woman. To consent to this temptation is to eat from the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, while the bodily members are restrained by higher counsel's authority so they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness to sin, this should be considered as if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food. But if in this consent to wickedly use things perceived through the body's senses, any sin is so determined upon that it is also fulfilled by the body when there is opportunity, then the woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband to eat together with her. For the mind cannot determine that a sin should not only be thought about with pleasure but also actually committed unless the mind's intention also yields and serves the evil action—the intention that has chief power to apply the bodily members to an outward act or restrain them from one.

17. Let us now complete, so far as the Lord helps us, the discussion which we have undertaken, respecting that part of reason to which knowledge belongs, that is, the cognizance of things temporal and changeable, which is necessary for managing the affairs of this life. For as in the case of that visible wedlock of the two human beings who were made first, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded them to eat of it; and the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they eat together; although she alone spoke with the serpent, and she alone was led away by him: so also in the case of that hidden and secret kind of wedlock, which is transacted and discerned in a single human being, the carnal, or as I may say, since it is directed to the senses of the body, the sensuous movement of the soul, which is common to us with beasts, is shut off from the reason of wisdom. For certainly bodily things are perceived by the sense of the body; but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. But the reason of knowledge has appetite very near to it: seeing that what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons concerning the bodily things which are perceived by the bodily sense; if well, in order that it may refer that knowledge to the end of the chief good; but if ill, in order that it may enjoy them as being such good things as those wherein it reposes with a false blessedness. Whenever, then, that carnal or animal sense introduces into this purpose of the mind which is conversant about things temporal and corporeal, with a view to the offices of a man's actions, by the living force of reason, some inducement to enjoy itself, that is, to enjoy itself as if it were some private good of its own, not as the public and common, which is the unchangeable, good; then, as it were, the serpent discourses with the woman. And to consent to this allurement, is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, but the members are so restrained by the authority of higher counsel that they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; this, I think, is to be considered as if the woman alone should have eaten the forbidden food. But if, in this consent to use wickedly the things which are perceived through the senses of the body, any sin at all is so determined upon, that if there is the power it is also fulfilled by the body; then that woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband with her, to be eaten together. For it is not possible for the mind to determine that a sin is not only to be thought of with pleasure, but also to be effectually committed, unless also that intention of the mind yields, and serves the bad action, with which rests the chief power of applying the members to an outward act, or of restraining them from one.

When the mind takes pleasure in thinking about unlawful things, even though it doesn't actually decide to do them but simply holds onto and gladly considers what should have been rejected the instant it entered the mind, this certainly cannot be denied to be sin. However, it is far less serious than if the person had also decided to carry it out in action. Therefore, forgiveness must be sought even for such thoughts. We must beat our chest and say, "Forgive us our debts," and what follows must be done and included in our prayer: "As we also forgive our debtors." The situation is not like it was with the first two human beings, where each carried their own distinct role. In that case, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she alone would certainly have received the punishment of death. But we cannot say the same thing about a single human being now—that if the thought by itself is gladly fed with unlawful pleasures from which it should immediately turn away, while there is still no decision to actually commit the bad actions but only to retain them with pleasure in memory, the woman can be condemned without the man, so to speak. We must never believe this. Here we are dealing with one person, one human being, and that person will be condemned as a whole unless those things are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator—the sins that are only in thought, where the will to act is absent but the will to please the mind with them is present.

18. And yet, certainly, when the mind is pleased in thought alone with unlawful things, while not indeed determining that they are to be done, but yet holding and pondering gladly things which ought to have been rejected the very moment they touched the mind, it cannot be denied to be a sin, but far less than if it were also determined to accomplished it in outward act. And therefore pardon must be sought for such thoughts too, and the breast must be smitten, and it must be said, Forgive us our debts; and what follows must be done, and must be joined in our prayer, As we also forgive our debtors. For it is not as it was with those two first human beings, of which each one bare his own person; and so, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she certainly alone would have been smitten with the punishment of death: it cannot, I say, be so said also in the case of a single human being now, that if the thought, remaining alone, be gladly fed with unlawful pleasures, from which it ought to turn away directly, while yet there is no determination that the bad actions are to be done, but only that they are retained with pleasure in remembrance, the woman as it were can be condemned without the man. Far be it from us to believe this. For here is one person, one human being, and he as a whole will be condemned, unless those things which, as lacking the will to do, and yet having the will to please the mind with them, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator.

This reasoning, by which we have searched for a kind of rational wedlock between contemplation and action in the mind of each individual person—with their functions distributed separately yet preserving the unity of the mind in both—while still maintaining the truth of the historical account that divine Scripture gives us about the first two human beings, the man and his wife, from whom the human race descended—this reasoning, I say, should be understood only in this way: that the apostle intended to signify something to be found in one individual person by assigning the image of God to the man only and not to the woman, even though they are two human beings distinguished merely by different sex.

19. This reasoning, then, whereby we have sought in the mind of each several human being a certain rational wedlock of contemplation and action, with functions distributed through each severally, yet with the unity of the mind preserved in both; saving meanwhile the truth of that history which divine testimony hands down respecting the first two human beings, that is, the man and his wife, from whom the human species is propagated; — this reasoning, I say, must be listened to only thus far, that the apostle may be understood to have intended to signify something to be sought in one individual man, by assigning the image of God to the man only, and not also to the woman, although in the merely different sex of two human beings.

Chapter 13.– The Opinion of Those Who Have Thought that the Mind Was Signified by the Man, the Bodily Sense by the Woman.

I am aware that some who came before us were outstanding defenders of the Catholic faith and interpreters of God's word. While looking for these two elements within a single human being, whose entire soul they understood to be a kind of excellent paradise, they claimed that the man represented the mind, while the woman represented the bodily sense. According to this interpretation, where the man is taken to be the mind and the woman the bodily sense, everything seems to fit together well if handled with proper care. However, there is the problem that Scripture says among all the beasts and birds, no helper like himself was found for man, and then the woman was made from his side. For this reason, I have not thought the bodily sense should be understood as the woman, since we see this sense is common to both ourselves and the beasts. Instead, I have wanted to find something that the beasts do not have. I have rather thought the bodily sense should be understood as the serpent, who we read was more subtle than all the beasts of the field. For among those natural good things which we see are common to ourselves and to irrational animals, the sense stands out with a kind of living power. This is not the sense mentioned in the epistle to the Hebrews, where we read that solid food belongs to those who are mature, those who through practice have had their senses trained to distinguish both good and evil, for these senses belong to rational nature and relate to understanding. Rather, it is that sense which is divided into five parts in the body, through which physical forms and movement are perceived not only by ourselves but also by beasts.

20. Nor does it escape me, that some who before us were eminent defenders of the Catholic faith and expounders of the word of God, while they looked for these two things in one human being, whose entire soul they perceived to be a sort of excellent paradise, asserted that the man was the mind, but that the woman was the bodily sense. And according to this distribution, by which the man is assumed to be the mind, but the woman the bodily sense, all things seem aptly to agree together if they are handled with due attention: unless that it is written, that in all the beasts and flying things there was not found for man an helpmate like to himself; and then the woman was made out of his side. And on this account I, for my part, have not thought that the bodily sense should be taken for the woman, which we see to be common to ourselves and to the beasts; but I have desired to find something which the beasts had not; and I have rather thought the bodily sense should be understood to be the serpent, whom we read to have been more subtle than all beasts of the field. For in those natural good things which we see are common to ourselves and to the irrational animals, the sense excels by a kind of living power; not the sense of which it is written in the epistle addressed to the Hebrews, where we read, that strong meat belongs to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil; for these senses belong to the rational nature and pertain to the understanding; but that sense which is divided into five parts in the body, through which corporeal species and motion is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by the beasts.

But whether what the apostle says—that the man is the image and glory of God, while the woman is the glory of the man—should be understood in this way, or that way, or in some other way, one thing is clear: when we live according to God, our mind, which focuses on His invisible things, ought to be progressively shaped by His eternity, truth, and love. But some part of our rational capacity, that is, of this same mind, must be directed toward using changeable and bodily things, without which this life cannot continue. This is not so that we may be conformed to this world by placing our ultimate goal in such good things and directing our desire for happiness toward them, but rather so that whatever we do rationally in using temporal things, we do it with our eyes on attaining eternal things, passing through the former but holding fast to the latter.

21. But whether that the apostle calls the man the image and glory of God, but the woman the glory of the man, is to be received in this, or that, or in any other way; yet it is clear, that when we live according to God, our mind which is intent on the invisible things of Him ought to be fashioned with proficiency from His eternity, truth, charity; but that something of our own rational purpose, that is, of the same mind, must be directed to the using of changeable and corporeal things, without which this life does not go on; not that we may be conformed to this world, by placing our end in such good things, and by forcing the desire of blessedness towards them, but that whatever we do rationally in the using of temporal things, we may do it with the contemplation of attaining eternal things, passing through the former, but cleaving to the latter.

Chapter 14.– What is the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge. The Worship of God is the Love of Him. How the Intellectual Cognizance of Eternal Things Comes to Pass Through Wisdom.

Knowledge also has its proper measure, if whatever in it puffs up or tends to puff up is overcome by the love of eternal things, which does not puff up but, as we know, builds up. Certainly the virtues themselves, through which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed without knowledge, and it is through these virtues that this miserable life may be so governed that we may attain that eternal life which is truly blessed.

For knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, edifies. Certainly without knowledge the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, by which this miserable life may be so governed, that we may attain to that eternal life which is truly blessed.

Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things. The latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. Although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle speaks when he says, Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known, where he doubtless meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints. Yet where he says, For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, he certainly distinguishes these two things without doubt, although he does not there explain the difference or how one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, Behold, piety, that is wisdom, but to depart from evil is knowledge. In this distinction, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebeia. The sentence in the Greek manuscripts has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him and believe and hope that we shall see Him, and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by face to face. This is also what John says, Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. Discourse about these and similar subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time and this world that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain so that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly belongs to that knowledge or discipline by which our action is concerned with avoiding evil and desiring good. So also, whatever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.

22. Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle too speaks, where he says, Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known; when doubtless he meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints; yet where he says, For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, certainly he distinguishes without doubt these two things, although he does not there explain the difference, nor in what way one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, Behold, piety, that is wisdom; but to depart from evil is knowledge. In thus distinguishing, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called θεοσέβεια. For the sentence in the Greek mss. has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him, and we believe and hope that we shall see Him; and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by face to face. This is also what John says, Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. Discourse about these and the like subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time [and this world] that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatsoever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, belongs to that knowledge or discipline wherewith our action is conversant in avoiding evil and desiring good; and so also, whatsoever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.

When a discussion relates to these things, I consider it to belong to knowledge, and it should be distinguished from a discussion belonging to wisdom. Wisdom concerns those things that neither have been nor will be, but simply are. Because of the eternity in which they exist, they are said to have been, to be, and to be about to be, without any change over time. For they have not existed in such a way that they ceased to be, nor are they going to exist as if they do not exist now. Rather, they have always possessed and always will possess absolute being. They remain constant, but not as if they were fixed in some physical location the way bodies are. Instead, as intelligible things existing in incorporeal nature, they are as readily available to the mind's observation as visible or tangible things in physical space are to the body's senses. And just as there are sensible things positioned in physical space, there also exist intelligible and incorporeal reasons for them apart from any spatial location. Similarly, for motions that pass by in successive moments of time, there exist reasons apart from any passage of time—these reasons being intelligible, not sensible. Reaching these with the mind's eye is possible for only a few people. Even when they are reached to whatever degree possible, the person who reaches them does not remain in them but is pushed back, as it were, by the recoil of the mind's eye itself. The result is a passing thought of something that is not itself passing. Yet this fleeting thought is committed to memory through the teaching process by which the mind is instructed, so that the mind, which must move away from these things, can return to them again. If the thought does not return to memory and find what it deposited there, it would need to be led back like someone never taught, just as it was led before. It would find these things where it first found them—in that incorporeal truth—from which they can once more be written down and fixed in the mind. For example, a person's thought does not remain in the incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body in the same way that reason itself remains—if indeed the thought could reach it at all without imagining physical space. Or if someone were to grasp the rhythm of some artistic or musical sound passing through certain intervals of time, as it exists outside of time in some secret and profound silence, it could be thought about only as long as that song could be heard. Yet what the mind's glance, though fleeting, captured from there and stored away in memory like food in a stomach—this the mind will be able to contemplate to some extent through recollection and transform what it has learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been erased by complete forgetfulness, once again, with the help of teaching, one will come back to what had entirely disappeared, and it will be found just as it was.

23. When a discourse then relates to these things, I hold it to be a discourse belonging to knowledge, and to be distinguished from a discourse belonging to wisdom, to which those things belong, which neither have been, nor shall be, but are; and on account of that eternity in which they are, are said to have been, and to be, and to be about to be, without any changeableness of times. For neither have they been in such way as that they should cease to be, nor are they about to be in such way as if they were not now; but they have always had and always will have that very absolute being. And they abide, but not as if fixed in some place as are bodies; but as intelligible things in incorporeal nature, they are so at hand to the glance of the mind, as things visible or tangible in place are to the sense of the body. And not only in the case of sensible things posited in place, there abide also intelligible and incorporeal reasons of them apart from local space; but also of motions that pass by in successive times, apart from any transit in time, there stand also like reasons, themselves certainly intelligible, and not sensible. And to attain to these with the eye of the mind is the lot of few; and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to them does not abide in them, but is as it were repelled by the rebounding of the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a thing not transitory. And yet this transient thought is committed to the memory through the instructions by which the mind is taught; that the mind which is compelled to pass from thence, may be able to return there again; although, if the thought should not return to the memory and find there what it had committed to it, it would be led thereto like an uninstructed person, as it had been led before, and would find it where it had first found it, that is to say, in that incorporeal truth, whence yet once more it may be as it were written down and fixed in the mind. For the thought of man, for example, does not so abide in that incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body, as that reason itself abides: if, to be sure, it could attain to it at all without the phantasy of local space. Or if one were to apprehend the rhythm of any artificial or musical sound, passing through certain intervals of time, as it rested without time in some secret and deep silence, it could at least be thought as long as that song could be heard; yet what the glance of the mind, transient though it was, caught from thence, and, absorbing as it were into a belly, so laid up in the memory, over this it will be able to ruminate in some measure by recollection, and to transfer what it has thus learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been blotted out by absolute forgetfulness, yet once again, under the guidance of teaching, one will come to that which had altogether dropped away, and it will be found such as it was.

Chapter 15.– In Opposition to the Reminiscence of Plato and Pythagoras. Pythagoras the Samian. Of the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge, and of Seeking the Trinity in the Knowledge of Temporal Things.

The renowned philosopher Plato tried to convince us that human souls existed before they inhabited these bodies, and therefore the things we learn are actually remembered from what we already knew, rather than being acquired as new knowledge. He told us about a boy who, when asked certain questions about geometry, answered as if he were an expert in that subject. Through careful, step-by-step questioning, the boy saw what needed to be seen and said what he observed. But if this were truly a case of remembering previously known things, then everyone, or nearly everyone, would be able to answer the same way when questioned. However, not everyone was a geometrician in a former life, since geometricians are so rare among people that you can hardly find one anywhere. Instead, we should believe that the intellectual mind is naturally formed to see those things which, by the Creator's arrangement, are connected to intelligible things in a natural order, through a kind of unique incorporeal light—just as the physical eye sees things near it in bodily light, for which it was made receptive and to which it is adapted. After all, the physical eye also distinguishes black from white without a teacher, not because it knew these colors before it was created in this flesh. Finally, why is it that only with intelligible things can someone properly questioned give answers about any subject they are ignorant of? Why can no one do this with sensible things, except those they have seen in their present body or believed from the reports of others who knew them, whether through someone's writings or words? We must not accept the claims of those who assert that Pythagoras of Samos remembered certain things he had experienced when he previously existed here in another body, and others tell similar stories about other people who supposedly experienced the same thing in their minds. Rather, it can be suggested that these were false memories, like those we commonly experience in sleep when we think we remember doing or seeing something we never did or saw at all. The minds of these people, even while awake, were affected this way through the influence of malicious and deceitful spirits, whose purpose is to confirm or plant false beliefs about the transmigration of souls in order to deceive people. This can be inferred from the fact that if they truly remembered things they had seen here before while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many people—indeed, to almost everyone—since they suppose that just as the dead come from the living, so continuously and without pause the living come into existence from the dead, as sleepers come from those who are awake, and those who are awake from those who sleep.

24. And hence that noble philosopher Plato endeavored to persuade us that the souls of men lived even before they bare these bodies; and that hence those things which are learned are rather remembered, as having been known already, than taken into knowledge as things new. For he has told us that a boy, when questioned I know not what respecting geometry, replied as if he were perfectly skilled in that branch of learning. For being questioned step by step and skillfully, he saw what was to be seen, and said that which he saw. But if this had been a recollecting of things previously known, then certainly every one, or almost every one, would not have been able so to answer when questioned. For not every one was a geometrician in the former life, since geometricians are so few among men that scarcely one can be found anywhere. But we ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things, which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of an unique kind; as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive, and adapted to it. For none the more does this fleshly eye, too, distinguish black things from white without a teacher, because it had already known them before it was created in this flesh. Why, lastly, is it possible only in intelligible things that any one properly questioned should answer according to any branch of learning, although ignorant of it? Why can no one do this with things sensible, except those which he has seen in this his present body, or has believed the information of others who knew them, whether somebody's writings or words? For we must not acquiesce in their story, who assert that the Samian Pythagoras recollected some things of this kind, which he had experienced when he was previously here in another body; and others tell yet of others, that they experienced something of the same sort in their minds: but it may be conjectured that these were untrue recollections, such as we commonly experience in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done or seen it, what we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these persons, even though awake, were affected in this way at the suggestion of malignant and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm or to sow some false belief concerning the changes of souls, in order to deceive men. This, I say, may be conjectured from this, that if they really remembered those things which they had seen here before, while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many, nay to almost all; since they suppose that as the dead from the living, so, without cessation and continually, the living are coming into existence from the dead; as sleepers from those that are awake, and those that are awake from them that sleep.

If this is the correct way to distinguish wisdom from knowledge—that the intellectual understanding of eternal things belongs to wisdom, while the rational understanding of temporal things belongs to knowledge—then it's not hard to decide which should be given priority. But even if we need to use some other method to tell these two apart (which the apostle certainly teaches us are different when he says, "To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit"), the distinction we've established remains crystal clear: intellectual understanding of eternal things is one thing, rational understanding of temporal things is another. And no one doubts that the former should be preferred to the latter. So as we move beyond the things that belong to the outer person and want to rise inward from those things we share with animals, before we arrive at the understanding of intelligible and supreme things that are eternal, the rational understanding of temporal things presents itself to us. Let us then find a trinity in this as well, if we can, just as we found one in the bodily senses and in those things that entered through them as images into our soul or spirit. Instead of physical objects that we touch through physical sensation and that exist outside us, we would have likenesses of bodies impressed within our memory, from which thought could be formed, while the will as a third element united them—just as sight was formed from external things when the will directed it toward the visible object to produce vision and united both, while also adding itself as a third element. But this subject shouldn't be squeezed into this book, so that in the next one, God willing, it may be properly examined and our conclusions clearly explained.

25. If therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge, it is not difficult to judge which is to be preferred or postponed to which. But if we must employ some other distinction by which to know these two apart, which without doubt the apostle teaches us are different, saying, To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit: still the difference between those two which we have laid down is a most evident one, in that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things is one thing, the rational cognizance of temporal things another; and no one doubts but that the former is to be preferred to the latter. As then we leave behind those things which belong to the outer man, and desire to ascend within from those things which we have in common with beasts, before we come to the cognizance of things intelligible and supreme, which are eternal, the rational cognizance of temporal things presents itself. Let us then find a trinity in this also, if we can, as we found one in the senses of the body, and in those things which through them entered in the way of images into our soul or spirit; so that instead of corporeal things which we touch by corporeal sense, placed as they are without us, we might have resemblances of bodies impressed within on the memory from which thought might be formed, while the will as a third united them; just as the sight of the eyes was formed from without, which the will applied to the visible thing in order to produce vision, and united both, while itself also added itself thereto as a third. But this subject must not be compressed into this book; so that in that which follows, if God help, it may be suitably examined, and the conclusions to which we come may be unfolded.


On the Trinity — Book XI

Trinities in the ‘outer man’: the object seen, the act of seeing, and the attention of the will; and in memory and imagination.

A kind of image of the Trinity is pointed out, even in the outer man; first of all, in those things which are perceived from without, viz. in the bodily object that is seen, and in the form that is impressed by it upon the sight of the seer, and in the purpose of the will that combines the two; although these three are neither mutually equal, nor of one substance. Next, a kind of trinity, in three somewhats of one substance, is observed to exist in the mind itself, as it were introduced there from those things that are perceived from without; viz. the image of the bodily object which is in the memory, and the impression formed therefrom when the mind's eye of the thinker is turned to it, and the purpose of the will combining both. And this latter trinity is also said to pertain to the outer man, in that it is introduced into the mind from bodily objects, which are perceived from without.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130111.htm>.

Contents · 11 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– A Trace of the Trinity Also In the Outer Man.
  2. Chapter 2.– A Certain Trinity in the Sight. That There are Three Things in Sight, Which Differ in Their Own Nature. In What Manner from a Visible Thing Vision is Produced, or the Image of that Thing Which is Seen. The Matter is Shown More Clearly by an Example. How These Three Combine in One.
  3. Chapter 3.– The Unity of the Three Takes Place in Thought, Viz Of Memory, of Ternal Vision,and of Will Combining Both.
  4. Chapter 4.– How This Unity Comes to Pass.
  5. Chapter 5.– The Trinity of the Outer Man, or of External Vision, is Not an Image of God. The Likeness of God is Desired Even in Sins. In External Vision the Form of the Corporeal Thing is as It Were the Parent, Vision the Offspring; But the Will that Unites These Suggests the Holy Spirit.
  6. Chapter 6.– Of What Kind We are to Reckon the Rest (Requies), and End (Finis), of the Will in Vision.
  7. Chapter 7.– There is Another Trinity in the Memory of Him Who Thinks Over Again What He Has Seen.
  8. Chapter 8.– Different Modes of Conceiving.
  9. Chapter 9.– Species is Produced by Species in Succession.
  10. Chapter 10.– The Imagination Also Adds Even to Things We Have Not Seen, Those Things Which We Have Seen Elsewhere.
  11. Chapter 11.– Number, Weight, Measure.

Chapter 1.– A Trace of the Trinity Also In the Outer Man.

No one doubts that just as the inner man is equipped with understanding, so the outer man is equipped with bodily sense. Let us try, then, if we can, to discover in this outer man also some trace, however slight, of the Trinity—not that it too is in the same way the image of God. For the apostle's opinion is clear, which declares that the inner man is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him, whereas he also says in another place, "But though our outer man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." Let us seek, then, as far as we can, in that which perishes, some image of the Trinity, if not as clear, yet perhaps easier to discern. For that outer man is not called man for no reason, but because there is in it some likeness of the inner man. And because of that very arrangement of our condition by which we are made mortal and fleshly, we handle visible things more easily and more familiarly than intelligible things, since the former are outward and the latter inward; and the former are perceived by bodily sense while the latter are understood by the mind; and we ourselves—that is, our minds—are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible things, since we are life. And yet, as I said, we are so habitually occupied with bodies, and our thought has projected itself outward with such a remarkable tendency toward bodies, that when it has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of corporeal things so that it may be fixed with a much more certain and stable knowledge in that which is spirit, it flies back to those bodies and seeks rest there where it has drawn weakness. And we must adapt our argument to this feebleness, so that if we want to try at any time to distinguish more accurately and communicate more readily the inward spiritual thing, we must take examples of likenesses from outward things pertaining to the body. The outer man, then, equipped as he is with bodily sense, deals with bodies. And this bodily sense, as is easily observed, is fivefold: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it is both a great deal of trouble and is not necessary that we should inquire about all five of these senses regarding what we seek. For what one of them shows us holds true also in the rest. Let us use, then, principally the testimony of the eyes. For this bodily sense far surpasses the rest and, in proportion to its difference in kind, is closer to the sight of the mind.

1. No one doubts that, as the inner man is endued with understanding, so is the outer with bodily sense. Let us try, then, if we can, to discover in this outer man also, some trace, however slight, of the Trinity, not that itself also is in the same manner the image of God. For the opinion of the apostle is evident, which declares the inner man to be renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him: whereas he says also in another place, But though our outer man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. Let us seek, then, so far as we can, in that which perishes, some image of the Trinity, if not so express, yet perhaps more easy to be discerned. For that outer man also is not called man to no purpose, but because there is in it some likeness of the inner man. And owing to that very order of our condition whereby we are made mortal and fleshly, we handle things visible more easily and more familiarly than things intelligible; since the former are outward, the latter inward; and the former are perceived by the bodily sense, the latter are understood by the mind; and we ourselves, i.e. our minds, are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible things, since we are life. And yet, as I said, we are so familiarly occupied with bodies, and our thought has projected itself outwardly with so wonderful a proclivity towards bodies, that, when it has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of things corporeal, that it may be fixed with a much more certain and stable knowledge in that which is spirit, it flies back to those bodies, and seeks rest there whence it has drawn weakness. And to this its feebleness we must suit our argument; so that, if we would endeavor at any time to distinguish more aptly, and intimate more readily, the inward spiritual thing, we must take examples of likenesses from outward things pertaining to the body. The outer man, then, endued as he is with the bodily sense, is conversant with bodies. And this bodily sense, as is easily observed, is fivefold; seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it is both a good deal of trouble, and is not necessary, that we should inquire of all these five senses about that which we seek. For that which one of them declares to us, holds also good in the rest. Let us use, then, principally the testimony of the eyes. For this bodily sense far surpasses the rest; and in proportion to its difference of kind, is nearer to the sight of the mind.

