Author: Mourad Takla

It might seem beneath our dignity to respond at all to foolish statements. Solomon's wise counsel seems to point us in that direction—not to answer a fool according to his folly. But there is a danger that our silence could allow error to triumph over truth, and this festering wound of heresy might spread and destroy the sound teaching of the faith. Therefore, it has seemed necessary to me to respond—not by matching the folly of these men who raise such objections to our religion, but to correct their distorted ideas. For I believe that passage from Proverbs is not calling for silence, but for correcting those who are acting foolishly. Our answers should not sink to the level of their foolish thinking, but rather should overturn these thoughtless and misguided views about doctrine.

It may indeed be undignified to give any answer at all to the statements that are foolish; we seem to be pointed that way by Solomon's wise advice, not to answer a fool according to his folly. But there is a danger lest through our silence error may prevail over the truth, and so the rotting sore of this heresy may invade it, and make havoc of the sound word of the faith. It has appeared to me, therefore, to be imperative to answer, not indeed according to the folly of these men who offer objections of such a description to our Religion, but for the correction of their depraved ideas. For that advice quoted above from the Proverbs gives, I think, the watchword not for silence, but for the correction of those who are displaying some act of folly; our answers, that is, are not to run on the level of their foolish conceptions, but rather to overturn those unthinking and deluded views as to doctrine.

What then is the charge they bring against us? They accuse us of blasphemy for holding exalted beliefs about the Holy Spirit. Everything that we confess about the Spirit, following the teachings of the Fathers, they twist to their own meaning and use as a weapon against us to denounce us for blasphemy. For instance, we confess that the Holy Spirit is of the same rank as the Father and the Son, so that there is no difference between them in anything—whether thought or spoken—that reverence can attribute to a divine nature. We confess that, except for being understood as having distinctive characteristics in regard to his hypostasis, the Holy Spirit is indeed from God and from Christ, according to Scripture. But while he is not to be confused with the Father in being unbegotten, nor with the Son in being the Only-begotten, and while he is to be regarded separately in certain distinctive properties, he has in all other respects, as I have just said, an exact identity with them. But our opponents claim that he is a stranger to any vital communion with the Father and the Son; that because of an essential difference he is inferior to and less than they in every respect—in power, in glory, in dignity, in short in everything that in word or thought we ascribe to deity; that, as a result, he has no share in their glory and no claim to equal honor with them; and that, as for power, he possesses only as much as is sufficient for the limited activities assigned to him; that he is completely disconnected from the creative power.

What then is the charge they bring against us? They accuse us of profanity for entertaining lofty conceptions about the Holy Spirit. All that we, in following the teachings of the Fathers, confess as to the Spirit, they take in a sense of their own, and make it a handle against us, to denounce us for profanity. We, for instance, confess that the Holy Spirit is of the same rank as the Father and the Son, so that there is no difference between them in anything, to be thought or named, that devotion can ascribe to a Divine nature. We confess that, save His being contemplated as with peculiar attributes in regard of Person, the Holy Spirit is indeed from God, and of the Christ, according to Scripture, but that, while not to be confounded with the Father in being never originated, nor with the Son in being the Only-begotten, and while to be regarded separately in certain distinctive properties, He has in all else, as I have just said, an exact identity with them. But our opponents aver that He is a stranger to any vital communion with the Father and the Son; that by reason of an essential variation He is inferior to, and less than they in every point; in power, in glory, in dignity, in fine in everything that in word or thought we ascribe to Deity; that, in consequence, in their glory He has no share, to equal honour with them He has no claim; and that, as for power, He possesses only so much of it as is sufficient for the partial activities assigned to Him; that with the creative force He is quite disconnected.

Such is their conception of Him, and the logical consequence is that the Spirit has in Himself none of those marks that our devotion, in word or thought, attributes to a Divine nature. What then will be our way of arguing? We will answer nothing new, nothing of our own invention, even though they challenge us to do so. We will fall back on the testimony in Holy Scripture about the Spirit, from which we learn that the Holy Spirit is Divine and is to be called so. Now, if they allow this and will not contradict the words of inspiration, then they, with all their eagerness to fight with us, must tell us why they are contending with us instead of with Scripture. We say nothing different from what Scripture says. But in a Divine nature as such, once we have believed in it, we can recognize no distinctions suggested either by Scripture's teaching or by our own common sense—distinctions, that is, that would divide that Divine and transcendent nature within itself by any degrees of intensity and remission, so as to be altered from itself by being more or less. Because we firmly believe that it is simple, uniform, and incomposite, because we see in it no complicity or composition of dissimilar elements, therefore it is that, once our minds have grasped the idea of Deity, we accept by the very implication of that name the perfection in it of every conceivable thing that befits the Deity. Deity, in fact, exhibits perfection in every line in which the good can be found. If it fails and falls short of perfection in any single point, in that point the conception of Deity will be impaired, so that it cannot in that respect be or be called Deity at all. For how could we apply that word to a thing that is imperfect and deficient and requiring an addition external to itself?

Such is the conception of Him that possesses them; and the logical consequence of it is that the Spirit has in Himself none of those marks which our devotion, in word or thought, ascribes to a Divine nature. What then, shall be our way of arguing? We shall answer nothing new, nothing of our own invention, though they challenge us to it; we shall fall back upon the testimony in Holy Scripture about the Spirit, whence we learn that the Holy Spirit is Divine, and is to be called so. Now, if they allow this, and will not contradict the words of inspiration, then they, with all their eagerness to fight with us, must tell us why they are for contending with us, instead of with Scripture. We say nothing different from that which Scripture says.– But in a Divine nature, as such, when once we have believed in it, we can recognize no distinctions suggested either by the Scripture teaching or by our own common sense; distinctions, that is, that would divide that Divine and transcendent nature within itself by any degrees of intensity and remission, so as to be altered from itself by being more or less. Because we firmly believe that it is simple, uniform, incomposite, because we see in it no complicity or composition of dissimilars, therefore it is that, when once our minds have grasped the idea of Deity, we accept by the implication of that very name the perfection in it of every conceivable thing that befits the Deity. Deity, in fact, exhibits perfection in every line in which the good can be found. If it fails and comes short of perfection in any single point, in that point the conception of Deity will be impaired, so that it cannot, therein, be or be called Deity at all; for how could we apply that word to a thing that is imperfect and deficient, and requiring an addition external to itself?

We can confirm our argument by material examples. Fire naturally gives off a sense of heat to those who touch it, in all its component parts. One part of it does not have heat that is more intense, another part less intense. As long as it is fire at all, it displays an unchanging oneness with itself in an absolutely complete sameness of activity. If any part of it gets cooled at all, that part can no longer be called fire. When its heat-giving activity changes into the reverse, its name also changes. The same holds for water, for air, for every element that makes up the universe. There is one and the same description of each element, admitting no ideas of excess or defect. Water, for instance, cannot be called more or less water. As long as it maintains an equal standard of wetness, the term water applies to it. But once it changes in the direction of the opposite quality, the name applied to it must also change. The yielding, buoyant, nimble nature of air is seen in every part of it, while what is dense, heavy, and downward gravitating sinks out of the very meaning of the term air. So Deity, as long as it possesses perfection throughout all the properties that devotion may attach to it, by virtue of this perfection in everything good does not betray its name. But if any one of those things that contribute to this idea of perfection is subtracted from it, the name of Deity is falsified in that particular case and no longer applies to the subject. It is equally impossible to apply the name of water to a dry substance, the name of fire to something whose quality is a state of coolness, the name of air to stiff and hard things, and to call that thing Divine which does not at once imply the idea of perfection—or rather the impossibility is even greater in this last case.

We can confirm our argument by material instances. Fire naturally imparts the sense of heat to those who touch it, with all its component parts; one part of it does not have the heat more intense, the other less intense; but as long as it is fire at all, it exhibits an invariable oneness with itself in an absolutely complete sameness of activity; if in any part it gets cooled at all, in that part it can no longer be called fire; for, with the change of its heat-giving activity into the reverse, its name also is changed. It is the same with water, with air, with every element that underlies the universe; there is one and the same description of the element, in each case, admitting of no ideas of excess or defect; water, for instance, cannot be called more or less water; as long as it maintains an equal standard of wetness, so long the term water will be realized by it; but when once it is changed in the direction of the opposite quality the name to be applied to it must be changed also. The yielding, buoyant, nimble nature of the air, too, is to be seen in every part of it; while what is dense, heavy, downward gravitating, sinks out of the connotation of the very term air. So Deity, as long as it possesses perfection throughout all the properties that devotion may attach to it, by virtue of this perfection in everything good does not belie its name; but if any one of those things that contribute to this idea of perfection is subtracted from it, the name of Deity is falsified in that particular, and does not apply to the subject any longer. It is equally impossible to apply to a dry substance the name of water, to that whose quality is a state of coolness the name of fire, to stiff and hard things the name of air, and to call that thing Divine which does not at once imply the idea of perfection; or rather the impossibility is greater in this last case.

If, then, the Holy Spirit is truly—and not merely in name—called Divine both by Scripture and by our Fathers, what basis remains for those who oppose the glory of the Spirit? He is Divine, and absolutely good, and omnipotent, and wise, and glorious, and eternal. He is everything of this kind that can be named to lift our thoughts to the greatness of His being. The fact that a single subject possesses all these qualities testifies that He does not possess them only partially, as if we could imagine that He was one thing in His very substance but became something else through the presence of these qualities. That condition belongs only to beings who have been given a composite nature, whereas the Holy Spirit is single and simple in every respect equally. Everyone agrees with this; no one denies it. If, then, there is only one simple and single definition of His being, the goodness He possesses is not something acquired. Rather, whatever else He may be, He is Himself Goodness, and Wisdom, and Power, and Sanctification, and Righteousness, and Everlastingness, and Imperishability, and every name that is lofty and elevated above other names. What, then, is the state of mind that leads these men—who do not fear the fearful sentence passed upon blasphemy against the Holy Spirit—to maintain that such a Being does not possess glory? For they clearly put forward that statement: that we ought not to believe that He should be glorified, though I do not know for what reason they judge it fitting not to confess the true nature of that which is essentially glorious.

If, then, the Holy Spirit is truly, and not in name only, called Divine both by Scripture and by our Fathers, what ground is left for those who oppose the glory of the Spirit? He is Divine, and absolutely good, and Omnipotent, and wise, and glorious, and eternal; He is everything of this kind that can be named to raise our thoughts to the grandeur of His being. The singleness of the subject of these properties testifies that He does not possess them in a measure only, as if we could imagine that He was one thing in His very substance, but became another by the presence of the aforesaid qualities. That condition is peculiar to those beings who have been given a composite nature; whereas the Holy Spirit is single and simple in every respect equally. This is allowed by all; the man who denies it does not exist. If, then, there is but one simple and single definition of His being, the good which He possesses is not an acquired good; but, whatever He may be besides, He is Himself Goodness, and Wisdom, and Power, and Sanctification, and Righteousness, and Everlastingness, and Imperishability, and every name that is lofty, and elevating above other names. What, then, is the state of mind that leads these men, who do not fear the fearful sentence passed upon the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, to maintain that such a Being does not possess glory? For they clearly put that statement forward; that we ought not to believe that He should be glorified: though I know not for what reason they judge it to be expedient not to confess the true nature of that which is essentially glorious.

For the plea will not help them in their defense that the Spirit is delivered by our Lord to His disciples third in order, and that therefore He is removed from our understanding of Deity. Where in each case the activity in working good shows no diminution or variation whatever, how unreasonable it is to suppose that numerical order is a sign of any diminution or essential variation! It is as if someone were to see a separate flame burning on three torches (and let us suppose that the third flame is caused by the first being transmitted to the middle, and then kindling the end torch), and were to insist that the heat in the first exceeded that of the others; that the one next to it showed a variation from it in the direction of being less; and that the third could not be called fire at all, though it burned and shone just like fire, and did everything that fire does. But if there is really no obstacle to the third torch being fire, though it has been kindled from a previous flame, what is the reasoning of these men, who impiously think that they can dismiss the dignity of the Holy Spirit because He is named by the Divine lips after the Father and the Son? Certainly, if there is in our conceptions of the ousia of the Spirit anything that falls short of the Divine ideal, they do well in testifying to His not possessing glory; but if the highness of His dignity is to be perceived in every point, why do they refuse to make the confession of His glory? It is as if anyone after describing someone as a man, were to consider it not safe to go on to say of him as well that he is reasoning, mortal, or anything else that can be predicated of a man, and so were to cancel what he had just allowed; for if he is not reasoning, he is not a man at all; but if the latter is granted, how can there be any hesitation about the conceptions already implied in man? So, with regard to the Spirit, if when one calls Him Divine one speaks the truth, neither when one defines Him to be worthy of honor, to be glorious, good, omnipotent, does one lie; for all such conceptions are at once admitted with the idea of Deity. So they must accept one of two alternatives: either not to call Him Divine at all, or to refrain from subtracting from His Deity any one of those conceptions which are attributable to Deity. We must then, most surely, comprehend along with each other these two thoughts: the Divine nature, and along with it a just idea, a devout intuition, of that Divine and transcendent nature.

For the plea will not avail them in their self-defense, that He is delivered by our Lord to His disciples third in order, and that therefore He is estranged from our ideal of Deity. Where in each case activity in working good shows no diminution or variation whatever, how unreasonable it is to suppose the numerical order to be a sign of any diminution or essential variation! It is as if a man were to see a separate flame burning on three torches (and we will suppose that the third flame is caused by that of the first being transmitted to the middle, and then kindling the end torch), and were to maintain that the heat in the first exceeded that of the others; that that next it showed a variation from it in the direction of the less; and that the third could not be called fire at all, though it burnt and shone just like fire, and did everything that fire does. But if there is really no hindrance to the third torch being fire, though it has been kindled from a previous flame, what is the philosophy of these men, who profanely think that they can slight the dignity of the Holy Spirit because He is named by the Divine lips after the Father and the Son? Certainly, if there is in our conceptions of the Substance of the Spirit anything that falls short of the Divine ideal, they do well in testifying to His not possessing glory; but if the highness of His dignity is to be perceived in every point, why do they grudge to make the confession of His glory? As if any one after describing some one as a man, were to consider it not safe to go on to say of him as well that he is reasoning, mortal, or anything else that can be predicated of a man, and so were to cancel what he had just allowed; for if he is not reasoning, he is not a man at all; but if the latter is granted, how can there be any hesitation about the conceptions already implied in man? So, with regard to the Spirit, if when one calls Him Divine one speaks the truth, neither when one defines Him to be worthy of honour, to be glorious, good, omnipotent, does one lie; for all such conceptions are at once admitted with the idea of Deity. So that they must accept one of two alternatives; either not to call Him Divine at all, or to refrain from subtracting from His Deity any one of those conceptions which are attributable to Deity. We must then, most surely, comprehend along with each other these two thoughts, viz. the Divine nature, and along with it a just idea, a devout intuition, of that Divine and transcendent nature.

Since it has been affirmed—and truly affirmed—that the Spirit is of the Divine Essence, and since in that one word "Divine" every idea of greatness, as we have said, is included, it follows that whoever grants that Divinity has implicitly granted all the rest: the glory, the omnipotence, everything that indicates superiority. It is indeed monstrous to refuse to confess this in the case of the Spirit—monstrous because of how inappropriate it would be to apply to Him the terms that stand opposite to the ones above. I mean, if one does not grant glory, one must grant the absence of glory; if one sets aside His power, one must accept its opposite. The same applies to honor, goodness, and any other superiority—if they are not accepted, their opposites must be conceded.

Since, then, it has been affirmed, and truly affirmed, that the Spirit is of the Divine Essence, and since in that one word Divine every idea of greatness, as we have said, is involved, it follows that he who grants that Divinity has potentially granted all the rest — the gloriousness, the omnipotence, everything indicative of superiority. It is indeed a monstrous thing to refuse to confess this in the case of the Spirit; monstrous, because of the incongruity, as applied to Him, of the terms which in the list of opposites correspond to the above terms. I mean, if one does not grant gloriousness, one must grant the absence of gloriousness; if one sets aside His power, one must acquiesce in its opposite. So also with regard to honour, and goodness, and any other superiority, if they are not accepted, their opposites must be conceded.

But if everyone must shrink from that, as it goes even beyond the most revolting blasphemy, then a devout mind must accept the nobler names and conceptions of the Holy Spirit, and must declare concerning Him everything we have already named: that He has honor, power, glory, goodness, and everything else that inspires devotion. We must also acknowledge that these realities do not attach to Him in any imperfect way or with any limit to the quality of their brilliance, but rather they correspond with their names to infinity. He is not to be regarded as possessing dignity up to a certain point and then becoming different; instead, He is always such. Whether you begin to count back before the ages, or whether you fix your gaze on the Hereafter, you will find no falling off whatever in dignity, or glory, or omnipotence—nothing that would make Him capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction. Being wholly and entirely perfect, He admits diminution in nothing. In whatever respect, on such a supposition as theirs, He is lessened, in that respect He will be exposed to the invasion of ideas tending to dishonor Him. For that which is not absolutely perfect must be suspected on some point of partaking of the opposite character. But if even entertaining the thought of this is a sign of extreme derangement of mind, it is right to confess our belief that His perfection in all that is good is altogether unlimited, uncircumscribed, and in no particular diminished.

But if all must shrink from that, as going even beyond the most revolting blasphemy, then a devout mind must accept the nobler names and conceptions of the Holy Spirit, and must pronounce concerning Him all that we have already named, that He has honour, power, glory, goodness, and everything else that inspires devotion. It must own, too, that these realities do not attach to Him in imperfection or with any limit to the quality of their brilliance, but that they correspond with their names to infinity. He is not to be regarded as possessing dignity up to a certain point, and then becoming different; but He is always such. If you begin to count behind the ages, or if you fix your gaze on the Hereafter, you will find no falling off whatever in dignity, or glory, or omnipotence, such as to constitute Him capable of increase by addition, or of diminution by subtraction. Being wholly and entirely perfect, He admits diminution in nothing. Whereinsoever, on such a supposition as theirs, He is lessened, therein He will be exposed to the inroad of ideas tending to dishonour Him. For that which is not absolutely perfect must be suspected on some one point of partaking of the opposite character. But if to entertain even the thought of this is a sign of extreme derangement of mind, it is well to confess our belief that His perfection in all that is good is altogether unlimited, uncircumscribed, in no particular diminished.

If this is what the doctrine teaches when fully developed, we should apply the same inquiry to the Son and the Father as well. Don't you acknowledge a perfection of glory in one just as in the other? I think everyone who considers this will agree. If the honor of the Father is perfect, and the honor of the Son is perfect, and they have also confessed the perfection of honor for the Holy Spirit, why do these new teachers insist that we must not allow Him equal honor with the Father and the Son? As for us, we follow this reasoning and find ourselves unable to think or say that what needs no addition for its perfection is somehow less dignified when compared to something else. When we have something in which, because of its flawless perfection, reason can find no possibility of increase, I don't see how it can find any possibility of decrease either. But these people, in denying equality of honor, are really asserting a comparative lack of it. And when they follow this same line of thinking further, through diminishment arising from comparison they undermine all the concepts that devotion has formed about the Holy Spirit. They refuse to acknowledge His perfection in goodness, omnipotence, or any such attribute. But if they shrink from such open blasphemy and admit His perfection in every good attribute, then these clever people must explain to us how one perfect thing can be more perfect or less perfect than another perfect thing. As long as the definition of perfection applies to something, that thing cannot admit of greater or lesser degrees of perfection.

If such is the doctrine concerning Him when followed out, let the same inquiry be made concerning the Son and the Father as well. Do you not confess a perfection of glory in the case of the one as in the case of the other? I think that all who reflect will allow it. If, then, the honour of the Father is perfect, and the honour of the Son is perfect, and they have confessed as well the perfection of honour for the Holy Spirit, wherefore do these new theorists dictate to us that we are not to allow in His case an equality of honour with the Father and the Son? As for ourselves, we follow out the above considerations and find ourselves unable to think, as well as to say, that that which requires no addition for its perfection is, as compared with something else, less dignified; for when we have something wherein, owing to its faultless perfection, reason can discover no possibility of increase, I do not see either wherein it can discover any possibility of diminution. But these men, in denying the equality of honour, really lay down the comparative absence of it; and so also when they follow out further this same line of thought, by a diminution arising from comparison they divert all the conceptions that devotion has formed of the Holy Spirit; they do not own His perfection either in goodness, or omnipotence, or in any such attribute. But if they shrink from such open profanity and allow His perfection in every attribute of good, then these clever people must tell us how one perfect thing can be more perfect or less perfect than another perfect thing; for so long as the definition of perfection applies to it, that thing can not admit of a greater and a less in the matter of perfection.

If they agree that the Holy Spirit is absolutely perfect, and if they have also admitted that true reverence requires perfection in every good thing for both the Father and the Son, what reasons can justify them in taking away the Father once they have granted Him? For to remove equality of dignity with the Father is clear proof that they do not believe the Spirit shares in the Father's perfection. And regarding this very idea of honor in the case of the Divine Being, from which they would exclude the Spirit, what do they mean by it? Do they mean the honor that people give to other people, when through words and gestures they show respect to them, expressing their own deference through giving precedence and all such practices, which in the foolish fashion of the day are maintained in the name of honor? But all these things depend on the goodwill of those who perform them. And if we imagine a situation in which they choose not to perform them, then no one among mankind has by nature any advantage that would make them necessarily more honored than anyone else, for all are marked equally with the same natural characteristics. The truth of this is clear and admits no doubt. We see, for instance, that the person who today is considered an object of honor by the crowd because of the office he holds becomes tomorrow one of those who give honor to others, once the office has been transferred to someone else. Do they then think of honor like this in the case of the Divine Being, so that as long as we choose to give it, that Divine honor remains, but when we stop doing so it also stops at the command of our will? Absurd idea, and blasphemous as well! The Deity, being independent of us, does not increase in honor. He is always the same. He cannot move into a better or worse state, for He has nothing better, and admits nothing worse.

If, then, they agree that the Holy Spirit is perfect absolutely, and it has been admitted in addition that true reverence requires perfection in every good thing for the Father and the Son as well, what reasons can justify them in taking away the Father when once they have granted Him? For to take away equality of dignity with the Father is a sure proof that they do not think that the Spirit has a share in the perfection of the Father. And as regards the idea itself of this honour in the case of the Divine Being, from which they would exclude the Spirit, what do they mean by it? Do they mean that honour which men confer on men, when by word and gesture they pay respect to them, signifying their own deference in the form of precedence and all such-like practices, which in the foolish fashion of the day are kept up in the name of honour. But all these things depend on the goodwill of those who perform them; and if we suppose a case in which they do not choose to perform them, then there is no one among mankind who has from mere nature any advantage, such that he should necessarily be more honoured than the rest; for all are marked alike with the same natural proportions. The truth of this is clear; it does not admit of any doubt. We see, for instance, the man who today, because of the office which he holds, is considered by the crowd an object of honour, becoming tomorrow himself one of those who pay honour, the office having been transferred to another. Do they, then, conceive of an honour such as that in the case of the Divine Being, so that, as long as we please to pay it, that Divine honour is retained, but when we cease to do so it ceases too at the dictate of our will? Absurd thought, and blasphemous as well! The Deity, being independent of us, does not grow in honour; He is evermore the same; He cannot pass into a better or a worse state; for He has no better, and admits no worse.

In what way, then, can you honor the Deity? How can you elevate the Highest? How can you give glory to that which is already above all glory? How can you praise the Incomprehensible? If all the nations are like a drop from a bucket, as Isaiah says, if all living humanity were to send up one united note of praise in harmony together, what addition will this gift of a mere drop make to that which is essentially glorious? The heavens declare the glory of God, and yet they are considered poor messengers of His worth, because His Majesty is exalted not just as far as the heavens, but high above those heavens, which are themselves included within a small fraction of the Deity figuratively called His span. And shall a man, this frail and short-lived creature, so fittingly compared to grass, who exists today and tomorrow does not, believe that he can worthily honor the Divine Being? It would be like someone lighting a thin fiber from some tow and imagining that by that spark he was adding to the dazzling rays of the sun. By what words, I ask, will you honor the Holy Spirit, supposing you do wish to honor Him at all? By saying that He is absolutely immortal, without turning or variableness, always beautiful, always independent of attribution from others, working as He wills all things in all, Holy, leading, direct, just, of true utterance, searching the deep things of God, proceeding from the Father, receiving from the Son, and all such things, what, after all, do you contribute to Him by these and similar terms? Do you mention what He has, or do you honor Him by what He does not have? Well, if you attest what He does not have, your attribution is meaningless and comes to nothing, for he who calls bitterness sweetness, while he lies himself, has failed to commend that which is blameworthy. Whereas, if you mention what He has, such and such a quality is essential, whether people recognize it or not; He remains the object of faith, says the Apostle, even if we do not have faith.

In what sort of manner, then, can you honour the Deity? How can you heighten the Highest? How can you give glory to that which is above all glory? How can you praise the Incomprehensible? If all the nations are as a drop of a bucket, as Isaiah says, if all living humanity were to send up one united note of praise in harmony together, what addition will this gift of a mere drop be to that which is glorious essentially? The heavens are telling the glory of God, and yet they are counted poor heralds of His worth; because His Majesty is exalted, not as far as the heavens, but high above those heavens, which are themselves included within a small fraction of the Deity called figuratively His span. And shall a man, this frail and short-lived creature, so aptly likened to grass, who today is, and tomorrow is not, believe that he can worthily honour the Divine Being? It would be like some one lighting a thin fibre from some tow and fancying that by that spark he was making an addition to the dazzling rays of the sun. By what words, pray, will you honour the Holy Spirit, supposing you do wish to honour Him at all? By saying that He is absolutely immortal, without turning, or variableness, always beautiful, always independent of ascription from others, working as He wills all things in all, Holy, leading, direct, just, of true utterance, searching the deep things of God, proceeding from the Father, receiving from the Son, and all such-like things, what, after all, do you lend to Him by these and such-like terms? Do you mention what He has, or do you honour Him by what He has not? Well, if you attest what He has not, your ascription is meaningless and comes to nothing; for he who calls bitterness sweetness, while he lies himself, has failed to commend that which is blamable. Whereas, if you mention what He has, such and such a quality is essential, whether men recognize it or not; He remains the object of faith, says the Apostle, if we have not faith.

What, then, explains this lowering and expanding of their soul on the part of these men who are enthusiastic for the Father's honor and grant the Son an equal share with Him, but in the case of the Spirit want to narrow down their favors? It has been demonstrated that the intrinsic worth of the Divine Being does not depend for its contents on any will of ours, but has always been inalienably inherent in Him. Their narrowness of mind and unthankfulness is exposed in this opinion of theirs, while the Holy Spirit is essentially honorable, glorious, almighty, and everything we can conceive of in the way of exaltation, in spite of them.

What means, then, this lowering and this expanding of their soul, on the part of these men who are enthusiastic for the Father's honour, and grant to the Son an equal share with Him, but in the case of the Spirit are for narrowing down their favours; seeing that it has been demonstrated that the intrinsic worth of the Divine Being does not depend for its contents upon any will of ours, but has been always inalienably inherent in Him? Their narrowness of mind, and unthankfulness, is exposed in this opinion of theirs, while the Holy Spirit is essentially honourable, glorious, almighty, and all that we can conceive of in the way of exaltation, in spite of them.

Yes, one of them replies, but we have been taught by Scripture that the Father is the Creator, and likewise that it was "through the Son" that "all things were made." But God's word tells us nothing of this kind about the Spirit. So how can it be right to place the Holy Spirit in a position of equal dignity with One who has displayed such magnificence of power through the Creation?

Yes, replies one of them, but we have been taught by Scripture that the Father is the Creator, and in the same way that it was 'through the Son ' that 'all things were made'; but God's word tells us nothing of this kind about the Spirit; and how, then, can it be right to place the Holy Spirit in a position of equal dignity with One Who has displayed such magnificence of power through the Creation?

What should we answer to this? That the thoughts in their hearts are just empty talk when they imagine that the Spirit was not always with the Father and the Son, but that, depending on the situation, He is sometimes to be thought of as alone and sometimes to be found in the closest union with Them. For if heaven and earth and all created things were really made through the Son and from the Father, but apart from the Spirit, what was the Holy Spirit doing at the time when the Father was working with the Son on creation? Was He busy with some other works, and was that the reason He had no part in building the universe? But what special work of the Spirit can they point to from the time when the world was being made? Surely it is senseless foolishness to think of a creation other than the one that came into existence from the Father through the Son. Well, suppose He was not working at all, but separated Himself from the busy work of creating because He preferred ease and rest and shrank from hard work?

What shall we answer to this? That the thoughts of their hearts are so much idle talk, when they imagine that the Spirit was not always with the Father and the Son, but that, as occasion varies, He is sometimes to be contemplated as alone, sometimes to be found in the closest union with Them. For if the heaven, and the earth, and all created things were really made through the Son and from the Father, but apart from the Spirit, what was the Holy Spirit doing at the time when the Father was at work with the Son upon the Creation? Was He employed upon some other works, and was this the reason that He had no hand in the building of the Universe? But, then, what special work of the Spirit have they to point to, at the time when the world was being made? Surely, it is senseless folly to conceive of a creation other than that which came into existence from the Father through the Son. Well, suppose that He was not employed at all, but dissociated Himself from the busy work of creating by reason of an inclination to ease and rest, which shrank from toil?

May the gracious Spirit Himself pardon this baseless assumption of ours! The blasphemy of these theorists, which we have had to trace through every step it takes, has caused us unwittingly to dirty our discussion with the mud of their own imaginings. The view that is consistent with all reverence is as follows. We are not to think of the Father as ever separated from the Son, nor to look for the Son as separate from the Holy Spirit. Just as it is impossible to ascend to the Father unless our thoughts are lifted there through the Son, so it is also impossible to say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are to be known only in a perfect Trinity, in closest connection and unity with each other, before all creation, before all the ages, before anything whatever that we can form an idea of. The Father is always Father, and in Him the Son, and with the Son the Holy Spirit. If these Persons, then, are inseparable from each other, how great is the foolishness of these men who try to break apart this indivisibility by certain distinctions of time, and who divide the Inseparable so far as to assert confidently that the Father alone, through the Son alone, made all things—the Holy Spirit, that is, being either not present at all during this making, or else not working. Well, if He was not present, they must tell us where He was, and whether, while God embraces all things, they can imagine any separate place for the Spirit, so that He could have remained in isolation during the time occupied by the process of creating. If, on the other hand, He was present, how was it that He was inactive? Because He could not work, or because He would not work? Did He abstain willingly, or because some strong necessity drove Him away? Now, if He deliberately chose this inactivity, He must reject working in any other possible way as well, and He who affirmed that He works all things in all, as He wills, is according to them a liar. If, on the contrary, this Spirit has the impulse to work, but some overwhelming control hinders His purpose, they must tell us the reason for this hindrance. Was it due to His being grudged a share in the glory of those operations, so that the admiration at their success should not extend to a third person as its object, or to a distrust of His help, as if His cooperation would result in present harm? These clever men most certainly provide the grounds for our holding one of these two hypotheses. Or else, if a grudging spirit has no connection with the Deity, any more than a failure can be conceived of in any relation to an Infallible Being, what meaning of any kind is there in these narrow views of theirs, which isolate the Spirit's power from all world-building activity? Their duty rather was to drive out their low human way of thinking by means of loftier ideas, and to make a calculation more worthy of the sublimity of the objects in question. For neither did the Universal God make the universe through the Son as needing any help, nor does the Only-begotten God work all things by the Holy Spirit as having a power that falls short of His purpose. Rather, the fountain of power is the Father, and the power of the Father is the Son, and the spirit of that power is the Holy Spirit, and creation entirely, in all its visible and spiritual extent, is the finished work of that Divine power. And since no toil can be thought of in the composition of anything connected with the Divine Being (for performance being bound to the moment of willing, the Plan at once becomes a Reality), we would be justified in calling all that Nature which came into existence by creation a movement of Will, an impulse of Design, a transmission of Power, beginning from the Father, advancing through the Son, and completed in the Holy Spirit.

May the gracious Spirit Himself pardon this baseless supposition of ours! The blasphemy of these theorists, which we have had to follow out in every step it takes, has caused us unwittingly to soil our discussion with the mud of their own imaginings. The view which is consistent with all reverence is as follows. We are not to think of the Father as ever parted from the Son, nor to look for the Son as separate from the Holy Spirit. As it is impossible to mount to the Father, unless our thoughts are exalted there through the Son, so it is impossible also to say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are to be known only in a perfect Trinity, in closest consequence and union with each other, before all creation, before all the ages, before anything whatever of which we can form an idea. The Father is always Father, and in Him the Son, and with the Son the Holy Spirit. If these Persons, then, are inseparate from each other, how great is the folly of these men who undertake to sunder this indivisibility by certain distinctions of time, and so far to divide the Inseparable as to assert confidently, the Father alone, through the Son alone, made all things; the Holy Spirit, that is, being not present at all on the occasion of this making, or else not working. Well, if He was not present, they must tell us where He was; and whether, while God embraces all things, they can imagine any separate standing-place for the Spirit, so that He could have remained in isolation during the time occupied by the process of creating. If, on the other hand, He was present, how was it that He was inactive? Because He could not, or because He would not, work? Did He abstain willingly, or because some strong necessity drove Him away? Now, if He deliberately embraced this inactivity, He must reject working in any other possible way either; and He Who affirmed that He works all things in all, as He wills 1 Corinthians 13:6, is according to them a liar. If, on the contrary, this Spirit has the impulse to work, but some overwhelming control hinders His design, they must tell us the wherefore of this hindrance. Was it owing to his being grudged a share in the glory of those operations, and in order to secure that the admiration at their success should not extend to a third person as its object; or to a distrust of His help, as if His co-operation would result in present mischief? These clever men most certainly furnish the grounds for our holding one of these two hypotheses; or else, if a grudging spirit has no connection with the Deity, any more than a failure can be conceived of in any relation to an Infallible Being, what meaning of any kind is there in these narrow views of theirs, which isolate the Spirit's power from all world-building efficiency? Their duty rather was to expel their low human way of thinking, by means of loftier ideas, and to make a calculation more worthy of the sublimity of the objects in question. For neither did the Universal God make the universe through the Son, as needing any help, nor does the Only-begotten God work all things by the Holy Spirit, as having a power that comes short of His design; but the fountain of power is the Father, and the power of the Father is the Son, and the spirit of that power is the Holy Spirit; and Creation entirely, in all its visible and spiritual extent, is the finished work of that Divine power. And seeing that no toil can be thought of in the composition of anything connected with the Divine Being (for performance being bound to the moment of willing, the Plan at once becomes a Reality), we should be justified in calling all that Nature which came into existence by creation a movement of Will, an impulse of Design, a transmission of Power, beginning from the Father, advancing through the Son, and completed in the Holy Spirit.

This is the view we take, in our usual non-technical way. We reject all these elaborate sophistries of our opponents, believing and confessing that in every deed and thought—whether in this world or beyond this world, whether in time or in eternity—the Holy Spirit is to be understood as joined to the Father and Son, and lacks no wish or energy or anything else that is implied in a devout conception of Supreme Goodness. Therefore, except for the distinction of order and hypostasis, no variation in any respect is to be understood. We assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them: in physis, in honor, in godhead and glory and majesty and almighty power, and in all devout belief.

This is the view we take, after the unprofessional way usual with us; and we reject all these elaborate sophistries of our adversaries, believing and confessing as we do, that in every deed and thought, whether in this world, or beyond this world, whether in time or in eternity, the Holy Spirit is to be apprehended as joined to the Father and Son, and is wanting in no wish or energy, or anything else that is implied in a devout conception of Supreme Goodness; and, therefore, that, except for the distinction of order and Person, no variation in any point is to be apprehended; but we assert that while His place is counted third in mere sequence after the Father and Son, third in the order of the transmission, in all other respects we acknowledge His inseparable union with them; both in nature, in honour, in godhead, and glory, and majesty, and almighty power, and in all devout belief.

Regarding service and worship and the other matters they so carefully calculate and emphasize, we say this: the Holy Spirit is exalted above all that we can do for Him with our merely human purpose. Our worship falls far short of the honor due, and anything else that human customs consider honorable falls somewhere below the dignity of the Spirit. For that which is measureless in its essence surpasses those who offer their all with such slight, limited, and inadequate capacity for giving. This, then, we say to those among them who agree with the reverent understanding that the Holy Spirit is Divine and of the Divine nature. But if any of them reject this statement and the concept inherent in the very name of Divinity, and say what circulates among the many to the destruction of the Spirit's greatness—namely, that He belongs not to making but to made beings, and that it is right to regard Him not as Divine but as of created nature—we answer such a claim by saying we cannot understand how we can count those who make it among the number of Christians at all. For just as it would not be possible to call the unformed embryo a human being, but only a potential one (assuming it is completed so as to come forth to human birth, while as long as it remains in this unformed state it is something other than a human being), so our reason cannot recognize as a Christian one who has failed to receive the genuine form of our religion regarding the entire mystery. We can hear Jews believing in God, and our God too—even our Lord reminds them in the Gospel that they recognize no other God than the Father of the Only-begotten, of whom they say "He is your God." Are we then to call the Jews Christians because they too agree to worship the God we adore? I am also aware that the Manichees go about boasting the name of Christ. Because they hold in reverence the Name at which we bow the knee, shall we therefore count them among Christians? Likewise, whoever both believes in the Father and receives the Son but sets aside the Majesty of the Spirit has denied the faith, is worse than an infidel, and belies the name of Christ which he bears. The Apostle commands the man of God to be perfect. Now, to take only the general man, perfection must consist in completeness in every aspect of human nature: having reason, capacity for thought and knowledge, a share of animal life, an upright posture, the ability to laugh, broadness of nail. And if someone were to call an individual a man yet were unable to produce evidence in his case of these signs of human nature, his calling him so would be a worthless honor. In the same way, the Christian is marked by his Belief in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; in this consists the form of one who is fashioned in accordance with the mystery of the truth. But if his form is arranged otherwise, I will not recognize the existence of anything from which the form is absent. There is a blurring of the mark and a loss of the essential form and an alteration of the characteristic signs of our complete humanity when the Holy Spirit is not included in the Belief. For indeed the word of Ecclesiastes speaks truth: your heretic is no living man but bones in the womb of her who is with child. For how can one who does not think of the unction along with the Anointed be said to believe in the Anointed? God, Peter says, anointed Him with the Holy Spirit.

But with regard to service and worship, and the other things which they so nicely calculate about, and bring into prominence, we say this; that the Holy Spirit is exalted above all that we can do for Him with our merely human purpose; our worship is far beneath the honour due; and anything else that in human customs is held as honourable is somewhere below the dignity of the Spirit; for that which in its essence is measureless surpasses those who offer their all with so slight and circumscribed and paltry a power of giving. This, then, we say to those of them who subscribe to the reverential conception of the Holy Spirit that He is Divine, and of the Divine nature. But if there is any of them who rejects this statement, and this idea involved in the very name of Divinity, and says that which, to the destruction of the Spirit's greatness, is in circulation among the many, namely, that He belongs, not to making, but to made, beings, that it is right to regard Him not as of a Divine, but as of a created nature, we answer to a proposition such as this, that we do not understand how we can count those who make it among the number of Christians at all. For just as it would not be possible to style the unformed embryo a human being, but only a potential one, assuming that it is completed so as to come forth to human birth, while as long as it is in this unformed state, it is something other than a human being; so our reason cannot recognize as a Christian one who has failed to receive, with regard to the entire mystery, the genuine form of our religion. We can hear Jews believing in God, and our God too: even our Lord reminds them in the Gospel that they recognize no other God than the Father of the Only-begotten, of Whom ye say that he is your God. Are we, then, to call the Jews Christians because they too agree to worship the God Whom we adore? I am aware, too, that the Manichees go about vaunting the name of Christ. Because they hold revered the Name to which we bow the knee, shall we therefore number them among Christians? So, too, he who both believes in the Father and receives the Son, but sets aside the Majesty of the Spirit, has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel, and belies the name of Christ which he bears. The Apostle bids the man of God to be perfect. Now, to take only the general man, perfection must consist in completeness in every aspect of human nature, in having reason, capability of thought and knowledge, a share of animal life, an upright bearing, risibility, broadness of nail; and if any one were to term some individual a man, and yet were unable to produce evidence in his case of the foregoing signs of human nature, his terming him so would be a valueless honour. Thus, too, the Christian is marked by his Belief in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; in this consists the form of him who is fashioned in accordance with the mystery of the truth. But if his form is arranged otherwise, I will not recognize the existence of anything whence the form is absent; there is a blurring out of the mark, and a loss of the essential form, and an alteration of the characteristic signs of our complete humanity, when the Holy Spirit is not included in the Belief. For indeed the word of Ecclesiastes says true; your heretic is no living man, but bones, he says, in the womb of her that is with child; for how can one who does not think of the unction along with the Anointed be said to believe in the Anointed? Him, says (Peter), did God anoint with the Holy Spirit.

Those who destroy the Spirit's glory by relegating him to a created world must tell us what this anointing symbolizes. Is it not a symbol of kingship? And what then? Do they not believe that the Only-begotten is a king by his very physis? Those who have not permanently covered their hearts with the Jewish veil will not deny that he is. If, then, the Son is a king by his very physis, and the anointing is the symbol of his kingship, what does reason demonstrate as a consequence? Simply this: that the anointing is not something alien to that kingship, and therefore the Spirit is not to be ranked in the Trinity as anything strange or foreign either. For the Son is king, and his living, actual, and personal kingship is found in the Holy Spirit, who anoints the Only-begotten and thus makes him the Anointed One and the king of all things that exist. If, then, the Father is king, and the Only-begotten is king, and the Holy Spirit is the kingship itself, one and the same definition of kingship must prevail throughout this Trinity, and the concept of anointing conveys the hidden meaning that there is no interval of separation between the Son and the Holy Spirit. For just as nothing intervening can be detected between the body's surface and the oil, either by reason or by perception, so inseparable is the union of the Spirit with the Son. The result is that whoever is to touch the Son by faith must first encounter the oil in the very act of touching; there is no part of him devoid of the Holy Spirit. Therefore belief in the lordship of the Son arises in those who hold it through the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is met on all sides by those who approach the Son by faith. If, then, the Son is essentially a king, and the Holy Spirit is that dignity of kingship which anoints the Son, what deprivation of this kingship in its essence, comparing it with itself, can be imagined?

These destroyers of the Spirit's glory, who relegate Him to a subject world, must tell us of what thing that unction is the symbol. It not a symbol of the Kingship? And what? Do they not believe in the Only-begotten as in His very nature a King? Men who have not once for all enveloped their hearts with the Jewish veil 2 Corinthians 3:14-15 will not gainsay that He is this. If, then, the Son is in His very nature a king, and the unction is the symbol of His kingship, what, in the way of a consequence, does your reason demonstrate? Why, that the Unction is not a thing alien to that Kingship, and so that the Spirit is not to be ranked in the Trinity as anything strange and foreign either. For the Son is King, and His living, realized, and personified Kingship is found in the Holy Spirit, Who anoints the Only-begotten, and so makes Him the Anointed, and the King of all things that exist. If, then, the Father is King, and the Only-begotten is King, and the Holy Ghost is the Kingship, one and the same definition of Kingship must prevail throughout this Trinity, and the thought of unction conveys the hidden meaning that there is no interval of separation between the Son and the Holy Spirit. For as between the body's surface and the liquid of the oil nothing intervening can be detected, either in reason or in perception, so inseparable is the union of the Spirit with the Son; and the result is that whosoever is to touch the Son by faith must needs first encounter the oil in the very act of touching; there is not a part of Him devoid of the Holy Spirit. Therefore belief in the Lordship of the Son arises in those who entertain it, by means of the Holy Ghost; on all sides the Holy Ghost is met by those who by faith approach the Son. If, then, the Son is essentially a King, and the Holy Spirit is that dignity of Kingship which anoints the Son, what deprivation of this Kingship, in its essence and comparing it with itself, can be imagined?

Let me look at this carefully. The kingship is clearly demonstrated through rule over subjects. Now what is subject to this Kingly Being? The Word certainly includes the ages, and everything in them. As Scripture says, "Your Kingdom is a Kingdom of ages," and by ages it means every substance created in infinite space within them, whether visible or invisible, for in them all things were created by the Maker of those ages. If, then, kingship must always be thought of along with the king, and the world of subjects is acknowledged to be something different from the world of rulers, how absurd it is for these people to contradict themselves in this way. They attribute the unction as an expression of the worth of the One whose very nature (physis) it is to be a King, yet they degrade that unction itself to the rank of a subject, as if it lacks such worth. If it is a subject by virtue of its nature, then why is it made the unction of kingship and thus associated with the kingly dignity of the Only-begotten? If, on the other hand, the capacity to rule is shown by its inclusion in the majesty of kingship, where is the necessity of dragging everything down to a common and servile lower condition and numbering it with the subject creation? When we affirm these two conditions of the Spirit, we cannot be speaking the truth in both cases—that is, that He is ruling and that He is subject. If He rules, He is not under any lord, but if He is subject, then He cannot be comprehended with the Being who is a King. Men are recognized as among men, angels among angels, everything among its kind, and so the Holy Spirit must be believed to belong to one only of two worlds: to the ruling world or to the inferior world. Between these two, our reason can recognize nothing. No new invention of any natural attribute on the borderland of the created and the uncreated can be thought of that would participate in both yet be neither entirely. We cannot imagine such an amalgamation and welding together of opposites by anything being blended of the created and the uncreated, with two opposites thus coalescing into one prosopon. In that case, the result of that strange mixture would not only be a composite thing but composed of elements that were unlike and disagreeing as to time, for that which receives its personality from a creation is certainly posterior to that which subsists without a creation.

Again, let us look at it in this way. Kingship is most assuredly shown in the rule over subjects. Now what is subject to this Kingly Being? The Word includes the ages certainly, and all that is in them; Your Kingdom, it says, is a Kingdom of ages, and, by ages, it means every substance in them created in infinite space, whether visible or invisible; for in them all things were created by the Maker of those ages. If, then, the Kingship must always be thought of along with the King, and the world of subjects is acknowledged to be something other than the world of rulers, what absurdity it is for these men to contradict themselves thus, attributing as they do the unction as an expression for the worth of Him Whose very nature it is to be a King, yet degrading that unction Itself to the rank of a subject, as if wanting in such worth! If It is a subject by virtue of its nature, then why is It made the unction of Kingship, and so associated with the Kingly dignity of the Only-begotten? If, on the other hand, the capacity to rule is shown by Its being included in the majesty of Kingship, where is the necessity of having everything dragged down to a plebeian and servile lower condition, and numbered with the subject creation? When we affirm of the Spirit the two conditions, we cannot be in both cases speaking the truth: i.e. that He is ruling, and that He is subject. If He rules, He is not under any lord, but if He is subject, then He cannot be comprehended with the Being who is a King. Men are recognized as among men, angels among angels, everything among its kind; and so the Holy Spirit must needs be believed to belong to one only of two worlds; to the ruling, or to the inferior world; for between these two our reason can recognize nothing; no new invention of any natural attribute on the borderland of the Created and the Uncreated can be thought of, such as would participate in both, yet be neither entirely; we cannot imagine such an amalgamation and welding together of opposites by anything being blended of the Created and the Uncreated, and two opposites thus coalescing into one person, in which case the result of that strange mixture would not only be a composite thing, but composed of elements that were unlike, and disagreeing as to time; for that which receives its personality from a creation is assuredly posterior to that which subsists without a creation.

If, then, they declare the Holy Spirit to be blended of both, they must consequently view that blending as of a prior with a posterior thing; and, according to them, He will be prior to Himself and, conversely, posterior to Himself. From the Uncreated He will get seniority, and from the Created He will get juniority. But in the nature of things, this cannot be; and so it must most certainly be true to affirm of the Holy Spirit only one of these alternatives, and that is the attribute of being Uncreated. Notice the amount of absurdity involved in the other alternative: all things that we can think of in the actual creation have, by virtue of all having received their existence by an act of creation, a rank and value that are perfectly equal in all cases. So what reason can there be for separating the Holy Spirit from the rest of creation and ranking Him with the Father and the Son? Logic, then, will discover this about Him: that which is contemplated as part of the Uncreated does not exist by creation. Or, if it does, then it has no more power than its kindred creation; it cannot associate itself with that Transcendent Nature. If, on the other hand, they declare that He is a created being and at the same time has a power which is above creation, then the creation will be found at variance with itself, divided into ruler and ruled, so that part of it is the benefactor and part the benefited, part the sanctifier and part the sanctified. And all that fund of blessings which we believe to be provided for the creation by the Holy Spirit are present in Him, welling up abundantly and pouring forth upon others, while the creation remains in need of the help and grace that issue from Him, and receives, as a mere dole, those blessings which can be passed to it from a fellow-creature. That would be like favoritism and respecting of persons. We know that there is no such partiality in the nature of things, such that those existences which differ in no way from each other on the basis of substance should not have equal power; and I think that no one who reflects will admit such views. Either He imparts nothing to others, if He possesses nothing essentially; or, if we do believe that He gives, His possession beforehand of that gift must be granted. This capacity of giving blessings, while needing oneself no such extraneous help, is the peculiar and exquisite privilege of Deity, and of no other.

If, then, they declare the Holy Ghost to be blended of both, they must consequently view that blending as of a prior with a posterior thing; and, according to them, He will be prior to Himself; and reversely, posterior to Himself; from the Uncreated He will get the seniority, and from the Created the juniority. But, in the nature of things, this cannot be; and so it must most certainly be true to affirm of the Holy Spirit one only of these alternatives, and that is, the attribute of being Uncreated; for notice the amount of absurdity involved in the other alternative; all things that we can think of in the actual creation have, by virtue of all having received their existence by an act of creation, a rank and value perfectly equal in all cases, and so what reason can there be for separating the Holy Spirit from the rest of the creation, and ranking Him with the Father and the Son? Logic, then, will discover this about Him; That which is contemplated as part of the Uncreated, does not exist by creation; or, if It does, then It has no more power than its kindred creation, It cannot associate itself with that Transcendent Nature; if, on the other hand, they declare that He is a created being, and at the same time has a power which is above the creation, then the creation will be found at variance with itself, divided into ruler and ruled, so that part of it is the benefactor, part the benefited, part the sanctifier, part the sanctified; and all that fund of blessings which we believe to be provided for the creation by the Holy Spirit are present in Him, welling up abundantly, and pouring forth upon others, while the creation remains in need of the thence-issuing help and grace, and receives, as a mere dole, those blessings which can be passed to it from a fellow-creature! That would be like favouritism and respecting of persons; when we know that there is no such partiality in the nature of things, as that those existences which differ in no way from each other on the score of substance should not have equal power; and I think that no one who reflects will admit such views. Either He imparts nothing to others, if He possesses nothing essentially; or, if we do believe that He does give, His possession beforehand of that gift must be granted; this capacity of giving blessings, while needing oneself no such extraneous help, is the peculiar and exquisite privilege of Deity, and of no other.

Then let us look at this too. In Holy Baptism, what is it that we secure? Is it not participation in a life no longer subject to death? I think that no one who can in any way be counted among Christians will deny that statement. What then? Is that life-giving power in the water itself which is used to convey the grace of Baptism? Or is it not rather clear to everyone that this element is only used as a means in the outward ministry, and by itself contributes nothing toward the sanctification, unless it is first transformed itself by the sanctification; and that what gives life to the baptized is the Spirit? As our Lord Himself says about Him with His own lips, It is the Spirit that gives life. But for the completion of this grace, the Spirit alone, received by faith, does not give life; instead, belief in our Lord must come first, so that the life-giving gift may come upon the believer, as our Lord has said, He gives life to whom He wills. But beyond this, seeing that this grace administered through the Son depends on the Unbegotten Source of all, Scripture accordingly teaches us that belief in the Father Who begets all things must come first, so that this life-giving grace should be completed, for those fit to receive it, after starting from that Source as from a spring pouring out life abundantly, through the Only-begotten Who is the True life, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. If, then, life comes in baptism, and baptism receives its completion in the name of Father, Son, and Spirit, what do these men mean who count this Minister of life as nothing? If the gift is a small one, they must tell us what thing is more precious than this life. But if everything precious is second to this life—I mean that higher and precious life in which brute creation has no part—how can they dare to depreciate so great a favor, or rather the actual Being who grants the favor, and to degrade Him in their thinking to a created world by separating Him from the higher world of deity? Finally, if they insist that this bestowal of life is a small thing, and that it means nothing great and awesome in the nature of the Bestower, why do they not draw the conclusion which this very view makes inevitable, namely, that we must suppose, even regarding the Only-begotten and the Father Himself, nothing great in Their life, which is the same life that we have through the Holy Spirit, supplied as it is from the Father through the Son?

Then let us look to this too. In Holy Baptism, what is it that we secure thereby? Is it not a participation in a life no longer subject to death? I think that no one who can in any way be reckoned among Christians will deny that statement. What then? Is that life-giving power in the water itself which is employed to convey the grace of Baptism? Or is it not rather clear to every one that this element is only employed as a means in the external ministry, and of itself contributes nothing towards the sanctification, unless it be first transformed itself by the sanctification; and that what gives life to the baptized is the Spirit; as our Lord Himself says in respect to Him with His own lips, It is the Spirit that gives life; but for the completion of this grace He alone, received by faith, does not give life, but belief in our Lord must precede, in order that the lively gift may come upon the believer, as our Lord has spoken, He gives life to whom He wills. But further still, seeing that this grace administered through the Son is dependent on the Ungenerate Source of all, Scripture accordingly teaches us that belief in the Father Who engenders all things is to come first; so that this life-giving grace should be completed, for those fit to receive it, after starting from that Source as from a spring pouring life abundantly, through the Only-begotten Who is the True life, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. If, then, life comes in baptism, and baptism receives its completion in the name of Father, Son, and Spirit, what do these men mean who count this Minister of life as nothing? If the gift is a slight one, they must tell us the thing that is more precious than this life. But if everything whatever that is precious is second to this life, I mean that higher and precious life in which the brute creation has no part, how can they dare to depreciate so great a favour, or rather the actual Being who grants the favour, and to degrade Him in their conceptions of Him to a subject world by disjoining Him from the higher world of deity. Finally, if they will have it that this bestowal of life is a small thing, and that it means nothing great and awful in the nature of the Bestower, how is it they do not draw the conclusion which this very view makes inevitable, namely, that we must suppose, even with regard to the Only-begotten and the Father Himself, nothing great in Their life, the same as that which we have through the Holy Spirit, supplied as it is from the Father through the Son?

If these people who despise and oppose their very own life consider the gift a small thing and therefore decide to treat lightly the Being who grants the gift, they should realize they cannot limit their ingratitude to one Person alone. Rather, they must extend its profanity beyond the Holy Spirit to the Holy Trinity itself. For just as grace flows down in an unbroken stream from the Father, through the Son and the Spirit, to those who are worthy of it, so this profanity returns backward and is transmitted from the Son to the God of all the world, passing from one to the other. If when a man is slighted, the one who sent him is also slighted—and what a distance there was between the man and the sender!—what criminality is implied in those who defy the Holy Spirit this way! Perhaps this is the blasphemy against our Lawgiver for which the judgment without remission has been decreed, since in him the entire Being, blessed and divine, is also insulted. Just as the devout worshipper of the Spirit sees in him the glory of the Only-begotten, and in that sight beholds the image of the infinite God, and by means of that image forms in his own mind an outline of the Original, so most clearly does this person who despises the Spirit, whenever he makes any of his bold statements against the glory of the Spirit, extend by the same reasoning his profanity to the Son, and beyond him to the Father. Therefore, those who think carefully must fear that they might commit an audacity whose result will be the complete blotting out of the one who commits it. While they exalt the Spirit in their words, they should exalt him in their thought even before speaking, since it is impossible for words to rise along with thought. Still, when someone reaches the highest limit of human abilities, the utmost height and magnificence of understanding that the mind can ever attain, even then one must believe it falls far below the glory that belongs to him, according to the words in the Psalms, that after exalting the Lord our God, even then you scarcely worship the footstool beneath his feet. And the reason this dignity is so incomprehensible is nothing other than that he is holy.

So that if these despisers and impugners of their very own life conceive of the gift as a little one, and decree accordingly to slight the Being who imparts the gift, let them be made aware that they cannot limit to one Person only their ingratitude, but must extend its profanity beyond the Holy Spirit to the Holy Trinity Itself. For like as the grace flows down in an unbroken stream from the Father, through the Son and the Spirit, upon the persons worthy of it, so does this profanity return backward, and is transmitted from the Son to the God of all the world, passing from one to the other. If, when a man is slighted, He Who sent him is slighted (yet what a distance there was between the man and the Sender!), what criminality is thereby implied in those who thus defy the Holy Spirit! Perhaps this is the blasphemy against our Law-giver for which the judgment without remission has been decreed; since in Him the entire Being, Blessed and Divine, is insulted also. As the devout worshipper of the Spirit sees in Him the glory of the Only-begotten, and in that sight beholds the image of the Infinite God, and by means of that image makes an outline, upon his own cognition, of the Original, so most plainly does this contemner (of the Spirit), whenever he advances any of his bold statements against the glory of the Spirit, extend, by virtue of the same reasoning, his profanity to the Son, and beyond Him to the Father. Therefore, those who reflect must have fear lest they perpetrate an audacity the result of which will be the complete blotting out of the perpetrator of it; and while they exalt the Spirit in the naming, they will even before the naming exalt Him in their thought, it being impossible that words can mount along with thought; still when one shall have reached the highest limit of human faculties, the utmost height and magnificence of idea to which the mind can ever attain, even then one must believe it is far below the glory that belongs to Him, according to the words in the Psalms, that after exalting the Lord our God, even then ye scarcely worship the footstool beneath His feet: and the cause of this dignity being so incomprehensible is nothing else than that He is holy.

If, then, every height of human ability falls below the grandeur of the Spirit (for that is what the Word means in the metaphor of footstool), what vanity is theirs who think that there is within themselves a power so great that it rests with them to define the amount of value to be attributed to a being who is beyond value! And so they pronounce the Holy Spirit unworthy of some things which are associated with the idea of value, as if their own abilities could do far more than the Spirit, as they estimate him, is capable of. What pitiable, what wretched madness! They do not understand what they are themselves when they talk like this, and what the Holy Spirit is against whom they insolently set themselves. Who will tell these people that human beings are a spirit that goes forth and does not return again, built up in their mother's womb by means of a polluted conception, and all of them returning to polluted earth; inheriting a life that is likened to grass; blooming for a little while during life's illusion, and then withering away, and all the bloom upon them being shed and vanishing; they themselves not knowing with certainty what they were before their birth, nor into what they will be changed, their soul being ignorant of her peculiar destiny as long as she remains in the flesh? Such is man.

If, then, every height of man's ability falls below the grandeur of the Spirit (for that is what the Word means in the metaphor of footstool), what vanity is theirs who think that there is within themselves a power so great that it rests with them to define the amount of value to be attributed to a being who is invaluable! And so they pronounce the Holy Spirit unworthy of some things which are associated with the idea of value, as if their own abilities could do far more than the Spirit, as estimated by them, is capable of. What pitiable, what wretched madness! They understand not what they are themselves when they talk like this, and what the Holy Spirit against Whom they insolently range themselves. Who will tell these people that men are a spirit that goes forth and returns not again Wisdom 16:14, built up in their mother's womb by means of a soiled conception, and returning all of them to a soiled earth; inheriting a life that is likened unto grass; blooming for a little during life's illusion, and then withering away, and all the bloom upon them being shed and vanishing; they themselves not knowing with certainty what they were before their birth, nor into what they will be changed, their soul being ignorant of her peculiar destiny as long as she tarries in the flesh? Such is man.

The Holy Spirit is, first of all, because of qualities that are essentially holy, what the Father, essentially Holy, is; and such as the Only-begotten is, such is the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, He is so by virtue of being life-giving, imperishable, unchangeable, everlasting, just, wise, upright, sovereign, good, powerful, able to give all good things—and above them all, life itself—and by being everywhere, present in each individual, filling the earth, dwelling in the heavens, poured out upon supernatural Powers, filling all things according to what each deserves, while Himself remaining full, being with all who are worthy, and yet not separated from the Holy Trinity. He continually searches the deep things of God, continually receives from the Son, is continually being sent and yet not separated, and is glorified and yet has always possessed glory. It is obvious, in fact, that one who gives glory to another must be found to possess superabundant glory himself; for how could someone devoid of glory glorify another? Unless something is itself light, how can it display the gracious gift of light? So the power to glorify could never be displayed by one who was not himself glory, honor, majesty, and greatness. Now the Spirit does glorify the Father and the Son. Neither does He lie who says, "Those who glorify Me I will glorify," and our Lord says to the Father, "I have glorified You," and again He says, "Glorify Me with the glory which I had with You before the world was." The Divine Voice answers, "I have both glorified, and will glorify again." You see the revolving circle of glory moving from Like to Like. The Son is glorified by the Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son; again the Son has His glory from the Father; and the Only-begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what shall the Father be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son? And with what again shall the Son be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit? In the same way, again, faith completes the circle and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of the Son.

On the contrary the Holy Spirit is, to begin with, because of qualities that are essentially holy, that which the Father, essentially Holy, is; and such as the Only-begotten is, such is the Holy Spirit; then, again, He is so by virtue of life-giving, of imperishability, of unvariableness, of everlastingness, of justice, of wisdom, of rectitude, of sovereignty, of goodness, of power, of capacity to give all good things, and above them all life itself, and by being everywhere, being present in each, filling the earth, residing in the heavens, shed abroad upon supernatural Powers, filling all things according to the deserts of each, Himself remaining full, being with all who are worthy, and yet not parted from the Holy Trinity. He ever searches the deep things of God, ever receives from the Son, ever is being sent, and yet not separated, and being glorified, and yet He has always had glory. It is plain, indeed, that one who gives glory to another must be found himself in the possession of superabundant glory; for how could one devoid of glory glorify another? Unless a thing be itself light, how can it display the gracious gift of light? So the power to glorify could never be displayed by one who was not himself glory, and honour, and majesty, and greatness. Now the Spirit does glorify the Father and the Son. Neither does He lie Who says, Them that glorify Me I glorify 1 Samuel 2:30; and I have glorified You, is said by our Lord to the Father; and again He says, Glorify Me with the glory which I had with You before the world was. The Divine Voice answers, I have both glorified, and will glorify again. You see the revolving circle of the glory moving from Like to Like. The Son is glorified by the Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son; again the Son has His glory from the Father; and the Only-begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what shall the Father be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son: and with what again shall the Son be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit? In like manner, again, Faith completes the circle, and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of the Son.

If the Spirit is this great, and everything morally beautiful and good comes from God through the Son and is completed through the Spirit who works all things in all people, why do they oppose their own life? Why do they cut themselves off from the hope that belongs to those who are being saved? Why do they separate themselves from union with God? For how can anyone be joined to the Lord unless the Spirit works within us to create that union with Him? Why do they argue with us about how much service and worship is appropriate? Why do they use the word worship sarcastically, as if it demeans a Divine and completely independent Being, when they claim to want their own salvation? We would say to them: Your prayer benefits you who ask, not the One who grants it. Why, then, do you approach your Benefactor as if you have something to offer Him? Or rather, why do you refuse to call Him a benefactor at all when He gives you blessings, and why do you disregard the Life-giver while clinging to life? Why, when seeking His sanctification, do you misunderstand the one who gives sanctifying grace? And regarding the giving of these blessings, why do you not deny that He has the power to give them, yet consider Him unworthy to be asked, failing to recognize that it is far greater to actually give a blessing than to be asked for it? Asking does not prove that the one being asked is great, because someone who does not have something to give can still be asked for it—the asking depends only on the will of the person asking. But someone who actually grants a blessing has thereby given undeniable proof of power residing in him. Why then, while acknowledging the greater thing in Him—that is, the power to give everything morally beautiful—do you withhold from Him the asking, as if it were something important? Yet asking, as we have said, is often directed to those who have no power at all, because of the delusion of their worshipers. For example, superstitious people ask idols for what they want, but the asking does not bring glory to the idols. People pay attention to them only because of the mistaken expectation that they will receive something they ask for, and so they keep asking. But you, who are convinced of what great things the Holy Spirit gives, neglect to ask Him for them, taking refuge in the law that commands you to "worship God and serve Him only." Well, how will you worship Him only, tell me, when you have separated Him from His intimate union with His own Only-begotten and His own Spirit? This worship is simply Jewish.

If such, then, is the greatness of the Spirit, and whatever is morally beautiful, whatever is good, coming from God as it does through the Son, is completed by the instrumentality of the Spirit that works all in all, why do they set themselves against their own life? Why do they alienate themselves from the hope belonging to such as are to be saved? Why do they sever themselves from their cleaving unto God? For how can any man cleave unto the Lord unless the Spirit operates within us that union of ourselves with Him? Why do they haggle with us about the amount of service and of worship? Why do they use that word worship in an ironical sense, derogatory to a Divine and entirely Independent Being, supposing that they desire their own salvation? We would say to them, Your supplication is the advantage of you who ask, and not the honouring of Him Who grants it. Why, then, do you approach your Benefactor as if you had something to give? Or rather, why do you refuse to name as a benefactor at all Him Who gives you your blessings, and slight the Life-giver while clinging to Life? Why, seeking for His sanctification, do you misconceive of the Dispenser of the Grace of sanctification; and as to the giving of those blessings, why, not denying that He has the power, do you deem Him not worthy to be asked to give, and fail to take this into consideration, viz. how much greater a thing it is to give some blessing than to be asked to give it? The asking does not unmistakably witness to greatness in him who is asked; for it is possible that one who does not have the thing to give might be asked for it, for the asking depends only on the will of the asker. But one who actually bestows some blessing has thereby given undoubted evidence of a power residing in him. Why then, while testifying to the greater thing in Him — I mean the power to bestow everything that is morally beautiful — do you deprive Him of the asking, as of something of importance; although his asking, as we have said, is often performed in the case of those who have nothing in their power, owing to the delusion of their devotees? For instance, the slaves of superstition ask the idols for the objects of their wishes; but the asking does not, in this instance of the idols, confer any glory; only people pay that attention to them owing to the deluded expectation that they will get some one of the things they ask for, and so they do not cease to ask. But you, persuaded as you are of what and how great things the Holy Spirit is the Giver, do you neglect the asking them from Him, taking refuge in the law which bids you 'worship God and serve Him only?' Well, how will you worship Him only, tell me, when you have severed Him from His intimate union with His own Only-begotten and His own Spirit? This worship is simply Jewish.

But you will say, "When I think of the Father, it is the Son alone that I have included as well in that term." But tell me: when you have grasped the notion of the Son, have you not admitted in it that of the Holy Spirit too? For how can you confess the Son except by the Holy Spirit? At what moment, then, is the Spirit in a state of separation from the Son, so that when the Father is being worshipped, the worship of the Spirit is not included along with that of the Son? And as for their worship itself, what in the world do they consider it to be? They bestow it, as some exquisite piece of honor, upon the God over all, and convey it over sometimes so as to reach the Only-begotten also, but the Holy Spirit they regard as unworthy of such a privilege. Now, in the common language of mankind, that self-prostration of inferiors upon the ground which they practice when they greet their betters is called worship. Thus, it was by such a posture that the patriarch Jacob, in his self-humiliation, seems to have wished to show his inferiority when coming to meet his brother and to appease his anger, for he bowed himself to the ground, the Scripture says, three times. And Joseph's brothers, as long as they did not know him and he pretended before them that he did not know them, because of the exaltation of his rank reverenced his sovereignty with this worship. And even the great Abraham himself bowed himself to the children of Heth, a stranger among the natives of that land, showing, I think, by that action how far more powerful those natives were than sojourners. It is possible to speak of many such actions both in the ancient records and from examples before our eyes in the world now.

But you will say, When I think of the Father it is the Son (alone) that I have included as well in that term. But tell me; when you have grasped the notion of the Son have you not admitted therein that of the Holy Spirit too? For how can you confess the Son except by the Holy Spirit? At what moment, then, is the Spirit in a state of separation from the Son, so that when the Father is being worshipped, the worship of the Spirit is not included along with that of the Son? And as regards their worship itself, what in the world do they reckon it to be? They bestow it, as some exquisite piece of honour, upon the God over all, and convey it over, sometimes, so as to reach the Only-begotten also; but the Holy Spirit they regard as unworthy of such a privilege. Now, in the common parlance of mankind, that self-prostration of inferiors upon the ground which they practise when they salute their betters is termed worship. Thus, it was by such a posture that the patriarch Jacob, in his self-humiliation, seems to have wished to show his inferiority when coming to meet his brother and to appease his wrath; for he bowed himself to the ground, says the Scripture, three times; and Joseph's brethren, as long as they knew him not, and he pretended before them that he knew them not, by reason of the exaltation of his rank reverenced his sovereignty with this worship; and even the great Abraham himself bowed himself to the children of Heth, a stranger among the natives of that land, showing, I opine, by that action, how far more powerful those natives were than sojourners. It is possible to speak of many such actions both in the ancient records, and from examples before our eyes in the world now.

Do they mean the same thing by their worship? Well, isn't it absurd to think it is wrong to honor the Holy Spirit with the same honor that the patriarch gave even to Canaanites? Or do they think their worship is something different, as if one kind is appropriate for human beings and another for the Supreme Being? But then why do they leave out worship entirely when it comes to the Spirit, not even giving Him the worship granted to human beings? And what kind of worship do they imagine is reserved especially for the Deity? Is it spoken words or physical gestures? But aren't these marks of honor shared by human beings as well? In their case, words are spoken and gestures are made. Isn't it clear to anyone with even the smallest capacity for thought that humanity has no gift worthy of the Deity to give? For the Author of all blessings has no need of us. But we human beings have transferred these signs of respect and admiration, which we use toward each other when we want to show by acknowledging a neighbor's superiority that one of us is in a lower position than another, to our service of a Higher Power; from our possessions we make a gift of what is most precious to a priceless Nature. Therefore, when people approach emperors and rulers seeking things they want to obtain from those rulers, they do not bring merely their petition alone, but use every possible means to make them feel pity and favor toward themselves, using a humble voice and a kneeling position, clasping their knees, prostrating themselves on the ground, and putting forward all sorts of pathetic signs to plead for their petition and awaken that pity—in the same way, those who recognize the True Ruler, by whom all existing things are controlled, when they are asking for what they have at heart—some lowly in spirit because of pitiable conditions in this world, some with their thoughts lifted up because of their eternal mysterious hopes—since they do not know how to ask, and their humanity is not capable of displaying any reverence that can reach the greatness of that Glory, carry the ceremony used in the case of human beings into the service of the Deity. And this is what worship is—that which is offered for the things we have at heart along with supplication and humiliation. Therefore Daniel also bends his knees to the Lord when asking His love for the captive people; and He who bore our sicknesses and intercedes for us is recorded in the Gospel to have fallen on His face, because of the man that He had taken upon Himself, at the hour of prayer, and in this posture to have made His petition, teaching by this, I think, that at the time of our petition our voice is not to be bold, but that we are to assume the attitude of the wretched; since the Lord resists the proud but gives grace to the humble; and somewhere else He says, whoever exalts himself will be humbled. If, then, worship is a kind of suppliant state, or pleading put forward for the object of the petition, what is the point of these newfangled rules? These men do not even deign to ask of the Giver, or to kneel to the Ruler, or to attend upon the Ruler.

Do they too, then, mean this by their worship? Well, is it anything but absurdity to think that it is wrong to honour the Holy Spirit with that with which the patriarch honoured even Canaanites? Or do they consider their worship something different to this, as if one sort were fitting for men, another sort for the Supreme Being? But then, how is it that they omit worship altogether in the instance of the Spirit, not even bestowing upon Him the worship conceded in the case of men? And what kind of worship do they imagine to be reserved especially for the Deity? Is it to be spoken word, or acted gesture? Well, but are not these marks of honour shared by men as well? In their case words are spoken and gestures acted. Is it not, then, plain to every one who possesses the least amount of reflection, that any gift worthy of the Deity mankind has not got to give; for the Author of all blessings has no need of us. But it is we men who have transferred these indications of respect and admiration, which we adopt towards each other, when we would show by the acknowledgment of a neighbour's superiority that one of us is in a humbler position than another, to our attendance upon a Higher Power; out of our possessions we make a gift of what is most precious to a priceless Nature. Therefore, since men, approaching emperors and potentates for the objects which they wish in some way to obtain from those rulers, do not bring to them their mere petition only, but employ every possible means to induce them to feel pity and favour towards themselves, adopting a humble voice, and a kneeling position, clasping their knees, prostrating themselves on the ground, and putting forward to plead for their petition all sorts of pathetic signs, to wake that pity — so it is that those who recognize the True Potentate, by Whom all things in existence are controlled, when they are supplicating for that which they have at heart, some lowly in spirit because of pitiable conditions in this world, some with their thoughts lifted up because of their eternal mysterious hopes, seeing that they know not how to ask, and that their humanity is not capable of displaying any reverence that can reach to the grandeur of that Glory, carry the ceremonial used in the case of men into the service of the Deity. And this is what worship is — that, I mean, which is offered for objects we have at heart along with supplication and humiliation. Therefore Daniel too bends the knees to the Lord, when asking His love for the captive people; and He Who bare our sicknesses, and intercedes for us, is recorded in the Gospel to have fallen on His face, because of the man that He had taken upon Him, at the hour of prayer, and in this posture to have made His petition, enjoining thereby, I think, that at the time of our petition our voice is not to be bold, but that we are to assume the attitude of the wretched; since the Lord resists the proud, but gives grace unto the humble; and somewhere else (He says), he that exalts himself shall be abased. If, then, worship is a sort of suppliant state, or pleading put forward for the object of the petition, what is the intention of these new-fashioned regulations? These men do not even deign to ask of the Giver, nor to kneel to the Ruler, nor to attend upon the Potentate.

It is important for understanding the following book to determine what mental faculty *epinoia* is. Gregory says that Eunomius makes a deliberate mockery of the word. He reduces its meaning to the lowest possible level and makes it merely the imagining of unnatural things, either shrinking or expanding the boundaries of nature, or combining incompatible concepts. He gives examples like colossi, pygmies, and centaurs as products of this mental operation. Fancy, or notion, would thus represent Eunomius' view of it. But Gregory attributes every art and every science to the working of this faculty. According to my explanation, it is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, moving on to further discoveries by means of what is adjacent to and follows from our first perception regarding the thing being studied. He gives examples like ontology, arithmetic, and geometry on the one hand, and agriculture, navigation, and timekeeping on the other, as results of it. Anyone who judged this faculty more valuable than any other ability we possess would not be far wrong. Induction might almost represent this view of it. But then Gregory does not deny that false marvels are also produced by it. By means of it an entertainer might amuse an audience with fire-breathing monsters, men wrapped in the coils of serpents, and so on. He calls it an inventive faculty. It must therefore be something more spontaneous than logical reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, while it is more reliable than fancy or imagination.

It is important, for the understanding of the following Book, to determine what faculty of the mind ̓ Επίνοια is. Eunomius, Gregory says, makes a solemn travesty of the word. He reduces its force to its lowest level, and makes it only fancy the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions together. He instances colossi, pigmies, centaurs, as the result of this mental operation. Fancy, or notion, would thus represent Eunomius' view of it. But Gregory ascribes every art and every science to the play of this faculty. According to my account, it is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries, by means of what adjoins and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied. He instances Ontology (!), Arithmetic, Geometry, on the one hand, Agriculture, Navigation, Horology, on the other, as the result of it. Any one who should judge this faculty more precious than any other with the exercise of which we are gifted would not be far mistaken. Induction might almost represent this view of it. But then Gregory does not deny that lying wonders are also fabricated by it. By means of it and entertainer might amuse an audience with fire-breathing monsters, men enfolded in the coils of serpents, etc. He calls it an inventive faculty. It must therefore be something more spontaneous than ratiocination, whether deductive or inductive; while it is more reliable than Fancy or Imagination.

This is illustrated by what Saint John Damascene says about Epinoia in his Dialectica (chapter 65): It has two kinds. The first is the faculty that analyzes and clarifies our view of things that are undivided and taken as a whole. Through this faculty, a simple phenomenon becomes complex when examined theoretically: for example, man becomes a compound of soul and body. The second kind, by combining perception and imagination, produces fictions from real things—that is, it divides wholes into parts and then combines those parts, chosen arbitrarily, into new wholes; for example, Centaurs and Sirens. Analysis (scientific) would describe the first kind; imagination would describe the second. Basil and Gregory were thinking of the first kind, Eunomius of the second, yet both parties used the same term.

This is illustrated by what S. John Damascene, in his Dialectica (c. 65), says of ̓ Επίνοια: It is of two sorts. The first is the faculty which analyses and elucidates the view of things undissected and in the gross ( ὁ λοσχερῆ): whereby a simple phenomenon becomes complex speculatively: for instance, man becomes a compound of soul and body. The second, by a union of perception and fancy, produces fictions out of realities, i.e. divides wholes into parts, and combines those parts, selected arbitrarily, into new wholes; e.g. Centaurs, Sirens. Analysis (scientific) would describe the one; fancy, the other. Basil and Gregory were thinking of the one, Eunomius of the other; but still both parties used the same expression.

If, then, there is one word that will cover the whole meaning, it would seem to be Conception. This word, at least, both in its outward form and in its intention, stands to perception in a way strictly analogous to that in which Epinoia stands to Ennoia. Both Conception and Epinoia represent some regulated operation of the mind upon data immediately given. In both cases the mind is led to contemplate its own contents in a new light, whether sensations or innate ideas. The fitness of Conception as an equivalent of Epinoia will be clear when we consider the real point at issue between Basil and Eunomius. Their controversy centers on the term Ungenerate. Is it, or is it not, expressive of the ousia of the Deity? To answer this question, it was found necessary to determine how such a name for the Supreme has been acquired. By a conception, says Basil. No, says Eunomius: it would be dangerous to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of Conception may and does deceive us; it can create monstrosities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, the names of the Son are too; for instance, the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the Vine. But since our Lord Himself applied these to Himself, He would, according to you, be employing the faculty of conception; and it is blasphemous to think that He employed names which we too might have arrived at by conceiving of Him in these particular ways. Therefore, Conception is not the source of the Divine Names; rather they come from a perception or intention implanted in us directly from on high. Ungenerate is such a name; and it reveals to us the very ousia of the Deity. But Gregory defends Basil's position. He shows the entire relativity of our knowledge of the Deity. Ungenerate and every other name of God is due to a conception; in each case we perceive either an operation of the Deity, or an element of evil, and then we conceive of Him as operating in the one, or as free from the other; and so name Him. But there is no conception, because there is no perception, of the ousia of the Deity. Scripture, which has revealed His operations, has not revealed that. The human mind feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways; and never pursues the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God; but, as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of the Universe; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable purity as regards this, not that we divide up the subject of such attributes along with them, but, believing that this Being, whatever it be in ousia, is one, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas.

If, then, there is one word that will cover the whole meaning, it would seem to be Conception. This word at all events, both in its outward form and in its intention, stands to perception in a way strictly analogous to that in which ̓ Επίνοια stands to ̓́ Εννοια. Both Conception and ̓ Επίνοια represent some regulated operation of the mind upon data immediately given. In both cases the mind is led to contemplate in a new light its own contents, whether sensations or innate ideas. The fitness of Conception as an equivalent of ̓ Επίνοια will be clear when we consider the real point at issue between Basil and Eunomius. Their controversy rages round the term Ungenerate. Is it, or is it not, expressive of the substance (being) of the Deity? To answer this question, it was found necessary to ascertain how such a name for the Supreme has been acquired. By a conception, says Basil. No, says Eunomius: it would be dangerous to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of Conception may and does play us false; it can create monstrosities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, the names of the Son are too; for instance, the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the Vine. But as our Lord Himself applied these to Himself, He would, according to you, be employing the faculty of conception; and it is blasphemous to think that He employed names which we too might have arrived at by conceiving of Him in these particular ways. Therefore, Conception is not the Source of the Divine Names; but rather they come from a perception or intention implanted in us directly from on High. Ungenerate is such a name; and it reveals to us the very substance of the Deity. But Gregory defends Basil's position. He shows the entire relativity of our knowledge of the Deity. Ungenerate and every other name of God is due to a conception; in each case we perceive either an operation of the Deity, or an element of evil, and then we conceive of Him as operating in the one, or as free from the other; and so name Him. But there is no conception, because there is no perception, of the substance of the Deity. Scripture, which has revealed His operations, has not revealed that. The human mind…feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways; and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God; but, as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of the Universe;…and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this,…not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but, believing that this Being, whatever it be in substance, is one, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas.

To sum up, Eunomius found it convenient to try to disparage ̓ Επίνοια to the point of making it seem morally impossible that any name of God, but especially ̓ Αγέννητος, should come from such a source. He mocks the orthodox party for treating the privative terms for the Deity as merely privative, embodying only a notion, and for holding to the truth that God's name is above every name. He does not see how God can be above His works simply by virtue of things that do not belong to Him; this is only giving words priority over realities. He wants, and believes there exists, a word for the ousia of God, and he finds it in ̓ Αγέννητος, which according to him is not privative at all; it is the single name for the single Deity, and all the other names are contained within it. The universal Guardian thought it right to implant these names in our minds by a law of His creation. These utterances come from above. The importance of this word to the Anomœans is obvious. Gregory, as spokesman of the Nicene party, defends the capacity of the mental operation of conception to supply terms for the Deity, which, however, can none of them be final. God is incomprehensible. At the same time there is a spiritual insight of God (an ἔννοια in fact) which far surpasses Eunomius' intellectual certainty.

To sum up, it had suited Eunomius to try to disparage ̓ Επίνοια so far as to make it appear morally impossible that any name of God, but especially ̓ Αγέννητος, should be derived from such a source. He scoffs at the orthodox party for treating the privative terms for the Deity as merely privative, embodying only a notion, and for adhering to the truth that God's name is above every name. He does not see how God can be above His works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him; this is only giving to words the prerogative over realities. He wants, and believes in the existence of, a word for the substance of God, and he finds it in ̓ Αγέννητος, which according to him is not privative at all; it is the single name for the single Deity, and all the others are bound up in it. The universal Guardian thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by a law of His creation. These utterances are from above. The importance of this word to the Anomœans is obvious. Gregory, as spokesman of the Nicene party, defends the efficacy of the mental operation of conception to supply terms for the Deity, which, however, can none of them be final. God is incomprehensible. At the same time there is a spiritual insight of God (an ἔ ννοια in fact) which far surpasses Eunomius' intellectual certainty (see note p. 256).

The first part of my arguments against Eunomius has, with God's help, been sufficiently established in the preceding work. Anyone who wishes can see from what I have written how his deception has been completely exposed in that earlier part, and his falsehood no longer has any power against the truth, except for those who show a very shameless hostility toward it. But since, like some robber's ambush, he has assembled a second work against orthodoxy, once again with God's help the truth takes up arms through me against the forces of her enemies. Truth commands my arguments like a general and directs them at her pleasure against the enemy. Following her lead, I shall boldly venture into the second part of my arguments, not at all intimidated by the display of falsehood, despite its parade of numerous arguments. For He who has promised that one shall chase a thousand and that two shall put ten thousand to flight is faithful, since victory in battle comes not from numbers but from righteousness. Just as the massive Goliath, when he brandished against the Israelites that enormous spear we read about, inspired no fear in his opponent—though he was a shepherd and unskilled in military tactics—but instead met him in combat and lost his own head in a complete reversal of his expectations, so our Goliath, the champion of this foreign system, extends his blasphemy against his opponents as though his hand were on a naked sword, and flashes his sophisms fresh from his whetstone. Yet he has failed to inspire any fear in us, though we are no soldiers, or to find himself free to boast about a lack of adversaries. On the contrary, he has found us to be warriors improvised from the Lord's sheepfold, untrained in logical warfare and considering it no disadvantage to be so, but simply hurling our plain, crude argument of truth against him. Now then, that shepherd in the biblical account, after he had struck down the foreigner with his sling and broken his helmet with the stone so that it split open from the force of the blow, did not limit his courage to gazing at his fallen enemy. Instead, he ran up to him, took his head, and returned bearing it as a trophy to his people, parading that boastful head through the ranks of his countrymen. Looking to this example, we too must advance without fear to the second part of our work, and as far as possible imitate David's courage. Like him, after the first blow we must plant our foot upon the fallen enemy, so that this enemy of the truth may be displayed as much as possible as a headless corpse. For separated as he is from the true faith, he is far more truly beheaded than that Philistine. Since Christ is the head of every man, as the Apostle says, and it is only reasonable that the believer alone should be called a man (for Christ, I assume, cannot be the head of the unbelieving as well), it follows that anyone who is severed from the saving faith must be headless like Goliath, being cut off from the true head by his own sword which he had sharpened against the truth. Our task will not be to cut off this head, but to show that it is already cut off.

The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God's help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see from what I have worked out, how in that former part his fallacy has been completely exposed, and its falsehood has no further force against the truth, except in the case of those who show a very shameless animus against her. But since, like some robber's ambuscade, he has got together a second work against orthodoxy, again with God's help the truth takes up arms through me against the array of her enemies, commanding my arguments like a general and directing them at her pleasure against the foe; following whose steps I shall boldly venture on the second part of my contentions, nothing daunted by the array of falsehood, notwithstanding its display of numerous arguments. For faithful is He who has promised that a thousand shall be chased by one, and that ten thousand shall be put to flight by two, victory in battle being due not to numbers, but to righteousness. For even as bulky Goliath, when he shook against the Israelites that ponderous spear we read of, inspired no fear in his opponent, though a shepherd and unskilled in the tactics of war, but having met him in fight loses his own head by a direct reversal of his expectations, so our Goliath, the champion of this alien system, stretching forth his blasphemy against his opponents as though his hand were on a naked sword, and flashing the while with sophisms fresh from his whetstone, has failed to inspire us, though no soldiers, with any fear of his prowess, or to find himself free to exult in the dearth of adversaries; on the contrary, he has found us warriors improvised from the Lord's sheepfold, untaught in logical warfare, and thinking it no detriment to be so, but simply slinging our plain, rude argument of truth against him. Since then, that shepherd who is in the record, when he had cast down the alien with his sling, and broken his helmet with the stone, so that it gaped under the violence of the blow, did not confine his valour to gazing on his fallen foe, but running in upon him, and depriving him of his head, returns bearing it as a trophy to his people, parading that braggart head through the host of his countrymen; looking to this example it becomes us also to advance nothing daunted to the second part of our labours, but as far as possible to imitate David's valour, and, like him, after the first blow to plant our foot upon the fallen foe, so that enemy of the truth may be exhibited as much as possible as a headless trunk. For separated as he is from the true faith he is far more truly beheaded than that Philistine. For since Christ is the head of every man, as says the Apostle 1 Corinthians 11:2, and it is only reasonable that the believer alone should be so termed (for Christ, I take it, cannot be the head of the unbelieving also), it follows that he who is severed from the saving faith must be headless like Goliath, being severed from the true head by his own sword which he had whetted against the truth; which head it shall be our task not to cut off, but to show that it is cut off.

Let no one think I'm engaging in this relentless and uncompromising battle with my opponent out of pride or desire for human praise. If I were permitted to live a peaceful life without bothering anyone, it would be completely contrary to my nature to needlessly disturb my own peace by voluntarily provoking and stirring up a war against myself. But now that God's city, the Church, is under siege, and the great wall of the faith is being shaken and battered by the surrounding siege engines of heresy, and there is serious risk that the word of the Lord will be swept into captivity through their demonic assault, I consider it a terrible thing to refuse to take part in the Christian struggle. I have not turned aside to rest, but have regarded the sweat of labor as more honorable than the relaxation of rest, knowing well that just as every man, as the Apostle says, shall receive his own reward according to his own labor, so naturally he shall receive punishment for neglecting his labor in proportion to his strength. Therefore I took on the first encounter in this debate with good courage, drawing from my shepherd's bag—that is, from the teaching of the Church—my natural and spontaneous arguments for the overthrow of this blasphemy, not needing at all the equipment of arguments from secular sources to qualify me for the contest. And now I don't hold back from the second part of the encounter either, fixing my hope like great David on Him who teaches my hands to war and my fingers to fight, hoping that the writer's hand may in my case also be guided by divine power to overthrow these heretical opinions, and my fingers may serve to overthrow their malicious array by directing my argument with skill and precision against the enemy. But just as in human battles those who excel in courage and strength, protected by their armor and having already acquired military skill through their training for facing danger, station themselves at the head of their column, encountering danger for those positioned behind them, while the rest of the company, though serving only to give an appearance of numbers, nevertheless seem, if only by their closely-packed shields, to contribute to the common good—so in our battles that noble soldier of Christ and fierce champion against the aliens, the mighty spiritual warrior Basil, equipped as he is with the whole armor described by the Apostle, protected by the shield of faith, and ever holding before him that weapon of defense, the sword of the spirit, fights at the front of the Lord's army by his elaborate argument against this heresy, alive and resisting and prevailing over the enemy, while we the common crowd, sheltering ourselves beneath the shield of that champion of the faith, will not hold back from any battles within the scope of our ability, as our captain may lead us on against the enemy. Since he, then, in his refutation of the false and untenable position maintained by this heresy, affirms that "ungenerate" cannot be predicated of God except as a mere notion or conception—which he has demonstrated with proofs supported by common sense and the evidence of Scripture—while Eunomius, the author of the heresy, neither agrees with his statements nor is able to overturn them, but in his struggle with the truth, the more clearly the light of true doctrine shines forth, the more, like nocturnal creatures, he shuns the light, and, no longer able to find the sophisticated hiding places he is accustomed to, he wanders about at random, and getting into the labyrinth of falsehood goes round and round in the same place—nearly all of his second treatise being taken up with this empty nonsense—it is therefore appropriate that our battle with those who oppose us should take place on the same ground where our champion has been our leader through his own treatise.

And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with the foe. For if it were allowed me to pass a peaceful life meddling with no one, it would be far enough from my disposition to wantonly disturb my tranquillity, by voluntarily provoking and stirring up a war against myself. But now that God's city, the Church, is besieged, and the great wall of the faith is shaken, battered by the encircling engines of heresy, and there is no small risk of the word of the Lord being swept into captivity through their devilish onslaught, deeming it a dreadful thing to decline taking part in the Christian conflict, I have not turned aside to repose, but have looked on the sweat of toil as more honourable than the relaxation of repose, knowing well that just as every man, as says the Apostle, shall receive his own reward 1 Corinthians 3:14 according to his own labour, so as a matter of course he shall receive punishment for neglect of labour proportioned to his strength. Accordingly I supported the first encounter in the discussion with good courage, discharging from my shepherd's scrip, i.e. from the teaching of the Church, my natural and unpremeditated arguments for the subversion of this blasphemy, needing not at all the equipment of arguments from profane sources to qualify me for the contest; and now also I do not hang back from the second part of the encounter, fixing my hope like great David on Him Who teaches my hands to war, and my fingers to fight, if haply the hand of the writer may in my case also be guided by Divine power to the overthrow of these heretical opinions, and my fingers may serve for the overthrow of their malignant array by directing my argument with skill and precision against the foe. But as in human conflicts those who excel in valour and might, secured by their armour and having previously acquired military skill by their training for facing danger, station themselves at the head of their column, encountering danger for those ranged behind them, while the rest of the company, though serving only to give an appearance of numbers, seem nevertheless, if only by their serried shields, to conduce to the common good, so in these our conflicts that noble soldier of Christ and vehement champion against the aliens, the mighty spiritual warrior Basil — equipped as he is with the whole armour described by the Apostle, and secured by the shield of faith, and ever holding before him that weapon of defense, the sword of the spirit — fights in the van of the Lord's host by his elaborated argument against this heresy, alive and resisting and prevailing over the foe, while we the common herd, sheltering ourselves beneath the shield of that champion of the faith, shall not hold back from any conflicts within the compass of our power, according as our captain may lead us on against the foe. As he, then, in his refutation of the false and untenable opinion maintained by this heresy, affirms that ungenerate cannot be predicated of God except as a mere notion or conception, whereof he has adduced proofs supported by common sense and the evidence of Scripture, while Eunomius, the author of the heresy, neither falls in with his statements nor is able to overturn them, but in his conflict with the truth, the more clearly the light of true doctrine shines forth, the more, like nocturnal creatures, does he shun the light, and, no longer able to find the sophistical hiding-places to which he is accustomed, he wanders about at random, and getting into the labyrinth of falsehood goes round and round in the same place, almost the whole of his second treatise being taken up with this empty trifling — it is well accordingly that our battle with those opposed to us should take place on the same ground whereon our champion by his own treatise has been our leader.

First of all, I think it's best to briefly review our own doctrinal beliefs and how our opponents disagree with them, so that our examination of these issues can proceed in an orderly way. Now the central point of Christian orthodoxy is to believe that the Only-begotten God, who is the truth and the true light, and the power of God and the life, is truly all that He is said to be—both in other ways and especially in this: that He is God and the truth, that is, God in truth, always being what He is understood to be and what He is called, who never at any time did not exist, nor will ever cease to exist, whose being, as it essentially is, is beyond the reach of any curious inquiry that would try to grasp it. But to us, as the word of Wisdom says, He makes Himself known through the greatness and beauty of His creatures in proportion to the things that are known, granting us the gift of faith through the works of His hands, but not the comprehension of what He is. While this is the belief held by all Christians—at least by those who are truly worthy of that name, those who have been taught by the law to worship nothing that is not truly God, and by that very act of worship confess that the Only-begotten is God in truth and not a God falsely so called—there arose this deadly plague upon the Church, bringing barrenness to the holy seeds of the faith, promoting the errors of Judaism and sharing to some extent in the impiety of the Greeks. For in its invention of a created God it promotes the error of the Greeks, and in not accepting the Son it supports that of the Jews. This school, which would destroy the very Godhead of the Lord and teach people to think of Him as a created being rather than as what the Father is in ousia and power and dignity, since these foggy ideas find no support when exposed on all sides to the light of truth, have ignored all those names supplied by Scripture for the glorification of God and applied equally to the Father and to the Son, and have turned instead to the word "ungenerate," a term they fabricated themselves to cast contempt on the greatness of the Only-begotten God. For while an orthodox confession teaches us to believe in the Only-begotten God so that all people should honor the Son just as they honor the Father, these people, rejecting the orthodox terms by which the greatness of the Son is expressed as equal with the dignity of the Father, draw from this the beginnings and foundations of their heresy regarding His Divinity. For since the Only-begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is of Him, they misrepresent this doctrine by changing the terms and use them to tear the true faith to pieces. For while the truth teaches that the Father is from no pre-existing cause, these people have given to such a view the name of ungeneracy, and they designate the ousia of the Only-begotten from the Father by the term generation—then comparing the two terms "ungenerate" and "generate" as contradictories to each other, they use this opposition to mislead their senseless followers. To make this clearer with an illustration: the expressions "He was generated" and "He was not generated" are much the same as "He is seated" and "He is not seated," and all similar expressions. But they twist these expressions away from the natural meaning of the terms and are eager to impose another meaning on them with the goal of subverting orthodoxy. For while, as has been said, the words "is seated" and "is not seated" are not equivalent in meaning—one expression being contradictory of the other—they claim that this formal contradiction in expression indicates an essential difference, assigning generation to the Son and non-generation to the Father as their essential attributes. Yet just as it is impossible to regard a man's sitting or not sitting as the ousia of the man—for one would not use the same definition for a man's sitting as for the man himself—so, by the analogy of the above example, the non-generated ousia is in its inherent idea something wholly different from the thing expressed by not having been generated. But our opponents, with an eye toward their evil goal of establishing their denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, do not say that the ousia of the Father is ungenerate, but conversely, they declare ungeneracy to be His ousia, so that by this distinction regarding generation they may establish, through the verbal opposition, a diversity of natures. In the direction of impiety they look with ten thousand eyes, but regarding the unworkability of their own argument they are as incapable of vision as people who deliberately close their eyes. For who but someone whose mental vision is utterly blind can fail to see the loose and insubstantial character of the foundation of their doctrine, and that their argument in support of ungeneracy as an ousia has nothing to stand on? For this is the way their error would establish itself.

First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent's disagreement with them, so that our review of the propositions in question may proceed methodically. Now the main point of Christian orthodoxy is to believe that the Only-begotten God, Who is the truth and the true light, and the power of God and the life, is truly all that He is said to be, both in other respects and especially in this, that He is God and the truth, that is to say, God in truth, ever being what He is conceived to be and what He is called, Who never at any time was not, nor ever will cease to be, Whose being, such as it is essentially, is beyond the reach of the curiosity that would try to comprehend it. But to us, as says the word of Wisdom, He makes Himself known that He is by the greatness and beauty of His creatures proportionately to the things that are known, vouchsafing to us the gift of faith by the operations of His hands, but not the comprehension of what He is. Whereas, then, such is the opinion prevailing among all Christians, (such at least as are truly worthy of the appellation, those, I mean, who have been taught by the law to worship nothing that is not very God, and by that very act of worship confess that the Only-begotten is God in truth, and not a God falsely so called,) there arose this deadly blight of the Church, bringing barrenness on the holy seeds of the faith, advocating as it does the errors of Judaism, and partaking to a certain extent in the impiety of the Greeks. For in its figment of a created God it advocates the error of the Greeks, and in not accepting the Son it supports that of the Jews. This school, then, which would do away with the very Godhead of the Lord and teach men to conceive of Him as a created being, and not that which the Father is in essence and power and dignity, since these misty ideas find no support when exposed on all sides to the light of truth, have overlooked all those names supplied by Scripture for the glorification of God, and predicated in like manner of the Father and of the Son, and have betaken themselves to the word ungenerate, a term fabricated by themselves to throw contempt on the greatness of the Only-begotten God. For whereas an orthodox confession teaches us to believe in the Only-begotten God so that all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father, these men, rejecting the orthodox terms whereby the greatness of the Son is signified as on a par with the dignity of the Father, draw from thence the beginnings and foundations of their heresy in regard to His Divinity. For as the Only-begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is of Him, misrepresenting this doctrine by a change of terms, they make use of them to rend the true faith in pieces. For whereas the truth teaches that the Father is from no pre-existing cause, these men have given to such a view the name of ungeneracy, and signify the substance of the Only-begotten from the Father by the term generation, — then comparing the two terms ungenerate and generate as contradictories to each other, they make use of the opposition to mislead their senseless followers. For, to make the matter clearer by an illustration, the expressions, He was generated and He was not generated, are much the same as, He is seated and He is not seated, and all such-like expressions. But they, forcing these expressions away from the natural significance of the terms, are eager to put another meaning upon them with a view to the subversion of orthodoxy. For whereas, as has been said, the words is seated and is not seated are not equivalent in meaning (the one expression being contradictory of the other), they pretend that this formal contradiction in expression indicates an essential difference, ascribing generation to the Son and non-generation to the Father as their essential attributes. Yet, as it is impossible to regard a man's sitting down or not as the essence of the man (for one would not use the same definition for a man's sitting as for the man himself), so, by the analogy of the above example, the non-generated essence is in its inherent idea something wholly different from the thing expressed by not having been generated. But our opponents, with an eye to their evil object, that of establishing their denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, do not say that the essence of the Father is ungenerate, but, conversely, they declare ungeneracy to be His essence, in order that by this distinction in regard to generation they may establish, by the verbal opposition, a diversity of natures. In the direction of impiety they look with ten thousand eyes, but with regard to the impracticability of their own contention they are as incapable of vision as men who deliberately close their eyes. For who but one whose mental optics are utterly purblind can fail to discern the loose and unsubstantial character of the principle of their doctrine, and that their argument in support of ungeneracy as an essence has nothing to stand upon? For this is the way in which their error would establish itself.

I will do my best to respond to our opponents' argument. They claim that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by nature simple, and that what is simple permits no composition. Therefore, if God who is declared to be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungenerate must belong to His very nature, and that nature is identical with ungeneracy. We reply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, because the former indicates the simplicity of the subject while the latter indicates its being without origin. These expressions are not interchangeable in meaning, even though both are predicated of one subject. From the name Ungenerate we have learned that the One who is so named is without origin, and from the name simple that He is free from all mixture or composition. These terms cannot be substituted for each other. Therefore it is not necessary that, because the Godhead is by its nature simple, that nature should be called ungeneracy. Rather, insofar as He is indivisible and without composition, He is called simple, while insofar as He was not generated, He is called ungenerate.

But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies' argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by nature simple, and that which is simple admits of no composition. If, then, God Who is declared to be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungenerate must belong to His very nature, and that nature is identical with ungeneracy. To whom we reply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, for the former represents the simplicity of the subject, the other its being without origin, and these expressions are not convertible in meaning, though both are predicated of one subject. But from the appellation of Ungenerate we have been taught that He Who is so named is without origin, and from the appellation of simple that He is free from all admixture (or composition), and these terms cannot be substituted for each other. There is therefore no necessity that, because the Godhead is by its nature simple, that nature should be termed ungeneracy; but in that He is indivisible and without composition, He is spoken of as simple, while in that He was not generated, He is spoken of as ungenerate.