Chapter 2.– A Certain Trinity in the Sight. That There are Three Things in Sight, Which Differ in Their Own Nature. In What Manner from a Visible Thing Vision is Produced, or the Image of that Thing Which is Seen. The Matter is Shown More Clearly by an Example. How These Three Combine in One.

When we see any physical object, we need to consider and distinguish three things, which is very easy to do. First, there is the object itself that we see, whether a stone, a flame, or anything else visible to the eyes. This object could have existed even before it was seen. Second, there is vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object presented to our sense. Third, there is what keeps the eye's sense focused on the object being seen for as long as it is seen, namely the attention of the mind. These three things are not only clearly distinct, but also have different natures. The visible body has a very different nature from the sense of the eyes, and when that sense encounters the body, vision arises. What is vision itself other than perception shaped by what is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object is removed, and there could be no vision at all if there were no body to be seen, still the body that shapes the sense of the eyes when that body is seen, and the form itself that is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are definitely not of the same substance. The body that is seen is, by its own nature, separable. But the sense, which already existed in the living subject even before it saw what it was able to see when it encountered something visible—or the vision that comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now connected with it and seen—the sense, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense formed from outside, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is completely different from that body we perceive by seeing and by which the sense is formed not so as to be sense, but so as to be vision. For unless the sense were already in us before the sensible object was presented to us, we would not differ from the blind at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this: even when we are not seeing, we have in us that by which we are able to see, which is called the sense. They do not have this, and they are called blind for no other reason than because they lack it. Furthermore, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense focused on what we see and connects both, not only differs from that visible thing in its nature (in that one is mind and the other is body), but also from the sense and vision itself, since this attention is the act of the mind alone. The sense of the eyes is called a bodily sense for no other reason than that the eyes themselves are also members of the body. Although an inanimate body does not perceive, the soul mixed with the body perceives through a bodily instrument, and that instrument is called sense. This sense is also cut off and destroyed by injury to the body when someone is blinded, while the mind remains the same. Its attention, since the eyes are lost, does not indeed have the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body outside it, and so fix its gaze upon it and see it. Yet by the very effort it shows that, even though the bodily sense is taken away, the mind itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For the desire to see remains unimpaired, whether it can be carried out or not. These three things, then—the body that is seen, vision itself, and the attention of mind that joins them together—are clearly distinguishable, not only because of the properties of each, but also because of the difference in their natures.

2. When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. For, first, that visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes, through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in with something visible — or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and seen — the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing, and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be vision. For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see, which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than because they have it not. Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see, and connects both, not only differs from that visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this attention is the act of the mind alone; but the sense of the eyes is called a bodily sense, for no other reason than because the eyes themselves also are members of the body; and although an inanimate body does not perceive, yet the soul commingled with the body perceives through a corporeal instrument, and that instrument is called sense. And this sense, too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed, the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a desire [ appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.

In this case, the sensation doesn't come from the body that is seen, but from the body of the living being who perceives it—the body with which the soul is joined together in its own remarkable way. Yet vision is produced (that is, the sense itself is informed) by the body that is seen. So now there is not only the capacity to sense, which can exist unimpaired even in darkness if the eyes are healthy, but also an actually informed sense, which is called vision. Vision, then, is produced from something visible, but not from that alone—there must also be someone who sees. Therefore vision is produced from a visible thing together with someone who sees. On the part of the person who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention to look and gaze at the object. But that information of the sense, which is called vision, is imprinted only by the body that is seen—that is, by some visible thing. When this is removed, the form that was in the sense as long as the thing was present no longer remains. Yet the sense itself remains, which existed even before anything was perceived. This is like the impression of a thing in water, which remains as long as the body itself that is impressed on it is in the water. If the body is taken away, there will no longer be any such impression, although the water remains, which existed before it took the form of that body. So we can't say that a visible thing produces the sense itself. But it does produce the form—its own likeness, as it were—which comes to be in the sense when we perceive something by seeing. However, we can't distinguish, through the same sense, the form of the body we see from the form that it produces in the sense of the one who sees, because the union of the two is so close that there's no room for distinguishing them. But we can rationally infer that we couldn't have sensation at all unless some likeness of the body seen were produced in our own sense. When a ring is pressed into wax, it doesn't follow that no image is produced just because we can't discern it until it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated, what was made remains so that it can be seen, we are easily convinced that there was already a form impressed from the ring in the wax before it was separated from it. But if the ring were pressed into a liquid, no image would appear when it was withdrawn. Yet reason should still discern that there was in that liquid, before the ring was withdrawn, a form of the ring produced from the ring, which is to be distinguished from the form that is in the ring itself—the form from which was produced that other form which ceases to be when the ring is withdrawn, even though the form in the ring remains, from which the other was produced. So we shouldn't suppose that the perception of the eyes contains no image of the body that is seen as long as it is seen, just because when that body is withdrawn the image doesn't remain. This is why it's very difficult to persuade people of duller mind that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense when we see it, and that this same form is vision.

3. And since, in this case, the sensation does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the living being that perceives, with which the soul is tempered together in some wonderful way of its own; yet vision is produced, that is, the sense itself is informed, by the body which is seen; so that now, not only is there the power of sense, which can exist also unimpaired even in darkness, provided the eyes are sound, but also a sense actually informed, which is called vision. Vision, then, is produced from a thing that is visible; but not from that alone, unless there be present also one who sees. Therefore vision is produced from a thing that is visible, together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part of him who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention of looking and gazing at the object; while yet that information of the sense, which is called vision, is imprinted only by the body which is seen, that is, by some visible thing; which being taken away, that form remains no more which was in the sense so long as that which was seen was present: yet the sense itself remains, which existed also before anything was perceived; just as the trace of a thing in water remains so long as the body itself, which is impressed on it, is in the water; but if this has been taken away, there will no longer be any such trace, although the water remains, which existed also before it took the form of that body. And therefore we cannot, indeed, say that a visible thing produces the sense; yet it produces the form, which is, as it were, its own likeness, which comes to be in the sense, when we perceive anything by seeing. But we do not distinguish, through the same sense, the form of the body which we see, from the form which is produced by it in the sense of him who sees; since the union of the two is so close that there is no room for distinguishing them. But we rationally infer that we could not have sensation at all, unless some similitude of the body seen was wrought in our own sense. For when a ring is imprinted on wax, it does not follow that no image is produced, because we cannot discern it unless when it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated, what was made remains, so that it can be seen; we are on that account easily persuaded that there was already also in the wax a form impressed from the ring before it was separated from it. But if the ring were imprinted upon a fluid, no image at all would appear when it was withdrawn; and yet none the less for this ought the reason to discern that there was in that fluid before the ring was withdrawn a form of the ring produced from the ring, which is to be distinguished from that form which is in the ring, whence that form was produced which ceases to be when the ring is withdrawn, although that in the ring remains, whence the other was produced. And so the [sensuous] perception of the eyes may not be supposed to contain no image of the body, which is seen as long as it is seen, [merely] because when that is withdrawn the image does not remain. And hence it is very difficult to persuade men of duller mind that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense, when we see it, and that this same form is vision.

However, if someone pays attention to what I am about to mention, they will find this investigation less difficult. Usually, when we have looked at a light for a little while and then close our eyes, certain bright colors seem to play before our eyes, changing in various ways and gradually growing dimmer until they completely disappear. We must understand that these are the remnants of the form that was produced in our sense while we were looking at the shining object, and that these changes occur as they slowly and gradually fade away. For example, if we happen to be gazing at window lattices, they often appear in these colors, making it clear that our sense is affected by such impressions from the thing being seen. Therefore, that form also existed while we were seeing, and at that time it was clearer and more distinct. But it was then closely united with the appearance of the thing being perceived, so that it could not be distinguished from it at all—and this was vision itself. In fact, even when a small lamp flame appears somehow doubled by the diverging rays of the eyes, double vision occurs, although the thing being seen is actually one. The rays shooting forth from each eye are affected separately because they are not allowed to meet evenly and together in viewing that physical object, so that one combined image might be formed from both. Therefore, if we close one eye, we will not see two flames but one, as it really is. But why, if we close the left eye, the image on the right disappears, and if we close the right eye, the one on the left vanishes—this is both tedious in itself and not at all necessary for our present subject to investigate and discuss. For it is sufficient for our current purpose to understand that unless some image exactly like the thing we perceive were produced in our sense, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of eyes, since a particular mode of perception has been employed that could separate the union of rays. Certainly, nothing that is truly single can be seen as if it were double by one eye, no matter how you pull, press, or distort it, if the other eye is closed.

4. But if any perhaps attend to what I am about to mention, they will find no such trouble in this inquiry. Commonly, when we have looked for some little time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there seem to play before our eyes certain bright colors variously changing themselves, and shining less and less until they wholly cease; and these we must understand to be the remains of that form which was wrought in the sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these variations take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade away. For the lattices, too, of windows, should we happen to be gazing at them, appear often in these colors; so that it is evident that our sense is affected by such impressions from that thing which is seen. That form therefore existed also while we were seeing, and at that time it was more clear and express. But it was then closely joined with the species of that thing which was being perceived, so that it could not be at all distinguished from it; and this was vision itself. Why, even when the little flame of a lamp is in some way, as it were, doubled by the divergent rays of the eyes, a twofold vision comes to pass, although the thing which is seen is one. For the same rays, as they shoot forth each from its own eye, are affected severally, in that they are not allowed to meet evenly and conjointly, in regarding that corporeal thing, so that one combined view might be formed from both. And so, if we shut one eye, we shall not see two flames, but one as it really is. But why, if we shut the left eye, that appearance ceases to be seen, which was on the right; and if, in turn, we shut the right eye, that drops out of existence which was on the left, is a matter both tedious in itself, and not necessary at all to our present subject to inquire and discuss. For it is enough for the business in hand to consider, that unless some image, precisely like the thing we perceive, were produced in our sense, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes; since a certain way of perceiving has been employed, which could separate the union of rays. Certainly nothing that is really single can be seen as if it were double by one eye, draw it down, or press, or distort it as you please, if the other is shut.

Since this is the case, let us remember how these three things, although different in nature, are blended together into a kind of unity: the form of the body that is seen, the image of it impressed on the sense (which is vision or informed sense), and the will of the mind that directs the sense to the sensible object and maintains the vision within it. The first of these—the visible object itself—does not belong to the nature of the living being, except when we perceive our own body. The second belongs to that nature to this extent: it is produced in the body and through the body in the soul, for it is produced in the sense, which exists neither without the body nor without the soul. The third belongs to the soul alone, because it is the will. Although the substances of these three are so different, they unite into such a oneness that the first two can scarcely be distinguished, even when reason serves as judge—namely, the form of the body that is seen and the image of it that is produced in the sense, which is vision. The will combines these two so powerfully that it both directs the sense to be informed by what is perceived and holds it fixed on that object once it is informed. If this will is so intense that it can be called love, desire, or lust, it strongly affects the rest of the living being's body as well; and where matter is not too dull and hard to resist, it transforms the body into a similar shape and color. One can see the small body of a chameleon change readily according to the colors it sees. In other animals, since their flesh is too dense to change easily, their offspring mostly reveal the particular interests of the mothers—whatever they have looked at with special pleasure. For the more tender and, so to speak, more shapeable the original seeds are, the more effectively and capably they follow the direction of the mother's soul and the image formed in it through the body she has gazed upon eagerly. Many examples could be given, but one is enough, taken from the most reliable books: what Jacob did so that the sheep and goats would give birth to offspring of various colors, by placing striped rods before them in the water troughs for them to look at while drinking, at the time when they had conceived.

5. The case then being so, let us remember how these three things, although diverse in nature, are tempered together into a kind of unity; that is, the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it impressed on the sense, which is vision or sense informed, and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and retains the vision itself in it. The first of these, that is, the visible thing itself, does not belong to the nature of the living being, except when we discern our own body. But the second belongs to that nature to this extent, that it is wrought in the body, and through the body in the soul; for it is wrought in the sense, which is neither without the body nor without the soul. But the third is of the soul alone, because it is the will. Although then the substances of these three are so different, yet they coalesce into such a unity that the two former can scarcely be distinguished, even with the intervention of the reason as judge, namely the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it which is wrought in the sense, that is, vision. And the will so powerfully combines these two, as both to apply the sense, in order to be informed, to that thing which is perceived, and to retain it when informed in that thing. And if it is so vehement that it can be called love, or desire, or lust, it vehemently affects also the rest of the body of the living being; and where a duller and harder matter does not resist, changes it into like shape and color. One may see the little body of a chameleon vary with ready change, according to the colors which it sees. And in the case of other animals, since their grossness of flesh does not easily admit change, the offspring, for the most part, betray the particular fancies of the mothers, whatever it is that they have beheld with special delight. For the more tender, and so to say, the more formable, are the primary seeds, the more effectually and capably they follow the bent of the soul of the mother, and the phantasy that is wrought in it through that body, which it has greedily beheld. Abundant instances might be adduced, but one is sufficient, taken from the most trustworthy books; viz. what Jacob did, that the sheep and goats might give birth to offspring of various colors, by placing variegated rods before them in the troughs of water for them to look at as they drank, at the time they had conceived.

Chapter 3.– The Unity of the Three Takes Place in Thought, Viz Of Memory, of Ternal Vision,and of Will Combining Both.

The rational soul, however, lives in a corrupted way when it lives according to a trinity of the outer man. This happens when it directs toward things that create bodily sense from outside not a praiseworthy will that would refer them to some useful purpose, but a base desire that clings to them. Even when the physical form that was perceived through the body is removed, its likeness remains in the memory. The will can turn its eye back to this likeness so that it is formed from within, just as the sense was formed from outside by the presence of the physical body. This produces a trinity from memory, from internal vision, and from the will that unites both. When these three things are combined into one, they are called conception because of that very combination. In these three things there is no longer any diversity of substance. The physical body is not there, since it is completely distinct from the nature of the living being. The bodily sense that was formed to produce vision is not there. The will itself does not perform its function of applying the sense to be formed to the physical body and holding it there once formed. Instead of the physical form that was perceived from outside, there is now the memory retaining that form which the soul absorbed through the bodily sense. Instead of the outward vision that occurred when the sense was formed through the physical body, there is now a similar vision within, while the eye of the mind is formed from what the memory retains, and the physical things being thought of are absent. The will itself, just as it previously applied the sense waiting to be formed to the physical thing presented from outside and united it to that thing once formed, now turns the vision of the remembering mind to memory so that the mental sight may be formed by what the memory has retained, and so there may be in conception a similar vision. Reason distinguished the visible appearance by which the bodily sense was formed from the likeness of it that was created in the sense when formed to produce vision—otherwise they would have been so united as to seem completely one and the same. Similarly, the mental image that arises from the mind thinking of the appearance of a body it has seen consists of the likeness of the body that the memory retains together with what is formed from it in the eye of the mind that remembers. Yet it seems to be one single thing, so that it can only be discovered to be two things by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that what remains in memory even when we are thinking of something else is different from what is brought into being when we remember, that is, when we return again to the memory and find the same appearance there. If this were not now present there, we would say that we had so completely forgotten that we were utterly unable to remember. If the eye of the one remembering were not formed from what was in the memory, the vision of the thinker could in no way occur. But the joining of both—that is, of what the memory retains and of what is expressed from it so as to form the eye of the one remembering—makes them appear as if they were one because they are extremely similar. But when the eye of the one conceiving is turned away from there and stops looking at what was perceived in memory, then nothing of the form that was impressed on it will remain in that eye, and it will be formed by whatever it has turned to again, so as to bring about another conception. Yet what it has left in the memory remains there, so that the eye may be turned back to it when we remember, and being turned there may be formed by it and become one with that from which it is formed.

6. The rational soul, however, lives in a degenerate fashion, when it lives according to a trinity of the outer man; that is, when it applies to those things which form the bodily sense from without, not a praiseworthy will, by which to refer them to some useful end, but a base desire, by which to cleave to them. Since even if the form of the body, which was corporeally perceived, be withdrawn, its likeness remains in the memory, to which the will may again direct its eye, so as to be formed thence from within, as the sense was formed from without by the presentation of the sensible body. And so that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision, and from the will which unites both. And when these three things are combined into one, from that combination itself they are called conception. And in these three there is no longer any diversity of substance. For neither is the sensible body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of the living being, nor is the bodily sense there informed so as to produce vision, nor does the will itself perform its office of applying the sense, that is to be informed, to the sensible body, and of retaining it in it when informed; but in place of that bodily species which was perceived from without, there comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has imbibed through the bodily sense; and in place of that vision which was outward when the sense was informed through the sensible body, there comes a similar vision within, while the eye of the mind is informed from that which the memory retains, and the corporeal things that are thought of are absent; and the will itself, as before it applied the sense yet to be informed to the corporeal thing presented from without, and united it thereto when informed, so now converts the vision of the recollecting mind to memory, in order that the mental sight may be informed by that which the memory has retained, and so there may be in the conception a like vision. And as it was the reason that distinguished the visible appearance by which the bodily sense was informed, from the similitude of it, which was wrought in the sense when informed in order to produce vision (otherwise they had been so united as to be thought altogether one and the same); so, although that phantasy also, which arises from the mind thinking of the appearance of a body that it has seen, consists of the similitude of the body which the memory retains, together with that which is thence formed in the eye of the mind that recollects; yet it so seems to be one and single, that it can only be discovered to be two by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that which remains in the memory, even when we think it from some other source, to be a different thing from that which is brought into being when we remember, that is, come back again to the memory, and there find the same appearance. And if this were not now there, we should say that we had so forgotten as to be altogether unable to recollect. And if the eye of him who recollects were not informed from that thing which was in the memory, the vision of the thinker could in no way take place; but the conjunction of both, that is, of that which the memory retains, and of that which is thence expressed so as to inform the eye of him who recollects, makes them appear as if they were one, because they are exceedingly like. But when the eye of the concipient is turned away thence, and has ceased to look at that which was perceived in the memory, then nothing of the form that was impressed thereon will remain in that eye, and it will be informed by that to which it had again been turned, so as to bring about another conception. Yet that remains which it has left in the memory, to which it may again be turned when we recollect it, and being turned thereto may be informed by it, and become one with that whence it is informed.

Chapter 4.– How This Unity Comes to Pass.

When the will, which moves the eye back and forth to be formed and unites it once formed, has fully converged on the inner phantasy and has completely turned the mind's eye away from the physical bodies present to the senses and from the bodily senses themselves, turning it entirely toward the image perceived within, then such an exact likeness of the bodily form is produced from memory that even reason itself cannot discern whether the actual body is being seen externally or only something like it is being thought of internally. For people sometimes, either enticed or frightened by thinking too much about visible things, have suddenly spoken words accordingly, as if they were actually engaged in the midst of such actions or sufferings. And I remember someone telling me that he used to perceive in thought a female form so distinct and seemingly solid that he was moved as if it were real. The soul has such power over its own body and such influence in turning and changing the quality of its bodily garment, just as a clothed person may be affected when his clothing clings to him. This is the same kind of effect by which we are deceived through mental images in sleep. But it makes a very great difference whether the bodily senses are dulled as in sleepers, disturbed from their inner structure as in madmen, distracted in some other way as in diviners or prophets, and so by one or another of these causes the mind's attention is forced by a kind of necessity upon those images that come to it either from memory or by some other hidden force through certain spiritual mixtures of a similarly spiritual substance; or whether, as sometimes happens to people who are healthy and awake, the will occupied by thought turns itself away from the senses and forms the eye of the mind with various images of sensible things as though those sensible things themselves were actually being perceived. But these impressions of images occur not only when the will is directed toward such things by desiring them, but also when, in order to avoid and guard against them, the mind is carried away to look upon these very things so as to flee from them. And thus, not only desire but also fear causes both the bodily eye to be formed by the sensible things themselves and the mental eye (acies) by the images of those sensible things. Accordingly, the more intense the fear or desire has been, the more distinctly is the eye formed, whether in the case of someone who perceives through the body what is physically close to him, or in the case of someone who conceives from the image of the body contained in memory. Therefore, what a body in space is to the bodily sense, the likeness of a body in memory is to the eye of the mind; and what the vision of someone looking at something is to that appearance of the body from which the sense is formed, the vision of someone conceiving is to the image of the body established in memory from which the eye of the mind is formed; and what the intention of the will is toward a body being seen and the vision to be combined with it, in order that a certain unity of three things may occur there, although their nature is diverse, that same intention of the will is toward combining the image of the body which is in memory and the vision of the one conceiving, that is, the form which the eye of the mind has taken in turning back to memory, in order that here too a certain unity of three things may occur, no longer distinguished by diversity of nature but of one and the same substance, because this whole is within and the whole is one mind.

7. But if that will which moves to and fro, hither and there, the eye that is to be informed, and unites it when formed, shall have wholly converged to the inward phantasy, and shall have absolutely turned the mind's eye from the presence of the bodies which lie around the senses, and from the very bodily senses themselves, and shall have wholly turned it to that image, which is perceived within; then so exact a likeness of the bodily species expressed from the memory is presented, that not even reason itself is permitted to discern whether the body itself is seen without, or only something of the kind thought of within. For men sometimes either allured or frightened by over-much thinking of visible things, have even suddenly uttered words accordingly, as if in real fact they were engaged in the very midst of such actions or sufferings. And I remember some one telling me that he was wont to perceive in thought, so distinct and as it were solid, a form of a female body, as to be moved, as though it were a reality. Such power has the soul over its own body, and such influence has it in turning and changing the quality of its [corporeal] garment; just as a man may be affected when clothed, to whom his clothing sticks. It is the same kind of affection, too, with which we are beguiled through imaginations in sleep. But it makes a very great difference, whether the senses of the body are lulled to torpor, as in the case of sleepers, or disturbed from their inward structure, as in the case of madmen, or distracted in some other mode, as in that of diviners or prophets; and so from one or other of these causes, the intention of the mind is forced by a kind of necessity upon those images which occur to it, either from memory, or by some other hidden force through certain spiritual commixtures of a similarly spiritual substance: or whether, as sometimes happens to people in health and awake, that the will occupied by thought turns itself away from the senses, and so informs the eye of the mind by various images of sensible things, as though those sensible things themselves were actually perceived. But these impressions of images not only take place when the will is directed upon such things by desiring them, but also when, in order to avoid and guard against them, the mind is carried away to look upon these very thing so as to flee from them. And hence, not only desire, but fear, causes both the bodily eye to be informed by the sensible things themselves, and the mental eye ( acies) by the images of those sensible things. Accordingly, the more vehement has been either fear or desire, the more distinctly is the eye informed, whether in the case of him who [sensuously] perceives by means of the body that which lies close to him in place, or in the case of him who conceives from the image of the body which is contained in the memory. What then a body in place is to the bodily sense, that, the similitude of a body in memory is to the eye of the mind; and what the vision of one who looks at a thing is to that appearance of the body from which the sense is informed, that, the vision of a concipient is to the image of the body established in the memory, from which the eye of the mind is informed; and what the intention of the will is towards a body seen and the vision to be combined with it, in order that a certain unity of three things may therein take place, although their nature is diverse, that, the same intention of the will is towards combining the image of the body which is in the memory, and the vision of the concipient, that is, the form which the eye of the mind has taken in returning to the memory, in order that here too a certain unity may take place of three things, not now distinguished by diversity of nature, but of one and the same substance; because this whole is within, and the whole is one mind.

Chapter 5.– The Trinity of the Outer Man, or of External Vision, is Not an Image of God. The Likeness of God is Desired Even in Sins. In External Vision the Form of the Corporeal Thing is as It Were the Parent, Vision the Offspring; But the Will that Unites These Suggests the Holy Spirit.

When both the form and appearance of a body have disappeared, the will cannot bring back the sense of perception to it. Similarly, when the image that memory holds is erased by forgetfulness, the will cannot force the mind's eye back through recollection in order to be shaped by it. But because the mind has great power to imagine not only forgotten things but also things it never saw or experienced—by enlarging, reducing, changing, or combining things that have not slipped from its memory—it often imagines things to be what it either knows they are not or doesn't know whether they are. In this case we must be careful that the mind doesn't either speak falsely to deceive or hold an opinion that leads to being deceived. If it avoids these two evils, then imagined fantasies don't hinder it, just as sensible things experienced or retained in memory don't hinder it if they are neither passionately pursued when pleasant nor shamefully avoided when unpleasant. But when the will abandons better things and greedily wallows in these, it becomes unclean. These things are thought of harmfully when present, and even more harmfully when absent. Therefore, someone lives badly and degradedly who lives according to the trinity of the outer man, because it is the intention of using sensible and corporeal things that has also given birth to this trinity, which, although it imagines within, imagines things from without. For no one could use those things well unless the images of things perceived by the senses were kept in memory. And unless the will dwells for the most part in higher and interior things, and unless this will itself, which is directed either toward bodies outside or toward their images within, refers whatever it receives from them to a better and truer life and rests in that end by contemplating it, judging that those things ought to be done accordingly—what else are we doing but what the apostle forbids when he says, "Be not conformed to this world"? Therefore this trinity is not an image of God, since it is produced in the mind itself through the bodily sense, from the lowest thing, that is, the corporeal creature, than which the mind is higher. Yet it is not altogether unlike God, for what exists that doesn't have some likeness to God according to its kind and measure, seeing that God made all things very good, and for no other reason than that He Himself is supremely good? Therefore, insofar as anything that exists is good, it plainly still has some likeness of the supreme good, however distant. If it is a natural likeness, then it is certainly a right and well-ordered one; but if it is a faulty likeness, then it is certainly a debased and perverted one. For even souls in their very sins strive after nothing other than some kind of likeness to God, in a proud and backwards and, so to speak, slavish freedom. Thus our first parents could not have been persuaded to sin unless it had been said to them, "You shall be as gods." Certainly, not everything in creatures that is in some way like God is also to be called His image, but only that than which He Himself alone is higher. For that alone is completely copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is placed in between.

8. But as, when [both] the form and species of a body have perished, the will cannot recall to it the sense of perceiving; so, when the image which memory bears is blotted out by forgetfulness, the will will be unable to force back the eye of the mind by recollection, so as to be formed thereby. But because the mind has great power to imagine not only things forgotten, but also things that it never saw, or experienced, either by increasing, or diminishing, or changing, or compounding, after its pleasure, those which have not dropped out of its remembrance, it often imagines things to be such as either it knows they are not, or does not know that they are. And in this case we have to take care, lest it either speak falsely that it may deceive, or hold an opinion so as to be deceived. And if it avoid these two evils, then imagined phantasms do not hinder it: just as sensible things experienced or retained by memory do not hinder it, if they are neither passionately sought for when pleasant, nor basely shunned when unpleasant. But when the will leaves better things, and greedily wallows in these, then it becomes unclean; and they are so thought of hurtfully, when they are present, and also more hurtfully when they are absent. And he therefore lives badly and degenerately who lives according to the trinity of the outer man; because it is the purpose of using things sensible and corporeal, that has begotten also that trinity, which although it imagines within, yet imagines things without. For no one could use those things even well, unless the images of things perceived by the senses were retained in the memory. And unless the will for the greatest part dwells in the higher and interior things, and unless that will itself, which is accommodated either to bodies without, or to the images of them within, refers whatever it receives in them to a better and truer life, and rests in that end by gazing at which it judges that those things ought to be done; what else do we do, but that which the apostle prohibits us from doing, when he says, Be not conformed to this world? And therefore that trinity is not an image of God since it is produced in the mind itself through the bodily sense, from the lowest, that is, the corporeal creature, than which the mind is higher. Yet neither is it altogether dissimilar: for what is there that has not a likeness of God, in proportion to its kind and measure, seeing that God made all things very good, and for no other reason except that He Himself is supremely good? In so far, therefore, as anything that is, is good, in so far plainly it has still some likeness of the supreme good, at however great a distance; and if a natural likeness, then certainly a right and well-ordered one; but if a faulty likeness, then certainly a debased and perverse one. For even souls in their very sins strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness of God, in a proud and preposterous, and, so to say, slavish liberty. So neither could our first parents have been persuaded to sin unless it had been said, You shall be as gods. No doubt every thing in the creatures which is in any way like God, is not also to be called His image; but that alone than which He Himself alone is higher. For that only is in all points copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is interposed.

Regarding that act of seeing—that is, the form which is created in the sense of the person who sees—the form of the physical object from which it comes is like a parent. But it is not a true parent, which is why that form is not a true offspring either. It is not completely born from the physical object, because something else must be applied to that physical object in order for the form to be created from it, namely, the sense of the person who sees. For this reason, to love this kind of seeing is to become alienated from God. Therefore the will, which unites both the quasi-parent and the quasi-child, is more spiritual than either of them. The physical object that is perceived is not spiritual at all. The vision that comes into existence in the sense has something spiritual mixed with it, since it cannot exist without the soul. But it is not wholly spiritual, because what is being formed is a bodily sense. Therefore the will that unites both is clearly more spiritual, as I have said. And so it begins to suggest, as it were, the person of the Spirit in the Trinity. But the will belongs more to the sense that is formed than to the physical object from which it is formed. For the sense and will of a living being belong to the soul, not to the stone or other physical thing that is seen. The will does not, therefore, proceed from that physical thing as from a parent. Neither does it proceed from that other quasi-offspring, namely, the vision and form that exists in the sense. For the will existed before the vision occurred. This will directed the sense that was to be formed toward the physical object that was to be perceived, but it was not yet satisfied. For how could something that was not yet seen bring satisfaction? And satisfaction means a will that rests content. Therefore, we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision, nor the quasi-parent, since that vision was not formed and expressed from the will, but from the physical object that was seen.

9. Of that vision then; that is, of the form which is wrought in the sense of him who sees; the form of the bodily thing from which it is wrought, is, as it were, the parent. But it is not a true parent; whence neither is that a true offspring; for it is not altogether born therefrom, since something else is applied to the bodily thing in order that it may be formed from it, namely, the sense of him who sees. And for this reason, to love this is to be estranged. Therefore the will which unites both, viz. the quasi-parent and the quasi-child, is more spiritual than either of them. For that bodily thing which is discerned, is not spiritual at all. But the vision which comes into existence in the sense, has something spiritual mingled with it, since it cannot come into existence without the soul. But it is not wholly spiritual; since that which is formed is a sense of the body. Therefore the will which unites both is confessedly more spiritual, as I have said; and so it begins to suggest ( insinuare), as it were, the person of the Spirit in the Trinity. But it belongs more to the sense that is formed, than to the bodily thing whence it is formed. For the sense and will of an animate being belongs to the soul, not to the stone or other bodily thing that is seen. It does not therefore proceed from that bodily thing as from a parent; yet neither does it proceed from that other as it were offspring, namely, the vision and form that is in the sense. For the will existed before the vision came to pass, which will applied the sense that was to be formed to the bodily thing that was to be discerned; but it was not yet satisfied. For how could that which was not yet seen satisfy? And satisfaction means a will that rests content. And, therefore, we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision; nor the quasi-parent, since that vision was not formed and expressed from the will, but from the bodily thing that was seen.

Chapter 6.– Of What Kind We are to Reckon the Rest (Requies), and End (Finis), of the Will in Vision.

Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will, but only with respect to this one object—namely, the bodily thing that is visible. For the will does not cease willing other things merely because it sees something it is currently willing to see. Therefore, this is not the whole will of the person, whose end is nothing other than blessedness. Rather, it is the will temporarily directed toward this one object, which has vision as its end in seeing, whether it refers the thing seen to anything else or not. For if it does not refer the vision to anything further, but wills only to see this, there can be no question about showing that the end of the will is the vision, for it is obvious. But if it does refer it to anything further, then certainly it does will something else, and it will no longer be simply a will to see; or if it is still a will to see, not one to see that particular thing. Just as, if someone wished to see the scar in order to learn from it that there had been a wound, or wished to see the window in order to see the passers-by through the window—all these and other such acts of will have their own proper immediate ends, which are referred to that final end of the will by which we will to live blessedly and to attain to that life which is not referred to anything else, but is sufficient in itself for the one who loves it. The will to see, then, has vision as its end; and the will to see this particular thing has the vision of this particular thing as its end. Therefore, the will to see the scar desires its own end, that is, the vision of the scar, and does not reach beyond it; for the will to prove that there had been a wound is a distinct will, although dependent upon that first will, which also has as its end to prove that there had been a wound. And the will to see the window has the vision of the window as its end; for that is another and further will which depends upon it, namely, to see the passers-by through the window, which also has the vision of the passers-by as its end. But all the individual wills that are bound to each other are at once right if the one to which all are referred is good; and if that is bad, then all are bad. And so the connected series of right wills is a kind of road which consists of certain steps, by which to ascend to blessedness; but the entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which the one who thus acts will be bound, so as to be cast into outer darkness. Blessed therefore are they who in act and character sing the song of the steps; and woe to those who draw sin, as it were a long rope. And it is just the same to speak of the will being at rest, which we call its end, if it is still referred to something further, as if we should say that the foot is at rest in walking when it is placed there, from which yet another foot may be planted in the direction of the person's steps. But if something so satisfies that the will rests in it with a certain delight, it is nevertheless not yet that to which the person ultimately tends; but this too is referred to something further, so as to be regarded not as the native country of a citizen, but as a place of refreshment, or even of stopping, for a traveler.

10. Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will, only with respect to this one object [namely, the bodily thing that is visible]. For it will not will nothing else merely because it sees something which it is now willing. It is not therefore the whole will itself of the man, of which the end is nothing else than blessedness; but the will provisionally directed to this one object, which has as its end in seeing, nothing but vision, whether it refer the thing seen to any other thing or not. For if it does not refer the vision to anything further, but wills only to see this, there can be no question made about showing that the end of the will is the vision; for it is manifest. But if it does refer it to anything further, then certainly it does will something else, and it will not be now a will merely to see; or if to see, not one to see the particular thing. Just as, if any one wished to see the scar, that from thence he might learn that there had been a wound; or wished to see the window, that through the window he might see the passers-by: all these and other such acts of will have their own proper [proximate] ends, which are referred to that [final] end of the will by which we will to live blessedly, and to attain to that life which is not referred to anything else, but suffices of itself to him who loves it. The will then to see, has as its end vision; and the will to see this particular thing, has as its end the vision of this particular thing. Therefore the will to see the scar, desires its own end, that is, the vision of the scar, and does not reach beyond it; for the will to prove that there had been a wound, is a distinct will, although dependent upon that, of which the end also is to prove that there had been a wound. And the will to see the window, has as its end the vision of the window; for that is another and further will which depends upon it, viz. to see the passers-by through the window, of which also the end is the vision of the passers-by. But all the several wills that are bound to each other, are at once right, if that one is good, to which all are referred; and if that is bad, then all are bad. And so the connected series of right wills is a sort of road which consists as it were of certain steps, whereby to ascend to blessedness; but the entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which he will be bound who thus acts, so as to be cast into outer darkness. Blessed therefore are they who in act and character sing the song of the steps [degrees]; and woe to those that draw sin, as it were a long rope. And it is just the same to speak of the will being in repose, which we call its end, if it is still referred to something further, as if we should say that the foot is at rest in walking, when it is placed there, whence yet another foot may be planted in the direction of the man's steps. But if something so satisfies, that the will acquiesces in it with a certain delight; it is nevertheless not yet that to which the man ultimately tends; but this too is referred to something further, so as to be regarded not as the native country of a citizen, but as a place of refreshment, or even of stopping, for a traveller.

Chapter 7.– There is Another Trinity in the Memory of Him Who Thinks Over Again What He Has Seen.

But consider yet another trinity, one more inward than the trinity found in physical objects and in the senses, though still conceived from them. Now it is no longer the bodily sense that receives its form from a physical object, but the eye of the mind that receives its form from the memory, since the image of the body that we perceived from outside has become fixed in the memory itself. This image that resides in the memory we call the quasi-parent of what is produced in the imagination of the one who is thinking. For it was already in the memory before we thought about it, just as the physical body was already in a place before we perceived it through our senses, so that perception could occur. But when we think about it, then from that form which the memory holds, there is copied into the mind's eye (acie) of the one who is thinking, and through remembering there is formed that image which is the quasi-offspring of what the memory retains. But the one is not a true parent, nor is the other a true offspring. For the mind's vision that is formed from memory when we think something by recollection does not proceed from that image which we remember as having seen, since we could not have remembered those things unless we had seen them. Yet the mind's eye, which receives its form through recollection, also existed before we saw the body that we remember, and therefore how much more before we committed it to memory? Therefore, although the form that is produced in the mind's eye of the one who remembers is produced from that form which is in the memory, still the mind's eye itself does not come from there, but existed beforehand. And it follows that if the one is not a true parent, neither is the other a true offspring. But both that quasi-parent and that quasi-offspring suggest something from which the more inward and truer things may appear more clearly and more certainly.

11. But yet again, take the case of another trinity, more inward indeed than that which is in things sensible, and in the senses, but which is yet conceived from thence; while now it is no longer the sense of the body that is informed from the body, but the eye of the mind that is informed from the memory, since the species of the body which we perceived from without has inhered in the memory itself. And that species, which is in the memory, we call the quasi-parent of that which is wrought in the phantasy of one who conceives. For it was in the memory also, before we conceived it, just as the body was in place also before we [sensuously] perceived it, in order that vision might take place. But when it is conceived, then from that form which the memory retains, there is copied in the mind's eye ( acie) of him who conceives, and by remembrance is formed, that species, which is the quasi-offspring of that which the memory retains. But neither is the one a true parent, nor the other a true offspring. For the mind's vision which is formed from memory when we think anything by recollection, does not proceed from that species which we remember as seen; since we could not indeed have remembered those things, unless we had seen them; yet the mind's eye, which is informed by the recollection, existed also before we saw the body that we remember; and therefore how much more before we committed it to memory? Although therefore the form which is wrought in the mind's eye of him who remembers, is wrought from that form which is in the memory; yet the mind's eye itself does not exist from thence, but existed before it. And it follows, that if the one is not a true parent, neither is the other a true offspring. But both that quasi-parent and that quasi-offspring suggest something, whence the inner and truer things may appear more practically and more certainly.

When we look more closely, it's harder to see clearly whether the will that connects the vision to the memory is the parent or offspring of either one. The difficulty in distinguishing comes from the likeness and equality of the same nature and substance. We can't do what we did with the bodily sense being formed from outside (where we could easily tell apart the physical object, the sense, and the will, because of the difference in nature among all three, which we discussed thoroughly before). Although this trinity we're now talking about enters the mind from outside, it operates within, and no part of it exists outside the mind's own nature. So how can we show that the will is neither the quasi-parent nor the quasi-offspring of the bodily image stored in memory or of the image copied from it when remembering? The will unites both in the act of thinking so completely that they appear as one thing and can only be distinguished by reason. First we need to consider that there can be no will to remember unless we keep in the depths of memory either all or some part of what we want to remember. The will to remember simply cannot arise for something we have completely and totally forgotten, because we must already have remembered that the thing we want to remember is or was in our memory. For example, if I want to remember what I had for dinner yesterday, I must already have remembered that I did eat dinner, or at least something about that time itself, if nothing else—I've remembered yesterday and that part of yesterday when people usually eat dinner, and what eating dinner is. If I hadn't remembered anything at all like this, I couldn't want to remember what I had for dinner yesterday. From this we can see that the will to remember proceeds from those things kept in memory, along with those things copied from it through recollection by the act of discerning—that is, from the combination of something we've remembered and the vision created in the mind's eye of the person thinking when we remembered. But the will itself, which unites both, also requires something else that is, so to speak, close at hand and nearby to the one remembering. There are as many trinities of this kind as there are acts of remembering, because in every one of them these three things exist: what was stored in memory before it was thought about, what occurs in thinking when this is discerned, and the will that unites both and from both and itself as a third completes one single thing. Or should we instead recognize just one trinity of this kind, so that we speak generally of all the bodily forms lying hidden in memory as a single unity, and again of the general vision of the mind that remembers and thinks about such things as a single unity, and to the combination of these two we add as a third the will that combines them, so that this whole becomes a single unity made up of three?

12. Further, it is more difficult to discern clearly, whether the will which connects the vision to the memory is not either the parent or the offspring of some one of them; and the likeness and equality of the same nature and substance cause this difficulty of distinguishing. For it is not possible to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed from without (which is easily discerned from the sensible body, and again the will from both), on account of the difference of nature which is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated sufficiently above. For although this trinity, of which we at present speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet it is transacted within, and there is no part of it outside of the nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be demonstrated that the will is neither the quasi-parent, nor the quasi-offspring, either of the corporeal likeness which is contained in the memory, or of that which is copied thence in recollecting; when it so unites both in the act of conceiving, as that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned except by reason? It is then first to be considered that there cannot be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of the memory either the whole, or some part, of that thing which we wish to remember. For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have forgotten altogether and absolutely; since we have already remembered that the thing which we wish to remember is or has been, in our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered something about that time itself, if nothing else; at all events, I have remembered yesterday, and that part of yesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is. For if I had not remembered anything at all of this kind, I could not wish to remember what I supped on yesterday. Whence we may perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed, from those things which are retained in the memory, with the addition also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied thence through recollection; that is, from the combination of something which we have remembered, and of the vision which was thence wrought, when we remembered, in the mind's eye of him who thinks. But the will itself which unites both requires also some other thing, which is, as it were, close at hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances; because there is no one of them wherein there are not these three things, viz. that which was stored up in the memory also before it was thought, and that which takes place in the conception when this is discerned, and the will that unites both, and from both and itself as a third, completes one single thing. Or is it rather that we so recognize some one trinity in this kind, as that we are to speak generally, of whatever corporeal species lie hidden in the memory, as of a single unity, and again of the general vision of the mind which remembers and conceives such things, as of a single unity, to the combination of which two there is to be joined as a third the will that combines them, that this whole may be a certain unity made up from three?

Chapter 8.– Different Modes of Conceiving.

But since the mind's eye cannot look at everything together in one glance that the memory holds, these trinities of thought alternate in a series of withdrawals and successions, and so that trinity becomes extremely numerous beyond counting; yet not infinite, if it does not go beyond the number of things stored up in the memory. For, although we begin to count from the earliest perception anyone has of material things through any bodily sense, and even include those things he has forgotten, the number would undoubtedly be certain and fixed, although innumerable. For we call not only infinite things innumerable, but also those things which, although finite, exceed anyone's ability to count.

But since the eye of the mind cannot look at all things together, in one glance, which the memory retains, these trinities of thought alternate in a series of withdrawals and successions, and so that trinity becomes most innumerably numerous; and yet not infinite, if it pass not beyond the number of things stored up in the memory. For, although we begin to reckon from the earliest perception which any one has of material things through any bodily sense, and even take in also those things which he has forgotten, yet the number would undoubtedly be certain and determined, although innumerable. For we not only call infinite things innumerable, but also those, which, although finite, exceed any one's power of reckoning.

We can understand a bit more clearly from this that what the memory stores and retains is different from what is copied from it into the mental image of the person who remembers, even though when both are combined together they seem to be one and the same. This is because we can only remember as many kinds of bodies as we have actually seen, and only as large and of such a kind as we have actually seen, since the mind absorbs them into memory through the bodily senses. However, the things seen in mental conception, although drawn from what is in the memory, are multiplied and varied infinitely and without any limit. For instance, I remember only one sun, because in fact I have seen only one. But if I choose, I can conceive of two, or three, or as many as I want. Yet the mental vision when I conceive of many suns is formed from the same memory by which I remember one. And I remember it exactly as large as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I saw it, then I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do not remember it at all. But because I do remember it, I remember it as large as I saw it. Nevertheless, I conceive of it as greater or smaller according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it, but I conceive of it as moving along its course as I wish, and as standing still where I wish, and as coming from wherever I wish and going wherever I wish. For it is in my power to conceive of it as square, although I remember it as round. And again, I can conceive of it as any color I please, even though I have never seen, and therefore do not remember, a green sun. The same applies to all other things as to the sun. But because of the bodily and sensible nature of these mental forms of things, the mind falls into error when it imagines that they exist outside in the same way it conceives them inside, either when they have already ceased to exist outside but are still retained in memory, or when in any other way what we remember is formed in the mind not by faithful recollection but according to the variations of thought.

13. But we can hence perceive a little more clearly that what the memory stores up and retains is a different thing from that which is thence copied in the conception of the man who remembers, although, when both are combined together, they appear to be one and the same; because we can only remember just as many species of bodies as we have actually seen, and so great, and such, as we have actually seen; for the mind imbibes them into the memory from the bodily sense; whereas the things seen in conception, although drawn from those things which are in the memory, yet are multiplied and varied innumerably, and altogether without end. For I remember, no doubt, but one sun, because according to the fact, I have seen but one; but if I please, I conceive of two, or three, or as many as I will; but the vision of my mind, when I conceive of many, is formed from the same memory by which I remember one. And I remember it just as large as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I saw it, then I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do not remember it. But because I remember it, I remember it as large as I saw it; yet I conceive of it as greater or as less according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it; but I conceive of it as running its course as I will, and as standing still where I will, and as coming whence I will, and whither I will. For it is in my power to conceive of it as square, although I remember it as round; and again, of what color I please, although I have never seen, and therefore do not remember, a green sun; and as the sun, so all other things. But owing to the corporeal and sensible nature of these forms of things, the mind falls into error when it imagines them to exist without, in the same mode in which it conceives them within, either when they have already ceased to exist without, but are still retained in the memory, or when in any other way also, that which we remember is formed in the mind, not by faithful recollection, but after the variations of thought.

Yet it very often happens that we also believe a true account told to us by others about things the narrators themselves have perceived with their senses. In this case, when we conceive the things narrated to us as we hear them, the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the memory in order to bring up images in our thoughts, for we do not conceive these things from our own recollection but from another person's account. Here that trinity does not seem to reach its completion—the one that is formed when the form lying hidden in the memory and the vision of the person who remembers are combined by the will as a third element. For I do not conceive what lay hidden in my memory, but what I hear when something is narrated to me. I am not speaking of the narrator's actual words, lest anyone suppose I have shifted to that other trinity that takes place externally in sensible things or in the senses. Rather, I am conceiving the forms of material things that the narrator signifies to me through words and sounds. I certainly conceive these forms not by remembering but by hearing. However, if we consider the matter more carefully, even in this case we do not overstep the boundary of memory. For I could not even understand the narrator unless I remembered generically the individual things he speaks of, even though I am hearing them for the first time as connected together in one story. For instance, someone who describes to me a mountain stripped of timber and covered with olive trees describes it to me who remembers the forms both of mountains and of timber and of olive trees. If I had forgotten these, I would not know at all what he was talking about and therefore could not conceive his description. So it happens that everyone who conceives corporeal things—whether he himself imagines something, or hears or reads either a narrative of past things or a prediction of future things—has recourse to his memory and finds there the boundary and measure of all the forms at which he gazes in his thought. For no one can conceive at all either a color or a bodily form he has never seen, or a sound he has never heard, or a flavor he has never tasted, or a scent he has never smelled, or any touch of a corporeal thing he has never felt. But if no one conceives anything corporeal except what he has perceived through the senses, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has thus perceived, then just as the boundary of perceiving lies in bodies, so the boundary of thinking lies in the memory. For the sense receives the form from the body we perceive, the memory receives it from the sense, and the mental eye of the one conceiving receives it from the memory.

14. Yet it very often happens that we believe also a true narrative, told us by others, of things which the narrators have themselves perceived by their senses. And in this case, when we conceive the things narrated to us, as we hear them, the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the memory, in order to bring up visions in our thoughts; for we do not conceive these things from our own recollection, but upon the narration of another; and that trinity does not here seem to come to its completion, which is made when the species lying hid in the memory, and the vision of the man that remembers, are combined by will as a third. For I do not conceive that which lay hid in my memory, but that which I hear, when anything is narrated to me. I am not speaking of the words themselves of the speaker, lest any one should suppose that I have gone off to that other trinity, which is transacted without, in sensible things, or in the senses: but I am conceiving of those species of material things, which the narrator signifies to me by words and sounds; which species certainly I conceive of not by remembering, but by hearing. But if we consider the matter more carefully, even in this case, the limit of the memory is not overstepped. For I could not even understand the narrator, if I did not remember generically the individual things of which he speaks, even although I then hear them for the first time as connected together in one tale. For he who, for instance, describes to me some mountain stripped of timber, and clothed with olive trees, describes it to me who remembers the species both of mountains, and of timber, and of olive trees; and if I had forgotten these, I should not know at all of what he was speaking, and therefore could not conceive that description. And so it comes to pass, that every one who conceives things corporeal, whether he himself imagine anything, or hear, or read, either a narrative of things past, or a foretelling of things future, has recourse to his memory, and finds there the limit and measure of all the forms at which he gazes in his thought. For no one can conceive at all, either a color or a form of body, which he never saw, or a sound which he never heard, or a flavor which he never tasted, or a scent which he never smelt, or any touch of a corporeal thing which he never felt. But if no one conceives anything corporeal except what he has [sensuously] perceived, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has thus perceived, then, as is the limit of perceiving in bodies, so is the limit of thinking in the memory. For the sense receives the species from that body which we perceive, and the memory from the sense; but the mental eye of the concipient, from the memory.

Further, just as the will directs the sense to the bodily object, so it directs the memory to the sense, and the eye of the mind of the one conceiving to the memory. The very thing that brings these together and unites them is the same thing that separates and divides them—that is, the will. The will separates the bodily senses from the objects to be perceived through bodily movement, either to prevent us from perceiving the thing or to make us stop perceiving it. For example, we turn our eyes away from what we don't want to see, or we close them. Similarly with the ears from sounds, or the nostrils from smells. We also turn away from tastes by closing the mouth or spitting something out. In the case of touch, we either move away the physical object so we won't touch what we don't want to, or if we were already touching it, we throw or push it away. In this way the will acts through bodily movement to prevent the bodily sense from being joined to sensible things. It does this according to its power. But when it suffers difficulty in doing so because of our condition of slavish mortality, the result is torment, such that nothing remains to the will except endurance. The will turns the memory away from the sense when, by being focused on something else, it doesn't allow present things to stick to it. Anyone can see this when we often don't seem to ourselves to have heard someone who was speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else. But this is a mistake—we did hear, but we don't remember, because the speaker's words immediately slipped out of our ears' perception when the will's attention was diverted elsewhere, since the will is what normally fixes things in the memory. Therefore, we should more accurately say in such cases that we don't remember, rather than that we didn't hear. This even happens in reading, and very often to me, when I've read through a page or a letter and don't know what I've read, and I start again. Because the will's purpose was fixed on something else, the memory wasn't applied to the bodily sense in the way the sense itself was applied to the letters. Similarly, anyone who walks with the will focused on something else doesn't know where he has ended up. If he hadn't seen, he wouldn't have walked there, or would have felt his way more carefully while walking, especially if passing through an unfamiliar place. Yet because he walked easily, he certainly saw. But because the memory wasn't applied to the sense itself in the same way the sense of the eyes was applied to the places he was passing through, he couldn't remember at all even the last thing he saw. Now, to will to turn away the eye of the mind from what is in the memory is nothing other than not to think about it.

15. Further, as the will applies the sense to the bodily object, so it applies the memory to the sense, and the eye of the mind of the concipient to the memory. But that which harmonizes those things and unites them, itself also disjoins and separates them, that is, the will. But it separates the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it: as when we avert our eyes from that which we are unwilling to see, or shut them; so, again, the ears from sounds, or the nostrils from smells. So also we turn away from tastes, either by shutting the mouth, or by casting the thing out of the mouth. In touch, also, we either remove the bodily thing, that we may not touch what we do not wish, or if we were already touching it, we fling or push it away. Thus the will acts by movement of the body, so that the bodily sense shall not be joined to the sensible things. And it does this according to its power; for when it endures hardship in so doing, on account of the condition of slavish mortality, then torment is the result, in such wise that nothing remains to the will save endurance. But the will averts the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer things present to cleave to it. As any one may see, when often we do not seem to ourselves to have heard some one who was speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else. But this is a mistake; for we did hear, but we do not remember, because the words of the speaker presently slipped out of the perception of our ears, through the bidding of the will being diverted elsewhere, by which they are usually fixed in the memory. Therefore, we should say more accurately in such a case, we do not remember, than, we did not hear; for it happens even in reading, and to myself very frequently, that when I have read through a page or an epistle, I do not know what I have read, and I begin it again. For the purpose of the will being fixed on something else, the memory was not so applied to the bodily sense, as the sense itself was applied to the letters. So, too, any one who walks with the will intent on something else, does not know where he has got to; for if he had not seen, he would not have walked there, or would have felt his way in walking with greater attention, especially if he was passing through a place he did not know; yet, because he walked easily, certainly he saw; but because the memory was not applied to the sense itself in the same way as the sense of the eyes was applied to the places through which he was passing, he could not remember at all even the last thing he saw. Now, to will to turn away the eye of the mind from that which is in the memory, is nothing else but not to think thereupon.