Now if the term ungenerate did not signify being without origin, but the idea of simplicity were part of what the term means, and if God were called ungenerate in their heretical sense merely because He is simple and incomposite, and if the terms simple and ungenerate mean the same thing, then the simplicity of the Son would also be equivalent to ungeneracy. For they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His physis simple, unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Therefore the term simplicity would have no such connection in its meaning with being ungenerate that His physis should be called ungeneracy because of its incomposite character. Otherwise they bring on themselves one of two absurd alternatives: either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or attributing ungeneracy to Him as well. For if God is simple, and the term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they must either claim the Son is of composite nature, which would imply that He is not God, or if they allow His Godhead, and God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out to be ungenerate at the same time, if the terms simple and ungenerate are convertible. To make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We affirm that each of these terms has its own distinct meaning, and that the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate by simple. Rather, by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore, we hold that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness. Similarly, when we speak of Him by the name of Son, we neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son. Rather, the term Son indicates that He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple means what the word plainly indicates. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should be defined by the term ungenerate simply because that essence is simple. For neither do we say of the Son, who is simple and whom we also believe to be generated, that His essence is simplicity. But just as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. Likewise, the Son being generated, our reason is freed from any necessity to define His essence as generateness just because His essence is simple. Here again each expression has its own distinct force. For the term generated suggests to you a source from which He comes, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this does not satisfy them. For they maintain that since the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy, and on this account He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to them we may also observe that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He who is so called is simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of the Father to be creation and making, since their argument about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by the same reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of the Father—not as though the power residing in the essence created and made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For just as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, neither is ungeneracy the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clarity and conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not because He has never been generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, then by the same reasoning the Son must also be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is clear that we must address the Father as ungenerate because He was not generated. But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but indicates a difference in our ways of understanding, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence of the Father, and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the Father's being without origin, when they have set aside the term ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner from the subject matter and disclosing what we seek in articulate syllables, it must follow that God either is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word left to express such distinct significance in regard to Him. For since according to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument, something else and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been removed from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to each Person and not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions about the word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be maintained without confusion, unless there is a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Therefore if the term denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by this name. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called Son-Fathers, all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from their account. But if they say that there is nothing to prevent the distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that this term also represents the essence, let them distinguish for us the related meanings of the word, so that the notion of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal contrast. For as an equivalent to saying the Son has, and the Father has not, been generated, we too agree with the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation. But how a clear manifestation of essence can be made by this name, this they are unable to say. But keeping silent on this matter, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his earlier treatise. Because God, he says, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What does the notion of simplicity have to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten generated, but without controversy He is also simple. But, he says, He is also without parts and incomposite. But what does this have to do with the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite, and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.

Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were called ungenerate in their heretical sense, merely because He is simple and incomposite, and if the terms simple and ungenerate are the same in meaning, then too must the simplicity of the Son be equivalent with ungeneracy. For they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His nature simple, unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Accordingly the term simplicity will in its meaning have no such connection with being ungenerate as that, by reason of its incomposite character, His nature should be termed ungeneracy; or they draw upon themselves one of two absurd alternatives, either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or attributing ungeneracy to Him also. For if God is simple, and the term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they must either make out the Son to be of composite nature, by which term it is implied that neither is He God, or if they allow His Godhead, and God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out at the same time to be ungenerate, if the terms simple and ungenerate are convertible. But to make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We affirm that each of these terms has its own peculiar meaning, and that the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate by simple; but by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore we hold that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness; and in like manner in speaking of Him also by the appellation of Son we neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son, but the term Son we hold to indicate that He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple we hold to mean what the word bears upon its face. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should, because that essence is simple, be defined by the term ungenerate. For neither of the Son, Who is simple, and Whom also we believe to be generated, do we say that His essence is simplicity. But as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. In like manner also the Son being generated, our reason is freed from any necessity that, because His essence is simple, we should define that essence as generateness; but here again each expression has its peculiar force. For the term generated suggests to you a source whence, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this does not approve itself to them. For they maintain that since the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy; on which account also He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to whom we may also observe that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He Who is so called is simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of the Father to be creation and making, since the argument about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by a parity of reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of the Father, not as though the power residing in the essence created and made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, no more is ungeneracy the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clearness and conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not by reason of His having never been generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, by a parity of reasoning the Son also must be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is manifest that we must address the Father as ungenerate, because He was not generated. But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence (of the Father), and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the Father's being without origin, when they have set aside the term ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner from the subject-matter, and disclosing what we seek in articulate syllables, it must follow that God is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word left to express such peculiar significance in regard to Him. For inasmuch as according to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument, something else, and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been got rid of from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to either Person, and not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions as to the word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be without confusion, unless there be a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Accordingly if the term denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by the appellation. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called Son-Fathers, all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from their account. But if they say that there is nothing to hinder the distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that term represents the essence too, let them distinguish for us the kindred meanings of the word, so that the notion of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal opposition. For as an equivalent to saying The Son has, and the Father has not, been generated, we too assent to the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation. But from what point of view a clear manifestation of essence can be made by this appellation, this they are unable to say. But keeping silence on this head, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his former treatise. Because God, says he, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What has the notion of simplicity to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten generated, but, without controversy, He is simple also. But, says he, He is without parts also, and incomposite. But what is this to the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite: and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.

But, he says, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Agreed—for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet He is the Son. But this is not the point. The task before us is this: in what sense of "ungenerate" is ousia declared? For just as this word marks the difference of properties, so they maintain that the ousia also is indicated without ambiguity by one of the things signified by this term.

But, says he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But this is not the point. For the task set before us is this: in what signification of ungenerate is essence declared? For as this word marks the difference of the properties, so they maintain that the essence also is indicated without ambiguity by one of the things signified by the appellation.

But Eunomius leaves this matter unaddressed and merely says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is spoken in this way, he claims, is dissolved and passes away with its utterance. But what utterance exists that is not dissolved in this way? We do not preserve undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we speak with our voice in the mold of speech that we form once and for all with our lips. Rather, as soon as one utterance has been sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For when the breath of our voice is dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the place where this dispersion of our voice has occurred. So if he makes this the distinguishing characteristic of a term that expresses a mere conception—that it does not remain but vanishes with the voice that utters it—he might as well call every term a mere conception, since no substance remains in any term after its utterance. Nor will he be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he exempts from the products of conception, is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this vocal expression through the lips does not remain in the air. From this we may see the insubstantial character of his assertions, because even if we describe our mental conceptions in writing without speech, it is not as though the substantial objects of our thoughts will acquire their significance from the letters while the non-substantial will have no part in what the letters express. For whatever enters our mind, whether intellectually existing or otherwise, we can store away in writing at our discretion. Voice and letters have equal value for expressing thought, since we communicate what we think by the latter just as by the former. What justification he sees, then, for making the mental conception perish with the voice alone, I cannot comprehend. For in the case of all speech uttered by means of sound, the passage of breath that conveys the voice returns to its kindred element, but the sense of the spoken words is engraved by hearing on the memory of the hearer's soul, whether it be true or false. Is this not, then, a weak interpretation of his conception that our writer offers, when he characterizes and defines it by the dissolution of the voice? For this reason the understanding hearer, as Isaiah says, objects to this inconceivable account of mental conception, showing it—to use the man's own words—to be a truly dissoluble and insubstantial one, and he discusses scientifically the force inherent in the term, advancing his argument by familiar examples to the contemplation of doctrine. Against him Eunomius, exalting himself with this pompous writing, attempts to overthrow the true account of mental conception in this manner.

But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, says he, is dissolved, and passes away with its utterance. But what is there that is uttered but is so dissolved? For we do not keep undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we utter with our voice in the mould of the speech which we form once for all with our lips, but as soon as one speech has been sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For the breath of our voice being dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the spot in which such dispersion of our voice has taken place: so that if he makes this the distinguishing characteristic of a term that expresses a mere conception, that it does not remain, but vanishes with the voice that gives it utterance, he may as well at once call every term a mere conception, inasmuch as no substance remains in any term subsequent to its utterance. No, nor will he be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he excepts from the products of conception, is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this expression of the voice through the lips does not abide in the air. And from this we may see the unsubstantial character of his assertions; because, even if without speech we describe in writing our mental conceptions, it is not as though the substantial objects of our thoughts will acquire their significance from the letters, while the non-substantial will have no part in what the letters express. For whatever comes into our mind, whether intellectually existing, or otherwise, it is possible for us at our discretion to store away in writing. And the voice and letters are of equal value for the expression of thought, for we communicate what we think by the latter as well as by the former. What he sees, then, to justify his making the mental conception perish with the voice only, I fail to comprehend. For in the case of all speech uttered by means of sound, the passage of the breath indeed which conveys the voice is towards its kindred element, but the sense of the words spoken is engraved by hearing on the memory of the hearer's soul, whether it be true or false. Is not this, then, a weak interpretation of this conception of his that our writer offers, when he characterizes and defines it by the dissolution of the voice? And for this reason the understanding hearer, as says Isaiah, objects to this inconceivable account of mental conception, showing it, to use the man's own words, to be a veritably dissoluble and unsubstantial one, and he discusses scientifically the force inherent in the term, advancing his argument by familiar examples to the contemplation of doctrine. Against whom Eunomius exalting himself with this pompous writing, endeavours to overthrow the true account of mental conception, after this manner.

But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to ask what his purpose is in refusing to admit that "ungenerate" can be predicated of God by way of conception. Now the teaching that has been held in common by all who have received the word of our religion is that all hope of salvation should be placed in Christ, since it is impossible for anyone to be found among the righteous unless faith in Christ supplies what is needed. And since this conviction is firmly established in the souls of the faithful, and all honor and glory and worship are due to the Only-begotten God as the Author of life, who does the works of the Father, as the Lord himself says in the Gospel, and who falls short of no excellence in all knowledge of what is good, I do not know how they have been so perverted by malice and jealousy of the Lord's honor that, as though they judged the worship paid by the faithful to the Only-begotten God to be harmful to themselves, they oppose his divine honors and try to persuade us that nothing said of him is true. For according to them, he is not truly God, though Scripture apparently calls him so, nor, though called Son, does he have a physis that makes good the title, nor does he share in dignity or physis with the Father. For, they say, it is not possible for the one who is begotten to be of equal honor with the one who made him, either in dignity, or in power, or in physis, because the latter's life is infinite and his existence is from eternity, while the Son's life is in a way circumscribed, with the beginning of his being begotten limiting his life at the start and preventing it from being coextensive with the Father's eternity, so that his life also is to be regarded as defective. And the Father was not always what he now is and is said to be, but, having been something else before, he afterwards determined that he would be a Father, or rather that he would be so called. For he was not rightly called Father even of the Son, but of a creature falsely given the title of son. And in every way, they say, the younger is necessarily inferior to the elder, the finite to the eternal, and what is begotten by the will of the begetter is inferior to the begetter himself in power, dignity, physis, precedence due to age, and all other privileges of respect. But how can we justly honor with the honors due to the true God that which lacks the perfection of the more divine attributes? Thus they would establish the doctrine that one who is limited in power, lacking in the perfection of life, subject to a superior, and doing nothing by himself except what is authorized by the more powerful, is worthy of no divine honor and consideration, but that while we call him God, we are using a term empty of all grandeur in its meaning. And since such statements as these, when stripped of their plausible disguise, provoke indignation and make the hearer shudder at their strangeness (for who can tolerate an evil counselor openly and recklessly urging the overthrow of Christ's majesty?), they therefore try to corrupt foolish hearers with these foreign ideas by wrapping their malicious and deceptive arguments in many seductive fallacies. For after laying down such premises as would naturally lead the hearers' minds in the desired direction, they leave the hearer to draw his own conclusion.

But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predicated of God by way of conception. Now the tenet which has been held in common by all who have received the word of our religion is, that all hope of salvation should be placed in Christ, it being impossible for any to be found among the righteous, unless faith in Christ supply what is desired. And this conviction being firmly established in the souls of the faithful, and all honour and glory and worship being due to the Only-begotten God as the Author of life, Who does the works of the Father, as the Lord Himself says in the Gospel, and Who falls short of no excellence in all knowledge of that which is good, I know not how they have been so perverted by malignity and jealousy of the Lord's honour, that, as though they judged the worship paid by the faithful to the Only-begotten God to be a detriment to themselves, they oppose His Divine honours, and try to persuade us that nothing that is said of them is true. For with them neither is He very God, though called so, it would seem, by Scripture, nor, though called Son, has He a nature that makes good the appellation, nor has He a community of dignity or of nature with the Father. For, say they, it is not possible for Him that is begotten to be of equal honour with Him Who made Him, either in dignity, or in power, or in nature, because the life of the latter is infinite, and His existence from eternity, while the life of the Son is in a manner circumscribed, the beginning of His being begotten limiting His life at the commencement, and preventing it from being coextensive with the eternity of the Father, so that His life also is to be regarded as defective; and the Father was not always what He now is and is said to be, but, having been something else before, He afterwards determined that He would be a Father, or rather that He would be so called. For not even of the Son was He rightly called Father, but of a creature supposititiously invested with the title of son. And every way, say they, the younger is of necessity inferior to the elder, the finite to the eternal, that which is begotten by the will of the begetter, to the begetter himself, both in power, and dignity, and nature, and precedence due to age, and all other prerogatives of respect. But how can we justly dignify with the honours due to the true God that which is wanting in the perfection of the diviner attributes? Thus they would establish the doctrine that one who is limited in power, and wanting in the perfection of life, and subject to a superior, and doing nothing of himself but what is sanctioned by the authority of the more powerful, is in no divine honour and consideration, but that, while we call him God, we are employing a term empty of all grandeur in its significance. And since such statements as these, when stripped of their plausible dress, move indignation and make the hearer shudder at their strangeness (for who can tolerate an evil counsellor nakedly and unadvisably urging the overthrow of the majesty of Christ?), they therefore try to pervert foolish hearers with these foreign notions by enveloping their malignant and insidious arguments in a number of seductive fallacies. For after laying down such premises as might naturally lead the mind of the hearers in the desired direction, they leave the hearer to draw his conclusion for himself.

After saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in ousia with the true Father, and after using sophisticated arguments to infer this from the opposition between generate and ungenerate, they work silently toward their conclusion, their impiety advancing through the natural course of logical inference. Just as a poisoner makes his drug acceptable to his victim by sweetening its deadliness with honey—he merely has to offer it, while the drug works its way into the vital organs without any further action from the poisoner and does its deadly work—so our opponents act in the same way. By coating their destructive teaching with sophisticated arguments, as if with honey, once they have planted in the hearer's mind the poisonous falsehood that God the Only-begotten is not truly God, they let everything else be inferred without saying another word. When people are convinced that He is not truly God, it naturally follows that no other divine attribute truly applies either. If He is truly neither Son nor God, except by misuse of terms, then the other names given to Him in Holy Scripture are departures from the truth. One thing cannot be truly predicated of Him while the other is false; they must follow from one another, so that if He is truly God, it follows that He is Judge and King, and His various attributes are as they are described. But if His godhead is falsely asserted, then the truth does not hold for any of His other attributes either. Once they have deceived people into believing that the attribute of Godhead is falsely applied to the Only-begotten, it follows that He is not rightly the object of worship and adoration, or in fact of any of the honors paid to God. So to make their attack on the Savior effective, this is the blasphemous method they have adopted. They argue there is no need to look at the complete set of attributes by which the Son's equality in honor and dignity with the Father is shown; instead, from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue for a distinctive difference of physis, for the divine physis is what is denoted by the term ungenerate. Furthermore, since all sensible people regard it as impossible to describe the ineffable Being by any use of words—because our knowledge does not extend to comprehending what transcends knowledge, nor does our use of words have such power as to fully express our thoughts when the mind is focused on anything supremely lofty and divine—these supposedly wise people, on the contrary, convict everyone else of senselessness and ignorance of logic, assert their own knowledge of such matters, and claim their ability to teach it to whomever they wish. Accordingly, they maintain that the divine physis is simply ungeneracy itself, and declaring this to be sovereign and supreme, they make this word encompass the whole greatness of Godhead, thus necessitating the inference that if ungeneracy is the main element of the essence, and the other divine attributes are connected with it—namely Godhead, power, imperishableness and so on—if ungeneracy means these things, then if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest. Just as reason, the capacity to laugh, and the capacity for knowledge are proper to man, and what is not humanity cannot be classified among the properties of his physis, so if true Godhead consists in ungeneracy, then whatever thing the latter name does not properly belong to will not have any of the other distinguishing attributes of Godhead in it. If, then, ungeneracy is not predicable of the Son, it follows that none of His sublime and godlike attributes are properly ascribed to Him. This, then, is what they define as a correct understanding of the divine mysteries—the rejection of the Son's Godhead—practically shouting in the ears of those who would listen to them: You are granted perfection in knowledge if only you do not believe in God the Only-begotten as being truly God, and do not honor the Son as the Father is honored, but regard Him as by physis a created being, not Lord and Master, but slave and subject. This is the aim and purpose of their plan, though the blasphemy is concealed in different terms.

For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the opposition between generate and ungenerate, they work in silence to the conclusion, their impiety prevailing by the natural course of inference. And as the poisoner makes his drug acceptable to his victim by sweetening its deadliness with honey, and, as for himself, has only to offer it, while the drug insinuating itself into the vitals without further action on the part of the poisoner does its deadly work — so, too, do our opponents act. For qualifying their pernicious teaching with their sophistical refinements, as with honey, when they have infused into the mind of the hearer the venomous fallacy that God the Only-begotten is not very God, they cause all the rest to be inferred without saying a word. For when they are persuaded that He is not truly God, it follows as a matter of course that no other Divine attribute is truly applicable. For if He is truly neither Son nor God, except by an abuse of terms, then the other names which are given to Him in Holy Scripture are a divergence from the truth. For the one thing cannot be predicated of Him with truth, and the other be destitute of it; but they must needs follow one another, so that, if He be truly God, it follows that He is Judge and King, and that His several attributes are such as they are described, while, if His godhead be falsely asserted, neither will the truth hold respecting any of His other attributes. They, then, having been deceived into the persuasion that the attribute of Godhead is falsely applied to the Only-begotten, it follows that He is not rightly the object of worship and adoration, or, in fact, of any of the honours that are paid to God. In order, then, to render their attack upon the Saviour efficacious, this is the blasphemous method that they have adopted. There is no need, they urge, of looking at the collective attributes by which the Son's equality in honour and dignity with the Father is signified, but from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue a distinctive difference of nature; for the Divine nature is that which is denoted by the term ungenerate. Again, since all men of sense regard it as impracticable to indicate the ineffable Being by any force of words, because neither does our knowledge extend to the comprehension of what transcends knowledge, nor does the ministry of words have such power in us as to avail for the full enunciation of our thought, where the mind is engaged on anything eminently lofty and divine, — these wise folk, on the contrary, convicting men in general of want of sense and ignorance of logic, assert their own knowledge of such matters, and their ability to impart it to whomsoever they will; and accordingly they maintain that the divine nature is simply ungeneracy per se, and declaring this to be sovereign and supreme, they make this word comprehend the whole greatness of Godhead, so as to necessitate the inference that if ungeneracy is the main point of the essence, and the other divine attributes are bound up with it, viz. Godhead, power, imperishableness and so on — if (I say) ungeneracy mean these, then, if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest. For as reason, and risibility, and capacity of knowledge are proper to man, and what is not humanity may not be classed among the properties of his nature, so, if true Godhead consists in ungeneracy, then, to whatsoever thing the latter name does not properly belong, no one at all of the other distinguishing attributes of Godhead will be found in it. If, then, ungeneracy is not predicable of the Son, it follows that no other of His sublime and godlike attributes are properly ascribed to Him. This, then, they define as a right comprehension of the divine mysteries — the rejection of the Son's Godhead — all but shouting in the ear of those who would listen to them; To you it is given to be perfect in knowledge, if only you believe not in God the Only-begotten as being very God, and honour not the Son as the Father is honoured, but regard Him as by nature a created being, not Lord and Master, but slave and subject. For this is the aim and object of their design, though the blasphemy is cloaked in different terms.

Therefore, wrapping up his earlier false reasoning in the twisting turns of his sophisticated arguments, and craftily manipulating the term ungenerate, he deceives the understanding of those he tricks, saying to them: "Well then, if it is not so by way of conception, nor by deprivation, nor by division (since He is without parts), nor as being another in Himself (since He is the one and only ungenerate), then He Himself must be, in ousia, ungenerate."

Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals away the intelligence of his dupes, saying to them, "Well, then, if neither by way of conception it is so, nor by deprivation, nor by division (for He is without parts), nor as being another in Himself (for He is the one only ungenerate), He Himself must be, in essence, ungenerate.

Seeing, then, the harm that results to those deceived by this fallacious reasoning—namely, that to deny He is truly God means departing from our confession of Him as our Lord, which is indeed where his words lead his teaching—our master does not deny that "ungenerate" is not a partial predicate of God, himself also admitting that God is without quantity, magnitude, or parts. But he challenges the statement that this term should not be applied to God by way of mental conception, and he provides his proofs. However, shifting from this position again, our writer in the second of his treatises confronts us with his sophistry, arguing against his own statements regarding mental conception.

Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning — that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confession of Him as our Lord, to which conclusion indeed his words would bring his teaching — our master does not indeed deny that ungenerate is no partial predicate of God, himself also admitting that God is without quantity, or magnitude, or parts; but the statement that this term ought not to be applied to Him by way of mental conception he impugns, and gives his proofs. But again, shifting from this position, our writer in the second of his treatises meets us with his sophistry, combating his own statements in regard to mental conception.

Human nature has no capacity sufficient for fully comprehending the divine essence. It may be easy to demonstrate this in the case of human ability alone, and to say that the incorporeal creation is incapable of grasping and comprehending that nature which is infinite would not be far from the truth, as we can see from familiar examples. There are many and various things that have fleshly life—winged creatures and earthly ones, some that rise above the clouds by their wings, others that live in hollows or burrow underground. Comparing these, it appears there is no small difference between the inhabitants of air and land. But if the comparison is extended to the stars and the fixed heavens, it becomes clear that what soars on wings is not less removed from heaven than from the animals on earth. In the same way, the strength of angels compared with our own seems extraordinarily great because, undisturbed by sensation, it pursues lofty themes with pure, unclothed intelligence. Yet if we measure even their comprehension against the majesty of Him Who truly is, perhaps if someone dared to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his guess would fall within the bounds of probability. Wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and separates uncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former is not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter extends itself within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space; the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling investigation from every angle. In this life we can grasp the beginning and end of all things that exist, but the blessedness that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning. It is above all that either term signifies, being always the same, self-dependent, not progressing by degrees from one point to another in its life. For there is no participation of other life in its life such that we might infer end and beginning. Whatever it is, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. Increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature without passions excludes all notion of decrease. When we look up to heaven and partially grasp through our eyes the beauty in the heights, we do not doubt the existence of what we see. But if asked what it is, we cannot define its nature. We simply marvel as we contemplate the overarching vault, the reverse planetary motion, the so-called Zodiac engraved obliquely on the pole (whereby astronomers observe the motion of bodies revolving in the opposite direction), the differences of luminaries according to their magnitude and the distinctive qualities of their rays, their risings and settings that occur according to the circling year always at the same seasons unfailingly, the conjunctions of planets, the courses of those that pass below, the eclipses of those that are above, the shadowings by the earth, the reappearance of eclipsed bodies, the moon's many-formed changes, the motion of the sun midway within the poles, and how—filled with his own light, crowned with his encircling beams, and embracing all things in his sovereign light—he himself also at times suffers eclipse (the disc of the moon, as they say, passing before him), and how, by the will of Him Who has so ordained it, always running his own particular course, he completes his appointed orbit and progress, opening out the four seasons of the year in succession. When we contemplate these phenomena with the aid of sight, we have no doubt of their existence, though we are as far from comprehending their essential nature as if sight had given us no glimpse whatever of what we have seen. Similarly, regarding the Creator of the world, we know that He exists, but we cannot deny that we are ignorant of His essential nature. But since they boast that they know these things, let them first tell us about things of inferior nature—what they think of the body of the heavens, of the machinery that conveys the stars in their eternal courses, or of the sphere in which they move. However far speculation may proceed, when it reaches the uncertain and incomprehensible it must stop. For even if someone says that another body, similar in form to that body of the heavens and fitting its circular shape, checks its velocity so that, always turning in its course, it revolves in conformity to that other body upon itself, being kept by the force that embraces it from flying off at a tangent—yet how can he claim that these bodies will remain unworn by their constant friction with each other? And how is motion produced in the case of two coexisting bodies mutually fitted together, when one remains motionless? For the inner body, one would think, being held as in a vise by the motionlessness of that which embraces it, will be completely unable to act. And what maintains the embracing body in its fixedness so that it remains unshaken and unaffected by the motion of what fits into it? And if in restless curiosity of thought we conceive of some position for it that would keep it stationary, we must go on in logical consistency to search for the base of that base, and of the next, and of the next, and so on. The inquiry, proceeding from like to like, will go on to infinity and end in helpless perplexity. Even when some body has been proposed as the farthest foundation of the system of the universe, the mind still reaches after what is beyond, so there is no stopping in our inquiry after the limit of the embracing circles. But others say differently: according to the vain theory of those who have speculated on these matters, there is an empty space spread over the back of the heavens, and the motion of the universe revolves upon itself within this vacuum, meeting no resistance from any solid body capable of slowing it by opposition and checking its revolution. What, then, is that vacuum, which they say is neither a body nor an idea? How far does it extend, and what comes after it, and what relation exists between the firm, resisting body and that void and unsubstantial one? What unites things so contrary by nature? And how can the harmony of the universe consist of elements so incompatible? And what can anyone say of heaven itself? That it is a mixture of the elements it contains, or one of them, or something else besides them? What about the stars themselves? Where does their radiance come from? What is it and how is it composed? And what is the reason for their difference in beauty and magnitude? And the seven inner orbs revolving in a direction opposite to the motion of the universe—what are they, and by what influence are they propelled? Then too, what is that immaterial and ethereal empyrean, and the intermediate air that forms a wall of partition between that element in nature which gives heat and consumes, and that which is moist and combustible? And how does earth below form the foundation of the whole, and what keeps it firmly in its place? What controls its downward tendency? If anyone questions us on these and similar points, will any of us be found so presumptuous as to promise an explanation of them? No! The only reply that can be given by sensible people is this: that He Who made all things in wisdom can alone provide an account of His creation. For ourselves, through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, as the Apostle says.

It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human nature adequate to the full comprehension of the divine essence. It may be that it is easy to show this in the case of human capacity alone, and to say that the incorporeal creation is incapable of taking in and comprehending that nature which is infinite will not be far short of the truth, as we may see by familiar examples; for as there are many and various things that have fleshly life, winged things, and things of the earth, some that mount above the clouds by virtue of their wings, others that dwell in hollows or burrow in the ground, on comparing which it would appear that there was no small difference between the inhabitants of air and of land; while, if the comparison be extended to the stars and the fixed circumference, it will be seen that what soars aloft on wings is not less widely removed from heaven than from the animals that are on the earth; so, too, the strength of angels compared with our own seems preeminently great, because, undisturbed by sensation, it pursues its lofty themes with pure naked intelligence. Yet, if we weigh even their comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his conjecture would fall within the limits of probability, for wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space: the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling curiosity from every point of view. In this life we can apprehend the beginning and the end of all things that exist, but the beatitude that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning, but is above all that is connoted by either, being ever the same, self-dependent, not travelling on by degrees from one point to another in its life; for there is no participation of other life in its life, such that we might infer end and beginning; but, be it what it may, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. For increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature passionless excludes all notion of decrease. And as, when looking up to heaven, and in a measure apprehending by the visual organs the beauty that is in the height, we doubt not the existence of what we see, but if asked what it is, we are unable to define its nature, but we simply admire as we contemplate the overarching vault, the reverse planetary motion, the so-called Zodiac graven obliquely on the pole, whereby astronomers observe the motion of bodies revolving in an opposite direction, the differences of luminaries according to their magnitude, and the specialities of their rays, their risings and settings that take place according to the circling year ever at the same seasons undeviatingly, the conjunctions of planets, the courses of those that pass below, the eclipses of those that are above, the obumbrations of the earth, the reappearance of eclipsed bodies, the moon's multiform changes, the motion of the sun midway within the poles, and how, filled with his own light, and crowned with his encircling beams, and embracing all things in his sovereign light, he himself also at times suffers eclipse (the disc of the moon, as they say, passing before him), and how, by the will of Him Who has so ordained, ever running his own particular course, he accomplishes his appointed orbit and progress, opening out the four seasons of the year in succession; we, as I say, when we contemplate these phenomena by the aid of sight, are in no doubt of their existence, though we are as far from comprehending their essential nature as if sight had not given us any glimpse whatever of what we have seen; and even so, with regard to the Creator of the world, we know that He exists, but of His essential nature we cannot deny that we are ignorant. But, boasting as they do that they know these things, let them first tell us about the things of inferior nature; what they think of the body of the heavens, of the machinery which conveys the stars in their eternal courses, or of the sphere in which they move; for, however far speculation may proceed, when it comes to the uncertain and incomprehensible it must stop. For though any one say that another body, like in fashion (to that body of the heavens), fitting to its circular shape, checks its velocity, so that, ever turning in its course, it revolves conformably to that other upon itself, being retained by the force that embraces it from flying off at a tangent, yet how can he assert that these bodies will remain unspent by their constant friction with each other? And how, again, is motion produced in the case of two coeval bodies mutually conformed, when the one remains motionless (for the inner body, one would have thought, being held as in a vice by the motionlessness of that which embraces it, will be quite unable to act); and what is it that maintains the embracing body in its fixedness, so that it remains unshaken and unaffected by the motion of that which fits into it? And if in restless curiosity of thought we should conceive of some position for it that should keep it stationary, we must go on in logical consistency to search for the base of that base, and of the next, and of the next, and so on, and so the inquiry, proceeding from like to like, will go on to infinity, and end in helpless perplexity, still, even when some body has been put for the farthest foundation of the system of the universe, reaching after what is beyond, so that there is no stopping in our inquiry after the limit of the embracing circles. But not so, say others: but (according to the vain theory of those who have speculated on these matters) there is an empty space spread over the back of the heavens, working in which vacuum the motion of the universe revolves upon itself, meeting with no resistance from any solid body capable of retarding it by opposition and of checking its course of revolution. What, then, is that vacuum, which they say is neither a body nor an idea? How far does it extend, and what succeeds it, and what relation exists between the firm, resisting body, and that void and unsubstantial one? What is there to unite things so contrary by nature? And how can the harmony of the universe consist out of elements so incongruous; and what can any one say of Heaven itself? That it is a mixture of the elements which it contains, or one of them, or something else beside them? What, again, of the stars themselves? Whence comes their radiance? What is it and how is it composed? And what is the reason of their difference in beauty and magnitude? And the seven inner orbs revolving in an opposite direction to the motion of the universe, what are they, and by what influence are they propelled? Then, too, what is that immaterial and ethereal empyrean, and the intermediate air which forms a wall of partition between that element in nature which gives heat and consumes, and that which is moist and combustible? And how does earth below form the foundation of the whole, and what is it that keeps it firmly in its place? What is it that controls its downward tendency? If any one should interrogate us on these and such-like points, will any of us be found so presumptuous as to promise an explanation of them? No! The only reply that can be given by men of sense is this:– that He Who made all things in wisdom can alone furnish an account of His creation. For ourselves, through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, as says the Apostle Hebrews 1:2.

If the lower creation that we can perceive with our senses surpasses human knowledge, how could He who made the worlds by His mere will be within reach of our understanding? Surely this is vanity and lying madness, as the Prophet says, to think we can comprehend things that are incomprehensible. We can see this in the way small children occupy themselves in their play. Often, when a sunbeam streams down on them through a window, they are delighted by its beauty and throw themselves at what they see, eager to catch the sunbeam in their hands. They compete with one another, grasping at the light with their fingers and imagining they have trapped the ray inside them. But when they open their hands and discover that the sunbeam they held has slipped through their fingers, they laugh and clap their hands. In the same way, the children of our generation, as the parable says, sit playing in the marketplaces. When they see the power of God shining into their souls through the dispensations of His providence and the wonders of His creation like a warm ray coming from the natural sun, they do not marvel at the divine gift or worship Him whom such things reveal. Instead, they go beyond the limits of the soul's capacities and seek with their sophisticated reasoning to grasp what cannot be grasped, thinking their arguments can lay hold of what they believe in. But when their argument unfolds and exposes the tangled web of their sophistries, discerning people immediately see that what they have grasped is nothing at all. So petty and childish are they, laboring in vain at impossibilities, trying to contain the inconceivable nature of God in the few syllables of the term ungenerate. They applaud their own foolishness and imagine God to be such that human reasoning can capture Him under a single term. While they claim to follow the teaching of the sacred writers, they are not afraid to raise themselves above them. What cannot be shown to have been said by any of those blessed ones whose words are recorded in the sacred books—these things, as the Apostle says, understanding neither what they say nor whereof they affirm—they nevertheless claim to know and boast of guiding others to such knowledge. Because of this, they declare that they have grasped that God the Only-begotten is not what He is called. Their premises force them to this conclusion.

If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be within the range of our apprehension? Surely this is vanity, and lying madness, as says the Prophet, to think it possible to comprehend the things which are incomprehensible. So may we see tiny children busying themselves in their play. For oft-times, when a sunbeam streams down upon them through a window, delighted with its beauty they throw themselves on what they see, and are eager to catch the sunbeam in their hands, and struggle with one another, and grasp the light in the clutch of their fingers, and fancy they have imprisoned the ray in them, but presently when they unclasp their hands and find that the sunbeam which they held has slipped through their fingers, they laugh and clap their hands. In like manner the children of our generation, as says the parable, sit playing in the market-places; for, seeing the power of God shining in upon their souls through the dispensations of His providence, and the wonders of His creation like a warm ray emanating from the natural sun, they marvel not at the Divine gift, nor adore Him Whom such things reveal, but passing beyond the limits of the soul's capabilities, they seek with their sophistical understanding to grasp that which is intangible, and think by their reasonings to lay hold of what they are persuaded of; but when their argument unfolds itself and discloses the tangled web of their sophistries, men of discernment see at once that what they have apprehended is nothing at all; so pettily and so childishly labouring in vain at impossibilities do they set themselves to include the inconceivable nature of God in the few syllables of the term ungenerate, and applaud their own folly, and imagine God to be such that human reasoning can include Him under one single term: and while they pretend to follow the teaching of the sacred writers, they are not afraid of raising themselves above them. For what cannot be shown to have been said by any of those blessed ones, any words of whose are recorded in the sacred books, these things, as says the Apostle, understanding neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm, they nevertheless say they know, and boast of guiding others to such knowledge. And on this account they declare that they have apprehended that God the Only-begotten is not what He is called. For to this conclusion they are compelled by their premises.

How pitiful they are in their cleverness! How wretched, how deadly is their overly wise philosophy! Who goes willingly into the pit as eagerly as these men work and exert themselves to dig out their lake of blasphemy? How far they have separated themselves from Christian hope! What a gulf they have fixed between themselves and the faith that saves! How far they have withdrawn from Abraham, the father of faith! He indeed—if in the lofty spirit of the Apostle we may interpret the words allegorically and so penetrate to the inner meaning of the story without losing sight of the truth of its actual events—he, I say, went out by divine command from his own country and relatives on a journey worthy of a prophet eager for knowledge of God. For no physical relocation seems to me to satisfy the idea of the blessings it indicates he found. For by going out from himself and from his country—by which I mean his earthly and fleshly mind—and raising his thoughts as far as possible above the common limits of nature, and abandoning the soul's kinship with the senses, so that undisturbed by any sensory objects his eyes might be open to invisible things, with neither sight nor sound to distract the mind in its work—walking, as the Apostle says, by faith and not by sight—he was raised so high by the sublimity of his knowledge that he came to be regarded as the peak of human perfection, knowing as much of God as finite human capacity at its fullest extent could possibly attain. Therefore the Lord of all creation, as though He were Abraham's discovery, is called specially the God of Abraham. Yet what does Scripture say about him? That he went out not knowing where he was going, nor even being able to learn the name of the One he loved, yet in no way impatient or ashamed because of such ignorance.

How pitiable are they for their cleverness! How wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit so eagerly as these men labour and bestir themselves to dig out their lake of blasphemy? How far have they separated themselves from the hope of the Christian! What a gulf have they fixed between themselves and the faith which saves! How far have they withdrawn themselves from Abraham the father of the faith! He indeed, if in the lofty spirit of the Apostle we may take the words allegorically, and so penetrate to the inner sense of the history, without losing sight of the truth of its facts — he, I say, went out by Divine command from his own country and kindred on a journey worthy of a prophet eager for the knowledge of God. Hebrews 11:8 For no local migration seems to me to satisfy the idea of the blessings which it is signified that he found. For going out from himself and from his country, by which I understand his earthly and carnal mind, and raising his thoughts as far as possible above the common boundaries of nature, and forsaking the soul's kinship with the senses — so that untroubled by any of the objects of sense his eyes might be open to the things which are invisible, there being neither sight nor sound to distract the mind in its work — walking, as says the Apostle, by faith, not by sight, he was raised so high by the sublimity of his knowledge that he came to be regarded as the acme of human perfection, knowing as much of God as it was possible for finite human capacity at its full stretch to attain. Therefore also the Lord of all creation, as though He were a discovery of Abraham, is called specially the God of Abraham. Yet what says the Scripture respecting him? That he went out not knowing whither he went, no, nor even being capable of learning the name of Him whom he loved, yet in no wise impatient or ashamed on account of such ignorance.

This, then, was what his safe guidance meant as he searched for what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the readily available means for learning about God, and that his mind, unhindered by any sense object, was never prevented from journeying in search of what lies beyond all that is known. Having gone far beyond the wisdom of his countrymen through reasoning (I mean the philosophy of the Chaldeans, which was limited to visible things), and rising above things that can be known by the senses, he desired to see the original pattern of all beauty based on the beauty of what he contemplated and the harmony of the heavenly wonders. And so too, all the other things he came to understand as he progressed through his reasoning—whether God's power, or His goodness, or His being without beginning, or His infinity, or whatever else can be conceived regarding the divine physis—he used all of them as provisions and tools for his journey forward, always making one discovery a stepping-stone to another, always reaching forward to what lay ahead, and establishing in his heart, as the Prophet says, each good stage of his progress. He passed by all knowledge gained through his own ability as falling short of what he was seeking. When he had gone beyond every guess about the divine physis suggested by any name among all our concepts of God, having cleansed his reason of all such ideas and arrived at a faith pure and free from all prejudice, he made this a sure and clear sign of the knowledge of God: the belief that He is greater and more exalted than any sign by which He may be known. For this reason, indeed, after the ecstasy that fell upon him and after his lofty meditations, falling back on his human weakness, he said, I am but dust and ashes—that is to say, without voice or power to express that good which his mind had conceived. For dust and ashes seem to indicate what is lifeless and barren, and so a law of faith arises for the life to come, teaching those who would approach God through this account of Abraham that it is impossible to draw near to God unless faith mediates and brings the searching soul into union with the incomprehensible physis of God. For leaving behind the curiosity that comes from knowledge, Abraham, the Apostle says, believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness. Now this was written not for his sake, the Apostle says, but for us, showing that God counts men's faith, not their knowledge, as righteousness. For knowledge acts in a kind of commercial way, dealing only with what is known. But the faith of Christians acts differently. For it is the substance not of things known, but of things hoped for. Now what we already have we no longer hope for. For what a man has, the Apostle says, why does he still hope for it? But faith makes our own what we do not see, assuring us by its own certainty of what does not appear. For so the Apostle speaks of the believer, that he endured as seeing Him who is invisible. Therefore, anyone who claims that it is possible to gain knowledge of the divine ousia through knowledge that uselessly puffs up is mistaken. For there is no one so great that he can claim equal understanding with the Lord, for as David says, Who among the clouds can be compared to the Lord? Nor is what is sought so small that it can be grasped by the reasoning of human shallowness. Listen to the preacher warning not to be quick to say anything before God, for God, he says, is in heaven above, and you are on earth beneath.

This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought — that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his instruction in the things of God, and that his mind, unimpeded by any object of sense, was never hindered from its journeying in quest of what lies beyond all that is known, but having gone by reasoning far beyond the wisdom of his countrymen, (I mean the philosophy of the Chaldees, limited as it was to the things which do appear,) and soaring above the things which are cognizable by sense, from the beauty of the objects of contemplation, and the harmony of the heavenly wonders, he desired to behold the archetype of all beauty. And so, too, all the other things which in the course of his reasoning he was led to apprehend as he advanced, whether the power of God, or His goodness, or His being without beginning, or His infinity, or whatever else is conceivable in respect to the divine nature, using them all as supplies and appliances for his onward journey, ever making one discovery a stepping-stone to another, ever reaching forth unto those things which were before, and setting in his heart, as says the Prophet, each fair stage of his advance, and passing by all knowledge acquired by his own ability as falling short of that of which he was in quest, when he had gone beyond every conjecture respecting the divine nature which is suggested by any name among all our conceptions of God, having purged his reason of all such fancies, and arrived at a faith unalloyed and free from all prejudice, he made this a sure and manifest token of the knowledge of God, viz. the belief that He is greater and more sublime than any token by which He may be known. On this account, indeed, after the ecstasy which fell upon him, and after his sublime meditations, falling back on his human weakness, I am, says he, but dust and ashes Genesis 18:27, that is to say, without voice or power to interpret that good which his mind had conceived. For dust and ashes seem to denote what is lifeless and barren; and so there arises a law of faith for the life to come, teaching those who would come to God, by this history of Abraham, that it is impossible to draw near to God, unless faith mediate, and bring the seeking soul into union with the incomprehensible nature of God. For leaving behind him the curiosity that arises from knowledge, Abraham, says the Apostle, believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness Genesis 15:6; Romans 4:22. Now it was not written for his sake, the Apostle says, but for us, that God counts to men for righteousness their faith, not their knowledge. For knowledge acts, as it were, in a commercial spirit, dealing only with what is known. But the faith of Christians acts otherwise. For it is the substance, not of things known, but of things hoped for. Now that which we have already we no longer hope for. For what a man has, says the Apostle, why does he yet hope for Romans 8:24? But faith makes our own that which we see not, assuring us by its own certainty of that which does not appear. For so speaks the Apostle of the believer, that he endured as seeing Him Who is invisible Hebrews 11:27. Vain, therefore, is he who maintains that it is possible to take knowledge of the divine essence, by the knowledge which puffs up to no purpose. For neither is there any man so great that he can claim equality in understanding with the Lord, for, as says David, Who is he among the clouds that shall be compared unto the Lord? nor is that which is sought so small that it can be compassed by the reasonings of human shallowness. Listen to the preacher exhorting not to be hasty to utter anything before God, for God, (says he,) is in heaven above, and thou upon earth beneath Ecclesiastes 5:2.

He shows, I think, through how these elements relate to or are separated from each other, how far the divine nature stands above human rational speculation. For that nature which transcends all intelligence is as high above earthly calculation as the stars are above the reach of our fingers, or rather, many times more than that.

He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations of human reason. For that nature which transcends all intelligence is as high above earthly calculation as the stars are above the touch of our fingers; or rather, many times more than that.

Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more reverent to believe that the majesty of God is greater than we can understand, than to imagine, after limiting His glory by our own mistaken ideas, that there is nothing beyond what we can conceive.

Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more reverent to believe the majesty of God to be greater than we can understand, than, after circumscribing His glory by our misconceptions, to suppose there is nothing beyond our conception of it.

For other reasons as well, it is safe to leave the Divine essence alone as unspeakable and beyond the scope of human reasoning. The desire to investigate what is obscure and trace out hidden things through human reasoning gives entrance to false notions just as much as to true ones, because someone who aspires to know the unknown will not always arrive at truth, but may also conceive of falsehood itself as truth. But the disciple of the Gospels and of Prophecy believes that He Who is, is—both from what he has learned from the sacred writers, and from the harmony of things that appear, and from the works of Providence. But what He is and how He is—leaving this as a useless and unprofitable speculation, such a disciple will open no door to falsehood against truth. For in speculative inquiry, fallacies readily find place. But where speculation is entirely at rest, the necessity of error is prevented. And that this is a true account of the case may be seen if we consider how heresies in the churches have wandered off into many and various opinions regarding God, with people deceiving themselves as they are swayed by one mental impulse or another, and how these very men with whom our treatise is concerned have slipped into such a pit of profanity. Would it not have been safer for all, following the counsel of wisdom, to abstain from searching into such deep matters, and in peace and quietness to keep inviolate the pure deposit of the faith? But since, in fact, human nothingness has begun intruding recklessly into matters that are above comprehension, and supporting by dogmatic teaching the inventions of their vain imagination, there has sprung up as a consequence a whole host of enemies to the truth, and among them these very men who are the subject of this treatise—dogmatizers of deceit who seek to limit the Divine Being, and all but openly idolize their own imagination, in that they deify the idea expressed by this ungeneracy of theirs, as if it were not only a certain relation discernible in the Divine nature, but as if it were itself God, or the ousia of God. Yet perhaps they would have done better to look to the sacred company of the Prophets and Patriarchs, to whom at various times and in various manners the Word of truth spoke, and, next in order, those who were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, that they might give due honor to the claims on their belief of the things attested by the Holy Spirit Himself, and abide within the limits of their teaching and knowledge, and not venture on themes which are not comprehended in the canon of the sacred writers. For those writers, by revealing God, so long unknown to human life because of the prevalence of idolatry, and making Him known to men, both from the wonders which manifest themselves in His works and from the names which express the manifold variety of His power, lead men, as by the hand, to the understanding of the Divine nature, making known to them the bare grandeur of the thought of God. But the question of His ousia, as one which it is impossible to grasp, and which bears no fruit to the curious inquirer, they dismiss without any attempt at its solution. For whereas they have set forth respecting all other things that they were created—the heaven, the earth, the sea, times, ages, and the creatures that are in them—yet what each is in itself, and how and from where, on these points they are silent. So too concerning God Himself, they exhort men to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him, but regarding His nature, as being above every name, they neither name it nor concern themselves about it. For if we have learned any names expressive of the knowledge of God, all these are related and have analogy to such names as denote human characteristics. For just as those who would indicate some person unknown by marks of recognition speak of him as of good parentage and descent, if such happens to be the case, or as distinguished for his riches or his worth, or as in the prime of life, or of such or such stature, and in so speaking they do not set forth the nature of the person indicated, but give certain notes of recognition (for neither advantages of birth, nor of wealth, nor of reputation, nor of age constitute the man; they are considered simply as being observable in the man), thus too the expressions of Holy Scripture devised for the glory of God set forth one or another of the things which are declared concerning Him, each inculcating some special teaching. For by these expressions we are taught either His power, or that He admits not of deterioration, or that He is without cause and without limit, or that He is supreme above all things, or, in short, something, be it what it may, respecting Him. But His very ousia, as not to be conceived by the human intellect or expressed in words, this it has left untouched as a thing not to be made the subject of curious inquiry, ruling that it be revered in silence, in that it forbids the investigation of things too deep for us, while it enjoins the duty of being slow to utter any word before God. And therefore, whoever searches the whole of Revelation will find in it no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul? Who is acquainted with its very ousia, whether it is material or immaterial, whether it is purely incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal character? How it comes into being, how it is composed, from where it enters into the body, how it departs from it, or what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body? How, being intangible and without form, it is kept within its own sphere? What difference exists among its powers? How one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back on material passions—anger and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and boldness, friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in the faculties of the soul? Observing these things, who has not imagined that he has a sort of crowd of souls gathered together in himself, each of the aforesaid passions differing widely from the rest, and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so that even the rational faculty falls under and is subject to the predominating power of such forces, and contributes its own cooperation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? What word, then, of the inspired Scripture has taught us the manifold and multiform character of what we understand in speaking of the soul? Is it a unity composed of them all, and, if so, what is it that blends and harmonizes things mutually opposed, so that many things become one, while each element, taken by itself, is shut up in the soul as in some ample vessel? And how is it that we do not have the perception of them all as being involved in it, being at one and the same time confident and afraid, at once hating and loving and feeling in ourselves the working as well of all other emotions confused and intermingled? But, on the contrary, we take knowledge only of their alternate control, when one of them prevails, the rest remaining quiet. What in short is this composition and arrangement, and this capacious void within us, such that to each is assigned its own post, as though hindered by middle walls of partition from holding intercourse with its neighbor? And then again what account has explained whether passion is the fundamental ousia of the soul, or fear, or any of the other elements which I have mentioned, and what emotions are unsubstantial? For if these have an independent subsistence, then, as I have said, there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul, but a collection of souls, each of them occupying its distinct position as a particular and individual soul. But if we must suppose these to be a kind of emotion without subsistence, how can that which has no essential existence exercise lordship over us, having reduced us as it were to slavery under whichever of these things may have happened to prevail? And if the soul is something that thought alone can grasp, how can that which is manifold and composite be contemplated as such, when such an object ought to be contemplated by itself, independently of these bodily qualities? Then, as to the soul's power of growth, of desire, of nutrition, of change, and the fact that all the bodily powers are nourished, while feeling does not extend through all, but, as in things without life, some of our members are destitute of feeling—the bones for example, the cartilages, the nails, the hair, all of which take nourishment but do not feel—tell me who is there that understands this only half-complete operation of the soul as to these? And why do I speak of the soul? Even the inquiry as to that thing in the flesh itself which assumes all the corporeal qualities has not been

And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the desire of investigating what is obscure and tracing out hidden things by the operation of human reasoning gives an entrance to false no less than to true notions, inasmuch as he who aspires to know the unknown will not always arrive at truth, but may also conceive of falsehood itself as truth. But the disciple of the Gospels and of Prophecy believes that He Who is, is; both from what he has learned from the sacred writers, and from the harmony of things which do appear, and from the works of Providence. But what He is and how — leaving this as a useless and unprofitable speculation, such a disciple will open no door to falsehood against truth. For in speculative enquiry fallacies readily find place. But where speculation is entirely at rest, the necessity of error is precluded. And that this is a true account of the case, may be seen if we consider how it is that heresies in the churches have wandered off into many and various opinions in regard to God, men deceiving themselves as they are swayed by one mental impulse or another; and how these very men with whom our treatise is concerned have slipped into such a pit of profanity. Would it not have been safer for all, following the counsel of wisdom, to abstain from searching into such deep matters, and in peace and quietness to keep inviolate the pure deposit of the faith? But since, in fact, human nothingness has commenced intruding recklessly into matters that are above comprehension, and supporting by dogmatic teaching the figments of their vain imagination, there has sprung up in consequence a whole host of enemies to the truth, and among them these very men who are the subject of this treatise; dogmatizers of deceit who seek to limit the Divine Being, and all but openly idolize their own imagination, in that they deify the idea expressed by this ungeneracy of theirs, as not being only in a certain relation discernible in the Divine nature, but as being itself God, or the essence of God. Yet perchance they would have done better to look to the sacred company of the Prophets and Patriarchs, to whom at sundry times, and in various manners Hebrews 1:1, the Word of truth spoke, and, next in order, those who were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, that they might give honour due to the claims on their belief of the things attested by the Holy Spirit Himself, and abide within the limits of their teaching and knowledge, and not venture on themes which are not comprehended in the canon of the sacred writers. For those writers, by revealing God, so long unknown to human life by reason of the prevalence of idolatry, and making Him known to men, both from the wonders which manifest themselves in His works, and from the names which express the manifold variety of His power, lead men, as by the hand, to the understanding of the Divine nature, making known to them the bare grandeur of the thought of God; while the question of His essence, as one which it is impossible to grasp, and which bears no fruit to the curious enquirer, they dismiss without any attempt at its solution. For whereas they have set forth respecting all other things, that they were created, the heaven, the earth, the sea, times, ages, and the creatures that are therein, but what each is in itself, and how and whence, on these points they are silent; so, too, concerning God Himself, they exhort men to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him Hebrews 11:6, but in regard to His nature, as being above every name, they neither name it nor concern themselves about it. For if we have learned any names expressive of the knowledge of God, all these are related and have analogy to such names as denote human characteristics. For as they who would indicate some person unknown by marks of recognition speak of him as of good parentage and descent, if such happen to be the case, or as distinguished for his riches or his worth, or as in the prime of life, or of such or such stature, and in so speaking they do not set forth the nature of the person indicated, but give certain notes of recognition (for neither advantages of birth, nor of wealth, nor of reputation, nor of age, constitute the man; they are considered, simply as being observable in the man), thus too the expressions of Holy Scripture devised for the glory of God set forth one or another of the things which are declared concerning Him, each inculcating some special teaching. For by these expressions we are taught either His power, or that He admits not of deterioration, or that He is without cause and without limit, or that He is supreme above all things, or, in short, something, be it what it may, respecting Him. But His very essence, as not to be conceived by the human intellect or expressed in words, this it has left untouched as a thing not to be made the subject of curious enquiry, ruling that it be revered in silence, in that it forbids the investigation of things too deep for us, while it enjoins the duty of being slow to utter any word before God. And therefore, whosoever searches the whole of Revelation will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul? Who is acquainted with its very essence, whether it is material or immaterial, whether it is purely incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal character; how it comes into being, how it is composed, whence it enters into the body, how it departs from it, or what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body; how, being intangible and without form, it is kept within its own sphere, what difference exists among its powers, how one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back on material passions, anger and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and audacity, friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in the faculties of the soul? Observing which things, who has not fancied that he has a sort of populace of souls crowded together in himself, each of the aforesaid passions differing widely from the rest, and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so that even the rational faculty falls under and is subject to the predominating power of such forces, and contributes its own co-operation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? What word, then, of the inspired Scripture has taught us the manifold and multiform character of what we understand in speaking of the soul? Is it a unity composed of them all, and, if so, what is it that blends and harmonizes things mutually opposed, so that many things become one, while each element, taken by itself, is shut up in the soul as in some ample vessel? And how is it that we have not the perception of them all as being involved in it, being at one and the same time confident and afraid, at once hating and loving and feeling in ourselves the working as well of all other emotions confused and intermingled; but, on the contrary, take knowledge only of their alternate control, when one of them prevails, the rest remaining quiescent? What in short is this composition and arrangement, and this capacious void within us, such that to each is assigned its own post, as though hindered by middle walls of partition from holding intercourse with its neighbour? And then again what account has explained whether passion is the fundamental essence of the soul, or fear, or any of the other elements which I have mentioned; and what emotions are unsubstantial? For if these have an independent subsistence, then, as I have said, there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul, but a collection of souls, each of them occupying its distinct position as a particular and individual soul. But if we must suppose these to be a kind of emotion without subsistence, how can that which has no essential existence exercise lordship over us, having reduced us as it were to slave under whichsoever of these things may have happened to prevail? And if the soul is something that thought only can grasp, how can that which is manifold and composite be contemplated as such, when such an object ought to be contemplated by itself, independently of these bodily qualities? Then, as to the soul's power of growth, of desire, of nutrition, of change, and the fact that all the bodily powers are nourished, while feeling does not extend through all, but, as in things without life, some of our members are destitute of feeling, the bones for example, the cartilages, the nails, the hair, all of which take nourishment, but do not feel — tell me who is there that understands this only half-complete operation of the soul as to these? And why do I speak of the soul? Even the inquiry as to that thing in the flesh itself which assumes all the corporeal qualities has not been pursued to any definite result. For if any one has made a mental analysis of that which is seen into its component parts, and, having stripped the object of its qualities, has attempted to consider it by itself, I fail to see what will have been left for investigation. For when you take from a body its color, its shape, its degree of resistance, its weight, its quantity, its position, its forces active or passive, its relation to other objects, what remains, that can still be called a body, we can neither see of ourselves, nor are we taught it by Scripture. But how can he who is ignorant of himself take knowledge of anything that is above himself? And if a man is familiarized with such ignorance of himself, is he not plainly taught by the very fact not to be astonished at any of the mysteries that are without? Wherefore also, of the elements of the world, we know only so much by our senses as to enable us to receive what they severally supply for our living. But we possess no knowledge of their substance, nor do we count it loss to be ignorant of it. For what does it profit me to inquire curiously into the nature of fire, how it is struck out, how it is kindled, how, when it has caught hold of the fuel supplied to it, it does not let it go till it has devoured and consumed its prey; how the spark is latent in the flint, how steel, cold as it is to the touch, generates fire, how sticks rubbed together kindle flame, how water shining in the sun causes a flash; and then again the cause of its upward tendency, its power of incessant motion?– Putting aside all which curious questions and investigations, we give heed only to the subservience of this fire to life, seeing that he who avails himself of its service fares no worse than he who busies himself with inquiries into its nature.

Therefore, Holy Scripture passes over all useless inquiry into substance as excessive and unnecessary. And I think this is why John, the Son of Thunder, who with the loud voice of the doctrines in his Gospel rose above the preaching that announced them, said at the end of his Gospel, "There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." He certainly does not mean by this the miracles of healing, for the narrative leaves none of these unrecorded, even though it does not mention the names of all who were healed. For when he tells us that the dead were raised, that the blind received their sight, that the deaf heard, that the lame walked, and that He healed all kinds of sickness and all kinds of disease, he does not leave any miracle unrecorded in this, but includes each and all of them in these general terms. But it may be that the Evangelist means this in his profound wisdom: that we are to learn the majesty of the Son of God not only by the miracles He did in the flesh. For these are small compared with the greatness of His other work. But look up to Heaven! See its glories! Transfer your thought to the wide extent of the earth, and the watery depths! Take in with your mind the whole world, and when you have come to knowledge of the nature beyond the world, learn that these are the true works of Him who lived among you in the flesh, which (he says), if each were written—and the ousia, manner, origin, and extent of each given—the world itself could not contain the fullness of Christ's teaching about the world itself. For since God has made all things in wisdom, and to His wisdom there is no limit (for His understanding, says the Scripture, is infinite), the world, which is bounded by its own limits, cannot contain within itself the account of infinite wisdom. If, then, the whole world is too small to contain the teaching of the works of God, how many worlds could contain an account of the Lord of them all? For perhaps it will not be denied even by the tongue of the blasphemer that the Maker of all things, which have been created by the mere command of His will, is infinitely greater than all. If, then, the whole creation cannot contain what might be said about itself (for so, according to our explanation, the great Evangelist testifies), how should human shallowness contain all that might be said of the Lord of Creation? Let those grand talkers tell us what man is, in comparison with the universe, what geometrical point is so without size, which of the atoms of Epicurus is capable of such infinitely small reduction in the empty imagination of those who make such problems the object of their study, which of them falls so little short of non-existence, as human shallowness when compared with the universe. As great David also says, with true insight into human weakness, "My age is as nothing unto You," not saying that it is absolutely nothing, but indicating, by this comparison to the non-existent, that what is so extremely brief is next to nothing at all.

Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thunder, who with the loud voice of the doctrines contained in his Gospel rose above that of the preaching which heralded them, said at the close of his Gospel, There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written. He certainly does not mean by these the miracles of healing, for of these the narrative leaves none unrecorded, even though it does not mention the names of all who were healed. For when he tells us that the dead were raised, that the blind received their sight, that the deaf heard, that the lame walked, and that He healed all manner of sickness and all manner of disease, he does not in this leave any miracle unrecorded, but embraces each and all in these general terms. But it may be that the Evangelist means this in his profound wisdom: that we are to learn the majesty of the Son of God not by the miracles alone which He did in the flesh. For these are little compared with the greatness of His other work. But look thou up to Heaven! Behold its glories! Transfer your thought to the wide compass of the earth, and the watery depths! Embrace with your mind the whole world, and when you have come to the knowledge of supramundane nature, learn that these are the true works of Him Who sojourned for you in the flesh, which (says he), if each were written — and the essence, manner, origin, and extent of each given — the world itself could not contain the fullness of Christ's teaching about the world itself. For since God has made all things in wisdom, and to His wisdom there is no limit (for His understanding, says the Scripture, is infinite), the world, that is bounded by limits of its own, cannot contain within itself the account of infinite wisdom. If, then, the whole world is too little to contain the teaching of the works of God, how many worlds could contain an account of the Lord of them all? For perhaps it will not be denied even by the tongue of the blasphemer that the Maker of all things, which have been created by the mere fiat of His will, is infinitely greater than all. If, then, the whole creation cannot contain what might be said respecting itself (for so, according to our explanation, the great Evangelist testifies), how should human shallowness contain all that might be said of the Lord of Creation? Let those grand talkers inform us what man is, in comparison with the universe, what geometrical point is so without magnitude, which of the atoms of Epicurus is capable of such infinitesimal reduction in the vain fancy of those who make such problems the object of their study, which of them falls so little short of non- existence, as human shallowness, when compared with the universe. As says also great David, with a true insight into human weakness, Mine age is as nothing unto You, not saying that it is absolutely nothing, but signifying, by this comparison to the non-existent, that what is so exceedingly brief is next to nothing at all.

But despite having only such a nature as their starting point, they speak boldly against the ineffable Power and try to contain the infinite nature within a single term, confining the Divine essence within the narrow boundaries of the word "ungeneracy," so that they may prepare the way for their blasphemy against the Only-begotten. Although the great Basil had corrected this error and shown, regarding these terms, that they have no existence in nature but are attached as concepts to the things they signify, they are so far from returning to the truth that they cling to what they have once asserted as if stuck to birdlime, and they will not release their grip on their deceptive argument. They do not allow the term "ungeneracy" to be used as a mental concept, but make it represent the Divine physis itself. Now to work through their entire argument and attempt to refute it by discussing word by word their trivial and long-winded nonsense would require much leisure, time, and freedom from other obligations. Just as I hear that Eunomius, after applying himself at his leisure and laboriously for a number of years exceeding those of the Trojan War, has constructed this fantasy for himself in his deep sleep, carefully seeking not how to explain any of the ideas he has reached, but how to drag and force them into conformity with his phrases, going around and collecting from certain books the words in them that sound most impressive. And just as beggars lacking clothing pin and patch together tunics for themselves out of rags, so he, plucking a phrase here and a phrase there, has woven together for himself the patchwork of his treatise, gluing in and fixing together the connections of his language with much labor and effort, displaying in this a petty and childish ambition for debate, which any person with an eye to reality would scorn, just as a mature wrestler, no longer in his prime, would scorn to act like a woman through excessive attention to dress. But it seems to me that when the scope of the whole question has been briefly examined, his roundabout flourishes may well be ignored.

But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by one appellation the infinite nature, confining the Divine essence within the narrow limits of the term ungeneracy, that they may thereby pave a way for their blasphemy against the Only-begotten; but although the great Basil had corrected this false opinion, and pointed out, in regard to the terms, that they have no existence in nature, but are attached as conceptions to the things signified, so far are they from returning to the truth, that they stick to what they have once advanced, as to birdlime, and will not loose their hold of their fallacious mode of argument, nor do they allow the term ungeneracy to be used in the way of a mental conception, but make it represent the Divine nature itself. Now to go through their whole argument, and to attempt to overthrow it by discussing word by word their frivolous and long-winded nonsense, would be a task requiring much leisure, and time, and freedom from calls of business. Just as I hear that Eunomius, after applying himself at his leisure, and laboriously, for a number of years exceeding those of the Trojan War, has fabricated this dream for himself in his deep slumbers, studiously seeking, not how to interpret any of the ideas which he has arrived at, but how to drag and force them into keeping with his phrases, and going round and collecting out of certain books the words in them that sound grandest. And as beggars in lack of clothing pin and tack together tunics for themselves out of rags, so he, cropping here a phrase and there a phrase, has woven together for himself the patchwork of his treatise, glueing in and fixing together the joinings of his diction with much labour and pains, displaying therein a petty and juvenile ambition for combat, which any man who has an eye to actuality would disdain, just as a steadfast wrestler, no longer in the prime of life, would disdain to play the woman by over-niceness in dress. But to me it seems that, when the scope of the whole question has been briefly run through, his roundabout flourishes may well be let alone.

I have said, then (for I make my master's words my own), that reason gives us only a dim and imperfect understanding of the Divine nature. Nevertheless, the knowledge we gain from the terms that piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have the same significance. Some of them express qualities inherent in God, and others express qualities that are not, as when we say that He is just or incorruptible. By the term just we mean that justice is found in Him, and by incorruptible we mean that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented by a term which does not belong to Him at all, and what is foreign to His nature may be represented by what does belong to Him. Since justice is the opposite of injustice, and everlastingness is the contrary of destruction, we may appropriately and without error use contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not unjust, which is the same as saying that He is just, and that He does not admit corruption. In the same way, other names of God, by a certain change of meaning, may be suitably used to express either sense—for example good, and immortal, and all expressions formed in a similar way. Each of these terms, depending on how it is taken, can indicate what does or does not belong to the Divine nature, so that, despite the formal change, our orthodox belief concerning the object remains firmly fixed. It amounts to the same thing whether we speak of God as incapable of evil, or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He lives forever. We understand no difference in the meaning of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though one may seem to convey affirmation and the other negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or when we speak of Him as without cause, we are not contradicting ourselves in meaning. By either name we declare that God is the supreme Ruler and First Cause of all. Accordingly, when we speak of Him as without cause and as Lord of all, in the former case we indicate what does not belong to Him, and in the latter case what does. It is possible, as I have said, by a change in what is signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice versa. It is permissible, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungenerately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at odds with each other, the meaning remains one and the same. In questions about God, the goal is not to produce a sweet and harmonious arrangement of words, but to work out an orthodox formulation of thought by which a worthy conception of God may be secured. Since it is only orthodox to conclude that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause, if this position is established, what further argument over words remains for people of sense and judgment, when every word that conveys such an idea to us has the same meaning? Whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence, as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a way, of similar force and equivalent to one another as far as the meaning of what is signified is concerned. It is mere foolishness to argue for this or that vocal sound, as if orthodoxy were a matter of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view has been carefully explained by our great master, so that all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may clearly see that, whatever the nature of God may be, He is not to be grasped by the senses, and that He transcends reason. Yet human thought, engaging in careful inquiry with such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unapproachable and sublime nature. It is neither sharp-sighted enough to see clearly what is invisible, nor so completely kept from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse of what it seeks to know. It attains such knowledge partly by the touch of reason, and partly from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that what is sought transcends knowledge. It has learned what is contrary to the Divine nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured about it. Not that it has been able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the knowledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this human mind sees what alone can be seen: that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good, is altogether such as I would call ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.

I have said, then (for I make my master's words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature; nevertheless, the knowledge that we gather from the terms which piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have a uniform significance; for some of them express qualities inherent in God, and others qualities that are not, as when we say that He is just or incorruptible, by the term just signifying that justice is found in Him, and by incorruptible that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented by a term which in no wise belongs to Him, and what is foreign to His nature may be represented by what belongs to Him. For whereas justice is the contradictory of injustice, and everlastingness the contrary of destruction, we may fitly and without impropriety employ contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not unjust, which is equivalent to saying that He is just, and that He admits not of corruption. So, too, we may say that other names of God, by a certain change of signification, may be suitably employed to express either meaning, for example good, and immortal, and all expressions of like formation; for each of these terms, according as it is taken, is capable of indicating what does or what does not appertain to the Divine nature, so that, notwithstanding the formal change, our orthodox opinion in regard to the object remains immovably fixed. For it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil, or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He ever lives. For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and the other of negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or again, when we speak of Him as without cause, we are guilty of no contradiction in sense, declaring as we do by either name that God is the prime Ruler and First Cause of all. Accordingly when we speak of Him as without cause, and as Lord of all, in the former case we signify what does not attach to Him, in the latter case what does; it being possible, as I have said, by a change of the things signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice versa. For it is allowable, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungenerately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at variance with each other, the sense remains one and the same. For the object to be aimed at, in questions respecting God, is not to produce a dulcet and melodious harmony of words, but to work out an orthodox formula of thought, whereby a worthy conception of God may be ensured. Since, then, it is only orthodox to infer that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause, if this opinion is established, what further contention of words remains for men of sense and judgment, when every word whereby such a notion is conveyed to us has the same signification? For whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence, as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a manner, of like force, and equivalent to one another, as far as the meaning of the things signified is concerned; and it is mere folly to contend for this or that vocal intonation, as if orthodoxy were a thing of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view, then, has been carefully enunciated by our great master, whereby all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may clearly see that, whatever be the nature of God, He is not to be apprehended by sense, and that He transcends reason, though human thought, busying itself with curious inquiry, with such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unapproachable and sublime nature, being neither keen-sighted enough to see clearly what is invisible, nor yet so far withheld from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse of what it seeks to know. For such knowledge it attains in part by the touch of reason, in part from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that what is sought transcends knowledge (for it has learned what is contrary to the Divine nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured respecting it). Not that it has been able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the knowledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this mind of man sees what alone can be seen, that that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good, is altogether such as I should pronounce ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.

Although our great teacher has removed all unworthy ideas about the Divine nature and has urged and taught everything that may be reverently and properly believed concerning it—namely, that the First Cause is neither something corruptible nor something brought into existence through any kind of birth, but rather stands outside the range of every such conception, and that by denying what is not inherent in God and affirming what may be reverently conceived as inherent in Him, we can best understand what He is—this fierce opponent of the truth nevertheless opposes these teachings and hopes that the impressive-sounding word "ungeneracy" will provide a clear definition of the ousia of God.

But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be reverently and fittingly held concerning it, viz. that the First Cause is neither a corruptible thing, nor one brought into being by any birth, but that it is outside the range of every conception of the kind; and that from the negation of what is not inherent, and the affirmation of what may be with reverence conceived to be inherent therein, we may best apprehend what He is — nevertheless this vehement adversary of the truth opposes these teachings, and hopes with the sounding word ungeneracy to supply a clear definition of the essence of God.

Anyone who has paid attention to how words are used can clearly see that the word incorruption uses its negative prefix to indicate that neither corruption nor birth belongs to God—just as many other words formed in the same way indicate the absence of something that is not present rather than the presence of something that is. For example: harmless, painless, guileless, undisturbed, passionless, sleepless, undiseased, impossible, unblamable, and similar words. All these terms truly apply to God and provide a kind of list and inventory of evil qualities from which God is separate. However, the terms we use give no positive description of that to which they are applied. We learn from them what something is not, but the force of these words does not tell us what it actually is. For example, if someone wanting to describe the nature of man were to say that it is not lifeless, not insentient, not winged, not four-footed, not amphibious, he would not be indicating what it is—he would simply be declaring what it is not, and he would be no more making false statements about man than he would be positively defining his subject. In the same way, from the many things that are said of the Divine nature, we learn the conditions under which we may conceive of God as existing, but such statements do not tell us what He is essentially.

And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that neither corruption nor birth appertains to God: just as many other words of like formation denote the absence of what is not inherent rather than the presence of what is; e.g. harmless, painless, guileless, undisturbed, passionless, sleepless, undiseased, impossible, unblamable, and the like. For all these terms are truly applicable to God, and furnish a sort of catalogue and muster of evil qualities from which God is separate. Yet the terms employed give no positive account of that to which they are applied. We learn from them what it is not; but what it is, the force of the words does not indicate. For if some one, wishing to describe the nature of man, were to say that it is not lifeless, not insentient, not winged, not four-footed, not amphibious, he would not indicate what it is: he would simply declare what it is not, and he would be no more making untrue statements respecting man than he would be positively defining his subject. In the same way, from the many things which are predicated of the Divine nature, we learn under what conditions we may conceive God as existing, but what He is essentially, such statements do not inform us.

While we carefully avoid any agreement with absurd ideas in our thinking about God, we allow ourselves to use many different names for Him, adapting them to our perspective. Since no suitable word has been found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names, each adding something new to our understanding of Him through some distinctive feature—thus seeking through variety of terminology to gain some glimpses toward comprehending what we seek. For when we question and examine ourselves about what God is, we express our conclusions in various ways: that He is the one who presides over the system and operation of all things that exist, that His existence has no cause while He is the Cause of existence for everything else; that He is the one who has no generation or beginning, no corruption, no turning backward, no diminution of supremacy; that He is the one in whom evil finds no place, and from whom no good is absent.

While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appellations in regard to Him, adapting them to our point of view. For whereas no suitable word has been found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names, each by some distinctive touch adding something fresh to our notions respecting Him — thus seeking by variety of nomenclature to gain some glimmerings for the comprehension of what we seek. For when we question and examine ourselves as to what God is, we express our conclusions variously, as that He is that which presides over the system and working of the things that are, that His existence is without cause, while to all else He is the Cause of being; that He is that which has no generation or beginning, no corruption, no turning backward, no diminution of supremacy; that He is that in which evil finds no place, and from which no good is absent.

And if anyone wanted to distinguish such concepts using words, they would find it absolutely necessary to call that which cannot change for the worse unchanging and invariable, and to call the First Cause of all things ungenerate, and that which cannot be corrupted incorruptible; and that which has no ending immortal and never failing; and that which rules over all things Almighty. And so, forming names for all other divine attributes in accordance with reverent conceptions of Him, we designate them now by one name, now by another, according to our varying lines of thought, such as power, or strength, or goodness, or ungeneracy, or perpetuity.

And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse unchanging and invariable, and to call the First Cause of all ungenerate, and that which admits not of corruption incorruptible; and that which ceases at no limit immortal and never failing; and that which presides over all Almighty. And so, framing names for all other Divine attributes in accordance with reverent conceptions of Him, we designate them now by one name, now by another, according to our varying lines of thought, as power, or strength, or goodness, or ungeneracy, or perpetuity.

I say, then, that people have the right to construct words in this way, adapting their names to fit their subject according to each person's judgment. There is no absurdity in this, despite what our opponent pretends, reacting with horror as if to some frightening monster. We are fully justified in permitting the use of such new applications of words with respect to all things that can be named, including God Himself.

I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment; and that there is no absurdity in this, such as our controversialist makes a pretence of, shuddering at it as at some gruesome hobgoblin, and that we are fully justified in allowing the use of such fresh applications of words in respect to all things that can be named, and to God Himself.

For God is not an expression, and He doesn't have His essence in voice or utterance. Rather, God is in Himself what He is also believed to be, but He is named by those who call upon Him not according to what He is essentially (for the physis of Him Who alone exists is unspeakable), but He receives His names from what are believed to be His operations in regard to our life. To take a ready example: when we speak of Him as God, we call Him this because we regard Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden. But if His essence exists before His works, and we understand His works by our senses, and express them in words as best we can, why should we be afraid of calling things by words that came into use later than the things themselves? For if we wait to interpret any of God's attributes until we understand them, and we understand them only by what His works teach us, and if His power comes before its exercise and depends on the will of God, while His will resides in the spontaneity of the Divine physis, are we not clearly taught that the words which represent things came into existence later than the things themselves, and that the words which are framed to express the operations of things are reflections of the things themselves? And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, through the mouth of great David, when, using certain peculiar and appropriate names derived from his contemplation of God's works, he speaks of the Divine physis in this way: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations, or His physis? No one will say that they indicate anything but His operations. At what time, then, after showing mercy and pity, did God acquire His name from their display? Was it before human life began? But who was there to be the object of pity? Was it, then, after sin entered into the world? But sin entered after man. The exercise, therefore, of pity, and the name itself, came after man. What then? Will our adversary, wise as he claims to be above the Prophets, convict David of error in applying names to God derived from his opportunities of knowing Him? Or, in contending with him, will he use against him the pretense in his stately passage as if from a tragedy, saying that David glorifies the most blessed life of God with names drawn from human imagination, whereas it glorified itself alone, long before men were born to imagine them? David's advocate will readily admit that the Divine physis glorified itself alone even before the existence of human imagination, but will contend that the human mind can speak only as much concerning God as its capacity, instructed by His works, will allow. For, as the Wisdom of Solomon says, by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen.

For God is not an expression, neither has He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations in regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden. But if His essence is prior to His works, and we understand His works by our senses, and express them in words as we are best able, why should we be afraid of calling things by words of later origin than themselves? For if we stay to interpret any of the attributes of God till we understand them, and we understand them only by what His works teach us, and if His power precedes its exercise, and depends on the will of God, while His will resides in the spontaneity of the Divine nature, are we not clearly taught that the words which represent things are of later origin than the things themselves, and that the words which are framed to express the operations of things are reflections of the things themselves? And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations, or His nature? No one will say that they indicate anything but His operations. At what time, then, after showing mercy and pity, did God acquire His name from their display? Was it before man's life began? But who was there to be the object of pity? Was it, then, after sin entered into the world? But sin entered after man. The exercise, therefore, of pity, and the name itself, came after man. What then? will our adversary, wise as he is above the Prophets, convict David of error in applying names to God derived from his opportunities of knowing Him? Or, in contending with him, will he use against him the pretence in his stately passage as out of a tragedy, saying that he glories in the most blessed life of God with names drawn from human imagination, whereas it gloried in itself alone, long before men were born to imagine them? The Psalmist's advocate will readily admit that the Divine nature gloried in itself alone even before the existence of human imagination, but will contend that the human mind can speak only so much in respect of God as its capacity, instructed by His works, will allow. For, as says the Wisdom of Solomon, by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen Wisdom 13:5.

But in applying such names to the Divine essence, which surpasses all understanding, we do not seek to glorify it by the names we use, but rather to guide ourselves by means of such terms toward comprehension of the things that are hidden. "I said to the Lord," says the Prophet, "You are my God, my goods are nothing unto You." How then are we glorifying the most blessed life of God, as this man claims, when (as the Prophet says) our goods are nothing unto Him? Does he perhaps take "call" to mean "glory in"? Yet those who use the latter word correctly, and who have been trained to use words with precision, tell us that the word "glory in" is never used for mere indication, but that this idea is expressed by such words as "to make known," "to show," "to indicate," or some other of that kind, whereas the word "glory in" means to be proud of, or delight in a thing, and the like. But he claims that by using names drawn from human imagination we glory in the blessed life. We hold, however, that adding any honor to the Divine nature, which is above all honor, is more than human weakness can do. At the same time we do not deny that we endeavor, by words and names devised with due reverence, to give some notion of its attributes. And so, carefully following the path of due reverence, we understand that the first cause is that which has its existence not from any cause superior to itself. This view, if one accepts it as true, is praiseworthy for its truth alone. But if one should judge it to be superior to other aspects of the Divine nature, and so should say that God, exulting and rejoicing in this alone, glories in it as of paramount excellence, one would find support only from the Muse by whom Eunomius is inspired, when he says that ungeneracy glories in itself, that which, mark you, he calls God's ousia, and styles the blessed and Divine life.

But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, which passes all understanding, we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but to guide our own selves by the aid of such terms towards the comprehension of the things which are hidden. I said to the Lord, says the Prophet, You are my God, my goods are nothing unto You. How then are we glorifying the most blessed life of God, as this man affirms, when (as says the Prophet) our goods are nothing unto Him? Is it that he takes call to mean glory in? Yet those who employ the latter word rightly, and who have been trained to use words with propriety, tell us that the word glory in is never used of mere indication, but that that idea is expressed by such words as to make known, to show, to indicate, or some other of the kind, whereas the word for glory in means to be proud of, or delight in a thing, and the like. But he affirms that by employing names drawn from human imagination we glory in the blessed life. We hold, however, that to add any honour to the Divine nature, which is above all honour, is more than human infirmity can do. At the same time we do not deny that we endeavour, by words and names devised with due reverence, to give some notion of its attributes. And so, following studiously in the path of due reverence, we apprehend that the first cause is that which has its subsistence not from any cause superior to itself. Which view, if so be one accepts it as true, is praiseworthy for its truth alone. But if one should judge it to be superior to other aspects of the Divine nature, and so should say that God, exulting and rejoicing in this alone, glories in it, as of paramount excellence, one would find support only from the Muse by whom Eunomius is inspired, when he says, that ungeneracy glories in itself, that which, mark you, he calls God's essence, and styles the blessed and Divine life.

But let us hear how, in the way he thinks most necessary, and in the form that came before (for with such rhythms he again offers us a sample of his stylistic flourishes)—let us hear, I say, how by such means he plans to refute the opinion people have formed of him, and to keep hidden the ignorance of those he has deceived. For I will use our verbose writer's own verbal patterns and phrasing. When, he says, we assert that words by which thought is expressed die as soon as they are uttered, we add that whether words are uttered or not, whether they exist yet or not, God was and is ungenerate. Let us learn, then, what connection there is between the conception or the formation of words, and the things which we signify by this or that mode of speech. Accordingly, if God is ungenerate before the creation of man, we must regard as insignificant the words which indicate that thought, since they are dispersed along with the sounds that express them, if such thought happens to be named according to human conception. For to be, and to be called, are not interchangeable terms. But God is by His nature what He is, yet He is called by us by such names as the poverty of our nature will allow us to use, since our nature is incapable of expressing thought except through voice and words. Accordingly, understanding Him to be without origin, we express that thought by the term ungenerate. And what harm is it to Him who truly is, that He should be named by us as we conceive Him to be? For His ungenerate existence is not the result of His being called ungenerate, but the name is the result of the existence. But this clever friend of ours fails to see this, nor does he take a clear view of his own positions. For if he did, he would certainly have stopped criticizing those who formed the word ungeneracy to express the idea in their minds. For look at what he says: Words so spoken perish as soon as they are spoken; but God both is and was ungenerate, both after the words were spoken and before. You see that the Supreme Being is what He is, before the creation of all things, whether spoken of or not, being what He is neither in greater nor in lesser degree; while the use of words and names was not devised until after the creation of man, endowed by God with the faculty of reason and speech.

But let us hear how, in the way most needed, and the form that preceded (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), let us hear, I say, how by such means he proposes to refute the opinion formed of him, and to keep in the dark the ignorance of those whom he has deluded. For I will use our dithyrambist's own verbal inflections and phraseology. When, says he, we assert that words by which thought is expressed die as soon as they are uttered, we add that whether words are uttered or not, whether they are yet in existence or not, God was and is ungenerate. Let us learn, then, what connection there is between the conception or the formation of words, and the things which we signify by this or that mode of utterance. Accordingly, if God is ungenerate before the creation of man, we must esteem as of no account the words which indicate that thought, inasmuch as they are dispersed along with the sounds that express them, if such thought happen to be named after human notion. For to be, and to be called, are not convertible terms. But God is by His nature what He is, but He is called by us by such names as the poverty of our nature will allow us to make use of, which is incapable of enunciating thought except by means of voice and words. Accordingly, understanding Him to be without origin, we enunciate that thought by the term ungenerate. And what harm is it to Him Who indeed is, that He should be named by us as we conceive Him to be? For His ungenerate existence is not the result of His being called ungenerate, but the name is the result of the existence. But this our acute friend fails to see, nor does he take a clear view of his own positions. For if he did, he would certainly have left off reviling those who framed the word ungeneracy to express the idea in their minds. For look at what he says, Words so spoken perish as soon as they are spoken; but God both is and was ungenerate, both after the words were spoken and before. You see that the Supreme Being is what He is, before the creation of all things, whether silent or not, being what He is neither in greater nor in less degree; while the use of words and names was not devised till after the creation of man, endowed by God with the faculty of reason and speech.

If the creation came after its Creator, and humanity is the last thing in the order of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristic of humanity, and verbs and nouns are the component parts of speech, and ungeneracy is a noun, how does he not understand that he is fighting against his own arguments? For we say that human thought and intelligence have devised words that express the things they represent, and he admits that those who use speech are demonstrably later in time than the Divine life, and that the Divine physis is now, and always has been, without generation. If, then, he admits that the blessed life existed before humanity (for I return to that point), and we do not deny humanity's later creation, but maintain that we have used forms of speech ever since we came into being and received the faculty of reason from our Maker, and if ungeneracy is a word that expresses a particular idea, and every word is a part of human speech—it follows that whoever admits the Divine physis existed before humanity must at the same time admit that the name invented by humanity to express that physis was itself later in existence. For it was not likely that the use of speech should be exercised before the existence of creatures to use it, any more than farming should be exercised before the existence of farmers, or navigation before the existence of navigators, or in fact any of the occupations of life before life itself. Why, then, does he argue with us instead of following his premises to their logical conclusion?

If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristic of man, and verbs and nouns are the component elements of speech, and ungeneracy is a noun, how is it that he does not understand that he is combating his own arguments? For we, on our side, say that by human thought and intelligence words have been devised expressive of things which they represent, and he, on his side, allows that those who employ speech are demonstrably later in point of time than the Divine life, and that the Divine nature is now, and ever has been, without generation. If, then, he allows the blessed life to be anterior to man (for to that point I return), and we do not deny man's later creation, but contend that we have used forms of speech ever since we came into being and received the faculty of reason from our Maker, and if ungeneracy is a word expressive of a special idea, and every word is a part of human speech — it follows that he who admits that the Divine nature was anterior to man must at the same time admit that the name invented by man to express that nature was itself later in being. For it was not likely that the use of speech should be exercised before the existence of creatures to use it, any more than that farming should be exercised before the existence of farmers, or navigation before that of navigators, or in fact any of the occupations of life before that of life itself. Why, then, does he contend with us, instead of following his premises to their legitimate conclusion?

He says that God was what He is before the creation of humanity. We don't deny this. For whatever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the world. But we maintain that it received its name after the one who names came into being. Here's why: if we use words so they can teach us about the things they signify, and if only ignorance requires teaching, while the Divine Nature comprehends all knowledge and is above all teaching, then it follows that names were invented to denote the Supreme Being not for His sake, but for ours. For He did not attach the term "ungeneracy" to His nature so that He Himself might be instructed. He who knows all things has no need of syllables and words to instruct Him about His own nature and majesty.

He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the world. But we maintain that it received its name after the namer came into being. For if we use words for this purpose, that they may supply us with teaching about the things which they signify, and it is ignorance alone that requires teaching, while the Divine Nature, as comprehending all knowledge, is above all teaching, it follows that names were invented to denote the Supreme Being, not for His sake, but for our own. For He did not attach the term ungeneracy to His nature in order that He Himself might be instructed. For He Who knows all things has no need of syllables and words to instruct Him as to His own nature and majesty.

In order for us to gain some understanding of what may reverently be thought about Him, we have marked our different ideas with certain words and syllables, labeling our mental processes with verbal formulas that serve as distinctive signs and indicators. Our goal is to give a clear and straightforward declaration of our mental processes by means of words that are attached to and express our ideas. Why, then, does he criticize our claim that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate that God exists without origin or beginning, and that—independently of all speech, silence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation—God was and remains ungenerate? If someone were to argue that God was not ungenerate until the name ungeneracy had been found, then perhaps he might be excused for writing as he has written against such an absurdity. But if no one denies that God existed before speech and reason, and while we say the form of words by which the meaning is expressed was devised by mental conception, what is the point of his controversy with us? His aim is to show that the name is not a human invention, but that it existed before our creation, though I do not know by whom it was spoken. What does the assertion that God existed ungenerately before all things, and the claim that mental conception is posterior to God, have to do with this aim of his? For it has been fully demonstrated that God is not a conception, so we may press him with the same sort of argument and reply, so to speak, in his own words: It is utter folly to regard understanding as existing before those who exercise it; or again, as he proceeds a little below, Nor as though we intended this—to make men, the latest of God's works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding. The argument would indeed have great force if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, were to argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever has been (for who would go to such an extreme of folly as to assert that He who alone exists, and who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?)—why does he fight with shadows, contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness clear? Feeling ashamed of the fallacy concerning ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words to things, so that by throwing everything into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced into imagining that we have described God either as a conception or as posterior in existence to the invention of human terminology. Thus, leaving our argument unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field. For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed at. But what they were trying to establish was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of this question is reserved for some other of his writings. But here he makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though someone were simply questioning him on such points as these—what view he held about the term ungenerate, whether he thought it was invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself. And he, with much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this way.

But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certain words and syllables, labelling, as it were, our mental processes with verbal formulæ to serve as characteristic notes and indications, with the object of giving a clear and simple declaration of our mental processes by means of words attached to, and expressive of, our ideas. Why, then, does he find fault with our contention that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate the existence of God without origin or beginning, and that, independently of all exercise of speech, or silence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation, God was and remains ungenerate? If, indeed, any one should argue that God was not ungenerate till the name ungeneracy had been found, the man might be pardonable for writing as he has written, in contravention of such an absurdity. But if no one denies that He existed before speech and reason, whereas, while the form of words by which the meaning is expressed is said by us to have been devised by mental conception, the end and aim of his controversy with us is to show that the name is not of man's device, but that it existed before our creation, though by whom it was spoken I do not know, what has the assertion that God existed ungenerately before all things, and the contention that mental conception is posterior to God, got to do with this aim of his? For that God is not a conception has been fully demonstrated, so that we may press him with the same sort of argument, and reply, so to say, in his own words, e.g. It is utter folly to regard understanding as of earlier birth than those who exercise it; or again, as he proceeds a little below, Nor as though we intended this, i.e. to make men, the latest of God's works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding. Great indeed would be the force of the argument, if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, should argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever has been, (for who would go to such a pitch of folly as to assert that He Who alone is, and Who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?) why does he fight with shadows, contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness clear, that, feeling ashamed of the fallacy respecting ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words to things, so that by throwing all into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced, by imagining that God has been described by us either as a conception, or as posterior in existence to the invention of human terminology; and thus, leaving our argument unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field? For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed at. But what they were for establishing was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of this question is in reserve in some other of his writings. But here he makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though some one were simply questioning him on such points as these — what view he held as to the term ungenerate, whether he thought it invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself; and he, with much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this wise.

They say that God is ungenerate, and we agree with this. But we take exception to the claim that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence. For we maintain that this term describes God's ungenerate subsistence, but not that ungeneracy is God. But what is the nature of his refutation? It is this: that before humanity's creation God existed ungenerately. But what does this have to do with the point he promises to establish, that the term and its Subject are identical? For he asserts that ungeneracy is the Divine essence. But what kind of fulfillment of his promise is it to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What a wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! What perfection of logical refinement! Who that has not been initiated in the mysteries of this fearsome craft may venture to confront it? Yet in listing the meanings of the term conception, he makes a mockery of it. For, he says, of words used to express a conception of the mind, some exist only in pronunciation, such as those which signify nonentity, while others have their distinct meaning. Of these, some have an amplifying function, as in the case of colossal things, others a diminishing function, as in the case of tiny things, others a multiplying function, as in the case of many-headed monsters, others a combining function, as in the case of centaurs. After reducing the force of the term conception to its lowest value in this way, our clever friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. He says that it is without sense and meaning, that it imagines the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting incompatible notions together, or playing tricks with strange and monstrous combinations.

They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maintain that this term is declarative of God's ungenerate subsistence, but not that ungeneracy is God. But of what nature is his refutation? It is this: that before man's creation God existed ungenerately. But what has this to do with the point which he promises to establish, that the term and its Subject are identical? For he lays it down that ungeneracy is the Divine essence. But what sort of a fulfilment of his promise is it, to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What a wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! What perfection of logical refinement! Who that has not been initiated in the mysteries of the awful craft may venture to look it in the face? Yet in particularizing the meanings of the term conception, he makes a solemn travesty of it. For, says he, of words used to express a conception of the mind, some exist only in pronunciation, as for instance those which signify nonentity, while others have their peculiar meaning; and of these some have an amplifying force, as in the case of things colossal, others a diminishing, as in that of pigmies, others a multiplying, as in that of many-headed monsters, others a combinative, as in that of centaurs. After thus reducing the force of the term conception to its lowest value, our clever friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. He says that it is without sense and meaning, that it fancies the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions together, or juggling with strange and monstrous combinations.

With such mockery of the term conception, he shows, as well as he can, that it is useless and unprofitable for human life. What, then, was the origin of our higher branches of learning—of geometry, arithmetic, the logical and physical sciences, of the inventions of mechanical art, of the marvels of measuring time by the bronze sundial and the water-clock? What, again, of ontology, of the science of ideas, in short of all intellectual inquiry as applied to great and sublime subjects? What of agriculture, of navigation, and of the other activities of human life? How does the sea become a highway for humanity? How are things of the air brought into the service of things of the earth, wild things tamed, objects of terror brought under control, animals stronger than ourselves made obedient to the rein? Have not all these benefits to human life been achieved by conception? For, according to my understanding of it, conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, advancing to further discoveries by means of what is connected to and follows from our first perception regarding the thing being studied. For when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, by fitting what follows to the first result of our discoveries, we gradually lead our investigation to the end of our intended research.

With such gibes at the term conception, he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, was the origin of our higher branches of learning, of geometry, arithmetic, the logical and physical sciences, of the inventions of mechanical art, of the marvels of measuring time by the brazen dial and the water-clock? What, again, of ontology, of the science of ideas, in short of all intellectual speculation as applied to great and sublime objects? What of agriculture, of navigation, and of the other pursuits of human life? How comes the sea to be a highway for man? How are things of the air brought into the service of things of the earth, wild things tamed, objects of terror brought into subjection, animals stronger than ourselves made obedient to the rein? Have not all these benefits to human life been achieved by conception? For, according to my account of it, conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied. For when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, by adapting what follows to the first result of our discoveries we gradually conduct our inquiry to the end of our proposed research.

But why list all the greater and more impressive achievements of this faculty? Anyone who is not hostile to the truth can see for himself that everything else that time has brought forth for the service and benefit of human life has been discovered by no other means than through conception. And it seems to me that anyone who judged this faculty more valuable than any other ability we have been given in this life by Divine Providence would not be far off in his judgment. In saying this I have the support of Job's teaching, where he shows God answering His servant from the whirlwind and the clouds, saying both other things fitting for Him to say, and that it is He who has placed man over the arts, and given to woman her skill in weaving and embroidery.

But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all else that Time has discovered for the service and benefit of human life, has been discovered by no other instrumentality than that of conception. And it seems to me, that any one who should judge this faculty more precious than any other with the exercise of which we are gifted in this life by Divine Providence would not be far mistaken in his judgment. And in saying this I am supported by Job's teaching, where he represents God as answering His servant by the tempest and the clouds, saying both other things meet for Him to say, and that it is He Who has set man over the arts, and given to woman her skill in weaving and embroidery.

No one whose nature isn't completely animal and brutish would deny that He didn't teach us such things through some visible operation, with Himself directly overseeing the work, as we see in matters of physical instruction. But it has been said that our first knowledge of such arts comes from Him, and if this is true, then surely He who gave our nature this faculty of conceiving and discovering the objects of our investigation was Himself our guide to these arts. By the law of causation, whatever is discovered and established through conception must be attributed to Him who is the author of that faculty. For example, human life invented the art of healing, but someone would still be right to claim that this art is a gift from God. Whatever discovery has been made in human life that serves any useful purpose in peace or war came to us from nowhere else but from an intelligence that conceives and discovers according to our various needs, and that intelligence is a gift of God. We owe everything that intelligence provides us to God. I don't deny the objection made by our opponents that lying wonders are also fabricated by this faculty. Their argument on this point actually supports our side. We too assert that the knowledge of opposites is the same, whether beneficial or harmful—for example, in the arts of healing and navigation, and so on. Someone who knows how to cure the sick with medicines will also know, if he were to turn his art to an evil purpose, how to mix some deadly ingredient into the food of healthy people. Someone who can steer a boat with its rudder into port can also steer it toward a reef or rock if he wants to destroy those on board. A painter, using the same art by which he depicts the most beautiful form on canvas, could give us an exact representation of the ugliest form. Similarly, a wrestling-master, through the experience he has gained in physical training, can set a dislocated limb or, if he wishes, dislocate a healthy one. But why burden our argument by multiplying examples? Just as in the cases mentioned above no one would deny that someone who has learned to practice an art for right purposes can also misuse it for wrong ones, so we say that God implanted the faculty of thought and conception in human nature for good, but when people abuse it as an instrument of discovery, it often becomes the servant of harmful inventions. Although this faculty can give a plausible appearance to what is false and unreal, it is nonetheless capable of investigating what actually and truly exists (subsists), and its ability for one must fairly be regarded as evidence of its ability for the other.

Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no one would gainsay whose nature is not altogether animal and brutish. But still it has been said that our first knowledge of such arts is from Him, and, if such is the case, surely He Who endowed our nature with such a faculty of conceiving and finding out the objects of our investigation was Himself our Guide to the arts. And by the law of causation, whatever is discovered and established by conception must be ascribed to Him Who is the Author of that faculty. Thus human life invented the Art of Healing, but nevertheless he would be right who should assert that Art to be a gift from God. And whatever discovery has been made in human life, conducive to any useful purposes of peace or war, came to us from no other quarter but from an intelligence conceiving and discovering according to our several requirements; and that intelligence is a gift of God. It is to God, then, that we owe all that intelligence supplies to us. Nor do I deny the objection made by our adversaries, that lying wonders also are fabricated by this faculty. For their contention as to this makes for our own side in the argument. For we too assert that the science of opposites is the same, whether beneficial or the reverse; e.g. in the case of the arts of healing and navigation, and so on. For he who knows how to relieve the sick by drugs will also know, if indeed he were to turn his art to an evil purpose, how to mix some deleterious ingredient in the food of the healthy. And he who can steer a boat with its rudder into port can also steer it for the reef or the rock, if minded to destroy those on board. And the painter, with the same art by which he depicts the fairest form on his canvas, could give us an exact representation of the ugliest. So, too, the wrestling-master, by the experience which he has gained in anointing, can set a dislocated limb, or, should he wish to do so, dislocate a sound one. But why encumber our argument by multiplying instances? As in the above-mentioned cases no one would deny that he who has learned to practise an art for right purposes can also abuse it for wrong ones, so we say that the faculty of thought and conception was implanted by God in human nature for good, but, with those who abuse it as an instrument of discovery, it frequently becomes the handmaid of pernicious inventions. But although it is thus possible for this faculty to give a plausible shape to what is false and unreal, it is none the less competent to investigate what actually and in very truth subsists, and its ability for the one must in fairness be regarded as an evidence of its ability for the other.

When someone sets out to frighten or captivate an audience, they need abundant imaginative power to achieve such a goal, and they should present to spectators monsters with many hands, many heads, or breathing fire, or people wrapped in serpent coils, or they should seem to make their size increase or stretch their natural dimensions to absurd proportions, or they should describe people transformed into springs and trees and birds—a kind of storytelling that appeals to those who enjoy such things. All this is the clearest proof that it is possible to reach higher knowledge through this creative faculty as well.

For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to the spectators many-handed, many-headed, or fire-breathing monsters, or men enfolded in the coils of serpents, or that he should seem to increase their stature, or enlarge their natural proportions to a ridiculous extent, or that he should describe men metamorphosed into fountains and trees and birds, a kind of narrative which is not without its attraction for such as take pleasure in things of that sort — all this, I say, is the clearest of demonstrations that it is possible to arrive at higher knowledge also by means of this inventive faculty.

For it is not the case that while the intelligence given to us by the Giver is fully capable of imagining things that do not exist, it has no ability at all to provide us with things that may benefit us. Just as the impulsive and elective faculty of the soul is established in our nature to direct us toward what is good and noble—though a person may also misuse it for what is evil—and no one can claim that because the elective faculty sometimes inclines toward evil it never inclines toward what is good, so the tendency of conception toward what is vain and unprofitable does not prove its inability for what is profitable. On the contrary, it demonstrates that it is not useless for what is beneficial and necessary to the mind. For just as in one case it discovers ways to produce pleasure or terror, so in the other it does not fail to find ways of arriving at truth. Now one of the questions we investigate is whether the First Cause, namely God, exists without beginning, or whether His existence depends on some beginning. But perceiving through thought that what we conceive as the consequence of something else cannot be a First Cause, we created a word to express such an idea, and we say that He who is without prior cause exists without origin, or, so to speak, ungenerately. And Him who exists in this way we call ungenerate and without origin, indicating by that name not what He is, but what He is not.

For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no faculty at all for providing us with things that may profit us. But as the impulsive and elective faculty of the soul is established in our nature, to incite us to what is good and noble, though a man may also abuse it for what is evil, and no one can call the fact that the elective faculty sometimes inclines to evil a proof that it never inclines to what is good — so the bias of conception towards what is vain and unprofitable does not prove its inability for what is profitable, but, on the contrary, is a demonstration of its not being unserviceable for what is beneficial and necessary to the mind. For as, in the one case, it discovers means to produce pleasure or terror, so, in the other, it does not fail to find ways for getting at truth. Now one of the objects of inquiry was whether the First Cause, viz. God, exists without beginning, or whether His existence is dependent on some beginning. But perceiving, by the aid of thought, that that cannot be a First Cause which we conceive of as the consequence of another, we devised a word expressive of such a notion, and we say that He who is without anterior cause exists without origin, or, so to say, ungenerately. And Him Who so exists we call ungenerate and without origin, indicating, by that appellation, not what He is, but what He is not.

But to make this idea as clear as possible, I will try to illustrate it with an even simpler example. Let us suppose we are asking about some tree, whether it is cultivated or wild. If it is the former, we call it planted; if the latter, not planted. Such a term accurately describes the truth, for the tree must necessarily be one way or the other. Yet the word does not indicate the particular physis of the plant. From the term "not-planted" we learn that it grows spontaneously, but whether what is thus signified is a plane tree, a vine, or some other such plant, the name applied to it does not tell us.