Chapter 9.– Species is Produced by Species in Succession.

In this arrangement, when we start from the bodily species and finally arrive at the species that comes to be in the intuition (contuitu) of the one conceiving, we find four species born, so to speak, step by step one from the other: the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third. From the species of the body itself arises the species that comes to be in the sense of the one perceiving; from this arises what comes to be in the memory; and from this arises what comes to be in the mind's eye of the one conceiving. Therefore, the will three times combines, as it were, parent with offspring: first, the species of the body with what it gives birth to in the bodily sense; then that species again with what comes to be from it in the memory; and third, this with what is born from it in the intuition of the conceiving mind. But the middle combination, which is the second, although it is closer to the first, is not as similar to the first as the third is. For there are two kinds of vision: one belonging to sensuous perception (sentientis), the other belonging to conception (cogitantis). But for the vision of conception to come to be, something like the vision of sensuous perception is produced in the memory for this purpose, to which the eye of the mind turns itself in conceiving, just as the glance (acies) of the eyes turns itself to the bodily object in sensuous perceiving. Therefore, I have chosen to present two trinities of this kind: one when the vision of sensuous perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of conception is formed from the memory. But I have refrained from commending the intermediate one, because we do not commonly call it vision when the form that comes to be in the sense of the one perceiving is committed to the memory. Yet in all cases the will appears only as the combiner, so to speak, of parent and offspring; and so, wherever it proceeds from, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.

16. In this arrangement, then, while we begin from the bodily species and arrive finally at the species which comes to be in the intuition ( contuitu) of the concipient, we find four species born, as it were, step by step one from the other, the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third: since from the species of the body itself, there arises that which comes to be in the sense of the percipient; and from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this, that which comes to be in the mind's eye of the concipient. And the will, therefore, thrice combines as it were parent with offspring: first the species of the body with that to which it gives birth in the sense of the body; and that again with that which from it comes to be in the memory; and this also, thirdly, with that which is born from it in the intuition of the concipient's mind. But the intermediate combination which is the second, although it is nearer to the first, is yet not so like the first as the third is. For there are two kinds of vision, the one of [sensuous] perception ( sentientis), the other of conception ( cogitantis). But in order that the vision of conception may come to be, there is wrought for the purpose, in the memory, from the vision of [sensuous] perception something like it, to which the eye of the mind may turn itself in conceiving, as the glance ( acies) of the eyes turns itself in [sensuously] perceiving to the bodily object. I have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of [sensuous] perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of conception is formed from the memory. But I have refrained from commending an intermediate one; because we do not commonly call it vision, when the form which comes to be in the sense of him who perceives, is entrusted to the memory. Yet in all cases the will does not appear unless as the combiner as it were of parent and offspring; and so, proceed from whence it may, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.

Chapter 10.– The Imagination Also Adds Even to Things We Have Not Seen, Those Things Which We Have Seen Elsewhere.

But if we only remember what we have perceived through the senses, and only conceive what we remember, why do we often conceive false things? We certainly do not remember falsely what we have actually perceived. The reason is that the will—which I have already worked hard to show is what unites and separates such things—guides the mental image being formed according to its own preference and desire, drawing from the hidden storehouses of memory. To imagine things we do not actually remember, the will drives us to take one thing from here and another from there, from among the things we do remember. When these combine into a single mental image, they produce something called false, either because it does not exist outside us in the nature of physical things, or because it does not appear to be copied from memory, since we do not remember ever seeing such a thing. For who has ever seen a black swan? Therefore no one remembers a black swan. Yet who cannot imagine it? It is easy to apply a black color, which we have seen in other objects, to the shape we have come to know by seeing swans. Because we have seen both, we remember both. I do not remember a four-footed bird, because I have never seen one, but I can easily imagine such a thing by adding to some winged shape I have seen two additional feet such as I have also seen. Therefore, when we imagine together what we have remembered seeing separately, we seem not to be imagining what we remember, while we are actually doing this according to the law of memory, from which we take everything we combine in various and diverse ways according to our own pleasure. We cannot even imagine the sizes of bodies that we have never seen without help from memory, because the measure of space that our gaze normally reaches through the vastness of the world is also the measure to which we enlarge the size of bodies, whatever they may be, when we imagine them as large as we can. Reason proceeds even beyond this, but mental imagery does not follow. For example, reason declares that numbers are infinite, yet no mental image of someone conceiving according to bodily things can grasp this. The same reason also teaches that the smallest atoms are infinitely divisible, yet when we reach those tiny and minute particles we remember having seen, we can no longer form mental images that are thinner and smaller, although reason does not stop dividing them further. Thus we imagine no physical things except either those we remember or things derived from what we remember.

17. But if we do not remember except what we have [sensuously] perceived, nor conceive except what we remember; why do we often conceive things that are false, when certainly we do not remember falsely those things which we have perceived, unless it be because that will (which I have already taken pains to show as much as I can to be the uniter and the separater of things of this kind) leads the vision of the conceiver that is to be formed, after its own will and pleasure, through the hidden stores of the memory; and, in order to conceive [ imagine] those things which we do not remember, impels it to take one thing from hence, and another from thence, from those which we do remember; and these things combining into one vision make something which is called false, because it either does not exist externally in the nature of corporeal things, or does not seem copied from the memory, in that we do not remember that we ever saw such a thing. For who ever saw a black swan? And therefore no one remembers a black swan; yet who is there that cannot conceive it? For it is easy to apply to that shape which we have come to know by seeing it, a black color, which we have not the less seen in other bodies; and because we have seen both, we remember both. Neither do I remember a bird with four feet, because I never saw one; but I contemplate such a phantasy very easily, by adding to some winged shape such as I have seen, two other feet, such as I have likewise seen. And therefore, in conceiving conjointly, what we remember to have seen singly, we seem not to conceive that which we remember; while we really do this under the law of the memory, whence we take everything which we join together after our own pleasure in manifold and diverse ways. For we do not conceive even the very magnitudes of bodies, which magnitudes we never saw, without help of the memory; for the measure of space to which our gaze commonly reaches through the magnitude of the world, is the measure also to which we enlarge the bulk of bodies, whatever they may be, when we conceive them as great as we can. And reason, indeed, proceeds still beyond, but phantasy does not follow her; as when reason announces the infinity of number also, which no vision of him who conceives according to corporeal things can apprehend. The same reason also teaches that the most minute atoms are infinitely divisible; yet when we have come to those slight and minute particles which we remember to have seen, then we can no longer behold phantasms more slender and more minute, although reason does not cease to continue to divide them. So we conceive no corporeal things, except either those we remember, or from those things which we remember.

Chapter 11.– Number, Weight, Measure.

Those things that are imprinted on the memory individually can be conceived according to number, and measure seems to belong to the memory, while number belongs to vision. Although the multiplicity of such visions is innumerable, a limit that cannot be transgressed is set for each one in the memory. Therefore, measure appears in the memory, and number in the vision of things. Just as there is a certain measure in visible bodies themselves, to which the sense of those who see is adapted in great number, and from one visible object the vision of many observers is formed—so that even a single person commonly sees a single thing in a double appearance because of the two eyes, as we explained above—so there is a certain measure in those things from which visions are copied, but in the visions themselves there is number. The will, which unites and regulates these things and combines them into a certain unity, and does not quietly rest its desire to perceive or to conceive except in those things from which the visions are formed, resembles weight. Therefore I want to point out in anticipation these three things—measure, number, weight—which are to be perceived in all other things as well. Meanwhile, I have now shown as much as I can, and to those to whom I can, that the will is the uniter of the visible thing and the vision, like a parent and offspring, whether in perception or in conception, and that it cannot be called either parent or offspring. Therefore the time has come for us to seek this same trinity in the inner man, and to strive to pass inward from that animal and carnal and (as he is called) outward man, about whom I have spoken for so long. Here we hope to be able to find an image of God according to the Trinity, with His help in our efforts, who, as things themselves show and as Holy Scripture also witnesses, has regulated all things in measure, and number, and weight.

18. But because those things which are impressed on the memory singly, can be conceived according to number, measure seems to belong to the memory, but number to the vision; because, although the multiplicity of such visions is innumerable, yet a limit not to be transgressed is prescribed for each in the memory. Therefore, measure appears in the memory, number in the vision of things: as there is some measure in visible bodies themselves, to which measure the sense of those who see is most numerously adjusted, and from one visible object is formed the vision of many beholders, so that even a single person sees commonly a single thing under a double appearance, on account of the number of his two eyes, as we have laid down above. Therefore there is some measure in those things whence visions are copied, but in the visions themselves there is number. But the will which unites and regulates these things, and combines them into a certain unity, and does not quietly rest its desire of [sensuously] perceiving or of conceiving, except in those things from whence the visions are formed, resembles weight. And therefore I would just notice by way of anticipation these three things, measure, number, weight, which are to be perceived in all other things also. In the meantime, I have now shown as much as I can, and to whom I can, that the will is the uniter of the visible thing and of the vision; as it were, of parent and of offspring; whether in [sensuous] perception or in conception, and that it cannot be called either parent or offspring. Wherefore time admonishes us to seek for this same trinity in the inner man, and to strive to pass inwards from that animal and carnal and (as he is called) outward man, of whom I have so long spoken. And here we hope to be able to find an image of God according to the Trinity, He Himself helping our efforts, who as things themselves show, and as Holy Scripture also witnesses, has regulated all things in measure, and number, and weight.


On the Trinity — Book X

The mind’s self-knowledge examined more closely, leading to the trinity of memory, understanding and will.

In which there is shown to be another trinity in the mind of man, and one that appears much more evidently, viz. in his memory, understanding, and will.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130110.htm>.

Contents · 12 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– The Love of the Studious Mind, that Is, of One Desirous to Know, is Not the Love of a Thing Which It Does Not Know.
  2. Chapter 2.– No One at All Loves Things Unknown.
  3. Chapter 3.– That When the Mind Loves Itself, It is Not Unknown to Itself.
  4. Chapter 4.– How the Mind Knows Itself, Not in Part, But as a Whole.
  5. Chapter 5.– Why the Soul is Enjoined to Know Itself. Whence Come the Errors of the Mind Concerning Its Own Substance.
  6. Chapter 6.– The Opinion Which the Mind Has of Itself is Deceitful.
  7. Chapter 7.– The Opinions of Philosophers Respecting the Substance of the Soul. The Error of Those Who are of Opinion that the Soul is Corporeal, Does Not Arise from Defective Knowledge of the Soul, But from Their Adding There to Something Foreign to It. What is Meant by Finding.
  8. Chapter 8.– How the Soul Inquires into Itself. Whence Comes the Error of the Soul Concerning Itself.
  9. Chapter 9.– The Mind Knows Itself, by the Very Act of Understanding the Precept to Know Itself.
  10. Chapter 10.– Every Mind Knows Certainly Three Things Concerning Itself — That It Understands, that It Is, and that It Lives.
  11. Chapter 11.– In Memory, Understanding [or Intelligence], and Will, We Have to Note Ability, Learning, and Use. Memory, Understanding, and Will are One Essentially, and Three Relatively.
  12. Chapter 12.– The Mind is an Image of the Trinity in Its Own Memory, and Understanding, and Will.

Chapter 1.– The Love of the Studious Mind, that Is, of One Desirous to Know, is Not the Love of a Thing Which It Does Not Know.

Let us now proceed in proper order, with more precise purpose, to explain this same point more thoroughly. First, since no one can love a thing of which he is completely ignorant, we must carefully examine what kind of love those who are eager to learn possess—that is, those who do not already know but are still wanting to learn any field of knowledge. In matters where the word "study" is not ordinarily used, love often arises from hearing about something, when the reputation of something for its beauty stirs the mind to see and enjoy it. This happens because the mind knows in a general way what makes bodily things beautiful, having seen them very often, and because there exists within us a capacity to approve what is desired from outside. When this happens, the love that is awakened is not for something completely unknown, since its general category is already known. But when we love a good man whose face we have never seen, we love him based on knowledge of his virtues, which virtues we know in truth itself. But in the case of learning, it is mostly the authority of others who praise and recommend it that kindles our love for it. Nevertheless, we could not be stirred with any enthusiasm at all for studying it unless we already had in our mind at least some faint impression of knowledge about each kind of learning. For instance, who would devote any effort and work to learning rhetoric unless he already knew it was the science of speaking? Sometimes, again, we marvel at the results of learning itself, which we have heard about or experienced, and from this we burn to gain, through learning, the ability to achieve these results. Suppose someone who did not know his letters were told that there is a kind of learning that enables a man to send words, crafted silently by hand, to someone far away, for the recipient in turn to gather these words not with his ears but with his eyes. If the man were to see this thing actually done, would he not be moved to pursue study toward a result he already knows and grasps, since he desires to know how he can do this? This is how the eager enthusiasm of learners is kindled: for what anyone is utterly ignorant of, he cannot in any way love.

1. Let us now proceed, then, in due order, with a more exact purpose, to explain this same point more thoroughly. And first, since no one can love at all a thing of which he is wholly ignorant, we must carefully consider of what sort is the love of those who are studious, that is, of those who do not already know, but are still desiring to know any branch of learning. Now certainly, in those things whereof the word study is not commonly used, love often arises from hearsay, when the reputation of anything for beauty inflames the mind to the seeing and enjoying it; since the mind knows generically wherein consist the beauties of corporeal things, from having seen them very frequently, and since there exists within a faculty of approving that which outwardly is longed for. And when this happens, the love that is called forth is not of a thing wholly unknown, since its genus is thus known. But when we love a good man whose face we never saw, we love him from the knowledge of his virtues, which virtues we know [abstractly] in the truth itself. But in the case of learning, it is for the most part the authority of others who praise and commend it that kindles our love of it; although nevertheless we could not burn with any zeal at all for the study of it, unless we had already in our mind at least a slight impression of the knowledge of each kind of learning. For who, for instance, would devote any care and labor to the learning of rhetoric, unless he knew before that it was the science of speaking? Sometimes, again, we marvel at the results of learning itself, which we have heard of or experienced; and hence burn to obtain, by learning, the power of attaining these results. Just as if it were said to one who did not know his letters, that there is a kind of learning which enables a man to send words, wrought with the hand in silence, to one who is ever so far absent, for him in turn to whom they are sent to gather these words, not with his ears, but with his eyes; and if the man were to see the thing actually done, is not that man, since he desires to know how he can do this thing, altogether moved to study with a view to the result which he already knows and holds? So it is that the studious zeal of those who learn is kindled: for that of which any one is utterly ignorant, he can in no way love.

When someone hears an unknown sign—for instance, the sound of a word whose meaning they don't know—they want to know what it is. That is, they want to know what thing has been agreed upon to be brought to mind by that sound. For example, if someone heard the word "temetum" and didn't know what it meant, they would ask what it is. They must already know that it is a sign—that is, that the word is not just an empty sound, but that something is signified by it. In other respects this three-syllable word is already known to them, and has already impressed its form upon their mind through the sense of hearing. Then what more is needed for them to gain greater knowledge of it, when all the letters and all the sounds of its syllables are already known? Only this: that they must recognize it is a sign, and that this recognition must stir in them the desire to know what it is a sign of. The more the thing is known, yet not fully known, the more the mind desires to know what remains. For if someone knew it only as a spoken word, but didn't know it was the sign of something, they would seek nothing further, since the sensible thing has already been perceived as far as it can be by the senses. But because they know it is not only a spoken word but also a sign, they want to know it perfectly. And no sign is known perfectly unless it is known what it is the sign of. Can someone who seeks this with eager care, and perseveres in the search with studious zeal, be said to be without love? What then does such a person love? For certainly nothing can be loved unless it is known. That person does not love those three syllables, which they already know. But if they love in them the fact that they know the syllables signify something, this is not what we're asking about now, for this is not what they seek to know. We are asking what they love in that which they desire to know but certainly do not yet know, and we are therefore wondering why they love, since we know most certainly that nothing can be loved unless it is known. What then do they love, except that they know and perceive in the reason of things what excellence there is in learning, in which the knowledge of all signs is contained, and what benefit there is in being skilled in these, since through them human fellowship mutually communicates its own perceptions? Otherwise gatherings of people would be actually worse than complete solitude if they could not share their thoughts by conversing together. The soul, then, discerns this fitting and serviceable form, and knows it, and loves it. And whoever seeks the meaning of words they don't know is working to make that form as perfect in themselves as they can. For it is one thing to see it in the light of truth, another to desire it as within one's own capacity. In the light of truth one sees how great and good a thing it is to understand and to speak all tongues of all nations, and so to hear no tongue and to be heard by none as a foreigner. The beauty, then, of this knowledge is already discerned by thought, and the thing being known is loved. And that thing is so regarded and so stimulates the studious zeal of learners that they are moved with respect to it and desire it eagerly in all the labor they spend upon attaining such a capacity, so that they may also embrace in practice what they know beforehand by reason. And so everyone, the nearer they approach that capacity in hope, the more fervently desires it with love. For those branches of learning are studied more eagerly which people do not despair of being able to attain. When anyone has no hope of attaining their end, they either love lukewarmly or do not love at all, however much they may see the excellence of it. Accordingly, because the knowledge of all languages is almost universally felt to be hopeless, everyone studies most to know that of their own nation. But if they feel they are not sufficient even to comprehend this perfectly, yet no one is so indolent in this knowledge as not to wish to know, when they hear an unknown word, what it is, and to seek and learn it if they can. And while they are seeking it, certainly they have a studious zeal of learning and seem to love a thing they do not know—but the case is really otherwise. For that form touches the mind, which the mind knows and thinks, wherein the fitness is clearly visible which comes from the associating of minds with one another in the hearing and returning of known and spoken words. And this form kindles studious zeal in the one who seeks what they do not know, but who gazes upon and loves the unknown form to which that belongs. If then, for example, anyone were to ask, "What is temetum?" (for I had used this word as an example already), and it were said to them, "What does this matter to you?"—they will answer, "So that I don't hear someone speaking and fail to understand them, or perhaps read the word somewhere and not know what the writer meant." Who would say to such an inquirer, "Don't care about understanding what you hear; don't care about knowing what you read"? For almost every rational soul quickly discerns the beauty of that knowledge through which the thoughts of people are mutually made known by the speaking of significant words. And it is on account of this fitness thus known, and because known therefore loved, that such an unknown word is eagerly sought out. When they hear and learn that wine was called "temetum" by our forefathers, but that the word is now quite obsolete in our present use of language, they may think they still need the word on account of this or that book of those forefathers. But if they consider these also to be unnecessary, perhaps they do now think the word not worth remembering, since they see it has nothing to do with that form of learning which they know with the mind, and gaze upon, and so love.

2. So also, if any one hear an unknown sign, as, for instance, the sound of some word of which he does not know the signification, he desires to know what it is; that is, he desires to know what thing it is which it is agreed shall be brought to mind by that sound: as if he heard the word temetum uttered, and not knowing, should ask what it is. He must then know already that it is a sign, i.e. that the word is not an empty sound, but that something is signified by it; for in other respects this trisyllabic word is known to him already, and has already impressed its articulate form upon his mind through the sense of hearing. And then what more is to be required in him, that he may go on to a greater knowledge of that of which all the letters and all the spaces of its several sounds are already known, unless that it shall at the same time have become known to him that it is a sign, and shall have also moved him with the desire of knowing of what it is the sign? The more, then, the thing is known, yet not fully known, the more the mind desires to know concerning it what remains to be known. For if he knew it to be only such and such a spoken word, and did not know that it was the sign of something, he would seek nothing further, since the sensible thing is already perceived as far as it can be by the sense. But because he knows it to be not only a spoken word, but also a sign, he wishes to know it perfectly; and no sign is known perfectly, except it be known of what it is the sign. He then who with ardent carefulness seeks to know this, and inflamed by studious zeal perseveres in the search; can such an one be said to be without love? What then does he love? For certainly nothing can be loved unless it is known. For that man does not love those three syllables which he knows already. But if he loves this in them, that he knows them to signify something, this is not the point now in question, for it is not this which he seeks to know. But we are now asking what it is he loves, in that which he is desirous to know, but which certainly he does not yet know; and we are therefore wondering why he loves, since we know most assuredly that nothing can be loved unless it be known. What then does he love, except that he knows and perceives in the reason of things what excellence there is in learning, in which the knowledge of all signs is contained; and what benefit there is in the being skilled in these, since by them human fellowship mutually communicates its own perceptions, lest the assemblies of men should be actually worse than utter solitude, if they were not to mingle their thoughts by conversing together? The soul, then, discerns this fitting and serviceable species, and knows it, and loves it; and he who seeks the meaning of any words of which he is ignorant, studies to render that species perfect in himself as much as he can: for it is one thing to behold it in the light of truth, another to desire it as within his own capacity. For he beholds in the light of truth how great and how good a thing it is to understand and to speak all tongues of all nations, and so to hear no tongue and to be heard by none as from a foreigner. The beauty, then, of this knowledge is already discerned by thought, and the thing being known is loved; and that thing is so regarded, and so stimulates the studious zeal of learners, that they are moved with respect to it, and desire it eagerly in all the labor which they spend upon the attainment of such a capacity, in order that they may also embrace in practice that which they know beforehand by reason. And so every one, the nearer he approaches that capacity in hope, the more fervently desires it with love; for those branches of learning are studied the more eagerly, which men do not despair of being able to attain; for when any one entertains no hope of attaining his end, then he either loves lukewarmly or does not love at all, howsoever he may see the excellence of it. Accordingly, because the knowledge of all languages is almost universally felt to be hopeless, every one studies most to know that of his own nation; but if he feels that he is not sufficient even to comprehend this perfectly, yet no one is so indolent in this knowledge as not to wish to know, when he hears an unknown word, what it is, and to seek and learn it if he can. And while he is seeking it, certainly he has a studious zeal of learning, and seems to love a thing he does not know; but the case is really otherwise. For that species touches the mind, which the mind knows and thinks, wherein the fitness is clearly visible which accrues from the associating of minds with one another, in the hearing and returning of known and spoken words. And this species kindles studious zeal in him who seeks what indeed he knows not, but gazes upon and loves the unknown form to which that pertains. If then, for example, any one were to ask, What is temetum (for I had instanced this word already), and it were said to him, What does this matter to you? He will answer, Lest perhaps I hear some one speaking, and understand him not; or perhaps read the word somewhere, and know not what the writer meant. Who, pray, would say to such an inquirer, Do not care about understanding what you hear; do not care about knowing what you read? For almost every rational soul quickly discerns the beauty of that knowledge, through which the thoughts of men are mutually made known by the enunciation of significant words; and it is on account of this fitness thus known, and because known therefore loved, that such an unknown word is studiously sought out. When then he hears and learns that wine was called temetum by our forefathers, but that the word is already quite obsolete in our present usage of language, he will think perhaps that he has still need of the word on account of this or that book of those forefathers. But if he holds these also to be superfluous, perhaps he does now come to think the word not worth remembering, since he sees it has nothing to do with that species of learning which he knows with the mind, and gazes upon, and so loves.

Therefore in every case, the love of an eager mind—that is, one that wants to know what it doesn't know—is not love of the thing it doesn't know, but of what it does know. It's because of what it knows that it wants to know what it doesn't know. Or if someone is so curious as to be driven not by any other known reason, but simply by the love of knowing unknown things, then such a curious person is certainly different from an ordinary student. Yet even this person doesn't love things they don't know any more than the student does. In fact, it's more accurate to say they hate things they don't know, since they want there to be nothing they don't know—they want to know everything. But in case someone raises a harder question by claiming that it's just as impossible to hate what you don't know as to love what you don't know, we won't deny what is true. However, we must understand that saying someone loves to know unknown things is not the same as saying they love unknown things. It's possible for someone to love to know unknown things, but it's not possible for them to love unknown things. The words "to know" aren't placed there without meaning. Someone who loves to know unknown things doesn't love the unknown things themselves, but loves knowing them. And unless someone knew what knowing means, no one could confidently say either that they knew something or that they didn't know it. Not only must the person who says "I know" (and says it truly) necessarily know what knowing is, but also the person who says "I don't know" (and says it confidently and truly, and knows they're saying it truly) certainly knows what knowing is. For they distinguish someone who doesn't know from someone who knows when they look into themselves and truly say "I don't know." And since they know they're saying this truly, how could they know it if they didn't know what knowing is?

3. Wherefore in all cases the love of a studious mind, that is, of one that wishes to know what it does not know, is not the love of that thing which it does not know, but of that which it knows; on account of which it wishes to know what it does not know. Or if it is so inquisitive as to be carried away, not for any other cause known to it, but by the mere love of knowing things unknown; then such an inquisitive person is, doubtless distinguishable from an ordinary student, yet does not, any more than he, love things he does not know; nay, on the contrary, he is more fitly said to hate things he knows not, of which he wishes that there should be none, in wishing to know everything. But lest any one should lay before us a more difficult question, by declaring that it is just as impossible for any one to hate what he does not know, as to love what he does not know, we will not withstand what is true; but it must be understood that it is not the same thing to say he loves to know things unknown, as to say he loves things unknown. For it is possible that a man may love to know things unknown; but it is not possible that he should love things unknown. For the word to know is not placed there without meaning; since he who loves to know things unknown, does not love the unknown things themselves, but the knowing of them. And unless he knew what knowing means, no one could say confidently, either that he knew or that he did not know. For not only he who says I know, and says so truly, must needs know what knowing is; but he also who says, I do not know, and says so confidently and truly, and knows that he says so truly, certainly knows what knowing is; for he both distinguishes him who does not know from him who knows, when he looks into himself and says truly I do not know; and whereas he knows that he says this truly, whence should he know it, if he did not know what knowing is?

Chapter 2.– No One at All Loves Things Unknown.

No serious student or inquiring person loves things they don't know, even when they urgently desire with intense longing to know what they don't know. Either they already know generically what they love and long to know it also in some individual instance or instances—which perhaps are praised but not yet known to them—and they form a mental image that might stir them to love. Where does this image come from, except from things they have already known? Yet perhaps they won't love it if they find that the praised form is unlike the other form they had imagined and fully known in their mind. And if they loved it, they will only begin to love it from the moment they learned it, since just before, the form they loved was different from the one their mind had been accustomed to present to itself. But if they find it similar to the form that report had proclaimed, so that they could truly say "I was already loving you," still even then they did not love a form they didn't know, since they had known it in that likeness. Or else we see something in the species of eternal reason and love it there, and when this is revealed in some image of a temporal thing and we believe the praises of those who have experienced it and so love it, then we do not love anything unknown, according to what we have already discussed sufficiently above. Or else again, we love something known and because of it seek something unknown, and so it is by no means the love of the unknown thing that grips us, but the love of the known thing to which we know the unknown thing belongs, so that we also know that which we still seek as unknown—as I said a little earlier about an unknown word. Or else again, everyone loves knowing itself, as no one can fail to know who desires to know anything. For these reasons, people seem to love unknown things when they wish to know something they don't know, and because of their intense desire to investigate, they cannot be said to be without love. But how different the reality is, and that nothing at all can be loved which is not known, I think I have persuaded everyone who carefully examines the truth. But since the examples we have given belong to those who desire to know something which they themselves are not, we must consider carefully lest perhaps some new idea appear when the mind desires to know itself.

4. No studious person, then, no inquisitive person, loves things he does not know, even while he is urgent with the most vehement desire to know what he does not know. For he either knows already generically what he loves, and longs to know it also in some individual or individuals, which perhaps are praised, but not yet known to him; and he pictures in his mind an imaginary form by which he may be stirred to love. And whence does he picture this, except from those things which he has already known? And yet perhaps he will not love it, if he find that form which was praised to be unlike that other form which was figured and in thought most fully known to his mind. And if he has loved it, he will begin to love it from that time when he learned it; since a little before, that form which was loved was other than that which the mind that formed it had been wont to exhibit to itself. But if he shall find it similar to that form which report had proclaimed, and to be such that he could truly say I was already loving you; yet certainly not even then did he love a form he did not know, since he had known it in that likeness. Or else we see somewhat in the species of the eternal reason, and therein love it; and when this is manifested in some image of a temporal thing, and we believe the praises of those who have made trial of it, and so love it, then we do not love anything unknown, according to that which we have already sufficiently discussed above. Or else, again, we love something known, and on account of it seek something unknown; and so it is by no means the love of the thing unknown that possesses us, but the love of the thing known, to which we know the unknown thing belongs, so that we know that too which we seek still as unknown; as a little before I said of an unknown word. Or else, again, every one loves the very knowing itself, as no one can fail to know who desires to know anything. For these reasons they seem to love things unknown who wish to know anything which they do not know, and who, on account of their vehement desire of inquiry, cannot be said to be without love. But how different the case really is, and that nothing at all can be loved which is not known, I think I must have persuaded every one who carefully looks upon truth. But since the examples which we have given belong to those who desire to know something which they themselves are not, we must take thought lest perchance some new notion appear, when the mind desires to know itself.

Chapter 3.– That When the Mind Loves Itself, It is Not Unknown to Itself.

What, then, does the mind love when it eagerly seeks to know itself while it is still unknown to itself? Look, the mind seeks to know itself and is stirred up by studious zeal. Therefore it loves. But what does it love? Does it love itself? But how can this be when it does not yet know itself, and no one can love what he does not know? Has some report described to it its own nature, in the same way we commonly hear about people who are absent? Perhaps, then, it does not love itself but loves what it imagines itself to be, which may be very different from what it actually is. Or if the mental image in the mind is like the mind itself, and when it loves this imagined picture it loves itself before knowing itself because it gazes at what is like itself, then it knew other minds from which to picture itself, and so it knows itself generically. Why, then, when it knows other minds, does it not know itself, since nothing can possibly be more present to it than itself? But if, just as the eyes of other people are better known to the eyes of the body than those eyes are to themselves, then let it not seek itself because it will never find itself. For eyes can never see themselves except in mirrors, and it cannot be supposed in any way that something like that could also apply to the contemplation of incorporeal things, so that the mind should know itself, as it were, in a mirror. Or does it see in the reason of eternal truth how beautiful it is to know oneself, and so loves what it sees, and works to bring it to pass in itself? Because, although it is not known to itself, yet it knows how good it is that it should be known to itself. And this is indeed very wonderful, that it does not yet know itself, yet already knows how excellent a thing it is to know itself. Or does it see some most excellent end, namely its own serenity and blessedness, by some hidden remembrance which has not left it, although it has gone far onward, and believes that it cannot reach that same end unless it knows itself? And so while it loves that, it seeks this, and loves what is known on account of which it seeks what is unknown. But why should the remembrance of its own blessedness be able to last, and the remembrance of itself not be able to last as well, so that it should know itself which wishes to attain, as well as know that which it wishes to attain? Or when it loves to know itself, does it love not itself, which it does not yet know, but the very act of knowing, and feel the more frustrated that itself is missing from its own knowledge with which it wishes to embrace all things? And it knows what it is to know, and while it loves this, which it knows, it desires also to know itself. By what means, then, does it know its own knowing if it does not know itself? For it knows that it knows other things but that it does not know itself, for it is from this that it also knows what knowing is. In what way, then, does that which does not know itself know itself as knowing anything? For it does not know that some other mind knows, but that it itself does so. Therefore it knows itself. Further, when it seeks to know itself, it knows itself now as seeking. Therefore again it knows itself. And so it cannot be altogether unknown to itself, when it certainly knows itself this much, that it knows itself as not knowing itself. But if it does not know that it does not know itself, then it does not seek to know itself. And therefore, in the very fact that it seeks itself, it is clearly proven to be more known to itself than unknown. For it knows itself as seeking and as not knowing itself, in that it seeks to know itself.

5. What, then, does the mind love, when it seeks ardently to know itself, while it is still unknown to itself? For, behold, the mind seeks to know itself, and is excited thereto by studious zeal. It loves, therefore; but what does it love? Is it itself? But how can this be when it does not yet know itself, and no one can love what he does not know? Is it that report has declared to it its own species, in like way as we commonly hear of people who are absent? Perhaps, then, it does not love itself, but loves that which it imagines of itself, which is perhaps widely different from what itself is: or if the phantasy in the mind is like the mind itself, and so when it loves this fancied image, it loves itself before it knew itself, because it gazes upon that which is like itself; then it knew other minds from which to picture itself, and so is known to itself generically. Why, then, when it knows other minds, does it not know itself, since nothing can possibly be more present to it than itself? But if, as other eyes are more known to the eyes of the body, than those eyes are to themselves; then let it not seek itself, because it never will find itself. For eyes can never see themselves except in looking-glasses; and it cannot be supposed in any way that anything of that kind can be applied also to the contemplation of incorporeal things, so that the mind should know itself, as it were, in a looking-glass. Or does it see in the reason of eternal truth how beautiful it is to know one's self, and so loves this which it sees, and studies to bring it to pass in itself? Because, although it is not known to itself, yet it is known to it how good it is, that it should be known to itself. And this, indeed, is very wonderful, that it does not yet know itself, and yet knows already how excellent a thing it is to know itself. Or does it see some most excellent end, viz. its own serenity and blessedness, by some hidden remembrance, which has not abandoned it, although it has gone far onwards, and believes that it cannot attain to that same end unless it know itself? And so while it loves that, it seeks this; and loves that which is known, on account of which it seeks that which is unknown. But why should the remembrance of its own blessedness be able to last, and the remembrance of itself not be able to last as well; that so it should know itself which wishes to attain, as well as know that to which it wishes to attain? Or when it loves to know itself, does it love, not itself, which it does not yet know, but the very act of knowing; and feel the more annoyed that itself is wanting to its own knowledge wherewith it wishes to embrace all things? And it knows what it is to know; and while it loves this, which it knows, desires also to know itself. Whereby, then, does it know its own knowing, if it does not know itself? For it knows that it knows other things, but that it does not know itself; for it is from hence that it knows also what knowing is. In what way, then, does that which does not know itself, know itself as knowing anything? For it does not know that some other mind knows, but that itself does so. Therefore it knows itself. Further, when it seeks to know itself, it knows itself now as seeking. Therefore again it knows itself. And hence it cannot altogether not know itself, when certainly it does so far know itself as that it knows itself as not knowing itself. But if it does not know itself not to know itself, then it does not seek to know itself. And therefore, in the very fact that it seeks itself, it is clearly convicted of being more known to itself than unknown. For it knows itself as seeking and as not knowing itself, in that it seeks to know itself.

Chapter 4.– How the Mind Knows Itself, Not in Part, But as a Whole.

What should we say then? Does something that knows itself partially not know itself partially? But it would be absurd to say that it does not know as a whole what it knows. I am not saying it knows everything about itself completely; but whatever it knows, it knows as a whole. So when it knows something about itself, which it can only know as a whole, it knows itself as a whole. But it does know that it knows something, and it cannot know anything except as a whole. Therefore it knows itself as a whole. Furthermore, what is more clearly known to it about itself than that it lives? And it cannot be a mind without living, though it also has something beyond this, namely that it understands—for the souls of animals also live but do not understand. Therefore, just as a mind is completely a mind, so it lives completely. But it knows that it lives. Therefore it knows itself as a whole. Finally, when the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind. Otherwise it does not know whether it is seeking itself, and might seek one thing while intending to seek another. For it could be that it was not actually a mind, and so in seeking to know a mind, it would not be seeking to know itself. Therefore, since the mind when it seeks to know what a mind is, knows that it seeks itself, it certainly knows that it is itself a mind. Moreover, if it knows this about itself—that it is a mind and a whole mind—then it knows itself as a whole. But suppose it did not know itself to be a mind, and in seeking itself only knew that it was seeking itself. In that case too, it might seek one thing instead of another if it did not know this. But to avoid seeking one thing instead of another, it undoubtedly knows what it seeks. And if it knows what it seeks and it seeks itself, then it certainly knows itself. What more then does it seek? But if it knows itself in part but still seeks itself in part, then it is not seeking itself but only part of itself. However, when we speak of the mind itself, we speak of it as a whole. Furthermore, because it knows that it has not yet found itself as a whole, it knows how much the whole is. And so it seeks what is missing, just as we usually try to recall to mind something that has slipped from memory but has not completely disappeared, since we can recognize it when it returns as the same thing we were seeking. But how can mind come into mind, as if it were possible for the mind not to be in the mind? Add to this: if after finding a part it does not seek itself as a whole, yet it seeks itself as a whole. Therefore it is present to itself as a whole, and nothing remains to be sought—for what is sought is what is missing, not the mind that is seeking. Since therefore it seeks itself as a whole, nothing of it is missing. Or if it does not seek itself as a whole, but the part that has been found seeks the part not yet found, then the mind does not seek itself, since no part of it seeks itself. For the part that has been found does not seek itself, nor does the part not yet found seek itself, since it is sought by the part already found. Therefore, since neither the mind as a whole seeks itself nor does any part of it seek itself, the mind does not seek itself at all.

6. What then shall we say? Does that which knows itself in part, not know itself in part? But it is absurd to say, that it does not as a whole know what it knows. I do not say, it knows wholly; but what it knows, it as a whole knows. When therefore it knows anything about itself, which it can only know as a whole, it knows itself as a whole. But it does know that itself knows something, while yet except as a whole it cannot know anything. Therefore it knows itself as a whole. Further, what in it is so known to itself, as that it lives? And it cannot at once be a mind, and not live, while it has also something over and above, viz., that it understands: for the souls of beasts also live, but do not understand. As therefore a mind is a whole mind, so it lives as a whole. But it knows that it lives. Therefore it knows itself as a whole. Lastly, when the mind seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is a mind: otherwise it knows not whether it seeks itself, and perhaps seeks one thing while intending to seek another. For it might happen that itself was not a mind, and so, in seeking to know a mind, that it did not seek to know itself. Wherefore since the mind, when it seeks to know what mind is, knows that it seeks itself, certainly it knows that itself is a mind. Furthermore, if it knows this in itself, that it is a mind, and a whole mind, then it knows itself as a whole. But suppose it did not know itself to be a mind, but in seeking itself only knew that it sought itself. For so, too, it may possibly seek one thing for another, if it does not know this: but that it may not seek one thing for another, without doubt it knows what it seeks. But if it knows what it seeks, and seeks itself, then certainly it knows itself. What therefore more does it seek? But if it knows itself in part, but still seeks itself in part, then it seeks not itself, but part of itself. For when we speak of the mind itself, we speak of it as a whole. Further, because it knows that it is not yet found by itself as a whole, it knows how much the whole is. And so it seeks that which is wanting, as we are wont to seek to recall to the mind something that has slipped from the mind, but has not altogether gone away from it; since we can recognize it, when it has come back, to be the same thing that we were seeking. But how can mind come into mind, as though it were possible for the mind not to be in the mind? Add to this, that if, having found a part, it does not seek itself as a whole, yet it as a whole seeks itself. Therefore as a whole it is present to itself, and there is nothing left to be sought: for that is wanting which is sought, not the mind which seeks. Since therefore it as a whole seeks itself, nothing of it is wanting. Or if it does not as a whole seek itself, but the part which has been found seeks the part which has not yet been found then the mind does not seek itself, of which no part seeks itself. For the part which has been found, does not seek itself; nor yet does the part itself which has not yet been found, seek itself; since it is sought by that part which has been already found. Wherefore, since neither the mind as a whole seeks itself, nor does any part of it seek itself, the mind does not seek itself at all.

Chapter 5.– Why the Soul is Enjoined to Know Itself. Whence Come the Errors of the Mind Concerning Its Own Substance.

Why, then, is the soul commanded to know itself? I believe it is so that the soul may consider itself and live according to its own nature—that is, seek to be ordered according to its own nature: under Him to whom it ought to be subject, and above those things to which it is to be preferred. Under Him by whom it ought to be ruled, above those things which it ought to rule. For through corrupt desire, the soul does many things as if it has forgotten itself. It sees certain things that are intrinsically excellent in that more excellent nature which is God, and although it ought to remain steadfast in order to enjoy them, it turns away from Him by wanting to claim those things for itself, and not to be like Him through His gift, but to be what He is through its own power. And so it begins to move and gradually slip down into lesser and lesser things, which it thinks are greater and greater. For it is neither sufficient for itself, nor is anything at all sufficient for it if it withdraws from Him who alone is sufficient. And so through lack and distress it becomes too focused on its own actions and on the restless pleasures it obtains through them. And thus, by the desire to acquire knowledge from those things that are external, whose nature it knows and loves, and which it feels can be lost unless held fast with anxious care, it loses its security and thinks of itself less and less, in proportion as it feels more and more secure that it cannot lose itself. Now, it is one thing not to know oneself, and another thing not to think of oneself—for we do not say of someone skilled in much learning that he is ignorant of grammar when he is simply not thinking of it because he is thinking at the time of the art of medicine. So, I say, it is one thing not to know oneself and another not to think of oneself. Yet such is the strength of love that the mind draws into itself those things which it has long thought of with love and has grown into them by the close adherence of diligent study, even when it returns in some way to think of itself. And because these things are bodily which it loved externally through the bodily senses, and because it has become entangled with them by a kind of daily familiarity, and yet cannot carry those bodily things themselves with it internally, as it were, into the region of incorporeal nature, therefore it combines certain images of them and thrusts them thus made from itself into itself. For it gives to the forming of them something of its own substance, yet preserves meanwhile something by which it may judge freely of the appearance of those images. And this something is more properly the mind, that is, the rational understanding, which is preserved so that it may judge. For we see that we have those parts of the soul which are formed by the likenesses of bodily things in common also with beasts.

7. Why therefore is it enjoined upon it, that it should know itself? I suppose, in order that, it may consider itself, and live according to its own nature; that is, seek to be regulated according to its own nature, viz., under Him to whom it ought to be subject, and above those things to which it is to be preferred; under Him by whom it ought to be ruled, above those things which it ought to rule. For it does many things through vicious desire, as though in forgetfulness of itself. For it sees some things intrinsically excellent, in that more excellent nature which is God: and whereas it ought to remain steadfast that it may enjoy them, it is turned away from Him, by wishing to appropriate those things to itself, and not to be like to Him by His gift, but to be what He is by its own, and it begins to move and slip gradually down into less and less, which it thinks to be more and more; for it is neither sufficient for itself, nor is anything at all sufficient for it, if it withdraw from Him who is alone sufficient: and so through want and distress it becomes too intent upon its own actions and upon the unquiet delights which it obtains through them: and thus, by the desire of acquiring knowledge from those things that are without, the nature of which it knows and loves, and which it feels can be lost unless held fast with anxious care, it loses its security, and thinks of itself so much the less, in proportion as it feels the more secure that it cannot lose itself. So, whereas it is one thing not to know oneself, and another not to think of oneself (for we do not say of the man that is skilled in much learning, that he is ignorant of grammar, when he is only not thinking of it, because he is thinking at the time of the art of medicine) — whereas, then, I say it is one thing not to know oneself, and another not to think of oneself, such is the strength of love, that the mind draws in with itself those things which it has long thought of with love, and has grown into them by the close adherence of diligent study, even when it returns in some way to think of itself. And because these things are corporeal which it loved externally through the carnal senses; and because it has become entangled with them by a kind of daily familiarity, and yet cannot carry those corporeal things themselves with itself internally as it were into the region of incorporeal nature; therefore it combines certain images of them, and thrusts them thus made from itself into itself. For it gives to the forming of them somewhat of its own substance, yet preserves the while something by which it may judge freely of the species of those images; and this something is more properly the mind, that is, the rational understanding, which is preserved that it may judge. For we see that we have those parts of the soul which are informed by the likenesses of corporeal things, in common also with beasts.

Chapter 6.– The Opinion Which the Mind Has of Itself is Deceitful.

The mind makes a mistake when it connects itself so intimately and affectionately with these mental images that it actually considers itself to be the same kind of thing as them. In doing this, the mind becomes conformed to these images to some degree—not by actually being such a thing, but by thinking it is. The mind doesn't think it is merely an image, but rather thinks it is the actual thing itself of which it holds the image. The mind still retains the ability to distinguish between the physical object that exists outside itself and the image of that physical object that it contains within itself—except when these images are projected outward as if they were being sensed externally rather than thought internally, as happens in people who are asleep, insane, or in a trance.

8. But the mind errs, when it so lovingly and intimately connects itself with these images, as even to consider itself to be something of the same kind. For so it is conformed to them to some extent, not by being this, but by thinking it is so: not that it thinks itself to be an image, but outright that very thing itself of which it entertains the image. For there still lives in it the power of distinguishing the corporeal thing which it leaves without, from the image of that corporeal thing which it contains therefrom within itself: except when these images are so projected as if felt without and not thought within, as in the case of people who are asleep, or mad, or in a trance.

Chapter 7.– The Opinions of Philosophers Respecting the Substance of the Soul. The Error of Those Who are of Opinion that the Soul is Corporeal, Does Not Arise from Defective Knowledge of the Soul, But from Their Adding There to Something Foreign to It. What is Meant by Finding.

When the soul thinks of itself in this way, it considers itself to be something corporeal. Because it is fully aware of its own superiority through which it rules the body, a question has arisen about which part of the body holds the greatest power in the body. Some have believed this to be the mind, or even the entire soul. Accordingly, some think it is the blood, others the brain, others the heart. This is not what Scripture means when it says, I will praise You, O Lord, with my whole heart, and, You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart. In Scripture, this word is transferred from the body to the soul through misapplication or metaphor. But these philosophers simply thought the soul was that small bodily part we see when the internal organs are torn open. Others have believed the soul is composed of extremely small, indivisible particles they call atoms, which meet and stick together within themselves. Others have said its substance is air, while others say fire. Some have concluded it is no substance at all, since they could only conceive of substance as body, and they did not find the soul to be body. Instead, they thought it was the blending of our body itself, or the combination of elements by which flesh is joined together. All of these have therefore held the soul to be mortal, since whether it was body or some combination of body, it certainly could not endure forever without dying. But those who have held its substance to be some kind of non-corporeal life, having found it to be a life that animates and gives life to every living body, have consequently tried, each according to his ability, to prove it immortal, since life cannot exist without life.

9. When, therefore, it thinks itself to be something of this kind, it thinks itself to be a corporeal thing; and since it is perfectly conscious of its own superiority, by which it rules the body, it has hence come to pass that the question has been raised what part of the body has the greater power in the body; and the opinion has been held that this is the mind, nay, that it is even the whole soul altogether. And some accordingly think it to be the blood, others the brain, others the heart; not as the Scripture says, I will praise You, O Lord, with my whole heart; and, You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart; for this word by misapplication or metaphor is transferred from the body to the soul; but they have simply thought it to be that small part itself of the body, which we see when the inward parts are rent asunder. Others, again, have believed the soul to be made up of very minute and individual corpustules, which they call atoms, meeting in themselves and cohering. Others have said that its substance is air, others fire. Others have been of opinion that it is no substance at all, since they could not think any substance unless it is body, and they did not find that the soul was body; but it was in their opinion the tempering together itself of our body, or the combining together of the elements, by which that flesh is as it were conjoined. And hence all of these have held the soul to be mortal; since, whether it were body, or some combination of body, certainly it could not in either case continue always without death. But they who have held its substance to be some kind of life the reverse of corporeal, since they have found it to be a life that animates and quickens every living body, have by consequence striven also, according as each was able, to prove it immortal, since life cannot be without life.

Regarding that fifth kind of body, whatever it may be, which some have added to the four well-known elements of the world and have claimed that the soul was made from it, I do not think we need to spend time discussing it here. Either they mean by "body" what we mean by it—namely, something whose part is smaller than the whole in terms of spatial extension—and in that case they should be counted among those who have believed the mind to be corporeal; or if they use the word "body" to refer either to all substance or to all changeable substance, while knowing that not all substance is contained in spatial extension through length, breadth, and height, then we need not argue with them over a matter of terminology.

For as to that fifth kind of body, I know not what, which some have added to the four well-known elements of the world, and have said that the soul was made of this, I do not think we need spend time in discussing it in this place. For either they mean by body what we mean by it, viz., that of which a part is less than the whole in extension of place, and they are to be reckoned among those who have believed the mind to be corporeal: or if they call either all substance, or all changeable substance, body, whereas they know that not all substance is contained in extension of place by any length and breadth and height, we need not contend with them about a question of words.

In all these views, anyone who understands that the nature of the mind is both a substance and yet not corporeal—meaning that a smaller part of it does not occupy less space and a larger part more space—must also recognize that those who believe the mind is corporeal do not err because they lack knowledge about the mind itself. Rather, they err because they attach to the mind certain qualities without which they cannot conceive of any nature whatsoever. If you ask them to think of existence apart from bodily mental images, they consider it simply nothing. Therefore, the mind would not search for itself as if it were lacking to itself. For what is so present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? Or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself? Hence, what we call discovery—if we consider the word's origin—means nothing other than that finding out is arriving at what is sought. Accordingly, things that enter the mind spontaneously are not usually said to be discovered, though they may be said to be known, since we did not strive by searching to arrive at them, that is, to discover or find them out. Therefore, just as the mind truly seeks those things that are sought by the eyes or any other bodily sense—for the mind directs even bodily sensation and then discovers or finds out when that sense arrives at the things sought—so too it discovers or finds out other things it ought to know, not through the medium of bodily sense but through itself, when it arrives at them. This applies whether in the case of the higher substance that is in God, or of the other parts of the soul, just as it does when the mind judges bodily images themselves, for it finds these within, in the soul, impressed through the body.

10. Now, in the case of all these opinions, any one who sees that the nature of the mind is at once substance, and yet not corporeal — that is, that it does not occupy a less extension of place with a less part of itself, and a greater with a greater — must needs see at the same time that they who are of opinion that it is corporeal do not err from defect of knowledge concerning mind, but because they associate with it qualities without which they are not able to conceive any nature at all. For if you bid them conceive of existence that is without corporeal phantasms, they hold it merely nothing. And so the mind would not seek itself, as though wanting to itself. For what is so present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? Or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself? And hence what is called invention, if we consider the origin of the word, what else does it mean, unless that to find out is to come into that which is sought? Those things accordingly which come into the mind as it were of themselves, are not usually said to be found out, although they may be said to be known; since we did not endeavor by seeking to come into them, that is to invent or find them out. And therefore, as the mind itself really seeks those things which are sought by the eyes or by any other sense of the body (for the mind directs even the carnal sense, and then finds out or invents, when that sense comes to the things which are sought); so, too, it finds out or invents other things which it ought to know, not with the medium of corporeal sense, but through itself, when it comes into them; and this, whether in the case of the higher substance that is in God, or of the other parts of the soul; just as it does when it judges of bodily images themselves, for it finds these within, in the soul, impressed through the body.

Chapter 8.– How the Soul Inquires into Itself. Whence Comes the Error of the Soul Concerning Itself.