But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about some tree, whether it is cultivated or wild. If the former, we call it planted, if the latter, not planted. And such a term exactly hits the truth, for the tree must needs be after this manner or that. And yet the word does not indicate the peculiar nature of the plant. From the term not-planted we learn that it is of spontaneous growth; but whether what is thus signified is a plane, or a vine, or some other such plant, the name applied to it does not inform us.

This example being understood, it is time to move on to the thing it illustrates. We comprehend this much: that the First Cause has His existence from no prior cause. Accordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately, putting this notion of ungeneracy into verbal form. We show by the force of the term that He is without origin or beginning. But this appellation does not lead us to discern what that Being is who exists ungenerately. Nor should it be supposed that the processes of conception could enable us to rise above the limits of our nature, open up the incomprehensible to our view, and allow us to grasp the knowledge of that which no knowledge can approach. Nevertheless, our adversary storms against our Master and tries to tear apart his teaching concerning the faculty of thought and conception. He derides what has been said, reveling as usual in the rattle of his jingling phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from providing evidence concerning those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter. For, quoting certain of the Master's reflections on the faculty of conception, in which he shows that its exercise occurs not only with reference to vain and trivial objects but that it is competent to deal also with weightier matters, he brings Basil into court with the charge that his language follows pagan philosophy. Through his discussion about the grain, seed, and other food (in Genesis), he accuses Basil of circumscribing Divine Providence by not allowing that words were given to things by God, and of fighting in the ranks of the Atheists and taking arms against Providence. He charges that Basil admires the doctrines of the profane rather than the laws of God and ascribes to them the palm of wisdom, not having observed in the earliest of the sacred records that before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed are mentioned in Holy Writ.

This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence from no antecedent one. Accordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately, reducing this notion of ungeneracy into verbal form. That He is without origin or beginning we show by the force of the term. But what that Being is which exists ungenerately, this appellation does not lead us to discern. Nor was it to be supposed that the processes of conception could avail to raise us above the limits of our nature, and open up the incomprehensible to our view, and enable us to compass the knowledge of that which no knowledge can approach. Nevertheless, our adversary storms at our Master, and tries to tear to pieces his teaching respecting the faculty of thought and conception, and derides what has been said, revelling as usual in the rattle of his jingling phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from adducing evidence respecting those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter. For, quoting certain of the Master's speculations on the faculty of conception, in which he shows that its exercise finds place, not only in reference to vain and trivial objects, but that it is competent to deal also with weightier matters, he, by means of his speculation about the grain, and seed, and other food (in Genesis), brings Basil into court with the charge, that his language is a following of pagan philosophy, and that he is circumscribing Divine Providence, as not allowing that words were given to things by God, and that he is fighting in the ranks of the Atheists, and taking arms against Providence, and that he admires the doctrines of the profane rather than the laws of God, and ascribes to them the palm of wisdom, not having observed in the earliest of the sacred records, that before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed are mentioned in Holy Writ.

These are his charges against us—not exactly in his own words, since we have made changes necessary to smooth out the roughness and harshness of his writing style. So what is our answer to this careful defender of Divine Providence? He claims we are wrong because, while we don't deny that God created humanity as rational beings, we say that the invention of words came from the logical faculty God placed in human nature. This is the worst of his accusations, by which he charges our teacher of righteousness with going over to atheist beliefs, denounces him as joining and supporting their lawless group, and indeed accuses him of every terrible offense imaginable. Well then, let this corrector of our mistakes tell us: did God give names to the things He created? For this is what our new interpreter of the mysteries says: Before creating humanity, God named germ, and herb, and grass, and seed, and tree, and similar things, when by the word of His power He brought each of them into being. If he sticks to the bare letter, and in this way follows a Jewish approach, and has yet to learn that the Christian is a student not of the letter but of the Spirit (for the letter kills, says the Apostle, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6), and quotes to us the bare literal reading as though God Himself spoke these words—if he believes this, that God used fluent speech in the manner of human beings, expressing His thoughts through voice and pronunciation—if he believes this, he cannot reasonably deny what logically follows. For our speech is produced by the speech organs: the windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, and the mouth, with air drawn in from outside and breath from within working together to produce sound. The windpipe, fitting into the throat like a flute, sends sound up from below; and the roof of the mouth, because of the empty space above extending to the nostrils, works like a musical instrument to give the voice volume from above. The cheeks also help with speech, contracting and expanding according to their structure, or pushing the voice through a narrow passage by various movements of the tongue, which works now with one part, now with another, making the sound that passes over it hard or soft by touching the teeth or palate. Moreover, the lips contribute significantly to the result, affecting the voice through their various distinct movements and helping to shape the words as they are spoken.

Such are his charges against us; not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to correct the ruggedness and harshness of his style. What, then, is our answer to this careful guardian of Divine Providence? He asserts that we are in error, because, while we do not deny man's having been created a rational being by God, we ascribe the invention of words to the logical faculty implanted by God in man's nature. And this is the bitterest of his accusations, whereby our teacher of righteousness is charged with deserting to the tenets of the Atheists, and is denounced as partaking with and supporting their lawless company, and indeed as guilty of all the most atrocious offenses. Well, then, let this corrector of our blunders tell us, did God give names to the things which He created? For so says our new interpreter of the mysteries: Before the creation of man God named germ, and herb, and grass, and seed, and tree, and the like, when by the word of His power He brought them severally into being. If, then, he abides by the bare letter, and so far Judaizes, and has yet to learn that the Christian is a disciple not of the letter but of the Spirit (for the letter kills, says the Apostle, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6), and quotes to us the bare literal reading of the words as though God Himself pronounced them — if, I say, he believes this, that, after the similitude of men, God made use of fluency of speech, expressing His thoughts by voice and accent — if, I repeat, he believes this, he cannot reasonably deny what follows as its logical consequence. For our speech is uttered by the organs of speech, the windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, and the mouth, the inhalation of air from without and the breath from within working together to produce the utterance. For the windpipe, fitting into the throat like a flute, emits a sound from below; and the roof of the mouth, by reason of the void space above extending to the nostrils, like some musical instrument, gives volume from above to the voice. And the cheeks, too, are aids to speech, contracting and expanding in accordance with their structural arrangement, or propelling the voice through a narrow passage by various movements of the tongue, which it effects now with one part of itself now with another, giving hardness or softness to the sound which passes over it by contact with the teeth or with the palate. Again, the service of the lips contributes not a little to the result, affecting the voice by the variety of their distinctive movements, and helping to shape the words as they are uttered.

If God gives things their names, as our new interpreter of the Divine record assures us—naming seed, grass, tree, and fruit—He must necessarily have pronounced each of these words exactly as it is pronounced, that is, according to how the syllables are put together, some produced by the lips, others by the tongue, others by both. But if none of these words could be spoken except through the action of vocal organs producing each syllable and sound through some appropriate movement, he must necessarily attribute such organs to God and shape the Divine Being according to the requirements of speech. For each use of the vocal organs must have some form or other, and form is a bodily limitation. Furthermore, we know very well that all bodies are composite, but where you see composition you also see dissolution, and dissolution, as the concept implies, is the same thing as destruction. This, then, is the result of our opponent's victory over us: to show us the God of his imagination, whom he has fashioned through the name agennesia (ungeneracy)—speaking, to be sure, so that He will not lose His share in the invention of names, but equipped with vocal organs to utter them, and not without bodily nature to enable Him to use them (for you cannot conceive of actual speech in the abstract apart from a body), and gradually proceeding to the natural affections of the body—through the composite to dissolution, and so reaching His end in destruction.

If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of necessity have pronounced each of these words not otherwise than as it is pronounced; i.e. according to the composition of the syllables, some of which are sounded by the lips, others by the tongue, others by both. But if none of these words could be uttered, except by the operation of vocal organs producing each syllable and sound by some appropriate movement, he must of necessity ascribe the possession of such organs to God, and fashion the Divine Being according to the exigencies of speech. For each adaptation of the vocal organs must be in some form or other, and form is a bodily limitation. Further, we know very well that all bodies are composite, but where you see composition you see also dissolution, and dissolution, as the notion implies, is the same thing as destruction. This, then, is the upshot of our controversialist's victory over us; to show us the God of his imagining whom he has fashioned by the name ungeneracy — speaking, indeed, that He may not lose His share in the invention of names, but provided with vocal organs with which to utter them, and not without bodily nature to enable Him to employ them (for you cannot conceive of formal utterance in the abstract apart from a body), and gradually going on to the congenital affections of the body — through the composite to dissolution, and so finding His end in destruction.

This is the nature of this new-fangled deity, as can be deduced from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures and insists that Moses explicitly declares this when he says, "God said," adding His words: "Let there be light," and "Let there be a firmament," and "Let the waters be gathered together…and let the dry land appear," and "Let the earth bring forth," and "Let the waters bring forth," and whatever else is written in its proper sequence. Let us then examine the meaning of what is said. Who does not know, even if he is the simplest person, that there is a natural connection between hearing and speech, and that just as hearing cannot function when no one is speaking, so speech is ineffectual unless directed to hearing? If, then, he means literally that God said, let him also tell us to what hearing His words were addressed. Does he mean that He said them to Himself? If so, the commands He issues, He issues to Himself. Yet who will accept this interpretation—that God sits upon His throne prescribing what He Himself must do, and employing Himself as His minister to do His bidding? But even supposing one were to allow that it was not blasphemy to say this, who has any need of words and speech for himself, even among men? For everyone's own mental activity is sufficient to produce choice and will. But he will doubtless say that the Father held conversation with the Son. But what need of vocal utterance for that? For it is a property of bodily nature to signify the thoughts of the heart by means of words, which is why written characters equivalent to speech were invented for the expression of thought. For we express thought equally by speaking and by writing, but in the case of those who are not too far away we reach their hearing by voice, while we make our mind known to those who are at a distance by written characters. In the case of those present with us, we raise or lower the tones of our voice in proportion to their distance from us, and to those close by us we sometimes point out what they are to do simply by a nod. Such or such an expression of the eye is sufficient to convey our intention, or a movement of the hand is sufficient to signify our approval or disapproval of something going on. If, then, those who are confined by the body are able to make known the hidden workings of their minds to their neighbors even without voice, or speech, or written correspondence, and silence causes no hindrance to the conduct of business, can it be that in the case of the immaterial and intangible and, as Eunomius says, the Supreme and first Being, there is any need of words to indicate the thought of the Father and to make known His will to the Only-Begotten Son—words which, as he himself says, perish as soon as they are uttered? No one, I think, who has common sense will accept this as the truth, especially since all sound is poured forth into the air. For voice cannot be produced unless it takes form in air. Now, even they themselves must suppose some medium of communication between the speaker and the one to whom he speaks. For if there were no such medium, how could the voice travel from the speaker to the hearer? What, then, will they say is the medium or interval by which they divide the Father from the Son? Between bodies, indeed, there is an interval of atmospheric space, differing in its nature from the nature of human bodies. But God, who is intangible and without form and pure from all composition, in communicating His counsels with the Only-Begotten Son, who is similarly, or rather in the same manner, immaterial and without body—if He made His communication by voice, what medium would He have had through which the word, transmitted as in a current, might reach the ears of the Only-Begotten? For we need hardly stop to consider that God is not divisible into separate faculties of perception, as we are, whose perceptions separately apprehend their corresponding objects—for example, sight apprehends what may be seen, hearing what may be heard, so that touch does not taste, and hearing has no perception of odors and flavors, but each confines itself to that function to which it was appointed by nature, holding itself insensible, as it were, to those with which it has no natural correspondence, and incapable of experiencing the pleasure enjoyed by its neighboring sense. But with God it is otherwise. All in all, He is at once sight and hearing and knowledge—and there we stop, for it is not permitted us to ascribe the more animal perceptions to that refined nature. Still, we take a very low view of God and drag down the Divine to our own groveling standard if we suppose the Father speaking with His mouth and the Son's ear listening to His words. What, then, are we to suppose is the medium which conveys the Father's voice to the hearing of the Son? It must be created or uncreate. But we may not call it created, for the Word was before the creation of the world, and beside the Divine nature there is nothing uncreate. If, therefore, there was no creation then, and the Word spoken of in the cosmogony was older than creation, will he who maintains that speech and a voice are meant by the Word suggest what medium existed between the Father and the Son, whereby those words and sounds were expressed? For if a medium exists, it must necessarily exist in a nature of its own, so as to differ in nature both from the Father and the Son. Being, then, something necessarily different, it divides the Father and the Son from each other, as though inserted between the two. What, then, could it be? Not created, for creation is younger than the Word. Generated we have learned the Only-Begotten (and Him alone) to be. Except the Father, none is ungenerate. Therefore, truth obliges us to conclude that there is no medium between the Father and the Son. But where separation is not conceived, the closest connection is naturally implied. And what is so connected needs no medium for voice or speech. Now, by connected, I mean here what is in all respects inseparable. For in the case of a spiritual nature the term connection does not mean bodily connection, but the union and blending of spiritual with spiritual through identity of will. Accordingly, there is no divergence of will between the Father and the Son, but the image of goodness is after the Archetype of all goodness and beauty, and just as, if a man should look at himself in a mirror (for it is perfectly allowable to explain the idea by bodily illustrations), the copy will in all respects be conformed to the original, the shape of the man who is reflected being the cause of the shape on the glass, and the reflection making no independent movement or inclination unless commenced by the original, but, if it moves, moving along with it—in like manner we maintain that our Lord, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and inseparably one with the Father in every movement of His will. If the Father wills anything, the Son who is in the Father knows the Father's will, or rather He is Himself the Father's will. For if He has in Himself all that is the Father's, there is nothing of the Father's that He cannot have. If, then, He has all things that are the Father's in Himself, or, say we rather, if He has the Father Himself, then, along with the Father and the things that are the Father's, He must necessarily have in Himself the whole of the Father's will. He needs not, therefore, to know the Father's will by word, being Himself the Word of the Father in the highest sense of the term. What, then, is the word that can be addressed to Him who is the Word indeed? And how can He who is the Word indeed require a second word for instruction?

Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintains that Moses explicitly declares this, when he says, God said, adding His words, Let there be light, and, Let there be a firmament, and, Let the waters be gathered together…and let the dry land appear, and, Let the earth bring forth, and, Let the waters bring forth, and, whatsoever else is written in its order. Let us, then, examine the meaning of what is said. Who does not know, even if he be the merest simpleton, that there is a natural correlation between hearing and speech, and that, as it is impossible for hearing to discharge its function when no one is speaking, so speech is ineffectual unless directed to hearing? If, then, he means literally that God said, let him tell us also to what hearing His words were addressed. Does he mean that He said them to Himself? If so, the commands which He issues, He issues to Himself. Yet who will accept this interpretation, that God sits upon His throne prescribing what He Himself must do, and employing Himself as His minister to do His bidding? But even supposing one were to allow that it was not blasphemy to say this, who has any need of words and speech for himself, even though a man? For every one's own mental action suffices him to produce choice and volition. But he will doubtless say that the Father held converse with the Son. But what need of vocal utterance for that? For it is a property of bodily nature to signify the thoughts of the heart by means of words, whence also written characters equivalent to speech were invented for the expression of thought. For we declare thought equally by speaking and by writing, but in the case of those who are not too far distant we reach their hearing by voice, but declare our mind to those who are at a distance by written characters; and in the case of those present with us, in proportion to their distance from us, we raise or lower the tones of our voice, and to those close by us we sometimes point out what they are to do simply by a nod; and such or such an expression of the eye is sufficient to convey our determination, or a movement of the hand is sufficient to signify our approval or disapproval of something going on. If, then, those who are encompassed by the body are able to make known the hidden working of their minds to their neighbours, even without voice, or speech, or correspondence by means of letters, and silence causes no hindrance to the dispatch of business, can it be that in the case of the immaterial, and intangible, and, as Eunomius says, the Supreme and first Being, there is any need of words to indicate the thought of the Father and to make known His will to the Only-Begotten Son — words, which, as he himself says, are wont to perish as soon as they are uttered? No one, methinks, who has common sense will accept this as the truth, especially as all sound is poured forth into the air. For voice cannot be produced unless it takes consistence in air. Now, even they themselves must suppose some medium of communication between the speaker and him to whom he speaks. For if there were no such medium, how could the voice travel from the speaker to the hearer? What, then, will they say is the medium or interval by which they divide the Father from the Son? Between bodies, indeed, there is an interval of atmospheric space, differing in its nature from the nature of human bodies. But God, Who is intangible, and without form, and pure from all composition, in communicating His counsels with the Only-Begotten Son, Who is similarly, or rather in the same manner, immaterial and without body — if He made His communication by voice, what medium would He have had through which the word, transmitted as in a current, might reach the ears of the Only-Begotten? For we need hardly stop to consider that God is not separable into apprehensive faculties, as we are, whose perceptions separately apprehend their corresponding objects; e.g. sight apprehends what may be seen, hearing what may be heard, so that touch does not taste, and hearing has no perception of odours and flavours, but each confines itself to that function to which it was appointed by nature, holding itself insensible, as it were, to those with which it has no natural correspondence, and incapable of tasting the pleasure enjoyed by its neighbour sense. But with God it is otherwise. All in all, He is at once sight, and hearing, and knowledge; and there we stop, for it is not permitted us to ascribe the more animal perceptions to that refined nature. Still we take a very low view of God, and drag down the Divine to our own grovelling standard, if we suppose the Father speaking with His mouth, and the Son's ear listening to His words. What, then, are we to suppose is the medium which conveys the Father's voice to the hearing of the Son? It must be created or uncreate. But we may not call it created; for the Word was before the creation of the world: and beside the Divine nature there is nothing uncreate. If, therefore, there was no creation then, and the Word spoken of in the cosmogony was older than creation, will he, who maintains that speech and a voice are meant by the Word, suggest what medium existed between the Father and the Son, whereby those words and sounds were expressed? For if a medium exist, it must needs exist in a nature of its own, so as to differ in nature both from the Father and the Son. Being, then, something of necessity different, it divides the Father and the Son from each other, as though inserted between the two. What, then, could it be? Not created, for creation is younger than the Word. Generated we have learned the Only-begotten (and Him alone) to be. Except the Father, none is ungenerate. Truth, therefore, obliges us to the conclusion that there is no medium between the Father and the Son. But where separation is not conceived of the closest connection is naturally implied. And what is so connected needs no medium for voice or speech. Now, by connected, I mean here what is in all respects inseparable. For in the case of a spiritual nature the term connection does not mean corporeal connection, but the union and blending of spiritual with spiritual through identity of will. Accordingly, there is no divergence of will between the Father and the Son, but the image of goodness is after the Archetype of all goodness and beauty, and as, if a man should look at himself in a glass (for it is perfectly allowable to explain the idea by corporeal illustrations), the copy will in all respects be conformed to the original, the shape of the man who is reflected being the cause of the shape on the glass, and the reflection making no spontaneous movement or inclination unless commenced by the original, but, if it move, moving along with it — in like manner we maintain that our Lord, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and inseparably one with the Father in every movement of His Will. If the Father will anything, the Son Who is in the Father knows the Father's will, or rather He is Himself the Father's will. For, if He has in Himself all that is the Father's, there is nothing of the Father's that He cannot have. If, then, He has all things that are the Father's in Himself, or, say we rather, if He has the Father Himself, then, along with the Father and the things that are the Father's, He must needs have in Himself the whole of the Father's will. He needs not, therefore, to know the Father's will by word, being Himself the Word of the Father, in the highest acceptation of the term. What, then, is the word that can be addressed to Him who is the Word indeed? And how can He Who is the Word indeed require a second word for instruction?

But it might be said that the Father's voice was addressed to the Holy Spirit. However, the Holy Spirit does not need instruction through speech either, for being God, as the Apostle says, He searches all things, even the deep things of God. So if God speaks any word, and all speech is directed to the ear, let those who claim that God expresses Himself in continuous discourse tell us what audience He was addressing. He does not need to address Himself. The Son has no need of instruction through words. The Holy Spirit searches even the deep things of God. Creation did not yet exist. To whom, then, was God's word directed?

But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for being God, as says the Apostle, He searches all things, yea the deep things of God 1 Corinthians 2:10. If, then, God utters any word, and all speech is directed to the ear, let those who maintain that God expresses Himself in the language of continuous discourse, inform us what audience He addressed. Himself He needs not address. The Son has no need of instruction by words. The Holy Ghost searches even the deep things of God. Creation did not yet exist. To whom, then, was God's word addressed?

But, he says, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spoke. No! Nor is great David among those who lie, and he clearly says: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handiwork. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge." And after saying that the heavens and the firmament declare, and that day and night show knowledge and speech, he adds to what he has said that there is neither speech nor language, and that their voices are not heard. Yet how can such declaring and showing be anything other than words, and how is it that no voice addresses itself to the ear? Is the prophet contradicting himself, or is he stating an impossibility when he speaks of words without sound, and declaration without language, and announcement without voice? Or is there not rather the very perfection of truth in his teaching, which tells us, in the words I have quoted, that the declaration of the heavens and the word shouted forth by the day is no articulate voice or language of the lips, but is a revelation of the power of God to those who are capable of hearing it, even though no voice is heard?

But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spoke. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he expressly says; The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handy work. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge; and after saying that the heavens and the firmament declare, and that day and that night shows knowledge and speech, he adds to what he has said, that there is neither speech nor language, and that their voices are not heard. Yet how can such declaring and showing forth be other than words, and how is it that no voice addresses itself to the ear? Is the prophet contradicting himself, or is he stating an impossibility, when he speaks of words without sound, and declaration without language, and announcement without voice? Or, is there not rather the very perfection of truth in his teaching, which tells us, in the words which I have quoted, that the declaration of the heavens, and the word shouted forth by the day, is no articulate voice nor language of the lips, but is a revelation of the power of God to those who are capable of hearing it, even though no voice be heard?

What, then, do we think of this passage? If we understand it, we may also understand what Moses means. Holy Scripture often uses physical illustrations to help us more clearly grasp what is being revealed, as appears to be the case in this passage from David. He teaches us through his words that none of the things that exist came to be by chance or accident, as some have imagined—that our world and everything in it was formed by random and unplanned combinations of basic elements, and that no Providence governs the world. Instead, we are taught that there is a cause behind the system and governance of the universe, on whom all nature depends, from whom it receives its origin and cause, toward whom it moves and inclines, and in whom it exists. And since, as the Apostle says, His eternal power and godhead are understood, being clearly seen through the creation of the world (Romans 1:20), all creation—and especially, as Scripture says, the order of the heavens—declares the wisdom of the Creator through the skill displayed in His works. This is what it seems to me David wants to communicate: the testimony of visible things to the fact that the worlds were made with wisdom and skill, and continue forever by the power of the one who rules over all. The very heavens, he says, by displaying the wisdom of the one who made them, practically shout aloud with a voice, and though they have no voice, they proclaim the wisdom of their Creator. We can hear what are like words teaching us: "O people, when you look at us and see our beauty and size, and this continual revolution with its well-ordered and harmonious motion, always working in the same direction and in the same way, turn your thoughts to the one who presides over our system, and from the beauty you see, imagine the beauty of the invisible Archetype. In us there is nothing without its Lord, nothing that moves by its own independent motion. Everything that appears or that can be understood about us depends on a Power who is beyond investigation and sublime." This is not given in spoken words, but through the things that are seen, and it plants in our minds knowledge of divine power more effectively than if speech proclaimed it with a voice. So then, just as the heavens declare though they do not speak, and the firmament shows God's handiwork yet requires no voice for this purpose, and the day utters speech though there is no speaking, and no one can say that Holy Scripture is in error—in the same way, since both Moses and David have one and the same Teacher, I mean the Holy Spirit, who says that the command came before the creation, we are not told that God is the Creator of words, but of things made known to us by what our words signify. For to prevent us from supposing that creation has no Lord and originated spontaneously, He says it was created by the Divine Being and is established in an orderly and connected system by Him. Now it would take considerable time to discuss the order in which Moses didactically records his historical summary about the creation of the world. Or if we did, each successive passage would serve to prove even more clearly how mistaken and empty our opponents' opinion is. But anyone who wishes may read what we have written on Genesis and judge whether our teaching or theirs is more reasonable.

What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that Holy Scripture, to enable us more clearly to comprehend a matter to be revealed, makes use of a bodily illustration, as would seem to be the case in this passage from David, who teaches us by what he says that none of the things which are have their being from chance or accident, as some have imagined that our world and all that is therein was framed by fortuitous and undesigned combinations of first elements, and that no Providence penetrated the world. But we are taught that there is a cause of the system and government of the Universe, on Whom all nature depends, to Whom it owes its origin and cause, towards Whom it inclines and moves, and in Whom it abides. And since, as says the Apostle, His eternal power and godhead are understood, being clearly seen through the creation of the world Romans 1:20, therefore all creation and, before all, as says the Scripture, the system of the heavens, declare the wisdom of the Creator in the skill displayed by His works. And this is what it seems to me that he is desirous to set forth, viz. the testimony of the things which do appear to the fact that the worlds were framed with wisdom and skill, and abide for ever by the power of Him who is the Ruler over all. The very heavens, he says, in displaying the wisdom of Him Who made them, all but shout aloud with a voice, and, though without voice, proclaim the wisdom of their Creator. For we can hear as it were words teaching us: O men, when you gaze upon us and behold our beauty and magnitude, and this ceaseless revolution, with its well-ordered and harmonious motion, working in the same direction and in the same manner, turn your thoughts to Him Who presides over our system, and, by aid of the beauty which you see, imagine to yourselves the beauty of the invisible Archetype. For in us there is nothing without its Lord, nothing that moves of its own proper motion: but all that appears, or that is conceivable in respect to us, depends on a Power Who is inscrutable and sublime. This is not given in articulate speech, but by the things which are seen, and it instils into our minds the knowledge of Divine power more than if speech proclaimed it with a voice. As, then, the heavens declare, though they do not speak, and the firmament shows God's handy-work, yet requires no voice for the purpose, and the day utters speech, though there is no speaking, and no one can say that Holy Scripture is in error — in like manner, since both Moses and David have one and the same Teacher, I mean the Holy Spirit, Who says that the fiat went before the creation, we are not told that God is the Creator of words, but of things made known to us by the signification of our words. For, lest we should suppose the creation to be without its Lord, and spontaneously originated, He says that it was created by the Divine Being, and that it is established in an orderly and connected system by Him. Now it would be a work of time to discuss the order of what Moses didactically records in his historical summary respecting the creation of the world. Or (if we did) each second passage would serve to prove more clearly the erroneous and futile character of our adversaries' opinion. But whoever cares to do so may read what we have written on Genesis, and judge whether our teaching or theirs is the more reasonable.

But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words "He said" do not imply voice and words on the part of God. Rather, the writer, in showing that God's power is concurrent with His will, makes the idea easier to grasp. Since all things were created by the will of God, and since it is the ordinary way of human beings to signify their will first of all by speech and then to bring their work into harmony with their will, and since the scriptural account of Creation is like an introduction for the learner into the knowledge of God, representing to our minds the power of the Divine Being through objects more readily accessible to our understanding (for sensible apprehension aids intellectual knowledge)—for this reason, Moses, by saying that God commanded all things to be, signifies to us the inciting power of His will. And by adding "and it was so," he shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and performance. On the contrary, though the purposing initiates God's activity, the accomplishment keeps pace with the purpose, and the two are to be considered together and at once: the deliberate motion of the mind and the power that effects its purpose. For the idea of the Divine purpose and action leaves no conceivable interval between them. Rather, just as light is produced along with the kindling of fire, immediately coming out from it and shining forth along with it, in the same manner the existence of created things is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time.

But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words He said do not imply voice and words on the part of God; but the writer, in showing the power of God to be concurrent with His will, renders the idea more easy of apprehension. For since by the will of God all things were created, and it is the ordinary way of men to signify their will first of all by speech, and so to bring their work into harmony with their will, and the scriptural account of the Creation is the learner's introduction, as it were, to the knowledge of God, representing to our minds the power of the Divine Being by objects more ready to our comprehension (for sensible apprehension is an aid to intellectual knowledge), on this account, Moses, by saying that God commanded all things to be, signifies to us the inciting power of His will, and by adding, and it was so, he shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and performance; but, on the contrary, that though the purposing initiates God's activity, the accomplishment keeps pace with the purpose, and that the two are to be considered together and at once, viz. the deliberate motion of the mind, and the power that effects its purpose. For the idea of the Divine purpose and action leaves no conceivable interval between them, but as light is produced along with the kindling of fire, at once coming out from it and shining forth along with it — in the same manner the existence of things created is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time.

In the case of people who have natural practical abilities, we can distinguish between their capability and their actual performance. For instance, someone who knows the craft of shipbuilding is always a shipbuilder in terms of ability, but only operates as one when actually demonstrating that skill in work. With God it is different, because everything we can conceive of in Him is entirely work and action, with His will immediately passing over to its object. Just as the structure of the heavens testifies to the glory of their Creator and acknowledges Him who made them without needing a voice to do so, likewise anyone familiar with the Mosaic Scripture will see that God speaks of the world as His creation, having brought everything into being by the command of His will, and that He needs no words to make His mind known. Therefore, just as the person who heard the heavens declaring the glory of God did not look for formal speech on that occasion (because for those who can understand it, the universe speaks through what is being done, without regard or need for verbal explanation), so even if someone hears Moses describing how God gave order and arrangement to each part of Creation by name, that person should not suppose the prophet is speaking falsely, nor drag down the contemplation of sublime truths with lowly and degrading notions, thereby reducing God to a merely human standard and imagining that He directs His operations through the instrument of speech the way humans do. Rather, let His command mean His will only, and let the names of those created things simply indicate the reality of their coming into being. In this way one will learn these two things from what is recorded: first, that God made all things by His will, and second, that without any trouble or difficulty the Divine Will became physis (nature).

For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each other. For example, we say of a man who possesses the art of shipbuilding, that he is always a shipbuilder in respect of his ability to build ships, but that he operates only when he displays his skill in working. It is otherwise with God; for all that we can conceive as in Him is entirely work and action, His will passing over immediately to its object. As, then, the mechanism of the heavens testifies to the glory of their Creator and confesses Him Who made them, and needs no voice for the purpose, so on the other hand any one who is acquainted with the Mosaic Scripture will see that God speaks of the world as His creation, having brought the whole into being by the fiat of His will, and that He needs no words to make known His mind. As, then, he who heard the heavens declaring the glory of God looked not for set speech on the occasion (for, to those who can understand it, the universe speaks through the things which are being done, without regard or care for verbal explanation), so, even if any one hears Moses telling how God gave order and arrangement to each several part of Creation by name, let him not suppose the prophet to speak falsely, nor degrade the contemplation of sublime verities by mean and grovelling notions, thus, as it were, reducing God to a mere human standard, and supposing that after the manner of men he directs His operations by the instrumentality of speech; but let His fiat mean His will only, and let the names of those created things denote the mere reality of their coming into being. And thus he will learn these two things from what is recorded: (1) That God made all things by His will, and (2) that without any trouble or difficulty the Divine Will became nature.

But if someone interprets the phrase "God said" more literally, as proof that articulate speech was His creation, by the same logic he must understand "God saw" to mean that He did so using faculties of perception like ours, through physical organs of vision. Similarly, with "The Lord heard me and had mercy upon me," and again, "He smelled a sweet savour," and whatever other sensory expressions Scripture uses in reference to a head, foot, hand, eyes, fingers, or sandals belonging to God—taking all these in their plain literal meaning, he will present us with a deity shaped like a human being, modeled after what we see among ourselves. But if someone hearing that the heavens are the work of His fingers, that He has a strong hand and a mighty arm, and eyes and feet and sandals, draws from such words ideas worthy of God and does not degrade the concept of His pure nature by fleshly and sensory imaginings, it follows that on one hand he will regard the verbal utterances as indications of the Divine will, but on the other he will not conceive of them as articulate sounds. Rather, he will reason this way: the Creator of human reason has given us speech in proportion to the capacity of our nature, so that we might be able to express the thoughts of our minds; but to the extent that the Divine nature differs from ours, so great will be the degree of difference between our notions about it and its own inherent majesty and godhead. And just as our power compared with God's, and our life with His life, is as nothing, and all else that is ours compared with what is in Him is as nothing in comparison with Him, as the inspired Teaching says, so also our word compared with Him, Who is the Word indeed, is as nothing. For this word of yours was not in the beginning, but was created along with our nature, nor should it be regarded as having any reality of its own, but as our teacher Basil has said somewhere, it vanishes along with the sound of the voice, nor is any operation of the word discernible, but it has its existence in voice only, or in written characters. But the word of God is God Himself, the Word that was in the beginning and that abides forever, through Whom all things were and are, Who rules over all and has all power over the things in heaven and the things on earth, being Life and Truth and Righteousness and Light and all that is good, and upholding all things in being. Such, then, and so great being the word, as we understand it, of God, our opponent grants God, as some great thing, the power of language made up of nouns, verbs, and conjunctions, not perceiving that, just as He Who gave practical powers to our nature is not spoken of as fabricating each of their several results, but while He gave our nature its ability, it is by us that a house is constructed, or a bench, or a sword, or a plough, or whatever thing our life happens to need, each of which is our own work though it may be ascribed to Him Who is the author of our being and Who created our nature capable of every skill—so also our power of speech is the work of Him Who made our nature what it is, but the invention of each particular term needed to denote objects at hand is of our own devising. This is proved by the fact that many terms in use are of a base and unseemly character, of which no sensible person would conceive God the inventor. So if certain of our familiar expressions are ascribed by Holy Scripture to God as the speaker, we should remember that the Holy Spirit is addressing us in language of our own, just as in the history of the Acts we are told that each person received the teaching of the disciples in his own language in which he was born, understanding the sense of the words by the language he knew. And that this is true may be seen even more clearly by a careful examination of the enactments of the Levitical law. For they make mention of pans and cakes and fine flour and the like in the mystical sacrifices, instilling wholesome doctrine under the veil of symbol and enigma. Mention is also made of certain measures then in use, such as ephah and nebel and hin and the like. Are we then to suppose that God made these names and designations, or that in the beginning He commanded them to be such and to be so named, calling one kind of grain wheat, and its pith flour, and flat sweetmeats, whether heavy or light, cakes; and that He commanded a vessel of the kind in which a moist lump is boiled or baked to be called a pan, or that He spoke of a certain liquid measure by the name of hin or nebel, and measured dry produce by the homer? Surely it is trivial and mere Jewish folly, far removed from the grandeur of Christian simplicity, to think that God, Who is the Most High and above every name and thought, Who by sole virtue of His will governs the world which He brought into existence and upholds it in being, should set Himself like some schoolmaster to settle the fine points of terminology. Rather let us say that, just as we indicate to the deaf what we want them to do by gestures and signs, not because we have no voice of our own but because verbal communication would be utterly useless to those who cannot hear, so, inasmuch as human nature is in a sense deaf and insensible to higher truths, we maintain that the grace of God at various times and in various ways spoke by the Prophets, ordering their voices according to our capacity and the modes of expression with which we are familiar, and that by such means it leads us, as with a guiding hand, to the knowledge of higher truths, not teaching us in terms proportioned to their inherent sublimity (for how can the great be contained by the little?) but descending to the lower level of our limited comprehension. And just as God, after giving animals their power of motion, no longer prescribes each step they take, for their nature, having once for all taken its beginning from the Creator, moves of itself and makes its way, adapting its power of motion to its object from time to time (except insofar as it is said that a man's steps are directed by the Lord), so our nature, having received from God the power of speech and utterance and of expressing the will by the voice, proceeds on its way through things, giving them distinctive names by varying inflections of sound; and these signs are the verbs and nouns which we use, and through which we signify the meaning of things. And though the word "fruit" is used by Moses before the creation of fruit, and "seed" before that of seed, this does not disprove our assertion, nor is the sense of the lawgiver opposed to what we have said regarding thought and conception. For that end of past agriculture which we speak of as fruit, and that beginning of future agriculture which we speak of as seed, this thing, I mean, underlying these names—whether wheat or some other produce which is increased and multiplied by sowing—does not, he teaches us, grow spontaneously, but by the will of Him Who created them to grow with their peculiar power, so as to be the same fruit and to reproduce themselves as seed, and to support mankind with their increase. And by the Divine will the thing is produced, not the name, so that the actual thing is the work of the Creator, but the distinguishing names of things, by which speech furnishes us with a clear and accurate description of them, are the work and the invention of man's reasoning faculty, though the reasoning faculty itself and its nature are a work of God. And since all people are endowed with reason, differences of language will of necessity be found according to differences of country. But if anyone maintains that light, or heaven, or earth, or seed were named in human fashion by God, he will certainly conclude that they were named in some specific language. What that was, let him show. For he who knows the one thing will not, in all probability, be ignorant of the other. For at the river Jordan, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, and again in the hearing of the Jews, and at the Transfiguration, there came a voice from heaven, teaching people not only to regard the phenomenon as something more than a figure, but also to believe the beloved Son of God to be truly God. Now that voice was fashioned by God, suitable to the understanding of the hearers, in airy substance, and adapted to the language of the day, God, who wills that all people should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, having so articulated His words in the air with a view to the salvation of the hearers, as our Lord also says to the Jews when they thought it thundered because the sound took place in the air: "This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes." But before the creation of the world, inasmuch as there was no one to hear the word, and no bodily element capable of articulating the spoken voice, how can he who says that God used words give any appearance of probability to his assertion? God Himself is without body, creation did not yet exist. Reason does not allow us to conceive of anything material in respect to Him. Those who might have been benefited by the hearing were not yet created. And if people were not yet

But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words God said, as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of reason he must understand by the words God saw, that He did so by faculties of perception like our own, through the organs of vision; and so again by the words The Lord heard me and had mercy upon me, and again, He smelled a sweet savour, and whatever other sensuous expressions are employed by Scripture in reference to head, or foot, or hand, or eyes, or fingers, or sandals, as appertaining to God, taking them, I say, in their plain literal acceptation, he will present to us an anthropomorphous deity, after the similitude of what is seen among ourselves. But if any one hearing that the heavens are the work of His fingers, that He has a strong hand, and a mighty arm, and eyes, and feet, and sandals, deduces from such words ideas worthy of God, and does not degrade the idea of His pure nature by carnal and sensuous imaginations, it will follow that on the one hand he will regard the verbal utterances as indications of the Divine will, but on the other he will not conceive of them as articulate sounds, but will reason thus; that the Creator of human reason has gifted us with speech proportionally to the capacity of our nature, so that we might be able thereby to signify the thoughts of our minds; but that, so far as the Divine nature differs from ours, so great will be the degree of difference between our notions respecting it and its own inherent majesty and godhead. And as our power compared with God's, and our life with His life, is as nothing, and all else that is ours, compared with what is in Him, is as nothing in comparison with Him, as says the inspired Teaching, so also our word as compared with Him, Who is the Word indeed, is as nothing. For this word of yours was not in the beginning, but was created along with our nature, nor is it to be regarded as having any reality of its own, but, as our master (Basil) somewhere has said, it vanishes along with the sound of the voice, nor is any operation of the word discernible, but it has its subsistence in voice only, or in written characters. But the word of God is God Himself, the Word that was in the beginning and that abides for ever, through Whom all things were and are, Who rules over all, and has all power over the things in heaven and the things on earth, being Life, and Truth, and Righteousness, and Light, and all that is good, and upholding all things in being. Such, then, and so great being the word, as we understand it, of God, our opponent allows God, as some great thing, the power of language, made up of nouns, verbs, and conjunctions, not perceiving that, as He Who conferred practical powers on our nature is not spoken of as fabricating each of their several results, but, while He gave our nature its ability, it is by us that a house is constructed, or a bench, or a sword, or a plough, and whatsoever thing our life happens to be in need of, each of which things is our own work, although it may be ascribed to Him Who is the author of our being, and Who created our nature capable of every science, — so also our power of speech is the work of Him Who made our nature what it is, but the invention of each several term required to denote objects in hand is of our own devising. And this is proved by the fact that many terms in use are of a base and unseemly character, of which no man of sense would conceive God the inventor: so that, if certain of our familiar expressions are ascribed by Holy Scripture to God as the speaker, we should remember that the Holy Spirit is addressing us in language of our own, as e.g. in the history of the Acts we are told that each man received the teaching of the disciples in his own language wherein he was born, understanding the sense of the words by the language which he knew. And, that this is true, may be seen yet more clearly by a careful examination of the enactments of the Levitical law. For they make mention of pans, and cakes, and fine flour, and the like, in the mystic sacrifices, instilling wholesome doctrine under the veil of symbol and enigma. Mention, too, is made of certain measures then in use, such as ephah, and nebel, and hin, and the like. Are we, then, to suppose that God made these names and appellations, or that in the beginning He commanded them to be such, and to be so named, calling one kind of grain wheat, and its pith flour, and flat sweetmeats, whether heavy or light, cakes; and that He commanded a vessel of the kind in which a moist lump is boiled or baked to be called a pan, or that He spoke of a certain liquid measure by the name of hin or nebel, and measured dry produce by the homer? Surely it is trifling and mere Jewish folly, far removed from the grandeur of Christian simplicity, to think that God, Who is the Most High and above every name and thought, Who by sole virtue of His will governs the world, which He brought into existence, and upholds it in being, should set Himself like some schoolmaster to settle the niceties of terminology. Rather let us say, that as we indicate to the deaf what we want them to do, by gestures and signs, not because we have no voice of our own, but because a verbal communication would be utterly useless to those who cannot hear, so, in as much as human nature is in a sense deaf and insensible to higher truths, we maintain that the grace of God at sundry times and in various manners spoke by the Prophets, ordering their voices conformably to our capacity and the modes of expression with which we are familiar, and that by such means it leads us, as with a guiding hand, to the knowledge of higher truths, not teaching us in terms proportioned to their inherent sublimity, (for how can the great be contained by the little?) but descending to the lower level of our limited comprehension. And as God, after giving animals their power of motion, no longer prescribes each step they take, for their nature, having once for all taken its beginning from the Creator, moves of itself, and makes its way, adapting its power of motion to its object from time to time (except in so far as it is said that a man's steps are directed by the Lord), so our nature, having received from God the power of speech and utterance and of expressing the will by the voice, proceeds on its way through things, giving them distinctive names by varying inflections of sound; and these signs are the verbs and nouns which we use, and through which we signify the meaning of the things. And though the word fruit is made use of by Moses before the creation of fruit, and seed before that of seed, this does not disprove our assertion, nor is the sense of the lawgiver opposed to what we have said in respect to thought and conception. For that end of past husbandry which we speak of as fruit, and that beginning of future husbandry which we speak of as seed, this thing, I mean, underlying these names — whether wheat or some other produce which is increased and multiplied by sowing — does not, he teaches us, grow spontaneously, but by the will of Him Who created them to grow with their peculiar power, so as to be the same fruit and to reproduce themselves as seed, and to support mankind with their increase. And by the Divine will the thing is produced, not the name, so that the substantial thing is the work of the Creator, but the distinguishing names of things, by which speech furnishes us with a clear and accurate description of them, are the work and the invention of man's reasoning faculty, though the reasoning faculty itself and its nature are a work of God. And since all men are endowed with reason, differences of language will of necessity be found according to differences of country. But if any one maintain that light, or heaven, or earth, or seed were named after human fashion by God, he will certainly conclude that they were named in some special language. What that was, let him show. For he who knows the one thing will not, in all probability, be ignorant of the other. For at the river Jordan, after the descent of the Holy Ghost, and again in the hearing of the Jews, and at the Transfiguration, there came a voice from heaven, teaching men not only to regard the phenomenon as something more than a figure, but also to believe the beloved Son of God to be truly God. Now that voice was fashioned by God, suitably to the understanding of the hearers, in airy substance, and adapted to the language of the day, God, who wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth 1 Timothy 2:4, having so articulated His words in the air with a view to the salvation of the hearers, as our Lord also says to the Jews, when they thought it thundered because the sound took place in the air. This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes. But before the creation of the world, inasmuch as there was no one to hear the word, and no bodily element capable of accentuating the articulate voice, how can he who says that God used words give any air of probability to his assertion? God Himself is without body, creation did not yet exist. Reason does not suffer us to conceive of anything material in respect to Him. They who might have been benefited by the hearing were not yet created. And if men were not yet in being, neither had any form of language been struck out in accordance with national peculiarities, by what arguments, then, can he who looks to the bare letter make good his assertion, that God spoke thus using human parts of speech?

The pointlessness of such claims can also be seen in this way. The natures of the elements, which are the Creator's work, appear the same to everyone, and human experience finds no difference in fire, air, or water. The physis of each is one and unchanging, working in the same way and not being altered by the differences among those who experience it. In the same way, if God had assigned names to things, the naming would have been the same for everyone. But in reality, while the physis of things as established by God remains the same, the names that identify them are divided by so many different languages that it would be difficult even to count them all.

And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to all, and there is no difference to human sense in men's experience of fire, or air, or water, but the nature of each is one and unchanging, working in the same way, and suffering no modification from the differences of those who partake of it, so also the imposition of names, if applied to things by God, would have been the same for all. But, in point of fact, while the nature of things as constituted by God remains the same, the names which denote them are divided by so many differences of language, that it were no easy task even to calculate their number.

And if anyone brings up the confusion of tongues that happened at the building of the tower as contradicting what I have said, even there God is not spoken of as creating men's languages, but as confounding the existing one, so that all might not understand all. For when everyone lived together and were not yet divided by various racial differences, the whole human population dwelt together with one language among them. But when it was decreed by the Divine will that all the earth should be filled with humanity, then their common tongue was broken up, and people were scattered in various directions and adopted different forms of speech and language. They possessed a certain bond of unity through similarity of tongue, not disagreeing from others in their knowledge of things, but differing in how they named them. For a stone or a stick does not seem like one thing to one person and something else to another, but different peoples call them by different names. So our position remains unshaken: that human language is the invention of the human mind or understanding. For from the beginning, as long as all people had the same language, we see from Holy Scripture that people received no teaching of God's words. Nor, when people were separated into various different languages, did a Divine decree prescribe how each person should talk. But God, willing that people should speak different languages, gave human nature full liberty to formulate arbitrary sounds in order to make their meaning more intelligible. Accordingly, Moses, who lived many generations after the building of the tower, uses one of the later languages in his historical narrative of the creation and attributes certain words to God, relating these things in his own tongue in which he had been brought up and with which he was familiar. He did not change the names for God by foreign peculiarities and turns of speech in order to prove them the words of God Himself by the strangeness and novelty of the expressions.

And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God spoken of as creating men's languages, but as confounding the existing one Genesis 11:7, that all might not hear all. For when all lived together and were not as yet divided by various differences of race, the aggregate of men dwelt together with one language among them; but when by the Divine will it was decreed that all the earth should be replenished by mankind, then, their community of tongue being broken up, men were dispersed in various directions and adopted this and that form of speech and language, possessing a certain bond of union in similarity of tongue, not indeed disagreeing from others in their knowledge of things, but differing in the character of their names. For a stone or a stick does not seem one thing to one man and another to another, but the different peoples call them by different names. So that our position remains unshaken, that human language is the invention of the human mind or understanding. For from the beginning, as long as all men had the same language, we see from Holy Scripture that men received no teaching of God's words, nor, when men were separated into various differences of language, did a Divine enactment prescribe how each man should talk. But God, willing that men should speak different languages, gave human nature full liberty to formulate arbitrary sounds, so as to render their meaning more intelligible. Accordingly, Moses, who lived many generations after the building of the tower, uses one of the subsequent languages in his historical narrative of the creation, and attributes certain words to God, relating these things in his own tongue in which he had been brought up, and with which he was familiar, not changing the names for God by foreign peculiarities and turns of speech, in order by the strangeness and novelty of the expressions to prove them the words of God Himself.

But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew language is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other miracles this miracle was performed on behalf of the Israelites—that after the Exodus from Egypt, the language was quickly created for the use of the nation. And there is a passage in the Prophet which confirms this. For he says, when he came out of the land of Egypt he heard a strange language. If, then, Moses was a Hebrew, and the language of the Hebrews came after the others, Moses, I say, who was born some thousands of years after the Creation of the world and who relates the words of God in his own language—does he not clearly teach us that he does not attribute to God such a language of human form, but that he speaks as he does because it was impossible to express his meaning in any way other than in human language, though the words he uses have some Divine and profound significance?

But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other miracles this miracle was wrought in behalf of the Israelites, that after the Exodus from Egypt, the language was hastily improvised for the use of the nation. And there is a passage in the Prophet which confirms this. For he says, when he came out of the land of Egypt he heard a strange language. If, then, Moses was a Hebrew, and the language of the Hebrews was subsequent to the others, Moses, I say, who was born some thousands of years after the Creation of the world, and who relates the words of God in his own language — does he not clearly teach us that he does not attribute to God such a language of human fashion, but that he speaks as he does because it was impossible otherwise than in human language to express his meaning, though the words he uses have some Divine and profound significance?

To suppose that God used the Hebrew language when there was no one to hear and understand it is something, I think, no reasonable person would accept. We read in Acts that the Divine power divided itself into many languages for this purpose: so that no one of a foreign tongue might lose their share of the benefit. But if God spoke in human language before the Creation, whom would He benefit by using it? That His speech should be adapted to the capacity of the hearers for their profit—no one would consider this unworthy of God's love for humanity, for Paul the follower of Christ knew how to adapt his words appropriately to the habits and disposition of his hearers, making himself milk for infants and solid food for mature people. But where no purpose was to be served by such use of language, to argue that God, as it were, spoke such words to Himself when there was no one needing the information they would convey—such an idea is, I think, both blasphemous and absurd. So God neither spoke in the Hebrew language nor expressed Himself according to any form used among the Gentiles. But whatever of God's words are recorded by Moses or the Prophets are indications of the Divine will, flashing forth now in one way, now in another, on the pure intellect of those holy men, according to the measure of grace they shared. Moses, then, spoke his native language, the one in which he was educated. But he attributed these words to God, as I have said repeatedly, because of the childlike understanding of those who were being brought to the knowledge of God, in order to give a clear representation of the Divine will and to make his hearers more obedient by being awed by the authority of the speaker.

For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consent. We read in the Acts that the Divine power divided itself into many languages for this purpose, that no one of alien tongue might lose his share of the benefit. But if God spoke in human language before the Creation, whom was He to benefit by using it? For that His speech should have some adaptation to the capacity of the hearers, with a view to their profit, no one would conceive to be unworthy of God's love to man, for Paul the follower of Christ knew how to adapt his words suitably to the habits and disposition of his hearers, making himself milk for babes and strong meat for grown men. Hebrews 5:12 But where no object was to be gained by such use of language, to argue that God, as it were, declaimed such words by Himself, when there was no one in need of the information they would convey — such an idea, methinks, is at once both blasphemous and absurd. Neither, then, did God speak in the Hebrew language, nor did He express Himself according to any form in use among the Gentiles. But whatsoever of God's words are recorded by Moses or the Prophets, are indications of the Divine will, flashing forth, now in one way, now in another, on the pure intellect of those holy men, according to the measure of the grace of which they were partakers. Moses, then, spoke his mother-tongue, and that in which he was educated. But he attributed these words to God, as I have said, repeatedly, on account of the childishness of those who were being brought to the knowledge of God, in order to give a clear representation of the Divine will, and to render his hearers more obedient, as being awed by the authority of the speaker.

But Eunomius denies this—the author of all this contempt directed at us, and the companion and adviser of this impious group. Setting aside insolence for courtesy, I will present his own words. He maintains, in so many words, that he has the testimony of Moses himself for his claim that men were given the use of both things and their names by the Creator of nature, and that the naming of things came before in time the creation of those who would use them. Now, if he possesses some Moses of his own, from whom he learned this wisdom, and relies on such statements as his base of operations—namely, that God, as Eunomius himself says, establishes the laws of human speech, decreeing that things shall be called one way and not another—let him play games as much as he wants, with his Moses in the background to support his claims. But if there is only one Moses whose writings are the common source of instruction for those learned in the Divine Word, we will freely accept our condemnation if we find ourselves refuted by that Moses's law. But where did he find this law about verbs and nouns? Let him produce it in the exact words of the text. The account of Creation, the genealogy of successive generations, the history of certain events, the complex system of legislation, and various regulations regarding religious service and daily life—these are the chief topics in Moses's writings. But if he says there was any legislative enactment regarding words, let him point it out, and I will be silent. But he cannot, for if he could, he would not abandon the more striking evidences of the Deity for such as can only bring him ridicule, not credibility, from sensible people. For to think it the essential point in piety to attribute the invention of words to God, Whose praise the whole world and its wonders are unable to celebrate—must it not be extremely foolish to neglect higher grounds of praise and magnify God on purely human ones? His command preceded Creation, but it was recorded by Moses in human fashion, though issued Divinely. That will of God, which brought about the creation of the world by His Divine power, consisted, according to this careful student of the Scriptures, in the teaching of words. And as though God had said, "Let there be a word," or "Let speech be created," or "Let this or that have such and such a name," he brings forward the fact that Creation took place by the impulse of the Divine will to support his trivial argument. For despite all his study and experience in the Scriptures, he does not even know this: that the impulse of the mind is frequently called a voice in Scripture. And for this we have the evidence of Moses himself, whose meaning Eunomius frequently distorts, but whom on this point he simply ignores. For who is there, however slightly acquainted with the holy book, who does not know this: that the people of Israel who had just escaped from Egypt were suddenly frightened in the wilderness by the pursuing Egyptians, and when dangers surrounded them on all sides—on one side the sea blocked their passage like a wall, while the enemy cut off their retreat from behind—the people came together to the Prophet and blamed him for causing their helpless situation? And when he comforted them in their abject terror and roused them to courage, a voice came from God, addressing the Prophet by name: "Why do you cry to Me?" And yet before this the narrative makes no mention of any utterance by Moses. But the thought which the Prophet had lifted up to God is called a cry, though uttered in silence in the hidden thought of his heart. If, then, Moses cries, though without speaking, as witnessed by Him Who hears those groanings which cannot be uttered, is it strange that the Prophet, knowing the Divine will as far as it was lawful for him to tell it and for us to hear it, revealed it through known and familiar words, describing God's discourse in human fashion—not actually expressed in words, but signified by the effects themselves? In the beginning, he says, God created not the names of heaven and earth, but heaven and earth. And again, God said, "Let there be light," not the name "Light." And having divided the light from the darkness, God called, he says, the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.

But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For, changing insolence into courtesy, I will present him with his own words. He maintains, in so many words, that he has the testimony of Moses himself to his assertion that men were endowed with the use of the things named, and of their names, by the Creator of nature, and that the naming of the things given was prior in time to the creation of those who should use them. Now, if he is in possession of some Moses of his own, from whom he has learned this wisdom, and, making this his base of operations, relies on such statements as these, viz. that God, as he himself says, lays down the laws of human speech, enacting that things shall be called in one way and not in another, let him trifle as much as he pleases, with his Moses in the background to support his assertions. But if there is only one Moses whose writings are the common source of instruction to those who are learned in the Divine Word, we will freely accept our condemnation if we find ourselves refuted by the law of that Moses. But where did he find this law respecting verbs and nouns? Let him produce it in the very words of the text. The account of the Creation, and the genealogy of the successive generations, and the history of certain events, and the complex system of legislation, and various regulations in regard to religious service and daily life, these are the chief heads of the writings of Moses. But, if he says that there was any legislative enactment in regard to words, let him point it out, and I will hold my tongue. But he cannot; for, if he could, he would not abandon the more striking evidences of the Deity, for such as can only procure him ridicule, and not credit, from men of sense. For to think it the essential point in piety to attribute the invention of words to God, Whose praise the whole world and the wonders that are therein are incompetent to celebrate — must it not be a proceeding of extreme folly so to neglect higher grounds of praise, and to magnify God on such as are purely human? His fiat preluded Creation, but it was recorded by Moses after human fashion, though Divinely issued. That will of God, then, which brought about the creation of the world by His Divine power, consisted, says our careful student of the Scriptures, in the teaching of words. And as though God had said, Let there be a word, or, Let speech be created, or, Let this or that have such or such an appellation, so, in advocacy of his trifling, he brings forward the fact that it was by the impulse of the Divine will that Creation took place. For with all his study and experience in the Scriptures he knows not even this, that the impulse of the mind is frequently spoken of in Scripture as a voice. And for this we have the evidence of Moses himself, whose meaning he frequently perverts, but whom on this point he simply ignores. For who is there, however slightly acquainted with the holy volume, who does not know this, that the people of Israel who had just escaped from Egypt were suddenly affrighted in the wilderness by the pursuit of the Egyptians, and when dangers encompassed them on all sides, and on one side the sea cut off their passage as by a wall, while the enemy barred their flight in the rear, the people coming together to the Prophet charged him with being the cause of their helpless condition? And when he comforted them in their abject terror, and roused them to courage, a voice came from God, addressing the Prophet by name, Wherefore do you cry unto Me? Exodus 14:15 And yet before this the narrative makes no mention of any utterance on the part of Moses. But the thought which the Prophet had lifted up to God is called a cry, though uttered in silence in the hidden thought of his heart. If, then, Moses cries, though without speaking, as witnessed by Him Who hears, those groanings which cannot be uttered Romans 8:26, is it strange that the Prophet, knowing the Divine will, so far as it was lawful for him to tell it and for us to hear it, revealed it by known and familiar words, describing God's discourse after human fashion, not indeed expressed in words, but signified by the effects themselves? In the beginning, he says, God created, not the names of heaven and earth, but, the heaven and the earth. And again, God said, Let there be light, not the name Light: and having divided the light from the darkness, God called, he says, the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.

On these passages our opponents will probably take their stand. I will agree with what is said on their behalf, and I will myself use their positions later in our inquiry, so that what we teach may be more firmly established, with no point in controversy left without proper examination. God called, he says, the firmament Heaven, and He called the dry land Earth, and the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. How is it, then, they will ask, when Scripture admits that their names were given by God, that you say their names are the work of human invention? What, then, is our reply? We return to our straightforward statement, and we assert that He who brought all creation into being out of nothing is the Creator of things seen in substantial existence, not of insubstantial words that have no existence except in the sound of the voice and the movement of the tongue. But things are named by the indication of the voice in accordance with the nature and qualities inherent in each, with the names being adapted to the things according to the native language of each particular people.

On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage of their positions further on in our inquiry, in order that what we teach may be more firmly established, no point in controversy being left without due examination. God called, he says, the firmament Heaven, and He called the dry land Earth, and the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. How comes it, then, they will ask, when the Scripture admits that their appellations were given them by God, that you say that their names are the work of human invention? What, then, is our reply? We return to our plain statement, and we assert, that He Who brought all creation into being out of nothing is the Creator of things seen in substantial existence, not of unsubstantial words having no existence but in the sound of the voice and the lisp of the tongue. But things are named by the indication of the voice in conformity with the nature and qualities inherent in each, the names being adapted to the things according to the vernacular language of each several race.

But since the nature of most things we see in creation is not simple, all that they mean cannot be captured in one word. For instance, with fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word that denotes it is another. Fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, burning, drying, heating, and consuming whatever fuel it takes hold of, but the name is just a brief word of one syllable. For this reason, speech distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire and gives each of them its own name, as I said before. We cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is called bright or consuming or anything else we observe it to be, because such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. Similarly, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or another of its particular characteristics. By looking at these we learn one thing by the term heaven and another by firmament. When speech defines the limit of sensible creation, beyond which lies the transmundane void understood by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible, incorporeal, and invisible, the beginning and end of all material existences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of earthly things, we call that which encompasses all material nature and forms the boundary of all visible things by the name heaven. In the same way, regarding earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the term dry defines to some extent its opposite. Earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since it threw off, by divine command, the water that covered it and appeared in its own character. But the name earth does not continue to express only one of its qualities; rather, by its meaning, it embraces all that the word includes—for example, hardness, density, weight, resistance, and the ability to support animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word dry was not changed by speech to the last name given to it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called dry), but while both terms remained, a particular meaning attached itself to each: one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so with light and day, and again with night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these terms we note the substance of the things they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God, the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lies in the middle, upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job says, "He hangs the earth upon nothing." When light traveled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, it was necessary that a side of darkness should be left by the obstruction. So, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot help but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obstruction, God ordained this revolution as a measure of the duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical explanation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth's obstruction a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So what was called light was not named day, but just as there was light and not merely the name of light, so the measure of time was also created and the name followed—not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal designation. And if the Lawgiver had plainly said that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or without formation, but has its existence from God, we might have concluded for ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, the order seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them. So also by what he says he leads us to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. With this in view he describes the successive events of creation in orderly fashion, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language except by expressing their meaning with words that would indicate it. Since it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to light and day, but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measured interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though perhaps not drawn out in strict logical form—showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for his sake but for ours. Since we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the designation of words to distinguish the things stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does he need memory, since all things are within the range of his penetrating vision. What need, then, in his case, of parts of speech, when his own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Therefore all things that exist substantially are from God, but for our guidance all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if anyone says that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of humankind, he will commit no offense against the scheme of divine providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh's daughter who named him from what had happened? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, in consequence of the tyrant's order, his parents had placed the baby in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained from the water, she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence—a name by which God himself did not disdain to address his servant, nor did he deem it beneath him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the prophet's proper appellation.

But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, as, for instance, in the case of fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word which denotes it is another (for fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, of burning, of drying and heating, and consuming whatever fuel it lays hold of, but the name is but a brief word of one syllable), on this account speech, which distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire, gives each of them a name of its own, as I have said before. And one cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is spoken of as bright, or consuming, or anything else that we observe it to be. For such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. So likewise, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or other of its peculiar characteristics, in looking at which we learn one thing by the appellation heaven, and another by firmament. For when speech would define the limit of sensible creation, beyond which it is succeeded by the transmundane void apprehended by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible and incorporeal and invisible, the beginning and the end of all material subsistences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of terrestrial things, we call that which encompasses all material nature, and which forms the boundary of all things visible, by the name of heaven. In the same manner with regard to earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the appellation dry defines to a certain extent its opposite, for earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since having thrown off, by Divine command, the water that overspread it, it appeared in its own character. But the name earth does not continue to express the signification of some one only of its qualities, but, by virtue of its meaning, it embraces all that the word connotes, e.g. hardness, density, weight, resistance, capability of supporting animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word dry was not changed by speech to the last name put upon it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called so), but while both the appellations remained, a peculiar signification attached itself to each, the one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so in light and day, and again in night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these appellations we note the substance of the things which they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lying in the midst, and being upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job says, He hangs the earth upon nothing Job 26:7, it was necessary when light travelled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, that a side of darkness should be left by the obscuration, and so, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obscuration, God ordained this revolution for a measure of duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical elucidation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth's obstruction, a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So that what was called light was not named day, but as there was light, and not the bare name of light, so the measure of time also was created and the name followed, not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal notation. And as, if it had been plainly said by the Lawgiver that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or unfashioned, but that it has its subsistence from God, we might have concluded of ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, and the order which is seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them, so also by what he says he leads us on to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. And with this view he describes the successive events of Creation in orderly method, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language, except by expressing their signification by words that should indicate it. Since, then, it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different, by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to light and day, but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measure of the interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light, and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though not, perhaps, drawn out in strict logical form — showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for His sake but for ours. For as we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the notation of words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does He need memory, all things being within the range of His penetrating vision. What need, then, in His case, of parts of speech, when His own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God; but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if any one say that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be guilty of no offense against the scheme of Divine Providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that, if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example which we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh's daughter who named him from what had happened Exodus 2:10? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, then, in consequence of the tyrant's order, his parents had placed the babe in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess, who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained from the water, she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence — a name by which God Himself did not disdain to address His servant, nor did He deem it beneath Him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the Prophet's proper appellation.

In the same way, Jacob took hold of his brother's heel before him and was called a supplanter from the position in which he was born. Those who are knowledgeable in such matters tell us that this is what the word Jacob means when translated into Greek. Similarly, Pharez was named by his nurse because of what happened at his birth, yet no one on that account, like Eunomius, showed any jealousy that he was taking authority that belonged to God. Furthermore, the mothers of the patriarchs gave them their names, such as Reuben, Simeon, Levi, and all those who came after them. And no one jumped up, like our new author does, as a defender of Divine providence to forbid women from seizing Divine authority by giving names. And what should we say about other details in the sacred record, such as the waters of strife, the place of mourning, the hill of the foreskins, the valley of the cluster, the field of blood, and similar names that were given by humans but were often recorded as being spoken by the Person of God? From these we may learn that people can communicate the meaning of things through words without being presumptuous, and that the Divine nature does not depend on words for evidence of itself.

In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother's heel, was called a supplanter Genesis 25:26, from the attitude in which he came to the birth. For those who are learned in such matters tell us that such is the interpretation of the word Jacob, as translated into Greek. So, too, Pharez was so named by his nurse from the incident at his birth Genesis 38:29, yet no one on that account, like Eunomius, displayed any jealousy of his assuming an authority above that of God. Moreover the mothers of the patriarchs gave them their names, as Reuben, and Simeon, and Levi, and all those who came after them. And no one started up, like our new author, as patron of Divine providence, to forbid women to usurp Divine authority by the imposition of names. And what shall we say of other particulars in the sacred record, such as the waters of strife, and the place of mourning, and the hill of the foreskins, and the valley of the cluster, and the field of blood, and such-like names, of human imposing, but oftentimes recorded to have been uttered by the Person of God, from which we may learn that men may notify the meaning of things by words without presumption, and that the Divine nature does not depend on words for its evidence to itself?

But I will pass over his other ramblings against the truth, since they have no force against our doctrines, for I consider it pointless to linger any longer over such absurdities. Who could be so lacking in more important subjects of thought as to waste energy on foolish arguments, and to argue with men who claim we are saying that human forethought carries greater weight and authority than God's guardianship, and that we attribute the carelessness that confuses weaker minds to the providence of God? These are the exact words of our accuser. But for my part, I think it is just as absurd to pay attention to remarks like that as to occupy myself with old women's dreams. For to think of securing the dignity of rule and sovereignty for the Divine Being through a particular form of words, and to show that the great power of God depends on this, while on the other hand neglecting Him and disregarding the providence that belongs to Him, and to make it a criticism against us that people, having received from God the faculty of reason, make arbitrary use of words to signify things—what is this but an old woman's tale, or a drunkard's dream? For the true power, and authority, and dominion, and sovereignty of God do not, we believe, consist in syllables. If that were so, any inventor of words might claim equal honor with God. But the infinite ages, and the beauties of the universe, and the rays of the heavenly lights, and all the wonders of land and sea, and the angelic hosts and heavenly powers, and whatever else exists in the realm above that is revealed to us under various figures by Holy Scripture—these are the things that bear witness to God's power over all. In contrast, to attribute the invention of vocal sound to those who are naturally endowed with the faculty of speech involves no impiety toward Him who gave them their voice. Nor indeed do we consider it a great thing to invent words that signify things. For the being to whom Holy Scripture in the creation account gave the name of man (ἄνθρωπος), a word of human invention, that same being Job calls mortal (βροτός), while among secular writers, some call him human being (φώς), and others articulate speaker (μέροψ)—to say nothing of other variations of the name. Do we, then, elevate them to equal honor with God, because they also invented names equivalent to that of man, all signifying the same subject? But, as I have said before, let us leave this idle talk, and make no account of his string of insults, in which he charges us with lying against the Divine oracles, and uttering slanders with shamelessness even against God.

But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger any longer over such absurdities. For who can be so wanting in the more important subjects of thought as to waste energy on silly arguments, and to contend with men who speak of us as asserting that man's forethought is of superior weight and authority to God's guardianship, and that we ascribe the carelessness which confuses the feebler minds to the providence of God? These are the exact words of our calumniator. But I, for my part, think it equally as absurd to pay attention to remarks like that, as to occupy myself with old wives' dreams. For to think of securing the dignity of rule and sovereignty to the Divine Being by a form of words, and to show the great power of God to be dependent upon this, and on the other hand to neglect Him and disregard the providence which belongs to Him, and to lay it to our reproach that men, having received from God the faculty of reason, make an arbitrary use of words to signify things — what is this but an old wife's fable, or a drunkard's dream? For the true power, and authority, and dominion, and sovereignty of God do not, we think, consist in syllables. Were it so, any and every inventor of words might claim equal honour with God. But the infinite ages, and the beauties of the universe, and the beams of the heavenly luminaries, and all the wonders of land and sea, and the angelic hosts and supra-mundane powers, and whatever else there is whose existence in the realm above is revealed to us under various figures by Holy Scripture — these are the things that bear witness to God's power over all. Whereas, to attribute the invention of vocal sound to those who are naturally endowed with the faculty of speech, this involves no impiety towards Him Who gave them their voice. Nor indeed do we hold it to be a great thing to invent words significative of things. For the being to whom Holy Scripture in the history of the creation gave the name of man Genesis 1:26 ( ἄ νθρωπος), a word of human devising, that same being Job calls mortal ( βροτός), while of profane writers, some call him human being ( φώς), and others articulate speaker ( μέροψ)– to say nothing of other varieties of the name. Do we, then, elevate them to equal honour with God, because they also invented names equivalent to that of man, alike signifying their subject. But, as I have said before, let us leave this idle talk, and make no account of his string of revilings, in which he charges us with lying against the Divine oracles, and uttering slanders with effrontery even against God.

Let me move on to what remains. Eunomius brings forward once more some of the Master's words, which say this: And it is in precisely the same way that we are taught by Holy Scripture the use of a conception. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when declaring to people the nature of His Godhead, explains it by certain special characteristics, calling Himself the Door, the Bread, the Way, the Vine, the Shepherd, the Light. Now I think it best to pass over his insulting remarks about these words (for this is how his rhetorical training has taught him to argue with his opponents), nor will I let myself be disturbed by his outbursts of childish foolishness. Let us, however, examine one sharp and supposedly irresistible argument which he puts forward to refute us. Which of the sacred writers, he asks, gives evidence that these names were attributed to our Lord by a conception? But which of them, I reply, forbids it, considering it blasphemy to regard such names as the result of a conception? For if he maintains that its not being mentioned is proof that it is forbidden, by the same logic he must admit that its not being forbidden is an argument that it is permitted. Is our Lord called by these names, or does Eunomius deny this also? If he does deny that these names are spoken of Christ, we have won without a battle. For what greater victory could there be than to prove our adversary is fighting against God by robbing the sacred words of the Gospel of their meaning? But if he admits that it is true that Christ is named by these names, let him say in what manner they can be applied without irreverence to the Only-begotten Son of God. Does he take the stone as indicating His physis? Does he understand His ousia under the figure of the Axe (not to burden our argument by listing the rest)? None of these names represents the physis of the Only-begotten, or His Godhead, or the particular character of His ousia. Nevertheless He is called by these names, and each title has its own special appropriateness. For we cannot, without irreverence, suppose anything in the words of God to be pointless and meaningless. Let him say, then, if he disallows these names as the result of a conception, how do they apply to Christ? For we on our part say this: that since our Lord provided for human life in various ways, each variety of His kindness is suitably distinguished by His several names, His providential care and working on our behalf passing over into the form of a name. And such a name is said by us to be arrived at by a conception. But if this is not agreeable to our opponents, let it be as each of them pleases. In his ignorance, however, of the figures of Scripture, our opponent contradicts what is said. For if he had learned the Divine names, he must have known that our Lord is called a Curse and Sin, and a Heifer, and a lion's Whelp, and a Bear bereaved of her cubs, and a Leopard, and such names, according to various modes of conception, by Holy Scripture, the sacred and inspired writers using such names, as if using well-aimed arrows, to indicate the central point of the idea they had in view. Yet these words, when taken in their literal and obvious meaning, seem not above suspicion, but each single one of them, unless we allow it to be said of God through some process of conception, will not escape the taint of a blasphemous suggestion. But it would be a lengthy task to bring them all forward and explain in every case how, in the general idea, these words have been turned away from their obvious meanings, and how it is only in connection with the faculty of conception that the names of God can be reconciled with the reverence which is His due.

To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master's words, to this effect: And it is in precisely the same manner that we are taught by Holy Scripture the employment of a conception. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when declaring to men the nature of His Godhead, explains it by certain special characteristics, calling Himself the Door, the Bread, the Way, the Vine, the Shepherd, the Light. Now I think it seemly to pass over his insolent remarks on these words (for it is thus that his rhetorical training has taught him to contend with his opponents), nor will I suffer myself to be disturbed by his ebullitions of childish folly. Let us, however, examine one pungent and irresistible argument which he puts forward for our refutation. Which of the sacred writers, he asks, gives evidence that these names were attributed to our Lord by a conception? But which of them, I reply, forbids it, deeming it a blasphemy to regard such names as the result of a conception? For if he maintains that its not being mentioned is a proof that it is forbidden, by a parity of reasoning he must admit that its not being forbidden is an argument that it is permitted. Is our Lord called by these names, or does Eunomius deny this also? If he does deny that these names are spoken of Christ, we have conquered without a battle. For what more signal victory could there be, than to prove our adversary to be fighting against God, by robbing the sacred words of the Gospel of their meaning? But if he admits that it is true that Christ is named by these names, let him say in what manner they may be applied without irreverence to the Only-begotten Son of God. Does he take the stone as indicative of His nature? Does he understand His essence under the figure of the Axe (not to encumber our argument by enumerating the rest)? None of these names represents the nature of the Only-begotten, or His Godhead, or the peculiar character of His essence. Nevertheless He is called by these names, and each appellation has its own special fitness. For we cannot, without irreverence, suppose anything in the words of God to be idle and unmeaning. Let him say, then, if he disallows these names as the result of a conception, how do they apply to Christ? For we on our part say this, that as our Lord provided for human life in various forms, each variety of His beneficence is suitably distinguished by His several names, His provident care and working on our behalf passing over into the mould of a name. And such a name is said by us to be arrived at by a conception. But if this is not agreeable to our opponents, let it be as each of them pleases. In his ignorance, however, of the figures of Scripture, our opponent contradicts what is said. For if he had learned the Divine names, he must have known that our Lord is called a Curse and Sin Galatians 3:13, and a Heifer Hebrews 9:13, and a lion's Whelp Genesis 49:9, and a Bear bereaved of her whelps Hosea 13:3, and a Leopard Hosea 13:7 and such-like names, according to various modes of conception, by Holy Scripture, the sacred and inspired writers by such names, as by well-directed shafts, indicating the central point of the idea they had in view; even though these words, when taken in their literal and obvious signification, seem not above suspicion, but each single one of them, unless we allow it to be predicated of God by some process of conception, will not escape the taint of a blasphemous suggestion. But it would be a lengthy task to bring them forward, and elucidate in every case how, in the general idea, these words have been perverted out of their obvious meanings, and how it is only in connection with the conceptive faculty that the names of God can be reconciled with that reverence which is His due.

But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny this fact. What then? Does Eunomius claim that these words indicate His physis itself? If so, he is asserting that the Divine physis is multiform, and that the variety it displays in what is signified by the names is very complex. For the meanings of the words Bread and Lion are not the same, nor those of Axe and Water, but to each of them we can assign its own definition, which the others do not share. They do not, therefore, signify physis or ousia, yet no one will presume to say that this way of naming is completely inappropriate and meaningless. If, then, these words are given to us, but not as indicators of ousia, and every word given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these names be properly applied to the Only-begotten Son of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under various names, according to the variety of His operations, so that we may think of Him in the aspect so named. What harm, then, is done to our reverent ideas of God by this mental operation, instituted with a view to our thinking about the things done, and which we call conception, though if anyone chooses to call it by some other name, we will make no objection.

But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm that the words are indicative of His nature itself? If so, he asserts that the Divine nature is multiform, and that the variety which it displays in what is signified by the names is very complex. For the meanings of the words Bread and Lion are not the same, nor those of Axe and Water, but to each of them we can assign a definition of its own, of which the others do not partake. They do not, therefore, signify nature or essence, yet no one will presume to say that this nomenclature is quite inappropriate and unmeaning. If, then, these words are given us, but not as indicative of essence, and every word given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these appellations be fitly applied to the Only-begotten Son of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under various names, according to the variety of His operations, so that we may think of Him in the aspect so named. What harm, then, is done to our reverential ideas of God by this mental operation, instituted with a view to our thinking upon the things done, and which we call conception, though if any one choose to call it by some other name, we shall make no objection.

Like a mighty wrestler, Eunomius refuses to let go of his grip on us and directly states that these names are the product of human thought and conception, and that through this mental operation some people arrive at conclusions that no Apostle or Evangelist ever taught. After this bold attack, he raises his self-righteous voice and spits out his vile abuse at us with a tongue well trained in such language. For he says that attributing homonyms derived from analogy to human thought and conception is the work of a mind that has lost all sound judgment and studies the Lord's words with a weakened understanding and dishonest thought patterns. Have mercy! What a logical argument! How scientifically it reaches its conclusion! Who after this will dare to defend the concept of conception, when such a stench pours from his mouth upon those who try to speak? I suppose we who do try to speak must refrain from examining his argument for fear he will stir up the cesspool of his abuse against us. And truly it is foolish to let ourselves be provoked by childish absurdities. We will therefore allow our insolent opponent full freedom to indulge in his method as he wishes. But we will return to the Master's argument so that from there too we may gather reinforcements for the truth. Eunomius has been reminded of analogy and has recognized that the homonyms are derived from it. Now where or from whom did he learn these terms? Not from Moses, not from the Prophets and Apostles, not from the Evangelists. It is impossible that he learned them from any Scripture's teaching. How then did he come to use them? The very word that describes this or that meaning of a thought as analogy—is it not the invention of the thinking faculty of the person who speaks it? How is it then that he fails to see that he is using the very views he fights against as his allies in the war? For he makes war against our principle that words are formed by the operation of conception, and would try to establish, with the help of words formed on that very principle, that it is unlawful to use them. It is not, he says, the teaching of any of the sacred writers. To whom then among the ancients do you yourself attribute the term ungenerate, and its being predicated of the ousia of God? Or is it permissible for you, when you want to establish some of your impious conclusions, to coin and invent terms to your own liking, but if something is said by someone else that contradicts your impiety, to deprive your opponent of similar freedom? Great indeed would be the power you would claim if you could make good your claim to such authority as this—that what you forbid to others should be allowed to you alone, and that what you yourself presume to do by virtue of it, you should prevent others from doing. You condemn, as if by decree, the doctrine that these names were applied to Christ as a result of conception, because none of the sacred writers have declared that they ought to be so applied. How then can you lay down the law that the Divine ousia should be denoted by the word ungenerate—a term which none of the sacred writers can be shown to have handed down to us? For if this is the test of the right use of words, that only such shall be employed as the inspired word of Scripture authorizes, the word ungenerate must be erased from your own writings, since none of the sacred writers has sanctioned the expression. But perhaps you accept it because of the meaning that resides in it. Well, we ourselves in the same way accept the term conception because of the meaning that resides in it. Accordingly we will either exclude both from use, or neither, and whichever alternative is adopted, we are equally victorious. For if the term ungenerate is completely suppressed, all our opponents' clamor against the truth is suppressed along with it, and a doctrine worthy of the Only-begotten Son of God will shine forth, since logical opposition can furnish no name to detract from the Lord's majesty. But if both are retained, in that case also the truth will prevail, and we along with it, when we have changed the word ungeneracy from the substance into a conception of the Deity. But as long as he does not exclude the term ungenerate from his own writings, let our modern Pharisee admonish himself not to look at the speck in our eye before he has cast out the beam that is in his own.

But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that these names are the work of human thought and conception, and that, by the exercise of this operation of the mind by some, results are arrived at which no Apostle or Evangelist has taught. And after this doughty onslaught he raises that sanctimonious voice of his, spitting out his foul abuse at us with a tongue well schooled to such language. For, says he, to ascribe homonyms, drawn from analogy, to human thought and conception is the work of a mind that has lost all judicial sense, and that studies the words of the Lord with an enfeebled understanding and dishonest habit of thought. Mercy on us! What a logical argument! How scientifically it proceeds to its conclusion! Who after this will dare to speak up for the cause of conception, when such a stench is poured forth from his mouth upon those who attempt speaking? I suppose, then, that we, who do attempt speaking, must forbear to examine his argument, for fear of his stirring up against us the cesspool of his abuse. And verily it is weak-minded to let ourselves be irritated by childish absurdities. We will therefore allow our insolent adversary full liberty to indulge in his method as he will. But we will return to the Master's argument, that thence too we may muster reinforcements for the truth. Eunomius has been reminded of analogy and has perceived the homonyms to be derived from it. Now where or from whom did he learn these terms? Not from Moses, not from the Prophets and Apostles, not from the Evangelists. It is impossible that he should have learned them from the teaching of any Scripture. How came he, then, to use them? The very word which describes this or that signification of a thought as analogy, is it not the invention of the thinking faculty of him who utters it? How is it, then, that he fails to perceive that he is using the views he fights against as his allies in the war? For he makes war against our principle of words being formed by the operation of conception, and would endeavour to establish, by the aid of words formed on that very principle, that it is unlawful to use them. It is not, says he, the teaching of any of the sacred writers. To whom, then, of the ancients do you yourself ascribe the term ungenerate, and its being predicated of the essence of God? Or is it allowable for you, when you want to establish some of your impious conclusions, to coin and invent terms to your own liking; but if anything is said by some one else in contravention of your impiety, to deprive your adversary of similar licence? Great indeed would be the power you would assume if you could make good your claim to such authority as this, that what you refuse to others should be allowable to you alone, and that what you yourself presume to do by virtue of it, you should prevent others from doing. You condemn, as by an edict, the doctrine that these names were applied to Christ as a result of conception, because none of the sacred writers have declared that they ought so to be applied. How, then, can you lay down the law that the Divine essence should be denoted by the word ungenerate — a term which none of the sacred writers can be shown to have handed down to us? For if this is the test of the right use of words, that only such shall be employed as the inspired word of Scripture shall authorize, the word ungenerate must be erased from your own writings, since none of the sacred writers has sanctioned the expression. But perhaps you accept it by reason of the sense that resides in it. Well, we ourselves in the same way accept the term conception by reason of the sense that resides in it. Accordingly we will either exclude both from use, or neither, and whichever alternative be adopted, we are equally masters of the field. For if the term ungenerate be altogether suppressed, all our adversaries' clamour against the truth is suppressed along with it, and a doctrine worthy of the Only-begotten Son of God will shine forth, inasmuch as logical opposition can furnish no name to detract from the majesty of the Lord. But if both be retained, in that case also the truth will prevail, and we along with it, when we have altered the word ungeneracy from the substance, into a conception, of the Deity. But so long as he does not exclude the term ungenerate from his own writings, let our modern Pharisee admonish himself not to behold the mote that is in our eye, before he has cast out the beam that is in his own.

But God, he says, gave the weakest of earthly things a share in the most honorable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, and to the highest He gave the names of the lowest, though the natural inferiority of the latter was not transferred to the former along with their names. We quote this in his exact words. If these words contain some deep and hidden meaning that has escaped us, let those who see what is beyond our range of vision inform us—initiated as they are by him in his esoteric and unspeakable mysteries. But if they admit no interpretation beyond what is obvious, I hardly know which of the two are more to be pitied, those who say such things or those who listen to them. To the weakest of earthly things, he says, God has given names in common with the most honorable, though not giving them an equal share of dignity. Let us examine what this means. The weakest things, he says, are honored with merely the name belonging to the honorable, their physis not corresponding with their name. And this he claims is the work of the God of truth—to honor the worse physis with the worthier title! On the other hand, he says that God applies the less honorable names to things superior in their physis, the physis of the latter not being carried over to the former along with the title. But to make the matter even clearer, the absurdity shall be shown by actual examples. If anyone should call a man who is esteemed for every virtue intemperate, or, on the other hand, a man equally in disrepute for his vices good and moral, would sensible people think him of sound mind, or one who had any regard for truth, reversing, as would be the case, the meanings of words and giving them an unnatural meaning? I for my part think not. He speaks, then, of things relating to God completely out of keeping with our common understanding and with the holy Scriptures. For in matters of ordinary life it is only those who are unsettled by drink or madness who go wrong in names and use them out of their proper meaning, calling, it may be, a man a dog, or vice versa. But Holy Scripture is so far from approving such confusion that we may clearly hear the voice of prophecy lamenting it. "Woe to him," says Isaiah, "who calls darkness light and light darkness, who calls bitter sweet and sweet bitter." Now what induces Eunomius to apply this absurdity to his God? Let those who are initiated in his mysteries say what they judge those weakest of earthly things to be, which God has honored with most honorable titles. The weakest of existing things are those animals whose generation takes place from the corruption of moist elements, just as the most honorable are virtue and holiness and whatever else is pleasing in the sight of God. Are flies, then, and midges and frogs and whatever insects are generated from dung honored with the names of holiness and virtue, so as to be consecrated with honorable names, though not sharing in such high qualities, as Eunomius says? But we have never yet heard anything like this, that these weak things are called by high-sounding titles, or that what is great and honorable by physis is degraded by the name of any one of them. Noah was a righteous man, says the Scripture, Abraham was faithful, Moses meek, Daniel wise, Joseph chaste, Job blameless, David perfect in patience. Let them say, then, whether all these had their names by contraries; or, to take the case of those who are unfavorably spoken of, such as Nabal the Carmelite, and Pharaoh the Egyptian, and Abimelech the alien, and all those who are mentioned for their vices, whether they were honored with honorable names by the voice of God. Not so! But God judges and distinguishes His creatures as they are in physis and truth, not by names contrary to them, but by such appropriate titles as may give the clearest idea of their meaning.

But God, he says, gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, and to the highest He imparted the names of the lowest, though the natural inferiority of the latter was not transferred to the former along with their names. We quote this in his very words. If they contain some deep and recondite meaning which has escaped us, let those inform us who see what is beyond our range of vision — initiated as they are by him in his esoteric and unspeakable mysteries. But if they admit of no interpretation beyond what is obvious, I scarcely know which of the two are more to be pitied, those who say such things or those who listen to them. To the weakest of terrestrial things, he says, God has given names in common with the most honourable, though not giving them an equal share of dignity. Let us examine what is meant by this. The weakest things, he says, are dignified with the bare name belonging to the honourable, their nature not corresponding with their name. And this he states to be the work of the God of truth — to dignify the worse nature with the worthier appellation! On the other hand, he says that God applies the less honourable names to things superior in their nature, the nature of the latter not being carried over to the former along with the appellation. But that the matter may be made plainer still, the absurdity shall be shown by actual instances. If any one should call a man who is esteemed for every virtue, intemperate; or, on the other hand, a man equally in disrepute for his vices, good and moral, would sensible people think him of sound mind, or one who had any regard for truth, reversing, as would be the case, the meanings of words, and giving them a non-natural signification? I for my part think not. He speaks, then, of things relating to God, out of all keeping with our common ideas and with the holy Scriptures. For in matters of ordinary life it is only those who are unsettled by drink or madness that go wrong in names, and use them out of their proper meaning, calling, it may be, a man a dog, or vice versa. But Holy Scripture is so far from sanctioning such confusion, that we may clearly hear the voice of prophecy lamenting it. Woe unto him, says Isaiah, that calls darkness light, and light darkness, that calls bitter sweet, and sweet bitter Isaiah 5:20. Now what induces Eunomius to apply this absurdity to his God? Let those who are initiated in his mysteries say what they judge those weakest of terrestrial things to be, which God has dignified with most honourable appellations. The weakest of existing things are those animals whose generation takes place from the corruption of moist elements, as the most honourable are virtue, and holiness, and whatever else is pleasing in the sight of God. Are flies, then, and midges, and frogs, and whatever insects are generated from dung, dignified with the names of holiness and virtue, so as to be consecrated with honourable names, though not sharing in such high qualities, as says Eunomius? But never as yet have we heard anything like this, that these weak things are called by high-sounding titles, or that what is great and honourable by nature is degraded by the name of any one of them. Noah was a righteous man, says the Scripture, Abraham was faithful, Moses meek, Daniel wise, Joseph chaste, Job blameless, David perfect in patience. Let them say, then, whether all these had their names by contraries; or, to take the case of those who are unfavourably spoken of, as Nabal the Carmelite, and Pharaoh the Egyptian, and Abimelech the alien, and all those who are mentioned for their vices, whether they were dignified with honourable names by the voice of God. Not so! But God judges and distinguishes His creatures as they are in nature and truth, not by names contrary to them, but by such appropriate appellations as may give the clearest idea of their meaning.

This is what our strong-minded opponent—who accuses us of dishonesty and charges us with being irrational in judgment—this is what he pretends to know about the Divine nature. These are the opinions he puts forward about God, as if God mocks His creatures with names that do not correspond to their true meaning, giving the weakest things the most honorable titles and pouring contempt on the honorable by making them identical with what is base. Now a virtuous person, even if carried beyond the limits of truth involuntarily, is overwhelmed with shame. Yet Eunomius thinks it is no shame to God that He should appear to give a false impression of things through their names. The Scriptures do not give this kind of testimony about the Divine nature. God is patient and full of mercy and truth, says David. But how can He be a God of truth if He gives false names to things and perverts the truth in the meanings of their names? Again, he is called a righteous Lord. Is it righteous to honor things that lack honor with honorable names, and while giving the bare name, to withhold the honor that it signifies? This is the testimony these theologians give about their newfangled God. This is the result of their boasted skill in dialectic: to portray God Himself delighting in deception and not above the passion of jealousy. For surely it is nothing better than deception to fail to name weak things as they truly are in their nature and worth, but instead to clothe them with empty names borrowed from superior things, without making their value match their name. And it is nothing better than jealousy if, having the power to give the more honorable name to things being named for some superiority, He begrudged them the honor itself, considering the happiness of the weak a personal loss to Himself. But I would recommend that all who are wise, even if the God of these Gnostics is shown by logical necessity to be of such a character, should not think this way about the true God, the Only-begotten, but should look at the truth of facts, giving each of them their due, and from this deduce His name. Come, you blessed, says our Lord, and again, Depart, you cursed, not honoring the one who deserves cursing with the name of blessed, nor dismissing the one who has stored up blessing for himself along with the wicked.

This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment — this it is that he pretends to know of the Divine nature. These are the opinions that he puts forth respecting God, as though He mocked His creatures with names untrue to their meaning, bestowing on the weakest the most honourable appellations, and pouring contempt on the honourable by making them synonymous with the base. Now a virtuous man, if carried, even involuntarily, beyond the limits of truth, is overwhelmed with shame. Yet Eunomius thinks it no shame to God that He should seem to give a false color to things by their appellations. Not such is the testimony of the Scriptures to the Divine nature. God is long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy and truth, says David. But how can He be a God of truth Who gives false names to things, and Who perverts the truth in the meanings of their names? Again, He is called by him a righteous Lord. Is it, then, a righteous thing to dignify things without honour by honourable names, and, while giving the bare name, to grudge the honour that it denotes? Such is the testimony of these Theologians to their new-fangled God. This is the end of their boasted dialectic cleverness, to display God Himself delighting in deceit, and not superior to the passion of jealousy. For surely it is no better than deceit not to name weak things, as they are in their true nature and worth, but to invest them with empty names, derived from superior things, not proportioning their value to their name; and it is no better than jealousy if, having it in His power to bestow the more honourable appellation on things to be named for some superiority, He grudged them the honour itself, as deeming the happiness of the weak a loss to Himself personally. But I should recommend all who are wise, even if the God of these Gnostics is by stress of logic shown to be of such a character, not to think thus of the true God, the Only-begotten, but to look at the truth of facts, giving each of them their due, and thence to deduce His name. Come, you blessed, says our Lord; and again, Depart, you cursed Matthew 25:34, not honouring him who deserves cursing with the name of blessed, nor, on the other hand, dismissing him who has treasured up for himself the blessing, along with the wicked.

But what does our author mean, and what is the goal of this argument? No one should think that because he lacked something to say, in order to make his work seem longer, he has gone on with all this meaningless rambling. His very lack of sense has a purpose and hints at heresy. By saying that the most honorable names are given to the weakest things, even though those things do not naturally share an equal portion of dignity, he secretly prepares the way for the blasphemy that follows, so he can teach his followers this: that although the Only-begotten is called God, and Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and the Truth, and the Judge, and the King, and God over all, and the great God, and the Prince of peace, and the Father of the world to come, and so on, His honor is limited to the name alone.

But what is our author's meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order that he may seem to extend his discourse to the utmost, he has indulged in all this senseless twaddle. Its very senselessness is not without a meaning, and smacks of heresy. For to say that the most honourable names are applied to the weakest things, though not having by nature an equal apportionment of dignity, secretly paves the way, as it were, for the blasphemy to follow, that he may teach his disciples this; that although the Only-begotten is called God, and Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and the Truth, and the Judge, and the King, and God over all, and the great God, and the Prince of peace, and the Father of the world to come, and so forth, His honour is limited to the name.

He does not actually share in the dignity that the meaning of those names indicates. The wise Daniel, when correcting the Babylonians' idolatrous error so they would not worship the bronze image or the dragon but would reverence the name of God (which people in their foolishness had attributed to those things), clearly demonstrated by his actions that the high and exalted name of God bore no resemblance to the reptile or to the molten bronze image. But this enemy of God works hard in his teaching to prove exactly the opposite regarding the Only-begotten Son of God. He declares in his characteristic style: Do not pay attention to the names that our Lord shares in such a way as to conclude that He possesses an unspeakable and sublime nature. For many of the weakest things are also given honorable names that sound impressive, even though their nature is not transformed to match the greatness of their titles. Accordingly, he says that inferior things receive honor from God only in terms of their names, with no corresponding equality of dignity accompanying what they are called. Therefore, when we have learned all the names of the Son that carry lofty meaning, we must remember that the honor these names imply is attributed to Him only at the level of words, but that according to the system of naming they use, He does not actually share in the dignity that the words signify.

He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates; and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians' error of idolatry, that they should not worship the brazen image or the dragon, but reverence the name of God, which men in their folly had ascribed to them, clearly showed by what he did that the high and lofty name of God had no likeness to the reptile, or to the image of molten brass — this enemy of God exerts himself in his teaching to prove the very opposite of this in regard to the Only-begotten Son of God, exclaiming in the style which he affects, Do not regard the names of which our Lord is a partaker, so as to infer His unspeakable and sublime nature. For many of the weakest things are likewise invested with names of honour, lofty indeed in sound, though their nature is not transformed so as to come up to the grandeur of their appellations. Accordingly he says that inferior things receive their honour from God only so far as their names go, no equality of dignity accompanying their appellations. When, therefore, we have learned all the names of the Son that are of lofty signification, we must bear in mind that the honour which they imply is ascribed to Him only so far as the words go, but that, according to the system of nomenclature which they adopt, He does not partake of the dignity implied by the words.

But by dwelling on such nonsense, I fear I am secretly pleasing our opponents. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to be exhausting my audience's patience before we even reach the main battle. I will leave these points for my more learned hearers to address and continue with my task. Nor will I now address something he has said that is closely connected with our inquiry: that these things have been arranged so that human thought and conception can claim no authority over names. But who maintains that something not seen in its own hypostasis has authority over anything? For only creatures governed by their own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are operations of the mind that depend on the deliberate choice of speakers, having no independent hypostasis but existing only in the force of what is said. But this, he says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who applies suitable names to each thing named through limitations and rules of relation, operation, and proportion. But this is either complete nonsense or contradicts his earlier statements. For if he now claims that God assigns names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen, that God gives lofty names to dishonorable things without allowing them to share in the dignity their names indicate, and again, that He degrades lofty things with dishonorable names, though their physis is not affected by the lowliness of their names? But perhaps we are being unfair to him by subjecting his senseless jumble of phrases to such accusations. For they are completely alien to any sense—I do not mean only to reverent sense—and they will be found utterly devoid of reason by all who understand how to form accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume but turns out to be only viscous matter disgusting to see and even more disgusting to touch, I shall pass over his remarks in silence, considering that the best answer to his idle chatter. For it would be better that we not inquire what law governs operation, proportion, and relation, and who prescribes laws to God regarding rules and modes of proportion and relation, than that by occupying ourselves with such matters we should disgust our hearers and stray from more important inquiries.

But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to myself to be wearing out the patience of my audience before we come to the brunt of the battle. These points, then, I will leave it to my more learned hearers to dispose of, and proceed with my task. Nor will I now notice a thing he has said, which, however, is closely connected with our inquiry; viz. that these things have been so arranged that human thought and conception can claim no authority over names. But who is there that maintains that what is not seen in its own subsistence has authority over anything? For only those creatures that are governed by their own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are an operation of the mind, which depends on the deliberate choice of those who speak, having no independent subsistence, but subsisting only in the force of the things said. But this, he says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who, by limitations and rules of relation, operation, and proportion, applies suitable appellations to each of the things named. But this either is sheer nonsense, or contradicts his previous assertions. For if he now professes that God affixes names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen that God bestows lofty names on things without honour, not allowing them a share in the dignity which their names indicate, and again, that He degrades things of a lofty nature by names without honour, their nature not being affected by the meanness of their appellations? But perhaps we are unfair to him in subjecting his senseless collocation of phrases to such accusations as these. For they are altogether alien to any sense (I do not mean only to a sense in keeping with reverence), and they will be found to be utterly devoid of reason by all who understand how to form an accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume, which turns out, however, to be only viscous matter disgusting to look at, and still more disgusting to handle, I shall pass over his remarks in silence, deeming that the best answer to his idle effusions. For it would be better that we should not inquire what law governs operation, and proportion, and relation, and who it is that prescribes laws to God in respect to rules and modes of proportion and relation, than that, by busying ourselves in such matters, we should nauseate our hearers, and digress from more important matters of inquiry.

I'm afraid that everything we'll find in Eunomius' discourse will turn out to be just empty swelling and foam, so that what has already been said must necessarily end our argument, since his writings will provide no material to work with. Smoke or mist makes the air around it heavy and thick, and prevents the eye from functioning normally, yet it doesn't form itself into something solid enough that someone could grasp and hold it in their hands, or offer resistance when struck. If someone said the same thing about his pompous writing, the comparison would be accurate. A lot of nonsense is packed into his swollen and sticky discourse, and to someone without much discernment—like viewing mist from a distance—it seems to have some substance and form. But if you come closer and examine what is actually said, the theories slip from your grasp like smoke and vanish into nothing. They have no solidity or resistance to oppose the force of your argument. So it's difficult to know what to do. People who like to complain will find either option objectionable: whether we leap over his empty wordiness as if over a ravine and direct our argument toward level, open ground—against those points that seem to have some strength against the truth—or fight our absurd battle along the whole line of his foolishness. In the latter case, for those who don't love hard work, our labor extending over thousands of lines to no useful purpose will be tiresome and unprofitable. But if we attack only those points that seem to have some force against the truth, we'll give our adversaries a chance to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs that we can't refute. Since two courses are open to us—either to take all their arguments one by one, or to run through only the more important ones—the first being tedious to our hearers, the second likely to be suspected by our opponents—I think it best to take a middle course, and in this way avoid criticism from either side as much as possible. What, then, is our method? After clearing away the rubbish from his worthless productions as well as we can, we will briefly run through the main points of his argument in such a way that we neither plunge needlessly into the depths of his nonsense, nor leave any of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that God speaks in the same way humans do, and that the Creator of all things gives them appropriate names that indicate the things themselves. Therefore, opposing himself to the person who argued that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from God, he accuses him of error and of abandoning his fundamental proposition. Having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments to support his position.

But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessarily close our argument, as his writings will supply no material to work on. For as a smoke or a mist makes the air in which it resides heavy and thick, and incapacitates the eye for the discharge of its natural function, yet does not form itself into so dense a body that he who will may grasp and hold it in his palms, and offer resistance to its stroke, so if one should say the same of his pompous piece of writing, the comparison would not be untrue. Much nonsense is worked up in his tumid and viscous discourse, and to one not gifted with over-much discernment, like a mist to one viewing it from afar, it seems to have some substance and shape, but if you come up to it and scrutinize what is said, the theories slip from your hold like smoke, and vanish into nothing, nor have they any solidity or resistance to oppose to the stroke of your argument. It is difficult, therefore, to know what to do. For to those who like to complain either alternative will seem objectionable; whether, leaping over his empty wordiness, as over a ravine, we direct the course of our argument to the level and open country, against those points which seem to have any strength against the truth, or form our absurd battle along the whole line of his inanities. For in the latter case, to those who do not love hard work, our labour, extending over some thousands of lines to no useful purpose, will be wearisome and unprofitable. But if we attack those points only which seem to have some force against the truth, we shall give occasion to our adversaries to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs which we are unable to refute. Since, then, two courses are open to us, either to take all their arguments seriatim, or to run through those only which are more important — the one course tedious to our hearers, the other liable to be suspected by our assailants — I think it best to take a middle course, and so, as far as possible, to avoid censure on either hand. What, then, is our method? After clearing his vain productions, as well as we can, of the rubbish they have accumulated, we will summarily run through the main points of his argument in such a way as neither to plunge needlessly into the profundities of his nonsense, nor to leave any of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that God speaks after the manner of men, and that the Creator of all things gives them suitable names, indicative of the things themselves. And, therefore, opposing himself to him who contended that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from God, he accuses him of error, and of desertion from his fundamental proposition: and having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments in support of his position.