The soul's search for itself raises a remarkable question: how does it aim to seek itself, and where does it arrive when it finds itself? For what is more present in the mind than the mind itself? But because the mind exists in those things it thinks about with love, and has become accustomed to being with love in sensible—that is, corporeal—things, it cannot exist in itself without the images of those corporeal things. This is where shameful error blocks its path, because the mind cannot separate these images of sensible things from itself in order to see itself alone. These images have become remarkably stuck to it through the strong attachment of love. This attachment is what makes the mind unclean; for while it tries to think of itself alone, it imagines itself to be that without which it cannot think of itself. Therefore, when the mind is commanded to know itself, it should not search for itself as if it were removed from itself. Instead, it should remove what it has added to itself. For the mind lies deeper within, not only than those sensible things that are clearly outside it, but also than the images of them. These images exist in a part of the soul that even animals possess, though animals lack understanding, which belongs properly to the mind. Since the mind is within, it goes out from itself in a certain way when it directs its loving attention toward these traces left by many acts of attention. These traces are imprinted on the memory when corporeal things outside are perceived in such a way that even when those corporeal things are absent, their images are available to those who think about them. Therefore let the mind know itself, and not search for itself as if it were absent. Instead, let it fix its voluntary attention upon itself—the same attention that was wandering among other things—and let it think of itself. Then it will see that it never stopped loving itself and never stopped knowing itself. But by loving another thing alongside itself, it has confused itself with that thing and has in some way become one with it. Thus, while embracing different things as though they were one, it has come to think that things which are different are actually one.

11. It is then a wonderful question, in what manner the soul seeks and finds itself; at what it aims in order to seek, or whither it comes, that it may come into or find out. For what is so much in the mind as the mind itself? But because it is in those things which it thinks of with love, and is wont to be in sensible, that is, in corporeal things with love, it is unable to be in itself without the images of those corporeal things. And hence shameful error arises to block its way, while it cannot separate from itself the images of sensible things, so as to see itself alone. For they have marvellously cohered with it by the close adhesion of love. And herein consists its uncleanness; since, while it strives to think of itself alone, it fancies itself to be that, without which it cannot think of itself. When, therefore, it is bidden to become acquainted with itself, let it not seek itself as though it were withdrawn from itself; but let it withdraw that which it has added to itself. For itself lies more deeply within, not only than those sensible things, which are clearly without, but also than the images of them; which are indeed in some part of the soul, viz., that which beasts also have, although these want understanding, which is proper to the mind. As therefore the mind is within, it goes forth in some sort from itself, when it exerts the affection of love towards these, as it were, footprints of many acts of attention. And these footprints are, as it were, imprinted on the memory, at the time when the corporeal things which are without are perceived in such way, that even when those corporeal things are absent, yet the images of them are at hand to those who think of them. Therefore let the mind become acquainted with itself, and not seek itself as if it were absent; but fix upon itself the act of [ voluntary] attention, by which it was wandering among other things, and let it think of itself. So it will see that at no time did it ever not love itself, at no time did it ever not know itself; but by loving another thing together with itself it has confounded itself with it, and in some sense has grown one with it. And so, while it embraces diverse things, as though they were one, it has come to think those things to be one which are diverse.

Chapter 9.– The Mind Knows Itself, by the Very Act of Understanding the Precept to Know Itself.

The mind should not try to perceive itself as if it were absent, but should work to perceive itself as present. It should not try to gain knowledge of itself as if it didn't know itself, but should distinguish itself from what it knows to be something else. How could it work to obey the command given to it, "Know yourself," if it doesn't know what "know" means or what "yourself" means? But if it knows both of these, then it also knows itself. The command "Know yourself" is not said to the mind the way we say "Know the cherubim and the seraphim," because those beings are absent from us, and we believe things about them, and based on that belief they are described as certain heavenly powers. Nor is it like when someone says "Know that man's will," because that is not something we can perceive at all through our senses or understanding, except through physical signs that are actually displayed—and even then, we believe rather than truly understand. Nor is it like when someone says "Look at your own face," which you can only do in a mirror, because our own face is beyond the reach of our own sight since it is not located where we can direct our gaze. But when the mind is told "Know yourself," it knows itself by the very act through which it understands the word "yourself"—and for no other reason than that it is present to itself. If the mind doesn't understand what is being said, then it certainly doesn't do what it is commanded to do. Therefore, it is commanded to do the very thing that it does when it understands the command itself.

12. Let it not therefore seek to discern itself as though absent, but take pains to discern itself as present. Nor let it take knowledge of itself as if it did not know itself, but let it distinguish itself from that which it knows to be another. For how will it take pains to obey that very precept which is given it, Know yourself, if it knows not either what know means or what yourself means? But if it knows both, then it knows also itself. Since know yourself is not so said to the mind as is Know the cherubim and the seraphim; for they are absent, and we believe concerning them, and according to that belief they are declared to be certain celestial powers. Nor yet again as it is said, Know the will of that man: for this it is not within our reach to perceive at all, either by sense or understanding, unless by corporeal signs actually set forth; and this in such a way that we rather believe than understand. Nor again as it is said to a man, Behold your own face; which he can only do in a looking-glass. For even our own face itself is out of the reach of our own seeing it; because it is not there where our look can be directed. But when it is said to the mind, Know yourself; then it knows itself by that very act by which it understands the word yourself; and this for no other reason than that it is present to itself. But if it does not understand what is said, then certainly it does not do as it is bid to do. And therefore it is bidden to do that thing which it does do, when it understands the very precept that bids it.

Chapter 10.– Every Mind Knows Certainly Three Things Concerning Itself — That It Understands, that It Is, and that It Lives.

The mind should not add anything to what it knows itself to be when it is told to know itself. For it knows, at least, that this command is said to itself—namely, to the self that exists, lives, and understands. But a dead body also exists, and cattle also live; yet neither a dead body nor cattle understand. Therefore the mind knows that it exists and lives in such a way that it understands. So when, for example, the mind thinks itself to be air, it thinks that air understands. However, it knows that it itself understands, but it does not know itself to be air; it only thinks so. Let it separate what it thinks itself to be; let it discern what it knows. Let this remain for it, which even those who have thought the mind to be one bodily thing or another have not doubted. For certainly not every mind considers itself to be air; some think themselves to be fire, others the brain, and some think themselves one kind of bodily thing, others another, as I mentioned before. Yet all know that they themselves understand, exist, and live. But they attribute understanding to what they understand, while they attribute existing and living to themselves. And no one doubts either that no one understands who does not live, or that no one lives of whom it is not true that he exists, and that therefore by consequence what understands both exists and lives—not as a dead body exists which does not live, nor as a soul lives which does not understand, but in some distinct and more excellent way. Furthermore, they know that they will, and they equally know that no one can will who does not exist and does not live; and they also relate that will itself to something which they will with that will. They also know that they remember, and they know at the same time that no one could remember unless he both existed and lived. But we relate memory itself also to something, in that we remember those things. Therefore the knowledge and science of many things are contained in two of these three: memory and understanding. But will must be present so that we may enjoy or use them. For we enjoy known things in which the will itself finds delight for their own sake, and so rests. But we use those things which we refer to some other thing that we are to enjoy. And the life of man is not vicious and blameworthy in any other way than by wrongly using and wrongly enjoying. But this is not the place to discuss this.

13. Let it not then add anything to that which it knows itself to be, when it is bidden to know itself. For it knows, at any rate, that this is said to itself; namely, to the self that is, and that lives, and that understands. But a dead body also is, and cattle live; but neither a dead body nor cattle understand. Therefore it so knows that it so is, and that it so lives, as an understanding is and lives. When, therefore, for example's sake, the mind thinks itself air, it thinks that air understands; it knows, however, that itself understands, but it does not know itself to be air, but only thinks so. Let it separate that which it thinks itself; let it discern that which it knows; let this remain to it, about which not even have they doubted who have thought the mind to be this corporeal thing or that. For certainly every mind does not consider itself to be air; but some think themselves fire, others the brain, and some one kind of corporeal thing, others another, as I have mentioned before; yet all know that they themselves understand, and are, and live; but they refer understanding to that which they understand, but to be, and to live, to themselves. And no one doubts, either that no one understands who does not live, or that no one lives of whom it is not true that he is; and that therefore by consequence that which understands both is and lives; not as a dead body is which does not live, nor as a soul lives which does not understand, but in some proper and more excellent manner. Further, they know that they will, and they equally know that no one can will who is not and who does not live; and they also refer that will itself to something which they will with that will. They know also that they remember; and they know at the same time that nobody could remember, unless he both was and lived; but we refer memory itself also to something, in that we remember those things. Therefore the knowledge and science of many things are contained in two of these three, memory and understanding; but will must be present, that we may enjoy or use them. For we enjoy things known, in which things themselves the will finds delight for their own sake, and so reposes; but we use those things, which we refer to some other thing which we are to enjoy. Neither is the life of man vicious and culpable in any other way, than as wrongly using and wrongly enjoying. But it is no place here to discuss this.

Since we are dealing with the nature of the mind, let us set aside all knowledge that comes from outside through the bodily senses, and pay closer attention to the principle we have established: that all minds know and are certain about themselves. People have certainly debated whether the capacity to live, remember, understand, will, think, know, and judge belongs to air, or fire, or the brain, or blood, or atoms, or to some fifth kind of body beyond the usual four elements—I don't know what. They have also debated whether the combination or blending of our flesh itself has the power to accomplish these things. One person has tried to prove one theory, another person another. But who has ever doubted that he himself lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? Even if he doubts, he lives. If he doubts, he remembers why he doubts. If he doubts, he understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wishes to be certain. If he doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he doubts, he judges that he ought not to give his agreement hastily. Therefore, whoever doubts about anything else ought not to doubt about all these things, because if they were not present, he would not be able to doubt about anything.

14. But since we treat of the nature of the mind, let us remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received from without, through the senses of the body; and attend more carefully to the position which we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain concerning themselves. For men certainly have doubted whether the power of living, of remembering, of understanding, of willing, of thinking, of knowing, of judging, be of air, or of fire, or of the brain, or of the blood, or of atoms, or besides the usual four elements of a fifth kind of body, I know not what; or,whether the combining or tempering together of this our flesh itself has power to accomplish these things. And one has attempted to establish this, and another to establish that. Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly. Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything.

Those who think the mind is either a body or a combination or tempering of the body will consider all these things to be present in a subject. They believe the substance is air, fire, or some other bodily thing, which they think is the mind. They believe understanding exists in this bodily thing as its quality, so that this bodily thing is the subject and understanding exists in the subject. In other words, the mind is the subject, which they judge to be a bodily thing, while understanding or any other of those things we have mentioned as certain to us exists in that subject. Those who deny the mind itself is body but think it is the combination or tempering together of the body hold nearly the same opinion. The difference is this: the former say the mind itself is the substance in which understanding exists as in a subject, but the latter say the mind itself exists in a subject, namely in the body, of which it is the combination or tempering together. Consequently, what else can they think except that understanding also exists in the same body as in a subject?

15. They who think the mind to be either a body or the combination or tempering of the body, will have all these things to seem to be in a subject, so that the substance is air, or fire, or some other corporeal thing, which they think to be the mind; but that the understanding ( intelligentia) is in this corporeal thing as its quality, so that this corporeal thing is the subject, but the understanding is in the subject: viz. that the mind is the subject, which they judge to be a corporeal thing, but the understanding [intelligence], or any other of those things which we have mentioned as certain to us, is in that subject. They also hold nearly the same opinion who deny the mind itself to be body, but think it to be the combination or tempering together of the body; for there is this difference, that the former say that the mind itself is the substance, in which the understanding [intelligence] is, as in a subject; but the latter say that the mind itself is in a subject, viz. in the body, of which it is the combination or tempering together. And hence, by consequence, what else can they think, except that the understanding also is in the same body as in a subject?

All of these people fail to recognize that the mind knows itself even when it is searching for itself, as we have already demonstrated. But nothing can properly be said to be known unless its substance is known. Therefore, when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance. And when it is certain about itself, it is certain about its own substance. The mind is certain about itself, as the arguments presented above prove convincingly. Yet it is not at all certain whether it is air, or fire, or some kind of body, or some function of a body. Therefore it is none of these things. The entire command to know itself means this: the mind is certain that it is not any of those things about which it is uncertain, and is certain that it is only what it is certain that it is. For the mind thinks about fire or air and whatever else is bodily in a certain way. And it can never be made to think about what it actually is in the same way it thinks about what it is not. It thinks about all these things through imaginary fantasy—whether fire, or air, or this or that body, or some part or combination and mixture of body. The mind is certainly not said to be all of these things, but rather some one of them. But if it were any one of them, it would think about that one differently from the rest—not through imaginary fantasy, as absent things are thought about that either the mind itself or similar things have encountered through bodily sense, but rather through some inward, not made-up but true presence (for nothing is more present to it than itself). This is just how it thinks that it lives, remembers, understands, and wills. For it knows these things within itself and does not imagine them as if it had encountered them through external sense, as bodily things are encountered. And if the mind adds nothing to itself from thinking about these things, so as to think itself is something of that kind, then whatever remains to it from itself—that alone is what it actually is.

16. And all these do not perceive that the mind knows itself, even when it seeks for itself, as we have already shown. But nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its substance is not known. And therefore, when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when it is certain about itself, it as certain about its own substance. But it is certain about itself, as those things which are said above prove convincingly; although it is not at all certain whether itself is air, or fire, or some body, or some function of body. Therefore it is not any of these. And to that whole which is bidden to know itself, belongs this, that it is certain that it is not any of those things of which it is uncertain, and is certain that it is that only, which only it is certain that it is. For it thinks in this way of fire, or air, and whatever else of the body it thinks of. Neither can it in any way be brought to pass that it should so think that which itself is, as it thinks that which itself is not. Since it thinks all these things through an imaginary phantasy, whether fire, or air, or this or that body, or that part or combination and tempering together of the body: nor assuredly is it said to be all those things, but some one of them. But if it were any one of them, it would think this one in a different manner from the rest viz. not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things are thought, which either themselves or some of like kind have been touched by the bodily sense; but by some inward, not feigned, but true presence (for nothing is more present to it than itself); just as it thinks that itself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills. For it knows these things in itself, and does not imagine them as though it had touched them by the sense outside itself, as corporeal things are touched. And if it attaches nothing to itself from the thought of these things, so as to think itself to be something of the kind, then whatsoever remains to it from itself that alone is itself.

Chapter 11.– In Memory, Understanding [or Intelligence], and Will, We Have to Note Ability, Learning, and Use. Memory, Understanding, and Will are One Essentially, and Three Relatively.

Let us set aside for now all the other things that the mind knows with certainty about itself, and focus especially on these three: memory, understanding, and will. We can usually recognize the quality of a young person's abilities through these three things. A boy is more praiseworthy in ability when he remembers more firmly and easily, understands more sharply, and pursues his studies more eagerly. However, when we ask about someone's learning, we do not ask how firmly and easily he remembers or how keenly he understands, but rather what he remembers and what he understands. And since the mind is considered praiseworthy not only for being learned but also for being good, we pay attention not only to what someone remembers and understands, but also to what he wills. We look not at how eagerly he wills something, but first at what he wills, and then at how much he wills it. A mind that loves eagerly deserves praise when it loves what ought to be loved eagerly. Therefore, since we speak of these three things—ability, knowledge, and use—the first must be considered under three aspects: what a person can do in memory, understanding, and will. The second must be considered with regard to what someone has acquired in his memory and understanding through a diligent will. The third, namely use, belongs to the will, which handles those things contained in memory and understanding, either directing them toward some further goal or resting satisfied with them as a final end. To use something means to take it up into the power of the will. To enjoy means to use with joy, not any longer in hope but in the actual thing itself. Thus, everyone who enjoys also uses, for he takes something up into the power of the will and finds satisfaction in it as a final end. But not everyone who uses something enjoys it, if he has sought what he takes up into the power of the will not for its own sake but for the sake of something else.

17. Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider and discuss these three — memory, understanding, will. For we may commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of the young also; since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the more praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is about any one's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he remembers, or how shrewdly he understands; but what it is that he remembers, and what it is that he understands. And because the mind is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as being learned, but also as being good, one gives heed not only to what he remembers and what he understands, but also to what he wills ( velit); not how ardently he wills, but first what it is he wills, and then how greatly he wills it. For the mind that loves eagerly is then to be praised, when it loves that which ought to be loved eagerly. Since, then, we speak of these three — ability, knowledge, use — the first of these is to be considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in regard to that which any one has in his memory and in his understanding, which he has attained by a studious will. But the third, viz. use, lies in the will, which handles those things that are contained in the memory and understanding, whether it refer them to anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an end. For to use, is to take up something into the power of the will; and to enjoy, is to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing. Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something into the power of the will, wherein he also is satisfied as with an end. But not every one who uses, enjoys, if he has sought after that, which he takes up into the power of the will, not on account of the thing itself, but on account of something else.

Since these three—memory, understanding, and will—are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, it certainly follows that they are not three substances but one substance. Memory, which is called life and mind and substance, is called these things in relation to itself; but it is called memory in relation to something else. I would say the same about understanding and will, since they are called understanding and will in relation to something else; but each in relation to itself is life and mind and essence. Therefore these three are one, because they are one life, one mind, one essence. Whatever else they are individually called in relation to themselves, they are also called together—not in the plural, but in the singular. But they are three in that they are mutually related to each other. And if they were not equal—not only each to each, but also each to all—they certainly could not mutually contain each other. For not only is each contained by each, but also all are contained by each. I remember that I have memory and understanding and will; I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will and remember and understand. I remember together my whole memory and understanding and will. For whatever part of my memory I do not remember is not in my memory, and nothing is as fully in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also, whatever I understand, I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know, I remember. Therefore I remember the whole of my understanding and the whole of my will. Likewise, when I understand these three things, I understand them together as wholes. For there is nothing intelligible that I do not understand except what I do not know; but what I do not know, I neither remember nor will. Therefore, whatever intelligible things I do not understand, it follows that I also neither remember nor will them. And whatever intelligible things I remember and will, it follows that I understand. My will also embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory, while I use the whole of what I understand and remember. Therefore, since all are mutually comprehended by each as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole is at the same time equal to all as wholes. And these three are one—one life, one mind, one essence.

18. Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance, is so called in respect to itself; but it is called memory, relatively to something. And I should say the same also of understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will relatively to something; but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also together, not plurally, but in the singular number. But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have memory and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will. For that of my memory which I do not remember, is not in my memory; and nothing is so much in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember the whole of my understanding, and the whole of my will. Likewise, when I understand these three things, I understand them together as whole. For there is none of things intelligible which I do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I do not know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore, whatever of things intelligible I do not understand, it follows also that I neither remember nor will. And whatever of things intelligible I remember and will, it follows that I understand. My will also embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory while I use the whole that I understand and remember. And, therefore, while all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence.

Chapter 12.– The Mind is an Image of the Trinity in Its Own Memory, and Understanding, and Will.

Are we now to ascend, with whatever strength of purpose we have, to that highest and supreme essence of which the human mind is an inadequate image, yet still an image? Or should these same three things be explained even more clearly in the soul through those things we receive from outside through the bodily senses, by which knowledge of physical things is impressed upon us in time? We have found that the mind itself exists in its own memory, understanding, and will in such a way that since it is understood always to know and always to will itself, it is also understood at the same time always to remember itself, always to understand and love itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinct from things that are not itself. Therefore its memory of itself and understanding of itself are difficult to discern in it. For in this situation, where these two things are very closely joined together and one does not come before the other by any amount of time, it appears as though they were not two things but one thing called by two names. And love itself is not so clearly felt to exist when a sense of need does not reveal it, since what is loved is always present. So these things can be explained more clearly, even to people with duller minds, if we discuss topics that come to the mind in time and occur to it in time—while it remembers what it did not remember before, sees what it did not see before, and loves what it did not love before. But this discussion now requires another beginning because of the length of the present book.

19. Are we, then, now to go upward, with whatever strength of purpose we may, to that chiefest and highest essence, of which the human mind is an inadequate image, yet an image? Or are these same three things to be yet more distinctly made plain in the soul, by means of those things which we receive from without, through the bodily sense, wherein the knowledge of corporeal things is impressed upon us in time? Since we found the mind itself to be such in its own memory, and understanding, and will, that since it was understood always to know and always to will itself, it was understood also at the same time always to remember itself, always to understand and love itself, although not always to think of itself as separate from those things which are not itself; and hence its memory of itself, and understanding of itself, are with difficult discerned in it. For in this case, where these two things are very closely conjoined, and one is not preceded by the other by any time at all, it looks as if they were not two things, but one called by two names; and love itself is not so plainly felt to exist when the sense of need does not disclose it, since what is loved is always at hand. And hence these things may be more lucidly set forth, even to men of duller minds, if such topics are treated of as are brought within reach of the mind in time, and happen to it in time; while it remembers what it did not remember before, and sees what it did not see before, and loves what it did not love before. But this discussion demands now another beginning, by reason of the measure of the present book.


On the Trinity — Book IX

An image of the Trinity in the human mind: the mind, its knowledge of itself, and its love of itself.

That a kind of trinity exists in man, who is the image of God, viz. the mind, and the knowledge wherewith the mind knows itself, and the love wherewith it loves both itself and its own knowledge; and these three are shown to be mutually equal, and of one essence.

Source: Translated by Arthur West Haddan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series , Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. ( Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130109.htm>.

Contents · 12 chapters
  1. Chapter 1.– In What Way We Must Inquire Concerning the Trinity.
  2. Chapter 2.– The Three Things Which are Found in Love Must Be Considered.
  3. Chapter 3.– The Image of the Trinity in the Mind of Man Who Knows Himself and Loves Himself. The Mind Knows Itself Through Itself.
  4. Chapter 4.– The Three are One, and Also Equal, Viz The Mind Itself, and the Love, and the Knowledge of It. That the Same Three Exist Substantially, and are Predicated Relatively. That the Same Three are Inseparable. That the Same Three are Not Joined and Commingled Like Parts, But that They are of One Essence, and are Relatives.
  5. Chapter 5.– That These Three are Several in Themselves, and Mutually All in All.
  6. Chapter 6.– There is One Knowledge of the Thing in the Thing Itself, and Another in Eternal Truth Itself. That Corporeal Things, Too, are to Be Judged the Rules of Eternal Truth.
  7. Chapter 7.– We Conceive and Beget the Word Within, from the Things We Have Beheld in the Eternal Truth. The Word, Whether of the Creature or of the Creator, is Conceived by Love.
  8. Chapter 8.– In What Desire and Love Differ.
  9. Chapter 9.– In the Love of Spiritual Things the Word Born is the Same as the Word Conceived. It is Otherwise in the Love of Carnal Things.
  10. Chapter 10.– Whether Only Knowledge that is Loved is the Word of the Mind.
  11. Chapter 11.– That the Image or Begotten Word of the Mind that Knows Itself is Equal to the Mind Itself.
  12. Chapter 12.– Why Love is Not the Offspring of the Mind, as Knowledge is So. The Solution of the Question. The Mind with the Knowledge of Itself and the Love of Itself is the Image of the Trinity.

Chapter 1.– In What Way We Must Inquire Concerning the Trinity.

We are certainly seeking a trinity—not just any trinity, but that Trinity which is God, the true and supreme and only God. My hearers should be patient, for we are still searching. No one can fairly criticize such a search, provided that the person seeking what is most difficult either to know or to express remains firm in the faith. But whoever sees or teaches better can quickly and justly criticize anyone who speaks confidently about these matters. Scripture says, "Seek God, and your heart shall live," and to prevent anyone from rashly thinking they have grasped it, Scripture says, "Seek His face evermore." The apostle says, "If anyone thinks he knows anything, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But if anyone loves God, he is known by Him." He did not say "has known Him," which would be dangerous presumption, but "is known by Him." Similarly, elsewhere, after saying "But now that you have known God," he immediately corrects himself: "or rather are known by God." And especially in another place: "Brothers, I do not count myself to have apprehended, but this one thing I do: forgetting what is behind and reaching forward to what is ahead, I press on toward the goal for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." Perfection in this life, he tells us, is nothing other than to forget what is behind and to reach forward and press on toward what is ahead. For the one who seeks has the safest goal, who keeps seeking until that toward which we are heading and reaching is grasped. But the right goal starts from faith. For a certain faith is in some way the starting point of knowledge, but such knowledge will not be made perfect except after this life, when we shall see face to face. Let us therefore be thus minded, so as to know that the disposition to seek truth is safer than presuming that unknown things are known. Let us therefore seek as if we were going to find, and find as if we were going to keep seeking. For when a person has finished, then he begins. Let us doubt things to be believed without unbelief; let us affirm things to be understood without rashness. Authority must be held fast in the former; truth must be sought out in the latter. Concerning this question, then, let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one God, the Creator and Ruler of all creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a trinity of persons mutually interrelated and a unity of equal ousia. And let us seek to understand this, praying for help from Him whom we wish to understand. And as much as He grants, let us desire to explain what we understand with such pious care and anxiety that even if we say one thing instead of another, we may at least say nothing unworthy. For example, if we say anything concerning the Father that does not properly belong to the Father but does belong to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to the Trinity itself; and if we say anything of the Son which does not properly suit the Son but does suit the Father, or the Holy Spirit, or the Trinity; or if we say anything concerning the Holy Spirit which is not fittingly a property of the Holy Spirit yet is not foreign to the Father, or to the Son, or to the one God, the Trinity itself. Just as now we wish to see whether the Holy Spirit is properly that most excellent love—and if He is not, then either the Father is love, or the Son, or the Trinity itself, since we cannot resist the most certain faith and weighty authority of Scripture saying "God is love." Yet we ought not to stray into profane error by saying anything of the Trinity that does not suit the Creator but rather the creature, or that is simply made up by empty thought.

1. We certainly seek a trinity — not any trinity, but that Trinity which is God, and the true and supreme and only God. Let my hearers then wait, for we are still seeking. And no one justly finds fault with such a search, if at least he who seeks that which either to know or to utter is most difficult, is steadfast in the faith. But whosoever either sees or teaches better, finds fault quickly and justly with any one who confidently affirms concerning it. Seek God, he says, and your heart shall live; and lest any one should rashly rejoice that he has, as it were, apprehended it, Seek, he says, His face evermore. And the apostle: If any man, he says, think that he knows anything, he knows nothing yet as he ought to know. But if any man love God, the same is known of Him. He has not said, has known Him, which is dangerous presumption, but is known of Him. So also in another place, when he had said, But now after that you have known God: immediately correcting himself, he says, or rather are known of God. And above all in that other place, Brethren, he says, I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press in purpose toward the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded. Perfection in this life, he tells us, is nothing else than to forget those things which are behind, and to reach forth and press in purpose toward those things which are before. For he that seeks has the safest purpose, [who seeks] until that is taken hold of whither we are tending, and for which we are reaching forth. But that is the right purpose which starts from faith. For a certain faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge; but a certain knowledge will not be made perfect, except after this life, when we shall see face to face. Let us therefore be thus minded, so as to know that the disposition to seek the truth is more safe than that which presumes things unknown to be known. Let us therefore so seek as if we should find, and so find as if we were about to seek. For when a man has done, then he begins. Let us doubt without unbelief of things to be believed; let us affirm without rashness of things to be understood: authority must be held fast in the former, truth sought out in the latter. As regards this question, then, let us believe that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one God, the Creator and Ruler of the whole creature; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a trinity of persons mutually interrelated, and a unity of an equal essence. And let us seek to understand this, praying for help from Himself, whom we wish to understand; and as much as He grants, desiring to explain what we understand with so much pious care and anxiety, that even if in any case we say one thing for another, we may at least say nothing unworthy. As, for the sake of example, if we say anything concerning the Father that does not properly belong to the Father, or does belong to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to the Trinity itself; and if anything of the Son which does not properly suit with the Son, or at all events which does suit with the Father, or with the Holy Spirit, or with the Trinity; or if, again, anything concerning the Holy Spirit, which is not fitly a property of the Holy Spirit, yet is not alien from the Father, or from the Son, or from the one God the Trinity itself. Even as now our wish is to see whether the Holy Spirit is properly that love which is most excellent which if He is not, either the Father is love, or the Son, or the Trinity itself; since we cannot withstand the most certain faith and weighty authority of Scripture, saying, God is love. And yet we ought not to deviate into profane error, so as to say anything of the Trinity which does not suit the Creator, but rather the creature, or which is feigned outright by mere empty thought.

Chapter 2.– The Three Things Which are Found in Love Must Be Considered.

And this being so, let us direct our attention to those three things we think we have found. We are not yet speaking of heavenly things, nor of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but of that inadequate image—which is still an image—that is, man. Our weak mind can perhaps examine this more familiarly and more easily. So then, when I, who am conducting this inquiry, love anything, there are three things involved: myself, what I love, and love itself. For I do not love love unless I love a lover, since there is no love where nothing is loved. Therefore there are three things: the one who loves, what is loved, and love. But what if I love nothing except myself? Will there not then be two things: what I love, and love? For the one who loves and what is loved are the same when someone loves himself, just as to love and to be loved are the very same thing when someone loves himself. The same thing is being said when it is said "he loves himself" and "he is loved by himself." In that case, to love and to be loved are not two different things, just as the one who loves and the one who is loved are not two different persons. But even so, love and what is loved are still two things. For there is no love when someone loves himself unless love itself is loved. But it is one thing to love oneself, another to love one's own love. For love is not loved unless it is already loving something, since where nothing is loved there is no love. Therefore there are two things when someone loves himself: love and what is loved. For then the one who loves and what is loved are one. From this it seems that it does not necessarily follow that three things are to be understood wherever love is. Let us set aside from our inquiry all the other many things that make up a person, and in order that we may discover clearly what we are now seeking—as far as possible in such a subject—let us deal with the mind alone. The mind, then, when it loves itself, reveals two things: mind and love. But what is it to love oneself, except to wish to help oneself to the enjoyment of oneself? And when someone wishes to be just as much as he is, then the will matches the mind, and the love is equal to the one who loves. And if love is a substance, it is certainly not body but spirit; and the mind also is not body but spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits but one spirit, nor two essences but one. And yet here are two things that are one: the one who loves and love, or if you prefer, what is loved and love. And these two are indeed said in relation to each other, since the one who loves is referred to love, and love to the one who loves. For the one who loves loves with some love, and love is the love of someone who loves. But mind and spirit are not said relatively but express essence. For mind and spirit do not exist because the mind and spirit of some particular person exists. For if we remove the body from what is called man—which is so called with the body joined to it—the mind and spirit remain. But if we remove the one who loves, then there is no love; and if we remove love, then there is no one who loves. And therefore, insofar as they are mutually referred to one another, they are two; but when they are spoken of in respect to themselves, each is spirit, and both together are also one spirit; and each is mind, and both together one mind. Where, then, is the trinity? Let us pay attention as much as we can, and let us invoke the everlasting light, that He may illuminate our darkness and that we may see in ourselves, as much as we are permitted, the image of God.

2. And this being so, let us direct our attention to those three things which we fancy we have found. We are not yet speaking of heavenly things, nor yet of God the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, but of that inadequate image, which yet is an image, that is, man; for our feeble mind perhaps can gaze upon this more familiarly and more easily. Well then, when I, who make this inquiry, love anything, there are three things concerned — myself, and that which I love, and love itself. For I do not love love, except I love a lover; for there is no love where nothing is loved. Therefore there are three things — he who loves, and that which is loved, and love. But what if I love none except myself? Will there not then be two things — that which I love, and love? For he who loves and that which is loved are the same when any one loves himself; just as to love and to be loved, in the same way, is the very same thing when any one loves himself. Since the same thing is said, when it is said, he loves himself, and he is loved by himself. For in that case to love and to be loved are not two different things: just as he who loves and he who is loved are not two different persons. But yet, even so, love and what is loved are still two things. For there is no love when any one loves himself, except when love itself is loved. But it is one thing to love one's self, another to love one's own love. For love is not loved, unless as already loving something; since where nothing is loved there is no love. Therefore there are two things when any one loves himself — love, and that which is loved. For then he that loves and that which is loved are one. Whence it seems that it does not follow that three things are to be understood wherever love is. For let us put aside from the inquiry all the other many things of which a man consists; and in order that we may discover clearly what we are now seeking, as far as in such a subject is possible, let us treat of the mind alone. The mind, then, when it loves itself, discloses two things — mind and love. But what is to love one's self, except to wish to help one's self to the enjoyment of self? And when any one wishes himself to be just as much as he is, then the will is on a par with the mind, and the love is equal to him who loves. And if love is a substance, it is certainly not body, but spirit; and the mind also is not body, but spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits, but one spirit; nor yet two essences, but one: and yet here are two things that are one, he that loves and love; or, if you like so to put it, that which is loved and love. And these two, indeed, are mutually said relatively. Since he who loves is referred to love, and love to him who loves. For he who loves, loves with some love, and love is the love of some one who loves. But mind and spirit are not said relatively, but express essence. For mind and spirit do not exist because the mind and spirit of some particular man exists. For if we subtract the body from that which is man, which is so called with the conjunction of body, the mind and spirit remain. But if we subtract him that loves, then there is no love; and if we subtract love, then there is no one that loves. And therefore, in so far as they are mutually referred to one another, they are two; but whereas they are spoken in respect to themselves, each are spirit, and both together also are one spirit; and each are mind, and both together one mind. Where, then, is the trinity? Let us attend as much as we can, and let us invoke the everlasting light, that He may illuminate our darkness, and that we may see in ourselves, as much as we are permitted, the image of God.

Chapter 3.– The Image of the Trinity in the Mind of Man Who Knows Himself and Loves Himself. The Mind Knows Itself Through Itself.

The mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself, because how can it love what it does not know? If someone claims that the mind believes itself to be of a certain character based on general or specific knowledge—from what it has learned by observing others—and therefore loves itself, that person is speaking utter nonsense. How can a mind know another mind if it does not know itself? The mind does not know other minds while remaining ignorant of itself, the way the eye of the body sees other eyes but cannot see itself. We see physical bodies through the eyes of the body because, unless we are looking in a mirror, we cannot bend and reflect back the rays that shine out through our eyes and touch whatever we perceive. This is indeed a subject dealt with very subtly and obscurely, until it can be clearly shown whether this is actually how it works or not. But whatever the nature of the power by which we perceive through the eyes—whether it is rays or something else—we certainly cannot perceive that power itself with the eyes. Instead, we investigate it with the mind and, if possible, understand even this through the mind. Therefore, just as the mind gathers knowledge of physical things through the senses of the body, so it gathers knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. Consequently, it also knows itself through itself, since it is incorporeal. If it does not know itself, it does not love itself.

3. For the mind cannot love itself, except also it know itself; for how can it love what it does not know? Or if any body says that the mind, from either general or special knowledge, believes itself of such a character as it has by experience found others to be and therefore loves itself, he speaks most foolishly. For whence does a mind know another mind, if it does not know itself? For the mind does not know other minds and not know itself, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself; for we see bodies through the eyes of the body, because, unless we are looking into a mirror, we cannot refract and reflect the rays into themselves which shine forth through those eyes, and touch whatever we discern — a subject, indeed, which is treated of most subtlely and obscurely, until it be clearly demonstrated whether the fact be so, or whether it be not. But whatever is the nature of the power by which we discern through the eyes, certainly, whether it be rays or anything else, we cannot discern with the eyes that power itself; but we inquire into it with the mind, and if possible, understand even this with the mind. As the mind, then, itself gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal; for if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.

Chapter 4.– The Three are One, and Also Equal, Viz The Mind Itself, and the Love, and the Knowledge of It. That the Same Three Exist Substantially, and are Predicated Relatively. That the Same Three are Inseparable. That the Same Three are Not Joined and Commingled Like Parts, But that They are of One Essence, and are Relatives.

But just as there are two things—the mind and its love when it loves itself—so there are two things: the mind and its knowledge when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself, its love, and its knowledge are three things, and these three are one. When they are perfect, they are equal. For if someone loves himself less than he truly is—for example, if a person's mind loves itself only as much as the human body ought to be loved, when the mind is greater than the body—then it is at fault, and its love is not perfect. Again, if it loves itself more than it truly is—for instance, if it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, when the mind is incomparably less than God—then it is also greatly at fault, and its self-love is not perfect. But it is even more perversely and wrongly at fault when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. Likewise, if knowledge is less than the thing that is known and can be fully known, then the knowledge is not perfect. But if it is greater, then the nature that knows is above what is known, just as knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of the knower, but the body is not life, and any life is greater than any body—not in size, but in power. But when the mind knows itself, its knowledge does not rise above itself, because it is both the knower and the known. Therefore, when it knows itself entirely and nothing else along with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself, because its knowledge does not come from another nature, since it knows itself. And when it perceives itself entirely and nothing more, then it is neither less nor greater. We were right, therefore, to say that these three things—mind, love, and knowledge—when they are perfect, are consequently equal.

4. But as there are two things ( duo quædam), the mind and the love of it, when it loves itself; so there are two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things ( tria quædam), and these three are one; and when they are perfect they are equal. For if one loves himself less than as he is — as for example, suppose that the mind of a man only loves itself as much as the body of a man ought to be loved, whereas the mind is more than the body — then it is in fault, and its love is not perfect. Again, if it loves itself more than as it is — as if, for instance, it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, whereas the mind is incomparably less than God — here also it is exceedingly in fault, and its love of self is not perfect. But it is in fault more perversely and wrongly still, when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. Also, if knowledge is less than that thing which is known, and which can be fully known, then knowledge is not perfect; but if it is greater, then the nature which knows is above that which is known, as the knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of the knower, but the body is not life; and any life is greater than any body, not in bulk, but in power. But when the mind knows itself, its own knowledge does not rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself is known. When, therefore, it knows itself entirely, and no other thing with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself; because its knowledge is not from another nature, since it knows itself. And when it perceives itself entirely, and nothing more, then it is neither less nor greater. We said therefore rightly, that these three things, [ mind, love, and knowledge], when they are perfect, are by consequence equal.

Similar reasoning suggests to us, if we can understand the matter at all, that these things—that is, love and knowledge—exist in the soul. Being wrapped up in it, as it were, they are drawn out from it so that they can be perceived and counted as existing substantially, or, so to speak, essentially. They do not exist in the soul as if it were a subject, the way color or shape or any other quality or quantity exists in a body. For anything of this material kind does not extend beyond the subject in which it exists. The color or shape of one particular body cannot also be the color or shape of another body. But the mind can also love something besides itself with the same love by which it loves itself. Furthermore, the mind does not know only itself, but also many other things. Therefore love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as in a subject. Rather, these also exist substantially, just as the mind itself does. For even though they are mutually predicated relatively, each still exists separately in its own substance. Nor are they predicated relatively to one another in the way that color and a colored subject are, where the color is in the colored subject but has no proper substance in itself—colored body being a substance, but color being in a substance. Instead, they are like two friends who are also two human beings, which are substances. While they are called human beings not relatively but friends relatively, they remain substances.

5. Similar reasoning suggests to us, if indeed we can any way understand the matter, that these things [ i.e. love and knowledge] exist in the soul, and that, being as it were involved in it, they are so evolved from it as to be perceived and reckoned up substantially, or, so to say, essentially. Not as though in a subject; as color, or shape, or any other quality or quantity, are in the body. For anything of this [material] kind does not go beyond the subject in which it is; for the color or shape of this particular body cannot be also those of another body. But the mind can also love something besides itself, with that love with which it loves itself. And further, the mind does not know itself only, but also many other things. Wherefore love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as in a subject, but these also exist substantially, as the mind itself does; because, even if they are mutually predicated relatively, yet they exist each severally in their own substance. Nor are they so mutually predicated relatively as color and the colored subject are; so that color is in the colored subject, but has not any proper substance in itself, since colored body is a substance, but color is in a substance; but as two friends are also two men, which are substances, while they are said to be men not relatively, but friends relatively.

Moreover, although one who loves or one who knows is a substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a substance, still "the one who loves" and "love," or "the one who knows" and "knowledge," are spoken of in relation to each other, just as friends are. Yet mind or spirit are not relational terms, just as human beings are not relational terms. Nevertheless, the one who loves and love, or the one who knows and knowledge, cannot exist separately from each other, whereas human beings who are friends can. It might seem that friends can also be separated in body though not in mind, insofar as they are friends. Indeed, it can even happen that a friend may begin to hate a friend and therefore cease to be a friend while the other does not know it and still loves him. But if the love by which the mind loves itself ceases to exist, then at the same time the mind will also cease to love. Similarly, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself ceases to exist, then at the same time the mind will also cease to know itself. Just as the head of anything that has a head is certainly a head, and they are predicated in relation to each other even though they are also substances—for both a head is a body and that which has a head is a body, and if there is no head, then there will be no thing that has a head—yet these things can be separated from each other by cutting them off, while those cannot.

6. But, further, although one who loves or one who knows is a substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a substance, but he that loves and love, or, he that knows and knowledge, are spoken of relatively to each other, as are friends: yet mind or spirit are not relatives, as neither are men relatives: nevertheless he that loves and love, or he that knows and knowledge, cannot exist separately from each other, as men can that are friends. Although it would seem that friends, too, can be separated in body, not in mind, in as far as they are friends: nay, it can even happen that a friend may even also begin to hate a friend and on this account cease to be a friend while the other does not know it, and still loves him. But if the love with which the mind loves itself ceases to be, then the mind also will at the same time cease to love. Likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself ceases to be, then the mind will also at the same time cease to know itself. Just as the head of anything that has a head is certainly a head, and they are predicated relatively to each other, although they are also substances: for both a head is a body, and so is that which has a head; and if there be no head, then neither will there be that which has a head. Only these things can be separated from each other by cutting off, those cannot.

Even if some bodies cannot be completely separated and divided, they would still not be bodies unless they were made up of their own distinct parts. A part, then, is spoken of in relation to a whole, since every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a whole by possessing all its parts. But since both part and whole are bodies, these things are not only spoken of in relation to each other but also exist as substances. Perhaps, then, the mind is a whole, and the love with which it loves itself and the knowledge with which it knows itself are like its parts, two parts that make up that whole. Or are there three equal parts that make up the one whole? But no part embraces the whole of which it is a part. However, when the mind knows itself as a whole—that is, knows itself perfectly—then its knowledge extends through the whole of it. And when it loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as a whole, and its love extends through the whole of it. Is it, then, like one drink made from wine and water and honey, where each individual ingredient extends through the whole, and yet they are three things (for there is no part of the drink that does not contain these three things; they are not joined like water and oil but are completely mixed together, and they are all substances, and the whole of that liquid composed of the three is one substance)—is it in some such way as this that we are to think these three are together: mind, love, and knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, although one substance results in the drink made from mixing them. And I cannot see how those other three are not of the same substance, since the mind itself loves itself and itself knows itself, and these three exist in such a way that the mind is neither loved nor known by anything else at all. These three, therefore, must be of one and the same essence. For this reason, if they were confused together as if by mixing, they could not in any way be three, nor could they be mutually related to each other. Just as if you were to make three similar rings from one and the same gold, even though connected to each other, they are mutually related to each other because they are similar. For everything similar is similar to something, and there is a trinity of rings and one gold. But if they are blended with each other and each mingled with the other through the whole of their bulk, then that trinity will collapse and will not exist at all. And not only will it be called one gold, as it was called in the case of those three rings, but now it will not be called three things of gold at all.

7. And even if there are some bodies which cannot be wholly separated and divided, yet they would not be bodies unless they consisted of their own proper parts. A part then is predicated relatively to a whole, since every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a whole by having all its parts. But since both part and whole are bodies, these things are not only predicated relatively, but exist also substantially. Perhaps, then, the mind is a whole, and the love with which it loves itself, and the knowledge with which it knows itself, are as it were its parts, of which two parts that whole consists. Or are there three equal parts which make up the one whole? But no part embraces the whole, of which it is a part; whereas, when the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly, then the knowledge of it extends through the whole of it; and when it loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as a whole, and the love of it extends through the whole of it. Is it, then, as one drink is made from wine and water and honey, and each single part extends through the whole, and yet they are three things (for there is no part of the drink which does not contain these three things; for they are not joined as if they were water and oil, but are entirely commingled: and they are all substances, and the whole of that liquor which is composed of the three is one substance), — is it, I say, in some such way as this we are to think these three to be together, mind, love, and knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, although one substance results in the drink made from the commingling of them. And I cannot see how those other three are not of the same substance, since the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows itself; and these three so exist, as that the mind is neither loved nor known by any other thing at all. These three, therefore, must needs be of one and the same essence; and for that reason, if they were confounded together as it were by a commingling, they could not be in any way three, neither could they be mutually referred to each other. Just as if you were to make from one and the same gold three similar rings, although connected with each other, they are mutually referred to each other, because they are similar. For everything similar is similar to something, and there is a trinity of rings, and one gold. But if they are blended with each other, and each mingled with the other through the whole of their own bulk, then that trinity will fall through, and it will not exist at all; and not only will it be called one gold, as it was called in the case of those three rings, but now it will not be called three things of gold at all.

Chapter 5.– That These Three are Several in Themselves, and Mutually All in All.

But in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains: mind, love, knowledge. And this trinity is not mixed up together by any blending. Although each one exists in itself, and mutually all are in all—or each one is in the other two, or each two are in each one—therefore all are in all. For certainly the mind is in itself, since it is called mind in relation to itself. Yet it is said to be knowing, or known, or knowable in relation to its own knowledge. And although as loving, and loved, or lovable, it is referred to love, by which it loves itself. And knowledge, although it is referred to the mind that knows or is known, is also spoken of both as known and knowing in relation to itself, for the knowledge by which the mind knows itself is not unknown to itself. And although love is referred to the mind that loves, whose love it is, it is also love in relation to itself, so as to exist also in itself, since love too is loved, yet cannot be loved with anything except with love, that is with itself. So these things each exist in themselves. But they also exist in each other, because both the mind that loves is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the one who loves, and knowledge is in the mind that knows. And each one likewise exists in the other two, because the mind which knows and loves itself is in its own love and knowledge. And the love of the mind that loves and knows itself is in the mind and in its knowledge. And the knowledge of the mind that knows and loves itself is in the mind and in its love, because it loves itself that knows, and knows itself that loves. And from this, each two are also in each one, since the mind which knows and loves itself is together with its own knowledge in love, and together with its own love in knowledge. And love itself and knowledge are together in the mind, which loves and knows itself. But we have already shown above how all are in all, since the mind loves itself as a whole and knows itself as a whole, and knows its own love wholly, and loves its own knowledge wholly, when these three things are perfect in relation to themselves. Therefore these three things are wonderfully inseparable from each other, and yet each of them is individually a substance, and all together are one substance or ousia, while they are mutually spoken of relatively.

8. But in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not confounded together by any commingling: although they are each severally in themselves and mutually all in all, or each severally in each two, or each two in each. Therefore all are in all. For certainly the mind is in itself, since it is called mind in respect to itself: although it is said to be knowing, or known, or knowable, relatively to its own knowledge; and although also as loving, and loved, or lovable, it is referred to love, by which it loves itself. And knowledge, although it is referred to the mind that knows or is known, nevertheless is also predicated both as known and knowing in respect to itself: for the knowledge by which the mind knows itself is not unknown to itself. And although love is referred to the mind that loves, whose love it is; nevertheless it is also love in respect to itself, so as to exist also in itself: since love too is loved, yet cannot be loved with anything except with love, that is with itself. So these things are severally in themselves. But so are they in each other; because both the mind that loves is in love, and love is in the knowledge of him that loves, and knowledge is in the mind that knows. And each severally is in like manner in each two, because the mind which knows and loves itself, is in its own love and knowledge: and the love of the mind that loves and knows itself, is in the mind and in its knowledge: and the knowledge of the mind that knows and loves itself is in the mind and in its love, because it loves itself that knows, and knows itself that loves. And hence also each two is in each severally, since the mind which knows and loves itself, is together with its own knowledge in love, and together with its own love in knowledge; and love too itself and knowledge are together in the mind, which loves and knows itself. But in what way all are in all, we have already shown above; since the mind loves itself as a whole, and knows itself as a whole, and knows its own love wholly, and loves its own knowledge wholly, when these three things are perfect in respect to themselves. Therefore these three things are marvellously inseparable from each other, and yet each of them is severally a substance, and all together are one substance or essence, while they are mutually predicated relatively. "Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? I pray that they all may be one, as thou Father art in Me, and I in Thee." Athanasius ( Oratio, 3, 21) remarks that Christ here prays that the disciples "may imitate the trinitarian unity of essence, in their unity of affection." Had it been possible for the disciples to be in the essence of the Father as the Son is, he would have prayed that they all may be "one in Thee," instead of "one in Us." The Platonists, also, employed this figure of circulatory movement, to explain the self-reflecting and self-communing nature of the human mind. "It is not possible for us to know what our souls are, but only by their κινήσεις κυκλικαὶ, their circular and reflex motions and converse with themselves, which only can steal from them their own secrets." J. Smith: Immortality of the Soul, Ch. ii. Augustine's illustration, however, is imperfect, because "the three things" which circulate are not "each of them severally a substance." Only one of them, namely, the mind, is a substance.–W.G.T.S.] }}–>

Chapter 6.– There is One Knowledge of the Thing in the Thing Itself, and Another in Eternal Truth Itself. That Corporeal Things, Too, are to Be Judged the Rules of Eternal Truth.

When the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love something unchangeable. Each individual person speaks about his own particular mind in one way, when he reflects on what happens within himself. But he defines the human mind in abstract terms through either specific or general knowledge. So when someone speaks to me about his own individual mind—whether he understands this or that, or does not understand it, or whether he wants or does not want this or that—I believe him. But when he speaks the truth about the human mind in general or specific terms, I recognize and approve it. From this it is clear that each person sees something in himself in such a way that another person can believe what he says about it but cannot see it directly. But another person sees something in the truth itself in such a way that another person can also look upon it. The former changes over time, while the latter exists in unchangeable eternity. For we do not acquire general or specific knowledge of the human mind through similarity by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes. Instead, we gaze upon indestructible truth, from which we can define perfectly, as far as we are able, not what sort of mind any particular person has, but what sort it ought to be according to the eternal plan.

9. But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love anything unchangeable: and each individual man declares his own particular mind by one manner of speech, when he considers what takes place in himself; but defines the human mind abstractly by special or general knowledge. And so, when he speaks to me of his own individual mind, as to whether he understands this or that, or does not understand it, or whether he wishes or does not wish this or that, I believe; but when he speaks the truth of the mind of man generally or specially, I recognize and approve. Whence it is manifest, that each sees a thing in himself, in such way that another person may believe what he says of it, yet may not see it; but another [sees a thing] in the truth itself, in such way that another person also can gaze upon it; of which the former undergoes changes at successive times, the latter consists in an unchangeable eternity. For we do not gather a generic or specific knowledge of the human mind by means of resemblance by seeing many minds with the eyes of the body: but we gaze upon indestructible truth, from which to define perfectly, as far as we can, not of what sort is the mind of any one particular man, but of what sort it ought to be upon the eternal plan.

Therefore, even in the case of images of physical things that are drawn in through our bodily senses and somehow infused into the memory—from which things we have not seen are also thought about under an imagined form, whether differently from how they really are or perhaps as they actually are—even here we are shown to accept or reject things within ourselves by other rules that remain completely unchangeable above our mind, whenever we approve or reject something correctly. For example, when I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and imagine for myself the walls of Alexandria which I have not seen, and in preferring one to the other among forms that in both cases are imaginary, I make that preference on rational grounds; the judgment of truth from above is still strong and clear, and rests firmly upon the utterly indestructible rules of its own rightness. And even if it is covered, so to speak, by the cloudiness of physical images, it is nevertheless not wrapped up and confused by them.

10. Whence also, even in the case of the images of things corporeal which are drawn in through the bodily sense, and in some way infused into the memory, from which also those things which have not been seen are thought under a fancied image, whether otherwise than they really are, or even perchance as they are — even here too, we are proved either to accept or reject, within ourselves, by other rules which remain altogether unchangeable above our mind, when we approve or reject anything rightly. For both when I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and imagine to myself the walls of Alexandria which I have not seen, and, in preferring this to that among forms which in both cases are imaginary, make that preference upon grounds of reason; the judgment of truth from above is still strong and clear, and rests firmly upon the utterly indestructible rules of its own right; and if it is covered as it were by cloudiness of corporeal images, yet is not wrapt up and confounded in them.