Eunomius says that Basil claims we first get a basic idea of something, and then a more detailed and precise investigation of that thing is called conception. Eunomius thinks he disproves this with the following argument: where you don't find both this first notion and this second, more detailed and precise notion, the mental activity we call thought and conception doesn't occur. However, anyone who listens carefully will recognize his dishonesty here. Our teacher Basil didn't lay down this definition for all thought and conception. Instead, after making a specific division within the objects of thought and conception—without burdening the discussion with too many words—and after clarifying this particular category, he left it to sensible people to figure out the whole from this part on their own. Similarly, if someone said we get our definition of an animal by examining various species of animals, he couldn't be accused of missing the truth if he used man as an example. There would be no need to correct him as mistaken unless he gave the same definition for a bird, a four-footed animal, or a sea creature as he did for a man. In the same way, since there are so many different perspectives from which we can consider this conception, it's no refutation of Basil's statement to say it's improperly named in one case just because another species exists. Therefore, even if another species comes under consideration, it doesn't mean the one previously identified was wrongly named. Now, he says, if one of the Apostles or Prophets could be shown to have used these names for Christ, the falsehood would have some support. What diligent study of God's word these remarks demonstrate from our opponent! None of the Prophets or Apostles spoke of our Lord as Bread, or a Stone, or a Fountain, or an Axe, or Light, or a Shepherd! What then does David say, and about whom? The Lord shepherds me. You who shepherd Israel, give ear. What difference does it make whether He is spoken of as shepherding or as a Shepherd? And again, With You is the Well of life. Does he deny that our Lord is called a Well? And again, The Stone which the builders rejected. And John too—when he represents our Lord's power to uproot evil under the image of an axe, saying, And now the Axe is laid to the root of the trees—isn't he a weighty and credible witness to the truth of our words?

Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under consideration is called conception. And Eunomius disproves this, as he thinks, by the following argument, that where this first, and this second notion, i.e. one more minute and accurate than the other, are not found, the operation which we call thought and conception does not find place. Here, however, he will be convicted of dishonesty by all who have ears to hear. For it was not of all thought and conception that our master (Basil) laid down this definition, but, after making a special subdivision of the objects of thought and conception (not to encumber the question with too many words), and having made this part clear, he left men of sense to reason out the whole from the part for themselves. And as, if any one should say that we get our definition of an animal from considering a number of animals of different species, he could not be convicted of missing the truth in making man an instance in point, nor would there be any need to correct him as deviating from the fact, unless he should give the same definition of a winged, or four-footed, or aquatic animal as of a man, so, when the points of view from which we may consider this conception are so many and various, it is no refutation of Basil's statement to say that it is improperly so called in one case because there is another species. Accordingly, even if another species come under consideration, it by no means follows that the one previously given is erroneously so called. Now if, says he, one of the Apostles or Prophets could be shown to have used these names of Christ, the falsehood would have something for its encouragement. To what industrious study of the word of God on the part of our opponent do not these words bear testimony! None of the Prophets or Apostles has spoken of our Lord as Bread, or a Stone, or a Fountain, or an Axe, or Light, or a Shepherd! What, then, says David, and of whom? The Lord shepherds me. You Who shepherdest Israel, give ear. What difference does it make whether He is spoken of as shepherding, or as a Shepherd? And again, With You is the Well of life. Does he deny that our Lord is called a Well? And again, The Stone which the builders rejected Matthew 21:42. And John, too — where, representing our Lord's power to uproot evil under the name of an axe, he says, And now also the Axe is laid to the root of the trees Matthew 3:10 — is he not a weighty and credible witness to the truth of our words?

And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light, and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him and a Light shone around him, and afterwards when he heard the words of the Light saying, "I am Jesus, whom you persecute"—is he not a competent witness? And regarding the name Bread, let him read the Gospel and see how the bread given by Moses and supplied to Israel from heaven was taken by our Lord as a type of Himself: "For Moses gave you not that Bread, but My Father gives you the true Bread" (meaning Himself) "which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world." But this genuine hearer of the law says that none of the Prophets or Apostles has applied these names to Christ. What shall we say, then, of what follows? Even if our Lord Himself adopts them, yet since in the Savior's names there is no first or second, none more minute or accurate than another, for He knows them all at once with equal accuracy, it is not possible to apply his (Basil's) account of the operation of conception to any of His names.

And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light, and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light shone round about him, and afterwards when he heard the words of the Light saying, I am Jesus, Whom you persecute. Acts 9:5, — is he not a competent witness? And as regards the name Bread, let him read the Gospel and see how the bread given by Moses, and supplied to Israel from heaven, was taken by our Lord as a type of Himself: For Moses gave you not that Bread, but My Father gives you the true Bread (meaning Himself) which comes down from heaven and gives life unto the world. But this genuine hearer of the law says that none of the Prophets or Apostles has applied these names to Christ. What shall we say, then, of what follows? Even if our Lord Himself adopts them, yet, since in the Saviour's names there is no first or second, none more minute or accurate than another, for He knows them all at once with equal accuracy, it is not possible to accommodate his (Basil's) account of the operation of conception to any of His names.

I have flooded my discussion with much of his nonsense, but I trust my readers will forgive me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his foolish statements. I do this not because we take pleasure in our author's inappropriate behavior (for what advantage can we gain from refuting our adversaries' foolishness?), but so that truth may be advanced by confirmation from whatever source. Since, he says, our Lord applies these titles to Himself, not considering any one of them first, or second, or more precise and accurate than the rest, you cannot say that these names are the result of conception. Why, he has forgotten his own point! How does he know the words against which he declares war? Our teacher and guide had mentioned an example familiar to everyone, to illustrate the doctrine of conception, and having explained his meaning by simpler illustrations, he lifts the consideration of the question to higher things. He had said that the word grain, considered by itself, is one thing only as to substance, but that, as to the various properties we see in it, it varies its names, being called seed, and fruit, and food, and the like. Similarly, he says, our Lord is in respect to Himself what He is essentially, but when named according to the differences of His operations, He does not have one name in all cases, but takes a different name according to each notion produced in us from the operation. How, then, does what he says disprove our theory that it is possible for many names to be properly attached, according to the diversity of His operations and His relation to their effects, to the Son of God, though one in respect of the underlying reality, even as grain, though one, has various names assigned to it, according to the point of view from which we regard it? How, then, can what is said be overthrown by our saying that Christ used all these names of Himself? For the question was not who assigned them, but about the meaning of the names, whether they denote ousia, or whether they are derived from His operations by the process of conception. But our clever and strong-minded opponent, overturning our theory of conception, which declares that it is possible to find many names for one and the same subject, according to the meanings of its operations, attacks us vigorously, asserting that such names were not given to our Lord by another. But what does this have to do with the case at hand? Since these names are used by our Lord, will he not allow that they are names, or titles, or words expressing ideas? For if he will not admit them to be names, then, in doing away with the titles, he does away at the same time with the conception. But if he does not deny that these words are names, what harm can he do to our doctrine of conception by showing that such titles were given to our Lord, not by someone else, but by Himself? For what was said was this: that, as in the instance of grain, our Lord, though substantively One, bears titles appropriate to His operations. And as it is admitted that grain has its names by virtue of our conception of its associations, it was shown that these terms describing our Lord are not of His ousia, but are formed by the method of conception in our minds concerning Him. But our opponent deliberately avoids attacking these positions, and maintains that our Lord received these names from Himself, in the same way as, if one sought for the true interpretation of the name Isaac, whether it means laughter, as some say, or something else, one of Eunomius' way of thinking should confidently reply that the name was given to him as a child by his mother: but that, one might say, was not the question, that is, by whom the name was given, but what does it mean when translated into our language? And this being the point of the inquiry, whether our Lord's various titles were the result of conception, instead of being indicative of His ousia, he who thus seeks to demonstrate that they are not so derived because they are used by our Lord Himself—how can he be numbered among sensible people, fighting as he does against the truth, and equipping himself with such arguments for the fight that only serve to show the superior strength of his enemy?

I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his inanities; not that we take pleasure in our author's indecorum, (for what advantage can we derive from the refutation of our adversaries' folly?) but that truth may be advanced by confirmation from whatever quarter. Since, says he, our Lord applies these appellations to Himself, not deeming any one of them first, or second, or more minute and accurate than the rest, you cannot say that these names are the result of conception. Why, he has forgotten his own object! How comes he by the knowledge of the words against which he declares war? Our master and guide had made mention of an example familiar to all, in illustration of the doctrine of conception, and having explained his meaning by lower illustrations, he lifts the consideration of the question to higher things. He had said that the word grain, regarded by itself, is one thing only as to substance, but that, as to the various properties we see in it, it varies its appellations, being called seed, and fruit, and food, and the like. Similarly, says he, our Lord is in respect to Himself what He is essentially, but when named according to the differences of His operations, He has not one appellation in all cases, but takes a different name according to each notion produced in us from the operation. How, then, does what he says disprove our theory that it is possible for many appellations to be attached with propriety, according to the diversity of His operations, and His relation to their effects, to the Son of God, though one in respect of the underlying force, even as grain, though one, has various names apportioned to it, according to the point of view from which we regard it? How, then, can what is said be overthrown by our saying that Christ used all these names of Himself? For the question was not, who ascribed them, but about the meaning of the names, whether they denote essence, or whether they are derived from His operations by the process of conception. But our shrewd and strong-minded opponent, overturning our theory of conception, which declares that it is possible to find many appellations for one and the same subject, according to the significances of its operations, attacks us vigorously, asserting that such names were not given to our Lord by another. But what has this to do with the case in point? Since these names are used by our Lord, will he not allow that they are names, or appellations, or words expressive of ideas? For if he will not admit them to be names, then, in doing away with the appellations, he does away at the same time with the conception. But if he does not deny that these words are names, what harm can he do to our doctrine of conception by showing that such titles were given to our Lord, not by some one else, but by Himself? For what was said was this, that, as in the instance of grain, our Lord, though substantively One, bears epithets suitable to His operations. And as it is admitted that grain has its names by virtue of our conception of its associations, it was shown that these terms significative of our Lord are not of His essence, but are formed by the method of conception in our minds respecting Him. But our antagonist studiously avoids attacking these positions, and maintains that our Lord received these names from Himself, in the same way as, if one sought for the true interpretation of the name Isaac, whether it means laughter, as some say, or something else, one of Eunomius' way of thinking should confidently reply that the name was given to him as a child by his mother: but that, one might say, was not the question, i.e. by whom the name was given, but what does it mean when translated into our language? And this being the point of the inquiry, whether our Lord's various appellations were the result of conception, instead of being indicative of His essence, he who thus seeks to demonstrate that they are not so derived because they are used by our Lord Himself — how can he be numbered among men of sense, warring as he does against the truth, and equipping himself with such alliances for the war as serve to show the superior strength of his enemy?

Then going farther, as if he had achieved his goal up to this point, he takes up other accusations against us that he thinks are more difficult to answer than the previous ones. With many preliminary groans and attempts to prejudice his hearers against us and to sharpen their interest in his speech, he accuses us of trying to establish blasphemous doctrines and of attributing to our own thinking names that God assigned (though he never mentions what assignment he means, or when and where it happened). He also accuses us of throwing everything into confusion and identifying the ousia of the Only-begotten with his operation, without actually arguing the case or showing how we prove that ousia and operation are identical. He concludes with the same list of charges as follows: And now, going beyond this, he (Basil) slanders even the Most High with the vilest blasphemies, using at the same time incoherent language and illustrations that miss the point. Before investigating this, I would like to know what our language is incoherent from and what point it misses—not that I actually want to know, but only to demonstrate the confusion and obscurity of his speech, which he forces upon the credulous people among us, taking pride in his clever phrases that he proclaims to those who admire such things. He is apparently unaware that in the judgment of educated people, this speech of his will serve only as a record of his own disgrace.

Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the former, and with many preliminary groans and attempts to prejudice his hearers against us, and to whet their appetite for his address, accusing us withal of seeking to establish doctrines savouring of blasphemy, and of ascribing to our own conception names assigned by God (though he nowhere mentions what assignment he refers to, nor when and where it took place), and, further, of throwing everything into confusion, and identifying the essence of the Only-begotten with his operation, without arguing the matter, or showing how we prove the identity of the essence and the operation, he winds up with the same list of charges, as follows: And now, passing beyond this, he (Basil) asperses even the Most High with the vilest blasphemies, using at the same time broken language, and illustrations wide of the mark. Now prior to inquiry, I should like to be told what our language is broken from, and what mark it is wide of; not that I want to know, except to show the confusion and obscurity of his address, which he dins into the ears of the old wives among our men, pluming himself on his nice phrases, which he mouths out to the admirers of such things, ignorant, as it would seem, that in the judgment of educated men this address of his will serve only as a memorial of his own infamy.

But all this is beside our purpose. I wish our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his manner of speaking, and not in matters of faith. After all, it would have been of relatively little importance to him to be praised or blamed for expressing himself in one style or another. But however that may be, the next part of his charges against us contains this in addition: He says that when considering the case of grain and of our Lord, after exercising his ideas in various ways upon them, he declares that even in the same way the most holy ousia of God admits of the same variety of conception. This is the most serious of his accusations, and it is in pursuing this that he delivers those heavy criticisms of his, charging what we have said with blasphemy, absurdity, and so forth. What, then, is the proof of our blasphemy? Eunomius says that he has mentioned certain well-known facts about grain—observing how it grows, and how when ripe it provides food, growing, multiplying, and being distributed by certain forces of nature—and, having mentioned these, he adds that it is only reasonable to suppose that the Only-begotten Son also admits of different modes of being conceived of, by reason of certain differences of operation, certain analogies, proportions, and relations. For he uses these terms respecting Him to excess. And is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with such objects as these? What objects? Why, grain, and God the Only-begotten! You see his cleverness. He wants to show that insignificant grain and God the Only-begotten are equally removed from the dignity of the Ungenerate. And to show that we are not treating his words unfairly, we may learn his meaning from the very words he has written. For, he asks, is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with these? And in speaking this way, he presents the case of grain and of our Lord as on the same level in terms of dignity, thinking it equally absurd to compare God with either. Now everyone knows that things equally distant from a given object have equality with respect to each other, so that according to our wise theologian the Maker of the worlds, who holds all nature in His hand, is shown to be on a par with the most insignificant seed, since He and grain to the same degree fall short of comparison with God. To such a level of blasphemy has he come!

But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery, and not in matters of faith; since it would have been of comparatively little importance to him to be praised or blamed for expressing himself in one style or another. But however that may be, the sequel of his charges against us contains this in addition: Considering the case of grain (he says), and of our Lord, after exercising his conceptions in various ways upon them, he declares that even in like manner the most holy essence of God admits of the same variety of conception. This is the gravest of his accusations, and it is in prosecuting this that he rehearses those heavy invectives of his, charging what we have said with blasphemy, absurdity, and so forth. What, then, is the proof of our blasphemy? He has mentioned (says Eunomius) certain well-known facts about grain — perceiving how it grows, and how when ripe it affords food, growing, multiplying, and being dispensed by certain forces of nature — and, having mentioned these, he adds that it is only reasonable to suppose that the Only-begotten Son also admits of different modes of being conceived of, by reason of certain differences of operation, certain analogies, proportions, and relations. For he uses these terms respecting Him to satiety. And is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with such objects as these? — What objects? Why, grain, and God the Only-begotten! You see his artfulness. He would show that insignificant grain and God the Only-begotten are equally removed from the dignity of the Ungenerate. And to show that we are not treating his words unfairly, we may learn his meaning from the very words he has written. For, he asks, is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with these? And in thus speaking, he instances the case of grain and of our Lord as on a level in point of dignity, thinking it equally absurd to compare God with either. Now every one knows that things equally distant from a given object are possessed of equality as regards each other, so that according to our wise theologian the Maker of the worlds, Who holds all nature in His hand, is shown to be on a par with the most insignificant seed, since He and grain to the same degree fall short of comparison with God. To such a pitch of blasphemy has he come!

But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity and see how it is logically connected with his whole discourse. After saying that it is absurd to compare God with grain and with Christ, he says that God is not, like them, subject to change. But regarding the Only-begotten, he keeps silence on the question of whether He too is not subject to change, thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare grain, with God. He breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he argues that the indestructibility of the Father does not actually attach to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality that actuates itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. However, there is but one single notion in indestructibility, considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son. No difference in indestructibility is observable either in degrees of intensity or in any other aspect of the process of destruction. This I say it is appropriate to assert both now and at all times, so as to reject the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. To be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, makes him assert that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he clearly shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction—and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility—how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming: God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies. If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be of the same kind, since it is through an energy that they both exist. But the blasphemy to which this logically leads is clear to everyone who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my discussion. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should exist by itself without there being something to set the energy in motion. We say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or worked. These capacities, that of operating and that of being operated upon, must necessarily stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one is removed, the remaining one cannot exist by itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not exist by itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, molded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For just as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise—in the case of things perceptible by sense, skillfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities but by impulses of choice—so, if anyone defines the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and worked to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator, whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to being acted upon, so that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy defines Him as one of those things which are subject to being acted upon and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he denies such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma—that of asserting His non-existence and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon—the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He truly exists and is not subject to being acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to being acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discourse. For after saying that it is absurd to compare God with grain and with Christ, he says of God that He is not, like them, subject to change; but in respect to the Only-begotten, keeping silence on the question whether He too is not subject to change, and thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare grain, with God, he breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses of the indestructibility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality, actuating itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. That, however, there is but one single notion in indestructibility, considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son, no difference as to indestructibility being observable either in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to assert, so as to preclude the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces him to assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he well shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction — and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility — how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming, God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies. If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be homogeneous, inasmuch as it is through an energy, that they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically tends is clear to every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should subsist of itself without there being something to set the energy in motion; as we say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore, that of operating, and that of being operated upon, must needs stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed, the remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not subsist of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any one define the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and wrought to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator: whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to be acted upon, that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon, cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be acted upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma, that of asserting His non- existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He verily exists, and is not subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son—such as justice, goodness, eternity, incapacity for evil, or infinite perfection in all conceivable goodness? Will anyone dare to say that any of the virtues in the divine nature are acquired, or deny that all good whatsoever springs from and is seen in it? For whatever is good is from Him, and whatever is lovely is from Him. But he adds to this that God is in His very essence ungenerate too. Now, if he means by this that the Father's essence is ungenerate, I agree with what is said and do not oppose his teaching, for none of the orthodox maintains that the Father of the Only-begotten is Himself begotten. But if, while his wording suggests only this, he actually maintains that ungeneracy itself is the essence, I say we must not leave such a position unexamined, but expose his attempt to win the assent of the unwary to his blasphemy.

But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son, as justice, goodness, eternity, incapacity for evil, infinite perfection in all conceivable goodness? Is there one who will venture to say that any of the virtues in the Divine nature are acquired, or to deny that all good whatsoever springs from and is seen in it? For whatsoever is good is from Him, and whatsoever is lovely is from Him. But he appends to this, that He is in His very essence ungenerate too. Well, if he means by this that the Father's essence is ungenerate, I agree with what is said, and do not oppose his doctrine: for not one of the orthodox maintains that the Father of the Only-begotten is Himself begotten. But if, while the form of his expression indicates only this, he maintains that the ungeneracy itself is the essence, I say that we ought not to leave such a position unexamined, but expose his attempt to gain the assent of the unwary to his blasphemy.

That the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things can be seen from what he himself has put forward. God, he says, is indestructible and ungenerate by His very essence, since He is unmixed and pure from all diversity and difference. This is what he says about God, whose essence he declares to be indestructibility and ungeneracy. There are three names, then, that he applies to God: being, indestructibility, ungeneracy. If the idea of these three words with respect to God is one, it follows that the Godhead and these three are identical. It's just like if someone, wanting to describe a human being, should say that he is a rational, able-to-laugh, and broad-nailed creature. Because there is no essential variation from these qualities in individual humans, we say that the terms are equivalent to each other, and that the three things seen in the subject are one thing—namely, humanity as described by these names. If, then, Godhead means this—ungeneracy, indestructibility, being—then by doing away with one of these he necessarily does away with the Godhead. For just as we would say that a creature which was neither rational nor able to laugh was not human either, so in the case of these three terms (ungeneracy, indestructibility, being), if the Godhead is described by these, should one of the three be absent, its absence destroys the definition of Godhead. Let him tell us, then, in reply, what opinion he holds about God the Only-begotten. Does he think Him generate or ungenerate? Of course he must say generate, unless he wants to contradict himself. If, then, being and indestructibility are equivalent to ungeneracy, and by all of these Godhead is denoted, then whoever lacks ungeneracy must also lack being and indestructibility, and in that case the Godhead must also necessarily be taken away. And so his blasphemous logic brings him to a twofold conclusion. For if being, indestructibility, and ungeneracy are applied to God in the same sense, our new God-maker is clearly convicted of regarding the Son he has created as destructible, by his not regarding Him as ungenerate. Not only that, but he regards the Son as altogether without being, through his inability to see Him in the Godhead—since he views Him as one in whom ungeneracy and indestructibility are not found, because he takes ungeneracy and indestructibility to be identical with being. But since in this there is obvious destruction, let someone counsel these unhappy people to turn to the only course left to them, and instead of setting themselves in open opposition to the truth, to allow that each of these terms has its own proper meaning, which can be seen even better from their contraries. For we find ungenerate set against generate, and we understand the indestructible by its opposition to the destructible, and being by contrast with that which has no subsistence. For just as that which was not generated is called ungenerate, and that which is not destructible is called indestructible, so that which is not non-existent we call being. Conversely, just as we do not call the generate ungenerate, nor the destructible indestructible, so that which is non-existent we do not call being. Being, then, is discernible in the being this or that, goodness or indestructibility in the being of this or of that kind, generacy or ungeneracy in the manner of the being. And thus the ideas of being, manner, and quality are distinct from each other.

Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, he says, is indestructible and ungenerate by His very essence, as being unmixed and pure from all diversity and difference. This he says of God, Whose essence he declares to be indestructibility and ungeneracy. There are three names, then, that he applies to God, being, indestructibility, ungeneracy. If the idea of these three words in respect of God is one, it follows that the Godhead and these three are identical. Just as if any one, wanting to describe a man, should say that he was a rational, risible, and broad-nailed creature; whereupon, because there is no essential variation from these in the individuals, we say that the terms are equivalent to each other, and that the three things seen in the subject are one thing, viz. the humanity described by these names. If, then, Godhead means this, ungeneracy, indestructibility, being, by doing away with one of these he necessarily does away with the Godhead. For just as we should say that a creature which was neither rational nor risible was not man either, so in the case of these three terms (ungeneracy, indestructibility, being), if the Godhead is described by these, should one of the three be absent, its absence destroys the definition of Godhead. Let him tell us, then, in reply, what opinion he holds of God the Only-begotten. Does he think Him generate or ungenerate? Of course he must say generate, unless he is to contradict himself. If, then, being and indestructibility are equivalent to ungeneracy, and by all of these Godhead is denoted, to Whom ungeneracy is wanting, to Him being and indestructibility must needs be wanting also, and in that case the Godhead also must necessarily be taken away. And thus his blasphemous logic brings him to a twofold conclusion. For if being, and indestructibility, and ungeneracy are applied to God in the same sense, our new God-maker is clearly convicted of regarding the Son created by Him as destructible, by his not regarding Him as ungenerate, and not only so, but altogether without being, through his inability to see Him in the Godhead, as one in whom ungeneracy and indestructibility are not found, since he takes the ungeneracy and indestructibility to be identical with the being. But since in this there is manifest perdition, let some one counsel these unhappy folk to turn to the only course which is left them, and, instead of setting themselves in open opposition to the truth, to allow that each of these terms has its own proper signification, such as may be seen still better from their contraries. For we find ungenerate set against generate, and we understand the indestructible by its opposition to the destructible, and being by contrast with that which has no subsistence. For as that which was not generated is called ungenerate, and that which is not destructible is called indestructible, so that which is not non-existent we call being, and, conversely, as we do not call the generate ungenerate, nor the destructible indestructible, so that which is non-existent we do not call being. Being, then, is discernible in the being this or that, goodness or indestructibility in the being of this or of that kind, generacy or ungeneracy in the manner of the being. And thus the ideas of being, manner, and quality are distinct from each other.

But I think it's best to pass over his disgusting remarks (for that's what we must call his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and focus more pleasantly on the actual subject matter of our thought. For all the poison that our opponent has spewed out trying to overthrow our Master's reflections on conception is not the kind that poses any danger to those who encounter it, no matter how foolish they are or how easily deceived. Who is so lacking in understanding as to think there's anything worthwhile in what Eunomius says, or to see any cleverness in his tricks against the truth when he takes our Master's reference to grain (which he meant simply as an illustration, thereby providing his hearers with a kind of method and introduction to studying higher matters), and applies it literally to the Lord of all? Consider his claim that the most fitting reason for God's begetting the Son was His sovereign authority and power—which could be said not only regarding the universe and its elements, but also regarding beasts and creeping things—while our reverent theologian teaches that the same thing is fitting in our conception of God the Only-begotten. Or again, consider his saying that God was called ungenerate, or Father, or any other name, even before creatures existed to call Him such, as if he were afraid that if His name wasn't being spoken among creatures not yet born, He would be ignorant or forgetful of Himself, not knowing His own physis (nature) because His name wasn't being spoken. Consider also the insolence of his attack on our teaching—what bitterness, what cleverness he displays while trying to establish the absurdity of what he (Basil) said: namely, that He who was in a sense the Father before all ages and time, and all sensible and intellectual nature, must somehow wait for man's creation in order to be named through man's conception, not having been so named either by the Son or by any of the intelligent beings of His creation. Why, I imagine no one can be so incredibly stupid as to be unaware that God the Only-begotten, who is in the Father and who sees the Father in Himself, has no need of any name or title to make Him known, nor is the mystery of the Holy Spirit, who searches out the deep things of God, brought to our knowledge by a verbal designation, nor can the incorporeal nature of the supramundane powers name God by voice and tongue. For in the case of immaterial intellectual nature, mental activity itself is speech that has no need of material instruments of communication. Even in the case of human beings, we would have no need to use words and names if we could otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings and impulses. But as things are, since the thoughts that arise in us cannot be revealed in that way, because our nature is burdened with its fleshly envelope, we are forced to express to each other what goes on in our minds by giving things their respective names as signs of their meaning.

But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and dwell more pleasurably on the subject matter of our thought. For all the venom that our disputant has disgorged with the view of overthrowing our Master's speculations in regard to conception, is not of such a kind as to be dangerous to those who come in its way, however stupid they may be and liable to be imposed on. For who is so devoid of understanding as to think that there is anything in what Eunomius says, or to see any ingenuity in his artifices against the truth when he takes our Master's reference to grain (which he meant simply by way of illustration, thereby providing his hearers with a sort of method and introduction to the study of higher instances), and applies it literally to the Lord of all? To think of his assertion that the most becoming cause for God's begetting the Son was His sovereign authority and power, which may be said not only in regard to the universe and its elements, but in regard to beasts and creeping things; and of our reverend theologian teaching that the same is becoming in our conception of God the Only-begotten — or again, of his saying that God was called ungenerate, or Father, or any other name, even before the existence of creatures to call Him such, as being afraid lest, His name not being uttered among creatures as yet unborn, He should be ignorant or forgetful of Himself, through ignorance of His own nature because of His name being unspoken! To think, again, of the insolence of his attack upon our teaching; what acrimony, what subtlety does he display, while attempting to establish the absurdity of what he (Basil) said, namely that He Who was in a manner the Father before all worlds and time, and all sensitive and intellectual nature, must somehow wait for man's creation in order to be named by means of man's conception, not having been so named, either by the Son or by any of the intelligent beings of His creation! Why no one, I imagine, can be so densely stupid as to be ignorant that God the Only-begotten, Who is in the Father, and Who sees the Father in Himself, is in no need of any name or title to make Him known, nor is the mystery of the Holy Spirit, Who searches out the deep things of God 1 Corinthians 2:10, brought to our knowledge by a nominal appellation, nor can the incorporeal nature of supramundane powers name God by voice and tongue. For, in the case of immaterial intellectual nature, the mental energy is speech which has no need of material instruments of communication. For even in the case of human beings, we should have no need of using words and names if we could otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings and impulses. But (as things are), inasmuch as the thoughts which arise in us are incapable of being so revealed, because our nature is encumbered with its fleshly surrounding, we are obliged to express to each other what goes on in our minds by giving things their respective names, as signs of their meaning.

But if it were somehow possible to reveal the movements of thought by some other means, setting aside the formal use of words, we would communicate with one another more clearly and lucidly, displaying through thought itself the essential nature of the things we are examining. However, because we are unable to do this, we have assigned specific names to things—calling one Heaven, another Earth, and so forth—and as each thing relates to another, acts, or is acted upon, we have distinguished them with particular names so that our thoughts about them can be communicated and made known. But supramundane and immaterial nature, being free and independent of bodily form, needs no words or names either for itself or for what is above it. Whatever utterance from such intellectual nature is recorded in Holy Scripture is provided for the sake of the hearers, who would otherwise be unable to learn what is being presented unless it were communicated to them through voice and word. And if David in the spirit speaks of something being said by the Lord to the Lord, it is David himself who is speaking, since he cannot make known to us the teaching of what is meant except by expressing through voice and word his own understanding of the mysteries given to him by divine inspiration.

But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should converse with one another more lucidly and clearly, revealing by the mere action of thought the essential nature of the things which are under consideration. But now, by reason of our inability to do so, we have given things their special names, calling one Heaven, another Earth, and so on, and as each is related to each, and acts or suffers, we have marked them by distinctive names, so that our thoughts in regard to them may not remain uncommunicated and unknown. But supramundane and immaterial nature being free and independent of bodily envelopment, requires no words or names either for itself or for that which is above it, but whatever utterance on the part of such intellectual nature is recorded in Holy Writ is given for the sake of the hearers, who would be unable otherwise to learn what is to be set forth, if it were not communicated to them by voice and word. And if David in the spirit speaks of something being said by the Lord to the Lord, it is David himself who is the speaker, being unable otherwise to make known to us the teaching of what is meant except by interpreting by voice and word his own knowledge of the mysteries given him by Divine inspiration.

I think it best to pass over all his arguments against the doctrine of conception, even though he accuses those who think the name of God—as humanity uses it to refer to the Supreme Being—results from this conception of being insane. Anyone who wishes can learn from his own words what he is thinking when he feels compelled to attack that doctrine. We have already stated our own view on the use of words: since things exist as they are in their nature, the rational faculty that God implanted in our nature invented words to indicate those actual things. If anyone attributes their origin to the Giver of this faculty, we would not disagree, for we too maintain that motion, sight, and the rest of the operations carried on by the senses are accomplished by the One who gave us such faculties. Therefore, the reason we name God, who is by His nature what He is, can by common agreement be traced back to Him, but the freedom to name all things we conceive of in one way or another lies in that aspect of our nature which—whether one wants to call it conception or something else—makes no difference to us. One sure piece of evidence in our favor is this: the Divine Being is not named the same way by everyone, but each person interprets his idea as he thinks best. Passing over in silence his worthless nonsense about conception, let us hold to our beliefs and simply note along the way some of the observations that appear in the midst of his empty speeches, where he pretends that God, sitting down with our first parents like some teacher or grammarian, gave them a lesson in words and names. Here he says that those who were first formed by God, or those who were born from them in continuous succession, would have lived together in dumbness and silence unless they had been taught what each thing should be called and named, and would have been unable to carry out any of the useful functions of life, since the meaning of each thing would be uncertain for lack of interpreters—verbs and nouns, no less. Such is this writer's delusion. He thinks the faculty God implanted in our nature is inadequate for any method of reasoning, and that unless it is taught each thing individually, like those who are taught Hebrew or Latin word by word, one must be ignorant of the nature of things, having no understanding of fire, water, air, or anything else unless one has learned about them through the names they bear. But we maintain that the One who made all things in His wisdom and who fashioned this living rational creature endowed him with all his rational faculties by the simple fact of implanting reason in his nature. Since we naturally possess our faculties of perception as a gift from the One who fashioned the eye and planted the ear, we can use them for their natural purposes on our own, and we do not need anyone to name the colors, for instance, that the eye perceives, for the eye is capable of informing itself about such things. Nor do we need someone else to acquaint us with the things we perceive through hearing, taste, or touch, since we possess within ourselves the means of discerning everything our perception tells us about. Likewise, we maintain that the intellectual faculty, originally made by God, acts on its own from then on when it observes realities, and to prevent confusion in its knowledge, it attaches some verbal marker to each thing as a stamp indicating its meaning. Great Moses himself confirms this teaching when he says that names were assigned by Adam to the animals, recording the fact in these words: "And out of the ground God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to all the beasts of the field."

All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that the name of God, as used by mankind to indicate the Supreme Being, is the result of this conception. For what he is thinking of when he considers himself bound to revile that doctrine, all who will may learn from his own words. What opinion we ourselves hold on the use of words we have already stated, viz. that, things being as they are in regard to their nature, the rational faculty implanted in our nature by God invented words indicative of those actual things. And if any one ascribe their origin to the Giver of the faculty, we would not contradict him, for we too maintain that motion, and sight, and the rest of the operations carried on by the senses are effected by Him Who endowed us with such faculties. So, then, the cause of our naming God, Who is by His nature what He is, is referable by common consent to Himself, but the liberty of naming all things that we conceive of in one way or another lies in that thing in our nature, which, whether a man wish to call it conception or something else, we are quite indifferent. And there is this one sure evidence in our favour, that the Divine Being is not named alike by all, but that each interprets his idea as he thinks best. Passing over, then, in silence his rubbishy twaddle about conception, let us hold to our tenets, and simply note by the way some of the observations that occur in the midst of his empty speeches, where he pretends that God, seating Himself by our first parents, like some pedagogue or grammarian, gave them a lesson in words and names; wherein he says that they who were first formed by God, or those who were born from them in continuous succession, unless they had been taught how each several thing should be called and named, would have lived together in dumbness and silence, and would have been unequal to the discharge of any of the serviceable functions of life, the meaning of each being uncertain through lack of interpreters — verbs forsooth, and nouns. Such is the infatuation of this writer; he thinks the faculty implanted in our nature by God insufficient for any method of reasoning, and that unless it be taught each thing severally, like those who are taught Hebrew or Latin word by word, one must be ignorant of the nature of the things, having no discernment of fire, or water, or air, or anything else, unless one have acquired the knowledge of them by the names that they bear. But we maintain that He Who made all things in His wisdom, and Who moulded this living rational creature, by the simple fact of His implanting reason in his nature, endowed him with all his rational faculties. And as naturally possessing our faculties of perception by the gift of Him Who fashioned the eye and planted the ear, we can of ourselves employ them for their natural objects, and have no need of any one to name the colors, for instance, of which the eye takes cognizance, for the eye is competent to inform itself in such matters; nor do we need another to make us acquainted with the things which we perceive by hearing, or taste, or touch, possessing as we do in ourselves the means of discerning all of which our perception informs us. And so, again, we maintain that the intellectual faculty, made as it was originally by God, acts thenceforward by itself when it looks out upon realities, and that there be no confusion in its knowledge, affixes some verbal note to each several thing as a stamp to indicate its meaning. Great Moses himself confirms this doctrine when he says Genesis 2:19-20 that names were assigned by Adam to the brute creation, recording the fact in these words: And out of the ground God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to all the beasts of the field.

But the nonsense he has concocted against our teaching about conception seems to cling to us like some thick and sticky clay, holding us back and preventing us from moving on to more important matters. For how can anyone pass over his solemn and profound philosophy, such as when he says that God's greatness is seen not only in the works of His hands, but that His wisdom is also displayed in their names, which are adapted with such peculiar fitness to the nature (physis) of each work of His creation? Having perhaps come across Plato's Cratylus, or hearing about it from someone who had read it, he patched that nonsense onto his own argument because of his own poverty of ideas, acting like people who beg for their bread. For just as beggars receive some small amount from each person who gives to them and collect their bread from many different sources, so the discourse of Eunomius, because of his scanty supply of the true bread, busily collects scraps of phrases and ideas from everywhere. And so, being impressed by the beauty of Plato's style, he thinks it proper to make Plato's theory a doctrine of the Church. For by how many names, for example, is the created firmament called according to the varieties of language? We call it Heaven, the Hebrew calls it Samaim, the Roman calls it caelum, and other names are given to it by the Syrian, the Mede, the Cappadocian, the African, the Scythian, the Thracian, and the Egyptian. Nor would it be easy to list all the different names that are applied to Heaven and other objects by the different nations that use them. Which of these names, then, tell me, is the appropriate word in which the great wisdom of God is manifested? If you prefer the Greek name to the rest, the Egyptian will perhaps confront you with his own. And if you give first place to the Hebrew, there is the Syrian to claim precedence for his own word, nor will the Roman yield supremacy, nor will the Mede allow himself to be outdone, while each of the other nations will claim the prize. What, then, will become of his teaching when it is torn to pieces by the claimants for so many different languages? But by these names, he says, as by publicly announced laws, it is shown that God made names exactly suited to the nature (physis) of the things they represent. What a grand doctrine! What grand views our theologian assigns to the Divine teachings—such views as people do not even begrudge to bath attendants! For we allow them to give names to the operations they perform, and yet no one honors them as divine for inventing such names as foot-baths, depilatories, towels, and the like—words which appropriately designate the articles in question.

But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and prevent us from applying ourselves to more important matters. For how can one pass over his solemn and profound philosophy, as when he says that God's greatness is seen not only in the works of His hands, but that His wisdom is displayed in their names also, adapted as they are with such peculiar fitness to the nature of each work of His creation? Having perchance fallen in with Plato's Cratylus, or hearing from some one who had met with it, by reason, I suppose, of his own poverty of ideas, he attached that nonsense patchwise to his own, acting like those who get their bread by begging. For just as they, receiving some trifle from each who bestows it on them, collect their bread from many and various sources, so the discourse of Eunomius, by reason of his scanty store of the true bread, assiduously collects scraps of phrases and notions from all quarters. And thus, being struck by the beauty of the Platonic style, he thinks it not unseemly to make Plato's theory a doctrine of the Church. For by how many appellations, say, is the created firmament called according to the varieties of language? For we call it Heaven, the Hebrew calls it Samaim, the Roman cœlum, other names are given to it by the Syrian, the Mede, the Cappadocian, the African, the Scythian, the Thracian the Egyptian: nor would it be easy to enumerate the multiplicity of names which are applied to Heaven and other objects by the different nations that employ them. Which of these, then, tell me, is the appropriate word wherein the great wisdom of God is manifested? If you prefer the Greek to the rest, the Egyptian haply will confront you with his own. And if you give the first place to the Hebrew, there is the Syrian to claim precedence for his own word, nor will the Roman yield the supremacy, nor the Mede allow himself to be outdone; while of the other nations each will claim the prize. What, then, will be the fate of his dogma when torn to pieces by the claimants for so many different languages? But by these, says he, as by laws publicly promulgated, it is shown that God made names exactly suited to the nature of the things which they represent. What a grand doctrine! What grand views our theologian allows to the Divine teachings, such indeed as men do not grudge even to bathing-attendants! For we allow them to give names to the operations they engage in, and yet no one invests them with Divine honours for the invention of such names as foot-baths, depilatories, towels, and the like — words which appropriately designate the articles in question.

But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus' nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms and empty space, and the accidental generation of things, is similar to what we mean by conception. What an understanding of Epicurus! If we attribute words that express things to the logical faculty in our nature, we are thereby convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of indivisible bodies, combinations of atoms, the collision and rebound of particles, and so on. I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he takes as his own patron and the ally of his system, whose opinion, he says in his later remarks, coincides with our views about conception. For he says that philosopher taught that Providence does not extend through all nature, nor penetrate into the realm of earthly things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds to our discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining a doctrine accurately! But he goes on to say that we must either deny that God created things, or, if we grant it, we must not deprive Him of the naming of things. And yet even with respect to the animal creation, as we have already said, we are taught the very opposite of both these alternatives by Holy Scripture—that Adam did not make the animals, nor did God name them, but the creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives us praise of speech in general, as though someone wished to disparage it, and after his extremely abusive and bombastic pile of words, he says that by a law and rule of His providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our knowledge and use of things necessary for our service. And after pouring out nonsense of this kind in the depths of his delusions, he passes on in his discourse to his supposedly irresistible and unanswerable argument. I will not state it word for word, but simply give the gist of it. We are not, he says, to attribute the invention of words to poets, who are greatly mistaken in their notions of God. What a generous concession he makes to God in crediting Him with the inventions of poetic craft, so that God may thereby seem more sublime and august to people, when the disciples of Eunomius believe that such expressions as those used by Homer for sideways, rang out, aside, mix, clung to his hand, hissed, thumped, rattled, clashed, rang terribly, twanged, shouted, pondered, and many others, are not used by poets by a certain arbitrary freedom, but that they introduce them into their poems by some mysterious revelation from God! Let this, too, be passed over, and also that clever and supposedly irresistible argument, that it is not in our power to cite Scriptural instances of holy men who have invented new terms. Now if human nature had been imperfect up to the time of such men's appearance, and not yet completed by the gift of reason, it would have been appropriate for them to seek that the deficiency might be supplied. But if from the very first man's nature existed self-sufficient and complete for all purposes of reason and thought, why should anyone, in order to establish this doctrine of conception, humor them so far as to look for instances where holy men originated sounds or names? Or, if we cannot produce any instances, why should anyone regard it as adequate proof that such and such syllables and words were appointed by God Himself?

But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus' nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms and empty space, and the fortuitous generation of things, is akin to what we mean by conception. What an understanding of Epicurus! If we ascribe words expressive of things to the logical faculty in our nature, we thereby stand convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of indivisible bodies, and combinations of atoms, and the collision and rebound of particles, and so on. I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he takes as his own patron, and the ally of his system, whose opinion, he says, in his subsequent remarks, coincides with our views about conception. For he says that that philosopher taught that Providence does not extend through all nature, nor penetrate into the region of terrestrial things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds to our discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining a doctrine with accuracy! But he goes on to say that we must either deny the creation of things to God, or, if we concede it, we must not deprive Him of the imposition of names. And yet even in respect to the brute creation, as we have said already, we are taught the very opposite (of both these alternatives) by Holy Scripture — that neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them, but the creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives us an encomium of speech in general (as though some one wished to disparage it), and after his eminently abusive and bombastic conglomeration of words, he says that, by a law and rule of His providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our knowledge and use of things necessary for our service; and after pouring forth twaddle of this kind in the profundity of his slumbers, he passes on in his discourse to his irresistible and unanswerable argument. I will not state it in so many words, but simply give the drift of it. We are not, he says, to ascribe the invention of words to poets, who are much mistaken in their notions of God. What a generous concession does he make to God in investing Him with the inventions of the poetic faculty, so that God may thereby seem to men more sublime and august, when the disciples of Eunomius believe that such expressions as those used by Homer for side-ways, rang out, aside, mix, clung to his hand, hissed, thumped, rattled, clashed, rang terribly, twanged, shouted, pondered, and many others, are not used by poets by a certain arbitrary licence, but that they introduce them into their poems by some mysterious initiation from God! Let this, too, be passed over, and withal that clever and irresistible attempt, that it is not in our power to quote Scriptural instances of holy men who have invented new terms. Now if human nature had been imperfect up to the time of such men's appearance, and not as yet completed by the gift of reason, it would have been well for them to seek that the deficiency might be supplied. But if from the very first man's nature existed self-sufficing and complete for all purposes of reason and thought, why should any one, in order to establish this doctrine of conception, humour them so far as to seek for instances where holy men initiated sounds or names? Or, if we cannot adduce any instances, why should any one regard it as a sufficient proof that such and such syllables and words were appointed by God Himself?

But, he says, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriate to things. What, then, is our answer? We account for God's willingness to admit people to communion with Himself by His love for humanity. But since that which is by nature finite cannot rise above its prescribed limits or lay hold of the superior nature of the Most High, for this reason He brings His power, so full of love for humanity, down to the level of human weakness, as far as it is possible for us to receive it, and bestows on us this helpful gift of grace. For just as by divine dispensation the sun, tempering the intensity of his full beams with the intervening air, pours down light as well as heat on those who receive his rays, being himself unapproachable because of the weakness of our nature, so the divine power, after the manner of the illustration I have used, though exalted far above our nature and inaccessible to all approach, like a tender mother who joins in the inarticulate utterances of her baby, gives to our human nature what it is capable of receiving. And thus in the various manifestations of God to humanity He both adapts Himself to humanity and speaks in human language, and assumes wrath, and pity, and such emotions, so that through feelings corresponding to our own our infantile life might be led by the hand, and lay hold of the divine nature by means of the words which His foresight has given. For no one who has thought at all about the truth of things will deny that it is irreverent to imagine that God is subject to any passion such as we see in respect to pleasure, or pity, or anger. And yet the Lord is said to take pleasure in His servants, and to be angry with the backsliding people, and again to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and to show compassion—the word teaching us in each of these expressions that God's providence helps our infirmity by using our own idioms of speech, so that those who are inclined to sin may be restrained from committing it by fear of punishment, and that those who are overtaken by it may not despair of return by the way of repentance when they see God's mercy, while those who are walking uprightly and strictly may yet more adorn their life with virtue, knowing that by their own life they rejoice Him Whose eyes are over the righteous. But just as we cannot call a man deaf who converses with a deaf man by means of signs—his only way of hearing—so we must not suppose speech in God because of His employing it by way of accommodation in addressing humanity. For we ourselves are accustomed to direct brute beasts by clucking and whistling and the like, and yet this, by which we reach their ears, is not our language, but we use our natural speech in talking to one another, while in regard to cattle, some suitable noise or sound accompanied with gesture is sufficient for all purposes of communication.

But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriate to things. What, then, is our answer? We account for God's willingness to admit men to communion with Himself by His love towards mankind. But since that which is by nature finite cannot rise above its prescribed limits, or lay hold of the superior nature of the Most High, on this account He, bringing His power, so full of love for humanity, down to the level of human weakness, so far as it was possible for us to receive it, bestowed on us this helpful gift of grace. For as by Divine dispensation the sun, tempering the intensity of his full beams with the intervening air, pours down light as well as heat on those who receive his rays, being himself unapproachable by reason of the weakness of our nature, so the Divine power, after the manner of the illustration I have used, though exalted far above our nature and inaccessible to all approach, like a tender mother who joins in the inarticulate utterances of her babe, gives to our human nature what it is capable of receiving; and thus in the various manifestations of God to man He both adapts Himself to man and speaks in human language, and assumes wrath, and pity, and such-like emotions, so that through feelings corresponding to our own our infantile life might be led as by hand, and lay hold of the Divine nature by means of the words which His foresight has given. For that it is irreverent to imagine that God is subject to any passion such as we see in respect to pleasure, or pity, or anger, no one will deny who has thought at all about the truth of things. And yet the Lord is said to take pleasure in His servants, and to be angry with the backsliding people, and, again, to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and to show compassion — the word teaching us in each of these expressions that God's providence helps our infirmity by using our own idioms of speech, so that such as are inclined to sin may be restrained from committing it by fear of punishment, and that those who are overtaken by it may not despair of return by the way of repentance when they see God's mercy, while those who are walking uprightly and strictly may yet more adorn their life with virtue, as knowing that by their own life they rejoice Him Whose eyes are over the righteous. But just as we cannot call a man deaf who converses with a deaf man by means of signs, — his only way of hearing — so we must not suppose speech in God because of His employing it by way of accommodation in addressing man. For we ourselves are accustomed to direct brute beasts by clucking and whistling and the like, and yet this, by which we reach their ears, is not our language, but we use our natural speech in talking to one another, while, in regard to cattle, some suitable noise or sound accompanied with gesture is sufficient for all purposes of communication.

But our pious opponent will not allow God to use our language because of our tendency toward evil, closing his eyes (good man!) to the fact that for our sake He did not refuse to be made sin and a curse. Such is the overflow of His love for humanity that He willingly came to experience not only our good, but our evil. And if He shared in our evil, why should He refuse to share in speech, the noblest of our gifts? But he brings forward David as his support and claims that David said names were given to things by God, because it is written: He tells the number of the stars; He calls them all by their names. But I think it must be clear to every sensible person that what is said about the stars has nothing whatever to do with the subject. However, since it is quite possible that some people may carelessly agree with his statement, I will briefly discuss the point. Holy Scripture often attributes expressions to God that seem quite consistent with our own, for example: The Lord was angry, and it repented Him because of their sins; and again, He repented that He had anointed Saul king; and again, The Lord awaked as one out of sleep; and besides this, it mentions His sitting, and standing, and moving, and the like, which are not actually connected with God but are not without their usefulness as an accommodation to those who are being taught. For in the case of those who are too unrestrained, a show of anger holds them back through fear. And to those who need the medicine of repentance, it says that the Lord repents along with them of the evil, and those who become arrogant through prosperity it warns, by God's repentance regarding Saul, that their good fortune is not a guaranteed possession, though it may seem to come from God. To those who are not swallowed up by their sinful fall but who have risen from a life of vanity as from sleep, it says that God arises out of sleep. To those who stand firmly upon righteousness—that He stands. To those who are seated in righteousness—that He sits. And again, in the case of those who have moved away from their steadfastness in righteousness—that He moves or walks; as in the case of Adam, the sacred history records God's walking in the garden in the cool of the day, signifying by this the fall of the first man into darkness, and by the moving, his weakness and instability in regard to righteousness.

But our pious opponent will not allow of God's using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes ( good man!) to the fact that for our sakes He did not refuse to be made sin and a curse. Such is the superabundance of His love for man, that He voluntarily came to prove not only our good, but our evil. And if He was partaker in our evil, why should He refuse to be partaker in speech, the noblest of our gifts? But he advances David in his support, and declares that he said that names were imposed on things by God, because it is thus written, He tells the number of the stars; He calls them all by their names. But I think it must be obvious to every man of sense that what is thus said of the stars has nothing whatever to do with the subject. Since, however, it is not improbable that some may unwarily give their assent to his statement, I will briefly discuss the point. Holy Scripture oftentimes is wont to attribute expressions to God such that they seem quite accordant with our own, e.g. The Lord was angry, and it repented Him because of their sins; and again, He repented that He had anointed Saul king 1 Samuel 15:35; and again, The Lord awaked as one out of sleep; and besides this, it makes mention of His sitting, and standing, and moving, and the like, which are not as a fact connected with God, but are not without their use as an accommodation to those who are under teaching. For in the case of the too unbridled, a show of anger restrains them by fear. And to those who need the medicine of repentance, it says that the Lord repents along with them of the evil, and those who grow insolent through prosperity it warns, by God's repentance in respect to Saul, that their good fortune is no certain possession, though it seem to come from God. To those who are not engulfed by their sinful fall, but who have risen from a life of vanity as from sleep, it says that God arises out of sleep. To those who steadfastly take their stand upon righteousness — that He stands. To those who are seated in righteousness — that He sits. And again, in the case of those who have moved from their steadfastness in righteousness — that He moves or walks; as, in the case of Adam, the sacred history records God's walking in the garden in the cool of the day Genesis 3:8, signifying thereby the fall of the first man into darkness, and, by the moving, his weakness and instability in regard to righteousness.

But most people will probably think this is too far removed from what we're currently investigating. However, no one will consider this next point irrelevant to our subject: many people think that whatever is incomprehensible to them is equally incomprehensible to God, and that whatever escapes their own knowledge is also beyond His power to know. Now since we use number to measure quantity, and number is nothing more than a combination of units growing into multitude in a complex way (for the ten is a unit brought to that value by combining units, and likewise the hundred is a unit composed of tens, and in the same way the thousand is another unit, and so proportionally the ten thousand is another through multiplication, one being made up to its value by thousands, the other by hundreds, and by assigning all of these to their underlying class we create signs of the quantity of things being counted)—accordingly, in order that we might be taught by Holy Scripture that nothing is unknown to God, it tells us that the multitude of stars is numbered by Him, not that their numbering happens as I have described (for who is so simple as to think that God gains knowledge of things through odd and even numbers, and that by putting units together He arrives at the total of the collective quantity?), but since in our own case exact knowledge of quantity is obtained through number, in order that we might be taught regarding God that all things are comprehended by the knowledge of His wisdom, and that nothing escapes His precise awareness, Scripture represents God as numbering the stars, advising us through these words to understand that we must not imagine God takes note of things by the measure of human knowledge, but that all things, however incomprehensible and above human understanding, are embraced by the knowledge of the wisdom of God. For since the stars escape numbering because of their multitude, as far as our human conception is concerned, Holy Scripture, teaching the whole from the part, in saying they are numbered by God attests that not one of the things unknown to us escapes God's knowledge. And therefore it says, Who tells the multitude of the stars, certainly not meaning that He did not know their number beforehand; for how could He be ignorant of what He Himself created, seeing that the Ruler of the Universe could not be ignorant of what is comprehended in His power, which includes the worlds in its embrace? Why, then, would He number what He already knows? For measuring quantity by number is the part of those who need information. But He Who knew all things before they were created does not need number to inform Him. But when David says that He numbers the stars, it is clear that Scripture descends to such language in accordance with our understanding, to teach us symbolically that the things we do not know are accurately known to God. Just as He is said to number, though needing no arithmetical process to arrive at knowledge of created things, so also the Prophet tells us that He calls them all by their names, not meaning, I think, that He does so through any vocal utterance. For truly such language would result in a strangely unworthy conception of God, if it meant that these names in common use among ourselves were applied to the stars by God. For if anyone were to allow that these names were applied by God, it would follow that the names of the Greek idol gods were also applied by Him to the stars, and we would have to regard as true all the tales from mythological history told about those star names, as though God Himself authorized their utterance. Thus the distribution of the seven planets contained in the heavens among the Greek idols would excuse those who have erred regarding them, if people were persuaded that such an arrangement was God's doing. Thus the fables about Orion and the Scorpion would be believed, along with the legends about the ship Argo, the Swan, the Eagle, the Dog, and the mythical story of Ariadne's crown. Moreover, it would pave the way for supposing God to be the inventor of the names in the zodiacal circle, devised after some imagined resemblance in the constellations, if Eunomius is right in supposing that David said these names were given by God.

But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping with our subject; the fact that many think that what is incomprehensible to themselves is equally incomprehensible to God, and that whatever escapes their own cognizance is also beyond the power of His. Now since we make number the measure of quantity, and number is nothing else than a combination of units growing into multitude in a complex way (for the decad is a unit brought to that value by the composition of units, and again the hundred is a unit composed of decads, and in like manner the thousand is another unit, and so in due proportion the myriad is another by a multiplication, the one being made up to its value by thousands, the other by hundreds, by assigning all which to their underlying class we make signs of the quantity of the things numbered), accordingly, in order that we may be taught by Holy Scripture that nothing is unknown to God, it tells us that the multitude of the stars is numbered by Him, not that their numbering takes place as I have described, (for who is so simple as to think that God takes knowledge of things by odd and even, and that by putting units together He makes up the total of the collective quantity?) but, since in our own case the exact knowledge of quantity is obtained by number, in order, I say, that we might be taught in respect to God that all things are comprehended by the knowledge of His wisdom, and that nothing escapes His minute cognizance, on this account it represents God as numbering the stars, counselling us by these words to understand this, viz. that we must not imagine God to take note of things by the measure of human knowledge, but that all things, however incomprehensible and above human understanding, are embraced by the knowledge of the wisdom of God. For as the stars on account of their multitude escape numbering, as far as our human conception is concerned, Holy Scripture, teaching the whole from the part, in saying that they are numbered by God attests that not one of the things unknown to us escapes the knowledge of God. And therefore it says, Who tells the multitude of the stars, of course not meaning that He did not know their number beforehand; for how should He be ignorant of what He Himself created, seeing that the Ruler of the Universe could not be ignorant of that which is comprehended in His power; which includes the worlds in its embrace? Why, then, should He number what He knows? For to measure quantity by number is the part of those who want information. But He Who knew all things before they were created needs not number as His informant. But when David says that He numbers the stars, it is evident that the Scripture descends to such language in accordance with our understanding, to teach us emblematically that the things which we know not are accurately known to God. As, then, He is said to number, though needing no arithmetical process to arrive at the knowledge of things created, so also the Prophet tells us that He calls them all by their names, not meaning, I imagine, that He does so by any vocal utterance. For verily such language would result in a conception strangely unworthy of God, if it meant that these names in common use among ourselves were applied to the stars by God. For, should any one allow that these were so applied by God, it must follow that the names of the idol gods of Greece were applied by Him also to the stars, and we must regard as true all the tales from mythological history that are told about those starry names, as though God Himself sanctioned their utterance. Thus the distribution among the Greek idols of the seven planets contained in the heavens will exempt from blame those who have erred in respect to them, if men be persuaded that such an arrangement was God's. Thus the fables of Orion and the Scorpion will be believed, and the legends respecting the ship Argo, and the Swan, and the Eagle, and the Dog, and the mythical story of Ariadne's crown. Moreover it will pave the way for supposing God to be the inventor of the names in the zodiacal circle, devised after some fancied resemblance in the constellations, if Eunomius is right in supposing that David said that these names were given them by God.

Since it would be absurd to regard God as the inventor of such names—otherwise even the names of these idol gods would seem to have originated from God—we should not accept what has been said without investigation, but should understand its meaning by comparing it to those things that number teaches us. Now, since it confirms the accuracy of our knowledge when we call someone we know by their name, we are taught here that He Who encompasses the Universe in His knowledge not only comprehends the total sum of everything, but also has exact knowledge of each individual unit that makes up that total. Therefore Scripture says not only that He counts the number of the stars, but that He calls them all by their names, which means that His precise knowledge extends to the smallest of them, and that He knows each one specifically, just as a person knows someone familiar to them by name. If anyone claims that the names God gave to the stars are different ones, unknown to human language, he strays far from the truth. For if there were other names for stars, Holy Scripture would not have mentioned those commonly used among the Greeks—Isaiah saying, "Who makes the Pleiades, and Hesperus, and Arcturus, and the Chambers of the South," and Job mentioning Orion and Aseroth. From this it is clear that Holy Scripture uses words that are in common use for our instruction. Thus we hear in Job of Amalthea's horn, and in Isaiah of the Sirens—the former naming abundance according to Greek mythology, the latter representing the pleasure derived from hearing through the figure of the Sirens. So then, just as in these cases the inspired word has used names drawn from mythological stories for the benefit of the hearers, here too it freely uses the names given to the stars by human imagination, teaching us that all things whatsoever that are named among people have their origin from God—the things themselves, not their names. For it does not say "Who names," but "Who makes Pleiad, and Hesperus, and Arcturus." I think, then, it has been sufficiently demonstrated in what I have said that David supports our position, teaching us by this statement not that God gives the stars their names, but that He has exact knowledge of them, in the way that people have the most certain knowledge of those whom they can, through long familiarity, call by their names.

Since, then, it is monstrous to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin from God, it will be well not to receive what has been said without inquiry, but to get to the meaning in this case also after the analogy of those things of which number informs us. Well, since it attests the accuracy of our knowledge, when we call one familiar to us by his name, we are here taught that He Who embraces the Universe in His knowledge not only comprehends the total of the aggregate quantity, but has an exact knowledge of the units also that compose it. And therefore the Scripture says not only that He tells the number of the stars, but that He calls them all by their names, which means that His accurate knowledge extends to the minutest of them, and that He knows each particular respecting them, just as a man knows one who is familiar to him by name. And if any one say that the names given to the stars by God are different ones, unknown to human language, he wanders far away from the truth. For if there were other names of stars, Holy Scripture would not have made mention of those which are in common use among the Greeks, Esaias saying, Which makes the Pleiads, and Hesperus, and Arcturus, and the Chambers of the South, and Job making mention of Orion and Aseroth; so that from this it is clear that Holy Scripture employs for our instruction such words as are in common use. Thus we hear in Job of Amalthea's horn, and in Esaias of the Sirens, the former thus naming plenty after the conceit of the Greeks, the latter representing the pleasure derived from hearing, by the figure of the Sirens. As, then, in these cases the inspired word has made use of names drawn from mythological fables, with a view to the advantage of the hearers, so here it freely makes use of the appellations given to the stars by human fancy, teaching us that all things whatsoever that are named among men have their origin from God — the things, not their names. For it does not say Who names, but Who makes Pleiad, and Hesperus, and Arcturus. I think, then, it has been sufficiently shown in what I have said that David supports our opinion, in teaching us by this utterance, not that God gives the stars their names, but that He has an exact knowledge of them, after the fashion of men, who have the most certain knowledge of those whom they are able, through long familiarity, to call by their names.

And if we present the interpretation that most commentators give to these words of the Psalmist, Eunomius' interpretation of them will be shown to be even more foolish. For those who have most carefully examined the meaning of the inspired Scripture declare that not all the works of creation are worthy of being counted by God. For in the Gospel accounts of feeding the crowds in the wilderness, women and children are not considered worthy of being counted. And in the account of the Exodus of the children of Israel, only those are counted in the register who were old enough to bear arms against their enemies and to perform brave deeds. For not all names of things are suitable to be spoken by the Divine lips, but the counting is only for what is pure and heavenly, which, by the excellence of its condition remaining pure from all mixture with darkness, is called a star, and the naming is only for what, for the same reason, is worthy to be recorded in the Divine records. For concerning His adversaries He says, I will not take up their names into my lips.

And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of foolishness. For those who have most carefully searched out the sense of the inspired Scripture, declare that not all the works of creation are worthy of the Divine reckoning. For in the Gospel narratives of feeding the multitudes in the wilderness, women and children are not thought worthy of enumeration. And in the account of the Exodus of the children of Israel, those only are enumerated in the roll who were of age to bear arms against their enemies, and to do deeds of valour. For not all names of things are fit to be pronounced by the Divine lips, but the enumeration is only for that which is pure and heavenly, which, by the loftiness of its state remaining pure from all admixture with darkness, is called a star, and the naming is only for that which, for the same reason, is worthy to be registered in the Divine tablets. For of His adversaries He says, I will not take up their names into my lips.

But we may clearly learn from the prophecy of Isaiah what names the Lord gives to such stars, where it says, "I have called you by your name; you are Mine" (Isaiah 43:1). So if a person makes himself God's possession, his action becomes his name. But let the reader decide about this. However, Eunomius adds to his earlier statement that the beginnings of creation testify to the fact that names were given by God to the things He created. But I think it would be unnecessary to repeat what I have already set out sufficiently as the result of my research. He may put his own arbitrary interpretation on the word "Adam," which the Apostle tells us points prophetically to Christ. For no one can be so deluded, when Paul has revealed the hidden mysteries to us through the power of the Spirit, as to consider Eunomius a more trustworthy interpreter of divine things—a man who openly attacks the words of inspired testimony and who through his false interpretation of the word tries to prove that the various kinds of animals were not named by Adam. We should also pass over his insulting expressions, tasteless vulgarity, and foul and disgusting language, with its usual fluency going on about our Master as a sower of tares, about a deceptive show of grain, the blight of Valentinus, and his grain piled in our Master's mind. And we will cover in silence the rest of his offensive talk as we cover decaying corpses in the ground, so that the stench may not prove harmful to many. Rather, let us proceed to what remains for us to say. For once again he brings forward a statement of our Master to this effect: We call God indestructible and ungenerate, applying these words from different points of view. For when we look to the ages that are past, finding the life of God transcending all limitation, we call Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, Him who is infinite, unlimited, and without end, we call indestructible. As, then, that which has no end of life is indestructible, so that which has no beginning we call ungenerate, representing things this way by the faculty of conception.

But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, I have called you by your name; you are Mine Isaiah 43:1. So that if a man makes himself God's possession, his act becomes his name. But be this as the reader pleases. Eunomius, however, adds to his previous statement that the beginnings of creation testify to the fact, that names were given by God to the things which He created; but I think that it would be superfluous to repeat what I have already sufficiently set forth as the result of my investigations; and he may put his own arbitrary interpretation on the word Adam, which, the Apostle tells us, points prophetically to Christ. For no one can be so infatuated, when Paul, by the power of the Spirit, has revealed to us the hidden mysteries, as to count Eunomius a more trustworthy interpreter of Divine things — a man who openly impugns the words of the inspired testimony, and who by his false interpretation of the word would fain prove that the various kinds of animals were not named by Adam. We shall do well, also, to pass over his insolent expressions, and tasteless vulgarity, and foul and disgusting tongue, with its accustomed fluency going on about our Master as a sower of tares, and about a deceptive show of grain, and the blight of Valentinus, and his grain piled in our Master's mind: and we will veil in silence the rest of his unsavoury talk as we veil putrefying corpses in the ground, that the stench may not prove injurious to many. Rather let us proceed to what remains for us to say. For once more he adduces a dictum of our Master, to this effect. We call God indestructible and ungenerate, applying these words from different points of view. For when we look to the ages that are past, finding the life of God transcending all limitation, we call Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, Him Who is infinite, illimitable, and without end, we call indestructible. As, then, that which has no end of life is indestructible, so that which has no beginning we call ungenerate, representing things so by the faculty of conception.

I will skip over the insults Eunomius has placed at the beginning of his discussion of these matters—things like "alteration of seed," "teacher of sowing," "illogical censure," and whatever other slurs he dares to utter with his foul tongue. Let us instead turn to the point he is trying to establish through his slanderous accusation. He promises to prove that we are saying God is not indestructible by His physis. But we only consider those things foreign to His physis that can be added to or taken away from it. However, in the case of things without which the subject cannot be conceived by the mind, how can anyone be accused of separating His physis from itself? If the indestructibility we attribute to God were something added on from outside and did not always belong to Him, or might cease to belong to Him, then his slanderous attack might be justified. But if it is always the same, and our argument is that God is always what He is, and that He receives nothing by way of increase or addition of properties but continues always in whatever is conceived and called good, why should we be slanderously accused of not attributing indestructibility to Him as part of His essential physis? But he pretends to base his accusation on Basil's words which I have already quoted, as though we granted indestructibility to God by reference to the ages. Now if this statement came from us ourselves, our defense might perhaps seem suspect, as if we now wanted to correct or justify any questionable expressions of ours. But since our statements are taken from the lips of an opponent, what stronger proof could we have of their truth than the testimony of our opponents themselves? How does the statement stand, then, which Eunomius seizes upon to prejudice us? When, he says, we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, we speak of the infinite, illimitable, and unending as indestructible. Does Eunomius consider such attribution the same as granting? Yet who is so unfamiliar with common usage that he does not know the proper meaning of these expressions? For a person grants something when he possesses what another does not have, while a person attributes something when he designates with a name what another already has. How is it, then, that our teacher of truth is not ashamed of his obviously slanderous accusation? But just as those who are deprived of sight through some disease behave inappropriately before the eyes of those who can see, supposing that what they themselves cannot see is also unobserved by those whose sight is unimpaired, such is the case with our sharp-sighted and quick-witted opponent, who assumes his hearers are afflicted with the same blindness to the truth as himself. And who is so foolish as not to compare the words he slanderously attacks with his accusation itself, and by reading them side by side to detect the malice of the writer? Our statement attributes indestructibility; he accuses it of granting indestructibility. What does this have to do with our statement? Every person has a right to be judged by his own deeds, not to be blamed for those of others; and in this present case, while he accuses us and directs his bitterness at us, in truth he is condemning no one but himself. For if it is wrong to grant indestructibility to God, and no one does this except himself, is not our slanderer his own accuser, attacking his own statements and not ours? And regarding the term indestructibility, we assert that just as the life that is endless is rightly called indestructible, so that which is without beginning is rightly called ungenerate. And yet Eunomius says we lend Him primacy over all created things simply by reference to the ages.

I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as alteration of seed, and teacher of sowing, and illogical censure, and whatever other aspersions he ventures on with his foul tongue. Let us rather turn to the point which he tries to establish by his calumnious accusation. He promises to convict us of saying that God is not by His nature indestructible. But we hold only such things foreign to His nature as may be added to or subtracted from it. But, in the case of things without which the subject is incapable of being conceived by the mind, how can any one be open to the charge of separating His nature from itself? If, then, the indestructibility which we ascribe to God were adventitious, and did not always belong to Him, or might cease to belong to Him, he might be justified in his calumnious attack. But if it is always the same, and our contention is, that God is always what He is, and that He receives nothing by way of increase or addition of properties, but continues always in whatsoever is conceived and called good, why should we be slanderously accused of not ascribing indestructibility to Him as of His essential nature? But he pretends that he grounds his accusation on the words of Basil which I have already quoted, as though we bestowed indestructibility on God by reference to the ages. Now if our statement were put forward by ourselves, our defense might perhaps seem open to suspicion, as if we now wanted to amend or justify any questionable expressions of ours. But since our statements are taken from the lips of an adversary, what stronger demonstration could we have of their truth than the evidence of our opponents themselves? How is it, then, with the statement which Eunomius lays hold of with a view to our prejudice? When, he says, we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to be, we speak of the infinite, and illimitable, and unending, as indestructible. Does Eunomius count such ascription as identical with bestowing? Yet who is such a stranger to existing usage as to be ignorant of the proper meaning of these expressions? For that man bestows who possesses something which another has not, while that man ascribes who designates with a name what another has. How is it, then, that our instructor in truth is not ashamed of his plainly calumnious impeachment? But as those who, from some disease, are bereft of sight, are unseemly in their behaviour before the eyes of the seeing, supposing that what is not seen by themselves is a thing unobserved also by those whose sight is unimpaired, just such is the case of our sharp-sighted and quick-witted opponent, who supposes his hearers to be afflicted with the same blindness to the truth as himself. And who is so foolish as not to compare the words which he calumniously assails with his charge itself, and by reading them side by side to detect the malice of the writer? Our statement ascribes indestructibility; he charges it with bestowing indestructibility. What has this to do with our statement? Every man has a right to be judged by his own deeds, not to be blamed for those of others; and in this present case, while he accuses us, and points his bitterness at us, in truth he is condemning no one but himself. For if it is reprehensible to bestow indestructibility on God, and this is done by no one but himself, is not our slanderer his own accuser, assailing his own statements and not ours? And with regard to the term indestructibility, we assert that as the life which is endless is rightly called indestructible, so that which is without beginning is rightly called ungenerate. And yet Eunomius says that we lend Him the primacy over all created things simply by reference to the ages.

I will pass over in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to the same level as all created things and, in short, allowing the Son of God no higher honor than theirs. Still, for the sake of my more intelligent listeners, I will here give an example of his senseless malice. He says that Basil grants God the primacy over all things by reference to the ages. What unintelligible nonsense this is! Man is made God's patron and gives to God a primacy that depends on the ages! What is this empty flourish of baseless expressions, when our teacher simply says that whatever in the Divine essence transcends the measurable distances of the ages in either direction is called by certain distinctive names, in the case of Him who, as the Apostle says, has neither beginning of days nor end of life, so that the distinction of the conception might be marked by distinction in the names. And yet on this account Eunomius has the audacity to write that to call that which is anterior to all beginning ungenerate, and again that which is circumscribed by no limit immortal and indestructible, is a bestowing or lending on our part, and other nonsense of the kind. Moreover, he says that we divide the ages into two parts, as if he had not read the words he quoted, or as if he were addressing those who had forgotten his own previous statements. For what does our teacher say? If we look at the time before the Creation, and if passing in thought through the ages we reflect on the infinitude of the Eternal Life, we signify the thought by the term ungenerate. And if we turn our thoughts to what follows and consider the being of God as extending beyond all ages, we interpret the thought by the word endless or indestructible. Well, how does such an account cut the ages in two, if by such available words and names we signify that eternity of God which is equally observable from every point of view, in all things the same, unbroken in continuity? For seeing that human life, moving from stage to stage, advances in its progress from a beginning to an end, and our life here is divided between that which is past and that which is expected, so that the one is the subject of hope, the other of memory, on this account, as in relation to ourselves we grasp a past and a future in this measurable extent, so also we apply the thought, though incorrectly, to the transcendent nature of God—not of course that God in His own existence leaves any interval behind or passes on afresh to something that lies before, but because our intellect can only conceive things according to our nature and measures the eternal by a past and a future, where neither the past blocks the mind's movement toward the limitless and infinite, nor the future tells us of any pause or limit of His endless life. If, then, it is in this way that we think and speak, why does he keep accusing us of dividing the ages? Unless, indeed, Eunomius would maintain that Holy Scripture does so too, signifying as it does by the same idea the infinity of the Divine existence—David, for example, making mention of the kingdom from everlasting, and Moses speaking of the kingdom of God as extending beyond all ages, so that we are taught by both that every duration conceivable is surrounded by the Divine nature, bounded on all sides by the infinity of Him who holds the universe in His embrace. For Moses, looking to the future, says that He reigns from generation to generation for evermore. And great David, turning his thought backward to the past, says, God is our King before the ages, and again, God, who was before the ages, shall hear us. But Eunomius, in his cleverness abandoning such guides as these, says that we talk of the life that is without beginning as one thing, and of that which is without end as quite another, and again of diversities of various ages, effecting by their own diversity a separation in our idea of God. But so that our controversy may not grow to a tedious length, we will add, without criticism or comment, the outcome of Eunomius' work on the subject, well fitted as it is by his effort displayed in the cause of error to make the truth yet more evident to the eyes of the discerning.

I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no higher honour than theirs. Still, for the sake of my more intelligent hearers, I will here give an instance of his insensate malice. Basil, he says, lends God the primacy over all things by reference to the ages. What unintelligible nonsense is this! Man is made God's patron, and gives to God a primacy owing to the ages! What is this vain flourish of baseless expressions, seeing that our Master simply says that whatever in the Divine essence transcends the measurable distances of the ages in either direction is called by certain distinctive names, in the case of Him Who, as says the Apostle, has neither beginning of days nor end of life Hebrews 7:3, in order that the distinction of the conception might be marked by distinction in the names. And yet on this account Eunomius has the effrontery to write, that to call that which is anterior to all beginning ungenerate, and again that which is circumscribed by no limit, immortal and indestructible, is a bestowing or lending on our part, and other nonsense of the kind. Moreover, he says that we divide the ages into two parts, as if he had not read the words he quoted, or as if he were addressing those who had forgotten his own previous statements. For what says our Master? If we look at the time before the Creation, and if passing in thought through the ages we reflect on the infinitude of the Eternal Life, we signify the thought by the term ungenerate. And if we turn our thoughts to what follows, and consider the being of God as extending beyond all ages, we interpret the thought by the word endless or indestructible. Well, how does such an account sever the ages in two, if by such possible words and names we signify that eternity of God which is equally observable from every point of view, in all things the same, unbroken in continuity? For seeing that human life, moving from stage to stage, advances in its progress from a beginning to an end, and our life here is divided between that which is past and that which is expected, so that the one is the subject of hope, the other of memory; on this account, as, in relation to ourselves, we apprehend a past and a future in this measurable extent, so also we apply the thought, though incorrectly, to the transcendent nature of God; not of course that God in His own existence leaves any interval behind, or passes on afresh to something that lies before, but because our intellect can only conceive things according to our nature, and measures the eternal by a past and a future, where neither the past precludes the march of thought to the illimitable and infinite, nor the future tells us of any pause or limit of His endless life. If, then, it is thus that we think and speak, why does he keep taunting us with dividing the ages? Unless, indeed, Eunomius would maintain that Holy Scripture does so too, signifying as it does by the same idea the infinity of the Divine existence; David, for example, making mention of the kingdom from everlasting, and Moses, speaking of the kingdom of God as extending beyond all ages, so that we are taught by both that every duration conceivable is environed by the Divine nature, bounded on all sides by the infinity of Him Who holds the universe in His embrace. For Moses, looking to the future, says that He reigns from generation to generation for evermore. And great David, turning his thought backward to the past, says, God is our King before the ages, and again, God, Who was before the ages, shall hear us. But Eunomius, in his cleverness taking leave of such guides as these, says that we talk of the life that is without beginning as one, and of that which is without end as quite another, and again, of diversities of sundry ages, effecting by their own diversity a separation in our idea of God. But that our controversy may not grow to a tedious length, we will add, without criticism or comment, the outcome of Eunomius' labours on the subject, well fitted as they are by his industry displayed in the cause of error to render the truth yet more evident to the eyes of the discerning.

As he continues his argument, he asks us what we mean by the ages. Yet we could more reasonably ask him the same question. After all, he's the one who claims to know the ousia of God, defining on his own authority what is beyond human approach and comprehension. So let him give us a detailed explanation of the nature of the ages, since he boasts about his knowledge of transcendent matters. And let him stop aggressively threatening us poor ignorant people with the double-edged danger of the dilemma in our answer, telling us that whether we hold this view or that view about the ages, the result must be absurd either way. For if, he says, you claim the ages are eternal, you will be Greeks and Valentinians and uneducated. And if you say they are generated, you will no longer be able to attribute ungeneracy to God. What a terribly unanswerable attack! If, Eunomius, something is held to be generated, we no longer hold the doctrine of divine ungeneracy! And please tell us what has happened to your subtle distinctions between generacy and ungeneracy, by which you tried to establish that the ousia of the Son is dissimilar from that of the Father? For it seems from what we're now being taught that the Father is not dissimilar in ousia when considered in relation to generacy, but that in fact, if we maintain His ungeneracy, we reduce Him to non-existence—since if we speak of the ages as generated, we are forced to abandon the Ungenerate. But let's examine the force of the argument by which he would compel us to accept this absurdity. When, he says, those things by comparison with which God is without beginning don't exist, He who is compared with them must also not exist. What a strong and overpowering grip this is! How tightly this wrestler has us by the waist in his inescapable hold! He says that God's ungeneracy is added to Him through comparison with the ages. By whom is it added? Who says that ungeneracy is added as something acquired through comparison with something else to Him who has no beginning? Neither such a word nor such a meaning will be found in any of our writings. Our words indeed justify themselves and contain nothing like what is alleged against us. And as for the meaning of what is said, who can be a more reliable interpreter than the one who said it? Don't we have the better right to say what we mean when we speak of God's life as extending beyond the ages? And what we say is what we have already said in our previous writings. But, he says, comparison with the ages being impossible, it is impossible that any addition should come to God from it—meaning of course that ungeneracy is an addition. Let him tell us by whom such an addition has been made. If by himself, he simply becomes ridiculous in charging us with his own foolishness. If by us, let him quote our words, and then we will admit the force of his accusation.

For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it is he who professes to know the essence of God, defining on his own authority what is unapproachable and incomprehensible by man. Let him, then, give us a scientific lecture on the nature of the ages, boasting as he does of his familiarity with transcendental things, and let him not so fiercely brandish over us, poor ignorant individuals, the double danger of the dilemma involved in our reply, telling us that, whether we hold this or that view of the ages, the result must be in either case an absurdity. For if (says he) you say that they are eternal, you will be Greeks, and Valentinians, and uninstructed: and if you say that they are generate, you will no longer be able to ascribe ungeneracy to God. What a terribly unanswerable attack! If, O Eunomius, something is held to be generate, we no longer hold the doctrine of the Divine ungeneracy! And pray what has become of your subtle distinctions between generacy and ungeneracy, by which you sought to establish the dissimilarity of the essence of the Son from that of the Father? For it seems from what we are now being taught that the Father is not dissimilar in essence when contemplated in respect of generacy, but that, in fact, if we hold His ungeneracy, we reduce Him to non- existence; since if we speak of the ages as generate, we are driven to relinquish the Ungenerate. But let us examine the force of the argument, by which he would compel us to allow this absurdity. When, says he, those things by comparison with which God is without beginning are non-existent, He Who is compared with them must be non-existent also. What a sturdy and overpowering grip is this! How tightly has this wrestler got us by the waist in his inextricable grasp! He says that God's ungeneracy is added to Him through comparison with the ages. By whom is it so added? Who is there that says that to Him Who has no beginning ungeneracy is added as an acquisition through comparison with something else? Neither such a word nor such a sense will be found in any writings of ours. Our words indeed carry their own justification, and contain nothing like what is alleged against us; and of the meaning of what is said, who can be a more trustworthy interpreter than he who said it? Have not we, then, the better title to say what we mean when we speak of the life of God as extending beyond the ages? And what we say is what we have said already in our previous writings. But, says he, comparison with the ages being impossible, it is impossible that any addition should accrue from it to God, meaning of course that ungeneracy is an addition. Let him tell us by whom such an addition has been made. If by himself, he becomes simply ridiculous in laying his own folly to our charge: if by us, let him quote our words, and then we will admit the force of his accusation.

But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is just the trivial play of children who amuse themselves by starting to build houses in sand. Having composed part of a paragraph without bringing it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is exactly what we say: that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no way bounded by any limit to its infinity. So far our opponent devotes his labors and efforts to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is not limited on any side, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, he leaves the subject of life and, grouping all the ideas we have about the Divine life under one heading, he unifies everything. If, he says, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds supporting arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable addition on our friend's part. It would seem, then, that we may use the same language regarding righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of ungeneracy. If asked to define justice, be ready with the incorporeal as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God's attributes be interchangeable terms, there being no special meaning to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius prescribes this, why do the Scriptures pointlessly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so insane as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its ousia, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and cannot be viewed in any form of complex composition, the human mind, groveling on earth and buried in this earthly life, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways, and never pursues the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasp of Him would indeed be easy if there were one single assigned path before us to the knowledge of God. But as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe; from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence. Again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable purity regarding this. When we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of evils, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind. Not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it is in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other as opposites, as if, when one exists there, the other could not coexist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject). But the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between incorporeal and just, even though the words do not coincide in meaning? And what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of the unending and the unbeginning, is not cut in two by this difference of name. Nor is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.

But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having composed a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his labours and exertions to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages, or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all the ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies everything. If, says he, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one, unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable addition on the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same language in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let, then, no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of ungeneracy; if to define justice, be ready with the incorporeal as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God's attributes be convertible terms, there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between incorporeal and just, even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of the unending and the unbeginning, is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.

Such is our position. Our adversary's view, regarding the precise meaning of this term, cannot be supported by any sound reasoning. He only randomly spits out these strangely meaningless and bombastic expressions in the framework of his sentences and periods. But the conclusion of everything he says is this: that there is no difference in meaning between the most varied names. But we must certainly, it seems to me, quote this passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be falsely accusing him of something that does not belong to him. True expressions, he says, derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same. And so one or the other of these two things must necessarily be held: either that the reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different. With these and many other similar words, he proceeds to accomplish the goal he has before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and affinities, such as species, proportion, part, time, and manner—in order that by the removal of all these, Ungeneracy may become indicative of the ousia of God. His process of proof is as follows (I will express his idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from the ousia; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the ousia. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would disagree with this. But how does he arrive at his intended conclusion, when he says, when we mean the unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to mean the ousia? The ungenerate, then, according to him is expressive of the very ousia of God. We, on the other hand, while we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the meaning of unbeginning, think that the belief that the idea expressed by the words "not generated" is the ousia of God is a madman's only. Who indeed can be so out of his mind as to declare the absence of any generation to be the definition of that ousia (for just as generation is involved in the generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)? Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we allow the indication of that which is absent to be His ousia? Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God's Ungeneracy is expressive of God's life. But to make his delusion on this subject quite plain, let us look at it in the following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the definition of the ousia to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the ousia of the Son to ungeneracy.

Such is our position; our adversary's, with regard to the precise meaning of this term, is such as can derive no help from any reasonings; he only spits forth at random about it these strangely unmeaning and bombastic expressions, in the framework of his sentences and periods. But the upshot of all he says is this; that there is no difference in the meaning of the most varied names. But we must most certainly, as it seems to me, quote this passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be calumniously charging him with something that does not belong to him. True expressions, he says, derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same: and so one or other of these two things must of necessity be held: either that the reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different. With these and many other such-like words, he proceeds to effect the object he has before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and affinities, such as species, proportion, part, time, manner: in order that by the withdrawal of all these Ungeneracy may become indicative of the substance of God. His process of proof is in the following manner (I will express his idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from the substance; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the substance. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would gainsay this. But how does he arrive at his contemplated conclusion, when he says, when we mean the unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to mean the substance? The ungenerate, then, according to him is expressive of the very substance of God. We, on the other hand, while we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the meaning of unbeginning, think that the belief that the idea expressed by the words not generated is the substance of God is a madman's only. Who indeed can be so beside himself as to declare the absence of any generation to be the definition of that substance (for as generation is involved in the generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)? Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we allow the indication of that which is absent to be His substance? Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God's Ungeneracy is expressive of God's life. But to make quite plain his delusion upon this subject, let us look at it in the following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the definition of the substance to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the substance of the Son to ungeneracy.

He says: The Life that is the same and completely single must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though it may seem to vary in mere names, manner, and order. For true expressions get their precision from the underlying realities they indicate. Different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same. So one of these two things must necessarily be true: either the reality indicated is quite different (if the expressions are different), or else the indicating expressions are not different. And in this case there is no other underlying reality besides the life of the Son for one either to base an idea on or to apply a different expression to. Is there, I may ask, anything wrong with these quoted words that would prevent them from being rightly spoken or written about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a Life that is completely single? Is there not for Him also one and the same fitting expression, though He may seem to vary in mere names, manner, and order? Must not one of these two things also be held fixed for Him: either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different, since there is no other underlying reality besides His life for one either to base an idea on or to apply a different expression to? We are not mixing up anything here with what Eunomius has said about the Father. We have simply moved from the same accepted premise to the same conclusion as he did, merely inserting the Son's name instead. If, then, the Son too is a single life, unmixed, removed from every sort of compositeness or complexity, and there is no underlying reality besides this life of the Son (for how can the mixture of anything foreign be suspected in that which is simple? What we must think of along with something else is no longer simple), and if the Father's ousia is also a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of its very life and its very singleness, there are no differences, no increase or decrease in quantity or quality creating any variation, then it must be that things that coincide in concept this way should be called by the same name as well. If, that is, the thing detected in both the Father and the Son—I mean the singleness of life—is one, and the very idea of singleness excludes any variation, as we have said, then it must be that the name fitting the one should be attached to the other as well. For just as that which reasons, is mortal, and is capable of thought and knowledge is called man equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is not changed either by the fact that Abel came into existence by generation or by the fact that Adam did so without generation, so if the simplicity and incompositeness of the Father's life has ungeneracy for its name, then in the same way for the Son's life the same idea will necessarily have to be attached to the same utterance, if, as Eunomius says, one of these two things must necessarily be true: either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different.

He says, The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manner, and order it may seem to vary. For true expressions derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same; and so one or other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the reality indicated is quite different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different; and there is in this case no other subject reality besides the life of the Son, for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon. Is there, I may ask, any unfitness in the words quoted, which would prevent them being rightly spoken or written about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a Life thoroughly single? Is there not for Him also one and the same befitting expression, though in mere names, and manner, and order He may seem to vary? Must not, for Him also, one or other of these two things be held fixed, either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different, there being no other subject reality, besides his life, for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon? We mix up nothing here with what Eunomius has said about the Father; we have only passed from the same accepted premise to the same conclusion as he did, merely inserting the Son's name instead. If, then, the Son too is a single life, unadulterated, removed from every sort of compositeness or complication, and there is no subject reality besides this life of the Son (for how in that which is simple can the mixture of anything foreign be suspected? What we have to think of along with something else is no longer simple), and if the Father's substance also is a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of its very life and its very singleness, there are no differences, no increase or decrease in quantity or quality in it creating any variation, it needs must be that things thus coinciding in idea should be called by the same appellation also. If, that is, the thing that is detected both in the Father and the Son, I mean the singleness of life, is one, the very idea of singleness excluding, as we have said, any variation, it needs must be that the name befitting the one should be attached to the other also. For as that which reasons, and is mortal, and is capable of thought and knowledge, is called man equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is not altered either by the fact that Abel passed into existence by generation, or by the fact that Adam did so without generation, so, if the simplicity and incompositeness of the Father's life has ungeneracy for its name, in like manner for the Son's life the same idea will necessarily have to be attached to the same utterance, if, as Eunomius says, one or other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different.

But why do we waste time on these foolish arguments when we should instead put Eunomius' book directly into the hands of serious students? That way, apart from any detailed examination, we could immediately prove to discerning readers not only the blasphemy of his opinion but also the weakness of his writing style. In various ways, not following our understanding of it but pursuing his own imagination, he misinterprets the word "Conception." Just as in a night battle no one can distinguish friend from foe, he does not realize that he is stabbing his own doctrine with the very weapons he thinks he is using against us. For the point where he thinks he most differs from the orthodox church is this: he attempts to prove that God became Father at some later time, and that the title of Fatherhood came later than all the other names that belong to Him. He claims God was called Father from the moment He purposed in Himself to become, and did become, Father. Well then, since in this treatise he is trying to prove that all the names applied to the Divine Nature coincide with each other and that there is no difference whatever between them, and since one of these applied names is Father (for just as God is indestructible and eternal, so also He is Father), we must either accept his opinion about this term as well, which would contradict his earlier position, since the idea of Fatherhood would then be involved in any of these other terms (for it is clear that if the meaning of "indestructible" and "Father" is exactly the same, He will be believed to be, just as He is always indestructible, likewise always Father, there being one single meaning, he says, in all these names); or else, if he fears thus acknowledging the eternal Fatherhood of God, he must necessarily abandon his whole argument and admit that each of these names has a meaning unique to itself. And so all this nonsense of his about the Divine names bursts like a bubble and vanishes like smoke.

But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius' book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any examination of it, to prove at once to the discerning, not only the blasphemy of his opinion, but also the nervelessness of his style? While in various ways, not going upon our apprehension of it, but following his own fancy, he misinterprets the word Conception, just as in a night-battle nobody can distinguish friend and foe, he does not understand that he is stabbing his own doctrine with the very weapons he thinks he is turning upon us. For the point in which he thinks he is most removed from the church of the orthodox is this; that he attempts to prove that God became Father at some later time, and that the appellation of Fatherhood is later than all those other names which attach to Him; for that He was called Father from that moment in which He purposed in Himself to become, and did become, Father. Well, then, since in this treatise he is for proving that all the names applied to the Divine Nature coincide with each other, and that there is no difference whatever between them, and since one among these applied names is Father (for as God is indestructible and eternal, so also He is Father), we must either sanction, in the case of this term also, the opinion he holds about the rest, and so contravene his former position, seeing that the idea of Fatherhood is found to be involved in any of these other terms (for it is plain that if the meaning of indestructible and Father is exactly the same, He will be believed to be, just as He is always indestructible, so likewise always Father, there being one single signification, he says, in all these names): or else, if he fears thus to testify to the eternal Fatherhood of God, he must perforce abandon his whole argument, and own that each of these names has a meaning peculiar to itself; and thus all this nonsense of his about the Divine names bursts like a bubble, and vanishes like smoke.

But if he should still insist in response to this opposition of divine names that only the term Father and the term Creator are applied to God to express production, both words being so applied because of an operation (as he says), then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject by conceding what would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (since both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, because if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite permissible to interchange the names and turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father would be devoid of any meaning of essential relation. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is thereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who think about it. For just as it is absurd to consider a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns both these terms to Him, according to Eunomius. But let us return to the question before us. He attacks our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that we thereby destroy the proof of His simplicity, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His ousia. Here I write in my own language, trimming down his wearisome wordiness; and to his foolish and weak redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except regarding his charge that we are senseless. Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt about its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation on it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, dwell on that to which everyone assents, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so lacking in reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking about Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fullness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has also made discoveries in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences connected with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar has nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is entirely possible for the idea of each of these sciences to be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not damaged regarding its simplicity, how can anyone imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other divine names, must—unless all these names are made to mean one thing—become composed of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His physis?

But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are applied to God as expressing production, both words being so applied, as he says, because of an operation, then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject, by thus conceding what it would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (for both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, since if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite allowable to interchange the names, and to turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son, and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father is to be devoid of any meaning of essential relation. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is hereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who reflect. For as it is absurd to deem a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns, according to Eunomius, both these terms to Him. But let us hold to the question before us. He abuses our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that the proof of His simplicity is destroyed by us so, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His essence. Here I write in my own language, curtailing his wearisome prolixity; and in answer to his foolish and nerveless redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except as regards his charging us with senselessness. Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt as to its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation upon it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, linger on that to which all assent, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so devoid of reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking of Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fullness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has made discoveries also in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar means nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is within the bounds of possibility that the idea of each of these sciences should be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity, how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to mean one thing, become of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His nature?

But let us examine a still more aggressive charge he makes against us. It is this: If one must say something even harsher, he does not even keep the Divine substance pure and unmixed from inferior and contradictory elements. This is the charge, but what is the proof of it? Observe the forceful rhetorical attack! If He is imperishable only because His Life is unending, and ungenerate only because it is unbeginning, then in whatever respect He is not imperishable He is perishable, and in whatever respect He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats: He will then be, as unbeginning, both ungenerate and perishable at the same time, and, as unending, both imperishable and generated at the same time. Such is his harsher statement, which, according to his threat, he has launched against us to prove that we say the Divine ousia is mixed with contradictory and even inferior elements. However, I think it is clear to all who preserve within themselves the uncorrupted power of judging the truth that our Master has given this slanderer no basis at all in what he has said, but that Eunomius has twisted it as he pleased and then, playing at arguing, has drawn out this childish sophistry. But to make it even clearer to all my readers, I will repeat that statement of the Master word for word and then set Eunomius' words alongside it. We call the universal Deity (he says) imperishable and ungenerate, using these words with different applications of thought. For when we focus our view on the ages behind us, we find the life of the Deity transcending every limit, and so we name Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages to come, we call what is infinite in Him, the boundless, the absence of any end to His living, imperishability. So, just as this endlessness is called imperishable, so too this beginninglessness is called ungenerate, and we arrive at these names by conception. Such are the Master's words, and through them he teaches us this: that the Divine Life is essentially single and continuous with itself, starting from no beginning, circumscribed by no end, and that the intuitions we possess regarding this Life can be made clear through words. That is, we express the never having come from any cause by the term unbeginning or ungenerate, and we express the not being circumscribed by any limit and not being destroyed by any death by the term imperishable or unending. And he defines that this absence of cause makes it right for us to speak of the Divine life as existing ungenerately, and this being without end we are to denote as imperishable, since anything that has ceased to exist is necessarily in a state of annihilation, and when we hear of anything annihilated, we immediately think of the destruction of its ousia. He says, then, that One who never ceases to exist and is completely foreign to all destruction and dissolution is to be called imperishable.

But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us; it is this: If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even keep the Divine substance pure and unadulterated from inferior and contradictory elements. This is the charge, but the proof of it is — what? Observe the strong professional attack! If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats, He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated. Such is his harsher statement, which, according to his threat, he has discharged against us, to prove that we say that the Divine substance is mingled with contradictory and even inferior elements. However, I think it is plain to all who keep unimpaired within themselves the power of judging the truth, that our Master has given no handle at all, in what he has said, to this calumniator, but that the latter has garbled it at will, and then, playing at arguing, has drawn out this childish sophistry. But that it may be plainer still to all my readers, I will repeat that statement of the Master word for word, and then confront Eunomius' words with it. We call the Universal Deity (he says) imperishable and ungenerate, using these words with different applications of thought; for when we concentrate our view upon the ages behind us, we find the life of the Deity transcending every limit, and so name Him 'ungenerate'; but when we turn our thoughts upon the ages to come, we call the infinite in Him, the boundless, the absence of all end to His living, 'imperishability.' As, then, this endlessness is called imperishable, so too this beginninglessness is called ungenerate; and we arrive at these names by Conception. Such are the Master's words, and by them he teaches us this: that the Divine Life is essentially single and continuous with Itself, starting from no beginning, circumscribed by no end; and that the intuitions which we possess regarding this Life it is possible to make clear by words. That is, we express the never having come from any cause by the term unbeginning or ungenerate; and we express the not being circumscribed by any limit, and not being destroyed by any death, by the term imperishable, or unending; and this absence of cause, he defines, makes it right for us to speak of the Divine life as existing ungenerately; and this being without end we are to denote as imperishable, since anything that has ceased to exist is necessarily in a state of annihilation, and when we hear of anything annihilated, we at once think of the destruction of its substance. He says then, that One Who never ceases to exist, and is a stranger to all destruction and dissolution, is to be called imperishable.

What, then, does Eunomius say to this? If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherever He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherever He is not ungenerate He is generated. Who granted you this, Eunomius, that imperishability is not connected with the whole life of God? Who ever divided that Life into two parts and then gave specific names to each half of the Life, so that the division to which one name applied could not be said to fit the other? This is the result of your dialectical cleverness: to say that the Life which has no beginning is perishable, and that what is imperishable cannot be connected with what is unbeginning! It is just as if, when someone had said that man was rational, as well as capable of speculation and knowledge, attaching each phrase to the subject according to a different application and idea, someone else were to mock him and continue in the same vein, saying: If man is capable of speculation and knowledge, he cannot, in this respect, be rational, but wherever he is capable of such knowledge, he is this and this only, and his nature does not allow him to be the other. And conversely, if rational were made the definition of man, he would deny in this case that man is capable of speculation and knowledge, for wherever he is rational, he is proven devoid of mind. But if the ridiculousness and absurdity in this case is plain to anyone, neither in that former case is it at all uncertain. When you have read the passage from the Master, you will find that his childish sophistry will vanish like a shadow. In our case of the definition of man, the capability of knowledge is not prevented by the possession of reason, nor the reason by the capability of knowledge. No more is the eternity of the Divine Life deprived of imperishability if it be unbeginning, or of beginninglessness if we recognize its imperishability. This would-be seeker after truth, with the tricks of his dialectical cleverness, inserts into our argument what comes from his own stock, and so he fights with himself and overthrows himself, without ever touching anything of ours. For our position was nothing but this: that the Life as existing without beginning is called, by means of a fresh conception, ungenerate—is called, I say, not made such—and that we identify the Life as going on into infinity with the term imperishable—identify it, I say, as such, not make it such. And the result is that while it is a property of the Divine Life, inherent in the subject, to be infinite in both respects, the thoughts connected with that subject are expressed in this way or that only with regard to that particular term which indicates the thought expressed. One thought connected with that life is that it does not exist from any cause; this is indicated by the term ungenerate. Another thought about it is that it is limitless and endless; this is represented by the word imperishable. Thus, while the subject remains what it is, above everything, whether name or thought, the not being from any cause and the not changing into the non-existent are signified by means of the conception implied in the aforesaid words.

What, then, does Eunomius say to this? If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Who conceded to you this, Eunomius, that the imperishability is not to be associated with the whole life of God? Who ever divided that Life into two parts, and then put particular names to each half of the Life, so that to the division which the one name fitted the other could not be said to apply? This is the result of your dialectic sharpness; to say that the Life which has no beginning is perishable, and that what is imperishable cannot be associated with what is unbeginning! It is just as if, when one had said that man was rational, as well as capable of speculation and knowledge, attaching each phrase to the subject of them according to a different application and idea, some one was to jeer, and to go on in the same strain, If man is capable of speculation and knowledge, he cannot, as regards this, be rational, but wherein he is capable of such knowledge, he is this and this only, and his nature does not admit of his being the other; and reversely, if rational were made the definition of man, he were to deny in this case his being capable of this speculation and knowledge; for wherein he is rational, he is proved devoid of mind. But if the ridiculousness and absurdity in this case is plain to any one, neither in that former case is it at all doubtful. When you have read the passage from the Master, you will find that his childish sophistry will vanish like a shadow. In our case of the definition of man, the capability of knowledge is not hindered by the possession of reason, nor the reason by the capability of knowledge: no more is the eternity of the Divine Life deprived of imperishability, if it be unbeginning, or of beginninglessness, if we recognize its imperishability. This would-be seeker after truth, with the artifices of his dialectic shrewdness, inserts in our argument what comes from his own repertoire; and so he fights with himself and overthrows himself, without ever touching anything of ours. For our position was nothing but this; that the Life as existing without beginning is styled, by means of a fresh Conception, as ungenerate: is styled, I say, not, is made such; and that we mark the Life as going on into infinity with the appellation of imperishable; mark it, I say, as such, not, make it such; and that the result is, that while it is a property of the Divine Life, inherent in the subject, to be infinite in both views, the thoughts associated with that subject are expressed in this way or in that only as regards that particular term which indicates the thought expressed. One thought associated with that life is, that it does not exist from any cause; this is indicated by the term ungenerate. Another thought about it is, that it is limitless and endless; this is represented by the word imperishable. Thus, while the subject remains what it is, above everything, whether name or thought, the not being from any cause, and the not changing into the non-existent, are signified by means of the Conception implied in the aforesaid words.

What, then, out of everything we have said, has provoked him to this childish foolishness, in which he returns to the attack and repeats himself with these words: "He will, then, as unbeginning, be both ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, be both imperishable and generated"? It is obvious to anyone with even the slightest capacity for thought, without our needing to test this logically, how absurdly foolish this is—or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same argument he uses to establish this combination of the perishable and the unbeginning, he could ridicule any proper and worthy name conceived for the Deity. After all, these are not the only two ideas we associate with the Divine Life—I mean, being without beginning and not admitting dissolution. It is also called immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just, and there are countless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each of which is expressed by a distinct sound with its own particular meaning. Well, we can apply this method of unnatural combination that Eunomius has devised to any name—any name, I mean, that expresses some proper conception of the Deity. For example, immateriality and absence of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life, but not with the same thought in both cases. By the term "immaterial" we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term "without anger" we convey freedom from any emotion of anger. Now Eunomius will very likely breeze right through all this and perform his dance, just as before, on our words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: "If He is called immaterial with respect to being separated from all mixture with matter, then in this respect He will not be without anger; and if He is without anger by reason of not indulging in anger, it is impossible to attribute immateriality to Him, but logic will compel us to admit that, insofar as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful." And you will find the same thing applies to His other attributes. If you like, we will propose another pairing of the same kind: His immutability and His incorporeality. Since both these terms are used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case too Eunomius' skill will produce the same absurdity. For if His always being as He is is signified by the term "immutable," and if the term "incorporeal" represents the spirituality of His ousia (essence), Eunomius will certainly say the same thing here too: that the terms are irreconcilable and alien to each other, and that the notions our minds attach to them have no point of contact with one another. For insofar as God is always the same, He is immutable but not incorporeal; and with regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His ousia, while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable. The result is that when immutability is considered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It is corporeal; but if spirituality is what you are looking for, you prove that It is both incorporeal and mutable.

What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in these words: He will, then, be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated. It is plain to any possessing the least reflection, without our testing this logically, how absurdly foolish it is, or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same argument as that whereby he establishes this union of the perishable and the unbeginning, he can make sport of any proper and worthily conceived name for the Deity. For it is not these two ideas only that we associate with the Divine Life, I mean, the being without beginning, and the not admitting of dissolution; but It is called as well immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just; and there are numberless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each one of which is announced by an expressive sound with a peculiar meaning of its own. Well, to any name — any name, I mean, expressive of some proper conception of the Deity — it is open for us to apply this method of unnatural union devised by Eunomius. For instance, immateriality and absence of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life; but not with the same thought in both cases; for by the term immaterial we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term without anger the strangeness to any emotion of anger. Now in all probability Eunomius will run trippingly over all this, and have his dance, just as before, upon our words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: If wherein He is separated from all mixture with matter He is called immaterial, in this respect He will not be without anger; and if by reason of His not indulging in anger He is without anger, it is impossible to attribute to him immateriality, but logic will compel us to admit that, in so far as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful; and so you will find the same to be the case in respect to his other attributes. And if you like we will propound another pairing of the same, i.e. His immutability and His incorporeality. For both these terms being used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case also Eunomius' skill will embellish the same absurdity. For if His being always as He is is signified by the term immutable, and if the term incorporeal represents the spirituality of His essence, Eunomius will certainly say the same here also, that the terms are irreconcilable, and alien to each other, and that the notions which our minds attach to them have no point of contact one with the other; for insofar as God is always the same He is immutable, but not incorporeal; and in regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His essence, while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable; so that it happens that when immutability is considered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It is corporeal; but if spirituality is the object of search, you prove that It is at once incorporeal and mutable.

These are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. Why should we go through his entire argument with tedious length? In every case you can see an attempt to establish the same worthless point. For example, using logic like the above, truth and justice will be found to oppose each other, since there is a difference in meaning between truth and justice. By the same reasoning, Eunomius will say about these also that truth is not injustice, and that justice is absent from truth. The result will be that when we think of God being alien to injustice, the Divine Being will be shown to be both just and untrue, while if we regard His being alien to untruth, we prove Him to be both true and unjust. The same applies to His being invisible and formless. According to wise reasoning similar to what we have presented, it will not be permissible to say either that the invisible exists in what is formless, or to say that what is formless exists in what is invisible. Instead, he will include form in what is invisible, and conversely, he will prove that what is formless is visible, using the same language about these as he devised about what is imperishable and unbeginning. The effect is that when we regard the incomposite nature of the Divine Life, we confess that it is formless, yet not invisible; and when we reflect that we cannot see God with our bodily eyes, while thus admitting His invisibility, we cannot admit His being formless. Now if these examples seem ridiculous and foolish, every sensible person will condemn even more the absurdity of the statements from which his argument has logically brought him to such a level of absurdity. Yet he criticizes the Master's words as wrong for seeing what is imperishable in what is unending, and what is unending in what is imperishable. Well then, let us also have our fun in a manner somewhat like this cleverness of Eunomius. Let us examine his opinion about these two names mentioned, and see what it is.

Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in every instance you may see an attempt to establish the same futility. For instance, by an implication such as that above, what is true and what is just will be found opposed to each other; for there is a difference in meaning between truth and justice. So that by a parity of reasoning Eunomius will say about these also, that truth is not injustice, and that justice is absent from truth; and it will happen that, when in respect of God we think of His being alien to injustice, the Divine Being will be shown to be at once just and untrue, while if we regard His being alien to untruth, we prove Him to be at once true and unjust. So, too, of His being invisible and formless. For according to a wise reasoning similar to that which we have adduced, it will not be permissible to say either that the invisible exists in that which is formless, or to say that that which is formless exists in that which is invisible; but he will comprise form in that which is invisible, and so again, conversely, he will prove that that which is formless is visible, using the same language in respect of these as he devised in respect to that which is imperishable and unbeginning, to the effect that when we regard the incomposite nature of the Divine Life, we confess that it is formless, yet not invisible; and that when we reflect that we cannot see God with our bodily eyes, while thus admitting His invisibility, we cannot admit His being formless. Now if these instances seem ridiculous and foolish, much more will every sensible man condemn the absurdity of the statements, starting from which his argument has logically brought him to such a pitch of absurdity. Yet he carps at the Master's words, as wrong in seeing that which is imperishable in that which is unending, and that which is unending in that which is imperishable. Well, then, let us also have our sport, in a manner something like this cleverness of Eunomius. Let us examine his opinion about these two names aforesaid, and see what it is.

Eunomius says either "endless" means something different from "imperishable," or the two terms must mean the same thing. If he calls both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he says that "imperishable" means one thing and "unending" means another, then necessarily, when things differ from each other, the force of one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If the idea of "imperishable" is one thing and "endless" is another, and each of these is what the other is not, then he will not grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable. Instead, the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must ask my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a playful tone against our opponent's mockeries, so that we might break through the childish effort of his sophistries. If it would not be too tiresome for my readers, it would be appropriate to set forth again what Eunomius says in his own words. He says, "If God is imperishable only because of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only because of the unbeginning, then wherever He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherever He is not ungenerate He is generated." Then returning to the attack, he repeats: "He will then be, as unbeginning, both ungenerate and perishable, and as unending, both imperishable and generated." I pass over the unnecessary and irrelevant remarks he has inserted here, as they contribute nothing to proving his point. Now I think it is easy for anyone to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation he lays against us. For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate, the Master says, using these words with different applications. His transcending every limit of the ages and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent—this absence of limit or boundary on either side in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy. But Eunomius would make out that we say the being-without-beginning is His ousia, and again that the being-without-end is His ousia, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of ousia. In this way he establishes an absurdity, and while setting up and then fighting against positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own invention to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument at any single point. For the claim that God is imperishable only where His Life is unending is his statement, not ours. Likewise, the claim that the imperishable is not without beginning is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would make a negative attribute an ousia, whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an ousia. Now it is a negative attribute of God that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation. We express this by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his slanderous accusations. For in defining ungeneracy as an ousia, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For since "beginning" means one thing and "end" means another by virtue of an intervening extension, if anyone allows the privation of the first of these to be ousia, he must suppose His Life to be only half-subsisting in this being-without-beginning, and not to extend further by virtue of His nature to the being-without-end, if ungeneracy is regarded as itself His nature. But if anyone insists that both are ousia, then according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as ousia, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term. Thus Eunomius' argument will not be without force, since that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa. According to his account, each of the things mentioned is an ousia, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different from that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.

Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing, and that that of being unending is another, then of necessity, in the case of things differing from each other, the force of the one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of the imperishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable, but the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must beg my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the mockeries of our opponent, that we might thereby break through the puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too wearisome to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what Eunomius says in his own words. If, says he, God is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats, He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable: and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated; for I pass over the superfluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed here, as in no way contributing to the proving of his point. Now I think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he lays against us. For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate, says the Master, using these words with different applications. His transcending, he continues, every limit of the ages, and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either hand in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy. But Eunomius would make out that we say that the being without beginning is His essence, and again that the being without end is His essence, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he establishes an absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument in any single point. For that God is imperishable only wherein His Life is unending, is his statement, not ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning, is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a negative attribute an essence; whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a negative attribute of God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in defining ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means one thing, and end means another, by virtue of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the first of these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half subsisting in this being without beginning, and not to extend further, by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if ungeneracy be regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are essence, then, according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of Eunomius will not be without force, inasmuch as that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa, since according to his account each of the things mentioned is an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different to that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.

But so that he himself may come to recognize his own trivial argument, we will refute him from his own statements. For in the course of his argument he says that God, in that He is without end, is ungenerate, and that, in that He is ungenerate, He is without end, as if the meanings of the two terms were identical. If, then, because He is without end He is ungenerate, and being without end and ungenerate are convertible terms, and he admits that the Son also is without end, by the same reasoning he must necessarily admit that the Son is ungenerate, if (as he has said) His being without end and His being without beginning are identical in meaning. For just as in the ungenerate he sees that which is without beginning, so he allows that in that which is without end he also sees that which is without beginning. For otherwise he would not have made the terms completely convertible. But God, he says, is ungenerate by physis, and not by contrast with the ages. Well, who contends that God is not by physis all that He is said to be? For we do not say that God is just, and almighty, and Father, and imperishable by contrast with the ages, nor by His relation to any other thing that exists. But in connection with the subject itself, whatever He may be in His physis, we hold every idea that is a reverent idea, so that even if neither ages nor any other created thing had been made, God would be no less what we believe Him to be, having no need of the ages to constitute Him what He is. But, says Eunomius, He has a Life that is not external, nor composite, nor admitting of differences; for He Himself is Life eternal by virtue of that Life itself immortal, by virtue of that immortality imperishable. This we are taught concerning the Only-begotten as well, nor can anyone challenge this teaching without openly opposing the declaration of Saint John. For life was not brought in from outside to the Son either (for He says, I am the Life), nor is His Life either composite, nor does it admit difference, but by virtue of that life itself He is immortal (for in what else but in life can we see immortality?), and by virtue of that immortality He is imperishable. For that which is stronger than death must naturally be incapable of corruption.

But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his argument he says that God, in that He is without end, is ungenerate, and that, in that He is ungenerate, He is without end, as if the meanings of the two terms were identical. If, then, by reason of His being without end He is ungenerate, and the being without end and ungenerate are convertible terms, and he admits that the Son also is without end, by a parity of reasoning he must necessarily admit that the Son is ungenerate, if (as he has said) His being without end and His being without beginning are identical in meaning. For just as in the ungenerate he sees that which is without beginning, so he allows that in that which is without end also he sees that which is without beginning. For otherwise he would not have made the terms wholly convertible. But God, he says, is ungenerate by nature, and not by contrast with the ages. Well, who is there that contends that God is not by nature all that He is said to be? For we do not say that God is just, and almighty, and Father, and imperishable, by contrast with the ages, nor by His relation to any other thing that exists. But in connection with the subject itself, whatever He may be in His nature, we entertain every idea that is a reverent idea; so that supposing neither ages, nor any other created thing, had been made, God would no less be what we believe Him to be, being in no need of the ages to constitute Him what He is. But, says Eunomius, He has a Life that is not extraneous, nor composite, nor admitting of differences; for He Himself is Life eternal by virtue of that Life itself immortal, by virtue of that immortality imperishable. This we are taught respecting the Only-begotten as well; nor can any one impugn this teaching without openly opposing the declaration of S. John. For life was not brought in from without upon the Son either (for He says, I am the Life), nor is His Life either composite, nor does it admit difference, but by virtue of that life itself He is immortal (for in what else but in life can we see immortality?), and by virtue of that immortality He is imperishable. For that which is stronger than death must naturally be incapable of corruption.

Our argument agrees with him up to this point. But the riddle that comes with his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to interpret, for he seems to have drawn what he says from that system. "Being incorruptible without beginning, He is ungenerate without end, being so called absolutely, and independently of anything beside Himself." Now anyone who has purified ears and an enlightened understanding knows, even without me saying it, that beyond the jingle of words produced by their extraordinary combination, there is no trace of sense in what he says. And if any shadow of an idea could be found in such a noise of words, it would prove to be either profane or ridiculous. For what do you mean when you say that He is without beginning as being without end, and without end as being without beginning? Do you think beginning is identical with end, and that the two words are used in the same sense, just as the names Simon and Peter represent one and the same subject? And on this account, in accordance with your thinking that beginning and end are the same, did you combine under one meaning these two words which denote the absence of each other—end, I mean, and beginning—and take "being without end" as interchangeable with "being without beginning," and blend and confuse one word with the other? Is this the meaning of such a mixing up of words, when you say that He is ungenerate as being without end, and that He is without end as being ungenerate? Yet how is it that you did not see the profanity as well as the ridiculous folly of your words? For if by this novel confusion of the words they are made interchangeable, so that ungenerate means ungenerate without end, and that which is without end is such ungenerately, it follows by necessity that that which is without end must be so as being ungenerate. And thus it comes to pass, my good friend, that your much-talked-of ungeneracy, which you say is the only characteristic of the Father's ousia, will be found to be shared with whatever is immortal, and to be making all things consubstantial with the Father, because it appears alike in all things whose life, by reason of their immortality, goes on to infinity—archangels, that is, angels, human souls, and perhaps also the Apostate host, the Devil and his demons. For if that which is without end and imperishable must also by your argument be ungenerately imperishable, then in whatever is without end and imperishable there must be implied ungeneracy. These are the absurdities into which those men fall who, before they have learned what is fitting for them to learn, only publish their own ignorance by what they attempt to teach. For if he had any faculty of discernment, he would not be ignorant of the particular sense inherent in his terms "without beginning" and "without end," and that the term "without end" is common to all things whose life we believe capable of extension to infinity, while the term "without beginning" belongs to Him alone who is without originating cause. How, then, is it possible for us to regard that which is common to them all as equivalent to that which is believed by all to be a special attribute of the Deity alone, so that we thereby either extend ungeneracy to everything that shares in immortality, or else must not allow immortality to any one of them, seeing that being without end is to belong only to the ungenerate, and conversely, being ungenerate is to belong only to that which is without end? Thus everything without end would have to be regarded as ungenerate.

Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to interpret: for he seems to have produced what he has said from that system. Being incorruptible without beginning, He is ungenerate without end, being so called absolutely, and independently of anything beside Himself. Now whoever has purged ears and an enlightened understanding knows, even without my saying it, that beyond the jingle of words produced by their extraordinary combination, there is no trace of sense in what he says; and if any shadow of an idea could be found in such a din of words, it would prove to be either profane or ridiculous. For what do you mean when you say that He is without beginning as being without end, and without end as being without beginning? Do you think beginning identical with end, and that the two words are employed in the same sense, just as the appellations Simon and Peter represent one and the same subject, and on this account, in accordance with your thinking beginning and end the same, did you, combining under one signification these two words which denote privation of each other — end, I mean, and beginning — and taking the being without end as convertible with the being without end, blend and confound one word with the other; and is this the meaning of such a mixing up of words, when you say that He is ungenerate as being without end, and that He is without end as being ungenerate? Yet how is it that you did not see the profanity as well as the ridiculous folly of your words? For if by this novel confusion of the words they are made convertible, so that ungenerate means ungenerate without end, and that which is without end is such ungenerately, it follows by necessity that that which is without end must needs be so as being ungenerate: and thus it comes to pass, my good friend, that your much-talked-of ungeneracy, which you say is the only characteristic of the Father's essence, will be found to be shared with whatever is immortal, and to be making all things consubstantial with the Father, because it is alike apparent in all things whose life, by reason of their immortality, goes on to infinity, archangels, that is, angels, human souls, and, it may be also, in the Apostate host, the Devil and his dæmons. For if that which is without end, and imperishable, must also by your argument be ungenerately imperishable, then in whatsoever is without end and imperishable there must be connoted ungeneracy. These are the absurdities into which those men fall who, before they have learned what it is fitting for them to learn, only publish their own ignorance by what they attempt to teach. For if he had any faculty of discernment, he would not be ignorant of the peculiar sense inherent in his terms, without beginning, and without end, and that the term without end is common to all things whose life we believe capable of extension to infinity, while the term without beginning belongs to Him alone Who is without originating cause. How, then, is it possible for us to regard that which is common to them all, as equivalent to that which is believed by all to be a special attribute of the Deity alone, so that we thereby either extend ungeneracy to everything that shares in immortality, or else must not allow immortality to any one of them, seeing that the being without end is to belong only to the ungenerate, and vice versa, the being ungenerate is to belong only to that which is without end? Thus everything without end would have to be regarded as ungenerate.

Let's set this aside, along with the usual flood of foul slander in his words, and move on to his later quotations from Basil. But I think it would perhaps be best to pass over most of these later words without examining them. In all of them he shows himself the same, not engaging with what we have actually said, but only inventing points for himself to refute which he pretends are taken from our statement. Anyone with good judgment would consider it useless to go through these carefully, because any intelligent reader of his book can perceive his abusive language from his very words. He says that God's Glory existed before our leader's conception. We do not deny that either. For God's glory, whatever we are to think of it, existed not only before this present generation of ours, but before all creation—it transcends the ages. So what does his argument gain from this fact, that God's glory is admitted to be superior not only to Basil, but to all the ages? Yes, but this name is His glory, he says. But please tell us, so that we may agree with this statement, who has proved that the name is identical with the glory? A law of our nature, he replies, teaches us that in naming realities, the dignity of the names does not depend on the will of those who give them. What is this law of nature? And how is it that it is not in force among all people? If nature had really enacted such a law, it ought to have authority among all who share the common nature, just as the other things peculiar to that nature do. If, in short, it was the law of nature that caused the names to spring up for us from the objects, just as her plants spring up from seeds and roots, and she did not entrust the meaningful naming of each of the subjects to the choice of those who had to indicate the objects, then all humanity would speak one language. For if the names imposed upon these objects did not vary, we would not differ from one another in the area of speech. He says it is a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon realities from a source above us. How is it, then, that the Prophets were ignorant of this holy thing, and were not instructed in this design of Providence, since according to your account they did not make God at all of this Ungeneracy? How, too, is it that God Himself never knew of this kind of holiness, when He did not give names from above to the animals which He had formed, but gave away this power of name-giving to Adam? If it is closely connected with the designs of Providence, as Eunomius says, and a holy thing, that their sounds should be imposed from above upon realities, it is certainly an unholy thing, and an unfitting thing, that these names should have been fitted to the things that are by anyone here below. But the universal Guardian, he says, thought it right to implant these names in our minds by a law of His creation. And how was it, then, if these were implanted in the minds of men, that from Adam onward to your transgression no fruits of this folly were produced, though they were implanted, according to you, in those minds, so that ungeneracy should be the name of the Father's ousia? Adam and all in succession after him would have pronounced this word, if such had been implanted by God in his physis. For just as all that now grows upon the earth continues always, owing to a transmission of its seed from the first creation, and not one single seed at the present time changes the natural form, so this word, if it had been, as you say, implanted by God in our physis, would have sprung up along with the first utterances of the first-formed human beings, and would have accompanied the line of their posterity. But seeing that this word did not exist at the first (for no one in former generations and up to the present ever uttered such a word, except this man), it is clear that it is a bastard invention, that has sprung up from the seed of weeds, not from that good seed which God has sown, to use gospel language, in the field of our physis. For all the things that characterize our common physis do not have their beginning now, but appeared with that physis at its first formation; such as, for instance, the operation of the senses, the appetitive or contrary instinct of the person with regard to anything, and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his physis, none of which a particular epoch has introduced among those born in it. But our humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none which it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as, while sight is a faculty common to our physis, scientific observation comes by training to those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is not everyone, for instance, who can observe with the theodolite, or prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do anything else where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight), so too, while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a common property of humanity united to the very ousia of our physis from above, the invention of terms that signify realities is the work of people who, possessing from above the power of reason, are continually finding out, according as they wish for them toward the clarification of that which they plainly see, certain words expressive of these things. But if these views are to prevail, he says, one of two things is proved: either that conception is prior to those who conceive, or that the names naturally befitting the Deity, and pre-existing before everything, are later than the beginning of humanity. Should we continue the fight against such assertions, and join issue with such obvious absurdity?

But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words; and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But I think it would perhaps be well to pass without examination over most of these subsequent words. For in all of them he shows himself the same, not grappling with that which we have really said, but only inventing for himself points for refutation which he pretends are taken from our statement. To go carefully through these would be pronounced useless by any one possessed of judgment; for any understanding reader of his book can from his very words perceive his scurrility. He says that God's Glory is prior to our leader's conception. We too do not deny that. For God's glory, whatever we are to think of it, is prior not only to this present generation of ours, but to all creation; it transcends the ages. What, then, is gained for his argument from this fact, that God's glory is conceded to be superior not only to Basil, but to all the ages? Yes, but this name is His glory, he says. But pray tell us, in order that we may assent to this statement, who has proved that the appellation is identical with the glory? A law of our nature, he replies, teaches us that, in naming realities, the dignity of the names does not depend on the will of those who give them. What is this law of nature? And how is it that it is not in force among all? If nature had really enacted such a law, it ought to have authority among all who share the common nature, just as the other things peculiar to that nature have. If, in fine, it was the law of nature that caused the appellations to spring up for us from the objects, just as her plants spring up from seeds and roots, and she did not entrust the significant naming of each of the subjects to the choice of those who had to indicate the objects, then all mankind would be of one tongue. For if the names imposed upon these objects did not vary, we should not differ from one another in the department of speech. He says it is a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon realities from a source above us. How is it, then, that the Prophets were ignorant of this holy thing, and were not instructed in this design of Providence, who according to your account did not make God at all of this Ungeneracy? How, too, is it that the Deity Himself never knew of this kind of holiness, when He did not give names from above to the animals which He had formed, but gave away this power of name-giving to Adam? If it is closely connected with the designs of Providence, as Eunomius says, and a holy thing, that their sounds should be imposed from above upon realities, it is certainly an unholy thing, and an unfitting thing, that these names should have been fitted to the things that are by any here below. But the universal Guardian, he says, thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by a law of His creation. And how was it, then, if these were engrafted in the minds of men, that from Adam onward to your transgression no fruits of this folly were produced, grafted as they were, according to you, in those minds, so that ungeneracy should be the name of the Father's essence? Adam and all in succession after him would have pronounced this word, if such had been grafted by God in his nature. For as all that now grows upon the earth continues always, owing to a transmission of its seed from the first creation, and not one single seed at the present time innovates upon the natural form, so this word, if it had been, as you say, grafted by God in our nature, would have sprung up along with the first utterances of the first-formed human beings, and would have accompanied the line of their posterity. But seeing that this word did not exist at the first (for no one in former generations and up to the present ever uttered such a word, except this man), it is plain that it is a bastard invention, that has sprung up from the seed of tares, not from that good seed which God has sown, to use evangelic words, in the field of our nature. For all the things that characterize our common nature do not have their beginning now, but appeared with that nature at its first formation; such, for instance, as the operation of the senses, the appetitive, or contrary, instinct of the man with regard to anything, and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his nature, none of which a particular epoch has introduced among those born in it; but our humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none which it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as, while sight is a faculty common to our nature, scientific observation comes by training to those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is not every one, for instance, who can observe with the theodolite, or prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do anything else, where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight), so too, while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a common property of humanity united to the very essence of our nature from above, the invention of terms significative of realities is the work of men who, possessing from above the power of reason, are continually finding out, according as they wish for them towards the elucidation of that which they plainly see, certain words expressive of these things. But if these views are to prevail, says he, one of two things is proved; either that conception is anterior to those who conceive, or that the names naturally befitting the Deity, and pre-existent to everything, are posterior to the beginning of man. Ought we to continue the fight against such assertions, and join issue with such manifest absurdity?

But who could possibly be so simple-minded as to be fooled by such arguments and to think that if names are once believed to be a product of the reasoning faculty, he must either allow that the utterance of names existed before those who utter them, or else think he is sinning against the Deity because every person continues to name the Deity according to how each one is able to conceive of Him after birth? Regarding this last assumption, it has already been explained that the Supreme Being does not Himself need words delivered by a voice and tongue, and it would be unnecessary to repeat what would only weigh down the argument. In short, a Being whose physis is neither lacking nor excessive, but simply perfect, neither fails to possess anything that is necessary, nor possesses what is not necessary. Therefore, since we have already proved, and all thinking people unanimously agree, that being called by names is not a necessity of the Deity, no one can deny the extreme profanity of assigning to Him what is not a necessity.

But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning faculty, he must allow that the utterance of names is anterior to those who utter them, or else that he must think he is sinning against the Deity, in that every man continues to name the Deity, according as each after birth is capable of conceiving Him? As to this last supposition, it has been already explained that the Supreme Being has no need Himself of words as delivered by a voice and a tongue; and it would be superfluous to repeat what would only encumber the argument. In fine, a Being Whose nature is neither lacking nor redundant, but simply perfect, neither fails to possess anything that is necessary, nor possesses what is not necessary. Since, then, we have proved previously, and all thinking men unanimously agree, that the calling by names is not a necessity of the Deity, no one can deny the extreme profanity of thus assigning to Him what is not a necessity.

I don't think we need to spend more time on this or examine closely what comes next. To the more careful reader, the argument our opponent has developed will itself appear to serve as a defense of orthodox belief. For instance, he says that imperishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. I see no reason to argue with him, whether these qualities simply belong to the Deity or whether they are, by their very meaning, His essence. Whichever of these two positions is accepted, it will fully support our argument. If being imperishable simply belongs to the essence, then not being generated will also most certainly simply belong to it, and so the concept of ungeneracy will be removed from being the defining mark of the essence. On the other hand, if someone affirms that imperishability is God's essence because God is not subject to destruction, and therefore defines immortality as His very essence because He is stronger than death, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), then imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability and the Son is imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no difference exists between them regarding the concept of imperishability, one essence will not differ from the other essence in any way, since in both equally the nature is completely free from corruption. Even if he should use the same method as before and present us with his dilemma, from which he thinks there is no escape, saying that if we distinguish what belongs to something from what it is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His simplicity, then imperishability and ungeneracy are clearly seen to signify His very essence—even then we can show that he is fighting on our side. For if he insists that God is made composite by our saying that anything belongs to Him, then he certainly cannot exclude Fatherhood from the essence either, but must confess that He is Father by His nature just as much as He is imperishable and immortal. And so, without intending it, he must admit that the Son also shares in that intimate nature, because it will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to Him that is likewise essential. But if he says that Fatherhood belongs to God yet is outside the sphere of the substance, then he must grant us that we may say whatever we like belongs to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is not at all compromised if His quality of ungeneracy is understood to mean something outside the essence. However, if he declares that imperishability and ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are equivalent, since there is no difference between them because the same meaning lies in each, and if he thus asserts that the very concept of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, then the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second as well. But even these men have no doubt, let us note, that the Son is imperishable. Therefore, by Eunomius' argument, the Son is also ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So he must accept one of two alternatives: either he must agree with us that ungeneracy is different from imperishability, or, if he sticks to his claims, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable in order to avoid having to say He is ungenerate, or ungenerate in order to avoid proving Him perishable.

But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our opponent will itself appear in the light of a special pleader on the side of orthodoxy. He says, for instance, that imperishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. For my part I see no need to contend with him, no matter whether these qualities aforesaid only accrue to the Deity, or whether they are, by virtue of their signification, His essence; whichever of these two views is adopted, it will completely support our argument. For if the being imperishable only accrues to the essence, the not being generated will also most certainly only accrue to it; and so the idea of ungeneracy will be ejected from being the mark of the essence. If, on the other hand, because God is not subject to destruction, one affirms imperishability to be His essence, and, because He is stronger than death, one therefore defines immortality to be His very essence, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability, and the Son imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no difference exists between them as regards the idea of imperishability, one essence will differ from the other essence in no way at all, seeing that in both equally the nature is a stranger to any corruption. Even if he should resume the same method as before, and place us on the horns of his dilemma from which, as he thinks, there is no escape, saying that, if we distinguish that which accrues from that which is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His simplicity, then the imperishability and the ungeneracy are seen at once to be significative of His very essence — even then again we can show that he is fighting for our side. For if he will have it that God is made composite by our saying that anything accrues to Him, then he certainly cannot eject the Fatherhood either from the essence, but must confess that He is Father by His nature as much as He is imperishable and immortal; and so without intending it he must admit the Son also to partake of that intimate nature; for it will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to Him thus essential. But if he says that the Fatherhood accrues to God, but is outside the circle of the substance, then he must concede to us that we may say anything we like accrues to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is in no way marred, if His quality of ungeneracy is made to mean something outside the essence. If, however, he declares that the imperishability and the ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are equivalent, since, by reason of the same meaning lying in each, there is no difference between them, and if he thus assert that the very idea of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second too. But that the Son is imperishable, let us observe, even these men entertain no doubt; therefore, by Eunomius' argument, the Son also is ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So that he must accept one of two alternatives; either he must agree with us that ungeneracy is other than imperishability, or, if he abides by his assertions, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable, in order that he may not have to say that He is ungenerate; or ungenerate, in order that he may not prove Him perishable.

I'm not sure which is better: to follow this subject step by step, or to end our contest with such foolishness right here. When people are selling poisonous drugs, a very small test assures buyers of the destructive power contained in the entire drug, and no one doubts, after discovering through a test its partial deadliness, that the whole drug being sold is completely of this deadly character. In the same way, I think it should no longer be doubtful to thoughtful people that this poisonous dose of argument, a sample of which has been shown in what we have already examined, will continue throughout to be just like what we have already refuted. For this reason I think it better not to prolong this detailed examination of his absurdities. Nevertheless, since the champions of this error discover plausibility for it from many sources, and there is reason to fear that overlooking any of their efforts will provide a convenient excuse for misrepresenting us as having avoided their strongest point, I ask those who follow us in this work to continue with our argument, without accusing us of being too wordy, while it expands to meet the attacks of error along the entire front. Notice, then, that he has barely finished weaving in the depths of his sleep this dream about conception before he arms himself again from his storehouse with those monstrous and senseless methods, and turns his argument into another dream much more meaningless than his previous illusion. But we can best understand how absurd his efforts are by observing his treatment of privation; though to wrestle with his nonsense in its full extent would require a Eunomius, or one of his school, men who have never spent a thought on serious realities. We will, however, briefly go over the main points of it, so that while none of his charges is omitted, no meaningless detail may help to prolong the discussion to an absurd length.

But now I do not know which it is best to do; to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in the case of those who are selling destructive drugs, a very slight experiment guarantees to the purchasers the destructive power latent in all the drug, and no one doubts, after he has found out by an experiment its partial deadliness, that the drug sold is entirely of this deadly character, so I think it can be no longer doubtful to reflecting persons that this poisonous dose of argument, of which a specimen has been shown in what we have already examined, will continue throughout to be such as that which we have just refuted. For this reason I think it better not to prolong this detailed dwelling upon his absurdities. Nevertheless, seeing that the champions of this error discover plausibility for it from many quarters, and there is reason to fear lest to have overlooked any of their efforts will be made a specious pretext for misrepresenting us as having shirked their strongest point, I beg for this reason those who follow us out in this work to accompany our argument still, without charging us with prolixity, while it expands itself to meet the attacks of error along the whole line. Observe, then, that he has scarcely ceased weaving in the depths of his slumber this dream about conception before he arms himself again from his storehouse with those monstrous and senseless methods, and turns his argument into another dream much more meaningless than his previous illusion. But we may best know how absurd his efforts are by observing his treatment of privation; though to grapple with his nonsense in all its range would require a Eunomius, or one of his school, men who have never spent a thought on serious realities. We will, however, in a concise way run over the heads of it, that while none of his charges is omitted, no meaningless item may help to prolong the discussion to an absurd length.

When he is about to introduce this discussion of terms of privation, he claims he will demonstrate what he calls the incurable absurdity of our teaching, along with its pretended and blameworthy caution. This is his promise; but what is his proof of these accusations? He says that some have claimed the Deity is ungenerate only by virtue of the privation of generation, but we say, in refuting these people, that neither this word nor this concept applies in any way to the Deity. Let him identify who actually maintains such a position, if anyone from the first creation of humanity to the present day, whether in foreign lands or among the Greeks, has ever committed to such a statement; and we will be silent. But no one in all of human history will be found to have said such a thing, except perhaps some madman. For who was ever so drunk, who was ever so overcome by madness or delirium, as to say explicitly that generation naturally belongs to the ungenerate God, but that, deprived of this natural condition, He becomes ungenerate instead of generated? But these are rhetorical tricks: to escape the shame of refutation when they are proven wrong by inventing fictional opponents. This is how he defended that famous Apology of his, shifting the blame for that title to jurors and accusers, though he was unable to show that there were any accusers, any trial, or any court at all. Now too, with the air of someone correcting another's foolishness, he pretends that necessity forces him to speak this way. This is what his proof of our incurable absurdity and our pretended and blameworthy caution amounts to. But he goes on to say that we do not know what to do in our present situation, and that to cover our confusion we attack him for his worldly learning, while we ourselves claim exclusive possession of the Holy Spirit's teaching. Here is his other fantasy: that he has acquired so much secular learning that he appears through it to be a formidable opponent to Basil. Just as some people have imagined themselves enthroned with royal power and exalted rank, because the deluded vision of their dreams, born from their waking desires, puts such fantasies in their hearts. He says that Basil, not knowing what to do after what has been said, attacks him for his worldly learning. He would indeed have valued such an attack highly, that is, being thought formidable because of his abundance of words even by any ordinary listener, not to mention by Basil and by people like him (if any are completely like him, or ever have been). But as for his intervening argument, if such crude vulgarity and such tasteless mockery can be called argument, by which he thinks he attacks our position, I pass over all of it, for I consider it an abominable and offensive thing to contaminate our treatise with such filth; and I loathe these things as people loathe some swollen and foul ulcer, or turn away from the sight of those whose skin is bloated by excess of fluids and disfigured with lumpy growths. And for a while our argument will be allowed to develop freely, without having to turn to defend itself against people who are ready to mock and tear apart everything that is said.

When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of privation, he takes upon himself to show the incurable absurdity, as he calls it, of our teaching, and its simulated and culpable caution. Such is his promise; but the proof of these accusations is, what? Some have said that the Deity is ungenerate by virtue only of the privation of generation; but we say, in refutation of these, that neither this word nor this idea is in any way whatever applicable to the Deity. Let him point out the maintainer of such a statement, if any from the first creation of man to the present day, whether in foreign or in Greek lands, has ever committed himself to such an utterance; and we will be silent. But no one in the whole history of mankind will be found to have said such a thing, except some madman. For who was ever so reeling from intoxication, who was ever so beside himself with madness or delirium, as to say, in so many words, that generation belongs naturally to the ungenerate God, but that, deprived of this natural condition, He becomes ungenerate instead of generated? But these are the shifts of rhetoric; namely, to escape when they are refuted from the shame of their refutation by means of some supposititious characters. It was in this way that he has apologized for that celebrated Apology of his, transferring as he did the blame for that title to jurymen and accusers, though unable to show that there were any accusers, any trial, or any court at all. Now, too, with the air of one who would correct another's folly, he pretends that he is driven by necessity to speak in this way. This is what his proof of our incurable absurdity, and our simulated and culpable caution, amounts to. But he goes on to say that we do not know what to do in our present position, and that to cover our perplexity we take to abusing him for his worldly learning, while we ourselves claim a monopoly of the teaching of the Holy Spirit. Here is his other dream, namely, that he has got so much of the heathen learning, that he appears by means of it a formidable antagonist to Basil. Just so there have been some men who have imagined themselves enthroned with basilicals, and of an exalted rank, because the deluded vision of their dreams, born of their waking longings, puts such fancies into their hearts. He says that Basil, not knowing what to do after what has been said, abuses him for his worldly learning. He would indeed have set a high value on such abuse, that is, on being thought formidable because of the abundance of his words even by any ordinary hearer, not to mention by Basil, and by men like him (if any are entirely like him, or ever have been). But, as for his intervening argument, if such low scurrility, and such tasteless buffoonery, can be called argument, by which he thinks he impugns our cause, I pass it all over, for I deem it an abominable and ungracious thing to soil our treatise with such pollutions; and I loathe them as men loathe some swollen and noisome ulcer, or turn from the spectacle presented by those whose skin is bloated by excess of humours, and disfigured with tuberous warts. And for a while our argument shall be allowed to expand itself freely, without having to turn to defend itself against men who are ready to scoff at and to tear to pieces everything that is said.

Every term—that is, every true term—is an expression that articulates some movement of thought. And every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed, as far as possible, toward the knowledge and contemplation of some reality. Now the entire world of realities is divided into two parts: the intelligible and the sensible. Regarding sensible phenomena, knowledge is readily available to everyone because perception of them is so immediate; the judgment of the senses leaves no room for doubt about what stands before them. The differences in color and the differences in all the other qualities we judge by hearing, smell, touch, or taste can be known and named by anyone who shares our common humanity. The same applies to all other things that seem more obvious to our understanding—things pertaining to the age we live in, designed for political and moral purposes. But in contemplating the intelligible world, because that world transcends the grasp of the senses, we circle around the object of our search in various ways. Then, according to the idea that arises in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to come as close as possible to the full meaning of the thing we are thinking about through expressive phrases. In this effort, though it is sometimes possible to succeed in both respects—when thought hits the mark and speech interprets the notion with the appropriate word—it may also happen that we fail in both, or at least in one of the two, when either our comprehending faculty or our interpreting capacity misses the proper mark. Since there are two factors that make any term correct—mental precision and verbal expression—the result that gains approval in both ways will certainly be preferable. But it will still be a valuable achievement not to have missed the right conception, even if the word itself happens to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever our thought focuses on those high and unseen things that the senses cannot reach—I mean that divine and unspeakable world about which it is reckless to grasp anything at random in thought, and even more reckless to trust any chance word to represent the conception arising from it—then we turn from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or badly depending on the speaker's mental faculty. Instead, we search for the thought alone that lies within the phrases, to see whether it is sound or not, and we leave the minutiae of phrase and name to be dealt with by the technicalities of grammarians. Now, since we mark with a label only those things we know, and since those things above our knowledge cannot be grasped by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark on something we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases no appropriate term can be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled to use many different names, as opportunity allows, to reveal our conjectures as they arise within us regarding the Deity. But on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence begins from the non-existent and ends in the non-existent), or lastly, we grasp the phenomenon by means of an association of qualities in which dying, suffering, change, alteration, and the like are combined. Recognizing this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His physis, ideas and phrases that express separation from all such conditions. We call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, suffering, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of terms can be organized into whatever system people wish by those who want one, and they can assign to these actual terms other labels—privative, for instance, or negative, or whatever they like. We leave the teaching and learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it. We will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

Every term — every term, that is, which is really such — is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed as far as it is possible to the knowledge and the contemplation of some reality. But then the whole world of realities is divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible. With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account of the perception of them being so near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no doubt about the subject before them. The differences in color, and the differences in all the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of hearing, or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the other things which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension, the things, that is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in the contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the object of our search; and then, according to the idea arising in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often possible to have achieved the task in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets the notion with the appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or the interpreting capacity is carried beside the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by which every term is made a correct term, the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which commands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but it will not be a lesser gain, not to have missed the right conception, even though the word itself may happen to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and unseen things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and unspeakable world with regard to which it is an audacious thing to grasp in thought anything in it at random and more audacious still to trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising from it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or ill according to the mental faculty of the speaker, we search for the thought, and that alone, which is found within the phrases, to see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the minutiæ of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities of grammarians. Now, seeing that we mark with an appellation only those things which we know, and those things which are above our knowledge it is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases there is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by many and differing names, as there may be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent, and ends in the non-existent), or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an association of qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of appellations can be reduced to any system that they like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on these actual appellations other appellations privative, for instance, or negative, or whatever they like. We yield the teaching and the learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it; and we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

If God did not exist previously, or if there will be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning. The same applies to terms like inalterable, incorporeal, or imperishable—if there is any hint of body, destruction, or change with regard to Him. But if it is part of our faith to attribute none of these things to Him, then it is our sacred duty to use privative names—that is, names that deny the things incompatible with His nature—and to say all that we have already listed so many times: that He is imperishable, unending, ungenerate, and the other terms in that category. The meaning inherent in each of these terms only tells us about the absence of what is obvious to our perception, but does not explain the actual physis of the one who is removed from those incompatible conditions. The meaning of these names does point out what the Deity is not, but what that further thing—which is not these things—essentially is, remains unrevealed. Moreover, even the rest of these names, whose meaning does indicate some position or state, do not give us an indication of the Divine physis itself, but only of the results of our reverent thinking about it. When we conclude generally that nothing in existence, whether an object of sense or of thought, comes about spontaneously or by chance, but that everything discoverable in the world is connected to the Being who transcends all existences and in whom it has the source of its continued existence, and we then perceive the beauty and majesty of the wonderful sights in creation, we gain from these and similar signs a new range of thoughts about the Deity. We express each one of the thoughts arising within us with a special name, following the advice of Wisdom, who says that by the greatness and beauty of the creatures, the Maker of them is seen proportionately. We therefore call Him Creator, the one who has made all mortal things, and Almighty, the one who has encompassed so vast a creation, whose might has been able to realize His will. When we perceive the good that is in our own life, we accordingly give the name Good to Him who is our life's first cause. Then, having learned from the Divine writings about the incorruptibility of the judgment to come, we therefore call Him Judge and Just. To sum up in one word: we transfer the thoughts that arise within us about the Divine Being into the form of a corresponding name, so that there is no name given to the Divine Being apart from some distinct understanding about Him. Even the word God (Theos) we understand to have come into usage from the activity of His seeing, for our faith tells us that the Deity is everywhere, sees (theasthai) all things, and penetrates all things. Then we stamp this thought with this name (Theos), guided to it by the Holy Voice. For someone who says, "O God, attend to me," and "Look, O God," and "God knows the secrets of the heart," clearly reveals the hidden meaning of this word—namely, that Theos is so called from theasthai. For there is no difference between saying "Attend to," "Look," and "See." Since, then, the seer must look toward something to be seen, God is rightly called the Seer of that which is to be seen. We are taught, then, by this word one particular operation of the Divine Being, though we do not grasp in thought by means of it His ousia itself, believing nevertheless that the Divine glory suffers no loss because we are at a loss for a naturally appropriate name. For this inability to express such inexpressible things, while it reflects the poverty of our own nature, provides evidence of God's glory, teaching us, in the words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally appropriate to God is to believe Him to be above every name. That He transcends every effort of thought and is far beyond any defining by a name constitutes proof to humanity of His ineffable majesty.

Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning; and so also neither inalterable, nor incorporeal, nor imperishable, if there is any suspicion of body, or destruction, or alteration with regard to Him. But if it be part of our religion to attribute to Him none of these things, then it is a sacred duty to use of Him names privative of the things abhorrent to His Nature, and to say all that we have so often enumerated already, viz. that He is imperishable, and unending, and ungenerate, and the other terms of that class, where the sense inherent in each only informs us of the privation of that which is obvious to our perception, but does not interpret the actual nature of that which is thus removed from those abhorrent conditions. What the Deity is not, the signification of these names does point out; but what that further thing, which is not these things, is essentially, remains undivulged. Moreover, even the rest of these names, the sense of which does indicate some position or some state, do not afford that indication of the Divine nature itself, but only of the results of our reverent speculations about it. For when we have concluded generally that no single thing existing, whether an object of sense or of thought, is formed spontaneously or fortuitously, but that everything discoverable in the world is linked to the Being Who transcends all existences, and possesses there the source of its continuance, and we then perceive the beauty and the majesty of the wonderful sights in creation, we thus get from these and such-like marks a new range of thoughts about the Deity, and interpret each one of the thoughts thus arising within us by a special name, following the advice of Wisdom, who says that by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionately the Maker of them is seen Wisdom 13:5. We address therefore as Creator Him Who has made all mortal things, and as Almighty Him Who has compassed so vast a creation, Whose might has been able to realize His wish. When too we perceive the good that is in our own life, we give in accordance with this the name of Good to Him Who is our life's first cause. Then also having learned from the Divine writings the incorruptibility of the judgment to come, we therefore call Him Judge and Just, and to sum up in one word, we transfer the thoughts that arise within us about the Divine Being into the mould of a corresponding name; so that there is no appellation given to the Divine Being apart from some distinct intuition about Him. Even the word God ( Θεὸς) we understand to have come into usage from the activity of His seeing; for our faith tells us that the Deity is everywhere, and sees ( θεασθαι) all things, and penetrates all things, and then we stamp this thought with this name ( Θεὸς), guided to it by the Holy Voice. For he who says, O God, attend unto me, and, Look, O God, and, God knows the secrets of the heart plainly, reveals the latent meaning of this word, viz. that Θεὸς is so called from θεασθαι. For there is no difference between saying Attend unto, Look, and See. Since, then, the seer must look towards some sight, God is rightly called the Seer of that which is to be seen. We are taught, then, by this word one sectional operation of the Divine Being, though we do not grasp in thought by means of it His substance itself, believing nevertheless that the Divine glory suffers no loss because of our being at a loss for a naturally appropriate name. For this inability to give expression to such unutterable things, while it reflects upon the poverty of our own nature, affords an evidence of God's glory, teaching us as it does, in the words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally appropriate to God is to believe Him to be above every name Philippians 2:9. That he transcends every effort of thought, and is far beyond any circumscribing by a name, constitutes a proof to man of His ineffable majesty.

That's what we can know about the names we use in any way when referring to God. We've offered a straightforward explanation of them, without complicated arguments, for the benefit of readers who come with good intentions. As for Eunomius' weak arguments about these names, we think it would be disgraceful and inappropriate for us to take them seriously enough to refute them. What could anyone say in response to someone who claims that we give more importance to the outward appearance of a name than to the value of what is named, giving names priority over realities and treating unequal things as equal? Those are his actual words. Well, anyone who is able should carefully judge whether this slanderous accusation he makes against us contains anything dangerous enough to make it worthwhile for us to defend ourselves against the charge of giving names priority over realities. After all, it's obvious to everyone that no single name has any substantial reality in itself, but rather every name is simply a marker placed on some reality or concept, having no existence of its own either as a fact or as a thought.

Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, unencumbered with argument, for the benefit of our candid hearers; as for Eunomius' nerveless contentions about these names, we judge it a thing disgraceful and unbecoming to us seriously to confute them. For what could one say in answer to a man who declares that we attach more weight to the outward form of the name than to the value of the thing named, giving to names the prerogative over realities, and equality to things unequal? Such are the words that he gives utterance to. Well, let any one who can do so considerately, judge whether this calumnious charge of his against us has anything in it dangerous enough to make it worth our while to defend ourselves as to our giving to names the prerogative over realities; for it is plain to every one that there is no single name that has in itself any substantial reality, but that every name is but a recognizing mark placed on some reality or some idea, having of itself no existence either as a fact or a thought.

How is it possible to assign one's gifts to what doesn't exist? Let this man, who claims to use words and phrases according to their natural meaning, explain this to his followers. I wouldn't have mentioned this at all, except that it forces me to prove our author's weakness in both thought and expression. As for all the passages from Scripture that he drags in—though they have nothing to do with his point—where he formulates a difference of immortality between angels and humans, I don't know what he's aiming at or what he hopes to prove by them, so I'll pass over them. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits no degrees of more or less based on comparison. For if one thing in the comparison suffers a reduction or loss of its immortality through the force of contrast, then such a thing cannot be called immortal at all. How can something be called absolutely immortal if mortality is detected in it through this comparison and contrast? And consider his hair-splitting: he won't allow the idea of privation to be consistent and universal, but instead claims that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of bad things shouldn't be called by that term. If he gets his way here, he will take the truth from the Apostle's words, which say that He only has immortality, which He gives to others. How this newly introduced dictum of his relates to his preceding argument, neither we nor anyone else among thoughtful people can understand. Yet because we lack the mental strength to grasp these scientific subtleties, he calls us unscientific both in our judgment about objects and in our use of terms—those are his exact words. But I'll pass over all this without further comment, since it has no power to shake the truth. I'll also pass over how he misrepresents our explanation of the imperishable and the unembodied—namely, that the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not found, and the former signifies what is not receptive of destruction. And how he says we don't think it right to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas that don't apply to them, or to imagine that each indicates something not present or not occurring, but rather that they indicate the actual ousia (essence). All this I consider worthy only of silence and deep oblivion, and I leave it to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative prefix doesn't mark the absence of the bad, but that the word under investigation means the ousia itself!

How it is possible, then, to assign one's gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural force, explain to the followers of his error. I would not, however, have mentioned this at all, if it had not placed a necessity upon me of proving our author's weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the passages from the inspired writings which he drags in, though quite unconnected with his object, formulating thereby a difference of immortality in angels and in men, I do not know what he has in his eye, or what he hopes to prove by them, and I pass them by. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits of no degrees of more and less arising from comparison. For if the one member of the comparison is, by the force of contrast, to suffer a diminution or privation as regards its immortality, it must needs be that such a member is not to be called immortal at all; for how can that be called absolutely immortal in which mortality is detected by this juxtaposition and comparison? And to think of that fine hair-splitting of his, in not allowing the idea of privation to be unvarying and general, but in asserting, on the contrary, that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of bad things is not to be marked by that term! If he is to get his way here, he will take the truth from the Apostle's words, which say that He only has immortality 1 Timothy 6:16, which He gives to others. What this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his preceding argument, neither we nor any one else among reflecting people are able to understand. Yet because we have not the mental strength to take in these scientific subtleties, he calls us unscientific both in our judgment as to objects, and in our use of terms; those are his very words. But all this, as having no power to shake the truth, I pass over without further notice; and also how he misrepresents the view we have expounded of the imperishable, and of the unembodied, namely, that of these terms the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not to be found, and the former signifies that which is not receptive of destruction: and also how he says, that we do not think it right to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas inapplicable to them, or to imagine that each of them is indicative of something not present or not accruing; but rather we think they are indicative of the actual essence; all this I deem worthy only of silence and deep oblivion, and leave to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative sign does not mark the absence of the bad, but that the word which is the subject of our inquiry means the essence itself!

Well, if this creator of an empty system doesn't consider the term imperishable or indestructible to be privative of destruction, then it necessarily follows that this word form indicates the exact opposite of the privation of destruction. That is, if indestructibility is not the negation of destruction, it must be the assertion of something contradictory to itself, because it is the very nature of opposites that when you remove one, you allow the other to take its place. But as for the tedious task he forces upon us of proving that the Deity cannot experience death—as if anyone held the opposite view—we leave that aside. For we hold that in the case of opposites, it makes no difference whether we say that something is A, or that it is not the opposite of A. For instance, in the present discussion, when we have said that God is Life, we implicitly rule out by this assertion any thought of death in connection with Him, even though we don't say this explicitly. And when we assert that He cannot experience death, we at the same time show Him to be Life.

Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern necessity it must follow that this shape given to the word indicates the very reverse (of the privation of destruction). If, that is, indestructibility is not the negation of destruction, it must be the assertion of something incongruous with itself; for it is the very nature of opposites that, when you take away the one, you admit the other to come in in its place. But as for the bitter task which he necessitates of proving that the Deity is unreceptive of death, as if there existed any one who held the contrary opinion, we leave it to take care of itself. For we hold that in the case of opposites, it makes no difference at all whether we say that something is A, or that it is not the opposite of A; for instance, in the present discussion, when we have said that God is Life, we implicitly forbid by this assertion the thought of death in connection with Him, even though we do not express this in speech; and when we assert that He is unreceptive of death, we in the same breath show Him to be Life.

But I do not see, he objects, how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of things that do not belong to Him. And based on this clever argument, he calls it a union of folly and profanity that our great Basil has dared to use such terms. But I would advise him not to indulge too freely in mockery against those who use these terms, or he might unconsciously be heaping insults on himself at the same time. For I think that he himself would not deny that the very greatness of the Divine Nature is recognized precisely in this: in the absence of any participation in those things that the lower natures are shown to possess. For if God were involved in any of these characteristics, He would not possess His superiority, but would be completely identified with any individual among the beings who share that characteristic. But if He is above such things precisely because He does not possess them, then He also stands above those who do possess them—just as we say that the Sinless is superior to those in sin. The fact of being removed from evil is evidence of abounding in the best. But let him heap these insults on us to his heart's content. We will only remark, in passing, on a single one of the points mentioned under this heading, and will then return to the discussion of the main question.

But I do not see, he rejoins, how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him. And on the strength of this clever sally he calls it a union of folly and profanity, that our great Basil has ventured on such terms. But I would counsel him not to indulge his ribaldry too freely against those who use these terms, lest he should be unconsciously at the same moment heaping insults on himself. For I think that he himself would not gainsay that the very grandeur of the Divine Nature is recognized in this, viz. in the absence of all participation in those things which the lower natures are shown to possess. For if God were involved in any of these peculiarities, He would not possess His superiority, but would be quite identified with any single individual among the beings who share that peculiarity. But if He is above such things, by reason, in fact, of His not possessing them, then He stands also above those who do possess them; just as we say that the Sinless is superior to those in sin. The fact of being removed from evil is an evidence of abounding in the best. But let him heap these insults on us to his heart's content. We will only remark, in passing, on a single one of the points mentioned under this head, and will then return to the discussion of the main question.

He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, and generated beings as ungenerate, all to the same degree. Isn't it clear to everyone what this blasphemy from this fighter against God is trying to prove? Or must we expose this profanity through careful argument? Everyone knows the principle that things separated by the same distance from something else are equal to one another. So if the destructible and the generated are surpassed by the same amount by the Deity, and if our Lord is generated, then Eunomius must draw the blasphemous conclusion that follows from these premises. It's clear he treats generation as the same thing as destruction and death, just as in his earlier arguments he declares that the ungenerate is the same thing as the indestructible. So if he views destruction and generation as being on the same level, and claims that the Deity is equally distant from both of them, and if our Lord is generated, let no one ask us to spell out the logical conclusion—let him draw it himself. This is the result if it's true, as he says, that God is equally removed from both the generated and the destructible. But he goes on to say that we cannot call Him indestructible and immortal based on any absence of death and destruction. Let those who are easily led and follow whatever each new teacher tells them believe this, and let them declare that destruction and death do belong to God in order to make it possible to call Him immortal and indestructible! If these negative terms, as Eunomius says, don't indicate the absence of death and destruction, then his treatment of these terms most certainly proves that their opposites—things alien to immortality and indestructibility—are present in Him. Everything we can conceive of is either absent from something else or not absent: for example, light and darkness, life and death, health and disease, and so on. In all these cases, if someone asserts that one concept is absent, he necessarily demonstrates that the other is present. So if Eunomius denies that God can be called immortal because of the absence of death, he will clearly prove the presence of death in Him, and thus deny any immortality in the universal Deity. Perhaps someone will say we're being unfair to his words, since no one is mad enough to claim that God is not immortal. But when no one knows what certain people secretly think, we have to judge those hidden thoughts by their words.

He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degree. Is it not, then, plain to all what this blasphemy of a fighter against God would prove? Or must we by verbal demonstration unveil the profanity? Well, who does not know the axiom, that things which are distanced to the same amount (by something else) are level with one another? If, then, the destructible and the generated are surpassed in the same degree by the Deity, and if our Lord is generated, it will be for Eunomius to draw the blasphemous conclusion resulting from these data. For it is clear that he regards generation as the same thing as destruction and death, just as in his previous discussions he declares the ungenerate to be the same thing as the indestructible. If, then, he looks upon destruction and generation as upon the same level, and asserts that the Deity is equally removed from both of them, and if our Lord is generated, let no one demand from ourselves that we should apply the logical conclusion, but let him draw it for himself; if indeed it is true, as he says, that from the generated and from the destructible God is equally removed. But, he proceeds, it is not allowable for us to call Him indestructible and immortal by virtue of any absence of death and destruction. Let those who are led by the nose, and turn in any direction that each successive teacher pleases, believe this, and let them declare that destruction and death do belong to God, to make it possible for Him to be called immortal and indestructible! For if these terms of privation, as Eunomius says, do not indicate the absence of death and destruction, then the presence in Him of the things opposite to, and estranged from, these is most certainly proved by this treatment of terms. Each one among conceivable things is either absent from something else, or it is not absent: for instance, light, darkness; life, death; health, disease, and so on. In all these cases, if one asserts that the one conception is absent, he will necessarily demonstrate that the other is present. If, then, Eunomius denies that God can be called immortal by reason of the absence of death, he will plainly prove the presence of death in Him, and so deny any immortality in the case of the universal Deity. But perhaps some one will say that we fix unfairly on his words; for that no one is so mad as to affirm that God is not immortal. But then, when none of mankind possess any knowledge of that which certain people secretly imagine, it is by their words that we have to make our guess about those secret things.

Therefore let us examine this statement of his again: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How are we to accept this claim—that death is not absent from the Deity though He is called immortal? If he really commands us to think this way, Eunomius' God will certainly be mortal and subject to destruction, for one from whom death is not absent is not immortal in his ousia. But again, if these terms do not signify the absence of death or destruction, then either they are applied falsely to God overall, or they contain some different meaning within themselves. What this meaning is, our system-maker must explain to us. We, on the other hand—the people who according to Eunomius are unscientific in our judgment of things and in our use of terms—have been taught to call someone sound (for instance) not when strength is absent from him, but when disease is absent from him; and unmutilated not when he stays away from drinking-parties, but when he has no mutilation upon him. We name other qualities in the same way, based on the presence or absence of something: manly and unmanly, for instance; sleepy and sleepless; and all other such terms that custom approves.

Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How are we to accept this statement, that death is not absent from the Deity though He be called immortal? If he really commands us to think like this, Eunomius' God will be certainly mortal, and subject to destruction; for he from whom death is not absent is not in his essence immortal. But again; if these terms signify the absence neither of death nor of destruction, either they are applied falsely to the God overall, or else they comprise within themselves some different meaning. What this meaning is, our system-maker must explain to us. Whereas we, the people who according to Eunomius are unscientific in our judgment of objects and in our use of terms, have been taught to call sound (for instance), not the man from whom strength is absent, but the man from whom disease is absent; and unmutilated, not the man who keeps away from drinking-parties, but the man who has no mutilation upon him; and other qualities in the same way we name from the presence or the absence of something; manly, for instance, and unmanly; sleepy and sleepless; and all the other terms like that, which custom sanctions.

So let me return to this claim of his: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How should we accept this statement—that death is not absent from the Deity even though He is called immortal? If he really commands us to think this way, Eunomius' God will certainly be mortal and subject to destruction. For one from whom death is not absent is not immortal in his ousia.

Still, I cannot see what profit there is in bothering to examine such nonsense. For someone like me, who has lived to gray hairs and whose eyes are fixed on truth alone, to take upon his lips the absurd and flippant utterances of a contentious opponent, risks bringing no small condemnation on himself. I will therefore pass over both those words and the adjoining passage—for instance, this: "Truth gives no evidence of any union of natures with God." Well, if these words had not been spoken, who ever was there (except yourself) who mentioned a double physis in the Deity at all? You, however, connect each idea of each name with the ousia of the Father, and deny that anything externally accrues to Him, centering every one of His names in that ousia. Again: "Neither does she write in the statute-book of our religion any idea that is external and fabricated by ourselves." Regarding these words again, I shall make clear that I have not quoted them to amuse the reader with their absurdity. Rather, I have done so to show with what a slender supply of arguments this man, after criticizing us for our lack of system, proceeds to take these audacious liberties with the name of Truth. What is he in reasoning, and what is he in speech, that he should revel in showing himself off before his hidebound readers, who applaud him as victorious over everybody by force of argument when he has brought these disjointed utterances of his dry bombastic jargon to an end? "Immortality," he says, "is the ousia itself." But what, then, do you assert to be the ousia of the Only-begotten? I ask you that: is it immortality, or is it not? For remember that in His ousia also the singleness admits, as you say, of no complexity of physis. If, then, Eunomius denies that immortality is the ousia of the Son, it is clear what he is aiming at. For it does not require an exceedingly penetrating understanding to discover what is the direct opposite to the immortal. Just as the logic of dichotomy exhibits the destructible instead of the indestructible, and the mutable instead of the immutable, so it exhibits the mortal instead of the immortal. What, therefore, will this setter forth of new doctrine do? What proper name will he give us for the ousia of the Only-begotten? Again I put this question to our author. He must either grant that it is immortality, or deny it. If, then, he will not agree that it is immortality, he must agree to the contradictory proposition: by denying the superior term he proves that it is death. If, on the other hand, he shrinks from anything so monstrous and names the ousia of the Only-begotten also as immortality, he must necessarily agree with us that there is consequently no difference whatever in ousia between them. If the physis of the Father and the physis of the Son are equally immortality, and if immortality does not divide itself by any manner of difference, then it is confessed by our foes themselves that on the score of ousia no manner of difference is discoverable between the Father and the Son.

Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs, and whose eyes are fixed on truth alone, to take upon his lips the absurd and flippant utterances of a contentious foe, incurs no slight danger of bringing condemnation on himself. I will therefore pass over both those words and the adjoining passage; this, for instance, Truth gives no evidence of any union of natures with God. Well, if these words had not been spoken, who ever was there (except yourself) who mentioned a double nature in the Deity at all? You, however, unite each idea of each name with the essence of the Father, and deny that anything externally accrues to Him, centering every one of His names in that essence. Again, Neither does she write in the statute-book of our religion any idea that is external and fabricated by ourselves. With regard to these words again I shall deprecate the idea that I have quoted them with a view of amusing the reader with their absurdity; rather I have done so with a view to show with what a slender equipment of arguments this man, after rating us for our want of system, advances to take these audacious liberties with the name of Truth. What is he in reasoning, and what is he in speech, that he should thus revel in showing himself off before his hidebound readers, who applaud him as victorious over everybody by force of argument when he has brought these disjointed utterances of his dry bombastic jargon to an end. Immortality, he says, is the essence itself. But what, then, do you assert to be the essence of the Only-begotten? I ask you that: is it immortality, or is it not? For remember that in His essence also the singleness admits, as you say, of no complexity of nature. If, then Eunomius denies that immortality is the essence of the Son, it is clear what he is aiming at; for it does not require an exceedingly penetrating understanding to discover what is the direct opposite to the immortal. Just as the logic of dichotomy exhibits the destructible instead of the indestructible, and the mutable instead of the immutable, so it exhibits the mortal instead of the immortal. What, therefore, will this setter forth of new doctrine do? What proper name will he give us for the essence of the Only-begotten? Again I put this question to our author. He must either grant that it is immortality, or deny it. If, then, he will not assent to its being immortality, he must assent to the contradictory proposition; by negativing the superior term he proves that it is death. If, on the other hand, he shrinks from anything so monstrous, and names the essence of the Only-begotten also as immortality, he must perforce agree with us that there is in consequence no difference whatever, as to essence, between them. If the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son are equally immortality, and if immortality does not divide itself by any manner of difference, then it is confessed by our foes themselves, that on the score of essence no manner of difference is discoverable between the Father and the Son.

But it is time now to expose the angry accusation he brings against us at the end of his treatise, claiming that we say the Father comes from what is absolutely non-existent. He steals an expression from its context, tearing it away as if from its surrounding body into naked isolation, and tries to criticize it by attacking the word, or rather covering it with the foam of his maddened teeth. I will therefore first give the meaning of the passage in which our teacher explained this point to us, then I will quote it word for word. By doing this, the man who intrudes upon the explanatory work of orthodox writers only to undermine the truth itself will be revealed in his true colors. Our teacher, in introducing us in his own treatise to the true meaning of ungenerate, suggested a way to arrive at real knowledge of the disputed term somewhat as follows, pointing out at the same time that it had a meaning very far removed from any idea of ousia (essence). He says that the Evangelist, in beginning our Lord's genealogy according to the flesh from Joseph and then going back through the generations one after another, and then ending the genealogy with Adam, and because there was no earthly father before this first-formed creature, saying that he was the son of God, makes it clear to every reader's understanding with regard to the Deity that He from whom Adam came does not Himself have His existence from another, in the same way as the human lives just described. When, having passed through the whole genealogy, we finally grasp the thought of the Deity, we perceive at the same moment the First Cause of it all. But if any such cause is found depending on something else, then it is not a first cause. Therefore, if God is the First Cause of the universe, there will be nothing whatever beyond this cause of all things. Such was our teacher's explanation of the meaning of ungenerate, and so that our testimony about it may not go beyond the exact truth, I will quote the passage.

But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be from what is absolutely non-existent. Stealing an expression from its context, from which he drags it, as from its surrounding body, into a naked isolation, he tries to carp at it by worrying the word, or rather covering it with the slaver of his maddened teeth. I will therefore first give the meaning of the passage in which our Master explained this point to us; then I will quote it word for word: by so doing the man who intrudes upon the expository work of orthodox writers, only to undermine the truth itself, will be revealed in his true colors. Our Master, in introducing us in his own treatise to the true meaning of ungenerate, suggested a way to arrive at a real knowledge of the term in dispute somewhat as follows, pointing out at the same time that it had a meaning very far removed from any idea of essence. He says that the Evangelist, in beginning our Lord's lineage according to the flesh from Joseph, and then going back to the generation continually preceding, and then ending the genealogy in Adam, and, because there was no earthly father anterior to this first-formed creature, saying that he was the son of God, makes it obvious to every reader's intelligence with regard to the Deity, that He, from Whom Adam was, has not Himself His subsistence from another, after the likeness of the human lives just given. When, having passed through the whole of it, we at last grasp the thought of the Deity, we perceive at the same moment the First Cause of it all. But if any such cause be found dependent on something else, then it is not a first cause. Therefore, if God is the First Cause of the Universe, there will be nothing whatever transcending this cause of all things. Such was our Master's exposition of the meaning of ungenerate; and in order that our testimony about it may not go beyond the exact truth, I will quote the passage.

The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Savior Jesus Christ, and moving from the last to the first, begins with Joseph, saying that he was 'the son of Heli, who was the son of Matthat,' and continues ascending until his list reaches Adam. But when he comes to the end and says that Seth 'was the son of Adam, who was the son of God,' he stops there. Since he has said that Adam was the son of God, we will ask these men, 'But God, whose son is He?' Isn't it obvious to everyone's understanding that God is no one's son? But to be no one's son is to be without a cause, clearly; and to be without a cause is to be ungenerate. Now in the case of human beings, being someone's son is not the ousia. Likewise, in the case of the Deity who rules the world, it is not possible to say that being ungenerate is the ousia.

The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first, begins with Joseph, saying that he was 'the son of Heli, which was the son of Matthat,' and so by ascending brings his enumeration up to Adam; but when he has come to the top and said, that Seth 'was the son of Adam, which was the son of God,' then he stops this process. As, then, he has said that Adam was the son of God, we will ask these men, 'But God, who is He the son of?' Is it not obvious to every one's intelligence that God is the son of no one? But to be the son of no one is to be without a cause, plainly; and to be without a cause is to be ungenerate. Now in the case of men, the being son of somebody is not the essence; no more, in the case of the Deity Who rules the world, is it possible to say that the being ungenerate is the essence.

With what eyes will you now dare to look at your guide? I am speaking to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who has erected such a monument to his shamelessness in argument? Are you not ashamed now, if not before, to take the hand of a man like this to lead you to the truth? Do you not regard it as a sign of his doctrinal madness that he so shamelessly stands against the truth contained in Scripture? Is this the way to champion the truth of doctrine—namely, to accuse Basil of deriving the God over all from that which has absolutely no existence? Should I tell you how he phrases it? Should I transcribe the very words of his shamelessness? I pass over their insolence; I do not blame their invective, for I do not censure someone whose breath smells bad because it smells bad, or someone who has bodily mutilation because he is mutilated. Such things are the misfortunes of nature; they escape blame from those who can reflect. This strength of vituperation, then, is infirmity in reasoning; it is an affliction of a soul whose powers of sound argument are damaged. No word from me, then, about his invectives. But as to that syllogism, with its supposedly strong and irrefutable structure, in whose conclusion, to achieve his beloved object, he arrives at this accusation against us, I will write it out in its own precise words. We will allow him to say that the Son exists by participation in the self-existent; but instead of this, he has unconsciously affirmed that the God over all comes from absolute nonentity. For if the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. To which of these statements should we first direct our attention? Should we criticize his opinion about the Son existing by participation in the Deity, and his bespattering with the filth of his tongue those who will not agree with it; or should we examine the sophism so coldly constructed from the stuff of dreams? However, everyone who possesses a spark of practical wisdom is aware that it is only poets and makers of mythology who produce sons by participation from the Divine Being. Those who string together the myths in their poems fabricate a Dionysus, or a Hercules, or a Minos, and such figures, out of the combination of the superhuman with human bodies; and they exalt such personages above the rest of humanity, representing them as more highly esteemed because of their participation in a superior nature. Therefore, with regard to this opinion of his, carrying as it does within itself the evidence of its own folly and profanity, it is best to be silent; and to repeat instead that irrefutable syllogism of his, in order that every poor ignoramus on our side may understand what and how many are the advantages which those who are not trained in his technical methods are deprived of. He says, If the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. He brandishes this Aristotelian weapon over us, but who has yet conceded to him that to say that anyone has no father amounts to saying that he has been generated from absolute nonentity? He who enumerates those persons whose line is recorded in Scripture is plainly thinking of a father preceding each person mentioned. For what relation is Heli to Joseph? What relation is Matthat to Heli? And what relation is Adam to Seth? Is it not plain to a mere child that this catalogue of names is a list of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, Adam must be the father of one thus born from him; and so tell me, who is the father of the Deity Who is over all? Come, answer this question, open your lips and speak, exert all your skill in expression to meet such an inquiry. Can you discover any expression that will escape the grasp of your own syllogism? Who is the father of the Ungenerate? Can you say? If you can, then He is not ungenerate. Pressed thus, you will say what necessity indeed compels you to say—No one is. Well, my dear sir, do you not yet find the weak seams of your sophism giving way? Do you not perceive that you have drooled upon your own lap? What does our great Basil say? That the Ungenerate One is from no father. For the conclusion to be drawn from the mention of fathers in the preceding genealogy permits the word father, even in the silence of the evangelist, to be added to this confession of faith. Whereas you have transformed no one into nothing at all, and again nothing at all into absolute nonentity, thereby concocting that fallacious syllogism of yours. Accordingly this clever result of professional shrewdness shall be turned against yourself. I ask, Who is the father of the Ungenerate One? No one, you will be obliged to answer; for the Ungenerate One cannot have a father. Then, if no one is the father of the Ungenerate, and you have changed no one into nothing at all, and nothing at all is, according to your argument, the same as absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is, as you say, perfectly legitimate, then the man (that is, you) who says that no one is the father of the Ungenerate One says that the Deity Who is over all comes from absolute nonentity!

With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who has reared such a monument as this of his shamelessness in argument? Are ye not ashamed now, at least, if not before, to take the hand of a man like this to lead you to the truth? Do ye not regard it as a sign of his madness as to doctrine, that he thus shamelessly stands out against the truth contained in Scripture? Is this the way to play the champion of the truth of doctrine — namely, to accuse Basil of deriving the God over all from that which has absolutely no existence? Am I to tell the way he phrases it? Am I to transcribe the very words of his shamelessness? I let the insolence of them pass; I do not blame their invective, for I do not censure one whose breath is of bad odour, because it is of bad odour; or one who has bodily mutilation, because he is mutilated. Things such as that are the misfortunes of nature; they escape blame from those who can reflect. This strength of vituperation, then, is infirmity in reasoning; it is an affliction of a soul whose powers of sound argument are marred. No word from me, then, about his invectives. But as to that syllogism, with its stout irrefragable folds, in whose conclusion, to effect his darling object, he arrives at this accusation against us, I will write it out in its own precise words. We will allow him to say that the Son exists by participation in the self-existent; but (instead of this), he has unconsciously affirmed that the God over all comes from absolute nonentity. For if the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. To which of these statements shall we first direct our attention? Shall we criticize his opinion about the Son existing by participation in the Deity, and his bespattering those who will not acquiesce in it with the foulness of his tongue; or shall we examine the sophism so frigidly constructed from the stuff of dreams? However, every one who possesses a spark of practical sagacity is not unaware that it is only poets and moulders of mythology who father sons by participation upon the Divine Being. Those, that is, who string together the myths in their poems, fabricate a Dionysus, or a Hercules, or a Minos, and such-like, out of the combination of the superhuman with human bodies; and they exalt such personages above the rest of mankind, representing them as of greater estimation because of their participation in a superior nature. Therefore, with regard to this opinion of his, carrying as it does within itself the evidence of its own folly and profanity, it is best to be silent; and to repeat instead that irrefragable syllogism of his, in order that every poor ignoramus on our side may understand what and how many are the advantages which those who are not trained in his technical methods are deprived of. He says, If the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing, says that He comes from nonentity. He brandishes over us this Aristotelian weapon, but who has yet conceded to him, that to say that any one has no father amounts to saying that he has been generated from absolute nonentity? He who enumerates those persons whose line is recorded in Scripture is plainly thinking of a father preceding each person mentioned. For what relation is Heli to Joseph? What relation is Matthat to Heli? And what relation is Adam to Seth? Is it not plain to a mere child that this catalogue of names is a list of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, Adam must be the father of one thus born from him; and so tell me, who is the father of the Deity Who is over all? Come, answer this question, open your lips and speak, exert all your skill in expression to meet such an inquiry. Can you discover any expression that will elude the grasp of your own syllogism? Who is the father of the Ungenerate? Can you say? If you can, then He is not ungenerate. Pressed thus, you will say, what indeed necessity compels you to say — No one is. Well, my dear sir, do you not yet find the weak seams of your sophism giving way? Do you not perceive that you have slavered upon your own lap? What says our great Basil? That the Ungenerate One is from no father. For the conclusion to be drawn from the mention of fathers in the preceding genealogy permits the word father, even in the silence of the evangelist, to be added to this confession of faith. Whereas, you have transformed no one into nothing at all, and again nothing at all into absolute nonentity, thereby concocting that fallacious syllogism of yours. Accordingly this clever result of professional shrewdness shall be turned against yourself. I ask, Who is the father of the Ungenerate One? No one, you will be obliged to answer; for the Ungenerate One cannot have a father. Then, if no one is the father of the Ungenerate, and you have changed no one into nothing at all, and nothing at all is, according to your argument, the same as absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is, as you say, perfectly legitimate, then the man ( i.e. you) who says that no one is the father of the Ungenerate One, says that the Deity Who is over all comes from absolute nonentity!

Such, to use your own words, is the evil—as one might expect—not of valuing the reputation for being clever before one actually is clever (for perhaps this does not amount to a very great misfortune), but of not knowing oneself, and how great the distance is between the soaring Basil and a grovelling reptile. For if those eyes of his, with their divine insight, still looked upon this world, if he still swept over mankind now living on the wings of his wisdom, he would have shown you with the swooping rush of his words how frail is that native shell of folly in which you are enclosed, how great is the one whom you oppose with your errors, while with insults and accusations hurled at him you are hunting for a reputation among decrepit and despicable creatures. Still, you need not give up all hope of feeling that great man's talons. For this work of ours, while it will be a great thing for it to be judged even a fraction of one such talon when compared with his, has, as regards yours, ability enough to have broken through the outer crust of your heresy and to have exposed the deformity that hides within.

Such, to use your own words, is the evil, as one might expect, not indeed of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such (for perhaps this does not amount to a very great misfortune), but of not knowing oneself, and how great the distance is between the soaring Basil and a grovelling reptile. For if those eyes of his, with their divine penetration, still looked on this world, if he still swept over mankind now living on the pinions of his wisdom, he would have shown you with the swooping rush of his words, how frail is that native shell of folly in which you are encased, how great is he whom you oppose with your errors, while, with insults and invectives hurled at him, you are hunting for a reputation among decrepit and despicable creatures. Still you need not give up all hope of feeling that great man's talons. For this work of ours, while, as compared with his, it will be a great thing for it to be judged the fraction of one such talon, has, as regards yours, ability enough to have broken asunder the outside crust of your heresy, and to have detected the deformity that hides within.

But let us see what is the next addition that follows upon this profanity, an addition which is in fact the key of their defense of their doctrine. For those who would degrade the majesty of the glory of the Only-begotten to slavish and groveling conceptions think that they find the strongest proof of their assertions in the words of the Lord to Mary, which He uttered after His resurrection and before His ascension into heaven, saying, "Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended to My Father: but go to My brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and to My God and your God." The orthodox interpretation of these words, the sense in which we have been accustomed to believe that they were spoken to Mary, is I think clear to all who have received the faith in truth. Still, the discussion of this point shall be given by us in its proper place. But meanwhile, it is worth asking those who use against us such phrases as ascending, being seen, being recognized by touch, and moreover being associated with men by brotherhood, whether they consider these things to be proper to the Divine or to the Human nature. For if they see in the Godhead the capacity of being seen and touched, of being sustained by food and drink, kinship and brotherhood with men, and all the attributes of corporeal nature, then let them ascribe to the Only-begotten God both these and whatever else they will, such as movement and local change, which are peculiar to things limited by a body. But if He through Mary is speaking with His brethren, and if the Only-begotten has no brethren—for how, if He had brethren, could the property of being Only-begotten be preserved?—and if the same Person who said "God is a Spirit" says to His disciples "Handle Me," that He may show that while the Human nature is capable of being handled the Divinity is intangible, and if He who says "I go" indicates local change, while He who contains all things, in whom, as the Apostle says, all things were created and in whom all things consist, has nothing in existent things external to Himself to which removal could take place by any kind of motion—for motion cannot otherwise happen than by that which is removed leaving the place in which it is and occupying another place instead, while that which extends through all, and is in all, and controls all, and is confined by no existent thing, has no place to which to pass, since nothing is void of the Divine fullness—how can these men abandon the belief that such expressions arise from that which is visible, and apply them to that nature which is Divine and which surpasses all understanding, when the Apostle has in his speech to the Athenians plainly forbidden us to imagine any such thing of God, since the Divine power is not discoverable by touch but by intelligent contemplation and faith? Or, again, whom does He who ate before the eyes of His disciples and promised to go before them into Galilee and there be seen by them—whom does He reveal Himself to be who should so appear to them? God, whom no man has seen or can see? Or the bodily image, that is, the form of a servant in which God was? If then what has been said plainly proves that the meaning of the phrases in question refers to that which is visible, expressing shape and capable of motion, akin to the nature of His disciples, and none of these properties is discernible in Him who is invisible, incorporeal, intangible, and formless, how do they come to degrade the very Only-begotten God, who was in the beginning and is in the Father, to a level with Peter, Andrew, John, and the rest of the Apostles, by calling them the brethren and fellow-servants of the Only-begotten? And yet all their efforts are directed to this aim, to show that in majesty of nature there is as great a distance between the Father and the dignity, power, and ousia of the Only-begotten as there is between the Only-begotten and humanity. And they press this saying into the support of this meaning, treating the name of the God and Father as being of common significance in respect of the Lord and of His disciples, with the view that no difference in dignity of nature is conceived while He is recognized as God and Father both of Him and of them in a precisely similar manner.

But let us see what is the next addition that follows upon this profanity, an addition which is in fact the key of their defense of their doctrine. For those who would degrade the majesty of the glory of the Only-begotten to slavish and grovelling conceptions think that they find the strongest proof of their assertions in the words of the Lord to Mary, which He uttered after His resurrection, and before His ascension into heaven, saying, Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended to My Father: but go to My brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and to My God and your God. The orthodox interpretation of these words, the sense in which we have been accustomed to believe that they were spoken to Mary, is I think manifest to all who have received the faith in truth. Still the discussion of this point shall be given by us in its proper place; but meantime it is worth while to inquire from those who allege against us such phrases as ascending, being seen, being recognized by touch, and moreover being associated with men by brotherhood, whether they consider them to be proper to the Divine or to the Human Nature. For if they see in the Godhead the capacity of being seen and touched, of being supported by meat and drink, kinship and brotherhood with men, and all the attributes of corporeal nature, then let them predicate of the Only-begotten God both these and whatsoever else they will, as motive energy and local change, which are peculiar to things circumscribed by a body. But if He by Mary is discoursing with His brethren, and if the Only-begotten has no brethren, (for how, if He had brethren, could the property of being Only-begotten be preserved?) and if the same Person Who said, God is a Spirit, says to His disciples, Handle Me Luke 24:39, that He may show that while the Human Nature is capable of being handled the Divinity is intangible, and if He Who says, I go, indicates local change, while He who contains all things, in Whom, as the Apostle says, all things were created, and in Whom all things consist Colossians 1:16-17, has nothing in existent things external to Himself to which removal could take place by any kind of motion, (for motion cannot otherwise be effected than by that which is removed leaving the place in which it is, and occupying another place instead, while that which extends through all, and is in all, and controls all, and is confined by no existent thing, has no place to which to pass, inasmuch as nothing is void of the Divine fullness,) how can these men abandon the belief that such expressions arise from that which is apparent, and apply them to that Nature which is Divine and which surpasses all understanding, when the Apostle has in his speech to the Athenians plainly forbidden us to imagine any such thing of God, inasmuch as the Divine power is not discoverable by touch, but by intelligent contemplation and faith? Or, again, whom does He Who did eat before the eyes of His disciples, and promised to go before them into Galilee and there be seen of them — whom does He reveal Him to be Who should so appear to them? God, Whom no man has seen or can see? Or the bodily image, that is, the form of a servant in which God was? If then what has been said plainly proves that the meaning of the phrases alleged refers to that which is visible, expressing shape, and capable of motion, akin to the nature of His disciples, and none of these properties is discernible in Him Who is invisible, incorporeal, intangible, and formless, how do they come to degrade the very Only-begotten God, Who was in the beginning, and is in the Father, to a level with Peter, Andrew, John, and the rest of the Apostles, by calling them the brethren and fellow-servants of the Only-begotten? And yet all their exertions are directed to this aim, to show that in majesty of nature there is as great a distance between the Father and the dignity, power, and essence of the Only-begotten, as there is between the Only-begotten and humanity. And they press this saying into the support of this meaning, treating the name of the God and Father as being of common significance in respect of the Lord and of His disciples, in the view that no difference in dignity of nature is conceived while He is recognized as God and Father both of Him and of them in a precisely similar manner.

The way they logically support their profane view is as follows: either the relational term used expresses a shared essence between the disciples and the Father, or we must not use this phrase to bring even the Lord into communion with the Father's nature. And just as calling the God over all "their God" implies that the disciples are His servants, so by the same reasoning they claim that these words acknowledge the Son to be God's servant as well. Now, one can learn from the purpose for which they were spoken that the words addressed to Mary do not apply to the Godhead of the Only-begotten. For it was He who humbled Himself to the level of human weakness who spoke these words. Those who search out the depths of the sacred mystery by the Spirit may fully understand the meaning of what He then said. But we will set down briefly as much as is within our reach, following the guidance of the Fathers. He who is by nature Father of existing things, from whom all things originate, has been proclaimed as one by the Apostle's sublime statement. For there is one God, he says, and Father, from whom are all things. Therefore human nature did not enter creation from any other source, nor grow spontaneously in the parents of the race, but it too had none other than the Father of all as the author of its constitution. The name of Godhead itself, whether it indicates the authority of oversight or foresight, implies a certain relation to humanity. For He who gave all things that exist the power to be is the God and overseer of what He Himself has made. But since, through the schemes of him who sowed in us the weeds of disobedience, our nature no longer preserved within itself the image of the Father, but was transformed into the corrupt likeness of sin, for this reason it was grafted by similarity of will into the evil family of the father of sin. As a result, the good and true God and Father was no longer the God and Father of the one who had been thus outlawed by his own depravity. Instead of Him who was by nature God, those were honored who, as the Apostle says, by nature were not gods, and in place of the Father, he was considered father who is falsely so called, as the prophet Jeremiah says in his obscure saying, The partridge called, she gathered together what she did not hatch. Since, then, this was the essence of our disaster—that humanity was exiled from the good Father and was banished from Divine oversight and care—for this reason He who is the Shepherd of the entire rational creation left His sinless and heavenly flock in the heights of heaven and, moved by love, went after the sheep that had gone astray, that is, our human nature. For human nature, which alone according to the parable's imagery wandered away through vice from the hundred rational beings, is, when compared with the whole, only an insignificant and tiny part. Since then it was impossible for our life, which had been estranged from God, to return by itself to the high and heavenly place, for this reason, as the Apostle says, He who knew no sin is made sin for us, and frees us from the curse by taking our curse upon Himself. Having taken up and, in the Apostle's language, slain in Himself the enmity that through sin had come between us and God (for sin was the enmity), and having become what we were, He through Himself again united humanity to God. For having through purity brought into closest relationship with the Father that new man of our nature who is created after God, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, He drew with Him into the same grace all the nature that shares His body and is related to Him. And He proclaims this good news through the woman, not only to those disciples but also to all who up to the present day become disciples of the Word—the news that man is no longer outlawed or cast out of God's kingdom, but is once more a son, once more in the position assigned to him by his God, since along with the firstfruits of humanity the whole lump is also made holy. For behold, He says, I and the children whom God has given Me. He who for our sakes shared in flesh and blood has recovered you and brought you back to the place from which you strayed away, becoming mere flesh and blood through sin. And so He from whom we were formerly alienated by our revolt has become our Father and our God. Accordingly, in the passage quoted above, the Lord brings the good news of this benefit. These words are not proof of the Son's degradation, but the good news of our reconciliation to God. For what has taken place in Christ's humanity is a common blessing given to mankind in general. For just as when we see in Him the weight of the body, which naturally falls toward earth, ascending through the air into the heavens, we believe according to the Apostle's words that we also will be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, so too when we hear that the true God and Father has become the God and Father of our firstfruits, we no longer doubt that this same God has become our God and Father as well, since we have learned that we will come to the same place where Christ has entered for us as our forerunner. The fact that this grace was revealed through a woman also fits with the interpretation we have given. For since, as the Apostle tells us, the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression, and was foremost through her disobedience in the revolt from God, for this reason she is the first witness of the resurrection, so that she might make up for by her faith in the resurrection the ruin caused by her disobedience. Just as by making herself at the beginning a minister and advocate to her husband of the serpent's advice, she brought into human life the beginning of evil and its consequences, so by ministering to His disciples the words of Him who slew the rebel dragon, she might become for men the guide to faith, through which the first proclamation of death is rightly annulled. It is likely that more diligent students may discover a more valuable explanation of the text. But even if none is found, I think every devout reader will agree that our opponents' explanation is worthless when compared with the one we have presented. For theirs has been constructed solely to destroy the glory of the Only-begotten and nothing more, but ours encompasses the purpose of the plan concerning man. For it has been shown that it was not the intangible, unchangeable, and invisible God, but the moving, visible, and tangible nature that is proper to humanity that gave the command to Mary to minister the word to His disciples.

And the mode in which they logically maintain their profanity is as follows — that either by the relative term employed there is expressed community of essence also between the disciples and the Father, or else we must not by this phrase bring even the Lord into communion in the Father's Nature, and that, even as the fact that the God over all is named as their God implies that the disciples are His servants so by parity of reasoning, it is acknowledged, by the words in question, that the Son also is the servant of God. Now that the words addressed to Mary are not applicable to the Godhead of the Only-begotten, one may learn from the intention with which they were uttered. For He Who humbled Himself to a level with human littleness, He it is Who spoke the words. And what is the meaning of what He then uttered, they may know in all its fullness who by the Spirit search out the depths of the sacred mystery. But as much as comes within our compass we will set down in few words, following the guidance of the Fathers. He Who is by nature Father of existent things, from Whom all things have their birth, has been proclaimed as one, by the sublime utterance of the Apostle. For there is one God, he says, and Father, of Whom are all things 1 Corinthians 8:6. Accordingly human nature did not enter into the creation from any other source, nor grow spontaneously in the parents of the race, but it too had for the author of its own constitution none other than the Father of all. And the name of Godhead itself, whether it indicates the authority of oversight or of foresight, imports a certain relation to humanity. For He Who bestowed on all things that are, the power of being, is the God and overseer of what He has Himself produced. But since, by the wiles of him that sowed in us the tares of disobedience, our nature no longer preserved in itself the impress of the Father's image, but was transformed into the foul likeness of sin, for this cause it was engrafted by virtue of similarity of will into the evil family of the father of sin: so that the good and true God and Father was no longer the God and Father of him who had been thus outlawed by his own depravity, but instead of Him Who was by Nature God, those were honoured who, as the Apostle says, by nature were no Gods Galatians 4:8, and in the place of the Father, he was deemed father who is falsely so called, as the prophet Jeremiah says in his dark saying, The partridge called, she gathered together what she hatched not. Since, then, this was the sum of our calamity, that humanity was exiled from the good Father, and was banished from the Divine oversight and care, for this cause He Who is the Shepherd of the whole rational creation, left in the heights of heaven His unsinning and supramundane flock, and, moved by love, went after the sheep which had gone astray, even our human nature. For human nature, which alone, according to the similitude in the parable, through vice roamed away from the hundred of rational beings, is, if it be compared with the whole, but an insignificant and infinitesimal part. Since then it was impossible that our life, which had been estranged from God, should of itself return to the high and heavenly place, for this cause, as says the Apostle, He Who knew no sin is made sin for us, and frees us from the curse by taking on Him our curse as His own, and having taken up, and, in the language of the Apostle, slain in Himself the enmity which by means of sin had come between us and God –(in fact sin was the enmity) — and having become what we were, He through Himself again united humanity to God. For having by purity brought into closest relationship with the Father of our nature that new man which is created after God, in Whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, He drew with Him into the same grace all the nature that partakes of His body and is akin to Him. And these glad tidings He proclaims through the woman, not to those disciples only, but also to all who up to the present day become disciples of the Word, — the tidings, namely, that man is no longer outlawed, nor cast out of the kingdom of God, but is once more a son, once more in the station assigned to him by his God, inasmuch as along with the first-fruits of humanity the lump also is hallowed. For behold, He says, I and the children whom God has given Me. He Who for our sakes was partaker of flesh and blood has recovered you, and brought you back to the place whence ye strayed away, becoming mere flesh and blood by sin. And so He from Whom we were formerly alienated by our revolt has become our Father and our God. Accordingly in the passage cited above the Lord brings the glad tidings of this benefit. And the words are not a proof of the degradation of the Son, but the glad tidings of our reconciliation to God. For that which has taken place in Christ's Humanity is a common boon bestowed on mankind generally. For as when we see in Him the weight of the body, which naturally gravitates to earth, ascending through the air into the heavens, we believe according to the words of the Apostle, that we also shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air 1 Thessalonians 4:16, even so, when we hear that the true God and Father has become the God and Father of our First-fruits, we no longer doubt that the same God has become our God and Father too, inasmuch as we have learned that we shall come to the same place whither Christ has entered for us as our forerunner. And the fact too that this grace was revealed by means of a woman, itself agrees with the interpretation which we have given. For since, as the Apostle tells us, the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression 1 Timothy 2:14, and was by her disobedience foremost in the revolt from God, for this cause she is the first witness of the resurrection, that she might retrieve by her faith in the resurrection the overthrow caused by her disobedience, and that as, by making herself at the beginning a minister and advocate to her husband of the counsels of the serpent, she brought into human life the beginning of evil, and its train of consequences, so, by ministering to His disciples the words of Him Who slew the rebel dragon, she might become to men the guide to faith, whereby with good reason the first proclamation of death is annulled. It is likely, indeed, that by more diligent students a more profitable explanation of the text may be discovered. But even though none such should be found, I think that every devout reader will agree that the one advanced by our opponents is futile, after comparing it with that which we have brought forward. For the one has been fabricated to destroy the glory of the Only-begotten, and nothing more: but the other includes in its scope the aim of the dispensation concerning man. For it has been shown that it was not the intangible, immutable, and invisible God, but the moving, visible, and tangible nature which is proper to humanity, that gave command to Mary to minister the word to His disciples.

Let us also investigate this point — what defense he has to offer on those matters where he was convicted of error by the great Basil, when he banishes the Only-begotten God to the realm of darkness. He says: "As great as the difference between the generate and the ungenerate is, so great is the divergence between Light and Light." Since he has already shown that the difference between the generate and the ungenerate is not merely one of greater or lesser intensity, but that they are diametrically opposed in their meaning, and since he has inferred by logical consequence from his premises that the difference between the light of the Father and that of the Son corresponds to ungeneracy and generation, we must necessarily suppose in the Son not a diminution of light but a complete alienation from light. For just as we cannot say that generation is a modified ungeneracy, but the meaning of the terms γέννησις and ἀγεννησία are absolutely contradictory and mutually exclusive, so if the same distinction is to be preserved between the Light of the Father and that conceived as existing in the Son, it will be logically concluded that the Son is not to be conceived as Light, since he is excluded both from ungeneracy itself and from the light which accompanies that condition — and He who is something different from light will evidently, by consequence, have affinity with its contrary. Since this absurdity results from his principles, Eunomius tries to explain it away by dialectical tricks, saying the following: "For we know, we know the true Light, we know Him who created the light after the heavens and the earth, we have heard the Life and Truth Himself, even Christ, saying to His disciples, 'You are the light of the world,' we have learned from the blessed Paul, when he gives the title of 'Light unapproachable' to the God over all, and by this addition defines and teaches us the transcendent superiority of His Light. And now that we have learned that there is so great a difference between the one Light and the other, we shall not patiently endure even the mere mention of the notion that the conception of light in either case is one and the same." Can he be serious when he advances such arguments in his attempts against the truth, or is he testing the dullness of those who follow his error to see whether they can detect so childish and transparent a fallacy, or have no sense to discern such a barefaced imposition? For I suppose that no one is so senseless as not to perceive the juggling with equivocal terms by which Eunomius deludes both himself and his admirers. The disciples, he says, were called light, and that which was produced in the course of creation is also called light. But who does not know that in these only the name is common, and the thing meant in each case is quite different? For the light of the sun gives discernment to the sight, but the word of the disciples implants in men's souls the illumination of the truth. If, then, he is aware of this difference even in the case of that light, so that he thinks the light of the body is one thing and the light of the soul another, we need no longer discuss the point with him, since his defense itself condemns him if we remain silent. But if in that light he cannot discover such a difference regarding the mode of operation (for it is not, he may say, the light of the eyes that illuminates the flesh and the spiritual light that illuminates the soul, but the operation and the potency of the one light and of the other is the same, operating in the same sphere and on the same objects), then how is it that from the difference between the light of the beams of the sun and that of the words of the Apostles, he infers a similar difference between the Only-begotten Light and the Light of the Father? But the Son, he says, is called the "true" Light, the Father "Light unapproachable." Well, these additional distinctions imply a difference in degree only, and not in kind, between the light of the Son and the light of the Father. He thinks that the true is one thing and the unapproachable another. I suppose there is no one so idiotic as not to see the real identity of meaning in the two terms. For the true and the unapproachable are each of them removed in an equally absolute degree from their contraries. For just as the true does not admit any intermixture of the false, even so the unapproachable does not admit the access of its contrary. For the unapproachable is surely unapproachable by evil. But the light of the Son is not evil, for how can anyone see in evil that which is true? Since, then, the truth is not evil, no one can say that the light which is in the Father is unapproachable by the truth. For if it were to reject the truth it would of course be associated with falsehood. For the nature of contradictories is such that the absence of the better involves the presence of its opposite. If, then, anyone were to say that the Light of the Father was contemplated as remote from the presentation of its opposite, he would interpret the term unapproachable in a manner agreeable to the intention of the Apostle. But if he were to say that unapproachable signified alienation from good, he would suppose nothing else than that God was alien from and at enmity with Himself, being at the same time good and opposed to good. But this is impossible, for the good is akin to good. Accordingly the one Light is not divergent from the other. For the Son is the true Light, and the Father is Light unapproachable. In fact I would make bold to say that the man who should interchange the two attributes would not be wrong. For the true is unapproachable by the false, and on the other side, the unapproachable is found to be in unsullied truth. Accordingly the unapproachable is identical with the true, because that which is signified by each expression is equally inaccessible to evil. What is the difference then that is imagined to exist in these by him who deceives himself and his followers by the equivocal use of the term Light? But let us not pass over this point either without notice: that it is only after garbling the Apostle's words to suit his own fancy that he cites the phrase as if it came from him. For Paul says, "dwelling in light unapproachable." But there is a great difference between being oneself something and being in something. For he who said "dwelling in light unapproachable" did not, by the word dwelling, indicate God Himself, but that which surrounds Him, which in our view is equivalent to the Gospel phrase which tells us that the Father is in the Son. For the Son is true Light, and the truth is unapproachable by falsehood, so then the Son is Light unapproachable in which the Father dwells, or in Whom the Father is.

Let us also investigate this point as well — what defense he has to offer on those matters on which he was convicted of error by the great Basil, when he banishes the Only-begotten God to the realm of darkness, saying, As great as is the difference between the generate and the ungenerate, so great is the divergence between Light and Light. For as he has already shown that the difference between the generate and the ungenerate is not merely one of greater or less intensity, but that they are diametrically opposed as regards their meaning; and since he has inferred by logical consequence from his premises that, as the difference between the light of the Father and that of the Son corresponds to ungeneracy and generation, we must necessarily suppose in the Son not a diminution of light, but a complete alienation from light. For as we cannot say that generation is a modified ungeneracy, but the signification of the terms γέννησις and ἀ γεννησία are absolutely contradictory and mutually exclusive, so, if the same distinction is to be preserved between the Light of the Father and that conceived as existing in the Son, it will be logically concluded that the Son is not henceforth to be conceived as Light, as he is excluded alike from ungeneracy itself, and from the light which accompanies that condition — and He Who is something different from light will evidently, by consequence, have affinity with its contrary — since this absurdity, I say, results from his principles, Eunomius endeavours to explain it away by dialectic artifices, delivering himself as follows: For we know, we know the true Light, we know Him who created the light after the heavens and the earth, we have heard the Life and Truth Himself, even Christ, saying to His disciples, 'You are the light of the world,' we have learned from the blessed Paul, when he gives the title of 'Light unapproachable ' to the God over all, and by the addition defines and teaches us the transcendent superiority of His Light; and now that we have learned that there is so great a difference between the one Light and the other, we shall not patiently endure so much as the mere mention of the notion that the conception of light in either case is one and the same. Can he be serious when he advances such arguments in his attempts against the truth, or is he experimenting upon the dulness of those who follow his error to see whether they can detect so childish and transparent a fallacy, or have no sense to discern such a barefaced imposition? For I suppose that no one is so senseless as not to perceive the juggling with equivocal terms by which Eunomius deludes both himself and his admirers. The disciples, he says, were termed light, and that which was produced in the course of creation is also called light. But who does not know that in these only the name is common, and the thing meant in each case is quite different? For the light of the sun gives discernment to the sight, but the word of the disciples implants in men's souls the illumination of the truth. If, then, he is aware of this difference even in the case of that light, so that he thinks the light of the body is one thing, and the light of the soul another, we need no longer discuss the point with him, since his defense itself condemns him if we hold our peace. But if in that light he cannot discover such a difference as regards the mode of operation, (for it is not, he may say, the light of the eyes that illumines the flesh, and the spiritual light which illumines the soul, but the operation and the potency of the one light and of the other is the same, operating in the same sphere and on the same objects,) then how is it that from the difference between the light of the beams of the sun and that of the words of the Apostles, he infers a like difference between the Only-begotten Light and the Light of the Father? But the Son, he says, is called the ' true ' Light, the Father 'Light unapproachable.' Well, these additional distinctions import a difference in degree only, and not in kind, between the light of the Son and the light of the Father. He thinks that the true is one thing, and the unapproachable another. I suppose there is no one so idiotic as not to see the real identity of meaning in the two terms. For the true and the unapproachable are each of them removed in an equally absolute degree from their contraries. For as the true does not admit any intermixture of the false, even so the unapproachable does not admit the access of its contrary. For the unapproachable is surely unapproachable by evil. But the light of the Son is not evil; for how can any one see in evil that which is true? Since, then, the truth is not evil, no one can say that the light which is in the Father is unapproachable by the truth. For if it were to reject the truth it would of course be associated with falsehood. For the nature of contradictories is such that the absence of the better involves the presence of its opposite. If, then, any one were to say that the Light of the Father was contemplated as remote from the presentation of its opposite, he would interpret the term unapproachable in a manner agreeable to the intention of the Apostle. But if he were to say that unapproachable signified alienation from good, he would suppose nothing else than that God was alien from, and at enmity with, Himself, being at the same time good and opposed to good. But this is impossible: for the good is akin to good. Accordingly the one Light is not divergent from the other. For the Son is the true Light, and the Father is Light unapproachable. In fact I would make bold to say that the man who should interchange the two attributes would not be wrong. For the true is unapproachable by the false, and on the other side, the unapproachable is found to be in unsullied truth. Accordingly the unapproachable is identical with the true, because that which is signified by each expression is equally inaccessible to evil. What is the difference then, that is imagined to exist in these by him who imposes on himself and his followers by the equivocal use of the term Light? But let us not pass over this point either without notice, that it is only after garbling the Apostle's words to suit his own fancy that he cites the phrase as if it came from him. For Paul says, dwelling in light unapproachable 1 Timothy 6:16. But there is a great difference between being oneself something and being in something. For he who said, dwelling in light unapproachable, did not, by the word dwelling, indicate God Himself, but that which surrounds Him, which in our view is equivalent to the Gospel phrase which tells us that the Father is in the Son. For the Son is true Light, and the truth is unapproachable by falsehood; so then the Son is Light unapproachable in which the Father dwells, or in Whom the Father is.