But it makes a difference whether I am shut off from the clear sky as if trapped in that darkness, or whether (as usually happens on high mountains) I enjoy the open air between both, looking up at once to the calmest light above and down to the densest clouds below. For why is the fire of brotherly love kindled in me when I hear that some man has endured bitter torments for the excellence and steadfastness of faith? And if that man is pointed out to me, I am eager to join myself to him, to become acquainted with him, to bind him to myself in friendship. And so, if opportunity offers, I approach him, I speak to him, I talk with him, I express my goodwill toward him in whatever words I can, and I wish that goodwill toward me might also be brought about and expressed in him in turn. I strive after a spiritual embrace through belief, since I cannot so quickly search out and fully discern his innermost heart. I therefore love the faithful and courageous man with a pure and genuine love. But if he were to confess to me in conversation, or were to show through carelessness in some way, that he either believes something unseemly about God and also desires something carnal in Him, and that he endured these torments on behalf of such an error, or from desire for money which he hoped for, or from empty greed for human praise, immediately the love with which I was carried toward him, now displeased and as it were repelled and taken away from an unworthy man, remains in that form according to which, believing him to be such as I did, I had loved him—unless perhaps I have come to love him to this end, that he may become such, when I have found that he is not in fact such. And in that man, nothing is changed, although it can be changed so that he may become what I had believed him already to be. But in my mind something is certainly changed, namely the estimate I had formed of him, which was previously of one sort and now is of another. And the same love, at the command from above of unchangeable righteousness, is turned aside from the purpose of enjoying to the purpose of seeking his correction. But the form itself of unshaken and stable truth, by which I should have enjoyed the man, believing him to be good, and by which I likewise seek counsel that he may be good, sheds in immovable eternity the same light of incorruptible and most sound reason, both upon the sight of my mind and upon that cloud of images which I discern from above when I think of the same man whom I had seen. Again, when I recall to my mind some arch, turned beautifully and symmetrically, which, let us say, I saw at Carthage, a certain reality that had been made known to the mind through the eyes and transferred to the memory causes the imaginary view. But I behold in my mind yet another thing, according to which that work of art pleases me, and from which also, if it displeased me, I should correct it. We judge therefore those particular things according to that form of eternal truth, and discern that form by the intuition of the rational mind. But those things themselves we either touch when present by the bodily sense, or when absent remember their images as fixed in our memory, or picture, in the way of likeness to them, such things as we ourselves also, if we wished and were able, would laboriously build up: figuring in the mind after one fashion the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body, but after another fashion, grasping by simple intelligence what is above the eye of the mind, namely the reasons and the unspeakably beautiful skill of such forms.

11. But it makes a difference, whether, under that or in that darkness, I am shut off as it were from the clear heaven; or whether (as usually happens on lofty mountains), enjoying the free air between both, I at once look up above to the calmest light, and down below upon the densest clouds. For whence is the ardor of brotherly love kindled in me, when I hear that some man has borne bitter torments for the excellence and steadfastness of faith? And if that man is shown to me with the finger, I am eager to join myself to him, to become acquainted with him, to bind him to myself in friendship. And accordingly, if opportunity offers, I draw near, I address him, I converse with him, I express my goodwill towards him in what words I can, and wish that in him too in turn should be brought to pass and expressed goodwill towards me; and I endeavor after a spiritual embrace in the way of belief, since I cannot search out so quickly and discern altogether his innermost heart. I love therefore the faithful and courageous man with a pure and genuine love. But if he were to confess to me in the course of conversation, or were through unguardedness to show in any way, that either he believes something unseemly of God, and desires also something carnal in Him, and that he bore these torments on behalf of such an error, or from the desire of money for which he hoped, or from empty greediness of human praise: immediately it follows that the love with which I was borne towards him, displeased, and as it were repelled, and taken away from an unworthy man, remains in that form, after which, believing him such as I did, I had loved him; unless perhaps I have come to love him to this end, that he may become such, while I have found him not to be such in fact. And in that man, too, nothing is changed: although it can be changed, so that he may become that which I had believed him to be already. But in my mind there certainly is something changed, viz., the estimate I had formed of him, which was before of one sort, and now is of another: and the same love, at the bidding from above of unchangeable righteousness, is turned aside from the purpose of enjoying, to the purpose of taking counsel. But the form itself of unshaken and stable truth, wherein I should have enjoyed the fruition of the man, believing him to be good, and wherein likewise I take counsel that he may be good, sheds in an immoveable eternity the same light of incorruptible and most sound reason, both upon the sight of my mind, and upon that cloud of images, which I discern from above, when I think of the same man whom I had seen. Again, when I call back to my mind some arch, turned beautifully and symmetrically, which, let us say, I saw at Carthage; a certain reality that had been made known to the mind through the eyes, and transferred to the memory, causes the imaginary view. But I behold in my mind yet another thing, according to which that work of art pleases me; and whence also, if it displeased me, I should correct it. We judge therefore of those particular things according to that [form of eternal truth], and discern that form by the intuition of the rational mind. But those things themselves we either touch if present by the bodily sense, or if absent remember their images as fixed in our memory, or picture, in the way of likeness to them, such things as we ourselves also, if we wished and were able, would laboriously build up: figuring in the mind after one fashion the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body; but after another, grasping by simple intelligence what is above the eye of the mind, viz., the reasons and the unspeakably beautiful skill of such forms.

Chapter 7.– We Conceive and Beget the Word Within, from the Things We Have Beheld in the Eternal Truth. The Word, Whether of the Creature or of the Creator, is Conceived by Love.

We behold with the mind's eye, in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, the form according to which we exist and according to which we do anything through true and right reason, whether in ourselves or in physical things. We possess true knowledge of things conceived from that eternal truth, like a word within us, and by speaking we bring it forth from within. Yet even when born forth, it does not leave us. When we speak to others, we employ the service of our voice or some physical sign alongside the word that remains within us, so that through a kind of sensory reminder, something similar may be produced in the mind of the one who hears—similar, I mean, to what does not depart from the mind of the one who speaks. Therefore, we do nothing through our bodily members in our words and actions, by which human conduct is either approved or condemned, that we have not first anticipated by a word uttered within ourselves. For no one willingly does anything that he has not first spoken in his heart.

12. We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason, either in ourselves, or in things corporeal; and we have the true knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we beget it from within; nor by being born does it depart from us. And when we speak to others, we apply to the word, remaining within us, the ministry of the voice or of some bodily sign, that by some kind of sensible remembrance some similar thing may be wrought also in the mind of him that hears — similar, I say, to that which does not depart from the mind of him that speaks. We do nothing, therefore, through the members of the body in our words and actions, by which the behavior of men is either approved or blamed, which we do not anticipate by a word uttered within ourselves. For no one willingly does anything, which he has not first said in his heart.

This word is conceived by love, whether of the creature or of the Creator—that is, whether by love of changeable nature or by love of unchangeable truth.

13. And this word is conceived by love, either of the creature or of the Creator, that is, either of changeable nature or of unchangeable truth.

Chapter 8.– In What Desire and Love Differ.

The word is therefore conceived either by desire or by love—not that the creature should not be loved at all, but if that love for the creature is directed back to the Creator, then it will not be desire (cupiditas) but love (charitas). For it is desire when the creature is loved for its own sake. And then it does not help a person by being used properly, but corrupts him by being enjoyed for itself. Therefore, when the creature is either equal to us or lower than us, we must use the lower one for the sake of God, but we must enjoy the equal one rightly in God. For just as you ought to enjoy yourself not in yourself but in Him who made you, so also should you enjoy the person whom you love as yourself. Let us therefore enjoy both ourselves and our brothers and sisters in the Lord, and let us not dare to give ourselves over and, so to speak, let ourselves slide downward toward ourselves. Now a word is born when, after being thought through, it pleases us either with the result of sinning or of doing what is right. Therefore love, acting as a kind of middle term, joins together our word and the mind from which it is conceived, and binds itself as a third element with them in an incorporeal embrace without any confusion.

[Conceived] therefore, either by desire or by love: not that the creature ought not to be loved; but if that love [of the creature] is referred to the Creator, then it will not be desire ( cupiditas), but love ( charitas). For it is desire when the creature is loved for itself. And then it does not help a man through making use of it, but corrupts him in the enjoying it. When, therefore, the creature is either equal to us or inferior, we must use the inferior in order to God, but we must enjoy the equal duly in God. For as you ought to enjoy yourself, not in yourself, but in Him who made you, so also him whom you love as yourself. Let us enjoy, therefore, both ourselves and our brethren in the Lord; and hence let us not dare to yield, and as it were to relax, ourselves to ourselves in the direction downwards. Now a word is born, when, being thought out, it pleases us either to the effect of sinning, or to that of doing right. Therefore love, as it were a mean, conjoins our word and the mind from which it is conceived, and without any confusion binds itself as a third with them, in an incorporeal embrace.

Chapter 9.– In the Love of Spiritual Things the Word Born is the Same as the Word Conceived. It is Otherwise in the Love of Carnal Things.

But the word conceived and the word born are the very same when the will finds rest in knowledge itself, as happens in the love of spiritual things. For instance, whoever knows righteousness perfectly and loves it perfectly is already righteous, even if no necessity exists to work it out externally through the bodily members. But in the love of carnal and temporal things, as in the offspring of animals, conceiving the word is one thing and bringing it forth is another. For here what is conceived through desire is born through attaining. Since it is not enough for greed to know and love gold unless it also possesses it, nor to know and love eating or lying with someone unless one actually does it, nor to know and love honors and power unless they actually happen. In fact, all these things, even when obtained, are not enough. Whoever drinks of this water, He says, will thirst again. And so also the Psalmist says, He has conceived pain and brought forth iniquity. And he speaks of pain or labor as conceived when those things are conceived which it is not sufficient merely to know and will, and when the mind burns and grows sick with longing until it arrives at those things and, as it were, brings them forth. Hence in the Latin language we have the word parta used elegantly for both reperta and comperta, which words sound as if derived from bringing forth. Since lust, when it has conceived, brings forth sin. Therefore the Lord proclaims, Come to me all you who labor and are heavy laden, and in another place, Woe to those who are with child and to those who give suck in those days! And so when He referred all either right actions or sins to the bringing forth of the word, By your words, He says, you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned, meaning by this not the visible mouth but the one that is within and invisible, of the thought and of the heart.

14. But the word conceived and the word born are the very same when the will finds rest in knowledge itself, as is the case in the love of spiritual things. For instance, he who knows righteousness perfectly, and loves it perfectly, is already righteous; even if no necessity exist of working according to it outwardly through the members of the body. But in the love of carnal and temporal things, as in the offspring of animals, the conception of the word is one thing, the bringing forth another. For here what is conceived by desiring is born by attaining. Since it does not suffice to avarice to know and to love gold, except it also have it; nor to know and love to eat, or to lie with any one, unless also one does it; nor to know and love honors and power, unless they actually come to pass. Nay, all these things, even if obtained, do not suffice. Whosoever drinks of this water, He says, shall thirst again. And so also the Psalmist, He has conceived pain and brought forth iniquity. And he speaks of pain or labor as conceived, when those things are conceived which it is not sufficient to know and will, and when the mind burns and grows sick with want, until it arrives at those things, and, as it were, brings them forth. Whence in the Latin language we have the word parta used elegantly for both reperta and comperta, which words sound as if derived from bringing forth. Since lust, when it has conceived, brings forth sin. Wherefore the Lord proclaims, Come unto me all you that labor and are heavy laden; and in another place Woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck, in those days! And when therefore He referred all either right actions or sins to the bringing forth of the word, By your mouth, He says, you shall be justified, and by your mouth you shall be condemned, intending thereby not the visible mouth, but that which is within and invisible, of the thought and of the heart.

Chapter 10.– Whether Only Knowledge that is Loved is the Word of the Mind.

It's rightly asked whether all knowledge is a word, or only knowledge that is loved. We also know things we hate, but what we don't like cannot be said to be conceived or brought forth by the mind. Not everything that touches the mind in some way is conceived by it; some things only reach the point of being known but are not spoken as words, like the things we're discussing now. The term "words" has different meanings: in one sense, words occupy spaces of time through their syllables, whether spoken or merely thought. In another sense, everything known is called a word imprinted on the mind, as long as it can be brought forth from memory and defined, even if we dislike the thing itself. In still another sense, we mean what we like that is conceived in the mind. What the apostle says must be understood according to this last kind of word: "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." Those also say this, but according to another meaning of the term word, of whom the Lord himself says, "Not every one that says unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven." Even with things we hate, when we rightly dislike and rightly censure them, we approve and like the censure given to them, and it becomes a word. It's not the knowledge of vices that displeases us, but the vices themselves. I like to know and define what intemperance is, and this is its word. Just as there are known faults in art, and knowledge of them is rightly approved when an expert discerns the presence or absence of excellence, affirming or denying whether it exists or not—yet lacking excellence and falling into fault is worthy of condemnation. Defining intemperance and stating its word belongs to the art of morals, but being intemperate belongs to what that art censures. Just as knowing and defining what a solecism is belongs to the art of speaking, but committing one is a fault that the same art condemns. A word, then, which is what we now want to discern and explain, is knowledge together with love. Whenever the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. Since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in the one who loves and speaks.

15. It is rightly asked then, whether all knowledge is a word, or only knowledge that is loved. For we also know the things which we hate; but what we do not like, cannot be said to be either conceived or brought forth by the mind. For not all things which in anyway touch it, are conceived by it; but some only reach the point of being known, but yet are not spoken as words, as for instance those of which we speak now. For those are called words in one way, which occupy spaces of time by their syllables, whether they are pronounced or only thought; and in another way, all that is known is called a word imprinted on the mind, as long as it can be brought forth from the memory and defined, even though we dislike the thing itself; and in another way still, when we like that which is conceived in the mind. And that which the apostle says, must be taken according to this last kind of word, No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost; since those also say this, but according to another meaning of the term word, of whom the Lord Himself says, Not every one that says unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. Nay, even in the case of things which we hate, when we rightly dislike and rightly censure them, we approve and like the censure bestowed upon them, and it becomes a word. Nor is it the knowledge of vices that displeases us, but the vices themselves. For I like to know and define what intemperance is; and this is its word. Just as there are known faults in art, and the knowledge of them is rightly approved, when a connoisseur discerns the species or the privation of excellence, as to affirm and deny that it is or that it is not; yet to be without excellence and to fall away into fault, is worthy of condemnation. And to define intemperance, and to say its word, belongs to the art of morals; but to be intemperate belongs to that which that art censures. Just as to know and define what a solecism is, belongs to the art of speaking; but to be guilty of one, is a fault which the same art reprehends. A word, then, which is the point we wish now to discern and intimate, is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks.

Chapter 11.– That the Image or Begotten Word of the Mind that Knows Itself is Equal to the Mind Itself.

All knowledge of something in its species (positive form) is like the thing it knows. There is another kind of knowledge based on privation (absence or lack), which we use when we condemn something. Condemning a privation amounts to praising the species, and so it is approved. The mind, then, contains some likeness to a known species, whether when it likes that species or when it dislikes its privation. Therefore, when we know God, we are like Him, but not to the point of equality, since we do not know Him to the extent that He actually exists. When we perceive bodies through bodily sense, a likeness of them arises in our mind, which is a mental image in the memory. The bodies themselves are not actually in the mind when we think of them, but only their likenesses. When we mistake the latter for the former, we make an error, since approving one thing as if it were another is a mistake. Yet the image of the body in the mind is something better than the bodily species itself, because it exists in a better nature—in a living substance, which the mind is. Similarly, when we know God, although we become better than we were before knowing Him, and especially when that same knowledge is also loved and becomes a word, so that this knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God, still that knowledge is of a lower kind because it exists in a lower nature—the mind is a creature, but God is Creator. From this we can infer that when the mind knows and approves itself, this same knowledge is its word in such a way that it is completely on equal terms with it, because it is neither knowledge of a lower essence, like a body, nor of a higher essence, like God. Since knowledge bears a likeness to what it knows, that is, to what it is knowledge of, in this case it has a perfect and equal likeness when the mind itself that knows is what is known. Therefore it is both image and word, because it is expressed in relation to the mind with which it is equal in knowing, and what is begotten is equal to the begetter.

16. But all knowledge according to species is like the thing which it knows. For there is another knowledge according to privation, according to which we speak a word only when we condemn. And this condemnation of a privation is equivalent to praise of the species, and so is approved. The mind, then, contains some likeness to a known species, whether when liking that species or when disliking its privation. And hence, in so far as we know God, we are like Him, but not like to the point of equality, since we do not know Him to the extent of His own being. And as, when we speak of bodies by means of the bodily sense, there arises in our mind some likeness of them, which is a phantasm of the memory; for the bodies themselves are not at all in the mind, when we think them, but only the likenesses of those bodies; therefore, when we approve the latter for the former, we err, for the approving of one thing for another is an error; yet the image of the body in the mind is a thing of a better sort than the species of the body itself, inasmuch as the former is in a better nature, viz. in a living substance, as the mind is: so when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew Him, and above all when the same knowledge being also liked and worthily loved becomes a word, and so that knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God; yet that knowledge is of a lower kind, since it is in a lower nature; for the mind is creature, but God is Creator. And from this it may be inferred, that when the mind knows and approves itself, this same knowledge is in such way its word, as that it is altogether on a par and equal with it, and the same; because it is neither the knowledge of a lower essence, as of the body, nor of a higher, as of God. And whereas knowledge bears a likeness to that which it knows, that is, of which it is the knowledge; in this case it has perfect and equal likeness, when the mind itself, which knows, is known. And so it is both image and word; because it is uttered concerning that mind to which it is equalled in knowing, and that which is begotten is equal to the begetter.

Chapter 12.– Why Love is Not the Offspring of the Mind, as Knowledge is So. The Solution of the Question. The Mind with the Knowledge of Itself and the Love of Itself is the Image of the Trinity.

What then is love? Is it not an image? Is it not a word? Is it not begotten? If the mind begets its knowledge when it knows itself, why does it not beget its love when it loves itself? If the mind causes its own knowing because it is knowable, then it also causes its own love because it is lovable. It is difficult, then, to explain why it does not beget both. There is also a further question concerning the supreme Trinity itself, the omnipotent God the Creator, in whose image man is made, which troubles people whom the truth of God invites to faith through human speech: why is the Holy Spirit not to be believed or understood as begotten by God the Father, so that He too might be called a Son? We are trying to investigate this question in some way through the human mind, so that from this lower image, in which our own nature answers when questioned in a way more familiar to us, we may be able to direct a more practiced mental vision from the enlightened creature to the unchangeable light. However, we assume that the truth itself has convinced us that just as no Christian doubts the Word of God is the Son, so the Holy Spirit is love. Let us return, then, to a more careful questioning and examination of this subject using that image which is the creature, that is, the rational mind. In the mind, knowledge of some things comes into existence in time that did not exist before, and love of some things arises that were not loved before. This opens to us more clearly what to say, because that which is grasped in the order of time is easier to explain in speech itself, which must also be arranged in time.

17. What then is love? Will it not be an image? Will it not be a word? Will it not be begotten? For why does the mind beget its knowledge when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves itself? For if it is the cause of its own knowing, for the reason that it is knowable, it is also the cause of its own love because it is lovable. It is hard, then, to say why it does not beget both. For there is a further question also respecting the supreme Trinity itself, the omnipotent God the Creator, after whose image man is made, which troubles men, whom the truth of God invites to the faith by human speech; viz. why the Holy Spirit is not also to be either believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that He also may be called a Son. And this question we are endeavoring in some way to investigate in the human mind, in order that from a lower image, in which our own nature itself as it were answers, upon being questioned, in a way more familiar to ourselves, we may be able to direct a more practised mental vision from the enlightened creature to the unchangeable light; assuming, however, that the truth itself has persuaded us, that as no Christian doubts the Word of God to be the Son, so that the Holy Spirit is love. Let us return, then, to a more careful questioning and consideration upon this subject of that image which is the creature, that is, of the rational mind; wherein the knowledge of some things coming into existence in time, but which did not exist before, and the love of some things which were not loved before, opens to us more clearly what to say: because to speech also itself, which must be disposed in time, that thing is easier of explanation which is comprehended in the order of time.

First, it is clear that something may be knowable—that is, able to be known—and yet remain unknown. But it is impossible for something to be known if it is not knowable. Therefore, we must clearly maintain that everything we know simultaneously begets knowledge of itself within us, for knowledge is produced from both the knower and the thing known. When the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its own knowledge, since it is both the thing known and the one who knows it. But the mind was knowable to itself even before it knew itself; only the knowledge of itself did not exist within it as long as it did not know itself. In knowing itself, then, it begets knowledge of itself equal to itself, since it does not know itself as less than it is, nor is its knowledge the knowledge of someone else's essence. This is true not only because it knows, but because it knows itself, as we said above. What then should be said about love? Why, when the mind loves itself, should it not also seem to have begotten its love of itself? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved itself, since it was able to love itself, just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, since it could know itself. For if it were not knowable to itself, it could never have known itself; and likewise, if it were not lovable to itself, it could never have loved itself. Why then can we not say that by loving itself it has begotten its own love, just as by knowing itself it has begotten its own knowledge? The reason is this: it is clearly shown that this is the source of love, from which it proceeds. For it proceeds from the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and so is the source of its own love by which it loves itself. But this love is not properly said to be begotten by the mind, as knowledge of itself is begotten when the mind knows itself, because in the case of knowledge, the thing has been found, which is what we call brought forth or discovered, and this is commonly preceded by a search that finds rest when its goal is reached. For inquiry is the desire to find or discover. But those things which are discovered are, as it were, brought forth, and so they are like offspring. And how are they offspring except in knowledge itself? For in knowledge they are, as it were, spoken and formed. Although the things we found by seeking already existed, the knowledge of them did not exist, and we regard this knowledge as an offspring that is born. Furthermore, the desire (appetitus) involved in seeking proceeds from the one who seeks and is somehow suspended, and does not rest in its goal except when what is sought is found and joined with the seeker. And this desire, that is, inquiry—although it does not seem to be the love by which what is known is loved, since in this case we are still trying to know—is nevertheless something of the same kind. For it can be called will (voluntas), since everyone who seeks wills (vult) to find; and if what is sought belongs to knowledge, everyone who seeks wills to know. And if someone wills ardently and earnestly, he is said to study (studere), a word most commonly used for pursuing and obtaining learning. Therefore, the bringing forth of the mind is preceded by a certain desire by which, through seeking and finding what we wish to know, the offspring, namely knowledge itself, is born. For this reason, that desire by which knowledge is conceived and brought forth cannot properly be called the bringing forth and the offspring itself. The same desire that led us to long for knowing the thing becomes love of the thing when known, as it holds and embraces its received offspring, that is, knowledge, and unites it to its begetter. And so there is a kind of image of the Trinity in the mind itself, along with the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one and one substance. Neither is the offspring less, since the mind knows itself according to the measure of its own being; nor is the love less, since it loves itself according to the measure both of its own knowledge and of its own being.

18. First, therefore, it is clear that a thing may possibly be knowable, that is, such as can be known, and yet that it may be unknown; but that it is not possible for that to be known which is not knowable. Wherefore it must be clearly held that everything whatsoever that we know begets at the same time in us the knowledge of itself; for knowledge is brought forth from both, from the knower and from the thing known. When, therefore, the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its own knowledge; for it is itself both the thing known and the knower of it. But it was knowable to itself also before it knew itself, only the knowledge of itself was not in itself so long as it did not know itself. In knowing itself, then, it begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself; since it does not know itself as less than itself is, nor is its knowledge the knowledge of the essence of some one else, not only because itself knows, but also because it knows itself, as we have said above. What then is to be said of love; why, when the mind loves itself, it should not seem also to have begotten the love of itself? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved itself since it could love itself; just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, since it could know itself. For if it were not knowable to itself, it never could have known itself; and so, if it were not lovable to itself, it never could have loved itself. Why therefore may it not be said by loving itself to have begotten its own love, as by knowing itself it has begotten its own knowledge? Is it because it is thereby indeed plainly shown that this is the principle of love, whence it proceeds? For it proceeds from the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and so is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself: but that this love is not therefore rightly said to be begotten by the mind, as is the knowledge of itself by which the mind knows itself, because in the case of knowledge the thing has been found already, which is what we call brought forth or discovered; and this is commonly preceded by an inquiry such as to find rest when that end is attained. For inquiry is the desire of finding, or, what is the same thing, of discovering. But those things which are discovered are as it were brought forth, whence they are like offspring; but wherein, except in the case itself of knowledge? For in that case they are as it were uttered and fashioned. For although the things existed already which we found by seeking, yet the knowledge of them did not exist, which knowledge we regard as an offspring that is born. Further, the desire ( appetitus) which there is in seeking proceeds from him who seeks, and is in some way in suspense, and does not rest in the end whither it is directed, except that which is sought be found and conjoined with him who seeks. And this desire, that is, inquiry — although it does not seem to be love, by which that which is known is loved, for in this case we are still striving to know — yet it is something of the same kind. For it can be called will ( voluntas),since every one who seeks wills ( vult) to find; and if that is sought which belongs to knowledge, every one who seeks wills to know. But if he wills ardently and earnestly, he is said to study ( studere): a word that is most commonly employed in the case of pursuing and obtaining any branches of learning. Therefore, the bringing forth of the mind is preceded by some desire, by which, through seeking and finding what we wish to know, the offspring, viz. knowledge itself, is born. And for this reason, that desire by which knowledge is conceived and brought forth, cannot rightly be called the bringing forth and the offspring; and the same desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known, while it holds and embraces its accepted offspring, that is, knowledge, and unites it to its begetter. And so there is a kind of image of the Trinity in the mind itself, and the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one, and one substance. Neither is the offspring less, since the mind knows itself according to the measure of its own being; nor is the love less, since it loves itself according to the measure both of its own knowledge and of its own being.