But he puts his strength into his pointless argument and says, "From the facts themselves, and from the oracles that are believed, I present the proof of my statement." Such is his promise, but whether the arguments he advances bear out his claims, the discerning reader will of course consider. The blessed John, he says, after saying that the Word was in the beginning, and after calling Him Life, and then giving the Life the further title of "Light," says a little later, "And the Word was made flesh." If then the Light is Life, and the Word is Life, and the Word was made flesh, it becomes clear from this that the Light became incarnate. What then? Because the Light and the Life, and God and the Word, was revealed in flesh, does it follow that the true Light is different in any degree from the Light which is in the Father? No, the Gospel testifies that even when it had its place in darkness, the light remained unreachable by the contrary element, for it says, "The Light shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not." If then the light when it found its place in darkness had been changed to its opposite and overpowered by gloom, this would have been a strong argument in support of the view of those who wish to show how far inferior this Light is in comparison with that contemplated in the Father. But if the Word, even though it is in the flesh, remains the Word, and if the Light, even though it shines in darkness, is no less Light, without admitting the fellowship of its opposite, and if the Life, even though it is in death, remains secure in Itself, and if God, even though He submits to take upon Himself the form of a servant, does not Himself become a servant, but takes away the slavish subordination and absorbs it into lordship and royalty, making that which was human and lowly to become both Lord and Christ—if all this is so, how does he show by this argument variation of the Light to inferiority, when each Light has in equal measure the property of being inconvertible to evil and unalterable? And how is it that he also fails to observe this, that he who looked on the incarnate Word, Who was both Light and Life and God, recognized through the glory which he saw the Father of glory, and says, "We beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father"?

But he puts his strength into his idle contention and says, From the facts themselves, and from the oracles that are believed, I present the proof of my statement. Such is his promise, but whether the arguments he advances bear out his professions, the discerning reader will of course consider. The blessed John, he says, after saying that the Word was in the beginning, and after calling Him Life, and subsequently giving the Life the further title of 'Light,' says, a little later, 'And the Word was made flesh.' If then the Light is Life, and the Word is Life, and the Word was made flesh, it thence becomes plain that the Light was incarnate. What then? Because the Light and the Life, and God and the Word, was manifested in flesh, does it follow that the true Light is divergent in any degree from the Light which is in the Father? Nay, it is attested by the Gospel that, even when it had place in darkness, the light remained unapproachable by the contrary element: for the Light, he says, shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. If then the light when it found place in darkness had been changed to its contrary, and overpowered by gloom, this would have been a strong argument in support of the view of those who wish to show how far inferior is this Light in comparison with that contemplated in the Father. But if the Word, even though it be in the flesh, remains the Word, and if the Light, even though it shines in darkness, is no less Light, without admitting the fellowship of its contrary, and if the Life, even though it be in death, remains secure in Itself, and if God, even though He submit to take upon Him the form of a servant, does not Himself become a servant, but takes away the slavish subordination and absorbs it into lordship and royalty, making that which was human and lowly to become both Lord and Christ — if all this be so, how does he show by this argument variation of the Light to inferiority, when each Light has in equal measure the property of being inconvertible to evil, and unalterable? And how is it that he also fails to observe this, that he who looked on the incarnate Word, Who was both Light and Life and God, recognized, through the glory which he saw, the Father of glory, and says, We beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father?

But he has reached what he thinks is an irrefutable argument, which we detected long ago lurking in what followed his statements, but which is here proclaimed openly without disguise. For he wants to show that the essence of the Son is subject to suffering and decay, and in no way differs from material nature, which is in a state of flux, so that by this means he may demonstrate His difference from the Father. For he says, If he can show that the God Who is over all, Who is the Light unapproachable, was incarnate or could be incarnate, came under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of men, bore the Cross, let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. If we had brought forward these words as following by necessary consequence from premises laid down by Eunomius, who would not have charged us with unfairness, using an overly subtle dialectic to reduce our opponents' statement to such an absurdity? But as things stand, the fact that they themselves make no attempt to suppress the absurdity that naturally follows from their assumption helps to support our argument that it was not without careful thought that, with the help of truth, we criticized the argument of heresy. For look how undisguised and outspoken is their striving against the Only-begotten God! Indeed, by His enemies His work of mercy is used as a means of disparaging and slandering the Nature of the Son of God, as though not by deliberate choice, but by a compulsion of His Nature he had slipped down to life in the flesh and to the suffering of the Cross! And just as it is the nature of a stone to fall downward and of fire to rise upward, and as these material objects do not exchange their natures with one another, so that the stone should have an upward tendency and fire be pressed down by its weight and sink downwards, even so they claim that suffering was part of the very Nature of the Son, and that for this reason He came to what was related and familiar to Him, but that the Nature of the Father, being free from such sufferings, remained unapproachable by contact with evil. For he says that the God Who is over all, Who is Light unapproachable, neither was incarnate nor could be incarnate. The first of the two statements was quite enough, that the Father did not become incarnate. But now by his addition a double absurdity arises; for he either accuses the Son of evil, or the Father of powerlessness. For if to partake of our flesh is evil, then he attributes evil to the Only-begotten God; but if the loving-kindness toward humanity was good, then he makes out the Father to be powerless for good, by saying that it would not have been in His power to have effectively bestowed such grace by taking flesh. And yet who in the world does not know that life-giving power proceeds to actual operation both in the Father and in the Son? For as the Father raises up the dead and gives them life, He says, even so the Son gives life to whom He wills—meaning obviously by dead us who had fallen from the true life. If then it is in the same way as the Father gives life, and not otherwise, that the Son brings to operation the same grace, how is it that the adversary of God moves his profane tongue against both, insulting the Father by attributing to Him powerlessness for good, and the Son by attributing to Him association with evil? But Light, he says, is not equal to Light, because the one he calls true, and the other unapproachable. Is then the true considered to be a diminution of the unapproachable? Why so? And yet their argument is that the Godhead of the Father must be conceived to be greater and more exalted than that of the Son, because the one is called in the Gospel true God, the other God without the addition of true. How then does the same term, as applied to the Godhead, indicate an enhancement of the concept, and as applied to Light, a diminution? For if they say that the Father is greater than the Son because He is true God, by the same reasoning the Son would be acknowledged to be greater than the Father, because the former is called true Light, and the latter not so. But this Light, says Eunomius, carried into effect the plan of mercy, while the other remained inactive with respect to that gracious action. A new and strange way of determining priority in dignity! They judge that which is ineffective for a benevolent purpose to be superior to that which is effective. But such a notion as this neither exists nor will ever be found among Christians—a notion by which it is claimed that every good that exists in things does not have its origin from the Father. But of goods that pertain to us humans, the crowning blessing is held by all right-minded people to be the return to life; and it is secured by the dispensation carried out by the Lord in His human nature; not that the Father remained aloof, as heresy claims, ineffective and inactive during the time of this dispensation. For this is not what He indicates Who said, He that sent Me is with Me, and The Father that dwells in Me, He does the works. With what right then does heresy attribute to the Son alone the gracious intervention on our behalf, and thereby exclude the Father from having any part or share in our gratitude for its successful outcome? For naturally the repayment of thanks is due to our benefactors alone, and He Who is incapable of benefiting us is outside the scope of our gratitude. Do you see how the course of their profane attack upon the Only-begotten Son has missed its mark, and is working around in natural consequence so as to be directed against the majesty of the Father? And this seems to me to be a necessary result of their method of proceeding. For if he that honors the Son honors the Father, according to the Divine declaration, it is plain on the other side that an assault upon the Son strikes at the Father. But I say that to those who with simplicity of heart receive the preaching of the Cross and the resurrection, the same grace should be a cause of equal thankfulness to the Son and to the Father, and now that the Son has accomplished the Father's will (and this, in the language of the Apostle, is that all men should be saved), they ought for this benefit to honor the Father and the Son alike, inasmuch as our salvation would not have been accomplished, had not the good will of the Father proceeded to actual operation for us through His own power. And we have learned from Scripture that the Son is the power of the Father.

But he has reached the irrefutable argument which we long ago detected lurking in the sequel of his statements, but which is here proclaimed aloud without disguise. For he wishes to show that the essence of the Son is subject to passion, and to decay, and in no wise differs from material nature, which is in a state of flux, that by this means he may demonstrate His difference from the Father. For he says, If he can show that the God Who is over all, Who is the Light unapproachable, was incarnate or could be incarnate, came under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of men, bore the Cross, let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. If these words had been brought forward by us as following by necessary consequence from premises laid down by Eunomius, who would not have charged us with unfairness, in employing an over-subtle dialectic to reduce our adversaries' statement to such an absurdity? But as things stand, the fact that they themselves make no attempt to suppress the absurdity that naturally follows from their assumption, helps to support our contention that it was not without due reflection that, with the help of truth, we censured the argument of heresy. For behold, how undisguised and outspoken is their striving against the Only-begotten God! Nay, by His enemies His work of mercy is reckoned a means of disparaging and maligning the Nature of the Son of God, as though not of deliberate purpose, but by a compulsion of His Nature he had slipped down to life in the flesh, and to the suffering of the Cross! And as it is the nature of a stone to fall downward, and of fire to rise upward, and as these material objects do not exchange their natures one with another, so that the stone should have an upward tendency, and fire be depressed by its weight and sink downwards, even so they make out that passion was part of the very Nature of the Son, and that for this cause He came to that which was akin and familiar to Him, but that the Nature of the Father, being free from such passions, remained unapproachable by the contact of evil. For he says, that the God Who is over all, Who is Light unapproachable, neither was incarnate nor could be incarnate. The first of the two statements was quite enough, that the Father did not become incarnate. But now by his addition a double absurdity arises; for he either charges the Son with evil, or the Father with powerlessness. For if to partake of our flesh is evil, then he predicates evil of the Only-begotten God; but if the lovingkindness to man was good, then he makes out the Father to be powerless for good, by saying that it would not have been in His power to have effectually bestowed such grace by taking flesh. And yet who in the world does not know that life-giving power proceeds to actual operation both in the Father and in the Son? For as the Father raises up the dead and quickens them, He says, even so the Son quickens whom He will, — meaning obviously by dead us who had fallen from the true life. If then it is even so as the Father quickens, and not otherwise, that the Son brings to operation the same grace, how comes it that the adversary of God moves his profane tongue against both, insulting the Father by attributing to Him powerlessness for good, and the Son by attributing to Him association with evil. But Light, he says, is not equal to Light, because the one he calls true, and the other unapproachable. Is then the true considered to be a diminution of the unapproachable? Why so? And yet their argument is that the Godhead of the Father must be conceived to be greater and more exalted than that of the Son, because the one is called in the Gospel true God, the other God without the addition of true. How then does the same term, as applied to the Godhead, indicate an enhancement of the conception, and, as applied to Light, a diminution? For if they say that the Father is greater than the Son because He is true God, by the same showing the Son would be acknowledged to be greater than the Father, because the former is called true Light, and the latter not so. But this Light, says Eunomius, carried into effect the plan of mercy, while the other remained inoperative with respect to that gracious action. A new and strange mode of determining priority in dignity! They judge that which is ineffective for a benevolent purpose to be superior to that which is operative. But such a notion as this neither exists nor ever will be found among Christians — a notion by which it is made out that every good that is in existent things has not its origin from the Father. But of goods that pertain to us men, the crowning blessing is held by all right-minded men to be the return to life; and it is secured by the dispensation carried out by the Lord in His human nature; not that the Father remained aloof, as heresy will have it, ineffective and inoperative during the time of this dispensation. For it is not this that He indicates Who said, He that sent Me is with Me, and The Father that dwells in Me, He does the works. With what right then does heresy attribute to the Son alone the gracious intervention on our behalf, and thereby exclude the Father from having any part or lot in our gratitude for its successful issue? For naturally the requital of thanks is due to our benefactors alone, and He Who is incapable of benefiting us is outside the pale of our gratitude. See you how the course of their profane attack upon the Only-begotten Son has missed its mark, and is working round in natural consequence so as to be directed against the majesty of the Father? And this seems to me to be a necessary result of their method of proceeding. For if he that honours the Son honours the Father, according to the Divine declaration, it is plain on the other side that an assault upon the Son strikes at the Father. But I say that to those who with simplicity of heart receive the preaching of the Cross and the resurrection, the same grace should be a cause of equal thankfulness to the Son and to the Father, and now that the Son has accomplished the Father's will (and this, in the language of the Apostle, is that all men should be saved 1 Timothy 2:4), they ought for this boon to honour the Father and the Son alike, inasmuch as our salvation would not have been wrought, had not the good will of the Father proceeded to actual operation for us through His own power. And we have learned from the Scripture that the Son is the power of the Father 1 Corinthians 1:24.

Let us examine the passage he cites once more. If he can demonstrate, he says, that the God who is over all, who is the unapproachable Light, was incarnate or could be incarnate, then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. The meaning of his words is clear from the very structure of the sentence: he does not believe that it was through His almighty Godhead that the Son proved strong enough for such an act of loving-kindness, but rather that it was by being of a nature subject to suffering that He submitted to the suffering of the Cross. As I reflected and investigated how Eunomius came to stumble into such ideas about the Deity—thinking that on one side the ungenerate Light was unapproachable by its opposite and entirely unharmed and free from every suffering and affection, but that on the other side the generate was intermediate in its physis, so that it did not preserve the Divine unsullied and pure in impassibility, but had an ousia mixed and compounded of opposites, which both reached out to partake of good and at the same time dissolved into a condition subject to suffering—since it was impossible to obtain from Scripture any support for such an absurd theory, the thought occurred to me whether perhaps he was an admirer of Egyptian speculation about the Divine and had mixed their ideas with his views concerning the Only-begotten. For it is reported that they say their elaborate way of constructing their idols, when they adapt the forms of certain irrational animals to human limbs, is a symbolic representation of that mixed nature which they call daemon, and that this is more subtle than that of humans and far surpasses our nature in power, but has the Divine element in it not unmixed or pure, but combined with the nature of the soul and the perceptions of the body, and is receptive of pleasure and pain, neither of which finds place with the ungenerate God. For they too use this term, attributing to the supreme God, as they conceive Him, the attribute of ungeneracy. Thus our wise theologian seems to us to be importing into the Christian creed an Anubis, Isis, or Osiris from the Egyptian shrines, everything except the acknowledgment of their names: but there is no difference in profanity between someone who openly professes the names of idols and someone who, while holding the belief about them in his heart, is nevertheless reluctant to use their names. If, then, it is impossible to derive any support for this impiety from Holy Scripture, while their theory draws all its strength from the riddles of the hieroglyphics, there can certainly be no doubt what right-minded people ought to think about this. But that this accusation we bring is no insulting slander, Eunomius will testify for us by his own words, saying as he does that the ungenerate Light is unapproachable and does not have the power to submit to experiencing affections, but affirming that such a condition is natural and appropriate to the generate: so that humanity need feel no gratitude to the Only-begotten God for what He suffered, if, as they say, it was by the spontaneous action of His physis that He fell into the experience of affections, His ousia, which was capable of being thus affected, being naturally dragged down to this, which deserves no thanks. For who would welcome as a favor that which happens by necessity, even if it is beneficial and profitable? For we do not thank fire for its warmth nor water for its fluidity, as we attribute these qualities to the necessity of their respective natures, because fire cannot be abandoned by its power of warming, nor can water remain stationary on a slope, since the incline spontaneously draws its motion forward. If, then, they say that the benefit accomplished by the Son through His incarnation was by a necessity of His physis, they certainly offer Him no thanks, since they attribute what He did not to an authoritative power but to a natural compulsion. But if, while they experience the benefit of the gift, they disparage the loving-kindness that brought it, I fear their impiety may lead them to the opposite error, and they may consider the condition of the Son, which could be thus affected, worthy of more honor than the freedom from such affections possessed by the Father, making their own advantage the standard of good. For if it had been the case that the Son was incapable of being thus affected, as they claim of the Father, our nature would still have remained in its miserable condition, since there would have been no one to lift up human nature to incorruption through what He Himself experienced—and so it goes unnoticed that the cunning of these quibblers, by the very means it uses in its attempt to destroy the majesty of the Only-begotten God, actually raises human conceptions of Him to a grander and loftier height, seeing that He who has the power to act is more to be honored than one who is powerless for good.

Let us once more notice the passage cited. If he can show, he says, that the God Who is over all, Who is the Light unapproachable, was incarnate, or could be incarnate,….then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. The purport of his words is plain from the very form of the sentence, namely, that he does not think that it was by His almighty Godhead that the Son proved strong for such a form of loving-kindness, but that it was by being of a nature subject to passion that He stooped to the suffering of the Cross. Well, as I pondered and inquired how Eunomius came to stumble into such notions about the Deity, as to think that on the one side the ungenerate Light was unapproachable by its contrary, and entirely unimpaired and free from every passion and affection, but that on the other the generate was intermediate in its nature, so as not to preserve the Divine unsullied and pure in impassibility, but to have an essence mixed and compounded of contraries, which at once stretched out to partake of good, and at the same time melted away into a condition subject to passion, since it was impossible to obtain from Scripture premises to support so absurd a theory, the thought struck me, whether it could be that he was an admirer of the speculations of the Egyptians on the subject of the Divine, and had mixed up their fancies with his views concerning the Only-begotten. For it is reported that they say that their fantastic mode of compounding their idols, when they adapt the forms of certain irrational animals to human limbs, is an enigmatic symbol of that mixed nature which they call dæmon, and that this is more subtle than that of men, and far surpasses our nature in power, but has the Divine element in it not unmingled or uncompounded, but is combined with the nature of the soul and the perceptions of the body, and is receptive of pleasure and pain, neither of which finds place with the ungenerate God. For they too use this name, ascribing to the supreme God, as they imagine Him, the attribute of ungeneracy. Thus our sage theologian seems to us to be importing into the Christian creed an Anubis, Isis, or Osiris from the Egyptian shrines, all but the acknowledgment of their names: but there is no difference in profanity between him who openly makes profession of the names of idols, and him who, while holding the belief about them in his heart, is yet chary of their names. If, then, it is impossible to get out of Holy Scripture any support for this impiety, while their theory draws all its strength from the riddles of the hieroglyphics, assuredly there can be no doubt what right-minded persons ought to think of this. But that this accusation which we bring is no insulting slander, Eunomius shall testify for us by his own words, saying as he does that the ungenerate Light is unapproachable, and has not the power of stooping to experience affections, but affirming that such a condition is germane and akin to the generate: so that man need feel no gratitude to the Only-begotten God for what He suffered, if, as they say, it was by the spontaneous action of His nature that He slipped down to the experience of affections, His essence, which was capable of being thus affected, being naturally dragged down thereto, which demands no thanks. For who would welcome as a boon that which takes place by necessity, even if it be gainful and profitable? For we neither thank fire for its warmth nor water for its fluidity, as we refer these qualities to the necessity of their several natures, because fire cannot be deserted by its power of warming, nor can water remain stationary upon an incline, inasmuch as the slope spontaneously draws its motion onwards. If, then, they say that the benefit wrought by the Son through His incarnation was by a necessity of His nature, they certainly render Him no thanks, inasmuch as they refer what He did, not to an authoritative power, but to a natural compulsion. But if, while they experience the benefit of the gift, they disparage the lovingkindness that brought it, I fear lest their impiety should work round to the opposite error, and lest they should deem the condition of the Son, that could be thus affected, worthy of more honour than the freedom from such affections possessed by the Father, making their own advantage the criterion of good. For if the case had been that the Son was incapable of being thus affected, as they affirm of the Father, our nature would still have remained in its miserable plight, inasmuch as there would have been none to lift up man's nature to incorruption by what He Himself experienced — and so it escapes notice that the cunning of these quibblers, by the very means which it employs in its attempt to destroy the majesty of the Only-begotten God, does but raise men's conceptions of Him to a grander and loftier height, seeing it is the case that He Who has the power to act, is more to be honoured than one who is powerless for good.

I feel that my argument is running away with me, since it does not stay on its regular course. Instead, like some hot-blooded and high-spirited colt, it is carried away by our opponents' blasphemies to wander through the absurdities of their system. So we must restrain it when it would run wild beyond the limits of moderate demonstration of absurd consequences. But the kind reader will surely pardon what we have said, not attributing the absurdity that emerges from our investigation to us, but to those who established such harmful premises. However, we must now turn our attention to another of his statements. He says that our God is also composite, because while we suppose the Light to be common, we still separate one Light from the other by certain special attributes and various differences. For what is united by one common nature but still separated by certain differences and combinations of peculiarities is nonetheless composite. Our answer to this is brief and easily dealt with. For what he brings as an accusation against our doctrines we acknowledge ourselves, if he is not found to establish the same position by his own words. Let us just consider what he has written. He calls the Lord true Light, and the Father unapproachable Light. So by naming each this way, he also acknowledges their commonality with respect to light. But since titles are applied to things because they fit them, as he has often insisted, we do not think that the name of light is used of the Divine Nature merely by itself, apart from some meaning, but rather that it is predicated by virtue of some underlying reality. So by using a common name, they recognize the identity of the things signified, since they have already declared that the natures of things that have the same name cannot be different. Since, then, the meaning of Light is one and the same, the addition of "unapproachable" and "true," according to heretical language, separates the common nature by specific differences, so that the Light of the Father is conceived as one thing, and the Light of the Son as another, separated from each other by special properties. Let him, then, either overthrow his own positions to avoid making the Deity composite by his statements, or let him stop charging us with what he can see contained in his own language. Our statement does not violate the simplicity of the Godhead in this way, since community and specific difference are not ousia, so that the conjunction of these would make the subject composite. Rather, on one side the ousia by itself remains whatever it is in nature, being what it is, while on the other side, everyone with reason would say that these—community and specific difference—are among the accompanying conceptions and attributes. Even in us humans some community with the Divine Nature can be discerned, but Divinity is not thereby humanity, or humanity Divinity. For while we believe that God is good, we also find this character predicated of men in Scripture. But the special meaning in each case establishes a distinction in the community arising from the use of the homonymous term. For He Who is the fountain of goodness is named from it, but he who has some share of goodness also partakes in the name, and God is not therefore composite because He shares with men the title of good. From these considerations it must clearly be allowed that the idea of community is one thing, and that of ousia another, and we are not on that account any more to maintain composition or multiplicity of parts in that simple Nature which has nothing to do with quantity, simply because some of the attributes we contemplate in It are either regarded as special, or have a kind of common significance.

But I feel that my argument is running away with me, for it does not remain in the regular course, but, like some hot-blooded and spirited colt, is carried away by the blasphemies of our opponents to range over the absurdities of their system. Accordingly we must restrain it when it would run wild beyond the bounds of moderation in demonstration of absurd consequences. But the kindly reader will doubtless pardon what we have said, not imputing the absurdity that emerges from our investigation to us, but to those who laid down such mischievous premises. We must, however, now transfer our attention to another of his statements. For he says that our God also is composite, in that while we suppose the Light to be common, we yet separate the one Light from the other by certain special attributes and various differences. For that is none the less composite which, while united by one common nature, is yet separated by certain differences and conjunctions of peculiarities. To this our answer is short and easily dismissed. For what he brings as matter of accusation against our doctrines we acknowledge against ourselves, if he is not found to establish the same position by his own words. Let us just consider what he has written. He calls the Lord true Light, and the Father Light unapproachable. Accordingly, by thus naming each, he also acknowledges their community in respect to light. But as titles are applied to things because they fit them, as he has often insisted, we do not conceive that the name of light is used of the Divine Nature barely, apart from some meaning, but rather that it is predicated by virtue of some underlying reality. Accordingly, by the use of a common name, they recognize the identity of the objects signified, since they have already declared that the natures of those things which have the same name cannot be different. Since, then, the meaning of Light is one and the same, the addition of unapproachable and true, according to the language of heresy, separates the common nature by specific differences, so that the Light of the Father is conceived as one thing, and the Light of the Son as another, separated one from the other by special properties. Let him, then, either overthrow his own positions to avoid making out by his statements that the Deity is composite, or let him abstain from charging against us what he may see contained in his own language. For our statement does not hereby violate the simplicity of the Godhead, since community and specific difference are not essence, so that the conjunction of these should render the subject composite. But on the one side the essence by itself remains whatever it is in nature, being what it is, while, on the other, every one possessed of reason would say that these — community and specific difference — were among the accompanying conceptions and attributes: since even in us men there may be discerned some community with the Divine Nature, but Divinity is not the more on that account humanity, or humanity Divinity. For while we believe that God is good, we also find this character predicated of men in Scripture. But the special signification in each case establishes a distinction in the community arising from the use of the homonymous term. For He Who is the fountain of goodness is named from it; but he who has some share of goodness also partakes in the name, and God is not for this reason composite, that He shares with men the title of good. From these considerations it must obviously be allowed that the idea of community is one thing, and that of essence another, and we are not on that account any the more to maintain composition or multiplicity of parts in that simple Nature which has nothing to do with quantity, because some of the attributes we contemplate in It are either regarded as special, or have a sort of common significance.

But let us move on, if you agree, to another of his statements, and set aside the nonsense in between. He laboriously repeats against our argument the Aristotelian division of existing things, elaborating on genera, species, differentiae, and individuals, and deploying all the technical language of the categories to attack our doctrines. Let us pass over all this and turn our discussion to address his supposedly weighty and irresistible argument. For having braced his argument with Demosthenic fervor, he has presented himself to us as a second Paeanian of Oltiseris, imitating that orator's severity in his struggle against us. I will quote our author's words exactly. Yes, he says, but if the generate is contrary to the ungenerate, and the Generate Light is equally inferior to the Ungenerate Light, then one will be found to be light and the other darkness. Let anyone who has the time learn from his words how sharp his way of dealing with this opposition is, and how exactly it hits the mark. But I would ask this imitator of our words either to say what we have said, or to make his imitation as close as possible, or else, if he deals with our argument according to his own education and ability, to speak in his own voice and not in ours. For I hope no one will so misunderstand our meaning as to suppose that, while generate is contradictory in sense to ungenerate, one is a diminution of the other. For the difference between contradictories is not one of greater or lesser intensity, but rests its opposition on their being mutually exclusive in their meaning: as, for example, we say that a man is asleep or not asleep, sitting or not sitting, that he was or was not, and all the rest following the same pattern, where the denial of one is the assertion of its contradictory. Just as living is not a diminution of not living, but its complete opposite, so we understood having been generated not as a diminution of not having been generated, but as an opposite and contradictory admitting no middle term, so that what is expressed by one has nothing whatever to do with what is expressed by the other in terms of less or more. Let him therefore who says that one of two contradictories is defective compared with the other speak in his own voice, not in ours. For our simple language says that things which correspond to contradictories differ from one another just as their originals do. So even if Eunomius perceives in the Light the same divergence as in the generate compared with the Ungenerate, I will reassert my statement that, just as in the one case the one member of the contradiction has nothing in common with its opposite, so if light is placed on the same side as one of the two contradictories, the remaining place in the figure must of course be assigned to darkness, the necessity of the antithesis arranging the term of light over against its opposite, in accordance with the analogy of the previous contradictory terms generate and ungenerate. Such is the straightforward answer which we, who as our disparaging author says have attempted to write without logical training, deliver in our plain speech to our new Paeanian. But to see how he contended with this contradiction, advancing against us those hot and fire-breathing words of his with Demosthenic intensity, let those who like to have a laugh study the treatise of our orator himself. For our pen is readily roused to refute the notions of impiety, but is quite unsuited to the task of ridiculing the ignorance of untrained minds.

But let us pass on, if it seems good, to another of his statements, and dismiss the nonsense that comes between. He who laboriously reiterates against our argument the Aristotelian division of existent things, has elaborated genera, and species, and differentiæ, and individuals, and advanced all the technical language of the categories for the injury of our doctrines. Let us pass by all this, and turn our discourse to deal with his heavy and irresistible argument. For having braced his argument with Demosthenic fervour, he has started up to our view as a second Pæanian of Oltiseris, imitating that orator's severity in his struggle with us. I will transcribe the language of our author word for word. Yes, he says, but if, as the generate is contrary to the ungenerate, the Generate Light be equally inferior to the Ungenerate Light, the one will be found to be light, the other darkness. Let him who has the leisure learn from his words how pungent is his mode of dealing with this opposition, and how exactly it hits the mark. But I would beg this imitator of our words either to say what we have said, or to make his imitation of it as close as may be, or else, if he deals with our argument according to his own education and ability, to speak in his own person and not in ours. For I hope that no one will so miss our meaning as to suppose that, while generate is contradictory in sense to ungenerate, one is a diminution of the other. For the difference between contradictories is not one of greater or less intensity, but rests its opposition upon their being mutually exclusive in their signification: as, for example, we say that a man is asleep or not asleep, sitting or not sitting, that he was or was not, and all the rest after the same model, where the denial of one is the assertion of its contradictory. As, then, to live is not a diminution of not living, but its complete opposite, even so we conceived having been generated not as a diminution of not having been generated, but as an opposite and contradictory not admitting of any middle term, so that which is expressed by the one has nothing whatever to do with that which is expressed by the other in the way of less or more. Let him therefore who says that one of two contradictories is defective as compared with the other, speak in his own person, not in ours. For our homely language says that things which correspond to contradictories differ from one another even as their originals do. So that, even if Eunomius discerns in the Light the same divergence as in the generate compared with the Ungenerate, I will re-assert my statement, that as in the one case the one member of the contradiction has nothing in common with its opposite, so if light be placed on the same side as one of the two contradictories, the remaining place in the figure must of course be assigned to darkness, the necessity of the antithesis arranging the term of light over against its opposite, in accordance with the analogy of the previous contradictory terms generate and ungenerate. Such is the clumsy answer which we, who as our disparaging author says, have attempted to write without logical training, deliver in our rustic dialect to our new Pæanian. But to see how he contended with this contradiction, advancing against us those hot and fire-breathing words of his with Demosthenic intensity, let those who like to have a laugh study the treatise of our orator itself. For our pen is not very hard to rouse to confute the notions of impiety, but is quite unsuited to the task of ridiculing the ignorance of untutored minds.

Let us now move on to the next stage in his argument: the Only-begotten Himself ascribing to the Father the title due of right to Him alone. For He Who has taught us that the appellation 'good' belongs to Him alone Who is the cause of His own goodness and of all goodness, and is so at all times, and Who refers to Him all good that has ever come into being, would be reluctant to claim for Himself the authority over all things that have come into being, and the title of 'the Existent.' Well, as long as he concealed his blasphemy under some kind of veil, and tried to trap his deceived hearers unknowingly in the mazes of his logic, I thought it necessary to watch his unfair and secretive tactics, and as far as possible to expose in my argument the hidden mischief. But now that he has stripped his falsehood of every disguising mask, and publicly declares his profanity in clear terms, I think it pointless to undergo useless labor in bringing logical methods of refutation against those who make no secret of their impiety. For what further means could we discover to demonstrate their wickedness so effective as that which they themselves show us in their writings ready at hand? He says that the Father alone is worthy of the title of good, that to Him alone such a name is due, on the grounds that even the Son Himself agrees that goodness belongs to Him alone. Our accuser has made our case for us: for perhaps in my earlier statements I was thought by my readers to show a certain reckless arrogance when I attempted to demonstrate that those who fight against Christ made Him out to be alien from the goodness of the Father. But I think it has now been proved by the confession of our opponents that in bringing such a charge against them we were not acting unfairly. For he who says that the title of good belongs of right to the Father only, and that such a designation befits Him alone, publishes abroad, by thus revealing his real meaning, the villainy which he had previously wrapped up in disguise. He says that the title of good befits the Father only. Does he mean the title with the meaning which belongs to the expression, or the title detached from its proper meaning? If on the one hand he merely ascribes to the Father the title of good in a special sense, he is to be pitied for his irrationality in allowing to the Father merely the sound of an empty name. But if he thinks that the concept expressed by the term good belongs to God the Father only, he is to be detested for his impiety, reviving as he does the plague of the Manichæan heresy in his own opinions. For just as health and disease, even so goodness and badness exist on terms of mutual destruction, so that the absence of one is the presence of the other. If then he says that goodness belongs to the Father only, he cuts off everything from every conceivable object in existence except the Father, so that, along with all, the Only-begotten God is shut out from good. For just as he who affirms that man alone is capable of laughter implies thereby that no other animal shares this property, so he who asserts that good is in the Father alone separates all things from that property. If then, as Eunomius declares, the Father alone has by right the title of good, such a term will not be properly applied to anything else. But every impulse of the will either operates in accordance with good, or tends to the contrary. For to be inclined neither one way nor the other, but to remain in a state of balance, is the property of creatures that are inanimate or insensible. If the Father alone is good, having goodness not as something acquired, but in His nature, and if the Son, as heresy would have it, does not share in the nature of the Father, then he who does not share the good essence of the Father is of course at the same time excluded also from share in the title of good. But he who has no claim either to the nature or to the name of good—what he is is certainly not unknown, even though I avoid the blasphemous expression. For it is plain to all that the objective for which Eunomius is so eager is to import into the conception of the Son a suspicion of that which is evil and opposite to good. For what kind of name belongs to him who is not good is clear to everyone who has a share of reason. As he who is not brave is cowardly, as he who is not just is unjust, and as he who is not wise is foolish, so he who is not good clearly has as his own the opposite name, and it is to this that the enemy of Christ wishes to press the conception of the Only-begotten, becoming thereby to the Church another Manes or Bardesanes. These are the sayings regarding which we say that our speech would be no more effective than silence. For if one were to say countless things, and to raise all possible arguments, one could not say anything so damaging about our opponents as what is openly and undisguisedly proclaimed by themselves. For what more bitter charge could one invent against them for malice than that of denying that He is good Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but yet condescended to the low estate of human nature, and did so solely for the love of man? In return for what, tell me, do you thus repay the Lord? (for I will borrow the language of Moses to the Israelites); is He not good, Who when you were soulless dust invested you with Godlike beauty, and raised you up as an image of His own power endowed with soul? Is He not good, Who for your sake took on Him the form of a servant, and for the joy set before Him did not shrink from bearing the sufferings due to your sin, and gave Himself a ransom for your death, and became for our sakes a curse and sin?

Let us now go on to the next stage in his argument:–….the Only-begotten Himself ascribing to the Father the title due of right to Him alone. For He Who has taught us that the appellation 'good' belongs to Him alone Who is the cause of His own goodness and of all goodness, and is so at all times, and Who refers to Him all good that has ever come into being, would be slow to appropriate to Himself the authority over all things that have come into being, and the title of 'the Existent.' Well, so long as he concealed his blasphemy under some kind of veil, and strove to entangle his deluded hearers unawares in the mazes of his dialectic, I thought it necessary to watch his unfair and clandestine dealings, and as far as possible to lay bare in my argument the lurking mischief. But now that he has stripped his falsehood of every mask that could disguise it, and publishes his profanity aloud in categorical terms, I think it superfluous to undergo useless labour in bringing logical modes of confutation to bear upon those who make no secret of their impiety. For what further means could we discover to demonstrate their malignity so efficacious as that which they themselves show us in their writings ready to our hand? He says that the Father alone is worthy of the title of good, that to Him alone such a name is due, on the plea that even the Son Himself agrees that goodness belongs to Him alone. Our accuser has pleaded our cause for us: for perhaps in my former statements I was thought by my readers to show a certain wanton insolence when I endeavoured to demonstrate that the fighters against Christ made Him out to be alien from the goodness of the Father. But I think it has now been proved by the confession of our opponents that in bringing such a charge against them we were not acting unfairly. For he who says that the title of good belongs of right to the Father only, and that such an address befits Him alone, publishes abroad, by thus disclosing his real meaning, the villainy which he had previously wrapped up in disguise. He says that the title of good befits the Father only. Does he mean the title with the signification which belongs to the expression, or the title detached from its proper meaning? If on the one side he merely ascribes to the Father the title of good in a special sense, he is to be pitied for his irrationality in allowing to the Father merely the sound of an empty name. But if he thinks that the conception expressed by the term good belongs to God the Father only, he is to be abominated for his impiety, reviving as he does the plague of the Manichæan heresy in his own opinions. For as health and disease, even so goodness and badness exist on terms of mutual destruction, so that the absence of the one is the presence of the other. If then he says that goodness belongs to the Father only, he cuts off these from every conceivable object in existence except the Father, so that, along with all, the Only-begotten God is shut out from good. For as he who affirms that man alone is capable of laughter implies thereby that no other animal shares this property, so he who asserts that good is in the Father alone separates all things from that property. If then, as Eunomius declares, the Father alone has by right the title of good, such a term will not be properly applied to anything else. But every impulse of the will either operates in accordance with good, or tends to the contrary. For to be inclined neither one way nor the other, but to remain in a state of equipoise, is the property of creatures inanimate or insensible. If the Father alone is good, having goodness not as a thing acquired, but in His nature, and if the Son, as heresy will have it, does not share in the nature of the Father, then he who does not share the good essence of the Father is of course at the same time excluded also from part and lot in the title of good. But he who has no claim either to the nature or to the name of good — what he is assuredly not unknown, even though I forbear the blasphemous expression. For it is plain to all that the object for which Eunomius is so eager is to import into the conception of the Son a suspicion of that which is evil and opposite to good. For what kind of name belongs to him who is not good is manifest to every one who has a share of reason. As he who is not brave is cowardly, as he who is not just is unjust, and as he who is not wise is foolish, so he who is not good clearly has as his own the opposite name, and it is to this that the enemy of Christ wishes to press the conception of the Only-begotten, becoming thereby to the Church another Manes or Bardesanes. These are the sayings in regard of which we say that our utterance would be no more effective than silence. For were one to say countless things, and to arouse all possible arguments, one could not say anything so damaging of our opponents as what is openly and undisguisedly proclaimed by themselves. For what more bitter charge could one invent against them for malice than that of denying that He is good Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but yet condescended to the low estate of human nature, and did so solely for the love of man? In return for what, tell me, do ye thus requite the Lord Deuteronomy 32:6? (for I will borrow the language of Moses to the Israelites); is He not good, Who when you were soulless dust invested you with Godlike beauty, and raised you up as an image of His own power endowed with soul? Is He not good, Who for your sake took on Him the form of a servant, and for the joy set before Him Hebrews 12:2 did not shrink from bearing the sufferings due to your sin, and gave Himself a ransom for your death, and became for our sakes a curse and sin?

Not even Marcion himself, the patron of your opinions, supports you in this. It's true that he shares with you the belief in a dualism of gods and thinks that one is different in physis from the other, but his more courteous view attributes goodness to the God of the Gospel. You, however, actually separate the Only-begotten God from the nature of good, so that you surpass even Marcion in the depravity of your doctrines. However, they claim Scripture on their side and say they are treated unfairly when they are accused of using the very words of Scripture. For they say that the Lord Himself said, "There is none good but one, that is, God" (Matthew 19:17). Accordingly, so that misrepresentation may not prevail against the divine words, we will briefly examine the actual passage in the Gospel. The story concerns the rich man to whom the Lord spoke this word as a young man—the kind of person, I suppose, inclined to enjoy the pleasures of this life—and attached to his possessions, for it says that he was grieved at the advice to part with what he had and that he did not choose to exchange his property for eternal life. This man, when he heard that a teacher of eternal life was in the neighborhood, came to him expecting to live in perpetual luxury with life indefinitely extended, flattering the Lord with the title of good—flattering, I should rather say, not the Lord as we conceive Him, but as He then appeared in the form of a servant. For his character was not such as to enable him to penetrate the outward veil of flesh and see through it into the inner shrine of Deity. The Lord, then, who sees hearts, discerned the motive with which the young man approached Him as a suppliant—that he did so not with a soul intently fixed upon the Divine, but that it was the man whom he besought, calling Him "Good Master," because he hoped to learn from Him some lore by which the approach of death might be hindered. Accordingly, with good reason did He who was thus besought answer even as He was addressed. For as the entreaty was not addressed to God the Word, so correspondingly the answer was delivered to the applicant by the Humanity of Christ, thereby impressing on the youth a double lesson. For He teaches him, by one and the same answer, both the duty of reverencing and paying homage to the Divinity, not by flattering speeches but by his life, by keeping the commandments and buying eternal life at the cost of all possessions, and also the truth that humanity, having been sunk in depravity by reason of sin, is barred from the title of Good. And for this reason He says, "Why do you call Me good?" suggesting in His answer by the word "Me" that human nature which encompassed Him, while by attributing goodness to the Godhead He expressly declared Himself to be good, seeing that He is proclaimed to be God by the Gospel. For had the Only-begotten Son been excluded from the title of God, it would perhaps not have been absurd to think Him alien also from the appellation of good. But if, as is the case, prophets, evangelists, and Apostles proclaim aloud the Godhead of the Only-begotten, and if the name of goodness is attested by the Lord Himself to belong to God, how is it possible that He who is partaker of the Godhead should not be partaker of the goodness too? For that both prophets, evangelists, disciples, and apostles acknowledge the Lord as God, there is no one so uninitiated in divine mysteries as to need to be expressly told. For who does not know that in the forty-fourth Psalm the prophet in his word affirms the Christ to be God, anointed by God? And again, who of all that are conversant with prophecy is unaware that Isaiah, among other passages, thus openly proclaims the Godhead of the Son, where he says: "The Sabeans, men of stature, shall come over to you, and shall be servants to you: they shall come after you bound in fetters, and in you shall they make supplication, because God is in you, and there is no God beside you; for you are God"? For what other God there is who has God in Himself and is Himself God, except the Only-begotten, let them say who do not hearken to the prophecy. But of the interpretation of Emmanuel, and the confession of Thomas after his recognition of the Lord, and the sublime diction of John, as being manifest even to those who are outside the faith, I will say nothing. No, I do not even think it necessary to bring forward in detail the utterances of Paul, since they are, as one may say, in all men's mouths, who gives the Lord the appellation not only of God, but of great God and God over all, saying to the Romans, "Whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever" (Romans 9:5), and writing to his disciple Titus, "According to the appearing of Jesus Christ the great God and our Savior," and to Timothy, proclaims in plain terms, "God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit." Since then the fact has been demonstrated on every side that the Only-begotten God is God, how is it that he who says that goodness belongs to God strives to show that the Godhead of the Son is alien from this ascription, and this though the Lord has actually claimed for Himself the epithet good in the parable of those who were hired into the vineyard? For there, when those who had labored before the others were dissatisfied at all receiving the same pay and deemed the good fortune of the last to be their own loss, the just judge says to one of the murmurers, "Friend, I do you no wrong: did I not agree with you for a penny a day? Look, there you have that which is yours: I will bestow upon this last even as upon you. Have I not power to do what I will with my own? Is your eye evil because I am good?" Of course no one will contest the point that to distribute recompense according to desert is the special function of the judge, and all the disciples of the Gospel agree that the Only-begotten God is Judge, for the Father, He says, judges no man, but has committed all judgment to the Son. But they do not set themselves in opposition to the Scriptures. For they say that the word "one" absolutely points to the Father. For He says, "There is none good but one, that is God." Will truth then lack vigor to plead her own cause? Surely there are many means to easily convict this quibble also of deception. For He who said this concerning the Father spoke also to the Father that other word, "All Mine are Yours, and Yours are Mine, and I am glorified in them" (John 17:10). Now if He says that all that is the Father's is also the Son's, and goodness is one of the attributes pertaining to the Father, either the Son does not have all things if He does not have this, and they will be saying that the Truth lies, or if it is impious to suspect the very Truth of being carried away into falsehood, then He who claimed all that is the Father's as His own thereby asserted that He was not outside of goodness. For He who has the Father in Himself and contains all things that belong to the Father manifestly has His goodness with all things. Therefore the Son is Good. But there is none good, he says, but one, that is God. This is what is alleged by our adversaries, nor do I myself reject the statement. I do not, however, for this cause deny the Godhead of the Son. But he who confesses that the Lord is God by that very confession assuredly also asserts of Him goodness. For if goodness is a property of God, and if the Lord is God, then by our premises the Son is shown to be God. But, says our opponent, the word "one" excludes the Son from participation in goodness. It is easy, however, to show that not even the word "one" separates the Father from the Son. For in all other cases, it is true, the term "one" carries with it the signification of not being coupled with anything else, but in the case of the Father and the Son "one" does not imply isolation. For He says, "I and the Father are one." If, then, the good is one, and a particular kind of unity is contemplated in the Father and the Son, it follows that the Lord, in predicating goodness of one, claimed under the term "one" the title of good also for Himself, who is one with the Father and not severed from oneness of nature.

Not even Marcion himself, the patron of your opinions, supports you in this. It is true that in common with you he holds a dualism of gods, and thinks that one is different in nature from the other, but it is the more courteous view to attribute goodness to the God of the Gospel. You however actually separate the Only-begotten God from the nature of good, that you may surpass even Marcion in the depravity of your doctrines. However, they claim the Scripture on their side, and say that they are hardly treated when they are accused for using the very words of Scripture. For they say that the Lord Himself has said, There is none good but one, that is, God Matthew 19:17. Accordingly, that misrepresentation may not prevail against the Divine words, we will briefly examine the actual passage in the Gospel. The history regards the rich man to whom the Lord spoke this word as young — the kind of person, I suppose, inclined to enjoy the pleasures of this life — and attached to his possessions; for it says that he was grieved at the advice to part with what he had, and that he did not choose to exchange his property for life eternal. This man, when he heard that a teacher of eternal life was in the neighbourhood, came to him in the expectation of living in perpetual luxury, with life indefinitely extended, flattering the Lord with the title of good, — flattering, I should rather say, not the Lord as we conceive Him, but as He then appeared in the form of a servant. For his character was not such as to enable him to penetrate the outward veil of flesh, and see through it into the inner shrine of Deity. The Lord, then, Who sees the hearts, discerned the motive with which the young man approached Him as a suppliant — that he did so, not with a soul intently fixed upon the Divine, but that it was the man whom he besought, calling Him Good Master, because he hoped to learn from Him some lore by which the approach of death might be hindered. Accordingly, with good reason did He Who was thus besought by him answer even as He was addressed. For as the entreaty was not addressed to God the Word, so correspondingly the answer was delivered to the applicant by the Humanity of Christ, thereby impressing on the youth a double lesson. For He teaches him, by one and the same answer, both the duty of reverencing and paying homage to the Divinity, not by flattering speeches but by his life, by keeping the commandments and buying life eternal at the cost of all possessions, and also the truth that humanity, having been sunk in depravity by reason of sin, is debarred from the title of Good: and for this reason He says, Why do you call Me good? suggesting in His answer by the word Me that human nature which encompassed Him, while by attributing goodness to the Godhead He expressly declared Himself to be good, seeing that He is proclaimed to be God by the Gospel. For had the Only-begotten Son been excluded from the title of God, it would perhaps not have been absurd to think Him alien also from the appellation of good. But if, as is the case, prophets, evangelists, and Apostles proclaim aloud the Godhead of the Only-begotten, and if the name of goodness is attested by the Lord Himself to belong to God, how is it possible that He Who is partaker of the Godhead should not be partaker of the goodness too? For that both prophets, evangelists, disciples and apostles acknowledge the Lord as God, there is none so uninitiated in Divine mysteries as to need to be expressly told. For who knows not that in the forty-fourth Psalm the prophet in his word affirms the Christ to be God, anointed by God? And again, who of all that are conversant with prophecy is unaware that Isaiah, among other passages, thus openly proclaims the Godhead of the Son, where he says: The Sabeans, men of stature, shall come over unto you, and shall be servants unto you: they shall come after you bound in fetters, and in you shall they make supplication, because God is in you, and there is no God beside you; for you are God. For what other God there is Who has God in Himself, and is Himself God, except the Only-begotten, let them say who hearken not to the prophecy; but of the interpretation of Emmanuel, and the confession of Thomas after his recognition of the Lord, and the sublime diction of John, as being manifest even to those who are outside the faith, I will say nothing. Nay, I do not even think it necessary to bring forward in detail the utterances of Paul, since they are, as one may say, in all men's mouths, who gives the Lord the appellation not only of God, but of great God and God over all, saying to the Romans, Whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, Who is over all, God blessed for ever Romans 9:5, and writing to his disciple Titus, According to the appearing of Jesus Christ the great God and our Saviour, and to Timothy, proclaims in plain terms, God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit. Since then the fact has been demonstrated on every side that the Only-begotten God is God, how is it that he who says that goodness belongs to God, strives to show that the Godhead of the Son is alien from this ascription, and this though the Lord has actually claimed for Himself the epithet good in the parable of those who were hired into the vineyard? For there, when those who had laboured before the others were dissatisfied at all receiving the same pay, and deemed the good fortune of the last to be their own loss, the just judge says to one of the murmurers, Friend, I do you no wrong: did I not agree with you for a penny a day? Lo, there you have that is yours: I will bestow upon this last even as upon you. Have I not power to do what I will with my own? Is your eye evil because I am good? Of course no one will contest the point that to distribute recompense according to desert is the special function of the judge; and all the disciples of the Gospel agree that the Only-begotten God is Judge; for the Father, He says, judges no man, but has committed all judgment unto the Son. But they do not set themselves in opposition to the Scriptures. For they say that the word one absolutely points to the Father. For He says, There is none good but one, that is God. Will truth then lack vigour to plead her own cause? Surely there are many means easily to convict of deception this quibble also. For He Who said this concerning the Father spoke also to the Father that other word, All Mine are Yours, and Yours are Mine, and I am glorified in them John 17:10. Now if He says that all that is the Father's is also the Son's, and goodness is one of the attributes pertaining to the Father, either the Son has not all things if He has not this, and they will be saying that the Truth lies, or if it is impious to suspect the very Truth of being carried away into falsehood, then He Who claimed all that is the Father's as His own, thereby asserted that He was not outside of goodness. For He Who has the Father in Himself, and contains all things that belong to the Father, manifestly has His goodness with all things. Therefore the Son is Good. But there is none good, he says, but one, that is God. This is what is alleged by our adversaries: nor do I myself reject the statement. I do not, however, for this cause deny the Godhead of the Son. But he who confesses that the Lord is God, by that very confession assuredly also asserts of Him goodness. For if goodness is a property of God, and if the Lord is God, then by our premises the Son is shown to be God. But, says our opponent, the word 'one' excludes the Son from participation in goodness. It is easy, however, to show that not even the word one separates the Father from the Son. For in all other cases, it is true, the term one carries with it the signification of not being coupled with anything else, but in the case of the Father and the Son one does not imply isolation. For He says, I and the Father are one. If, then, the good is one, and a particular kind of unity is contemplated in the Father and the Son, it follows that the Lord, in predicating goodness of one, claimed under the term one the title of good also for Himself, Who is one with the Father, and not severed from oneness of nature.

But so that the research and learning of our impressive author may be fully revealed, we will examine sentence by sentence how he presents his views. The Son, he says, does not claim the dignity of the Existent, using the word dignity to mean the actual fact of being—how skillfully he knows how to match words to things! And since the Son exists because of the Father, Eunomius says that He is alienated from Himself on the grounds that the ousia which is supreme over Him draws to itself the concept of the Existent. This is much the same as if someone were to say that a person who is bought for money, insofar as he exists in his own being, is not the person bought but rather the purchaser, because his essential personal existence is absorbed into the nature of the one who has acquired authority over him. Such are the lofty ideas of our divine teacher—but what is the proof of his statements? The Only-begotten, he says, Himself assigns to the Father the title that belongs by right to Him alone, and then he introduces the point that the Father alone is good. Where in this does the Son disclaim the title of Existent? Yet this is what Eunomius is getting at when he continues word by word as follows: For He who has taught us that the name 'good' belongs to Him alone who is the cause of His own goodness and of all goodness, and is so at all times, and who refers to Him all good that has ever come into being, would be reluctant to claim for Himself the authority over all things that have come into being, and the title of 'the Existent.' What does authority have to do with the topic? And how along with this is the Son also cut off from the title of Existent? But really I do not know what one should do about this—laugh at the lack of education, or pity the harmful foolishness it displays. For the expression "His own," not used according to its natural meaning and as those who know how to use language normally use it, demonstrates his extensive knowledge of the grammar of pronouns, which even little boys master easily with their teachers, and his ridiculous wandering from the subject to what has nothing to do either with his argument or with the logical form of that argument—namely, that the Son has no share in the title of Existent, an assertion suited to his monstrous inventions—this and similar absurdities seem combined together to provoke laughter, so that perhaps readers of a more careless sort experience such an inclination and are amused by the disconnectedness of his arguments. But that God the Word should not exist, or that He should at least not be good—and this is what Eunomius maintains when he says that He does not claim the title of Existent and good—and to assert that the authority over all things that come into being does not belong to Him—this calls for our tears and for a wail of mourning.

But that the research and culture of our imposing author may be completely disclosed, we will consider sentence by sentence his presentment of his sentiments. The Son, he says, does not appropriate the dignity of the Existent, giving the name of dignity to the actual fact of being:– (with what propriety he knows how to adapt words to things!)– and since He is by reason of the Father, he says that He is alienated from Himself on the ground that the essence which is supreme over Him attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. This is much the same as if one were to say that he who is bought for money, in so far as he is in his own existence, is not the person bought, but the purchaser, inasmuch as his essential personal existence is absorbed into the nature of him who has acquired authority over him. Such are the lofty conceptions of our divine: but what is the demonstration of his statements?…. the Only-begotten, he says, Himself ascribing to the Father the title due of right to Him alone, and then he introduces the point that the Father alone is good. Where in this does the Son disclaim the title of Existent? Yet this is what Eunomius is driving at when he goes on word for word as follows:– For He Who has taught us that the appellation 'good' belongs to Him alone Who is the cause of His own goodness and of all goodness, and is so at all times, and Who refers to Him all good that has ever come into being, would be slow to appropriate to Himself the authority over all things that have come into being, and the title of 'the Existent.' What has authority to do with the context? And how along with this is the Son also alienated from the title of Existent? But really I do not know what one ought rather to do at this — to laugh at the want of education, or to pity the pernicious folly which it displays. For the expression, His own, not employed according to the natural meaning, and as those who know how to use language are wont to use it, attests his extensive knowledge of the grammar of pronouns, which even little boys get up with their masters without trouble, and his ridiculous wandering from the subject to what has nothing to do either with his argument or with the form of that argument, considered as syllogistic, namely, that the Son has no share in the appellation of Existent — an assertion adapted to his monstrous inventions — this and similar absurdities seem combined together for the purpose of provoking laughter; so that it may be that readers of the more careless sort experience some such inclination, and are amused by the disjointedness of his arguments. But that God the Word should not exist, or that He at all events should not be good (and this is what Eunomius maintains when he says that He does not appropriate the title of Existent and good), and to make out that the authority over all things that come into being does not belong to him — this calls for our tears, and for a wail of mourning.

Eunomius doesn't just make this kind of statement once in a moment of reckless impulse and then try to correct his mistake. Instead, he lingers over this malicious claim and tries in his later statements to outdo what he said before. As he continues, he says the Son is as far below the Divine Nature as the nature of angels is below the Son's own nature. He doesn't say this directly in these exact words, but he tries through what he does say to create this impression. Readers can judge for themselves what his words mean. Here is what he writes: "Who, by being called 'Angel,' clearly showed by Whom He published His words, and Who is the Existent, while by being addressed also as God, He showed His superiority over all things. For He Who is the God of all things that were made by Him, is the Angel of the God over all." Anger floods my heart and interrupts my argument, and in this emotional state my reasoning gets lost in the turmoil of rage these words provoke. Perhaps I can be forgiven for feeling this way. Whose anger wouldn't be stirred by such blasphemy, especially when we remember how the Apostle proclaims that every angelic nature is subject to the Lord, and as proof of this teaching he appeals to the sublime statements of the prophets: "When He brings the first-begotten into the world, He says, And let all the angels of God worship Him, and, Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever, and, You are the same, and Your years shall not fail?" When the Apostle has gone through all this reasoning to demonstrate the unapproachable majesty of the Only-begotten God, what should I feel when I hear from this opponent of Christ that the Lord of Angels is Himself only an Angel? And he doesn't let this statement slip out accidentally, but works hard to maintain this monstrous invention, so that he can establish that his Lord has no superiority over John and Moses. For the word says about them, "This is he of whom it is written, 'Behold I send my angel before your face.'" John therefore is an angel. But this enemy of the Lord, even though he grants his Lord the name of God, still makes Him out to be on the same level as the deity of Moses, since Moses too was a servant of the God over all and was made a god to the Egyptians. Yet this phrase "over all," as has been previously noted, belongs to the Son along with the Father, since the Apostle has explicitly attributed this title to Him when he says, "Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, Who is God over all" (Romans 9:5). But this man demotes the Lord of angels to the rank of an angel, as if he had never heard that the angels are ministering spirits and a flame of fire. By using these distinctive terms the Apostle makes the difference between the various subjects clear and unmistakable, defining the subordinate nature as spirits and fire, and distinguishing the supreme power by the name of Godhead. And yet, though there are so many who proclaim the glory of the Only-begotten God, Eunomius lifts up his single voice against them all, calling the Christ an angel of the God over all. By contrasting Him with the God over all, he defines Him as one of the all things, and by giving Him the same name as the angels, he tries to establish that He in no way differs from them in nature, since he has often said before that all things which share the same name cannot be different in nature. Does the argument still lack critics when it concerns a man who declares in so many words that the Angel does not publish His own word, but that of the Existent? This is how he tries to show that the Word Who was in the beginning, the Word Who was God, is not Himself the Word, but is the Word of some other Word, being its servant and angel. And everyone knows that the only opposite of the Existent is the nonexistent. So when he contrasts the Son with the Existent, he is clearly acting like a Jew, robbing Christian doctrine of the Person of the Only-begotten. By saying He is excluded from the title of the Existent, he is surely trying to establish also that He is outside the realm of existence, because if he granted Him existence, he wouldn't quarrel about the sound of the word.

For it is not as if he had but let fall something of the kind just once under some headlong and inconsiderate impulse, and in what followed had striven to retrieve his error: no, he dallies lingeringly with the malignity, striving in his later statements to surpass what had gone before. For as he proceeds, he says that the Son is the same distance below the Divine Nature as the nature of angels is subjected below His own, not indeed saying this in so many words, but endeavouring by what he does say to produce such an impression. The reader may judge for himself the meaning of his words: they run as follows — Who, by being called 'Angel,' clearly showed by Whom He published His words, and Who is the Existent, while by being addressed also as God, He showed His superiority over all things. For He Who is the God of all things that were made by Him, is the Angel of the God over all. Indignation rushes into my heart and interrupts my discourse, and under this emotion arguments are lost in a turmoil of anger roused by words like these. And perhaps I may be pardoned for feeling such emotion. For whose resentment would not be stirred within him at such profanity, when he remembers how the Apostle proclaims that every angelic nature is subject to the Lord, and in witness of his doctrine invokes the sublime utterances of the prophets:– When He brings the first-begotten into the world, He says, And let all the angels of God worship Him, and, Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever, and, You are the same, and Your years shall not fail? When the Apostle has gone through all this argument to demonstrate the unapproachable majesty of the Only-begotten God, what must I feel when I hear from the adversary of Christ that the Lord of Angels is Himself only an Angel — and when he does not let such a statement fall by chance, but puts forth his strength to maintain this monstrous invention, so that it may be established that his Lord has no superiority over John and Moses? For the word says concerning them, This is he of whom it is written, 'Behold I send my angel before your face. ' John therefore is an angel. But the enemy of the Lord, even though he grants his Lord the name of God, yet makes Him out to be on a level with the deity of Moses, since he too was a servant of the God over all, and was constituted a god to the Egyptians. And yet this phrase, over all, as has been previously observed, is common to the Son with the Father, the Apostle having expressly ascribed such a title to Him, when he says, Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, Who is God over all Romans 9:5. But this man degrades the Lord of angels to the rank of an angel, as though he had not heard that the angels are ministering spirits, and a flame of fire. For by the use of these distinctive terms does the Apostle make the difference between the several subjects clear and unmistakable, defining the subordinate nature to be spirits and fire, and distinguishing the supreme power by the name of Godhead. And yet, though there are so many that proclaim the glory of the Only-begotten God, against them all Eunomius lifts up his single voice, calling the Christ an angel of the God over all, defining Him, by thus contrasting Him with the God over all, to be one of the all things, and, by giving Him the same name as the angels, trying to establish that He no wise differs from them in nature: for he has often previously said that all those things which share the same name cannot be different in nature. Does the argument, then, still lack its censors, as it concerns a man who proclaims in so many words that the Angel does not publish His own word, but that of the Existent? For it is by this means that he tries to show that the Word Who was in the beginning, the Word Who was God, is not Himself the Word, but is the Word of some other Word, being its minister and angel. And who knows not that the only opposite to the Existent is the nonexistent? So that he who contrasts the Son with the Existent, is clearly playing the Jew, robbing the Christian doctrine of the Person of the Only-begotten. For in saying that He is excluded from the title of the Existent, he is assuredly trying to establish also that He is outside the pale of existence: for surely if he grants Him existence, he will not quarrel about the sound of the word.

But Eunomius tries to support his absurdity with Scripture and puts Moses forward as his advocate against the truth. As if this were where he got his arguments, he freely presents us with his own inventions, saying: "He who sent Moses was the Existent himself, but He by whom He sent and spoke was the Angel of the Existent, and the God of all else." However, that his statement is not drawn from Scripture can be conclusively proven by Scripture itself. But if he says this is the meaning of what is written, we must examine the original language of Scripture. Let us first notice that Eunomius, after calling the Lord God of all things after him, allows him no superiority compared to the angelic nature. For neither did Moses, when he heard that he was made a god to Pharaoh, pass beyond the limits of humanity, but while in nature (physis) he was equal to his fellow humans, he was raised above them by superior authority, and being called a god did not prevent him from being human. In the same way, Eunomius makes out the Son to be one of the angels, while trying to cover over such an error with the title of Godhead in the manner described, allowing him the title of God in some equivocal sense. Let us again set down and examine the very words in which he delivers his blasphemy: "He who sent Moses was the Existent himself, but He by whom He sent was the Angel of the Existent"—this, namely Angel, being the title he gives his Lord. Well, our author's absurdity is refuted by Scripture itself, in the passage where Moses begs the Lord not to entrust an angel with leading the people, but to conduct their journey himself. The passage reads: God is speaking: "Go, get down, guide this people to the place I have told you about: behold my Angel shall go before you on the day when I visit." And shortly after he says again, "And I will send my Angel before you." Then, a little after what immediately follows, comes the servant's plea to God, which goes like this: "If I have found favor in your sight, let my Lord go among us," and again, "If you yourself do not go with us, do not carry me up from here"; and then God's answer to Moses: "I will do for you this thing also that you have said, for you have found favor in my sight, and I know you above all men." Therefore, if Moses begs that the people not be led by an angel, and if He who was speaking with him agrees to become his fellow-traveler and guide of the army, it is clearly shown that He who made himself known by the title of the Existent is the Only-begotten God.

But he strives to prop up his absurdity by the testimony of Scripture, and puts forth Moses as his advocate against the truth. For as though that were the source from which he drew his arguments, he freely sets forth to us his own fables, saying, He Who sent Moses was the Existent Himself, but He by Whom He sent and spoke was the Angel of the Existent, and the God of all else. That his statement, however, is not drawn from Scripture, may be conclusively proved by Scripture itself. But if he says that this is the sense of what is written, we must examine the original language of Scripture. Moreover let us first notice that Eunomius, after calling the Lord God of all things after Him, allows Him no superiority in comparison with the angelic nature. For neither did Moses, when he heard that he was made a god to Pharaoh, pass beyond the bounds of humanity, but while in nature he was on an equality with his fellows, he was raised above them by superiority of authority, and his being called a god did not hinder him from being man. So too in this case Eunomius, while making out the Son to be one of the angels, salves over such an error by the appellation of Godhead, in the manner expressed, allowing Him the title of God in some equivocal sense. Let us once more set down and examine the very words in which he delivers his blasphemy. He Who sent Moses was the Existent Himself, but He by Whom He sent was the Angel of the Existent — this, namely Angel, being the title he gives his Lord. Well, the absurdity of our author is refuted by the Scripture itself, in the passage where Moses beseeches the Lord not to entrust an angel with the leadership of the people, but Himself to conduct their march. The passage runs thus: God is speaking, Go, get you down, guide this people unto the place of which I have spoken unto you: behold Mine Angel shall go before you in the day when I visit. And a little while after He says again, And I will send Mine Angel before you. Then, a little after what immediately follows, comes the supplication to God on the part of His servant, running on this wise, If I have found grace in Your sight, let my Lord go among us, and again, If You Yourself go not with us, carry me not up hence; and then the answer of God to Moses, I will do for you this thing also that you have spoken: for you have found grace in My sight, and I know you above all men. Accordingly, if Moses begs that the people may not be led by an angel, and if He Who was discoursing with him consents to become his fellow-traveller and the guide of the army, it is hereby manifestly shown that He Who made Himself known by the title of the Existent is the Only-begotten God.

If anyone disagrees with this, he will show himself to be a supporter of the Jewish position by not associating the Son with the deliverance of the people. For if, on the one hand, it was not an angel who went forth with the people, and if, on the other hand, as Eunomius claims, the One who was revealed by the name of the Existent is not the Only-begotten, this amounts to nothing less than transferring the teachings of the synagogue to the Church of God. Therefore, they must necessarily admit one of two alternatives: either that the Only-begotten God never appeared to Moses, or that the Son is Himself the Existent, from whom the word came to His servant. But he contradicts what was said earlier, claiming that Scripture itself tells us that the voice of an angel was involved, and that the message of the Existent was conveyed in this way. However, this is not a contradiction but a confirmation of our view. For we too say plainly that the prophet, wishing to make clear to people the mystery concerning Christ, called the Self-Existent Angel, so that the meaning of the words would not be referred to the Father, as would have happened if the title of Existent alone had appeared throughout the passage. But just as our spoken word is the revealer and messenger (or angel) of the thoughts of the mind, so we affirm that the true Word who was in the beginning, when He announces the will of His own Father, is called Angel (or Messenger), a title given to Him because of His function of conveying the message. And just as the exalted John, having first called Him Word, then introduces the further truth that the Word was God, so that our thoughts might not immediately turn to the Father, as they would have if the title of God had been put first, so too does the great Moses, after first calling Him Angel, teach us in the following words that He is none other than the Self-Existent Himself, so that the mystery concerning the Christ might be revealed in advance, with Scripture assuring us by the name Angel that the Word is the interpreter of the Father's will, and by the title of the Self-Existent, of the closeness of relationship existing between the Son and the Father. And if he should bring forward Isaiah also as calling Him the Angel of mighty counsel, even this will not undermine our argument. For there, in clear and undeniable terms, the prophecy indicates the dispensation of His Humanity; for he says, unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon His shoulder, and His name is called the Angel of mighty counsel. And it is with this in view, I suppose, that David describes the establishment of His kingdom, not as though He were not a King, but in the sense that the humiliation to the condition of a servant which the Lord underwent as part of the dispensation was taken up and absorbed into the majesty of His Kingdom. For he says, I was established King by Him on His holy hill of Sion, declaring the ordinance of the Lord. Accordingly, He who through Himself reveals the goodness of the Father is called Angel and Word, Seal and Image, and all similar titles with the same purpose. For just as the Angel (or Messenger) gives information from someone, so the Word reveals the thought within, the Seal shows by its own impression the original pattern, and the Image by itself interprets the beauty of that of which it is the image, so that in their meaning all these terms are equivalent to one another. For this reason the title Angel is placed before that of the Self-Existent, with the Son being called Angel as the exponent of His Father's will, and the Existent as having no name that could possibly give knowledge of His essence, but transcending all the power of names to express. Therefore also His name is testified by the writing of the Apostle to be above every name, not as though it were some particular name preferred above all others, though still comparable with them, but rather in the sense that He who truly is is above every name.

If any one gainsays this, he will show himself to be a supporter of the Jewish persuasion in not associating the Son with the deliverance of the people. For if, on the one hand, it was not an angel that went forth with the people, and if, on the other, as Eunomius would have it, He Who was manifested by the name of the Existent is not the Only-begotten, this amounts to nothing less than transferring the doctrines of the synagogue to the Church of God. Accordingly, of the two alternatives they must needs admit one, namely, either that the Only-begotten God on no occasion appeared to Moses, or that the Son is Himself the Existent, from Whom the word came to His servant. But he contradicts what has been said above, alleging the Scripture itself which informs us that the voice of an angel was interposed, and that it was thus that the discourse of the Existent was conveyed. This, however, is no contradiction, but a confirmation of our view. For we too say plainly, that the prophet, wishing to make manifest to men the mystery concerning Christ, called the Self-Existent Angel, that the meaning of the words might not be referred to the Father, as it would have been if the title of Existent alone had been found throughout the discourse. But just as our word is the revealer and messenger (or angel) of the movements of the mind, even so we affirm that the true Word that was in the beginning, when He announces the will of His own Father, is styled Angel (or Messenger), a title given to Him on account of the operation of conveying the message. And as the sublime John, having previously called Him Word, so introduces the further truth that the Word was God, that our thoughts might not at once turn to the Father, as they would have done if the title of God had been put first, so too does the mighty Moses, after first calling Him Angel, teach us in the words that follow that He is none other than the Self-Existent Himself, that the mystery concerning the Christ might be foreshown, by the Scripture assuring us by the name Angel, that the Word is the interpreter of the Father's will, and, by the title of the Self-Existent, of the closeness of relation subsisting between the Son and the Father. And if he should bring forward Isaiah also as calling Him the Angel of mighty counsel, not even so will he overthrow our argument. For there, in clear and uncontrovertible terms, there is indicated by the prophecy the dispensation of His Humanity; for unto us, he says, a Child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon His shoulder, and His name is called the Angel of mighty counsel. And it is with an eye to this, I suppose, that David describes the establishment of His kingdom, not as though He were not a King, but in the view that the humiliation to the estate of a servant to which the Lord submitted by way of dispensation, was taken up and absorbed into the majesty of His Kingdom. For he says, I was established King by Him on His holy hill of Sion, declaring the ordinance of the Lord. Accordingly, He Who through Himself reveals the goodness of the Father is called Angel and Word, Seal and Image, and all similar titles with the same intention. For as the Angel (or Messenger) gives information from some one, even so the Word reveals the thought within, the Seal shows by Its own stamp the original mould, and the Image by Itself interprets the beauty of that whereof It is the image, so that in their signification all these terms are equivalent to one another. For this reason the title Angel is placed before that of the Self-Existent, the Son being termed Angel as the exponent of His Father's will, and the Existent as having no name that could possibly give a knowledge of His essence, but transcending all the power of names to express. Wherefore also His name is testified by the writing of the Apostle to be above every name Philippians 2:9, not as though it were some one name preferred above all others, though still comparable with them, but rather in the sense that He Who verily is is above every name.

After this, fearing to extend his reply to great length, he passes by most of his adversary's statements as already refuted. But the remainder, for the sake of those who deem them of much force, he briefly summarizes, and refutes the blasphemy of Eunomius, who says of the Lord also that He is what animals and plants in all creation are, non-existent before their own generation; and so with the production of frogs; alas for the blasphemy!

But I must move on quickly, because I can see that my treatise has already gone beyond reasonable limits, and I'm afraid that people might think I'm talkative and excessive in my speech if I drag out my answer too long, even though I have deliberately skipped over many parts of my opponent's treatise so that my argument wouldn't stretch into tens of thousands of words. For more serious readers, even a lack of brevity gives reason for criticism; but for those whose minds don't focus on what is useful but on the preferences of people who are lazy and not serious, their wish and desire is to get through as much of the journey as possible in just a few steps. So what should we do when Eunomius' blasphemy pulls us along? Should we follow his every move? Or is it perhaps unnecessary and merely talkative to spend our efforts over and over again on similar arguments? Because all their reasoning that follows is consistent with what we have already examined, and presents no new point beyond what has already been said. So if we have succeeded in completely demolishing his previous statements, the rest fall along with them. But in case argumentative and stubborn people should think that the strongest part of their case is in what I have left out, for this reason it may perhaps be necessary to touch briefly on what remains.

But I must hasten on, for I see that my treatise has already extended beyond bounds, and I fear that I may be thought garrulous and inordinate in my talk, if I prolong my answer to excess, although I have intentionally passed by many parts of my adversary's treatise, that my argument might not be spun out to many myriads of words. For to the more studious even the want of conciseness gives an occasion for disparagement; but as for those whose mind looks not to what is of use, but to the fancy of those who are idle and not in earnest, their wish and prayer is to get over as much of the journey as they can in a few steps. What then ought we to do when Eunomius' profanity draws us on? Are we to track his every turn? Or is it perhaps superfluous and merely garrulous to spend our energies over and over again on similar encounters? For all their argument that follows is in accordance with what we have already investigated, and presents no fresh point in addition to what has gone before. If then we have succeeded in completely overthrowing his previous statements, the remainder fall along with them. But in case the contentious and obstinate should think that the strongest part of their case is in what I have omitted, for this reason it may perhaps be necessary to touch briefly upon what remains.

He says that the Lord did not exist before His own generation—though he cannot prove that the Lord was ever separated from the Father in any way. He says this without citing any Scripture to support his claim, but instead maintains his position through his own arguments. Yet this characteristic has been shown to be common to all parts of creation. Not a frog, not a worm, not a beetle, not a blade of grass, nor any other of the most insignificant things existed before its own formation. So what he labors with great effort to establish through his dialectical skill about the Son has already been acknowledged as true for any random parts of creation. His mighty labor amounts to showing that the Only-begotten God, by sharing attributes, is on the same level as the lowest of created things. Accordingly, the fact that their opinions about the Only-begotten God coincide with their view of how frogs come into being is sufficient evidence of their doctrinal perversity. Next he insists that not existing before His generation is equivalent in fact and meaning to not being ungenerate. Once again the same argument will serve me in dealing with this too—that one would not be wrong in saying the same thing about a dog, or a flea, or a snake, or any of the meanest creatures you choose, since for a dog not to exist before its generation is equivalent in fact and meaning to its not being ungenerate. But if, according to the definition they have so often laid down, all things that share in attributes also share in physis, and if it is an attribute of the dog and of each of the others not to exist before generation—which is what Eunomius thinks fit to maintain also of the Son—the reader will see for himself the conclusion of this demonstration by logical process.

He says that the Lord did not exist before His own generation — he who cannot prove that He was in anything separated from the Father. And this he says, not quoting any Scripture as a warrant for his assertion, but maintaining his proposition by arguments of his own. But this characteristic has been shown to be common to all parts of the creation. Not a frog, not a worm, not a beetle, not a blade of grass, nor any other of the most insignificant objects, existed before its own formation: so that what by aid of his dialectic skill he tries with great labour and pains to establish to be the case with the Son, has previously been acknowledged to be true of any chance portions of the creation, and our author's mighty labour is to show that the Only-begotten God, by participation of attributes, is on a level with the lowest of created things. Accordingly the fact of the coincidence of their opinions concerning the Only-begotten God, and their view of the mode in which frogs come into being, is a sufficient indication of their doctrinal pravity. Next he urges that not to be before His generation, is equivalent in fact and meaning to not being ungenerate. Once more the same argument will fit my hand in dealing with this too — that a man would not be wrong in saying the same thing of a dog, or a flea, or a snake, or any one you please of the meanest creatures, since for a dog not to exist before his generation is equivalent in fact and meaning to his not being ungenerate. But if, in accord with the definition they have so often laid down, all things that share in attributes share also in nature, and if it is an attribute of the dog, and of the rest severally, not to exist before generation, which is what Eunomius thinks fit to maintain also of the Son, the reader will by logical process see for himself the conclusion of this demonstration.

Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation both intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power and the commission for creation. He presents the Son as being entrusted with the task of creation as if He were a craftsman hired by someone, receiving His power of creation as something added from outside, in the same way that destiny decrees people's lot in life at their birth according to certain combinations and positions of the stars. Thus, passing over most of what Eunomius had written, Gregory refutes his blasphemy that the Maker of all things came into being in the same manner as the earth and the angels, and that the hypostasis of the Only-begotten differs in no way from the genesis of all things. Gregory reproaches him for showing no reverence for the divine mystery or the custom of the Church, and for not following any teacher of pious doctrine in his attempt to discover godliness, but instead following Manichaeus, Colluthus, Arius, Aetius, and others like them. Eunomius supposes that Christianity in general is foolishness, and that the customs of the Church and the venerable sacraments are a joke. In this he differs in no way from the pagans, who borrowed from our doctrine the idea of a great God supreme over all. Likewise, this new idolater preaches in the same fashion, and specifically that baptism is into an artificer and creator, not fearing the curse upon those who add to or take away from the Holy Scriptures. Gregory closes his book by showing him to be Antichrist.

5. Eunomius again speaks of the Son as Lord and God, and Maker of all creation intelligible and sensible, having received from the Father the power and the commission for creation, being entrusted with the task of creation as if He were an artizan commissioned by some one hiring Him, and receiving His power of creation as a thing adventitious, ab extra, as a result of the power allotted to Him in accordance with such and such combinations and positions of the stars, as destiny decrees their lot in life to men at their nativity. Thus, passing by most of what Eunomius had written, he confutes his blasphemy that the Maker of all things came into being in like manner with the earth and with angels, and that the subsistence of the Only-begotten differs not at all from the genesis of all things, and reproaches Him with reverencing neither the Divine mystery nor the custom of the Church, nor following in his attempt to discover godliness any teacher of pious doctrine, but Manichæus, Colluthus, Arius, Aetius, and those like to them, supposing that Christianity in general is folly, and that the customs of the Church and the venerable sacraments are a jest, wherein he differs in nothing from the pagans, who borrowed from our doctrine the idea of a great God supreme over all. So, too, this new idolater preaches in the same fashion, and in particular that baptism is into an artificer and creator, not fearing the curse of those who cause addition or diminution to the Holy Scriptures. And he closes his book with showing him to be Antichrist.

Afterwards, however, he gives his discourse a more moderate turn, even adding a touch of gentleness. Though he had just a little earlier excluded the Son from the title of Existent, he now says: We affirm that the Son is not only existent and above all existent things, but we also call Him Lord and God, the Maker of every being, sensible and intelligible. What does he suppose this being to be? Created or uncreated? If he confesses Jesus to be Lord, God, and Maker of all intelligible being, it necessarily follows that if he says it is uncreated, he speaks falsely, ascribing to the Son the making of uncreated nature. But if he believes it to be created, he makes Him His own Maker. For if the act of creation is not separated from intelligible nature in favor of Him who is independent and uncreated, there will no longer remain any mark of distinction, since sensible creation and intelligible being will be thought of under one heading. But here he brings in the assertion that in the creation of existent things He has been entrusted by the Father with the construction of all things visible and invisible, and with the providential care over all that comes into being, since the power allotted to Him from above is sufficient for the production of those things which have been constructed. The vast length to which our treatise has run compels us to pass over these assertions briefly. But in a sense, profanity surrounds the argument, containing a vast swarm of notions like venomous wasps. He was entrusted, he says, with the construction of things by the Father. But if he had been talking about some craftsman executing his work at the pleasure of his employer, would he not have used the same language? For we are not wrong in saying just the same of Bezaleel, that being entrusted by Moses with the building of the tabernacle, he became the constructor of those things mentioned there, and would not have taken the work in hand had he not previously acquired his knowledge by divine inspiration and ventured upon the undertaking when Moses entrusted him with its execution. Accordingly, the term entrusted suggests that His office and power in creation came to Him as something external, in the sense that before He was entrusted with that commission He had neither the will nor the power to act, but when He received authority to execute the works and power sufficient for the works, then He became the artificer of things that are, the power allotted to Him from on high being, as Eunomius says, sufficient for the purpose. Does he then place even the generation of the Son, by some astrological manipulation, under some destiny, just as those who practice this vain deceit affirm that the appointment of their lot in life comes to men at the time of their birth through such and such conjunctions or oppositions of the stars, as the rotation above moves on in a kind of ordered sequence, assigning to those who are coming into being their special faculties? It may be that something of this kind is in the mind of our sage, and he says that to Him who is above all rule and authority and dominion and above every name that is named, not only in this world but also in that which is to come, there has been allotted, as though He were confined in some hollow spaces, power from on high, measured out in accordance with the quantity of things which come into being. I will pass over this part of his treatise also summarily, letting fall from a slight beginning of investigation, for the more intelligent sort of readers, seeds to enable them to discern his profanity. Moreover, in what follows, there is ready written a kind of apology for ourselves. For we cannot any longer be thought to be missing the intention of his discourse and misinterpreting his words to render them subject to criticism, when his own voice acknowledges the absurdity of his doctrine. His words stand as follows: What? Did not earth and angel come into being, when before they were not? See how our lofty theologian is not ashamed to apply the same description to earth and angels and to the Maker of all! Surely if he thinks it fit to predicate the same of earth and its Lord, he must either make a god of the one or degrade the other to a level with it.

Afterwards, however, he gives his discourse a more moderate turn, imparting to it even a touch of gentleness, and, though he had but a little earlier partitioned off the Son from the title of Existent, he now says — We affirm that the Son is not only existent, and above all existent things, but we also call Him Lord and God, the Maker of every being, sensible and intelligible. What does he suppose this being to be? created? Or uncreated? For if he confesses Jesus to be Lord, God, and Maker of all intelligible being, it necessarily follows, if he says it is uncreated, that he speaks falsely, ascribing to the Son the making of the uncreated Nature. But if he believes it to be created, he makes Him His own Maker. For if the act of creation be not separated from intelligible nature in favour of Him Who is independent and uncreated, there will no longer remain any mark of distinction, as the sensible creation and the intelligible being will be thought of under one head. But here he brings in the assertion that in the creation of existent things He has been entrusted by the Father with the construction of all things visible and invisible, and with the providential care over all that comes into being, inasmuch as the power allotted to Him from above is sufficient for the production of those things which have been constructed. The vast length to which our treatise has run compels us to pass over these assertions briefly: but, in a sense, profanity surrounds the argument, containing a vast swarm of notions like venomous wasps. He was entrusted, he says, with the construction of things by the Father. But if he had been talking about some artizan executing his work at the pleasure of his employer, would he not have used the same language? For we are not wrong in saying just the same of Bezaleel, that being entrusted by Moses with the building of the tabernacle, he became the constructor of those things there mentioned, and would not have taken the work in hand had he not previously acquired his knowledge by Divine inspiration, and ventured upon the undertaking on Moses' entrusting him with its execution. Accordingly the term entrusted suggests that His office and power in creation came to Him as something adventitious, in the sense that before He was entrusted with that commission He had neither the will nor the power to act, but when He received authority to execute the works, and power sufficient for the works, then He became the artificer of things that are, the power allotted to Him from on high being, as Eunomius says, sufficient for the purpose. Does he then place even the generation of the Son, by some astrological juggling, under some destiny, just as they who practise this vain deceit affirm that the appointment of their lot in life comes to men at the time of their birth, by such and such conjunctions or oppositions of the stars, as the rotation above moves on in a kind of ordered train, assigning to those who are coming into being their special faculties? It may be that something of this kind is in the mind of our sage, and he says that to Him that is above all rule, and authority, and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, there has been allotted, as though He were pent in some hollow spaces, power from on high, measured out in accordance with the quantity of things which come into being. I will pass over this part of his treatise also summarily, letting fall from a slight commencement of investigation, for the more intelligent sort of readers, seeds to enable them to discern his profanity. Moreover, in what follows, there is ready written a kind of apology for ourselves. For we cannot any longer be thought to be missing the intention of his discourse, and misinterpreting his words to render them subject to criticism, when his own voice acknowledges the absurdity of his doctrine. His words stand as follows:– What? Did not earth and angel come into being, when before they were not? See how our lofty theologian is not ashamed to apply the same description to earth and angels and to the Maker of all! Surely if he thinks it fit to predicate the same of earth and its Lord, he must either make a god of the one, or degrade the other to a level with it.

Then he adds something that strips away all disguise from his profanity, making its absurdity obvious even to a child. For he says: It would be a long task to detail all the modes of generation of intelligible objects, or the essences which do not all possess the nature of the Existent in common, but display variations according to the operations of Him Who constructed them. Without any words from us, the blasphemy against the Son contained here is glaring and obvious, when he acknowledges that what is predicated of every mode of generation and ousia in no way differs from the description of the Divine hypostasis of the Only-begotten. But it seems best to me to pass over the intermediate passages in which he seeks to maintain his profanity, and to hasten to the main accusation we have to bring against his doctrines. For he will be found to present the sacrament of regeneration as an idle thing, the mystic oblation as profitless, and participation in them as of no advantage to those who partake. For after those elaborate arguments in which, by way of attacking our doctrine, he names as its supporters a Valentinus, a Cerinthus, a Basilides, a Montanus, and a Marcion, and after laying down that those who affirm that the Divine nature is unknowable, and the mode of His generation unknowable, have no right or title whatever to the name of Christians, and after counting us among those whom he thus attacks, he proceeds to develop his own view in these terms: But we, in agreement with holy and blessed men, affirm that the mystery of godliness does not consist in venerable names, nor in the distinctive character of customs and sacramental tokens, but in exactness of doctrine. That when he wrote this, he did so not under the guidance of evangelists, apostles, or any of the authors of the Old Testament, is plain to everyone who has any acquaintance with sacred and Divine Scripture. We should naturally be led to suppose that by holy and blessed men he meant Manichaeus, Nicolaus, Colluthus, Aetius, Arius, and the rest of the same group, with whom he is in strict agreement in laying down this principle: that neither the confession of sacred names, nor the customs of the Church, nor her sacramental tokens, are a ratification of godliness. But we, having learned from the holy voice of Christ that except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit he shall not enter into the kingdom of God and that He that eats My flesh and drinks My blood, shall live forever, are persuaded that the mystery of godliness is ratified by the confession of the Divine Names—the Names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that our salvation is confirmed by participation in the sacramental customs and tokens. But doctrines have often been carefully investigated by those who have had no part or lot in that mystery, and one may hear many such putting forward the faith we hold as a subject for themselves in competitive debate, and some of them often even succeeding in hitting the truth, and for all that remaining no less estranged from the faith. Since, then, he despises the revered Names, by which the power of the more Divine birth distributes grace to those who come for it in faith, and scorns the fellowship of the sacramental customs and tokens from which the Christian profession draws its strength, let us, with a slight variation, speak to those who listen to his deceit the word of the prophet: How long will you be slow of heart? Why do you love destruction and seek after lies? How is it that you do not see the persecutor of the faith inviting those who consent to him to violate their Christian profession? For if the confession of the revered and precious Names of the Holy Trinity is useless, and the customs of the Church unprofitable, and if among these customs is the sign of the cross, prayer, baptism, confession of sins, a ready zeal to keep the commandment, right ordering of character, sobriety of life, regard to justice, the effort not to be excited by passion, or enslaved by pleasure, or to fall short in moral excellence—if he says that none of such habits as these is cultivated to any good purpose, and that the sacramental tokens do not, as we have believed, secure spiritual blessings, and avert from believers the assaults directed against them by the wiles of the evil one, what else does he do but openly proclaim to people that he considers the mystery which Christians cherish a fable, laughs at the majesty of the Divine Names, considers the customs of the Church a joke, and all sacramental operations idle prattle and folly? What beyond this do those who remain attached to paganism bring forward in attacking our creed? Do not they too make the majesty of the sacred Names, in which the faith is ratified, an occasion of laughter? Do not they ridicule the sacramental tokens and the customs which are observed by the initiated? And of whom is it so much a distinguishing characteristic as of the pagans, to think that piety should consist in doctrines only? Since they also say that according to their view, there is something more persuasive than the Gospel which we preach, and some of them hold that there is some one great God preeminent above the rest, and acknowledge some subordinate powers, differing among themselves in the way of superiority or inferiority, in some regular order and sequence, but all alike subject to the Supreme. This, then, is what the teachers of the new idolatry preach, and those who follow them have no dread of the condemnation that abides on transgressors, as though they did not understand that actually to do some improper thing is far more serious than to err in word alone. They, then, who in act deny the faith, and scorn the confession of the sacred Names, and judge the sanctification effected by the sacramental tokens to be worthless, and have been persuaded to have regard to cunningly devised fables, and to imagine that their salvation consists in quibbles about the generate and the ungenerate—what else are they than transgressors of the doctrines of salvation?

Then he adds to this something by which his profanity is yet more completely stripped of all disguise, so that its absurdity is obvious even to a child. For he says — It would be a long task to detail all the modes of generation of intelligible objects, or the essences which do not all possess the nature of the Existent in common, but display variations according to the operations of Him Who constructed them. Without any words of ours, the blasphemy against the Son which is here contained is glaring and conspicuous, when he acknowledges that that which is predicated of every mode of generation and essence in nowise differs from the description of the Divine subsistence of the Only-begotten. But it seems to me best to pass over the intermediate passages in which he seeks to maintain his profanity, and to hasten to the head and front of the accusation which we have to bring against his doctrines. For he will be found to exhibit the sacrament of regeneration as an idle thing, the mystic oblation as profitless, and the participation in them as of no advantage to those who are partakers therein. For after those high-wrought æons in which, by way of disparagement of our doctrine, he names as its supporters a Valentinus, a Cerinthus, a Basilides, a Montanus, and a Marcion, and after laying it down that those who affirm that the Divine nature is unknowable, and the mode of His generation unknowable, have no right or title whatever to the name of Christians, and after reckoning us among those whom he thus disparages, he proceeds to develop his own view in these terms:– But we, in agreement with holy and blessed men; affirm that the mystery of godliness does not consist in venerable names, nor in the distinctive character of customs and sacramental tokens, but in exactness of doctrine. That when he wrote this, he did so not under the guidance of evangelists, apostles, or any of the authors of the Old Testament, is plain to every one who has any acquaintance with the sacred and Divine Scripture. We should naturally be led to suppose that by holy and blessed men he meant Manichæus, Nicolaus, Colluthus, Aetius, Arius, and the rest of the same band, with whom he is in strict accord in laying down this principle, that neither the confession of sacred names, nor the customs of the Church, nor her sacramental tokens, are a ratification of godliness. But we, having learned from the holy voice of Christ that except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit he shall not enter into the kingdom of God and that He that eats My flesh and drinks My blood, shall live for ever, are persuaded that the mystery of godliness is ratified by the confession of the Divine Names — the Names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and that our salvation is confirmed by participation in the sacramental customs and tokens. But doctrines have often been carefully investigated by those who have had no part or lot in that mystery, and one may hear many such putting forward the faith we hold as a subject for themselves in the rivalry of debate, and some of them often even succeeding in hitting the truth, and for all that none the less estranged from the faith. Since, then, he despises the revered Names, by which the power of the more Divine birth distributes grace to them who come for it in faith, and slights the fellowship of the sacramental customs and tokens from which the Christian profession draws its vigour, let us, with a slight variation, utter to those who listen to his deceit the word of the prophet:– How long will you be slow of heart? Why do ye love destruction and seek after leasing? How is it that you do not see the persecutor of the faith inviting those who consent unto him to violate their Christian profession? For if the confession of the revered and precious Names of the Holy Trinity is useless, and the customs of the Church unprofitable, and if among these customs is the sign of the cross, prayer, baptism, confession of sins, a ready zeal to keep the commandment, right ordering of character, sobriety of life, regard to justice, the effort not to be excited by passion, or enslaved by pleasure, or to fall short in moral excellence — if he says that none of such habits as these is cultivated to any good purpose, and that the sacramental tokens do not, as we have believed, secure spiritual blessings, and avert from believers the assaults directed against them by the wiles of the evil one, what else does he do but openly proclaim aloud to men that he deems the mystery which Christians cherish a fable, laughs at the majesty of the Divine Names, considers the customs of the Church a jest, and all sacramental operations idle prattle and folly? What beyond this do they who remain attached to paganism bring forward in disparagement of our creed? Do not they too make the majesty of the sacred Names, in which the faith is ratified, an occasion of laughter? Do not they deride the sacramental tokens and the customs which are observed by the initiated? And of whom is it so much a distinguishing peculiarity as of the pagans, to think that piety should consist in doctrines only? Since they also say that according to their view, there is something more persuasive than the Gospel which we preach, and some of them hold that there is some one great God preeminent above the rest, and acknowledge some subject powers, differing among themselves in the way of superiority or inferiority, in some regular order and sequence, but all alike subject to the Supreme. This, then, is what the teachers of the new idolatry preach, and they who follow them have no dread of the condemnation that abides on transgressors, as though they did not understand that actually to do some improper thing is far more grievous than to err in word alone. They, then, who in act deny the faith, and slight the confession of the sacred Names, and judge the sanctification effected by the sacramental tokens to be worthless, and have been persuaded to have regard to cunningly devised fables, and to fancy that their salvation consists in quibbles about the generate and the ungenerate — what else are they than transgressors of the doctrines of salvation?

But if anyone thinks we are bringing these charges against them unfairly or harshly, let him examine our author's writings on his own, both what we have already quoted and what logically follows from those quotes. In direct violation of the Lord's command—for what was handed down to us as the means of initiation has the force of law—he says that baptism is not into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as Christ commanded His disciples when He gave them the mystery, but into a craftsman and creator, who is not only Father, he says, of the Only-begotten, but also His God. Woe to him who gives his neighbor turbid wickedness to drink! How he troubles and muddies the truth by throwing his filth into it! How is it that he does not fear the curse that rests on those who add anything to God's word or dare to take anything away? Let us read the Lord's declaration in His exact words: Go, He says, teach all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Where did He call the Son a creature? Where did the Word teach that the Father is creator and craftsman of the Only-begotten? Where in these quoted words is it taught that the Son is a servant of God? Where in the delivery of the mystery is the God of the Son proclaimed? Do you not see and understand, you who are being dragged by deception to destruction, what kind of guide you have put in charge of your souls—one who distorts the Holy Scriptures, who corrupts the divine words, who defiles the purity of godly teaching with his own filth, who not only arms his own tongue against us but also tries to tamper with the sacred voices of truth, who is eager to make his own twisted teaching seem more authoritative than the Lord's teaching? Do you not see that he stirs himself up against the Name at which everyone must bow, so that in time the Lord's Name will no longer be heard, and instead of Christ, Eunomius will be brought into the churches? Do you not yet realize that this preaching of godlessness has been set in motion by the devil as a rehearsal, preparation, and preview of Antichrist's coming? For what else could you properly call someone who tries to show that his own words carry more authority than Christ's, and who attempts to transform the faith from the divine Names and the sacramental customs and signs to his own deception—what else but Antichrist?

But if any one thinks that these charges are brought against them by us ungenerously and unfairly, let him consider independently our author's writings, both what we have previously alleged, and what is inferred in logical connection with our citations. For in direct contravention of the law of the Lord — (for the deliverance to us of the means of initiation constitutes a law) — he says that baptism is not into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as Christ commanded His disciples when He delivered to them the mystery, but into an artificer and creator, and not only Father, he says, of the Only-begotten, but also His God. Woe unto him who gives his neighbour to drink turbid mischief! How does he trouble and befoul the truth by flinging his mud into it! How is it that he feels no fear of the curse that rests upon those who add anything to the Divine utterance, or dare to take anything away? Let us read the declaration of the Lord in His very words — Go, He says, teach all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Where did He call the Son a creature? Where did the Word teach that the Father is creator and artificer of the Only-begotten? Where in the words cited is it taught that the Son is a servant of God? Where in the delivery of the mystery is the God of the Son proclaimed? Do ye not perceive and understand, you who are dragged by guile to perdition, what sort of guide you have put in charge of your souls — one who interpolates the Holy Scriptures, who garbles the Divine utterances, who with his own mud befouls the purity of the doctrines of godliness, who not only arms his own tongue against us, but also attempts to tamper with the sacred voices of truth, who is eager to invest his own perversion with more authority than the teaching of the Lord? Do ye not perceive that he stirs himself up against the Name at which all must bow, so that in time the Name of the Lord shall be heard no more, and instead of Christ Eunomius shall be brought into the Churches? Do ye not yet consider that this preaching of godlessness has been set on foot by the devil as a rehearsal, preparation, and prelude of the coming of Antichrist? For he who is ambitious of showing that his own words are more authoritative than those of Christ, and of transforming the faith from the Divine Names and the sacramental customs and tokens to his own deceit, — what else, I say, could he properly be called, but only Antichrist?

Let us stay on topic, however. A little further on, he argues against those who admit that human nature is too weak to grasp what cannot be comprehended, and with lofty claims he expands on this subject in this way, dismissing our belief about the matter with these words: It does not necessarily follow that if someone's mind is blinded by malice and for that reason unable to see anything in front of it or above its head, and is only moderately capable of understanding truth, we should therefore think that the discovery of reality is unattainable for the rest of humanity. But I would say to him that whoever declares the discovery of reality is attainable has obviously developed his own intellect by some method and logical process through knowledge of existing things, and after being trained in matters that are relatively small and easily understood, has then, when thus prepared, directed his understanding toward those objects which surpass all conception. So then, let the man who claims to have attained knowledge of real existence explain to us the actual nature of the most insignificant object before our eyes, so that by what is knowable he may prove trustworthy concerning what is hidden: let him explain rationally what the nature of the ant is, whether its life is sustained by breath and respiration, whether it is governed by vital organs like other animals, whether its body has a skeleton of bones, whether the cavities of the bones are filled with marrow, whether its joints are connected by the tension of sinews and ligaments, whether the position of the sinews is maintained by enclosures of muscles and glands, whether the marrow runs along the spine from the crown of the head to the tail, whether it provides the limbs that are moved with the power of motion by means of the covering of sinewy membrane; whether the creature has a liver, and connected with the liver a gall-bladder; whether it has kidneys and heart, arteries and veins, membranes and diaphragm; whether it is externally smooth or covered with hair; whether it is distinguished by the division into male and female; in what part of its body the power of sight and hearing is located; whether it has a sense of smell; whether its feet are undivided or jointed; how long it lives; what is the method by which they reproduce from one another, and what is the period of pregnancy; how it is that not all ants crawl, nor are all winged, but some belong to the creatures that move along the ground, while others are carried through the air. So let the person who claims to have grasped knowledge of real existence reveal to us for a while the nature of the ant, and then, and only then, let him speak about the nature of the power that surpasses all understanding. But if he has not yet learned through his knowledge the nature of the tiny ant, how does he dare to boast that through rational understanding he has grasped Him Who in Himself governs all creation, and to say that those who acknowledge in themselves the weakness of human nature have the perceptions of their souls darkened, and can reach neither anything in front of them nor anything above their head?

Let us, however, keep to our subject. A little further on he contends against those who acknowledge that human nature is too weak to conceive what cannot be grasped, and with lofty boasts enlarges on this topic on this wise, making light of our belief on the matter in these words:– For it by no means follows that, if some one's mind, blinded by malignity, and for that reason unable to see anything in front or above its head, is but moderately competent for the apprehension of truth, we ought on that ground to think that the discovery of reality is unattainable by the rest of mankind. But I should say to him that he who declares that the discovery of reality is attainable, has of course advanced his own intellect by some method and logical process through the knowledge of existent things, and after having been trained in matters that are comparatively small and easily grasped by way of apprehension, has, when thus prepared, flung his apprehensive fancy upon those objects which transcend all conception. Let, then, the man who boasts that he has attained the knowledge of real existence, interpret to us the real nature of the most trivial object that is before our eyes, that by what is knowable he may warrant our belief touching what is secret: let him explain by reason what is the nature of the ant, whether its life is held together by breath and respiration, whether it is regulated by vital organs like other animals, whether its body has a framework of bones, whether the hollows of the bones are filled with marrow, whether its joints are united by the tension of sinews and ligaments, whether the position of the sinews is maintained by enclosures of muscles and glands, whether the marrow extends along the vertebræ from the sinciput to the tail, whether it imparts to the limbs that are moved the power of motion by means of the enclosure of sinewy membrane; whether the creature has a liver, and in connection with the liver a gall-bladder; whether it has kidneys and heart, arteries and veins, membranes and diaphragm; whether it is externally smooth or covered with hair; whether it is distinguished by the division into male and female; in what part of its body is located the power of sight and hearing; whether it enjoys the sense of smell; whether its feet are undivided or articulated; how long it lives; what is the method in which they derive generation one from another, and what is the period of gestation; how it is that all ants do not crawl, nor are all winged, but some belong to the creatures that move along the ground, while others are borne aloft in the air. Let him, then, who boasts that he has grasped the knowledge of real existence, disclose to us awhile the nature of the ant, and then, and not till then, let him discourse on the nature of the power that surpasses all understanding. But if he has not yet ascertained by his knowledge the nature of the tiny ant, how comes he to vaunt that by the apprehension of reason he has grasped Him Who in Himself controls all creation, and to say that those who own in themselves the weakness of human nature, have the perceptions of their souls darkened, and can neither reach anything in front of them, nor anything above their head?

But now let us see what understanding this person who claims to have knowledge of existing things possesses beyond the rest of the world. Let us listen to his arrogant statement: Surely it would have been pointless for the Lord to call Himself 'the door' if there were no one to pass through to the understanding and contemplation of the Father, and it would have been pointless for Him to call Himself 'the way' if He gave no help to those who wish to come to the Father. And how could He be a light without enlightening people, without illuminating the eye of their soul to understand both Himself and the transcendent Light? Well, if he were listing some arguments from his own mind that evade the hearers' understanding through their cleverness, there might perhaps be a possibility of being deceived by the argument's ingenuity, since his underlying thought often escapes the reader's notice. But since he quotes the divine words, of course no one blames those who believe that their inspired teaching is common property for all. Since, he says, the Lord was named 'a door,' it follows from this that God's ousia can be comprehended by man. But the Gospel does not admit this meaning. Let us hear the divine statement itself. I am the door, Christ says; by Me if anyone enters in he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and find pasture. Which of these, then, is knowledge of the ousia? For since several things are said here, and each has its own special meaning, it is impossible to refer them all to the idea of the ousia, lest the Deity should be thought to be composed of different elements. Yet it is not easy to find which of the phrases just quoted can most properly be applied to that subject. The Lord is the door. By Me, He says, if anyone enters in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and shall find pasture. Are we to say that the entrance He speaks of means the ousia of God, or the salvation of those who enter, or going out, or pasture, or finding? For each of these is distinct in its meaning and does not agree in meaning with the rest. For getting inside is obviously contrary to going out, and so with the other phrases. For pasture, in its proper meaning, is one thing, and finding is another thing distinct from it. Which of these, then, is the ousia of the Father supposed to be? For surely one cannot, by uttering all these phrases that disagree with one another in meaning, intend to indicate by incompatible terms that ousia which is simple and uncompounded. And how can these words hold true: No man has seen God at any time, and Whom no man has seen nor can see, and There shall no man see the face of the Lord and live, if being inside the door, or outside, or finding pasture denotes the ousia of the Father? For truly He is at the same time a door of protection and a house of defense, as David calls Him, and through Himself He receives those who enter, and in Himself He saves those who have come within, and again by Himself He leads them forth to the pasture of virtues, and becomes all things to those who are on the path of salvation, so that He may make Himself whatever each person's needs require—both way, and guide, and door of protection, and house of defense, and water of comfort, and green pasture, which in the Gospel He calls pasture. But our new theologian says that the Lord has been called the door because of knowledge of the Father's ousia. Why then does he not force the same meaning onto the titles Rock, and Stone, and Fountain, and Tree, and the rest, so that he might obtain evidence for his own theory through the multitude of strange testimonies, since he is quite able to apply to each of these the same account he has given for the Way, the Door, and the Light? But, as I am taught by the inspired Scripture, I boldly affirm that He Who is above every name has for us many names, receiving them according to the variety of His gracious dealings with us. He is called the Light when He disperses the gloom of ignorance, and the Life when He grants the gift of immortality, and the Way when He guides us from error to the truth. So also He is termed a tower of strength, and a city of protection, and a fountain, and a rock, and a vine, and a physician, and resurrection, and all such things, with reference to us, imparting Himself under various aspects by virtue of His benefits toward us. But those who are keen-sighted beyond human ability, who claim to see the incomprehensible but overlook what may be comprehended, when they use such titles to explain the ousiai, are certain that they not only see but measure Him Whom no man has seen nor can see. But they do not discern with the eye of their soul the Faith, which is the only thing within the scope of our observation, valuing above this the knowledge they obtain from reasoning. Just so I have heard the sacred record blaming the sons of Benjamin who did not regard the law but could shoot within a hair's breadth, wherein, I think, the word showed their eager pursuit of a pointless object—that they were far-shooting and skillful marksmen at things that were useless and insubstantial, but ignorant and careless of what was clearly for their benefit. For after what I have quoted, the history goes on to relate what happened to them: how, when they had run madly after the iniquity of Sodom, and the people of Israel had taken up arms against them in full force, they were utterly destroyed. And it seems to me to be a kindly thought to warn young archers not to wish to shoot within a hair's breadth while they have no eyes for the door of faith, but rather to drop their pointless labor concerning the incomprehensible, and not to lose the gain that is ready at hand, which is found by faith alone.

But now let us see what understanding he who has the knowledge of existent things possesses beyond the rest of the world. Let us listen to his arrogant utterance:– Surely it would have been idle for the Lord to call Himself 'the door,' if there were none to pass through to the understanding and contemplation of the Father, and it would have been idle for Him to call Himself 'the way,' if He gave no facility to those who wish to come to the Father. And how could He be a light, without lightening men, without illuminating the eye of their soul to understand both Himself and the transcendent Light? Well, if he were here enumerating some arguments from his own head, that evade the understanding of the hearers by their subtlety, there would perhaps be a possibility of being deceived by the ingenuity of the argument, as his underlying thought frequently escapes the reader's notice. But since he alleges the Divine words, of course no one blames those who believe that their inspired teaching is the common property of all. Since then, he says, the Lord was named 'a door,' it follows from hence that the essence of God may be comprehended by man. But the Gospel does not admit of this meaning. Let us hear the Divine utterance itself. I am the door, Christ says; by Me if any man enter in he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and find pasture. Which then of these is the knowledge of the essence? For as several things are here said, and each of them has its own special meaning, it is impossible to refer them all to the idea of the essence, lest the Deity should be thought to be compounded of different elements; and yet it is not easy to find which of the phrases just quoted can most properly be applied to that subject. The Lord is the door, By Me, He says, if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and shall find pasture. Are we to say entrance of which he speaks in place of the essence of God, or salvation of those that enter in, or going out, or pasture, or finding?– for each of these is peculiar in its significance, and does not agree in meaning with the rest. For to get within appears obviously contrary to going out, and so with the other phrases. For pasture, in its proper meaning, is one thing, and finding another thing distinct from it. Which, then, of these is the essence of the Father supposed to be? For assuredly one cannot, by uttering all these phrases that disagree one with another in signification, intend to indicate by incompatible terms that Essence which is simple and uncompounded. And how can the word hold good, No man has seen God at any time and, Whom no man has seen nor can see 1 Timothy 6:16 and, There shall no man see the face of the Lord and live Exodus 33:20 if to be inside the door, or outside, or the finding pasture, denote the essence of the Father? For truly He is at the same time a door of encompassing and a house of defense as David calls Him, and through Himself He receives them that enter, and in Himself He saves those who have come within, and again by Himself He leads them forth to the pasture of virtues, and becomes all things to them that are in the way of salvation, that so He may make Himself that which the needs of each demand — both way, and guide, and door of encompassing, and house of defense, and water of comfort and green pasture which in the Gospel He calls pasture: but our new divine says that the Lord has been called the door because of the knowledge of the essence of the Father. Why then does he not force into the same significance the titles, Rock, and Stone, and Fountain, and Tree, and the rest, that so he might obtain evidence for his own theory by the multitude of strange testimonies, as he is well able to apply to each of these the same account which he has given of the Way, the Door, and the Light? But, as I am so taught by the inspired Scripture, I boldly affirm that He Who is above every name has for us many names, receiving them in accordance with the variety of His gracious dealings with us, being called the Light when He disperses the gloom of ignorance, and the Life when He grants the boon of immortality, and the Way when He guides us from error to the truth; so also He is termed a tower of strength, and a city of encompassing, and a fountain, and a rock, and a vine, and a physician, and resurrection, and all the like, with reference to us, imparting Himself under various aspects by virtue of His benefits to us-ward. But those who are keen-sighted beyond human power, who see the incomprehensible, but overlook what may be comprehended, when they use such titles to expound the essences, are positive that they not only see, but measure Him Whom no man has seen nor can see, but do not with the eye of their soul discern the Faith, which is the only thing within the compass of our observation, valuing before this the knowledge which they obtain from ratiocination. Just so I have heard the sacred record laying blame upon the sons of Benjamin who did not regard the law, but could shoot within a hair's breadth Judges 20:16, wherein, methinks, the word exhibited their eager pursuit of an idle object, that they were far-darting and dexterous aimers at things that were useless and unsubstantial, but ignorant and regardless of what was manifestly for their benefit. For after what I have quoted, the history goes on to relate what befell them, how, when they had run madly after the iniquity of Sodom, and the people of Israel had taken up arms against them in full force, they were utterly destroyed. And it seems to me to be a kindly thought to warn young archers not to wish to shoot within a hair's-breadth, while they have no eyes for the door of the faith, but rather to drop their idle labour about the incomprehensible, and not to lose the gain that is ready to their hand, which is found by faith alone.

Now that I have examined what remains of his treatise, I shrink from continuing my argument further, as a shudder runs through my heart at his words. He wants to show that the Son is something different from eternal life, yet unless eternal life is found in the Son, our faith will be proven empty and our preaching worthless, baptism unnecessary, the sufferings of the martyrs for nothing, and the labors of the Apostles useless and unprofitable for human life. Why did they preach Christ, in whom, according to Eunomius, the power of eternal life does not reside? Why do they mention those who had believed in Christ, unless it was through him that they were to share in eternal life? For the intelligence, he says, of those who have believed in the Lord, leaping beyond all sensible and intellectual existence, cannot stop even at the generation of the Son, but speeds beyond even this in its yearning for eternal life, eager to meet the First. What should I most lament in this passage? That these wretched men do not think eternal life is in the Son, or that they conceive of the prosopon of the Only-begotten in so low and earthly a way that they imagine they can climb in their reasoning upon his beginning, and so look by the power of their own intellect beyond the life of the Son, and, leaving the generation of the Lord somewhere beneath them, can speed onward beyond this in their yearning for eternal life? For the meaning of what I have quoted is nothing else than this: that the human mind, examining the knowledge of real existence and lifting itself above the sensible and intelligible creation, will leave God the Word, who was in the beginning, below itself, just as it has left below it all other things, and itself comes to be in him in whom God the Word was not, treading by mental activity regions that lie beyond the life of the Son, searching there for eternal life where the Only-begotten God is not. For in its yearning for eternal life, he says, it is carried in thought beyond the Son—clearly as though it had not found in the Son what it was seeking. If eternal life is not in the Son, then surely he who said, I am the life, will be convicted of lying, or else he is life, it is true, but not eternal life. But what is not eternal is of course limited in duration. And this kind of life is common to irrational animals as well as to humans. Where then is the majesty of life itself, if even the irrational creation shares it? And how will the Word or Divine Reason be the same as the Life, if this finds a home, by virtue of life that is only temporary, in irrational creatures? For if, according to the great John, the Word is Life, but that life is temporary and not eternal, as their heresy holds, and if, moreover, temporary life exists in other creatures, what is the logical consequence? Either irrational animals are rational, or the Reason must be confessed to be irrational. Do we need any more words to refute their accursed and malignant blasphemy? Do such statements even pretend to conceal their intention of denying the Lord? For if the Apostle plainly says that what is not eternal is temporary, and if these people see eternal life in the ousia of the Father alone, and if by alienating the Son from the physis of the Father they also cut him off from eternal life, what is this but a clear denial and rejection of faith in the Lord? Meanwhile the Apostle clearly says that those who in this life only have hope in Christ are of all people most miserable. If then the Lord is life, but not eternal life, surely the life is temporal and only for a day, operative only for the present time, or else the Apostle laments those who have hope as having missed the true life.

But now that I have surveyed what remains of his treatise I shrink from conducting my argument further, as a shudder runs through my heart at his words. For he wishes to show that the Son is something different from eternal life, while, unless eternal life is found in the Son, our faith will be proved to be idle, and our preaching to be vain, baptism a superfluity, the agonies of the martyrs all for nought, the toils of the Apostles useless and unprofitable for the life of men. For why did they preach Christ, in Whom, according to Eunomius, there does not reside the power of eternal life? Why do they make mention of those who had believed in Christ, unless it was through Him that they were to be partakers of eternal life? For the intelligence, he says, of those who have believed in the Lord, overleaping all sensible and intellectual existence, cannot stop even at the generation of the Son, but speeds beyond even this in its yearning for eternal life, eager to meet the First. What ought I most to bewail in this passage? That the wretched men do not think that eternal life is in the Son, or that they conceive of the Person of the Only-begotten in so grovelling and earthly a fashion, that they fancy they can mount in their reasonings upon His beginning, and so look by the power of their own intellect beyond the life of the Son, and, leaving the generation of the Lord somewhere beneath them, can speed onward beyond this in their yearning for eternal life? For the meaning of what I have quoted is nothing else than this, that the human mind, scrutinizing the knowledge of real existence, and lifting itself above the sensible and intelligible creation, will leave God the Word, Who was in the beginning, below itself, just as it has left below it all other things, and itself comes to be in Him in Whom God the Word was not, treading, by mental activity, regions which lie beyond the life of the Son, there searching for eternal life, where the Only-begotten God is not. For in its yearning for eternal life, he says, it is borne in thought, beyond the Son — clearly as though it had not in the Son found that which it was seeking. If the eternal life is not in the Son, then assuredly He Who said, I am the life, will be convicted of falsehood, or else He is life, it is true, but not eternal life. But that which is not eternal is of course limited in duration. And such a kind of life is common to the irrational animals as well as to men. Where then is the majesty of the very life, if even the irrational creation share it? And how will the Word or Divine Reason be the same as the Life, if this finds a home, in virtue of the life which is but temporary, in irrational creatures? For if, according to the great John, the Word is Life, but that life is temporary and not eternal, as their heresy holds, and if, moreover, the temporary life has place in other creatures, what is the logical consequence? Why, either that irrational animals are rational, or that the Reason must be confessed to be irrational. Have we any further need of words to confute their accursed and malignant blasphemy? Do such statements even pretend to conceal their intention of denying the Lord? For if the Apostle plainly says that what is not eternal is temporary, and if these people see eternal life in the essence of the Father alone, and if by alienating the Son from the Nature of the Father they also cut Him off from eternal life, what is this but a manifest denial and rejection of the faith in the Lord? While the Apostle clearly says that those who in this life only have hope in Christ are of all men most miserable 1 Corinthians 15:19. If then the Lord is life, but not eternal life, assuredly the life is temporal, and but for a day, that which is operative only for the present time, or else the Apostle bemoans those who have hope, as having missed the true life.

However, those who are enlightened in Eunomius' way bypass the Son and carry their reasoning beyond Him, seeking eternal life in the One Who is contemplated as outside and separate from the Only-begotten. What should one say to such evils as these—except whatever calls forth lamentation and weeping? Alas, how can we groan over this wretched and pitiable generation that produces a crop of such deadly evils? Long ago the zealous Jeremiah mourned for the people of Israel when they gave their evil consent to Jehoiakim, who led the way to idolatry, and were condemned to captivity under the Assyrians as punishment for their unlawful worship, exiled from the sanctuary and banished far from their fathers' inheritance. Yet it seems to me even more fitting that these lamentations be sung when the imitator of Jehoiakim draws away those he deceives to this new kind of idolatry, banishing them from their ancestral inheritance—I mean the Faith. They too, in a way that corresponds to the scriptural record, are carried away captive to Babylon from Jerusalem that is above—that is, from the Church of God to this confusion of destructive doctrines—for Babylon means confusion. And just as Jehoiakim was mutilated, so this man, having voluntarily deprived himself of the light of truth, has become prey to the Babylonian despot, never having learned, poor wretch, that the Gospel commands us to behold eternal life equally in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since the Word has spoken concerning the Father that to know Him is eternal life, and concerning the Son that everyone who believes in Him has eternal life, and concerning the Holy Spirit that for the one who has received His grace it shall be a well of water springing up unto eternal life. Accordingly, everyone who yearns for eternal life, when he has found the Son—I mean the true Son, not the falsely-called Son—has found in Him in its entirety what he longed for, because He is life and has life in Himself. But this man, so subtle in mind, so keen-sighted of heart, does not through his extreme sharpness of vision discover life in the Son; instead, having passed Him over and left Him behind as a hindrance in the way to that for which he searches, he seeks eternal life there where he thinks the true Life is not! What could we conceive more abhorrent than this for profanity, or more melancholy as an occasion for lamentation? But that the charge of Sabellianism and Montanism should be repeatedly brought against our doctrines is much the same as if one should charge us with the blasphemy of the Anomoeans. For if one were to carefully investigate the falsehood of these heresies, he would find that they have great similarity to the error of Eunomius. For each of them adopts the Jewish position in its doctrine, admitting neither the Only-begotten God nor the Holy Spirit to share in the Deity of the God Whom they call Great and First. For the one Whom Sabellius calls God of the three names, Eunomius calls unbegotten; but neither contemplates the Godhead in the Trinity of Persons (hypostasis). Who then is really akin to Sabellius, let the judgment of those who read our argument decide. Thus far for these matters.

However, they who are enlightened in Eunomius' fashion pass the Son by, and are carried in their reasonings beyond Him, seeking eternal life in Him Who is contemplated as outside and apart from the Only-begotten. What ought one to say to such evils as these — save whatever calls forth lamentation and weeping? Alas, how can we groan over this wretched and pitiable generation, bringing forth a crop of such deadly mischiefs? In days of yore the zealous Jeremiah bewailed the people of Israel, when they gave an evil consent to Jehoiakim who led the way to idolatry, and were condemned to captivity under the Assyrians in requital for their unlawful worship, exiled from the sanctuary and banished far from the inheritance of their fathers. Yet more fitting does it seem to me that these lamentations be chanted when the imitator of Jehoiakim draws away those whom he deceives to this new kind of idolatry, banishing them from their ancestral inheritance — I mean the Faith. They too, in a way corresponding to the Scriptural record, are carried away captive to Babylon from Jerusalem that is above — that is from the Church of God to this confusion of pernicious doctrines, — for Babylon means confusion. And even as Jehoiakim was mutilated, so this man, having voluntarily deprived himself of the light of the truth, has become a prey to the Babylonian despot, never having learned, poor wretch, that the Gospel enjoins us to behold eternal life alike in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Word has thus spoken concerning the Father, that to know Him is life eternal, and concerning the Son, that every one that believes in Him has eternal life, and concerning the Holy Spirit, that to Him that has received His grace it shall be a well of water springing up unto eternal life. Accordingly every one that yearns for eternal life when he has found the Son — I mean the true Son, and not the Son falsely so called — has found in Him in its entirety what he longed for, because He is life and has life in Himself. But this man, so subtle in mind, so keen-sighted of heart, does not by his extreme acuteness of vision discover life in the Son, but, having passed Him over and left Him behind as a hindrance in the way to that for which he searches he there seeks eternal life where he thinks the true Life not to be! What could we conceive more to be abhorred than this for profanity, or more melancholy as an occasion of lamentation? But that the charge of Sabellianism and Montanism should be repeatedly urged against our doctrines, is much the same as if one should lay to our charge the blasphemy of the Anomœans. For if one were carefully to investigate the falsehood of these heresies, he would find that they have great similarity to the error of Eunomius. For each of them affects the Jew in his doctrine, admitting neither the Only-begotten God nor the Holy Spirit to share the Deity of the God Whom they call Great, and First. For Whom Sabellius calls God of the three names, Him does Eunomius term unbegotten: but neither contemplates the Godhead in the Trinity of Persons. Who then is really akin to Sabellius let the judgment of those who read our argument decide. Thus far for these matters.

But since in what follows he actively stirs up the foul smell of his disgusting attempts, by which he tries to argue that the Only-begotten God once was not, it will be good—as our thinking on this matter has been made quite clear by our previous arguments—to no longer plunge our argument into what is likewise bad, except that it may not be out of place to add this one point, having selected it from the many. He says (someone having remarked that the property of not being begotten is equally associated with the ousia of the Father), The argument proceeds by similar steps to those by which it reached a conclusion in the case of the Son. The orthodox doctrine is clearly strengthened by the attack of its adversaries, namely the doctrine that we ought not to think that not being begotten or being begotten are identical with the ousia, but that these should be contemplated, it is true, in the subject, while the subject in its proper definition is something else beyond these, and since no difference is found in the subject, because the difference of begotten and unbegotten is apart from the ousia and does not affect it, it necessarily follows that the ousia must be allowed to be in both Persons without variation. Let us moreover inquire, beyond what has already been said, into this point: in what sense does he say that generation is alien from the Father—does he conceive of it as an ousia or an operation? If he conceives it to be an operation, it is clearly equally connected with its result and with its author, as in every kind of production one may see the operation both in the product and the producer, appearing in the production of the effects and not separated from their maker. But if he calls generation an ousia separate from the ousia of the Father, while admitting that the Lord came into being from it, then he plainly puts this in the place of the Father as regards the Only-begotten, so that two Fathers are conceived in the case of the Son: one a Father in name alone, whom he calls the Ungenerate, who has nothing to do with generation, and the other, which he calls generation, performing the part of a Father to the Only-begotten.

But since, in what follows, he is active in stirring up the ill savour of his disgusting attempts, whereby he tries to make out that the Only-begotten God once was not, it will be well, as our mind on this head has been made pretty clear by our previous arguments, no longer to plunge our argument also in what is likewise bad, except perhaps that it is not unseasonable to add this one point, having selected it from the multitude. He says (some one having remarked that the property of not being begotten is equally associated with the essence of the Father), The argument proceeds by like steps to those by which it came to a conclusion in the case of the Son. The orthodox doctrine is clearly strengthened by the attack of its adversaries, the doctrine, namely, that we ought not to think that not to be begotten or to be begotten are identical with the essence, but that these should be contemplated, it is true, in the subject, while the subject in its proper definition is something else beyond these, and since no difference is found in the subject, because the difference of begotten and unbegotten is apart from the essence, and does not affect it, it necessarily follows that the essence must be allowed to be in both Persons without variation. Let us moreover inquire, over and above what has been already said, into this point, in what sense he says that generation is alien from the Father — whether he does so conceiving of it as an essence or an operation. If he conceives it to be an operation, it is clearly equally connected with its result and with its author, as in every kind of production one may see the operation alike in the product and the producer, appearing in the production of the effects and not separated from their artificer. But if he terms generation an essence separate from the essence of the Father, admitting that the Lord came into being therefrom, then he plainly puts this in the place of the Father as regards the Only-begotten, so that two Fathers are conceived in the case of the Son, one a Father in name alone, Whom he calls the Ungenerate, Who has nothing to do with generation, and the other, which he calls generation, performing the part of a Father to the Only-begotten.

This is made even clearer by Eunomius's own statements than by our arguments. For in what follows, he says: God, being without generation, is also prior to that which is generate, and a little further on, for He Whose existence arises from being generated did not exist before He was generated. So, if the Father has nothing to do with generation, and if the Son derives His being from generation, then the Father has no role in the Son's subsistence and is completely separate from generation, from which the Son draws His being. If, then, the Father is alien from the generation of the Son, they either invent another Father for the Son under the name of generation, or in their wisdom make out the Son to be self-begotten and self-generated. You see the confused mind of the man who displays his ignorance to us throughout his own argument, how his profanity wanders down many paths, or rather in places where there is no path at all, without moving toward its goal by any trustworthy guidance. Just as one may see in the case of infants, when in their childish play they imitate the building of houses with sand, that what they build is not formed according to any plan or by any rules of art to resemble the original, but first they make something randomly and in a silly way, and then consider what to call it—this is the kind of insight I discern in our author. For after gathering together words of impiety according to whatever first comes into his head, like a heap of sand, he begins to look around to see where his unintelligible profanity is heading, growing up as it does spontaneously from what he has said, without any rational sequence. For I do not imagine that he originally set out to invent generation as an actual subsistence standing in relation to the ousia of the Son in the place of the Father, nor that it was part of our rhetorician's plan that the Father should be considered as alien from the generation of the Son, nor was the absurdity of self-generation deliberately introduced. But all such absurdities have been uttered by our author without reflection, so that, regarding them, the man who so blunders is not even worth much refutation, as he knows, to borrow the Apostle's words, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms.

And this is brought home even more by the statements of Eunomius himself than by our own arguments. For in what follows, he says:– God, being without generation, is also prior to that which is generate, and a little further on, for He Whose existence arises from being generated did not exist before He was generated. Accordingly, if the Father has nothing to do with generation, and if it is from generation that the Son derives His being, then the Father has no action in respect of the subsistence of the Son, and is apart from all connection with generation, from which the Son draws His being. If, then, the Father is alien from the generation of the Son, they either invent for the Son another Father under the name of generation, or in their wisdom make out the Son to be self-begotten and self-generated. You see the confusion of mind of the man who exhibits his ignorance to us up and down in his own argument, how his profanity wanders in many paths, or rather in places where no path is, without advancing to its mark by any trustworthy guidance; and as one may see in the case of infants, when in their childish sport they imitate the building of houses with sand, that what they build is not framed on any plan, or by any rules of art, to resemble the original, but first they make something at haphazard, and in silly fashion, and then take counsel what to call it — this penetration I discern in our author. For after getting together words of impiety according to what first comes into his head, like a heap of sand, he begins to cast about to see whither his unintelligible profanity tends, growing up as it does spontaneously from what he has said, without any rational sequence. For I do not imagine that he originally proposed to invent generation as an actual subsistence standing to the essence of the Son in the place of the Father, nor that it was part of our rhetorician's plan that the Father should be considered as alien from the generation of the Son, nor was the absurdity of self-generation deliberately introduced. But all such absurdities have been emitted by our author without reflection, so that, as regards them, the man who so blunders is not even worth much refutation, as he knows, to borrow the Apostle's words, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms 1 Timothy 1:7.

Eunomius says, "He Whose existence arises from generation did not exist before generation." If he is using the term "generation" here to refer to the Father, I agree with him, and there is no dispute. Either phrase can mean the same thing—whether we say "Abraham begot Isaac" or "Abraham was the father of Isaac." Since being a father is the same as having begotten, if someone changes the wording from one form to another, paternity will be shown to be identical with generation. Therefore, if what Eunomius is saying is this: "He Whose existence is derived from the Father was not before the Father," the statement is correct, and I support it. But if he is returning in this phrase to the kind of generation we discussed earlier, and says that it is separated from the Father but associated with the Son, then I think it is a waste of time to spend effort on something unintelligible. Whether he thinks generation is a self-existent object, or whether by using this name he is thinking of something that has no actual existence, I have not been able to figure out from his language to this day. His unstable and groundless argument works equally well for either interpretation, leaning one way or the other depending on what the reader happens to think.

For He Whose existence arises from generation, he says, did not exist before generation. If he here uses the term generation of the Father, I agree with Him, and there is no opponent. For one may mean the same thing by either phrase, by saying either that Abraham begot Isaac, or, that Abraham was the father of Isaac. Since then to be father is the same as to have begotten, if any one shifts the words from one form of speech to the other, paternity will be shown to be identical with generation. If, therefore, what Eunomius says is this, He Whose existence is derived from the Father was not before the Father, the statement is sound, and we give our vote in favour of it. But if he is recurring in the phrase to that generation of which we have spoken before, and says that it is separated from the Father but associated with the Son, then I think it waste of time to linger over the consideration of the unintelligible. For whether he thinks generation to be a self-existent object, or whether by the name he is carried in thought to that which has no actual existence, I have not to this day been able to find out from his language. For his fluid and baseless argument lends itself alike to either supposition, inclining to one side or to the other according to the fancy of the thinker.

But the most serious part of his blasphemy has not yet been examined, which the rest of his treatise goes on to add. So let us consider his words sentence by sentence. Yet I don't know how I can dare to let my mouth speak the horrible and godless language of someone who fights against Christ. For I fear that, like some harmful drugs, the residue of destructive bitterness might be deposited on the lips through which the words pass. "He who comes to God," says the Apostle, "must believe that He is." Accordingly, true existence is the special characteristic of Godhead. But Eunomius claims that He Who truly is either does not exist at all, or does not exist in a proper sense, which is just the same as not existing at all. For whoever does not properly exist does not really exist at all—just as someone is said to run in a dream who in that state imagines he is exerting himself in the race, while, since he falsely acts out the appearance of the real race, his imagination that he is running is not for this reason actually a race. But even though in an inexact sense it is called that, the name is still given to it falsely. Accordingly, whoever dares to assert that the Only-begotten God either does not properly exist or does not exist at all clearly removes all faith in Him from his creed. For who can any longer believe in something non-existent? Or who would turn to Him Whose being has been shown by the enemies of the true Lord to be improper and unsubstantial?

But not yet has the most grievous part of his profanity been examined, which the sequel of his treatise goes on to add. Well, let us consider his words sentence by sentence. Yet I know not how I can dare to let my mouth utter the horrible and godless language of him who fights against Christ. For I fear lest, like some baleful drugs, the remnant of the pernicious bitterness should be deposited upon the lips through which the words pass. He that comes unto God, says the Apostle, must believe that He is Hebrews 11:6. Accordingly, true existence is the special distinction of Godhead. But Eunomius makes out Him Who truly is, either not to exist at all, or not to exist in a proper sense, which is just the same as not existing at all; for he who does not properly exist, does not really exist at all; as, for example, he is said to run in a dream who in that state fancies he is exerting himself in the race, while, since he untruly acts the semblance of the real race, his fancy that he is running is not for this reason a race. But even though in an inexact sense it is so called, still the name is given to it falsely. Accordingly, he who dares to assert that the Only-begotten God either does not properly exist, or does not exist at all, manifestly blots out of his creed all faith in Him. For who can any longer believe in something non-existent? Or who would resort to Him Whose being has been shown by the enemies of the true Lord to be improper and unsubstantial?

To ensure fairness to our opponents, I will place their impious words side by side with ours. Here is what they say: He Who is in the bosom of the Existent, and Who is in the beginning and is with God, is not being, or at least not being in a strict sense, even though Basil ignores this distinction and addition and uses the title "Existent" interchangeably, contrary to the truth. What are you saying? That He Who is in the Father is not, and that He Who is in the beginning and Who is in the bosom of the Father is not, precisely because He is in the beginning and is in the Father and is found in the bosom of the Existent, and therefore does not strictly exist because He is in the Existent? What foolish and irrational ideas! This is the first time we have heard such empty babbling—that the Lord, through Whom all things exist, does not strictly exist. And we have not yet reached the end of this shocking statement. Something even more startling remains: he not only claims that He does not exist, or does not strictly exist, but also that the physis in which He is understood to reside is varied and composite. For he says not being, or not being simple. But whatever lacks simplicity is clearly varied and composite. How then can the same Person be both non-existent and composite in ousia? They must choose one of two options: if they claim He does not exist, they cannot call Him composite; or if they say He is composite, they cannot deny His existence. But to make their blasphemy take many different forms, they embrace every godless idea when they want to contrast Him with the Existent, claiming that strictly speaking He does not exist, and when relating Him to the uncompounded physis they deny Him the attribute of simplicity—not existing, not existing simply, not existing in the strict sense. Which of those who have violated the word and abandoned the Faith has ever been so free with statements denying the Lord? He has set himself up as a rival to John's divine proclamation. For as often as John has declared "was" of the Word, he applies to Him Who is the opposing "was not." And he attacks the holy words of our father Basil, accusing him of neglecting these distinctions when he says that He Who is in the Father, and in the beginning, and in the bosom of the Father, exists. He holds the view that the addition of "in the beginning" and "in the bosom of the Father" prevents the real existence of Him Who is. Empty learning! What things these teachers of deceit teach! What strange doctrines they introduce to their listeners! They instruct them that whatever is in something else does not exist! So, Eunomius, since your heart and brain are within you, neither of them exists according to your distinction. For if the Only-begotten God does not strictly exist for the reason that He is in the bosom of the Father, then everything that is in something else is thereby excluded from existence. But certainly your heart exists in you and not independently. Therefore, according to your view, you must either say it does not exist at all or that it does not exist in the strict sense. However, the ignorance and profanity of his language are so obvious and glaring that they are evident even before our argument, at least to all sensible people. But to make his foolishness as well as his impiety more clear, we will add this much to what has already been said. If one may only say that something strictly exists when Scripture affirms its existence detached from all relation to anything else, why do they, like those who carry water, die of thirst when they could drink? Even this man, though he had the antidote to his blasphemy against the Son right at hand, closed his eyes and ran past it as if afraid to be saved, and charges Basil with unfairness for having left out the qualifying words and only quoting "was" by itself in reference to the Only-Begotten. And yet it was completely within his power to see what Basil saw and what everyone with eyes sees. And in this the sublime John seems to me to have been moved prophetically, so that the mouths of those who fight against Christ might be stopped—those who on the basis of these additions deny the existence, in the strict sense, of Christ. He simply and without qualification says "The Word was God," and "was Life," and "was Light," not merely speaking of Him as being in the beginning and with God and in the bosom of the Father, so that through their relation the absolute existence of the Lord should be eliminated. But his assertion that He was God, by this absolute declaration detached from all relation to anything else, cuts off every escape for those whose reasoning leads to impiety. And in addition to this, there is something else that even more convincingly proves the malice of our adversaries. For if they maintain that to exist in something is a sign of not existing in the strict sense, then certainly they must admit that not even the Father exists absolutely, since they have learned in the Gospel that just as the Son abides in the Father, so the Father abides in the Son, according to the Lord's words. For to say that the Father is in the Son is equivalent to saying that the Son is in the bosom of the Father. And let us make this further inquiry in passing. When the Son, as they say, was not, what did the bosom of the Father contain? For surely they must either grant that it was full or suppose it was empty. If the bosom was full, then certainly the Son was what filled the bosom. But if they imagine there was some void in the bosom of the Father, they are doing nothing else than asserting that His perfection came through augmentation, in the sense that He passed from a state of void and deficiency to a state of fullness and perfection. But "they knew not nor understood," says David, of those who still walk in darkness. For one who has become hostile to the true Light cannot keep his soul in light. For this reason they did not perceive what lay ready at hand in logical sequence that would have corrected their impiety, being struck, as it were, with blindness like the men of Sodom.

But that our statement may not be thought to be unfair to our opponents, I will set side by side with it the language of the impious persons, which runs as follows:– He Who is in the bosom of the Existent, and Who is in the beginning and is with God, not being, or at all events not being in a strict sense, even though Basil, neglecting this distinction and addition, uses the title of 'Existent' interchangeably, contrary to the truth — What do you say? That He Who is in the Father is not, and that He Who is in the beginning, and Who is in the bosom of the Father, is not, for this very reason, that He is in the beginning and is in the Father, and is discerned in the bosom of the Existent, and hence does not in a strict sense exist, because He is in the Existent? Alas for the idle and irrational tenets! Now for the first time we have heard this piece of vain babbling — that the Lord, by Whom are all things, does not in a strict sense exist. And we have not yet got to the end of this appalling statement; but something yet more startling remains behind, that he not only affirms that He does not exist, or does not strictly speaking exist, but also that the Nature in which He is conceived to reside is various and composite. For he says not being, or not being simple. But that to which simplicity does not belong is manifestly various and composite. How then can the same Person be at once non-existent and composite in essence? For one of two alternatives they must choose: if they predicate of Him non- existence they cannot speak of Him as composite, or if they affirm Him to be composite they cannot rob Him of existence. But that their blasphemy may assume many and varied shapes, it jumps at every godless notion when it wishes to contrast Him with the existent, affirming that, strictly speaking, He does not exist, and in His relation to the uncompounded Nature denying Him the attribute of simplicity:– not existing, not existing simply, not existing in the strict sense. Who among those who have transgressed the word and forsworn the Faith was ever so lavish in utterances denying the Lord? He has stood up in rivalry with the divine proclamation of John. For as often as the latter has attested was of the Word, so often does he apply to Him Who is an opposing was not. And he contends against the holy lips of our father Basil, bringing against him the charge that he neglects these distinctions, when he says that He Who is in the Father, and in the beginning, and in the bosom of the Father, exists, holding the view that the addition of in the beginning, and in the bosom of the Father, bars the real existence of Him Who is. Vain learning! What things the teachers of deceit teach! What strange doctrines they introduce to their hearers! They instruct them that that which is in something else does not exist! So, Eunomius, since your heart and brain are within you, neither of them, according to your distinction, exists. For if the Only-begotten God does not, strictly speaking, exist, for this reason, that He is in the bosom of the Father, then everything that is in something else is thereby excluded from existence. But certainly your heart exists in you, and not independently; therefore, according to your view, you must either say that it does not exist at all, or that it does not exist in the strict sense. However, the ignorance and profanity of his language are so gross and so glaring, as to be obvious even before our argument, at all events to all persons of sense: but that his folly as well as his impiety may be more manifest, we will add thus much to what has gone before. If one may only say that that in the strict sense exists, of which the word of Scripture attests the existence detached from all relation to anything else, why do they, like those who carry water, perish with thirst when they have it in their power to drink? Even this man, though he had at hand the antidote to his blasphemy against the Son, closed his eyes and ran past it as though fearing to be saved, and charges Basil with unfairness for having suppressed the qualifying words, and for only quoting the was by itself, in reference to the Only-Begotten. And yet it was quite in his power to see what Basil saw and what every one who has eyes sees. And herein the sublime John seems to me to have been prophetically moved, that the mouths of those fighters against Christ might be stopped, who on the ground of these additions deny the existence, in the strict sense, of the Christ, saying simply and without qualification The Word was God, and was Life, and was Light, not merely speaking of Him as being in the beginning, and with God, and in the bosom of the Father, so that by their relation the absolute existence of the Lord should be done away. But his assertion that He was God, by this absolute declaration detached from all relation to anything else, cuts off every subterfuge from those who in their reasonings run into impiety; and, in addition to this, there is moreover something else which still more convincingly proves the malignity of our adversaries. For if they make out that to exist in something is an indication of not existing in the strict sense, then certainly they allow that not even the Father exists absolutely, as they have learned in the Gospel, that just as the Son abides in the Father, so the Father abides in the Son, according to the words of the Lord. For to say that the Father is in the Son is equivalent to saying that the Son is in the bosom of the Father. And in passing let us make this further inquiry. When the Son, as they say, was not, what did the bosom of the Father contain? For assuredly they must either grant that it was full, or suppose it to have been empty. If then the bosom was full, certainly the Son was that which filled the bosom. But if they imagine that there was some void in the bosom of the Father, they do nothing else than assert of Him perfection by way of augmentation, in the sense that He passed from the state of void and deficiency to the state of fullness and perfection. But they knew not nor understood, says David of those that walk on still in darkness. For he who has been rendered hostile to the true Light cannot keep his soul in light. For this reason it was that they did not perceive lying ready to their hand in logical sequence that which would have corrected their impiety, smitten, as it were, with blindness, like the men of Sodom.

But he also says that the essence of the Son is controlled by the Father, his exact words being as follows: For He who is and lives because of the Father does not appropriate this dignity, as the ousia which controls even Him attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. If these doctrines approve themselves to some of the sages who are outside the faith, let not the Gospels or the rest of the teaching of Holy Scripture be in any way disturbed. For what fellowship is there between the creed of Christians and the wisdom that has been made foolish? But if he leans upon the support of the Scriptures, let him show one such declaration from the holy writings, and we will hold our peace. I hear Paul cry aloud, There is one Lord Jesus Christ. But Eunomius shouts against Paul, calling Christ a slave. For we recognize no other mark of a slave than to be subject and controlled. The slave is assuredly a slave, but the slave cannot by nature be Lord, even though the term be applied to Him by inexact use. And why should I bring forward the declarations of Paul in evidence of the lordship of the Lord? For Paul's Master Himself tells His disciples that He is truly Lord, accepting as He does the confession of those who called Him Master and Lord. For He says, You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well, for so I am. And in the same way He commanded that the Father should be called Father by them, saying, Call no man master upon earth, for one is your Master, even Christ; and call no man father upon earth, for one is your Father, who is in heaven. To which then ought we to give heed, as we are thus hemmed in between them? On one side the Lord Himself, and he who has Christ speaking in him, command us not to think of Him as a slave, but to honor Him even as the Father is honored, and on the other side Eunomius brings his suit against the Lord, claiming Him as a slave, when he says that He on whose shoulders rests the government of the universe is under dominion. Can our choice what to do be doubtful, or is the decision which is the more advantageous course unimportant? Shall I slight the advice of Paul, Eunomius? Shall I deem the voice of the Truth less trustworthy than your deceit? But if I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin. Since then He has spoken to them, truly declaring Himself to be Lord, and that He is not falsely named Lord—for He says, I am, not I am called—what need is there that they should do that, whereon the vengeance is inevitable because they are forewarned?

But he also says that the essence of the Son is controlled by the Father, his exact words being as follows:– For He Who is and lives because of the Father, does not appropriate this dignity, as the essence which controls even Him attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. If these doctrines approve themselves to some of the sages who are without, let not the Gospels nor the rest of the teaching of the Holy Scripture be in any way disturbed. For what fellowship is there between the creed of Christians and the wisdom that has been made foolish? But if he leans upon the support of the Scriptures, let him show one such declaration from the holy writings, and we will hold our peace. I hear Paul cry aloud, There is one Lord Jesus Christ 1 Corinthians 8:6. But Eunomius shouts against Paul, calling Christ a slave. For we recognize no other mark of a slave than to be subject and controlled. The slave is assuredly a slave, but the slave cannot by nature be Lord, even though the term be applied to Him by inexact use. And why should I bring forward the declarations of Paul in evidence of the lordship of the Lord? For Paul's Master Himself tells His disciples that He is truly Lord, accepting as He does the confession of those who called Him Master and Lord. For He says, You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well, for so I am John 13:13. And in the same way He enjoined that the Father should be called Father by them, saying, Call no man master upon earth: for one is your Master, even Christ: and call no man father upon earth, for one is your Father, Which is in heaven Matthew 23:8-10. To which then ought we to give heed, as we are thus hemmed in between them? On one side the Lord Himself, and he who has Christ speaking in him 2 Corinthians 13:3, enjoin us not to think of Him as a slave, but to honour Him even as the Father is honoured, and on the other side Eunomius brings his suit against the Lord, claiming Him as a slave, when he says that He on Whose shoulders rests the government of the universe is under dominion. Can our choice what to do be doubtful, or is the decision which is the more advantageous course unimportant? Shall I slight the advice of Paul, Eunomius? Shall I deem the voice of the Truth less trustworthy than your deceit? But if I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin. Since then, He has spoken to them, truly declaring Himself to be Lord, and that He is not falsely named Lord (for He says, I am, not I am called), what need is there that they should do that, whereon the vengeance is inevitable because they are forewarned?

Perhaps in response to this, he will again put forward his usual logic and say that the same Being is both slave and Lord, dominated by the controlling power but ruling over the rest. These profound distinctions are discussed in the streets, spread by those who are in love with falsehood, who support their empty ideas about the Deity by illustrations from ordinary life. Since events in this world give us examples of such arrangements (for instance, in a wealthy household one may see the more active and devoted servant placed over his fellow-servants by the command of his master, and thus given authority over others in the same rank and position), they transfer this concept to the doctrines concerning the Godhead, so that the Only-begotten God, though subject to the sovereignty of His superior, is in no way prevented by the authority of His sovereign from directing those inferior to Him. But let us say farewell to such philosophy, and proceed to discuss this point according to the measure of our understanding. Do they confess that the Father is by physis Lord, or do they hold that He arrived at this position by some kind of election? I do not think that a person who has any share of intellect could reach such a level of madness as not to acknowledge that the lordship of the God of all is His by physis. For that which is by physis simple, uncompounded, and indivisible, whatever it happens to be, that it is throughout in all its entirety, not becoming one thing after another by some process of change, but remaining eternally in the condition in which it is. What, then, is their belief about the Only-begotten? Do they acknowledge that His ousia is simple, or do they suppose that in it there is any sort of composition? If they think that He is some multiform thing, made up of many parts, certainly they will not grant Him even the name of Deity, but will drag down their doctrine of the Christ to corporeal and material conceptions. But if they agree that He is simple, how is it possible in the simplicity of the subject to recognize the presence of contrary attributes? For just as the contradictory opposition of life and death admits of no middle ground, so in its distinguishing characteristics is domination diametrically and irreconcilably opposed to servitude. For if one were to consider each of these by itself, one could not properly frame any definition that would apply alike to both, and where the definition of things is not identical, their physis also is certainly different. If then the Lord is simple and uncompounded in physis, how can the conjunction of contraries be found in the subject, as would be the case if servitude mingled with lordship? But if He is acknowledged to be Lord, in accordance with the teaching of the saints, the simplicity of the subject is evidence that He can have no part in the opposite condition. While if they make Him out to be a slave, then it is pointless for them to give Him the title of lordship. For that which is simple in physis is not divided into contradictory attributes. But if they claim that He is one and is called the other, that He is by physis slave and Lord in name alone, let them boldly make this declaration and relieve us from the long labor of answering them. For who can afford to be so leisurely in his treatment of absurdities as to employ arguments to demonstrate what is obvious and unambiguous? For if a man were to accuse himself of the crime of murder, the accuser would not need to go to any trouble to prove against him by evidence the charge of blood-guiltiness. In the same way we will no longer bring against our opponents, when they advance so far in impiety, a refutation framed after examination of their case. For he who claims the Only-begotten to be a slave makes Him out by so saying to be a fellow-servant with himself, and from this will necessarily arise a double enormity. For either he will despise his fellow-slave and deny the faith, having thrown off the yoke of the lordship of Christ, or he will bow before the slave and, turning away from the self-determining physis that acknowledges no Lord over it, will in a way worship himself instead of God. For if he sees himself in slavery, and the object of his worship also in slavery, he of course looks at himself, seeing the whole of himself in that which he worships. But what calculation can count up all the other evils that necessarily accompany this perversity of doctrine? For who does not know that he who is by physis a slave, and follows his occupation under the constraint imposed by a master, cannot be removed even from the emotion of fear? And of this the inspired Apostle is a witness, when he says, You have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. So that they will be found to attribute, after the likeness of men, the emotion of fear also to their fellow-servant God.

But perhaps, in answer to this, he will again put forth his accustomed logic, and will say that the same Being is both slave and Lord, dominated by the controlling power but lording it over the rest. These profound distinctions are talked of at the cross-roads, circulated by those who are enamoured of falsehood, who confirm their idle notions about the Deity by illustrations from the circumstances of ordinary life. For since the occurrences of this world give us examples of such arrangements (thus in a wealthy establishment one may see the more active and devoted servant set over his fellow-servants by the command of his master, and so invested with superiority over others in the same rank and station), they transfer this notion to the doctrines concerning the Godhead, so that the Only-begotten God, though subject to the sovereignty of His superior, is no way hindered by the authority of His sovereign in the direction of those inferior to Him. But let us bid farewell to such philosophy, and proceed to discuss this point according to the measure of our intelligence. Do they confess that the Father is by nature Lord, or do they hold that He arrived at this position by some kind of election? I do not think that a man who has any share whatever of intellect could come to such a pitch of madness as not to acknowledge that the lordship of the God of all is His by nature. For that which is by nature simple, uncompounded, and indivisible, whatever it happens to be, that it is throughout in all its entirety, not becoming one thing after another by some process of change, but remaining eternally in the condition in which it is. What, then, is their belief about the Only-begotten? Do they own that His essence is simple, or do they suppose that in it there is any sort of composition? If they think that He is some multiform thing, made up of many parts, assuredly they will not concede Him even the name of Deity, but will drag down their doctrine of the Christ to corporeal and material conceptions: but if they agree that He is simple, how is it possible in the simplicity of the subject to recognize the concurrence of contrary attributes? For just as the contradictory opposition of life and death admits of no mean, so in its distinguishing characteristics is domination diametrically and irreconcilably opposed to servitude. For if one were to consider each of these by itself, one could not properly frame any definition that would apply alike to both, and where the definition of things is not identical, their nature also is assuredly different. If then the Lord is simple and uncompounded in nature, how can the conjunction of contraries be found in the subject, as would be the case if servitude mingled with lordship? But if He is acknowledged to be Lord, in accordance with the teaching of the saints, the simplicity of the subject is evidence that He can have no part or lot in the opposite condition: while if they make Him out to be a slave, then it is idle for them to ascribe to Him the title of lordship. For that which is simple in nature is not parted asunder into contradictory attributes. But if they affirm that He is one, and is called the other, that He is by nature slave and Lord in name alone, let them boldly utter this declaration and relieve us from the long labour of answering them. For who can afford to be so leisurely in his treatment of inanities as to employ arguments to demonstrate what is obvious and unambiguous? For if a man were to inform against himself for the crime of murder, the accuser would not be put to any trouble in bringing home to him by evidence the charge of blood-guiltiness. In like manner we shall no longer bring against our opponents, when they advance so far in impiety, a confutation framed after examination of their case. For he who affirms the Only-begotten to be a slave, makes Him out by so saying to be a fellow-servant with himself: and hence will of necessity arise a double enormity. For either he will despise his fellow-slave and deny the faith, having shaken off the yoke of the lordship of Christ, or he will bow before the slave, and, turning away from the self-determining nature that owns no Lord over it, will in a manner worship himself instead of God. For if he sees himself in slavery, and the object of his worship also in slavery, he of course looks at himself, seeing the whole of himself in that which he worships. But what reckoning can count up all the other mischiefs that necessarily accompany this pravity of doctrine? For who does not know that he who is by nature a slave, and follows his avocation under the constraint imposed by a master, cannot be removed even from the emotion of fear? And of this the inspired Apostle is a witness, when he says, You have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear Romans 8:15. So that they will be found to attribute, after the likeness of men, the emotion of fear also to their fellow-servant God.

This is what the God of heresy looks like. But I will briefly set out what we, who according to the Apostle have been called to liberty by Christ—who freed us from bondage—have been taught by the Scriptures to think. I begin from the inspired teaching and boldly declare that the Divine Word does not want even us to be slaves, since our nature has now been changed for the better. He who took all that was ours, on the condition of giving us in return what is His—just as He took disease, death, curse, and sin—also took our slavery. But He did not take it in such a way that He Himself would have what He took. Rather, He took it to cleanse our nature of such evils, with our defects being swallowed up and destroyed in His stainless nature. Therefore, just as in the life we hope for there will be no disease, curse, sin, or death, slavery too will vanish away along with these things. To prove what I say is true, I call as witness the Truth Himself, who says to His disciples, "I call you no longer servants, but friends." If our nature will eventually be freed from the disgrace of slavery, how can the Lord of all be reduced to slavery by the madness and delusion of these deranged men? As a logical consequence, they must also claim that He does not know the Father's plans, because of His statement about the slave, which tells us that the servant does not know what his lord does. But when they say this, let them hear that the Son has in Himself everything that belongs to the Father, and sees all things that the Father does, and none of the good things that belong to the Father is outside the Son's knowledge. For how can He fail to have anything that is the Father's, since He has the Father wholly in Himself? Therefore, if the servant does not know what his lord does, and if He has in Himself all things that are the Father's, let those who are drunk on strong drink finally become sober. Let them now, if never before, look up at the truth and see that He who has all things that the Father has is lord of all, and not a slave. For how can the person who has no lord over him bear the mark of slavery? How can the King of all fail to have His form as equally honorable with Himself? How can dishonor—for slavery is dishonor—make up the brightness of the true glory? And how is the King's son born into slavery? No, it is not so. Rather, just as He is Light of Light, and Life of Life, and Truth of Truth, so is He Lord of Lord, King of King, God of God, Supreme of Supreme. Having the Father in Himself in His entirety, whatever the Father has in Himself He also certainly has. And since, moreover, all that the Son has belongs to the Father, the enemies of God's glory are inevitably forced, if the Son is a slave, to drag the Father down into servitude as well. For there is no attribute of the Son that is not absolutely the Father's. "For all Mine are Yours," He says, "and Yours are Mine." What then will these poor creatures say? Which is more reasonable—that the Son, who has said "Yours are Mine" and "I am glorified in them," should be glorified in the sovereignty of the Father, or that insult should be offered to the Father through the degradation involved in the slavery of the Son? For it is not possible that He who contains in Himself all that belongs to the Son, and who is Himself in the Son, should not also absolutely be in the slavery of the Son and have slavery in Himself. These are the results achieved by Eunomius' philosophy, by which he inflicts upon his Lord the insult of slavery, while he attaches the same degradation to the stainless glory of the Father.

Such is the God of heresy. But what we, who, in the words of the Apostle, have been called to liberty by Christ, Who has freed us from bondage, have been taught by the Scriptures to think, I will set forth in few words. I take my start from the inspired teaching, and boldly declare that the Divine Word does not wish even us to be slaves, our nature having now been changed for the better, and that He Who has taken all that was ours, on the terms of giving to us in return what is His, even as He took disease, death, curse, and sin, so took our slavery also, not in such a way as Himself to have what He took, but so as to purge our nature of such evils, our defects being swallowed up and done away with in His stainless nature. As therefore in the life that we hope for there will be neither disease, nor curse, nor sin, nor death, so slavery also along with these will vanish away. And that what I say is true I call the Truth Himself to witness, Who says to His disciples I call you no more servants, but friends. If then our nature will be free at length from the reproach of slavery, how comes the Lord of all to be reduced to slavery by the madness and infatuation of these deranged men, who must of course, as a logical consequence, assert that He does not know the counsels of the Father, because of His declaration concerning the slave, which tells us that the servant knows not what his lord does? But when they say this, let them hear that the Son has in Himself all that pertains to the Father, and sees all things that the Father does, and none of the good things that belong to the Father is outside the knowledge of the Son. For how can He fail to have anything that is the Father's, seeing He has the Father wholly in Himself? Accordingly, if the servant knows not what his lord does, and if He has in Himself all things that are the Father's, let those who are reeling with strong drink at last become sober, and let them now, if never before, look up at the truth, and see that He who has all things that the Father has is lord of all, and not a slave. For how can the personality that owns no lord over it bear on itself the brand of slavery? How can the King of all fail to have His form of like honour with Himself? How can dishonour — for slavery is dishonour — constitute the brightness of the true glory? And how is the King's son born into slavery? No, it is not so. But as He is Light of Light, and Life of Life, and Truth of Truth, so is He Lord of Lord, King of King, God of God, Supreme of Supreme; for having in Himself the Father in His entirety, whatever the Father has in Himself He also assuredly has, and since, moreover, all that the Son has belongs to the Father, the enemies of God's glory are inevitably compelled, if the Son is a slave, to drag down to servitude the Father as well. For there is no attribute of the Son which is not absolutely the Father's. For all Mine are Yours, He says, and Yours are Mine John 17:10. What then will the poor creatures say? Which is more reasonable — that the Son, Who has said, Yours are Mine, and I am glorified in them John 17:10, should be glorified in the sovereignty of the Father, or that insult should be offered to the Father by the degradation involved in the slavery of the Son? For it is not possible that He Who contains in Himself all that belongs to the Son, and Who is Himself in the Son, should not also absolutely be in the slavery of the Son, and have slavery in Himself. Such are the results achieved by Eunomius' philosophy, whereby he inflicts upon his Lord the insult of slavery, while he attaches the same degradation to the stainless glory of the Father.

Let us return once more to the course of his treatise. What does Eunomius say concerning the Only-begotten? That He does not appropriate the dignity, for he calls the term "being" a dignity. What startling philosophy! Who among all people who have ever existed, whether among Greeks or barbarian sages, who among people of our own day, who among people of all time has ever given being the name of dignity? For everything that is regarded as subsisting is said, by the common custom of all who use language, to be: and from the word "be" has been formed the term "being." But now the expression "dignity" is applied in a new way to the idea expressed by "being." For he says that the Son, who is and lives because of the Father, does not appropriate this dignity, having no Scripture to support his statement, and not arriving at such a senseless conclusion by any process of logical inference, but as if he had consumed some windy food, he belches forth his blasphemy in its crude and unprocessed form, like some foul breath. He does not appropriate this dignity. Let us grant the point that being is called dignity. What then? Does He who does not appropriate being not be? No, says Eunomius, because He exists by reason of the Father. Do you not then say that He who does not appropriate being is not? For "not to appropriate" has the same force as "to be alien from," and the mutual opposition of these ideas is evident. For that which is proper is not alien, and that which is alien is not proper. He therefore who does not appropriate being is obviously alien from being: and He who is alien from being is nonexistent.

Let us however return once more to the course of his treatise. What does Eunomius say concerning the Only-begotten? That He does not appropriate the dignity, for he calls the appellation of being a dignity. A startling piece of philosophy! Who of all men that have ever been, whether among Greeks or barbarian sages, who of the men of our own day, who of the men of all time ever gave being the name of dignity? For everything that is regarded as subsisting is said, by the common custom of all who use language, to be: and from the word be has been formed the term being. But now the expression dignity is applied in a new fashion to the idea expressed by being. For he says that the Son, Who is and lives because of the Father, does not appropriate this dignity, having no Scripture to support his statement, and not conducting his statement to so senseless a conclusion by any process of logical inference, but as if he had taken into his intestines some windy food, he belches forth his blasphemy in its crude and unmethodized form, like some unsavoury breath. He does not appropriate this dignity. Let us concede the point of being being called dignity. What then? Does He Who is not appropriate being? No, says Eunomius, because He exists by reason of the Father. Do you not then say that He Who does not appropriate being is not? For not to appropriate has the same force as to be alien from, and the mutual opposition of the ideas is evident. For that which is proper is not alien, and that which is alien is not proper. He therefore Who does not appropriate being is obviously alien from being: and He Who is alien from being is nonexistent.

But his convincing proof of this absurdity he presents in these words: "as the essence which controls even Him attracts to itself the conception of the Existent." Let us say nothing about the awkward phrasing here. Let us examine his real meaning. What argument ever demonstrated this? He unnecessarily repeats his claim that the ousia of the Father has sovereignty over the Son. What evangelist is the patron of this doctrine? What dialectical process leads us to it? What premises support it? What line of argument ever demonstrated through any logical consequence that the Only-begotten God is under dominion? But, he says, the essence that is dominant over the Son attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. What does "the attraction of the existent" mean? And how does this phrase about attracting get tossed on top of what he said before? Certainly anyone who considers the force of words will judge for himself. However, we will say nothing about this. Instead, we will take up again the argument that he does not grant essential being to the One to whom he does not allow the title of the Existent. And why does he pointlessly fight with shadows, arguing about the non-existent being this or that? For what does not exist is of course neither like anything else nor unlike it. But while granting that He exists, he forbids Him to be called so. What a vain precision—haggling over the sound of a word while making concessions on the more important matter! But in what sense does He who, as Eunomius says, has dominion over the Son, attract to Himself the conception of the Existent? For if he says that the Father attracts His own essence, this process of attraction is unnecessary, since existence is already His without being attracted. If, on the other hand, his meaning is that the existence of the Son is attracted by the Father, I cannot understand how existence can be wrenched from the Existent and pass over to the One who attracts it. Can he be imagining the error of Sabellius, as though the Son did not exist in Himself but was merely painted onto the personal existence of the Father? Is this his meaning in the expression that the conception of the Existent is attracted by the essence which exercises domination over the Son? Or does he, while not denying the personal existence of the Son, nevertheless say that He is separated from the meaning conveyed by the term "the Existent"? And yet, how can the Existent be separated from the conception of existence? For as long as anything is what it is, nature does not permit that it should not be what it is.

But his cogent proof of this absurdity he brings forward in the words, as the essence which controls even Him attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. Let us say nothing about the awkwardness of the combination here: let us examine his serious meaning. What argument ever demonstrated this? He superfluously reiterates to us his statement of the Essence of the Father having sovereignty over the Son. What evangelist is the patron of this doctrine? What process of dialectic conducts us to it. What premises support it? What line of argument ever demonstrated by any logical consequence that the Only-begotten God is under dominion? But, says he, the essence that is dominant over the Son attracts to itself the conception of the Existent. What is the meaning of the attraction of the existent? And how comes the phrase of attracting to be flung on the top of what he has said before? Assuredly he who considers the force of words will judge for himself. About this, however, we will say nothing: but we will take up again that argument that he does not grant essential being to Him to Whom he does not leave the title of the Existent. And why does he idly fight with shadows, contending about the non-existent being this or that? For that which does not exist is of course neither like anything else, nor unlike. But while granting that He is existent he forbids Him to be so called. Alas for the vain precision of haggling about the sound of a word while making concessions on the more important matter! But in what sense does He, Who, as he says, has dominion over the Son, attract to Himself the conception of the Existent? For if he says that the Father attracts His own essence, this process of attraction is superfluous: for existence is His already, without being attracted. If, on the other hand, his meaning is that the existence of the Son is attracted by the Father, I cannot make out how existence is to be wrenched from the Existent, and to pass over to Him Who attracts it. Can he be dreaming of the error of Sabellius, as though the Son did not exist in Himself, but was painted on to the personal existence of the Father? Is this his meaning in the expression that the conception of the Existent is attracted by the essence which exercises domination over the Son? Or does he, while not denying the personal existence of the Son, nevertheless say that He is separated from the meaning conveyed by the term the Existent? And yet, how can the Existent be separated from the conception of existence? For as long as anything is what it is, nature does not admit that it should not be what it is.

But he now turns to loftier language, elevating himself and puffing himself up with empty conceit, and takes it upon himself to say something worthy of God's majesty. For God, he says, being the most highly exalted of all goods, and the mightiest of all, and free from all necessity — How nobly does this gallant man bring his discourse, like some ship without ballast, driven unguided by the waves of deceit, into the harbor of truth! God is the most highly exalted of all goods. Splendid acknowledgment! I suppose he will not bring a charge of unconstitutional conduct against the great John, who in his lofty proclamation declares the Only-begotten to be God, who was with God and was God. If he, then, the proclaimer of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, is worthy of credit, and if God is the most highly exalted of all goods, it follows that the Son is acknowledged by the enemies of his glory to be the most highly exalted of all goods. And since this phrase is also applied to the Father, the superlative force of most highly exalted admits of no diminution or addition by way of comparison. But now that we have obtained from the adversary's testimony these statements for the proof of the glory of the Only-begotten, we must add in support of sound doctrine his next statement too. He says, God, the most highly exalted of all goods, being without hindrance from nature, or constraint from cause, or impulse from need, begets and creates according to the supremacy of his own authority, having his will as power sufficient for the constitution of the things produced. If, then, all good is according to his will, he not only determines that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good, if, that is to say, as one may assume, it is an indication of weakness to make what one does not will. We shall borrow this much, for the confirmation of orthodox doctrines, from our adversaries' statement, though that statement is percolated through with vile and counterfeit clauses. Yes, he who has, by the supremacy of his authority, power in his will that suffices for the constitution of the things that are made, he who created all things without hindrance from nature or compulsion from cause, does determine not only that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good. But he who made all things is, as the gospel proclaims, the Only-begotten God. He, at that time when he willed it, made the creation; at that time, by means of the surrounding essence, he enclosed within the body of heaven all that universe that is shut off within its compass; at that time, when he thought it well that this should be, he displayed the dry land to view, he enclosed the waters in their hollow places; vegetation, fruits, the generation of animals, the formation of man appeared at that time when each of these things seemed expedient to the wisdom of the Creator — and he who made all these things (I will once more repeat my statement) is the Only-begotten God who made the ages. For if the interval of the ages had preceded existing things, it would be proper to employ the temporal adverb and to say he then willed and he then made. But since the age was not, since no conception of interval is present to our minds in regard to that divine nature which is not measured by quantity or by interval, the force of temporal expressions must surely be void. Thus to say that the creation has been given a beginning in time, according to the good pleasure of the wisdom of him who made all things, does not go beyond probability. But to regard the divine nature itself as being in a kind of extension measured by intervals belongs only to those who have been trained in the new wisdom. What a point is this, embedded in his words, which I intentionally passed by in my eagerness to reach the subject! I will now resume it and read it to show our author's cleverness.

But he now turns to loftier language, and elevating himself and puffing himself up with empty conceit, he takes in hand to say something worthy of God's majesty. For God, he says, being the most highly exalted of all goods, and the mightiest of all, and free from all necessity — Nobly does the gallant man bring his discourse, like some ship without ballast, driven unguided by the waves of deceit, into the harbour of truth! God is the most highly exalted of all goods. Splendid acknowledgment! I suppose he will not bring a charge of unconstitutional conduct against the great John, by whom, in his lofty proclamation, the Only-begotten is declared to be God, Who was with God and was God. If he, then, the proclaimer of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, is worthy of credit, and if God is the most highly exalted of all goods, it follows that the Son is alleged by the enemies of His glory, to be the most highly exalted of all goods. And as this phrase is also applied to the Father, the superlative force of most highly exalted admits of no diminution or addition by way of comparison. But, now that we have obtained from the adversary's testimony these statements for the proof of the glory of the Only-begotten, we must add in support of sound doctrine his next statement too. He says, God, the most highly exalted of all goods, being without hindrance from nature, or constraint from cause, or impulse from need, begets and creates according to the supremacy of His own authority, having His will as power sufficient for the constitution of the things produced. If, then, all good is according to His will, He not only determines that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good, if, that is to say, as one may assume, it is an indication of weakness to make what one does not will. We shall borrow so far as this, for the confirmation of the orthodox doctrines, from our adversaries' statement, percolated as that statement is by vile and counterfeit clauses. Yes, He Who has, by the supremacy of His authority, power in His will that suffices for the constitution of the things that are made, He Who created all things without hindrance from nature or compulsion from cause, does determine not only that which is made as good, but also the time of its being good. But He Who made all things is, as the gospel proclaims, the Only-begotten God. He, at that time when He willed it, did make the creation; at that time, by means of the circumambient essence, He surrounded with the body of heaven all that universe that is shut off within its compass: at that time, when He thought it well that this should be, He displayed the dry land to view, He enclosed the waters in their hollow places; vegetation, fruits, the generation of animals, the formation of man, appeared at that time when each of these things seemed expedient to the wisdom of the Creator: — and He Who made all these things (I will once more repeat my statement) is the Only-begotten God Who made the ages. For if the interval of the ages has preceded existing things, it is proper to employ the temporal adverb, and to say He then willed and He then made: but since the age was not, since no conception of interval is present to our minds in regard to that Divine Nature which is not measured by quantity or by interval, the force of temporal expressions must surely be void. Thus to say that the creation has had given to it a beginning in time, according to the good pleasure of the wisdom of Him Who made all things, does not go beyond probability: but to regard the Divine Nature itself as being in a kind of extension measured by intervals, belongs only to those who have been trained in the new wisdom. What a point is this, embedded in his words, which I intentionally passed by in my eagerness to reach the subject! I will now resume it, and read it to show our author's cleverness.

The one who is most highly exalted in God Himself before all other things that are generated, he says, has dominion over His own power. This phrase has been transferred word for word by our pamphleteer from the Hebrew Philo to his own argument, and anyone who cares to check will find Eunomius' theft proven by Philo's own works. I point this out now not so much to criticize our speechmaker for the poverty of his own arguments and thoughts, but rather to show my readers the close relationship between Eunomius' teaching and Jewish reasoning. This phrase from Philo would not have fit word for word into his argument if there weren't some kinship between the intent of one and the other. In the Hebrew author you can find the phrase in this form: God, before all other things that are generated; and what follows, has dominion over His own power, is an addition from this new Judaism. But an examination of this statement will clearly show what an absurdity it involves. God, he says, has dominion over His own power. Tell me, what is He? Over what does He have dominion? Is He something other than His own power, and Lord of a power that is something other than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of power. For that which is something other than power is surely not power, and so He is found to have dominion over power precisely insofar as He is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in Himself, and has dominion over one by means of the other. And what conflict or division is there, that God should split the power that exists in Himself and overthrow one part of His power with the other? I suppose He could not have dominion over His own power without the help of some greater and more violent power to accomplish this! Such is Eunomius' God: a being with a double nature, or composite, dividing Himself against Himself, having one power out of harmony with another, so that by one He is driven toward disorder, and by the other He restrains this discordant motion. Again, with what intention does He dominate the power that pushes toward generation? So that no evil will arise if generation is not prevented? Or rather let him explain this first—what is that which is naturally under dominion? His language points to some movement of impulse and choice, considered separately and independently. For that which dominates must be one thing, and that which is dominated another. Now God has dominion over His power—and this is what? A self-determining nature? Or something other than this, pressing toward disturbance or remaining in a state of rest? Well, if he assumes it to be at rest, that which is tranquil needs no one to have dominion over it; and if he says He has dominion, He clearly has dominion over something that drives forward and is in motion, and this, I assume he will say, is something naturally different from Him who rules it. What then, let him tell us, does he understand by this idea? Is it something other than God, considered as having an independent existence? How can another existence be in God? Or is it some condition in the Divine nature considered as having an existence not its own? I hardly think he would say so, for that which has no existence of its own does not exist, and that which does not exist is neither under dominion nor free from it. What then is this power that was under dominion and was restrained in respect to its own activity while the proper time for the generation of Christ was still to come, and to set this power free to proceed to its natural operation? What was the intervening cause of delay for which God postponed the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it good as yet to become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as intervening between the life of the Father and that of the Son, that is not time nor space, nor any concept of extension, nor anything like these? For what purpose does this keen and clear-sighted eye observe and perceive the separation of the life of God in relation to the life of the Son? When he is pressed from all directions he is himself forced to admit that the interval does not exist at all.

For He Who is most highly exalted in God Himself before all other things that are generated, he says, has dominion over His own power. The phrase has been transferred by our pamphleteer word for word from the Hebrew Philo to his own argument, and Eunomius' theft will be proved by Philo's works themselves to any one who cares about it. I note the fact, however, at present, not so much to reproach our speech-monger with the poverty of his own arguments and thoughts, as with the intention of showing to my readers the close relationship between the doctrine of Eunomius and the reasoning of the Jews. For this phrase of Philo would not have fitted word for word into his argument had there not been a sort of kindred between the intention of the one and the other. In the Hebrew author you may find the phrase in this form: God, before all other things that are generated; and what follows, has dominion over His own power, is an addition of the new Judaism. But what an absurdity this involves an examination of the saying will clearly show. God, he says, has dominion over His own power. Tell me, what is He? Over what has He dominion? Is He something else than His own power, and Lord of a power that is something else than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of power. For that which is something else than power is surely not power, and thus He is found to have dominion over power just in so far as He is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in Himself, and has dominion over the one by the other. And what contest or schism is there, that God should divide the power that exists in Himself, and overthrow one section of His power by the other. I suppose He could not have dominion over His own power without the assistance to that end of some greater and more violent power! Such is Eunomius' God: a being with double nature, or composite, dividing Himself against Himself, having one power out of harmony with another, so that by one He is urged to disorder, and by the other restrains this discordant motion. Again, with what intent does He dominate the power that urges on to generation? Lest some evil should arise if generation be not hindered? Or rather let him explain this in the first place — what is that which is naturally under dominion? His language points to some movement of impulse and choice, considered separately and independently. For that which dominates must needs be one thing, that which is dominated another. Now God has dominion over His power — and this is — what? A self-determining nature? Or something else than this, pressing on to disquiet, or remaining in a state of quiescence? Well, if he supposes it to be quiescent, that which is tranquil needs no one to have dominion over it: and if he says He has dominion, He has dominion clearly over something which impels and is in motion: and this, I presume he will say, is something naturally different from Him Who rules it. What then, let him tell us, does he understand in this idea? Is it something else besides God, considered as having an independent existence? How can another existence be in God? Or is it some condition in the Divine Nature considered as having an existence not its own? I hardly think he would say so: for that which has no existence of its own is not: and that which is not, is neither under dominion, nor set free from it. What then is that power which was under dominion, and was restrained in respect of its own activity, while the due time of the generation of Christ was still about to come, and to set this power free to proceed to its natural operation? What was the intervening cause of delay, for which God deferred the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it good as yet to become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as intervening between the life of the Father and that of the Son, that is not time nor space, nor any idea of extension, nor any like thing? To what purpose is it that this keen and clear-sighted eye marks and beholds the separation of the life of God in regard to the life of the Son? When he is driven in all directions he is himself forced to admit that the interval does not exist at all.

However, though there is no interval between them, he does not admit that their communion is immediate and intimate. Instead, he condescends to the measure of our knowledge and converses with us in human language as one of ourselves, quietly confessing the weakness of reasoning and taking refuge in a line of argument that was never taught by Aristotle and his school. He says: It was good and proper that He should beget His Son at that time when He willed, and in the minds of sensible men no questioning arises as to why He did not do so before. What does this mean, Eunomius? Are you also going on foot like us unlettered men? Are you leaving your artistic periods and actually taking refuge in unreasoning assent? You, who so much reproached those who undertake to write without logical skill? You, who say to Basil, You show your own ignorance when you say that definitions of the terms that express spiritual things are impossible for men—you who elsewhere advance the same charge—you make your own weakness common to others when you declare that what is not possible for you is impossible for all? Is this the way that you, who say such things, approach the ears of him who questions about the reason why the Father defers becoming the Father of such a Son? Do you think it an adequate explanation to say, He begot Him at that time when He chose—let there be no questioning on this point? Has your apprehensive fancy grown so feeble in maintaining your doctrines? What has become of your premises that lead to dilemmas? What has become of your forcible proofs? How is it that those terrible and inevitable syllogistic conclusions of your art have dissolved into vanity and nothingness? He begot the Son at that time when He chose—let there be no questioning on this point! Is this the finished product of your many labors, of your voluminous undertakings? What was the question asked? If it is good and fitting for God to have such a Son, why should we not believe that the good is always present with Him? What answer does he make to us from the very shrine of his philosophy, tightening the bonds of his argument by inevitable necessity? He made the Son at that time when He chose—let there be no questioning as to why He did not do so before. Why, if the inquiry before us concerned some irrational being that acts by natural impulse, why it did not sooner do whatever it may be—why the spider did not make her webs, or the bee her honey, or the turtle-dove her nest—what else could you have said? Would not the same answer have been ready—She did it at that time when she chose—let there be no questioning on this matter? Indeed, if it concerned some sculptor or painter who works in paintings or sculptures by his imitative art, whatever it may be (supposing that he exercises his art without being subject to any authority), I imagine that such an answer would meet the case of anyone who wished to know why he did not exercise his art sooner—that, being under no necessity, he made his own choice the occasion of his operation. For men, because they do not always wish the same things and commonly do not have power cooperating with their will, do something which seems good to them at that time when their choice inclines to the work and they have no external hindrance. But that nature which is always the same, to which no good is adventitious, in which all that variety of plans which arises by way of opposition, from error or from ignorance, has no place, to which there comes nothing as a result of change which was not with it before, and by which nothing is chosen afterwards which it had not from the beginning regarded as good—to say of this nature that it does not always possess what is good, but afterwards chooses to have something which it did not choose before—this belongs to wisdom that surpasses us. For we were taught that the Divine nature (physis) is at all times full of all good, or rather is itself the fullness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for its perfecting, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of good. Now that which is perfect is equally remote from addition and from diminution. Therefore, we say that perfection of goods which we behold in the Divine nature always remains the same, as, in whatever direction we extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to be such as it is. The Divine nature, then, is never void of good. But the Son is the fullness of all good, and accordingly He is at all times contemplated in that Father whose nature is perfection in all good. But he says, let there be no questioning about this point, why He did not do so before. And we shall answer him: It is one thing, most wise sir, to lay down as an ordinance some proposition that you happen to approve, and another to make converts by reasoning on the points of controversy. So long, therefore, as you cannot assign any reason why we may piously say that the Son was afterwards begotten by the Father, your ordinances will be of no effect with sensible men.

However, though there is no interval between them, he does not admit that their communion is immediate and intimate, but condescends to the measure of our knowledge, and converses with us in human phrase as one of ourselves, himself quietly confessing the impotence of reasoning and taking refuge in a line of argument that was never taught by Aristotle and his school. He says, It was good and proper that He should beget His Son at that time when He willed: and in the minds of sensible men there does not hence arise any questioning why He did not do so before. What does this mean, Eunomius? Are you too going afoot like us unlettered men? Are you leaving your artistic periods and actually taking refuge in unreasoning assent? You, who so much reproached those who take in hand to write without logical skill? You, who say to Basil, You show your own ignorance when you say that definitions of the terms that express things spiritual are an impossibility for men, who again elsewhere advance the same charge, you make your own impotence common to others, when you declare that what is not possible for you is impossible for all? Is this the way that you, who say such things as these, approach the ears of him who questions about the reason why the Father defers becoming the Father of such a Son? Do you think it an adequate explanation to say, He begot Him at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on this point? Has your apprehensive fancy grown so feeble in the maintenance of your doctrines? What has become of your premises that lead to dilemmas? What has become of your forcible proofs? How comes it that those terrible and inevitable syllogistic conclusions of your art have dissolved into vanity and nothingness? He begot the Son at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on this point! Is this the finished product of your many labours, of your voluminous undertakings? What was the question asked? If it is good and fitting for God to have such a Son, why are we not to believe that the good is always present with Him? What is the answer he makes to us from the very shrine of his philosophy, tightening the bonds of his argument by inevitable necessity? He made the Son at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning as to why He did not do so before. Why, if the inquiry before us were concerning some irrational being, that acts by natural impulse, why it did not sooner do whatever it may be — why the spider did not make her webs, or the bee her honey, or the turtle-dove her nest — what else could you have said? Would not the same answer have been ready — She did it at that time when she chose: let there be no questioning on this matter? Nay, if it were concerning some sculptor or painter who works in paintings or in sculptures by his imitative art, whatever it may be (supposing that he exercises his art without being subject to any authority), I imagine that such an answer would meet the case of any one who wished to know why he did not exercise his art sooner — that, being under no necessity, he made his own choice the occasion of his operation. For men, because they do not always wish the same things, and commonly have not power co-operating with their will, do something which seems good to them at that time when their choice inclines to the work, and they have no external hindrance. But that nature which is always the same, to which no good is adventitious, in which all that variety of plans which arises by way of opposition, from error or from ignorance, has no place, to which there comes nothing as a result of change, which was not with it before, and by which nothing is chosen afterwards which it had not from the beginning regarded as good — to say of this nature that it does not always possess what is good, but afterwards chooses to have something which it did not choose before — this belongs to wisdom that surpasses us. For we were taught that the Divine. Nature is at all times full of all good, or rather is itself the fullness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for its perfecting, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of good. Now that which is perfect is equally remote from addition and from diminution; and therefore, we say that perfection of goods which we behold in the Divine Nature always remains the same, as, in whatsoever direction we extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to be such as it is. The Divine Nature, then, is never void of good: but the Son is the fullness of all good: and accordingly He is at all times contemplated in that Father Whose Nature is perfection in all good. But he says, let there be no questioning about this point, why He did not do so before: and we shall answer him –It is one thing, most sapient sir, to lay down as an ordinance some proposition that you happen to approve, and another to make converts by reasoning on the points of controversy. So long, therefore, as you cannot assign any reason why we may piously say that the Son was afterwards begotten by the Father, your ordinances will be of no effect with sensible men.

So this is how Eunomius brings the truth to light for us through his learned attack. We will use his argument, as we usually do, to establish true doctrine, so that even from this passage it becomes clear that at every point they are forced against their will to support our position. For if, as our opponent says, the Father begot the Son at that time when He chose, and if He always chose what is good, and His power matched His choice, it follows that the Son must be considered as always with the Father, who always both chooses what is excellent and is able to possess what He chooses. And if we apply truth to his next words as well, it is easy for us to adapt them to the doctrine we hold. Let there be no questioning among reasonable people on this point: why did He not do so before? For the word "before" has a temporal sense, set against what is afterward and later. But if time does not exist, the terms expressing temporal intervals are surely abolished along with it. Now the Lord existed before times and before ages. Questioning about "before" or "after" concerning the Maker of the ages is useless in the eyes of reasonable people, for words of this type have no meaning unless they are used in reference to time. Since the Lord is prior to times, the words "before" and "after" have no application to Him. This may perhaps be enough to refute arguments that need no one to overthrow them, since they collapse by their own weakness. For who has so much spare time that he can devote himself to listening to the arguments from the other side and to our response against such nonsense? However, since in people prejudiced by impiety, deception is like some ingrained dye that is hard to wash out and deeply burned into their hearts, let us spend a little more time on our argument, in case we might be able to cleanse their souls from this evil stain. After the statements I have quoted, and after adding to them some disconnected and poorly arranged strings of insolence and abuse in the manner of his teacher Prunicus, he reaches the high point of his arguments. Leaving behind the illogical presentation of his foolishness, he arms his speech once more with the weapons of logic and maintains his absurd position against us, as he imagines, through syllogisms.

Thus it is then that Eunomius brings the truth to light for us as the result of his scientific attack. And we for our part shall apply his argument, as we are wont to do, for the establishment of the true doctrine, so that even by this passage it may be clear that at every point, constrained against their will, they advocate our view. For if, as our opponent says, He begot the Son at that time when He chose, and if He always chose that which is good, and His power coincided with His choice, it follows that the Son will be considered as always with the Father, Who always both chooses that which is excellent, and is able to possess what He chooses. And if we are to reduce his next words also to truth, it is easy for us to adapt them also to the doctrine we hold:– Let there be no questioning among sensible men on this point, why He did not do so before — for the word before has a temporal sense, opposed to what is afterwards and later: but on the supposition that time does not exist, the terms expressing temporal interval are surely abolished with it. Now the Lord was before times and before ages: questioning as to before or after concerning the Maker of the ages is useless in the eyes of reasonable men: for words of this class are devoid of all meaning, if they are not used in reference to time. Since then the Lord is antecedent to times, the words before and after have no place as applied to Him. This may perhaps be sufficient to refute arguments that need no one to overthrow them, but fall by their own feebleness. For who is there with so much leisure that he can give himself up to such an extent to listen to the arguments on the other side, and to our contention against the silly stuff? Since, however, in men prejudiced by impiety, deceit is like some ingrained dye, hard to wash out, and deeply burned in upon their hearts, let us spend yet a little time upon our argument, if haply we may be able to cleanse their souls from this evil stain. After the utterances that I have quoted, and after adding to them, in the manner of his teacher Prunicus, some unconnected and ill-arranged octads of insolence and abuse, he comes to the crowning point of his arguments, and, leaving the illogical exposition of his folly, arms his discourse once more with the weapons of dialectic, and maintains his absurdity against us, as he imagines, syllogistically.

What he says runs as follows: Since all generation does not continue indefinitely but stops when it reaches some end, those who admit that the Son originated are absolutely required to say that He stopped being generated at some point. They should not regard with disbelief the beginning of things that cease being generated, which therefore must also begin. For the cessation of generation establishes a beginning point for both begetting and being begotten, and these facts cannot be disbelieved on the grounds of both nature itself and the Divine laws. Now since he tries to establish his argument by inference, setting up his universal proposition according to the scientific method of those skilled in such matters, and including within the general premise the proof of the particular case, let us first consider his universal statement and then examine the force of his inferences. Is it a reverent thing to draw conclusions about the pretemporal generation of the Son based on evidence from all generation? And should we put forward ordinary nature as our teacher concerning the being of the Only-begotten? For my part, I would not have expected anyone to reach such a level of madness that such an idea about the Divine and unsullied generation would enter his mind. He says all generation does not continue indefinitely. What does he mean by generation? Is he speaking of fleshly, bodily birth or of the formation of inanimate objects? The processes involved in bodily generation are well known—processes which no one would think of applying to the Divine Nature. Therefore, so that our discussion does not appear excessive by mentioning the works of nature at length, we shall pass over such matters in silence, since I assume every sensible person is already aware of the causes that mark the extent of generation, both regarding its beginning and its ending. It would be tedious and at the same time unnecessary to express them all in detail: the coming together of those who generate, the formation in the womb of what is generated, labor, birth, place, time—without which the generation of a body cannot occur. All of these are equally foreign to the Divine generation of the Only-begotten. For if any one of these things were admitted, the rest would necessarily all come with it. Therefore, so that the Divine generation may be free from every idea connected with passion, we shall avoid conceiving of it even in terms of that extension which is measured by intervals. Now whatever begins and ends is surely considered to exist in a kind of extension, and all extension is measured by time. Since time (by which we mark both the end and the beginning of birth) is excluded, it would be pointless in the case of the uninterrupted generation to entertain the idea of end or beginning, since no concept can be formed to mark either the point at which such generation begins or the point at which it ceases. If on the other hand he is looking at the inanimate creation, in this case likewise, place and time and matter and preparation and the power of the artificer and many similar things work together to bring the product to completion. And since time certainly accompanies all things that are produced, and since with everything that is created, whether animate or inanimate, there are also conceived foundations of construction relating to the product, we can find in these cases clear beginnings and endings of the process of formation. For even the procurement of material is actually the beginning of the construction and is a marker of place and is logically connected with time. All these things establish for the products their beginnings and endings. And no one could say that these things have any share in the pretemporal generation of the Only-begotten God, so that by means of the things now under consideration we could calculate any beginning or end with regard to that generation.

What he says runs thus:– As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end, those who admit the origination of the Son are absolutely obliged to say that He then ceased being generated, and not to look incredulously on the beginning of those things which cease being generated, and therefore also surely begin: for the cessation of generation establishes a beginning of begetting and being begotten: and these facts cannot be disbelieved, on the ground at once of nature itself and of the Divine laws. Now since he endeavours to establish his point inferentially, laying down his universal proposition according to the scientific method of those who are skilled in such matters, and including in the general premise the proof of the particular, let us first consider his universal, and then proceed to examine the force of his inferences. Is it a reverent proceeding to draw from all generation evidence even as to the pre-temporal generation of the Son? And ought we to put forward ordinary nature as our instructor on the being of the Only-begotten? For my own part, I should not have expected any one to reach such a point of madness, that any such idea of the Divine and unsullied generation should enter his fancy. All generation, he says, is not protracted to infinity. What is it that he understands by generation? Is he speaking of fleshly, bodily birth, or of the formation of inanimate objects? The affections involved in bodily generation are well known — affections which no one would think of transferring to the Divine Nature. In order therefore that our discourse may not, by mentioning the works of nature at length, be made to appear redundant, we shall pass such matters by in silence, as I suppose that every sensible man is himself aware of the causes by which generation is protracted, both in regard to its beginning and to its cessation: it would be tedious and at the same time superfluous to express them all minutely, the coming together of those who generate, the formation in the womb of that which is generated, travail, birth, place, time, without which the generation of a body cannot be brought about — things which are all equally alien from the Divine generation of the Only-begotten: for if any one of these things were admitted, the rest will of necessity all enter with it. That the Divine generation, therefore, may be clear of every idea connected with passion, we shall avoid conceiving with regard to it even that extension which is measured by intervals. Now that which begins and ends is surely regarded as being in a kind of extension, and all extension is measured by time, and as time (by which we mark both the end of birth and its beginning) is excluded, it would be vain, in the case of the uninterrupted generation, to entertain the idea of end or beginning, since no idea can be formed to mark either the point at which such generation begins or that at which it ceases. If on the other hand it is the inanimate creation to which he is looking, even in this case, in like manner, place, and time, and matter, and preparation, and power of the artificer, and many like things, concur to bring the product to perfection. And since time assuredly is concurrent with all things that are produced, and since with everything that is created, be it animate or inanimate, there are conceived also bases of construction relative to the product, we can find in these cases evident beginnings and endings of the process of formation. For even the procuring of material is actually the beginning of the fabric, and is a sign of place, and is logically connected with time. All these things fix for the products their beginnings and endings; and no one could say that these things have any participation in the pretemporal generation of the Only-begotten God, so that, by the aid of the things now under consideration, we are able to calculate, with regard to that generation, any beginning or end.

Now that we have discussed these matters so far, let us return to considering our adversaries' argument. It says, "As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end." Since the meaning of generation has been considered with respect to either sense—whether he intends by this word to signify the birth of bodily beings or the formation of created things (neither of which has anything in common with the unsullied Nature)—the premise is shown to have no connection with the subject. For it is not absolutely necessary, as he claims, that because all making and generation stops at some limit, those who accept the generation of the Son should confine it within a double limit by supposing it has both a beginning and an end. For only things that are confined in some quantitative way can be said either to begin or to cease when they reach a limit, and the measure expressed by time (which extends alongside the quantity of that which is produced) separates the beginning from the end by the interval between them. But how can anyone measure or treat as extended that which is without quantity and without extension? What measure can he find for that which has no quantity, or what interval for that which has no extension? Or how can anyone define the infinite by end and beginning? For beginning and end are names for the limits of extension, and where there is no extension, there is no limit either. Now the Divine Nature is without extension, and being without extension, it has no limit; and that which is limitless is infinite, and is rightly called so. Thus it is pointless to try to confine the infinite by beginning and ending—for what is confined cannot be infinite. How is it, then, that this Platonic Phaedrus incoherently attaches to his own teaching those speculations about the soul which Plato makes in that dialogue? For just as Plato there spoke of the stopping of motion, so this writer too was eager to speak of the stopping of generation, in order to deceive those who have no knowledge of these matters with fine Platonic phrases. And these things, he tells us, cannot be disbelieved, on the grounds both of nature itself and of the Divine laws. But nature, from our previous remarks, appears not to be trustworthy for instruction about the Divine generation—not even if one were to take the universe itself as an illustration of the argument, since through its creation also, as we learn in the cosmogony of Moses, the measure of time ran, distributed in a certain order and arrangement by specific days and nights, for each of the things that came into being. And even our adversaries' statement does not admit this with regard to the being of the Only-begotten, since it acknowledges that the Lord existed before the times of the ages.

Now that we have so far discussed these matters, let us resume consideration of our adversaries' argument. It says, As all generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end. Now, since the sense of generation has been considered with respect to either meaning — whether he intends by this word to signify the birth of corporeal beings, or the formation of things created (neither of which has anything in common with the unsullied Nature), the premise is shown to have no connection with the subject. For it is not a matter of absolute necessity, as he maintains, that, because all making and generation ceases at some limit, therefore those who accept the generation of the Son should circumscribe it by a double limit, by supposing, as regards it, a beginning and an end. For it is only as being circumscribed in some quantitative way that things can be said either to begin or to cease on arriving at a limit, and the measure expressed by time (having its extension concomitant with the quantity of that which is produced) differentiates the beginning from the end by the interval between them. But how can any one measure or treat as extended that which is without quantity and without extension? What measure can he find for that which has no quantity, or what interval for that which has no extension? Or how can any one define the infinite by end and beginning? for beginning and end are names of limits of extension, and, where there is no extension, neither is there any limit. Now the Divine Nature is without extension, and, being without extension, it has no limit; and that which is limitless is infinite, and is spoken of accordingly. Thus it is idle to try to circumscribe the infinite by beginning and ending — for what is circumscribed cannot be infinite. How comes it, then, that this Platonic Phædrus disconnectedly tacks on to his own doctrine those speculations on the soul which Plato makes in that dialogue? For as Plato there spoke of cessation of motion, so this writer too was eager to speak of cessation of generation, in order to impose upon those who have no knowledge of these matters, with fine Platonic phrases. And these facts, he tells us, cannot be disbelieved, on the ground at once of nature itself and of the Divine laws. But nature, from our previous remarks, appears not to be trustworthy for instruction as to the Divine generation — not even if one were to take the universe itself as an illustration of the argument: since through its creation also, as we learn in the cosmogony of Moses, there ran the measure of time, meted out in a certain order and arrangement by stated days and nights, for each of the things that came into being: and this even our adversaries' statement does not admit with regard to the being of the Only-begotten, since it acknowledges that the Lord was before the times of the ages.

It remains to look at how he supports his argument using divine laws. Through these, he tries to show that the generation of the Son has both an end and a beginning. He says that God, wanting to impress the law of creation upon the Hebrews, did not designate the first day of generation as the end of creation or as evidence of its beginning. Instead, God gave them the seventh day as the memorial of creation—the day when He rested from His works—not the first day of generation. Can anyone really believe Eunomius wrote this? It seems like we inserted these words ourselves to misrepresent his work and make him look ridiculous by bringing in matters that have nothing to do with the question at hand. The issue was to prove, as he claimed to do, that the Son did not previously exist but came into being, and that in being generated He had a beginning and an end to His generation, with His generation drawn out over time like a kind of labor. What does he use to establish this? The fact that the Hebrew people keep the sabbath on the seventh day according to the Law! How well does this evidence fit the matter at hand? Because the Jew honors his sabbath with rest, this supposedly proves that the Lord both had a beginning of birth and stopped being born! How many other testimonies on this subject has our author ignored—testimonies no less weighty than the one he uses to establish his point? There is circumcision on the eighth day, the week of unleavened bread, the mystery on the fourteenth day of the moon's course, the purification sacrifices, the observance concerning lepers, the ram, the calf, the heifer, the scapegoat, the he-goat. If these things are far removed from the point, let those so devoted to Jewish mysteries tell us how that particular matter is relevant to the question. We consider it petty and unmanly to trample on someone who has fallen, and will proceed to examine what follows in his writings to see if there is anything there that might trouble his opponent. Everything he maintains in the next passage about the impropriety of supposing anything intermediate between the Father and the Son I will pass over, since it is, in a sense, in agreement with our teaching. It would be both indiscriminate and unfair not to distinguish in his remarks what is beyond reproach and what is blameworthy, especially since he fights against his own statements and does not follow his own admissions. He speaks of the immediate character of the connection while refusing to admit its continuity, and he holds that nothing existed before the Son and has some suspicion that the Son existed, yet still contends that He came into being when He was not. We will spend only a short time on these points, since the argument has already been established beforehand, and then move on to handle the proposed arguments.

It remains to consider his support of his point by the Divine laws, by which he undertakes to show both an end and a beginning of the generation of the Son. God, he says, willing that the law of creation should be impressed upon the Hebrews, did not appoint the first day of generation for the end of creation, or to be the evidence of its beginning; for He gave them as the memorial of the creation, not the first day of generation, but the seventh, whereon He rested from His works. Will any one believe that this was written by Eunomius, and that the words cited have not been inserted by us, by way of misrepresenting his composition so as to make him appear ridiculous to our readers, in dragging in to prove his point matters that have nothing to do with the question? For the matter in hand was to show, as he undertook to do, that the Son, not previously existing, came into being; and that in being generated, He took a beginning of generation, and of cessation — His generation being protracted in time, as it were by a kind of travail. And what is his resource for establishing this? The fact that the people of the Hebrews, according to the Law, keep sabbath on the seventh day! How well the evidence agrees with the matter in hand! Because the Jew honours his sabbath by idleness, the fact, as he says, is proved that the Lord both had a beginning of birth and ceased being born! How many other testimonies on this matter has our author passed by, not at all of less weight than that which he employs to establish the point at issue!– the circumcision on the eighth day, the week of unleavened bread, the mystery on the fourteenth day of the moon's course, the sacrifices of purification, the observation of the lepers, the ram, the calf, the heifer, the scapegoat, the he-goat. If these things are far removed from the point, let those who are so much interested in the Jewish mysteries tell us how that particular matter is within range of the question. We judge it to be mean and unmanly to trample on the fallen, and shall proceed to enquire, from what follows in his writings, whether there is anything there of such a kind as to give trouble to his opponent. All, then, that he maintains in the next passage, as to the impropriety of supposing anything intermediate between the Father and the Son, I shall pass by, as being, in a sense, in agreement with our doctrine. For it would be alike undiscriminating and unfair not to distinguish in his remarks what is irreproachable, and what is blamable, seeing that, while he fights against his own statements, he does not follow his own admissions, speaking of the immediate character of the connection while refusing to admit its continuity, and conceiving that nothing was before the Son and having some suspicion that the Son was while yet contending that He came into being when He was not. We shall spend but a short time on these points (since the argument has already been established beforehand), and then proceed to handle the arguments proposed.

It is not acceptable for someone to claim that nothing exists above the Only-begotten while also saying that before His generation He did not exist, but that He was generated when the Father willed it. The words "then" and "when" have a meaning that specifically refers to indicating time, according to the normal usage of people who speak correctly and according to their meaning in Scripture. One can cite examples like "then they will say among the nations," and "when I sent you," and "then the kingdom of heaven will be compared to," along with countless similar phrases throughout all of Scripture, to prove this point—that ordinary scriptural usage employs these words to indicate time. Therefore, if time did not exist, as our opponent admits, then the indication of time also disappears. And if this did not exist, it must necessarily be replaced by eternity in our understanding. In the phrase "was not," the word "once" is surely implied. If someone spoke of not being without the qualification "once," he would also be denying His present existence. But if he admits His present existence and argues against His eternity, it is clearly not "not being" in an absolute sense but "not being once" that he has in mind. Since this phrase is completely meaningless unless it depends on the indication of time, it would be foolish and pointless to say that nothing existed before the Son while also maintaining that the Son did not always exist. If there is neither place nor time nor any other created thing where the Word who was in the beginning is not, then the statement that the Lord once did not exist is entirely removed from orthodox teaching. So he contradicts not so much us as himself when he declares that the Only-begotten both existed and did not exist. By confessing that the union of the Son with the Father is not interrupted by anything, he clearly testifies to His eternity. But if he should say that the Son was not in the Father, we will not speak against such a statement ourselves but will oppose it with Scripture, which declares that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son, without adding the words "once" or "when" or "then" but testifying to His eternity through this positive and unqualified statement.

It is not allowable for the same person to set nothing above the existence of the Only-begotten, and to say that before His generation He was not, but that He was generated then when the Father willed. For then and when have a sense which specially and properly refers to the denoting of time, according to the common use of men who speak soundly, and according to their signification in Scripture. One may take then shall they say among the heathen, and when I sent you Luke 22:35 and then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened, and countless similar phrases through the whole of Scripture, to prove this point, that the ordinary Scriptural use employs these parts of speech to denote time. If therefore, as our opponent allows, time was not, the signifying of time surely disappears too: and if this did not exist, it will necessarily be replaced by eternity in our conception. For in the phrase was not there is surely implied once: as, if he should speak of not being, without the qualification once, he would also deny his existence now: but if he admits His present existence, and contends against His eternity, it is surely not not being absolutely, but not being once which is present to his mind. And as this phrase is utterly unreal, unless it rests upon the signification of time, it would be foolish and idle to say that nothing was before the Son, and yet to maintain that the Son did not always exist. For if there is neither place nor time, nor any other creature where the Word that was in the beginning is not, the statement that the Lord once was not is entirely removed from the region of orthodox doctrine. So he is at variance not so much with us as with himself, who declares that the Only-begotten both was and was not. For in confessing that the conjunction of the Son with the Father is not interrupted by anything, He clearly testifies to His eternity. But if he should say that the Son was not in the Father, we shall not ourselves say anything against such a statement, but shall oppose to it the Scripture which declares that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son, without adding to the phrase once or when or then, but testifying His eternity by this affirmative and unqualified utterance.

Regarding his attempt to show that we say the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, it is as though he were saying that we actually define the Father as begotten: either statement is equally absurd, or rather equally blasphemous. So if he has decided to slander us, let him add the other charge as well and hold back nothing that might allow him to stir up his hearers more violently against us. But if he withholds one of these charges because its slanderous nature is obvious, why does he make the other? As we have said, it is exactly the same thing in terms of impiety to call the Son ungenerate as it is to call the Father generated. Now if any such phrase can be found in our writings where the Son is called ungenerate, we will vote against ourselves. But if he is inventing false charges and slanders as he pleases, making up any fictitious statements to slander our teachings, this fact can serve as evidence of our orthodoxy to sensible people: while truth itself fights on our side, he brings forward a lie to accuse our teaching and creates an accusation of unorthodoxy that has no connection to our actual statements. However, we can give a brief answer to these charges. Just as we consider that person cursed who says the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, let him in turn anathematize the person who declares that He who was in the beginning once was not. By this method it will be shown who brings his charges truthfully and who slanderously. But if we deny his accusations, if when we speak of a Father we understand that a Son is also implied in that word, and if when we use the name Son we declare that He truly is what He is called, being brought forth by generation from the ungenerate Light, how can the slander of those who insist we say the Only-begotten is ungenerate fail to be obvious? Yet we will not admit that He once was not just because we say He exists by generation. For everyone knows that the contradiction between being and not being is immediate, so that affirming one of these terms absolutely destroys the other, and just as being is the same at every time when any of the things that exist is supposed to have its existence (for the sky, stars, sun, and the rest of the things that exist are not more in a state of being now than they were yesterday, the day before, or at any earlier time), so the meaning of not being expresses non-existence equally at every time, whether one speaks of it in reference to what is earlier or what is later. For any of the things that do not exist is no more in a state of not being now than if it were non-existent before, but the idea of not being is one that applies to what is not at any distance of time. For this reason, when speaking of living creatures, while we use different words to denote the dissolution into not being of what has existed and the condition of non-existence of what has never entered into being, and we say either that something has never come into being at all or that what was generated has died, yet by either form of speech we equally represent non-existence through our words. For just as day is bounded on each side by night, yet the parts of night that bound it are not named the same way—we speak of one as after nightfall and the other as before dawn, while what both phrases denote is night—so if anyone looks at what is not in contrast to what is, he will give different names to the state that is before formation and to the state that follows the dissolution of what was formed, yet will conceive as one the condition that both phrases signify: the condition that is before formation and the condition following dissolution after formation. For the state of not being of what has not been generated and of what has died are the same, except for the difference in names—apart from the hope of the resurrection that we acknowledge. Now since we learn from Scripture that the Only-begotten God is the Prince of Life, the very life, light, truth, and all that is honorable in word or thought, we say it is absurd and impious to contemplate, in connection with Him Who really is, the opposite conception, whether of dissolution tending to corruption or of non-existence before formation. But as we extend our thought in every direction to what is to follow or to what was before the ages, we nowhere pause in our conceptions at the condition of not being, judging it equally impious to cut short the Divine being by non-existence at any time whatever. For it is the same thing to say that immortal life is mortal, that truth is a lie, that light is darkness, and that what is is not. Therefore, whoever refuses to allow that He will cease to be at some future time will also refuse to allow that He once was not, avoiding the same impiety on either side according to our view: for just as no death cuts short the endlessness of the Only-begotten's life, so as we look back, no period of non-existence will terminate His life in its course toward eternity, so that what truly is may be completely separate from what truly is not. For this reason the Lord, wanting His disciples to be far removed from this error (so they would never, by searching for something before the existence of the Only-begotten, be led by their reasoning to the idea of non-existence), says, "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me," meaning that neither is what is not conceived in what is, nor is what is conceived in what is not. Here the very order of the phrase explains the orthodox doctrine: because the Father is not of the Son, but the Son of the Father, He says "I am in the Father," showing the fact that He is not from another but from Him, and then reverses the phrase to "and the Father in Me," indicating that whoever in his speculative inquiry passes beyond the Son also passes beyond the conception of the Father. For He who is in anything cannot be found outside of that in which He is, so that the person who, while not denying that the Father is in the Son, yet imagines that he has somehow understood the Father as external to the Son, is talking nonsense. The wanderings of our adversaries are also nonsense—fighting about shadows regarding the matter of ungeneracy, proceeding without solid foundation by means of non-entities. Yet if I am to bring the complete absurdity of their argument more fully to light, let me spend a little more time on this examination. Since they say the Only-begotten God came into existence later, after the Father, this unbegotten of theirs, whatever they imagine it to be, is necessarily discovered to exhibit along with itself the idea of evil. Who does not know that just as the non-existent is contrasted with the existent, so with every good thing or name is contrasted the opposite conception, as bad with good, falsehood with truth, darkness with light, and all the rest that are similarly opposed to one another, where the opposition admits no middle term, and it is impossible for the two to coexist? Rather, the presence of one destroys its opposite, and when the other withdraws, the appearance of its contrary takes place.

With regard to his attempting to show that we say the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, it is as though he should say that we actually define the Father to be begotten: for either statement is of the same absurdity, or rather of the same blasphemous character. If, therefore, he has made up his mind to slander us, let him add the other charge as well, and spare nothing by which it may be in his power more violently to exasperate his hearers against us. But if one of these charges is withheld because its calumnious nature is apparent, why is the other made? For it is just the same thing, as we have said, so far as the impiety goes, to call the Son ungenerate and to call the Father generated. Now if any such phrase can be found in our writings, in which the Son is spoken of as ungenerate, we shall give the final vote against ourselves: but if he is fabricating false charges and calumnies at his pleasure, making any fictitious statement he pleases to slander our doctrines, this fact may serve with sensible men for an evidence of our orthodoxy, that while truth itself fights on our side, he brings forward a lie to accuse our doctrine and makes up an indictment for unorthodoxy that has no relation to our statements. To these charges, however, we can give a concise answer. As we judge that man accursed who says that the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, let him in turn anathematize the man who lays it down that He who was in the beginning once was not. For by such a method it will be shown who brings his charges truly, and who calumniously. But if we deny his accusations, if, when we speak of a Father, we understand as implied in that word a Son also, and if, when we use the name Son, we declare that He really is what He is called, being shed forth by generation from the ungenerate Light, how can the calumny of those who persist that we say the Only-begotten is ungenerate fail to be manifest? Yet we shall not, because we say that He exists by generation, therefore admit that He once was not. For every one knows that the contradiction between being and not being is immediate, so that the affirmation of one of these terms is absolutely the destruction of the other, and that, just as being is the same in regard to every time at which any of the things that are is supposed to have its existence (for the sky, and stars, and sun, and the rest of the things that are, are not more in a state of being now than they were yesterday, or the day before, or at any previous time), so the meaning of not being expresses non- existence equally at every time, whether one speaks of it in reference to what is earlier or to what is later. For any of the things that do not exist is no more in a state of not being now than if it were non-existent before, but the idea of not being is one applied to that which is not at any distance of time. And for this reason, in speaking of living creatures, while we use different words to denote the dissolution into a state of not being of that which has been, and the condition of non- existence of that which has never had an entrance into being, and say either that a thing has never come into being at all, or that which was generated has died, yet by either form of speech we equally represent by our words non- existence. For as day is bounded on each side by night, yet the parts of the night which bound it are not named alike, but we speak of one as after night-fall, and of the other as before dawn, while that which both phrases denote is night, so, if any one looks on that which is not in contrast to that which is, he will give different names to that state which is antecedent to formation and to that which follows the dissolution of what was formed, yet will conceive as one the condition which both phrases signify — the condition which is antecedent to formation and the condition following on dissolution after formation. For the state of not being of that which has not been generated, and of that which has died, save for the difference of the names, are the same — with the exception of the account which we take of the hope of the resurrection. Now since we learn from Scripture that the Only-begotten God is the Prince of Life, the very life, and light, and truth, and all that is honourable in word or thought, we say that it is absurd and impious to contemplate, in conjunction with Him Who really is, the opposite conception, whether of dissolution tending to corruption, or of non- existence before formation: but as we extend our thought in every direction to what is to follow, or to what was before the ages, we nowhere pause in our conceptions at the condition of not being, judging it to tend equally to impiety to cut short the Divine being by non- existence at any time whatever. For it is the same thing to say that the immortal life is mortal, that the truth is a lie, that light is darkness, and that that which is is not. He, accordingly, who refuses to allow that He will at some future time cease to be, will also refuse to allow that He once was not, avoiding, according to our view, the same impiety on either hand: for, as no death cuts short the endlessness of the life of the Only-begotten, so, as we look back, no period of nonexistence will terminate His life in its course towards eternity, that that which in reality is may be clear of all community with that which in reality is not. For this cause the Lord, desiring that His disciples might be far removed from this error (that they might never, by themselves searching for something antecedent to the existence of the Only-begotten, be led by their reasoning to the idea of non- existence), says, I am in the Father, and the Father in Me, in the sense that neither is that which is not conceived in that which is, nor that which is in that which is not. And here the very order of the phrase explains the orthodox doctrine; for because the Father is not of the Son, but the Son of the Father, therefore He says, I am in the Father, showing the fact that He is not of another but of Him, and then reverses the phrase to, and the Father in Me, indicating that he who, in his curious speculation, passes beyond the Son, passes also beyond the conception of the Father: for He who is in anything cannot be found outside of that in which He is: so that the man who, while not denying that the Father is in the Son, yet imagines that he has in any degree apprehended the Father as external to the Son, is talking idly. Idle too are the wanderings of our adversaries' fighting about shadows touching the matter of ungeneracy, proceeding without solid foundation by means of nonentities. Yet if I am to bring more fully to light the whole absurdity of their argument, let me be allowed to spend a little longer on this speculation. As they say that the Only-begotten God came into existence later, after the Father, this unbegotten of theirs, whatever they imagine it to be, is discovered of necessity to exhibit with itself the idea of evil. Who knows not, that, just as the non-existent is contrasted with the existent, so with every good thing or name is contrasted the opposite conception, as bad with good, falsehood with truth, darkness with light, and all the rest that are similarly opposed to one another, where the opposition admits of no middle term, and it is impossible that the two should co-exist, but the presence of the one destroys its opposite, and with the withdrawal of the other takes place the appearance of its contrary?

Now that these points are granted to us, anyone can see that, just as Moses says darkness existed before the creation of light, so also in the case of the Son (if, according to the heretical claim, the Father made Him at the time when He willed), before He made Him, that Light which the Son is did not exist. And when light does not yet exist, it is impossible for its opposite not to exist. We also learn from other examples that nothing that comes from the Creator is random, but that what was lacking is added through creation to existing things. It is therefore quite clear that if God did make the Son, He made Him because of a deficiency in the nature of things. So then, while sensible light was still lacking, there was darkness, and darkness certainly would have prevailed if light had not come into being. Similarly, when the Son as yet did not exist, the very and true Light, and everything else that the Son is, did not exist. For even according to heresy's own testimony, what already exists has no need of coming into being. If therefore He made Him, He certainly made what did not exist. Thus, according to their view, before the Son came into being, neither had truth come into being, nor the intelligible Light, nor the fountain of life, nor, in general, the nature of anything excellent and good. Now, along with the absence of each of these, the opposite concept is found to exist. And if light did not exist, it cannot be denied that darkness did. And so with the rest—in place of each of these more excellent concepts, it is clearly impossible that its opposite did not exist in place of what was lacking. It is therefore a necessary conclusion that when the Father, as the heretics say, had not yet willed to make the Son, none of those things which the Son is being yet in existence, we must say that He was surrounded by darkness instead of Light, by falsehood instead of truth, by death instead of life, by evil instead of good. For He who creates, creates things that do not exist. What already exists, as Eunomius says, needs no generation. And of those things considered as opposites, the better cannot be non-existent except by the existence of the worse. These are the gifts with which heretical wisdom honors the Father, by which it degrades the eternity of the Son, and ascribes to God and the Father, before the production of the Son, the whole catalog of evils!

Now these points being conceded to us, the further point is also clear to any one, that, as Moses says darkness was before the creation of light, so also in the case of the Son (if, according to the heretical statement, the Father made Him at that time when He willed), before He made Him, that Light which the Son is was not; and, light not yet being, it is impossible that its opposite should not be. For we learn also from the other instances that nothing that comes from the Creator is at random, but that which was lacking is added by creation to existing things. Thus it is quite clear that if God did make the Son, He made Him by reason of a deficiency in the nature of things. As, then, while sensible light was still lacking, there was darkness, and darkness would certainly have prevailed had light not come into being, so also, when the Son as yet was not, the very and true Light, and all else that the Son is, did not exist. For even according to the evidence of heresy, that which exists has no need of coming into being; if therefore He made Him, He assuredly made that which did not exist. Thus, according to their view, before the Son came into being, neither had truth come into being, nor the intelligible Light, nor the fount of life, nor, generally, the nature of anything that is excellent and good. Now, concurrently with the exclusion of each of these, there is found to subsist the opposite conception: and if light was not, it cannot be denied that darkness was; and so with the rest — in place of each of these more excellent conceptions it is clearly impossible that its opposite did not exist in place of that which was lacking. It is therefore a necessary conclusion, that when the Father, as the heretics say, had not as yet willed to make the Son, none of those things which the Son is being yet existent, we must say that He was surrounded by darkness instead of Light, by falsehood instead of truth, by death instead of life, by evil instead of good. For He Who creates, creates things that are not; That which is, as Eunomius says, needs not generation; and of those things which are considered as opposed, the better cannot be non-existent, except by the existence of the worse. These are the gifts with which the wisdom of heresy honours the Father, by which it degrades the eternity of the Son, and ascribes to God and the Father, before the production of the Son, the whole catalogue of evils!

And let no one think they can refute this demonstration of doctrinal absurdity by using examples from the rest of creation. Someone might say that just as there was no opposite to the sky when it did not exist, we are not absolutely forced to admit that if the Son, who is Truth, had not come into existence, then the opposite did exist. To this person we may reply that the sky has no corresponding opposite, unless someone claims that its non-existence is opposed to its existence. But to virtue there certainly is an opposite—that which is vicious—and the Lord is virtue. Therefore, when the sky did not exist, it does not follow that anything else existed. But when good did not exist, its opposite did exist. So anyone who says that good did not exist will certainly admit, even unintentionally, that evil did exist. But the Father also, he says, is absolute virtue, and life, and unapproachable light, and everything that is exalted in word or thought. Therefore there is no necessity to suppose that when the Only-begotten Light did not exist, the darkness which is His corresponding opposite existed. But this is exactly what I am saying—that darkness never existed, because the light never did not exist. For the light, as the prophecy says, is always in the light. However, if according to the heretical doctrine the ungenerate light is one thing and the generated light is another, and one is eternal while the other comes into existence at a later time, it follows by absolute necessity that in the eternal light we should find no place for the establishment of its opposite. For if the light always shines, the power of darkness has no place in it. And in the case of the light which comes into being later, as they say, it is impossible that the light should shine forth except out of darkness. And the interval of darkness between eternal light and that which arises later will be clearly marked in every way. For there would have been no need to make the later light if what was created had not been useful for some purpose. And the one use of light is to disperse the prevailing gloom through its means. Now the light which exists without creation is what it is by nature because of itself. But the created light clearly comes into being because of something else. It must be, then, that darkness preceded its existence, and it was on account of this darkness that the light was necessarily created. And it is not possible by any reasoning to make plausible the view that darkness did not precede the manifestation of the Only-begotten Light—on the assumption, that is, that He is believed to have been made at a later time. Surely such a doctrine is beyond all impiety! It is therefore clearly shown that the Father of truth did not make the truth at a time when it was not. Rather, being the fountain of light and truth and of all good, He shed forth from Himself that Only-begotten Light of truth by which the glory of His Person is expressly imaged. In this way the blasphemy of those who say that the Son was a later addition to God by way of creation is refuted at all points.

And let no one think to rebut by examples from the rest of creation the demonstration of the doctrinal absurdity which results from this argument. One will perhaps say that, as, when the sky was not, there was no opposite to it, so we are not absolutely compelled to admit that if the Son, Who is Truth, had not come into existence, the opposite did exist. To him we may reply that to the sky there is no corresponding opposite, unless one were to say that its non- existence is opposed to its existence. But to virtue is certainly opposed that which is vicious (and the Lord is virtue); so that when the sky was not, it does not follow that anything was; but when good was not, its opposite was; thus he who says that good was not, will certainly allow, even without intending it, that evil was. But the Father also, he says, is absolute virtue, and life, and light unapproachable, and all that is exalted in word or thought: so that there is no necessity to suppose, when the Only-begotten Light was not, the existence of that darkness which is His corresponding opposite. But this is just what I say, that darkness never was; for the light never was not, for the light, as the prophecy says, is always in the light. If, however, according to the heretical doctrine, the ungenerate light is one thing, and the generated light another, and the one is eternal, while the other comes into existence at a later time, it follows of absolute necessity that in the eternal light we should find no place for the establishment of its opposite; (for if the light always shines, the power of darkness has no place in it;) and that in the case of the light which comes into being, as they say, afterwards, it is impossible that the light should shine forth save out of darkness; and the interval of darkness between eternal light and that which arises later will be clearly marked in every way. For there would have been no need of the making of the later light, if that which was created had not been of utility for some purpose: and the one use of light is that of the dispersion by its means of the prevailing gloom. Now the light which exists without creation is what it is by nature by reason of itself; but the created light clearly comes into being by reason of something else. It must be then that its existence was preceded by darkness, on account of which the light was of necessity created, and it is not possible by any reasoning to make plausible the view that darkness did not precede the manifestation of the Only-begotten Light — on the supposition, that is, that He is believed to have been made at a later time. Surely such a doctrine is beyond all impiety! It is therefore clearly shown that the Father of truth did not make the truth at a time when it was not; but, being the fountain of light and truth, and of all good, He shed forth from Himself that Only-begotten Light of truth by which the glory of His Person is expressly imaged; so that the blasphemy of those who say that the Son was a later addition to God by way of creation is at all points refuted.

These, then, are the strong points of Eunomius' case, and I think that when those which promised to be powerful are proved by argument to be so rotten and lacking substance, I may well keep silent about the rest, since the others are practically refuted along with the refutation of the stronger ones. It's like what happens in military operations: when a force more powerful than the rest has been beaten, the remainder of the army no longer matters in the eyes of those who have overcome the strong portion of it. But the fact that the chief part of his blasphemy lies in the later part of his discourse forbids me to be silent. For the transition of the Only-begotten from nothing into being—that horrid and godless doctrine of Eunomius, which is to be shunned more than all impiety—is next maintained in the order of his argument. And since everyone who has been bewitched by this deceit has the phrase ready on his tongue for maintaining the doctrine: "If He was, He has not been begotten, and if He has been begotten, He was not"—claiming that He who made us and all creation from nothing is Himself from nothing—and since the deceit gains much support from this, as people of weaker mind are pressed by this superficial bit of plausibility and led to accept the blasphemy, we must not pass by this doctrinal root of bitterness, lest, as the Apostle says, it spring up and trouble us. Now I say that we must first of all consider the actual argument itself, apart from our contest with our opponents, and then afterwards proceed to the examination and refutation of what they have set forth.

These, then, are the strong points of Eunomius' case; and I think that when those which promised to be powerful are proved by argument to be so rotten and unsubstantial, I may well keep silence concerning the rest, since the others are practically refuted, concurrently with the refutation of the stronger ones; just as it happens in warlike operations that when a force more powerful than the rest has been beaten, the remainder of the army are no longer of any account in the eyes of those by whom the strong portion of it has been overcome. But the fact that the chief part of his blasphemy lies in the later part of his discourse forbids me to be silent. For the transition of the Only-begotten from nothing into being, that horrid and godless doctrine of Eunomius, which is more to be shunned than all impiety, is next maintained in the order of his argument. And since every one who has been bewitched by this deceit has the phrase, If He was, He has not been begotten, and if He has been begotten, He was not, ready upon his tongue for the maintenance of the doctrine that He Who made of nothing us and all the creation is Himself from nothing, and since the deceit obtains much support thereby, as men of feebler mind are pressed by this superficial bit of plausibility, and led to acquiesce in the blasphemy, we must needs not pass by this doctrinal root of bitterness, lest, as the Apostle says, it spring up and trouble us. Now I say that we must first of all consider the actual argument itself, apart from our contest with our opponents, and thus afterwards proceed to the examination and refutation of what they have set forth.

One mark of true Godhead is indicated by the words of Holy Scripture that Moses learned through the voice from heaven, when he heard the One who said, "I am He that is." We think it right, then, to believe that what is represented as eternal and infinite in respect of being is alone truly Divine. Everything contemplated in this being is always the same, neither growing nor being consumed. So if anyone should say of God that He formerly existed but now does not, or that He now exists but formerly did not, we would consider both statements equally godless. Both mutilate the idea of eternity by cutting it short on one side or the other with non-existence—whether one contemplates nothing as preceding being, or declares that being ends in nothing. The frequent repetition of "first of all" or "last of all" concerning God's non-existence does not make up for this impious conception about the Divinity. For this reason we declare that maintaining their doctrine about the non-existence at some time of Him who truly is amounts to a denial and rejection of His true Godhead. On the one hand, He who showed Himself to Moses by the light speaks of Himself as being when He says, "I am He that is," while on the other, Isaiah (being made, so to speak, the instrument of Him who spoke in him) says in the person of Him who is, "I am the first, and hereafter am I." By this, whichever way we consider it, we conceive eternity in God. Likewise, the word spoken to Manoah shows that the Divinity cannot be comprehended by the significance of His name, because when Manoah asks to know His name—so that when the promise actually comes to pass he may glorify his benefactor by name—He says to him, "Why do you ask this? It also is wonderful." By this we learn that there is one name signifying the Divine Nature—the wonder that arises unspeakably in our hearts concerning it. Great David, too, in his discourses with himself, proclaims the same truth, in the sense that all creation was brought into being by God, while He alone exists always in the same manner and abides forever, where he says, "But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail." When we hear these sayings and others like them from men inspired by God, let us leave everything that is not from eternity to the worship of idolaters, as a new thing alien from the true Godhead. For that which now exists and formerly did not is clearly new and not eternal, and to regard any new object of worship is called by Moses the service of demons, when he says, "They sacrificed to devils and not to God, to gods whom their fathers knew not; new gods were they that came newly up." If then everything that is new in worship is a service of demons and is alien from the true Godhead, and if what now exists but was not always is new and not eternal, we who have regard to that which is necessarily reckon those who contemplate non-existence as attaching to Him who is, and who say that He once was not, among the worshippers of idols. For we may also see that the great John, when declaring in his own preaching the Only-begotten God, guards his own statement in every way so that the conception of non-existence shall find no access to Him who is. For he says that He was in the beginning, and was with God, and was God, and was light, and life, and truth, and all good things at all times, and never at any time failed to be anything that is excellent. He is the fullness of all good and is in the bosom of the Father. If then Moses lays down as a law for us this kind of mark of true Godhead—that we know nothing else of God except this one thing, that He is (for to this point the words "I am He that is")—while Isaiah in his preaching declares aloud the absolute infinity of Him who is, defining the existence of God as having no regard to beginning or to end (for He who says "I am the first, and hereafter am I" places no limit to His eternity in either direction, so that neither, if we look to the beginning, do we find any point marked since which He is and beyond which He was not, nor, if we turn our thought to the future, can we cut short by any boundary the eternal progress of Him who is)—and if the prophet David forbids us to worship any new and strange God (both of which are involved in the heretical doctrine; newness is clearly indicated in that which is not eternal, and strangeness is alienation from the Nature of the very God)—if, I say, these things are so, we declare all the sophistical fabrication about the non-existence at some time of Him who truly is to be nothing else than a departure from Christianity and a turning to idolatry. For when the Evangelist, in his discourse concerning the Nature of God, separates at all points non-existence from Him who is, and by his constant repetition of the word "was" carefully destroys the suspicion of non-existence, and calls Him the Only-begotten God, the Word of God, the Son of God, equal with God, and all such names, we have this judgment fixed and settled in us: that if the Only-begotten Son is God, we must believe that He who is believed to be God is eternal. And indeed He is truly God and assuredly is eternal, and is never at any time found to be non-existent. For God, as we have often said, if He now exists, also assuredly always existed, and if He once did not exist, neither does He now exist at all. But since even the enemies of the truth confess that the Son is and continually abides the Only-begotten God, we say this: that being in the Father, He is not in Him in one respect only, but He is in Him altogether, in respect of all that the Father is conceived to be. As, then, being in the incorruptibility of the Father, He is incorruptible, good in His goodness, powerful in His might, and being in each of these attributes of special excellence which are conceived of the Father, He is that particular thing, so also, being in His eternity, He is assuredly eternal. Now the eternity of the Father is marked by His never having taken His being from non-existence and never terminating His being in non-existence. He, therefore, who has all things that are the Father's and is contemplated in all the glory of the Father—even as, being in the endlessness of the Father, He has no end—so, being in the unoriginateness of the Father, has, as the Apostle says, no beginning of days, but at once is of the Father and is regarded in the eternity of the Father. And in this respect especially is seen the complete absence of divergence in the Likeness, as compared with Him whose Likeness He is. And herein is His saying found true which tells us, "He that has seen Me has seen the Father." Moreover, it is in this way that those words of the Apostle—that the Son is the brightness of His glory and the express image of His hypostasis—are best understood to have an excellent and close application. For the Apostle conveys to those hearers who are unable, by the contemplation of purely intellectual objects, to elevate their thought to the height of the knowledge of God, a kind of notion of the truth by means of things apparent to sense. For as the body of the sun is expressly imaged by the whole disc that surrounds it, and he who looks on the sun argues, by means of what he sees, the existence of the whole solid substratum, so, he says, the majesty of the Father is expressly imaged in the greatness of the power of the Son, so that the one may be believed to be as great as the other is known to be. And again, as the radiance of light sheds its brilliancy from the whole of the sun's disc (for in the disc one part is not radiant and the rest dim), so all that glory which the Father is sheds its brilliancy from its whole extent by means of the brightness that comes from it, that is, by the true Light. And as the ray is of the sun (for there would be no ray if the sun were not), yet the sun is never conceived as existing by itself without the ray of brightness that is shed from it, so the Apostle, delivering to us the continuity and eternity of that existence which the Only-begotten has of the Father, calls the Son the brightness of His glory.

One mark of the true Godhead is indicated by the words of Holy Scripture, which Moses learned by the voice from heaven, when He heard Him Who said, I am He that is Exodus 3:4. We think it right, then, to believe that to be alone truly Divine which is represented as eternal and infinite in respect of being; and all that is contemplated therein is always the same, neither growing nor being consumed; so that if one should say of God, that formerly He was, but now is not, or that He now is, but formerly was not, we should consider each of the sayings alike to be godless: for by both alike the idea of eternity is mutilated, being cut short on one side or the other by non- existence, whether one contemplates nothing as preceding being, or declares that being ends in nothing; and the frequent repetition of first of all or last of all concerning God's non- existence does not make amends for the impious conception touching the Divinity. For this reason we declare the maintenance of their doctrine as to the non- existence at some time of Him Who truly is, to be a denial and rejection of His true Godhead; and this on the ground that, on the one hand, He Who showed Himself to Moses by the light speaks of Himself as being, when He says, I am He that is Exodus 3:4, while on the other, Isaiah (being made, so to say, the instrument of Him Who spoke in him) says in the person of Him that is, I am the first, and hereafter am I, so that hereby, whichever way we consider it, we conceive eternity in God. And so, too, the word that was spoken to Manoah shows the fact that the Divinity is not comprehensible by the significance of His name, because, when Manoah asks to know His name, that, when the promise has come actually to pass, he may by name glorify his benefactor, He says to him, Why do you ask this? It also is wonderful; so that by this we learn that there is one name significant of the Divine Nature — the wonder, namely, that arises unspeakably in our hearts concerning It. So, too, great David, in his discourses with himself, proclaims the same truth, in the sense that all the creation was brought into being by God, while He alone exists always in the same manner, and abides for ever, where he says, But You are the same, and Your years shall not fail. When we hear these sayings, and others like them, from men inspired by God, let us leave all that is not from eternity to the worship of idolaters, as a new thing alien from the true Godhead. For that which now is, and formerly was not, is clearly new and not eternal, and to have regard to any new object of worship is called by Moses the service of demons, when he says, They sacrificed to devils and not to God, to gods whom their fathers knew not; new gods were they that came newly up. If then everything that is new in worship is a service of demons, and is alien from the true Godhead, and if what is now, but was not always, is new and not eternal, we who have regard to that which is, necessarily reckon those who contemplate non- existence as attaching to Him Who is, and who say that He once was not, among the worshippers of idols. For we may also see that the great John, when declaring in his own preaching the Only-begotten God, guards his own statement in every way, so that the conception of non- existence shall find no access to Him Who is. For he says that He was in the beginning, and was with God, and was God, and was light, and life, and truth, and all good things at all times, and never at any time failed to be anything that is excellent, Who is the fullness of all good, and is in the bosom of the Father. If then Moses lays down as a law for us some such mark of true Godhead as this, that we know nothing else of God but this one thing, that He is (for to this point the words, I am He that is Exodus 3:4); while Isaiah in his preaching declares aloud the absolute infinity of Him Who is, defining the existence of God as having no regard to beginning or to end (for He Who says I am the first, and hereafter am I, places no limit to His eternity in either direction, so that neither, if we look to the beginning, do we find any point marked since which He is, and beyond which He was not, nor, if we turn our thought to the future, can we cut short by any boundary the eternal progress of Him Who is) — and if the prophet David forbids us to worship any new and strange God (both of which are involved in the heretical doctrine; newness is clearly indicated in that which is not eternal, and strangeness is alienation from the Nature of the very God), — if, I say, these things are so, we declare all the sophistical fabrication about the non- existence at some time of Him Who truly is, to be nothing else than a departure from Christianity, and a turning to idolatry. For when the Evangelist, in his discourse concerning the Nature of God, separates at all points non- existence from Him Who is, and, by his constant repetition of the word was, carefully destroys the suspicion of non- existence, and calls Him the Only-begotten God, the Word of God, the Son of God, equal with God, and all such names, we have this judgment fixed and settled in us, that if the Only-begotten Son is God, we must believe that He Who is believed to be God is eternal. And indeed He is verily God, and assuredly is eternal, and is never at any time found to be non-existent. For God, as we have often said, if He now is, also assuredly always was, and if He once was not, neither does He now exist at all. But since even the enemies of the truth confess that the Son is and continually abides the Only-begotten God, we say this, that, being in the Father, He is not in Him in one respect only, but He is in Him altogether, in respect of all that the Father is conceived to be. As, then, being in the incorruptibility of the Father, He is incorruptible, good in His goodness, powerful in His might, and, as being in each of these attributes of special excellence which are conceived of the Father, He is that particular thing, so, also, being in His eternity, He is assuredly eternal. Now the eternity of the Father is marked by His never having taken His being from nonexistence, and never terminating His being in non- existence. He, therefore, Who has all things that are the Father's, and is contemplated in all the glory of the Father, even as, being in the endlessness of the Father, He has no end, so, being in the unoriginateness of the Father, has, as the Apostle says, no beginning of days Hebrews 7:3, but at once is of the Father, and is regarded in the eternity of the Father: and in this respect, more especially, is seen the complete absence of divergence in the Likeness, as compared with Him Whose Likeness He is. And herein is His saying found true which tells us, He that has seen Me has seen the Father. Moreover, it is in this way that those words of the Apostle, that the Son is the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His Person Hebrews 1:3, are best understood to have an excellent and close application. For the Apostle conveys to those hearers who are unable, by the contemplation of purely intellectual objects, to elevate their thought to the height of the knowledge of God, a sort of notion of the truth, by means of things apparent to sense. For as the body of the sun is expressly imaged by the whole disc that surrounds it, and he who looks on the sun argues, by means of what he sees, the existence of the whole solid substratum, so, he says, the majesty of the Father is expressly imaged in the greatness of the power of the Son, that the one may be believed to be as great as the other is known to be: and again, as the radiance of light sheds its brilliancy from the whole of the sun's disc (for in the disc one part is not radiant, and the rest dim), so all that glory which the Father is, sheds its brilliancy from its whole extent by means of the brightness that comes from it, that is, by the true Light; and as the ray is of the sun (for there would be no ray if the sun were not), yet the sun is never conceived as existing by itself without the ray of brightness that is shed from it, so the Apostle delivering to us the continuity and eternity of that existence which the Only-begotten has of the Father, calls the Son the brightness of His glory.

After making these distinctions, no one should any longer doubt how the Only-begotten is both believed to be from the Father and is eternal, even if these two phrases don't seem at first glance to agree with each other—the one declaring him to be from the Father and the one asserting his eternity. But if we need to support our statement with further arguments, it may be possible to understand the teaching on this point by using things we can perceive with our senses. And no one should mock our statement if it cannot find among existing things a comparison to what we're investigating that is completely adequate for presenting the matter through analogy and resemblance. For we want to persuade those who say that the Father first willed and then proceeded to become a Father, and on this basis claim the Word came later in existence, using whatever illustrations might work, to turn to the orthodox view. This immediate union does not exclude the willing of the Father, as if he had a Son without choice, by some necessity of his nature, nor does the willing separate the Son from the Father, coming between them as a kind of interval. So we neither reject from our teaching the willing of the Begetter directed toward the Son, as if it were somehow forced out by the unity of the Son's oneness with the Father, nor do we in any way break that inseparable connection when willing is understood as involved in the generation. For it properly belongs to our heavy and sluggish nature that the wish and the possession of something are not often present with us at the same moment. But now we wish for something we don't have, and at another time we obtain what we don't wish to obtain. However, in the case of the simple and all-powerful nature, all things are conceived together and at once—the willing of good as well as the possession of what he wills. For the good and eternal will is contemplated as operating, indwelling, and coexisting in the eternal nature, not arising in it from any separate source, nor able to be conceived apart from the object of will. For it is not possible that with God either the good will should not exist, or the object of will should not accompany the act of will, since no cause can either bring it about that what befits the Father should not always exist, or hinder the possession of the object of will. Since, then, the Only-begotten God is by nature the good (or rather beyond all good), and since the good does not fail to be the object of the Father's will, it is clearly shown by this both that the union of the Son with the Father has no intermediary, and also that the will, which is always present in the good nature, is not forced out or excluded because of this inseparable union. And if anyone is listening to my argument without scoffing, I would like to add to what I have already said something of the following kind.

After these distinctions on our part no one can well be longer in doubt how the Only-begotten at once is believed to be of the Father, and is eternally, even if the one phrase does not at first sight seem to agree with the other — that which declares Him to be of the Father with that which asserts His eternity. But if we are to confirm our statement by further arguments, it may be possible to apprehend the doctrine on this point by the aid of things cognizable by our senses. And let no one deride our statement, if it cannot find among existing things a likeness of the object of our enquiry such as may be in all respects sufficient for the presentation of the matter in hand by way of analogy and resemblance. For we should like to persuade those who say that the Father first willed and so proceeded to become a Father, and on this ground assert posteriority in existence as regards the Word, by whatever illustrations may make it possible, to turn to the orthodox view. Neither does this immediate conjunction exclude the willing of the Father, in the sense that He had a Son without choice, by some necessity of His Nature, nor does the willing separate the Son from the Father, coming in between them as a kind of interval: so that we neither reject from our doctrine the willing of the Begetter directed to the Son, as being, so to say, forced out by the conjunction of the Son's oneness with the Father, nor do we by any means break that inseparable connection, when willing is regarded as involved in the generation. For to our heavy and inert nature it properly belongs that the wish and the possession of a thing are not often present with us at the same moment; but now we wish for something we have not, and at another time we obtain what we do not wish to obtain. But, in the case of the simple and all-powerful Nature, all things are conceived together and at once, the willing of good as well as the possession of what He wills. For the good and the eternal will is contemplated as operating, indwelling, and co-existing in the eternal Nature, not arising in it from any separate principle, nor capable of being conceived apart from the object of will: for it is not possible that with God either the good will should not be, or the object of will should not accompany the act of will, since no cause can either bring it about that that which befits the Father should not always be, or be any hindrance to the possession of the object of will. Since, then, the Only-begotten God is by nature the good (or rather beyond all good), and since the good does not fail to be the object of the Father's will, it is hereby clearly shown, both that the conjunction of the Son with the Father is without any intermediary, and also that the will, which is always present in the good Nature, is not forced out nor excluded by reason of this inseparable conjunction. And if any one is listening to my argument in no scoffing spirit, I should like to add to what I have already said something of the following kind.

Just as, if we were to grant (I'm speaking hypothetically, of course) that flame possessed the power of deliberate choice, it would be clear that the flame would, immediately upon existing, will that its radiance should shine forth from itself. And when it wills this, it would not lack the power to accomplish it—since, as soon as the flame appears, its natural power immediately fulfills its will regarding the radiance. So undoubtedly, if we grant that the flame is moved by deliberate choice, we would understand all these things as happening simultaneously: the kindling of the fire, its act of will concerning the radiance, and the radiance itself. In this way, the movement by choice would not hinder the dignity of the radiance's existence. In the same way, according to the illustration we have described, you will not, by acknowledging that a good act of will exists in the Father, separate the Son from the Father by that act of will. For it is not reasonable to suppose that the act of willing that He should exist could prevent Him from immediately coming into being. Rather, just as in the eye seeing and the will to see are two different things—one being an operation of nature, the other an impulse of choice—yet the movement of choice in this direction causes no delay to the act of sight (for each of these is regarded separately and by itself, not as hindering the existence of the other at all, but as somehow existing together, with the natural operation accompanying the choice, and the choice in turn being accompanied by the natural motion)—just as, I say, perception naturally belongs to the eye, and willing to see produces no delay in actual sight, but one wills that the eye should have vision and immediately what he wills exists, so also in the case of that Nature which is unspeakable and above all thought, our understanding of everything comes together simultaneously: the eternal existence of the Father, an act of will concerning the Son, and the Son Himself, who is, as John says, in the beginning, and is not conceived as coming after the beginning. Now the beginning of all is the Father, but in this beginning the Son also is declared to be, being in His Nature that very thing which the Beginning is. For the Beginning is God, and the Word who was in the Beginning is God. Since the phrase "the beginning" points to eternity, John appropriately joins the Word to the Beginning, saying that the Word was in it. He asserts this fact, I believe, so that the first idea present to his hearer's mind may not be the Beginning alone by itself, but rather, before this has been impressed upon him, there should also be presented to his mind, together with the Beginning, the Word who was in it, entering with it into the hearer's understanding and being present to his hearing at the same time as the Beginning.

Just as, if one were to grant (I speak, of course, hypothetically) the power of deliberate choice to belong to flame, it would be clear that the flame will at once upon its existence will that its radiance should shine forth from itself, and when it wills it will not be impotent (since, on the appearance of the flame, its natural power at once fulfils its will in the matter of the radiance), so that undoubtedly, if it be granted that the flame is moved by deliberate choice, we conceive the concurrence of all these things simultaneously — of the kindling of the fire, of its act of will concerning the radiance, and of the radiance itself; so that the movement by way of choice is no hindrance to the dignity of the existence of the radiance — even so, according to the illustration we have spoken of, you will not, by confessing the good act of will as existing in the Father, separate by that act of will the Son from the Father. For it is not reasonable to suppose that the act of willing that He should be, could be a hindrance to His immediately coming into being; but just as, in the eye, seeing and the will to see are, one an operation of nature, the other an impulse of choice, yet no delay is caused to the act of sight by the movement of choice in that particular direction –(for each of these is regarded separately and by itself, not as being at all a hindrance to the existence of the other, but as both being somehow interexistent, the natural operation concurring with the choice, and the choice in turn not failing to be accompanied by the natural motion)– as, I say, perception naturally belongs to the eye, and the willing to see produces no delay in respect to actual sight, but one wills that it should have vision, and immediately what he wills is, so also in the case of that Nature which is unspeakable and above all thought, our apprehension of all comes together simultaneously — of the eternal existence of the Father, and of an act of will concerning the Son, and of the Son Himself, Who is, as John says, in the beginning, and is not conceived as coming after the beginning. Now the beginning of all is the Father; but in this beginning the Son also is declared to be, being in His Nature that very thing which the Beginning is. For the Beginning is God, and the Word Who was in the Beginning is God. As then the phrase the beginning points to eternity, John well conjoins the Word in the Beginning, saying that the Word was in It; asserting, I suppose, this fact to the end that the first idea present to the mind of his hearer may not be the Beginning alone by itself, but that, before this has been impressed upon him, there should also be presented to his mind, together with the Beginning the Word Who was in It, entering with It into the hearer's understanding, and being present to his hearing at the same time with the Beginning.

Now that we have thoroughly examined our own teaching, it may be time to present and consider the opposing statement, examining it alongside our own position. He states it this way: While there are two statements we have made—first, that the ousia of the Only-begotten was not before its own generation, and second, that once generated, it existed before all things—he does not prove either of these statements to be false. He did not dare to say that the Son existed before that supreme generation and formation, since he would immediately face opposition both from the physis of the Father and from the judgment of sensible people. For what sensible person could accept that the Son both exists and is begotten before that supreme generation? And the One who is without generation does not need generation in order to be what He is. Now, whether he speaks truthfully when he claims that our teacher opposed his arguments to no purpose can surely be recognized by anyone who has read that writer's works. But for my part, since I think that refuting his false accusation on this matter is a small step toward exposing his malice, I will leave the task of showing that this point was not overlooked by our teacher without discussion, and turn my argument instead to examining, as far as I am able, the points now being advanced. He says that in his own writing he has discussed two matters: first, that the ousia of the Only-begotten was not before its own generation, and second, that once generated, it existed before all things. Now I believe that through what we have already said, the fact has been sufficiently demonstrated that no new ousia was begotten by the Father besides that which is contemplated in the Father himself, and that we need not get entangled in a debate with this kind of blasphemy, as if the argument were now being presented to us for the first time. Furthermore, the real force of our argument must be directed to one point—namely, to his horrible and blasphemous statement, which clearly declares concerning God the Word that He was not. Moreover, since our argument in the previous discussion has already dealt to some extent with the question of his blasphemy, it would perhaps be unnecessary to establish again through similar reasoning what we have already proved. For we made those earlier statements so that by first impressing upon our hearers an orthodox way of thinking, the blasphemy of our opponents, who claim that non-existence preceded existence in the case of the Only-begotten God, might become more evident.

Now that we have thus thoroughly scrutinized our doctrine, it may perhaps be time to set forth and to consider the opposing statement, examining it side by side in comparison with our own opinion. He states it thus:– For while there are, he says, two statements which we have made, the one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was not before its own generation, the other that, being generated, it was before all things, he does not prove either of these statements to be untrue; for he did not venture to say that He was before that supreme generation and formation, seeing that he is opposed at once by the Nature of the Father, and the judgment of sober-minded men. For what sober man could admit the Son to be and to be begotten before that supreme generation? And He Who is without generation needs not generation in order to His being what He is. Well, whether he speaks truly, when he says that our master opposed his antitheses to no purpose, all may surely be aware who have been conversant with that writer's works. But for my own part (for I think that the refutation of his calumny on this matter is a small step towards the exposure of his malice), I will leave the task of showing that this point was not passed over by our master without discussion, and turn my argument to the discussion, as far as in me lies, of the points now advanced. He says that he has in his own discourse spoken of two matters — one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was not before Its own generation, the other, that, being generated, It was before all things. Now I think that by what we have already said, the fact has been sufficiently shown that no new essence was begotten by the Father besides that which is contemplated in the Father Himself, and that there is no need for us to be entangled in a contest with blasphemy of this kind, as if the argument were now propounded to us for the first time; and further, that the real force of our argument must be directed to one point, I mean to his horrible and blasphemous utterance, which clearly states concerning God the Word that He was not. Moreover, as our argument in the foregoing discourse has already to some extent dealt with the question of his blasphemy, it would perhaps be superfluous again to establish by like considerations what we have proved already. For it was to this end that we made those former statements, that by the earlier impression upon our hearers of an orthodox mode of thought, the blasphemy of our adversaries, who assert that non- existence preceded existence in the case of the Only-begotten God, might be more manifest.

At this point it seems appropriate to investigate more carefully in our discussion the actual meaning of generation. It is clear to everyone that this term presents to us the fact of existence as resulting from some cause, and I suppose there is no need to debate this point. But since the explanation of things that exist as a result of a cause varies, I think this matter should be clarified in our discourse through some kind of systematic division. Of things that result from something, we understand the varieties to be as follows. Some result from matter and art, such as the construction of buildings and other works, which come into being through their respective matter, and these are directed by some art that accomplishes the intended purpose with a view to the proper goal of what is produced. Others result from matter and nature, for the generations of animals are the construction of nature, who carries on her own work through their material bodily existence. Others result from material outflow, in which cases what comes first remains in its natural condition, while what flows from it is conceived of separately, as in the case of the sun and its beam, or the lamp and its radiance, or scents and ointments and the quality they emit. For these, while they remain in themselves without loss, have at the same time, existing alongside themselves, that natural property which they emit: the sun its beam, the lamp its radiance, the scents the perfume they produce in the air. There is also another kind of generation besides these, in which the cause is immaterial and incorporeal, but the generation is perceptible to the senses and takes place through bodily means—I mean the word that is begotten by the mind. For the mind, being itself incorporeal, brings forth the word through the sense organs. We mentally include all these varieties of generation in one general overview. For all the wonders that are worked by nature, which changes the bodies of some animals into something of a different kind, or produces some animals from a change in liquids, or a corruption of seed, or the rotting of wood, or transforms the cold vapor that comes from firebrands, enclosed in the heart of the fire, out of the condensed mass of fire to produce an animal they call the salamander—these, even if they seem to be outside the boundaries we have set, are nonetheless included among the cases we have mentioned. For it is through bodies that nature fashions these varied forms of animals, for it is such and such a bodily change, arranged by nature in this or that particular way, that produces this or that particular animal, and this is not a distinct kind of generation apart from that which is accomplished through nature and matter.

It seems at this point well to investigate in our argument, by a more careful examination, the actual significance of generation. That this name presents to us the fact of being as the result of some cause is clear to every one, and about this point there is, I suppose, no need to dispute. But since the account to be given of things which exist as the result of cause is various, I think it proper that this matter should be cleared up in our discourse by some sort of scientific division. Of things, then, which are the result of something, we understand the varieties to be as follows. Some are the result of matter and art, as the structure of buildings and of other works, coming into being by means of their respective matter, and these are directed by some art that accomplishes the thing proposed, with a view to the proper aim of the results produced. Others are the results of matter and nature; for the generations of animals are the building of nature, who carries on her own operation by means of their material bodily subsistence. Others are the result of material efflux, in which cases the antecedent remains in its natural condition, while that which flows from it is conceived separately, as in the case of the sun and its beam, or the lamp and its brightness, or of scents and ointments and the quality they emit; for these, while they remain in themselves without diminution, have at the same time, each concurrently with itself, that natural property which they emit: as the sun its beam, the lamp its brightness, the scents the perfume produced by them in the air. There is also another species of generation besides these, in which the cause is immaterial and incorporeal, but the generation is an object of sense and takes place by corporeal means — I speak of the word which is begotten by the mind: for the mind, being itself incorporeal, brings forth the word by means of the organs of sense. All these varieties of generation we mentally include, as it were, in one general view. For all the wonders that are wrought by nature, which changes the bodies of some animals to something of a different kind, or produces some animals from a change in liquids, or a corruption of seed, or the rotting of wood, or out of the condensed mass of fire transforms the cold vapour that issues from the firebrands, shut off in the heart of the fire, to produce an animal which they call the salamander — these, even if they seem to be outside the limits we have laid down, are none the less included among the cases we have mentioned. For it is by means of bodies that nature fashions these varied forms of animals; for it is such and such a change of body, disposed by nature in this or that particular way, which produces this or that particular animal; and this is not a distinct species of generation besides that which is accomplished as the result of nature and matter.

Now these modes of generation are well known to people, and the loving dispensation of the Holy Spirit, in delivering to us the divine mysteries, conveys its instruction on matters that transcend language by means of what is within our capacity. It does this constantly elsewhere too, when it portrays the Divinity in bodily terms, making mention in speaking about God of His eye, His eyelids, His ear, His fingers, His hand, His right hand, His arm, His feet, His shoes, and similar things—none of which is understood to belong in its primary sense to the Divine Nature. Rather, turning its teaching to what we can easily perceive, it describes facts that are beyond every name by using terms well-worn in human use, while through each of the terms employed concerning God we are led analogically to some more exalted conception. In this way, then, it uses the numerous forms of generation to present to us, from the inspired teaching, the unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, taking just so much from each as may be reverently admitted into our conceptions concerning God. For just as its mention of fingers, hand, and arm in speaking of God does not portray through the phrase the structure of the limb out of bones and sinews and flesh and ligaments, but signifies through such an expression His effective and operative power—and just as it indicates through each of the other words of this kind those conceptions concerning God which correspond to them, not admitting the corporeal senses of the words—so also it speaks indeed of the forms of these modes of coming into being as applied to the Divine Nature, yet does not speak in that sense which our customary knowledge enables us to understand. For when it speaks of the formative power, it calls that particular energy by the name of generation, because the word expressive of Divine power must necessarily descend to our lowliness. Yet it does not indicate all that is associated with formative generation among ourselves—neither place nor time nor preparation of material, nor the cooperation of instruments, nor the purpose in the things produced. Rather, it leaves these out of sight and greatly and loftily claims for God the generation of the things that are, where it says, "He spoke and they were begotten, He commanded and they were created." Again, when it expounds that unspeakable and transcendent existence which the Only-begotten has from the Father, because human poverty is incapable of the truths that are too high for speech or thought, it uses our language here also and calls Him by the name of Son—a name which our ordinary use applies to those who are produced by matter and physis. But just as the word which tells us in reference to God of the generation of the creation did not add the statement that it was generated by the aid of any material, declaring that its material substance, its place, its time, and all the like had their existence in the power of His will, so here too, in speaking of the Son, it leaves out of sight both all other things which human nature sees in earthly generation (I mean passions and dispositions, and the cooperation of time and the need of place, and especially matter), without all of which earthly generation as a result of physis does not occur. Now every such conception of matter and interval being excluded from the sense of the word Son, physis alone remains, and hereby in the word Son is declared concerning the Only-begotten the close and true character of His manifestation from the Father. And since this particular species of generation did not suffice to produce in us an adequate idea of the unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, it employs also another species of generation, that which is the result of efflux, to express the Divine Nature of the Son, and calls Him "the brightness of glory," "the savour of ointment," "the breath of God," which our accustomed use, in the scientific discussion we have already made, calls material efflux. But just as in the previous cases neither the making of creation nor the significance of the word Son admitted time, or matter, or place, or passion, so here also the phrase, purifying the sense of brightness and the other terms from every material conception and employing only that element in this particular species of generation which is suitable to the Divinity, points through the force of this mode of expression to the truth that He is conceived as being both from Him and with Him. For the word "breath" does not present to us dispersion into the air from the underlying matter, nor "savour" the transference that takes place from the quality of the ointment to the air, nor "brightness" the efflux by means of rays from the body of the sun. Rather, this only, as we have said, is manifested by this particular mode of generation: that He is conceived to be of Him and also with Him, with no intermediate interval existing between the Father and that Son who is of Him. And since, in its abundant loving-kindness, the grace of the Holy Spirit has ordered that our conceptions concerning the Only-begotten Son should arise in us from many sources, it has added also the remaining species of things contemplated in generation—that, I mean, which is the result of mind and word. But the lofty John uses special foresight that the hearer may not by any means through inattention or feebleness of thought fall into the common understanding of "Word," so that the Son should be supposed to be the voice of the Father. For this reason he prepares us at his first proclamation to regard the Word as existing in ousia—and not in any ousia foreign to or severed from that ousia from which It has Its being, but in that first and blessed Nature. For this is what he teaches us when he says "the Word was in the beginning, and was with God," being Himself also both God and all else that the Beginning is. For thus it is that he makes his discourse on the Godhead, touching the eternity of the Only-begotten. Seeing then that these modes of generation (those, I mean, which are the result of cause) are ordinarily known among us and are employed by Holy Scripture for our instruction on the subjects before us in such a way as it might be expected that each of them would be applied to the presentation of Divine conceptions, let the reader of our argument judge righteous judgment whether any of the assertions that heresy makes have any force against the truth.

Now these modes of generation being well known to men, the loving dispensation of the Holy Spirit, in delivering to us the Divine mysteries, conveys its instruction on those matters which transcend language by means of what is within our capacity, as it does also constantly elsewhere, when it portrays the Divinity in bodily terms, making mention, in speaking concerning God, of His eye, His eyelids, His ear, His fingers, His hand, His right hand, His arm, His feet, His shoes, and the like — none of which things is apprehended to belong in its primary sense to the Divine Nature, — but turning its teaching to what we can easily perceive, it describes by terms well worn in human use, facts that are beyond every name, while by each of the terms employed concerning God we are led analogically to some more exalted conception. In this way, then, it employs the numerous forms of generation to present to us, from the inspired teaching, the unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, taking just so much from each as may be reverently admitted into our conceptions concerning God. For as its mention of fingers, hand, and arm, in speaking of God, does not by the phrase portray the structure of the limb out of bones and sinews and flesh and ligaments, but signifies by such an expression His effective and operative power, and as it indicates by each of the other words of this kind those conceptions concerning God which correspond to them, not admitting the corporeal senses of the words, so also it speaks indeed of the forms of these modes of coming into being as applied to the Divine Nature, yet does not speak in that sense which our customary knowledge enables us to understand. For when it speaks of the formative power, it calls that particular energy by the name of generation, because the word expressive of Divine power must needs descend to our lowliness, yet it does not indicate all that is associated with formative generation among ourselves — neither place nor time nor preparation of material, nor the co-operation of instruments, nor the purpose in the things produced, but it leaves these out of sight, and greatly and loftily claims for God the generation of the things that are, where it says, He spoke and they were begotten, He commanded and they were created. Again, when it expounds that unspeakable and transcendent existence which the Only-begotten has from the Father, because human poverty is incapable of the truths that are too high for speech or thought, it uses our language here also, and calls Him by the name of Son, — a name which our ordinary use applies to those who are produced by matter and nature. But just as the word, which tells us in reference to God of the generation of the creation, did not add the statement that it was generated by the aid of any material, declaring that its material substance, its place, its time, and all the like, had their existence in the power of His will, so here too, in speaking of the Son, it leaves out of sight both all other things which human nature sees in earthly generation ( passions, I mean, and dispositions, and the co-operation of time and the need of place, and especially matter), without all which earthly generation as a result of nature does not occur. Now every such conception of matter and interval being excluded from the sense of the word Son, nature alone remains, and hereby in the word Son is declared concerning the Only-begotten the close and true character of His manifestation from the Father. And since this particular species of generation did not suffice to produce in us an adequate idea of the unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, it employs also another species of generation, that which is the result of efflux, to express the Divine Nature of the Son, and calls Him the brightness of glory Hebrews 1:3, the savour of ointment, the breath of God Wisdom 7:25, which our accustomed use, in the scientific discussion we have already made, calls material efflux. But just as in the previous cases neither the making of creation nor the significance of the word Son admitted time, or matter, or place, or passion, so here also the phrase, purifying the sense of brightness and the other terms from every material conception, and employing only that element in this particular species of generation which is suitable to the Divinity, points by the force of this mode of expression to the truth that He is conceived as being both from Him and with Him. For neither does the word breath present to us dispersion into the air from the underlying matter, nor savour the transference that takes place from the quality of the ointment to the air, nor brightness the efflux by means of rays from the body of the sun; but this only, as we have said, is manifested by this particular mode of generation, that He is conceived to be of Him and also with Him, no intermediate interval existing between the Father and that Son Who is of Him. And since, in its abundant loving-kindness, the grace of the Holy Spirit has ordered that our conceptions concerning the Only-begotten Son should arise in us from many sources, it has added also the remaining species of things contemplated in generation — that, I mean, which is the result of mind and word. But the lofty John uses special foresight that the hearer may not by any means by inattention or feebleness of thought fall into the common understanding of Word, so that the Son should be supposed to be the voice of the Father. For this reason he prepares us at his first proclamation to regard the Word as in essence, and not in any essence foreign to or dissevered from that essence whence It has Its being, but in that first and blessed Nature. For this is what he teaches us when he says the Word was in the beginning, and was with God, being Himself also both God and all else that the Beginning is. For thus it is that he makes his discourse on the Godhead, touching the eternity of the Only-begotten. Seeing then that these modes of generation (those, I mean, which are the result of cause) are ordinarily known among us, and are employed by Holy Scripture for our instruction on the subjects before us, in such a way as it might be expected that each of them would be applied to the presentation of Divine conceptions, let the reader of our argument judge righteous judgement, whether any of the assertions that heresy makes have any force against the truth.

I will now quote my opponent's actual words once more, exactly as he wrote them. He says this: While there are two statements we have made, one that the essence of the Only-begotten was not before its own generation, the other that, being generated, it was before all things — What kind of generation does our dogmatist propose to us? Is it one we may fittingly think and speak about regarding God? And who is so godless as to assume non-existence in God? But it is clear that he has in view this material generation of ours, and is making lower nature the teacher of his ideas concerning the Only-begotten God. Since an ox or donkey or camel is not before its own generation, he thinks it proper to say even of the Only-begotten God what the course of lower nature shows us in the case of animals. The corporeal theologian that he is, he does not think about this fact: that the term Only-begotten, when applied to God, signifies by the very word itself what is not common to all begetting but peculiar to Him. How could the term Only-begotten be used of this generation if it had community and sameness of meaning with other generation? That there is something unique and exceptional to be understood in His case, which is not observed in other generation, is clearly and fittingly expressed by the title Only-begotten. If any element of lower generation were conceived in it, He who in any of the attributes of His generation was placed on the same level with other begotten things would no longer be Only-begotten. For if the same things are said of Him that are said of other things that come into being by generation, the definition will transform the meaning of Only-begotten to signify a kind of relationship involving brotherhood. If then the meaning of Only-begotten points to absence of mixture and community with the rest of generated things, we shall not admit that anything we observe in lower generation is also to be conceived in the case of that existence which the Son has from the Father. But non-existence before generation is characteristic of all things that exist by generation; therefore this is foreign to the special character of the Only-begotten, to which the name Only-begotten testifies that nothing belonging to the mode of that common form of generation which Eunomius misunderstands is attached. Let this materialist and friend of the senses therefore be persuaded to correct the error of his conception by other forms of generation. What will you say when you hear of the brightness of glory or the fragrance of ointment? That the brightness was not before its own generation? But if you answer this way, you will surely admit that neither did the glory exist, nor the ointment, for it is impossible that the glory should be conceived as having existed by itself, dark and without light, or the ointment without producing its sweet breath. So that if the brightness did not exist, the glory also surely did not exist, and if the fragrance is non-existent, the non-existence of the ointment is also proved. But if these examples taken from Scripture arouse anyone's fear on the grounds that they do not accurately present to us the majesty of the Only-begotten, because neither is essentially the same with its substratum—neither the fragrance with the ointment nor the beam with the sun—let the true Word correct his fear, Who was in the Beginning and is all that the Beginning is, and existent before all things, since John declares this in his preaching: And the Word was with God, and the Word was God. If then the Father is God and the Son is God, what doubt still remains regarding the perfect Divinity of the Only-begotten, when by the meaning of the word Son the close relationship of nature is acknowledged, by brightness the conjunction and inseparability, and by the title of God, applied alike to the Father and the Son, their absolute equality, while the express image, contemplated in reference to the whole person (prosopon) of the Father, marks the absence of any defect in the Son's proper greatness, and the form of God indicates His complete identity by showing in itself all those marks by which the Godhead is shown.

I will now once more subjoin the actual language of my opponent, word for word. It runs thus:– While there are, he says, two statements which we have made, the one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was not before its own generation, the other, that, being generated, it was before all things — What kind of generation does our dogmatist propose to us? Is it one of which we may fittingly think and speak in regard to God? And who is so godless as to pre-suppose non- existence in God? But it is clear that he has in view this material generation of ours, and is making the lower nature the teacher of his conceptions concerning the Only-begotten God, and since an ox or an ass or a camel is not before its own generation, he thinks it proper to say even of the Only-begotten God that which the course of the lower nature presents to our view in the case of the animals, without thinking, corporeal theologian that he is, of this fact, that the predicate Only -begotten, applied to God, signifies by the very word itself that which is not in common with all begetting, and is peculiar to Him. How could the term Only-begotten be used of this generation, if it had community and identity of meaning with other generation? That there is something unique and exceptional to be understood in His case, which is not to be remarked in other generation, is distinctly and suitably expressed by the appellation of Only-begotten; as, were any element of the lower generation conceived in it, He Who in respect of any of the attributes of His generation was placed on a level with other things that are begotten would no longer be Only -begotten. For if the same things are to be said of Him which are said of the other things that come into being by generation, the definition will transform the sense of Only-begotten to signify a kind of relationship involving brotherhood. If then the sense of Only-begotten points to absence of mixture and community with the rest of generated things, we shall not admit that anything which we behold in the lower generation is also to be conceived in the case of that existence which the Son has from the Father. But non- existence before generation is proper to all things that exist by generation: therefore this is foreign to the special character of the Only-begotten, to which the name Only-begotten bears witness that there attaches nothing belonging to the mode of that form of common generation which Eunomius misapprehends. Let this materialist and friend of the senses be persuaded therefore to correct the error of his conception by the other forms of generation. What will you say when you hear of the brightness of glory or of the savour of ointment? That the brightness was not before its own generation? But if you answer thus, you will surely admit that neither did the glory exist, nor the ointment: for it is not possible that the glory should be conceived as having existed by itself, dark and lustreless, or the ointment without producing its sweet breath: so that if the brightness was not, the glory also surely was not, and the savour being non-existent, there is also proved the non- existence of the ointment. But if these examples taken from Scripture excite any man's fear, on the ground that they do not accurately present to us the majesty of the Only-begotten, because neither is essentially the same with its substratum — neither the exhalation with the ointment, nor the beam with the sun — let the true Word correct his fear, Who was in the Beginning and is all that the Beginning is, and existent before all; since John so declares in his preaching, And the Word was with God, and the Word was God. If then the Father is God and the Son is God, what doubt still remains with regard to the perfect Divinity of the Only-begotten, when by the sense of the word Son is acknowledged the close relationship of Nature, by brightness the conjunction and inseparability, and by the appellation of God, applied alike to the Father and the Son, their absolute equality, while the express image, contemplated in reference to the whole Person of the Father, marks the absence of any defect in the Son's proper greatness, and the form of God indicates His complete identity by showing in itself all those marks by which the Godhead is betokened.

Let me now present Eunomius' statement once more. He says that He was not before His own generation. Who is it about whom he says He was not? Let him state the divine names by which He who, according to Eunomius, once was not, is called. He will say, I suppose, light, and blessedness, life and incorruptibility, and righteousness and sanctification, and power, and truth, and similar things. So the one who says that He was not before His generation is absolutely proclaiming this: that when He was not, there was no truth, no life, no light, no power, no incorruptibility, no other of those pre-eminent qualities that are conceived of Him. And, what is even more remarkable and even more difficult for impiety to face, there was no brightness, no express image. For in saying that there was no brightness, the non-existence of the radiating power is surely also maintained, as one may see in the illustration provided by the lamp. For he who speaks of the ray of the lamp indicates also that the lamp shines, and he who says that the ray is not signifies also the extinction of that which gives light. So when the Son is said not to be, the non-existence of the Father is also maintained as a necessary consequence. For if the one is related to the other by way of conjunction, according to the Apostolic testimony—the brightness to the glory, the express image to the Person, the Wisdom to God—he who says that one of the things so joined together is not surely abolishes the one that remains by his abolition of the one. So if the brightness was not, it is acknowledged that neither did the illuminating nature exist, and if the express image had no existence, neither did the Person imaged exist, and if the wisdom and power of God was not, it is surely acknowledged that He also was not, who is not conceived by Himself without wisdom and power. If, then, the Only-begotten God, as Eunomius says, was not before His generation, and Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, and the express image and the brightness, then neither surely did the Father exist, whose power and wisdom and express image and brightness the Son is. For it is not possible to conceive by reason either a Person without express image, or glory without radiance, or God without wisdom, or a Maker without hands, or a Beginning without the Word, or a Father without a Son. But all such things are manifestly declared to be in mutual union, alike by those who confess and by those who deny, and by the abolition of one the other also disappears with it. Since then they maintain that the Son (that is, the brightness of the glory) was not before He was begotten, and since logical consequence involves also, together with the non-existence of the brightness, the abolition of the glory, and the Father is the glory from which came the brightness of the Only-begotten Light, let these men who are overly wise consider that they are manifestly supporters of the Epicurean doctrines, preaching atheism under the guise of Christianity. Now since the logical consequence is shown to be one of two absurdities—either that we should say that God does not exist at all, or that we should say that His being was not unoriginate—let them choose which they like of the two courses before them: either to be called atheist, or to cease saying that the essence of the Father is unoriginate. They would avoid, I suppose, being reckoned atheists. It remains, therefore, that they maintain that God is not eternal. And if the course of what has been proved forces them to this, what becomes of their varied and irreversible conversions of names? What becomes of that invincible compulsion of their syllogisms, which sounded so fine to the ears of old women, with its opposition of Generated and Ungenerate?

Let us now set forth Eunomius' statement once more. He was not, he says, before His own generation. Who is it of Whom he says He was not? Let him declare the Divine names by which He Who, according to Eunomius, once was not, is called. He will say, I suppose, light, and blessedness, life and incorruptibility, and righteousness and sanctification, and power, and truth, and the like. He who says, then, that He was not before His generation, absolutely proclaims this — that when He was not there was no truth, no life, no light, no power, no incorruptibility, no other of those pre-eminent qualities which are conceived of Him: and, what is still more marvellous and still more difficult for impiety to face, there was no brightness, no express image. For in saying that there was no brightness, there is surely maintained also the non- existence of the radiating power, as one may see in the illustration afforded by the lamp. For he who speaks of the ray of the lamp indicates also that the lamp shines, and he who says that the ray is not, signifies also the extinction of that which gives light: so that when the Son is said not to be, thereby is also maintained as a necessary consequence the non- existence of the Father. For if the one is related to the other by way of conjunction, according to the Apostolic testimony — the brightness to the glory, the express image to the Person, the Wisdom to God — he who says that one of the things so conjoined is not, surely by his abolition of the one abolishes also that which remains; so that if the brightness was not, it is acknowledged that neither did the illuminating nature exist, and if the express image had no existence, neither did the Person imaged exist, and if the wisdom and power of God was not, it is surely acknowledged that He also was not, Who is not conceived by Himself without wisdom and power. If, then, the Only-begotten God, as Eunomius says, was not before His generation, and Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God 1 Corinthians 1:24, and the express image Hebrews 1:3 and the brightness Hebrews 1:3, neither surely did the Father exist, Whose power and wisdom and express image and brightness the Son is: for it is not possible to conceive by reason either a Person without express image, or glory without radiance, or God without wisdom, or a Maker without hands, or a Beginning without the Word, or a Father without a Son; but all such things, alike by those who confess and by those who deny, are manifestly declared to be in mutual union, and by the abolition of one the other also disappears with it. Since then they maintain that the Son (that is, the brightness of the glory,) was not before He was begotten, and since logical consequence involves also, together with the non- existence of the brightness, the abolition of the glory, and the Father is the glory whence came the brightness of the Only-begotten Light, let these men who are wise over-much consider that they are manifestly supporters of the Epicurean doctrines, preaching atheism under the guise of Christianity. Now since the logical consequence is shown to be one of two absurdities, either that we should say that God does not exist at all, or that we should say that His being was not unoriginate, let them choose which they like of the two courses before them — either to be called atheist, or to cease saying that the essence of the Father is un-originate. They would avoid, I suppose, being reckoned atheists. It remains, therefore, that they maintain that God is not eternal. And if the course of what has been proved forces them to this, what becomes of their varied and irreversible conversions of names? What becomes of that invincible compulsion of their syllogisms, which sounded so fine to the ears of old women, with its opposition of Generated and Ungenerate?

Enough of these matters. But it would be good not to leave his next point unanswered, though let us pass over in silence the comic interlude where our clever speaker displays his youthful conceit, whether joking or serious, thinking this will give him an advantage in his argument. Certainly no one will force us to join either with those whose eyes are crossed in distorting our vision, or with those who are afflicted with strange disease in being twisted, or in their bodily leaps and plunges. We shall pity them, but we shall not depart from our settled state of mind. He says, then, turning his discourse on the subject to our master, as if he were really engaging him face to face, You shall be taken in your own snare. For Basil had said that what is good is always present with God Who is over all, and that it is good to be the Father of such a Son—so that what is good was never absent from Him, nor was it the Father's will to be without the Son, and when He willed He did not lack the power, but having the power and the will to be in the mode in which it seemed good to Him, He also always possessed the Son by reason of His always willing that which is good (for this is the direction in which the intention of our father's remarks tends). Eunomius tears this apart beforehand and puts forward to overthrow what has been said some such argument as this, introduced from his extraneous philosophy: What will become of you, he says, if one of those who have had experience of such arguments should say, 'If to create is good and agreeable to the physis of God, how is it that what is good and agreeable to His physis was not present with Him without beginning, seeing that God is without beginning? And that when there was no hindrance of ignorance or impediment of weakness or of age in the matter of creation'—and all the rest that he collects together and pours out upon himself—for I may not say, upon God. Well, if it were possible for our master to answer the question in person, he would have shown Eunomius what would have become of him, as he asked, by setting forth the Divine mystery with that tongue that was taught of God, and by scourging the champion of deceit with his refutations, so that it would have been made clear to all people what a difference there is between a minister of the mysteries of Christ and a ridiculous buffoon or a setter-forth of new and absurd doctrines. But since he, as the Apostle says, being dead, speaks to God, while the other puts forth such a challenge as though there were no one to answer him, even though an answer from us may not have equal force when compared with the words of the great Basil, we shall yet boldly say this in answer to the questioner: Your own argument, put forth to overthrow our statement, is a testimony that in the charges we make against your impious doctrine we speak truly. For there is no other point we blame so much as this, that you think there is no difference between the Lord of creation and the general body of creation, and what you now allege is a maintaining of the very things which we find fault with. For if you are bound to attach exactly what you see in creation also to the Only-begotten God, our contention has gained its end: your own statements proclaim the absurdity of the doctrine, and it is manifest to all, both that we keep our argument in the straight way of truth, and that your conception of the Only-begotten God is such as you have of the rest of the creation.

Enough, however, of these matters. But it might be well not to leave his next point unanswered; yet let us pass over in silence the comic interlude, where our clever orator shows his youthful conceit, whether in jest or in earnest, under the impression that he will thereby have an advantage in his argument. For certainly no one will force us to join either with those whose eyes are set askance in distorting our sight, or with those who are stricken with strange disease in being contorted, or in their bodily leaps and plunges. We shall pity them, but we shall not depart from our settled state of mind. He says, then, turning his discourse upon the subject to our master, as if he were really engaging him face to face, You shall be taken in your own snare. For as Basil had said that what is good is always present with God Who is over all, and that it is good to be the Father of such a Son, — that so what is good was never absent from Him, nor was it the Father's will to be without the Son, and when He willed He did not lack the power, but having the power and the will to be in the mode in which it seemed good to Him, He also always possessed the Son by reason of His always willing that which is good (for this is the direction in which the intention of our father's remarks tends), Eunomius pulls this in pieces beforehand, and puts forward to overthrow what has been said some such argument as this, introduced from his extraneous philosophy:– What will become of you, he says, if one of those who have had experience of such arguments should say, 'If to create is good and agreeable to the Nature of God, how is it that what is good and agreeable to His Nature was not present with Him unoriginately, seeing that God is unoriginate? And that when there was no hindrance of ignorance or impediment of weakness or of age in the matter of creation, — and all the rest that he collects together and pours out upon himself — for I may not say, upon God. Well, if it were possible for our master to answer the question in person, he would have shown Eunomius what would have become of him, as he asked, by setting forth the Divine mystery with that tongue that was taught of God, and by scourging the champion of deceit with his refutations, so that it would have been made clear to all men what a difference there is between a minister of the mysteries of Christ and a ridiculous buffoon or a setter-forth of new and absurd doctrines. But since he, as the Apostle says, being dead, speaks to God, while the other puts forth such a challenge as though there were no one to answer him, even though an answer from us may not have equal force when compared with the words of the great Basil, we shall yet boldly say this in answer to the questioner:– Your own argument, put forth to overthrow our statement, is a testimony that in the charges we make against your impious doctrine we speak truly. For there is no other point we blame so much as this, that you think there is no difference between the Lord of creation and the general body of creation, and what you now allege is a maintaining of the very things which we find fault with. For if you are bound to attach exactly what you see in creation also to the Only-begotten God, our contention has gained its end: your own statements proclaim the absurdity of the doctrine, and it is manifest to all, both that we keep our argument in the straight way of truth, and that your conception of the Only-begotten God is such as you have of the rest of the creation.

Concerning whom was the controversy? Was it not about the Only-begotten God, the Maker of all creation, whether He always existed, or whether He came into being later as an addition to His Father? What then do our master's words say about this matter? That it is irreverent to believe that what is naturally good was not in God, for he saw no cause that would make it likely that the good was not always present with Him Who is good, either because of lack of power or weakness of will. What does the one who argues against these statements say? If you grant that God the Word is to be believed eternal, you must grant the same thing to the things that have been created—(How well he knows how to distinguish in his argument the physis of the creatures and the majesty of God! How well he knows about each, what befits it, what he may piously think concerning God, what concerning the creation!)—if the Maker, he says, begins from the time of His making, for there is nothing else by which we can mark the beginning of things that have been made, if time does not define by its own interval the beginnings and endings of the things that come into being.

Concerning whom was the controversy? Was it not concerning the Only-begotten God, the Maker of all the creation, whether He always was, or whether He came into being afterwards as an addition to His Father? What then do our master's words say on this matter? That it is irreverent to believe that what is naturally good was not in God: for that he saw no cause by which it was probable that the good was not always present with Him Who is good, either for lack of power or for weakness of will. What does he who contends against these statements say? If you allow that God the Word is to be believed eternal, you must allow the same of the things that have been created — (How well he knows how to distinguish in his argument the nature of the creatures and the majesty of God! How well he knows about each, what befits it, what he may piously think concerning God, what concerning the creation!)– if the Maker, he says, begins from the time of His making: for there is nothing else by which we can mark the beginning of things that have been made, if time does not define by its own interval the beginnings and the endings of the things that come into being.

Eunomius argues on this basis that the Maker of time must begin His existence from a similar beginning. Now, the creation has the ages as its beginning, but what beginning can you conceive for the Maker of the ages? If someone says it is the "beginning" mentioned in the Gospel, that refers to the Father, and the confession of the Son together with Him is indicated there. The One who is in the Father, as the Lord says, cannot begin His being in Him from any particular point. And if someone speaks of another beginning besides this, let him tell us the name by which he identifies this beginning, since none can be grasped before the establishment of the ages. Therefore, such a statement will not move us at all from the orthodox understanding concerning the Only-begotten, even if old women do applaud the proposition as sound. For we stand by what has been determined from the beginning, having our teaching firmly grounded in truth, namely that all things which orthodox doctrine assumes that we affirm concerning the Only-begotten God have no kinship with the creation, but the distinguishing marks that separate the Maker of all and His works are divided by a wide interval. If indeed the Son had in any other respect communion with the creation, we surely ought to say that He did not differ from it even in the manner of His existence. But if the creation has no share in such things as are all those which we learn concerning the Son, we must surely of necessity say that in this matter also He has no communion with it. For the creation was not in the beginning, and was not with God, and was not God, nor life, nor light, nor resurrection, nor the rest of the Divine names, such as truth, righteousness, sanctification, Judge, just, Maker of all things, existing before the ages, for ever and ever. The creation is not the brightness of the glory, nor the express image of the hypostasis, nor the likeness of goodness, nor grace, nor power, nor truth, nor salvation, nor redemption. Nor do we find any one at all of those names which are employed by Scripture for the glory of the Only-begotten either belonging to the creation or employed concerning it—not to mention those more exalted words: I am in the Father, and the Father in Me, and He that has seen Me has seen the Father, and None has seen the Son, save the Father. If indeed our teaching allowed us to claim for the creation things so many and so great as these, he might have been right in thinking that we ought to attach what we observe in it to our conceptions of the Only-begotten also, since the transfer would be from kindred subjects to one closely related. But if all these concepts and names involve communion with the Father, while they transcend our notions of the creation, does not our clever and sharp-witted friend slink away in shame at discussing the physis of the Lord of the Creation by means of what he observes in creation, without being aware that the distinguishing marks of the creation are of a different sort? The ultimate division of all that exists is made by the line between created and uncreated, the one being regarded as a cause of what has come into being, the other as coming into being thereby. Now the created physis and the Divine ousia being thus divided, and admitting no intermixture with respect to their distinguishing properties, we must by no means conceive both by means of similar terms, nor seek in the idea of their physis the same distinguishing marks in things that are thus separated. Accordingly, as the physis that is in the creation, as the phrase of the most excellent Wisdom somewhere tells us, exhibits the beginning, ending, and midst of the times in itself, and extends concurrently with all temporal intervals, we take as a sort of characteristic of the subject this property, that in it we see some beginning of its formation, look on its midst, and extend our expectations to its end. For we have learned that the heaven and the earth were not from eternity, and will not last to eternity, and thus it is clear from this that those things both started from some beginning, and will surely cease at some end. But the Divine physis, being limited in no respect, but passing all limitations on every side in its infinity, is far removed from those marks which we find in creation. For that power which is without interval, without quantity, without circumscription, having in itself all the ages and all the creation that has taken place in them, and surpassing at all points, by virtue of the infinity of its own physis, the unmeasured extent of the ages, either has no mark which indicates its physis, or has one of an entirely different sort, and not that which the creation has. Since, then, it belongs to the creation to have a beginning, that will be alien from the uncreated physis which belongs to the creation. For if anyone should venture to suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to be, like the creation, from any beginning comprehensible by us, he must certainly append to his statement concerning the Son the rest also of the sequence. For it is not possible to avoid acknowledging, together with the beginning, that also which follows from it. For just as if one were to admit some person to be a man in all the properties of his physis, he would observe that in this confession he declared him to be an animal and rational, and whatever else is conceived of man, so by the same reasoning, if we should understand any of the properties of creation to be present in the Divine ousia, it will no longer be open to us to refrain from attaching to that pure physis the rest of the list of the attributes contemplated in it. For the beginning will demand by force and compulsion that which follows it. For the beginning, thus conceived, is a beginning of what comes after it, in such a sense that if they are, it is, and if the things connected with it are removed, the antecedent also would not remain. Now as the book of Wisdom speaks of midst and end as well as of beginning, if we assume in the physis of the Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma, some beginning of existence defined by a certain mark of time, the book of Wisdom will by no means allow us to refrain from subjoining to the beginning a midst and an end also. If this should be done we shall find, as the result of our arguments, that the Divine word shows us that the Deity is mortal. For if, according to the book of Wisdom, the end is a necessary consequence of the beginning, and the idea of midst is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one of these also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of measure and limitation for the infinite physis. And if this is impious and absurd, the giving a beginning to that argument which ends in impiety deserves equal, or even greater censure. And the beginning of this absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of the Son was circumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is before them: either they must revert to sound doctrine under the compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate Him Who is of the Father in union with the Father's eternity, or if they do not like this, they must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and reduce the limitless character of His life to non-existence by a beginning and an end. And, granted that the physis both of souls and of the angels has no end, and is in no way hindered from going on to eternity, by the fact of its being created and having the beginning of its existence from some point of time, so that our adversaries can use this fact to assert a parallel in the case of Christ, in the sense that He is not from eternity, and yet endures everlastingly—let anyone who advances this argument also consider the following point, how widely the Godhead differs from the creation in its special attributes. For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no conceivable thing which is regarded as good, while the creation attains excellence by partaking in something better than itself. And further, it not only had a beginning of its being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning to be in excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becomes by participation a beginning of its ascent to something still greater, and it never ceases, in Paul's phrase, reaching forth to the things that are before, and forgetting the things that are behind. Since, then, the Godhead is very life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and life, and truth, and every conceivable thing that is lofty and Divine, while the creation draws from Him its supply of good, it may from this be evident that if it is in life by partaking of life, it will surely, if it ceases from this participation, cease from life also. If they dare, then, to say also of the Only-begotten God those things which it is true to say of the creation, let them say this too, along with the rest, that He has a beginning of His being like the creation, and abides in life after the likeness of souls. But if He is the very life, and needs not to have life in Himself from outside, while all other things are not life, but are merely participants in life, what constrains us to cancel

On this ground he says that the Maker of time must commence His existence from a like beginning. Well, the creation has the ages for its beginning, but what beginning can you conceive of the Maker of the ages? If any one should say, The 'beginning' which is mentioned in the Gospel — it is the Father Who is there signified, and the confession of the Son together with Him is there pointed to, nor can it be that He Who is in the Father, as the Lord says, can begin His being in Him from any particular point. And if any one speaks of another beginning besides this, let him tell us the name by which he marks this beginning, as none can be apprehended before the establishment of the ages. Such a statement, therefore, will not move us a whit from the orthodox conception concerning the Only-begotten, even if old women do applaud the proposition as a sound one. For we abide by what has been determined from the beginning, having our doctrine firmly based on truth, to wit, that all things which the orthodox doctrine assumes that we assert concerning the Only-begotten God have no kindred with the creation, but the marks which distinguish the Maker of all and His works are separated by a wide interval. If indeed the Son had in any other respect communion with the creation, we surely ought to say that He did not diverge from it even in the manner of His existence. But if the creation has no share in such things as are all those which we learn concerning the Son, we must surely of necessity say that in this matter also He has no communion with it. For the creation was not in the beginning, and was not with God, and was not, God, nor life, nor light, nor resurrection, nor the rest of the Divine names, as truth, righteousness, sanctification, Judge, just, Maker of all things, existing before the ages, for ever and ever; the creation is not the brightness of the glory, nor the express image of the Person, nor the likeness of goodness, nor grace, nor power, nor truth, nor salvation, nor redemption; nor do we find any one at all of those names which are employed by Scripture for the glory of the Only-begotten, either belonging to the creation or employed concerning it — not to speak of those more exalted words, I am in the Father, and the Father in Me, and, He that has seen Me has seen the Father, and, None has seen the Son, save the Father. If indeed our doctrine allowed us to claim for the creation things so many and so great as these, he might have been right in thinking that we ought to attach what we observe in it to our conceptions of the Only-begotten also, since the transfer would be from kindred subjects to one nearly allied. But if all these concepts and names involve communion with the Father, while they transcend our notions of the creation, does not our clever and sharp-witted friend slink away in shame at discussing the nature of the Lord of the Creation by the aid of what he observes in creation, without being aware that the marks which distinguish the creation are of a different sort? The ultimate division of all that exists is made by the line between created and uncreated, the one being regarded as a cause of what has come into being, the other as coming into being thereby. Now the created nature and the Divine essence being thus divided, and admitting no intermixture in respect of their distinguishing properties, we must by no means conceive both by means of similar terms, nor seek in the idea of their nature for the same distinguishing marks in things that are thus separated. Accordingly, as the nature that is in the creation, as the phrase of the most excellent Wisdom somewhere tells us, exhibits the beginning, ending, and midst of the times Wisdom 7:18 in itself, and extends concurrently with all temporal intervals, we take as a sort of characteristic of the subject this property, that in it we see some beginning of its formation, look on its midst, and extend our expectations to its end. For we have learned that the heaven and the earth were not from eternity, and will not last to eternity, and thus it is hence clear that those things are both started from some beginning, and will surely cease at some end. But the Divine Nature, being limited in no respect, but passing all limitations on every side in its infinity, is far removed from those marks which we find in creation. For that power which is without interval, without quantity, without circumscription, having in itself all the ages and all the creation that has taken place in them, and over-passing at all points, by virtue of the infinity of its own nature, the unmeasured extent of the ages, either has no mark which indicates its nature, or has one of an entirely different sort, and not that which the creation has. Since, then, it belongs to the creation to have a beginning, that will be alien from the uncreated nature which belongs to the creation. For if any one should venture to suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to be, like the creation, from any beginning comprehensible by us, he must certainly append to his statement concerning the Son the rest also of the sequence; for it is not possible to avoid acknowledging, together with the beginning, that also which follows from it. For just as if one were to admit some person to be a man in all the properties of his nature, he would observe that in this confession he declared him to be an animal and rational, and whatever else is conceived of man, so by the same reasoning, if we should understand any of the properties of creation to be present in the Divine essence, it will no longer be open to us to refrain from attaching to that pure Nature the rest of the list of the attributes contemplated therein. For the beginning will demand by force and compulsion that which follows it; for the beginning, thus conceived, is a beginning of what comes after it, in such a sense, that if they are, it is, and if the things connected with it are removed, the antecedent also would not remain. Now as the book of Wisdom speaks of midst and end as well as of beginning, if we assume in the Nature of the Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma, some beginning of existence defined by a certain mark of time, the book of Wisdom will by no means allow us to refrain from subjoining to the beginning a midst and an end also. If this should be done we shall find, as the result of our arguments, that the Divine word shows us that the Deity is mortal. For if, according to the book of Wisdom, the end is a necessary consequence of the beginning, and the idea of midst is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one of these also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of measure and limitation for the infinite Nature. And if this is impious and absurd, the giving a beginning to that argument which ends in impiety deserves equal, or even greater censure; and the beginning of this absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of the Son was circumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is before them: either they must revert to sound doctrine under the compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate Him Who is of the Father in union with the Father's eternity, or if they do not like this, they must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and reduce the limitless character of His life to non- existence by a beginning and an end. And, granted that the nature both of souls and of the angels has no end, and is no way hindered from going on to eternity, by the fact of its being created, and having the beginning of its existence from some point of time, so that our adversaries can use this fact to assert a parallel in the case of Christ, in the sense that He is not from eternity, and yet endures everlastingly — let any one who advances this argument also consider the following point, how widely the Godhead differs from the creation in its special attributes. For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no conceivable thing which is regarded as good, while the creation attains excellence by partaking in something better than itself; and further, not only had a beginning of its being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning to be in excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becomes by participation a beginning of its ascent to something still greater, and it never ceases, in Paul's phrase, reaching forth to the things that are before, and forgetting the things that are behind Philippians 3:13. Since, then, the Godhead is very life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and life, and truth, and every conceivable thing that is lofty and Divine, while the creation draws from Him its supply of good, it may hence be evident that if it is in life by partaking of life, it will surely, if it ceases from this participation, cease from life also. If they dare, then, to say also of the Only-begotten God those things which it is true to say of the creation, let them say this too, along with the rest, that He has a beginning of His being like the creation, and abides in life after the likeness of souls. But if He is the very life, and needs not to have life in Himself ab extra, while all other things are not life, but are merely participants in life, what constrains us to cancel, by reason of what we see in creation, the eternity of the Son? For that which is always unchanged as regards its nature, admits of no contrary, and is incapable of change to any other condition: while things whose nature is on the boundary line have a tendency that shifts either way, inclining at will to what they find attractive. If, then, that which is truly life is contemplated in the Divine and transcendent nature, the decadence thereof will surely, as it seems, end in the opposite state.

Now the meaning of life and death has many aspects and is not always understood the same way. When it comes to the flesh, the activity and movement of the bodily senses is called life, and their extinction and dissolution is called death. But in the case of the intellectual nature, drawing near to the Divine is true life, and falling away from it is called death. For this reason the original evil, the devil, is called both death and the inventor of death, and he is also said by the Apostle to have the power of death. So then, since we receive from the Scriptures, as has been said, a twofold understanding of death, He Who is truly unchangeable and immutable alone has immortality and dwells in light that cannot be reached or approached by the darkness of wickedness. But all things that share in death, being far removed from immortality by their contrary tendency, if they fall away from what is good, would, by the changeability of their nature, admit fellowship with the worse condition, which is nothing other than death, having a certain correspondence with the death of the body. For just as in that case the extinction of the activities of nature is called death, so also in the case of the intellectual being, the absence of movement toward the good is death and departure from life. Therefore what we observe in the bodiless creation does not conflict with our argument, which refutes the teaching of heresy. For that form of death which corresponds to the intellectual nature—that is, separation from God, Whom we call Life—is not, potentially, separated even from their nature. For their emergence from non-existence shows changeability of nature, and what is naturally allied to change is prevented from sharing in the contrary state by the grace of Him Who strengthens it. It does not remain in the good by its own nature, and such a thing is not eternal. If, then, one truly speaks the truth in saying that we ought not to evaluate the Divine essence and the created nature in the same way, nor to limit the being of the Son of God by any beginning, lest, if this is granted, the other attributes of creation should enter in along with our acknowledgment of this one, the absurd character of that man's teaching is clearly shown—the one who uses the attributes of creation to separate the Only-begotten God from the eternity of the Father. For just as none of the other marks that characterize the creation appear in the Maker of the creation, so neither is the fact that the creation has its existence from some beginning a proof that the Son was not always in the Father—that Son Who is Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and Life, and all that is conceived of in the bosom of the Father.

Now the meaning of life and death is manifold, and not always understood in the same way. For as regards the flesh, the energy and motion of the bodily senses is called life, and their extinction and dissolution is named death. But in the case of the intellectual nature, approximation to the Divine is the true life, and decadence therefrom is named death: for which reason the original evil, the devil, is called both death, and the inventor of death: and he is also said by the Apostle to have the power of death. As, then, we obtain, as has been said, from the Scriptures, a twofold conception of death, He Who is truly unchangeable and immutable alone has immortality, and dwells in light that cannot be attained or approached by the darkness of wickedness 1 Timothy 3:16: but all things that participate in death, being far removed from immortality by their contrary tendency, if they fall away from that which is good, would, by the mutability of their nature, admit community with the worse condition, which is nothing else than death, having a certain correspondence with the death of the body. For as in that case the extinction of the activities of nature is called death, so also, in the case of the intellectual being, the absence of motion towards the good is death and departure from life; so that what we perceive in the bodiless creation does not clash with our argument, which refutes the doctrine of heresy. For that form of death which corresponds to the intellectual nature (that is, separation from God, Whom we call Life) is, potentially, not separated even from their nature; for their emergence from non- existence shows mutability of nature; and that to which change is in affinity is hindered from participation in the contrary state by the grace of Him Who strengthens it: it does not abide in the good by its own nature: and such a thing is not eternal. If, then, one really speaks truth in saying that we ought not to estimate the Divine essence and the created nature in the same way, nor to circumscribe the being of the Son of God by any beginning, lest, if this be granted, the other attributes of creation should enter in together with our acknowledgment of this one, the absurd character of the teaching of that man, who employs the attributes of creation to separate the Only-begotten God from the eternity of the Father, is clearly shown. For as none other of the marks which characterize the creation appears in the Maker of the creation, so neither is the fact that the creation has its existence from some beginning a proof that the Son was not always in the Father — that Son, Who is Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and Life, and all that is conceived of in the bosom of the Father.

Since Eunomius claims that the word Lord refers to the ousia and not to the dignity of the Only-begotten, and he cites the Apostle as a witness to this view when he says to the Corinthians, Now the Lord is the Spirit (2 Corinthians 3:17), it may be appropriate that we should not pass over even this error on his part without correction. He claims that the word Lord signifies ousia, and as proof of this assumption he brings up the passage mentioned above. The Lord, it says, is the Spirit (2 Corinthians 3:17). But our friend who interprets Scripture according to his own preference calls Lordship by the name of ousia, and thinks he can prove his statement by means of the words quoted. Well, if Paul had said, Now the Lord is ousia, we too would have agreed with his argument. But since the inspired writing on one side says, the Lord is the Spirit, and Eunomius says on the other side, Lordship is ousia, I do not know where he finds support for his statement, unless he is prepared to say again that the word Spirit stands in Scripture for ousia. Let us consider, then, whether the Apostle anywhere, in his use of the term Spirit, employs that word to indicate ousia. He says, The Spirit itself bears witness with our Spirit (Romans 8:16), and no one knows the things of a man except the Spirit of man which is in him (1 Corinthians 2:11), and the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life (2 Corinthians 3:6), and if you through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, you shall live (Romans 8:13), and if we live in the Spirit let us also walk in the Spirit (Galatians 5:25). Who indeed could count all the Apostle's statements on this point? And in them we nowhere find ousia signified by this word. For whoever says that the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit signifies nothing other than the Holy Spirit which comes to be in the mind of the faithful; for in many other passages of his writings he gives the name of spirit to the mind, by which the recipients, through receiving communion with the Spirit, attain the dignity of adoption. Again, in the passage, No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of man which is in him, if man refers to the ousia, and spirit likewise, it will follow from the phrase that the man is maintained to be of two ousiai. Again, I do not know how someone who says that the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, sets ousia in opposition to letter; nor, again, how this writer imagines that when Paul says that we ought through the Spirit to destroy the deeds of the body, he is directing the meaning of spirit to express ousia; while as for living in the Spirit, and walking in the Spirit, this would be quite unintelligible if the sense of the word Spirit referred to ousia. For in what other than in ousia do all we who are alive partake of life? Thus when the Apostle is laying down advice for us on this matter that we should live in ousia, it is as though he said partake of life by means of yourselves, and not by means of others. If then it is not possible that this sense can be adopted in any passage, how can Eunomius here once more imitate the interpreters of dreams, and tell us to take spirit for ousia, so that he may arrive in proper syllogistic form at his conclusion that the word Lord is applied to the ousia? For if spirit is ousia (he argues), and the Lord is Spirit, the Lord is clearly found to be ousia. How undeniable is the force of this attempt! How can we evade or resolve this irrefutable necessity of demonstration? The word Lord, he says, is spoken of the ousia. How does he maintain it? Because the Apostle says, The Lord is the Spirit. Well, what does this have to do with ousia? He gives us the further instruction that spirit is put for ousia. These are the techniques of his demonstrative method! These are the results of his Aristotelian science! This is why, in your view, we are so much to be pitied, who are uninitiated in this wisdom! And you of course are to be deemed happy, who track out the truth by a method like this—that the Apostle's meaning was such that we are to suppose the Spirit was put by him for the ousia of the Only-begotten!

Since, however, Eunomius asserts that the word Lord is used in reference to the essence and not to the dignity of the Only-begotten, and cites as a witness to this view the Apostle, when he says to the Corinthians, Now the Lord is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:17, it may perhaps be opportune that we should not pass over even this error on his part without correction. He asserts that the word Lord is significative of essence, and by way of proof of this assumption he brings up the passage above mentioned. The Lord, it says, is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:17. But our friend who interprets Scripture at his own sweet will calls Lordship by the name of essence, and thinks to bring his statement to proof by means of the words quoted. Well, if it had been said by Paul, Now the Lord is essence, we too would have concurred in his argument. But seeing that the inspired writing on the one side says, the Lord is the Spirit, and Eunomius says on the other, Lordship is essence, I do not know where he finds support for his statement, unless he is prepared to say again that the word Spirit stands in Scripture for essence. Let us consider, then, whether the Apostle anywhere, in his use of the term Spirit, employs that word to indicate essence. He says, The Spirit itself bears witness with our Spirit Romans 8:16, and no one knows the things of a man save the Spirit of man which is in him 1 Corinthians 2:11, and the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6, and if you through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, you shall live Romans 8:13, and if we live in the Spirit let us also walk in the Spirit Galatians 5:25. Who indeed could count the utterances of the Apostle on this point? And in them we nowhere find essence signified by this word. For he who says that the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit, signifies nothing else than the Holy Spirit Which comes to be in the mind of the faithful; for in many other passages of his writings he gives the name of spirit to the mind, on the reception by which of the communion of the Spirit the recipients attain the dignity of adoption. Again, in the passage, No one knows the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him, if man is used of the essence, and spirit likewise, it will follow from the phrase that the man is maintained to be of two essences. Again, I know not how he who says that the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, sets essence in opposition to letter; nor, again, how this writer imagines that when Paul says that we ought through the Spirit to destroy the deeds of the body, he is directing the signification of spirit to express essence; while as for living in the Spirit, and walking in the Spirit, this would be quite unintelligible if the sense of the word Spirit referred to essence. For in what else than in essence do all we who are alive partake of life?– thus when the Apostle is laying down advice for us on this matter that we should live in essence, it is as though he said partake of life by means of yourselves, and not by means of others. If then it is not possible that this sense can be adopted in any passage, how can Eunomius here once more imitate the interpreters of dreams, and bid us to take spirit for essence, to the end that he may arrive in due syllogistic form at his conclusion that the word Lord is applied to the essence?– for if spirit is essence (he argues), and the Lord is Spirit, the Lord is clearly found to be essence. How incontestable is the force of this attempt! How can we evade or resolve this irrefragable necessity of demonstration? The word Lord, he says, is spoken of the essence. How does he maintain it? Because the Apostle says, The Lord is the Spirit. Well, what has this to do with essence? He gives us the further instruction that spirit is put for essence. These are the arts of his demonstrative method! These are the results of his Aristotelian science! This is why, in your view, we are so much to be pitied, who are uninitiated in this wisdom! And you of course are to be deemed happy, who track out the truth by a method like this — that the Apostle's meaning was such that we are to suppose the Spirit was put by him for the Essence of the Only-begotten!

But how will you make sense of what comes next? When Paul says, "Now the Lord is the Spirit," he continues by saying, "and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." So if the Lord is the Spirit, and Spirit means ousia, what are we supposed to understand by the ousia of the ousia? He speaks of another Spirit of the Lord who is the Spirit—that is, according to your interpretation, of another ousia. Therefore in your view, when the Apostle writes specifically about the Lord the Spirit and about the Spirit of the Lord, he means nothing other than an ousia of an ousia. Well, let Eunomius make whatever he wants of what is written. What we understand is this: Scripture, given by the inspiration of God as the Apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit, and its purpose is the benefit of humanity. For "every scripture is given by inspiration of God and is profitable," and the benefit is varied and multifaceted, as the Apostle says—"for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." However, such a blessing is not within reach for just anyone to grasp. Rather, the divine meaning lies hidden beneath the body of Scripture, as if under a veil, with some legislative rule or historical narrative covering the truths that are understood by the mind. For this reason, the Apostle tells us that those who look at the body of Scripture have a veil over their heart and cannot see the glory of the spiritual law, being blocked by the veil cast over the face of the lawgiver. Therefore he says, "the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life," showing that often the plain interpretation, if not understood in the proper sense, has an effect opposite to the life indicated by the Spirit. The Spirit sets before all people the perfection of virtue free from passion, while the historical content in the writings sometimes includes accounts even of inappropriate events and is understood, so to speak, to align with the passions of our nature. If anyone follows these according to the plain sense, he will make Scripture a teaching of death. Accordingly, he says the veil is cast over the perceptive faculties of the souls of those who handle what is written in too literal a way. But for those who turn their contemplation toward what is grasped by the intellect, the glory underlying the letter is revealed, stripped bare of its mask, as it were. And what is discovered by this more elevated perception, he says, is the Lord, which is the Spirit. He says, "when it turns to the Lord the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is the Spirit." In saying this, he draws a contrasting distinction between the lordship of the Spirit and the bondage of the letter. Just as what gives life is opposed to what kills, so he contrasts the Lord with bondage. And so we won't be confused when we are taught about the Holy Spirit (being led by the word "Lord" to think of the Only-begotten), he protects the meaning by repetition, both saying that the Lord is the Spirit and making further mention of the Spirit of the Lord. This shows the supremacy of his nature through the honor implied in lordship, while at the same time avoiding confusion in his argument about the distinctness of his hypostasis. For he who calls him both Lord and Spirit of the Lord teaches us to conceive of him as a distinct individual besides the Only-begotten, just as elsewhere he speaks of the Spirit of Christ, using appropriately and in its mystical sense this very term which is devoutly employed in the system of teaching according to gospel tradition. Thus we, the most miserable of all people, being led forward by the Apostle in these mysteries, pass from the letter that kills to the Spirit that gives life, learning from him who was in Paradise and initiated into unspeakable mysteries that everything divine Scripture says consists of utterances of the Holy Spirit. "For the Holy Spirit prophesied well"—he says this to the Jews in Rome, introducing the words of Isaiah. And to the Hebrews, citing the authority of the Holy Spirit with the words "Therefore as the Holy Spirit says," he introduces the words of the Psalm which are spoken at length in the person of God. And from the Lord himself we learn the same thing—that David declared the heavenly mysteries not in himself (that is, not speaking according to human nature). For how could anyone, being only human, know the supercelestial conversation of the Father with the Son? But being in the Spirit, he said that the Lord spoke to the Lord those words which he uttered. For "if," he says, "David in the Spirit calls him Lord, how is he then his son?" Thus it is by the power of the Spirit that the holy men under divine influence are inspired, and every Scripture is for this reason said to be given by inspiration of God, because it is the teaching of the divine breath. If the bodily veil of the words were removed, what remains is Lord and life and Spirit, according to the teaching of the great Paul and according to the words of the gospel as well. For Paul declares that whoever turns from the letter to the Spirit no longer grasps the bondage that kills, but the Lord which is the life-giving Spirit. And the sublime gospel says, "the words that I speak are spirit and are life," as being stripped of the bodily veil. However, the idea that the Spirit is the ousia of the Only-begotten we will leave to our dreamers—or rather, we will make abundant use of what they say and arm the truth with the weapons of the adversary. For it is permissible that the Egyptian should be plundered by the Israelites and that we should make their wealth an ornament for ourselves. If the ousia of the Son is called Spirit, and God also is Spirit (for the gospel tells us so), clearly the ousia of the Father is called Spirit as well. But if their particular argument is that things introduced by different names are also different in nature, the conclusion surely is that things named alike are not alien to one another in nature either. Since then, according to their account, the ousia of the Father and that of the Son are both called Spirit, this clearly proves the absence of any difference in ousia. For a little further on Eunomius says: "Of those ousiai which are divergent, the names signifying ousia are also surely divergent, but where there is one and the same name, what is declared by the same name will surely be one also"—so that at every point, he who takes the wise in their own craftiness has turned our author's long labors and the infinite toil spent on what he has worked out to the establishment of the teaching we uphold. For if God is called Spirit in the gospel, and the ousia of the Only-begotten is maintained by Eunomius to be Spirit, since there is no apparent difference in the one name compared with the other, neither surely will the things signified by the names be mutually different in nature.

Then how will you make it fit with what follows? For when Paul says, Now the Lord is the Spirit, he goes on to say, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. If then the Lord is the Spirit, and Spirit means essence, what are we to understand by the essence of the essence? He speaks again of another Spirit of the Lord Who is the Spirit — that is to say, according to your interpretation, of another essence. Therefore in your view the Apostle, when he writes expressly of the Lord the Spirit, and of the Spirit of the Lord, means nothing else than an essence of an essence. Well, let Eunomius make what he likes of that which is written; what we understand of the matter is as follows. The Scripture, given by inspiration of God, as the Apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit, and its intention is the profit of men. For every scripture, he says, is given by inspiration of God and is profitable; and the profit is varied and multiform, as the Apostle says — for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness 2 Timothy 3:16. Such a boon as this, however, is not within any man's reach to lay hold of, but the Divine intention lies hid under the body of the Scripture, as it were under a veil, some legislative enactment or some historical narrative being cast over the truths that are contemplated by the mind. For this reason, then, the Apostle tells us that those who look upon the body of the Scripture have a veil upon their heart 2 Corinthians 3:15, and are not able to look upon the glory of the spiritual law, being hindered by the veil that has been cast over the face of the law-giver. Wherefore he says, the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, showing that often the obvious interpretation, if it be not taken according to the proper sense, has an effect contrary to that life which is indicated by the Spirit, seeing that this lays down for all men the perfection of virtue in freedom from passion, while the history contained in the writings sometimes embraces the exposition even of facts incongruous, and is understood, so to say, to concur with the passions of our nature, whereto if any one applies himself according to the obvious sense, he will make the Scripture a doctrine of death. Accordingly, he says that over the perceptive powers of the souls of men who handle what is written in too corporeal a manner, the veil is cast; but for those who turn their contemplation to that which is the object of the intelligence, there is revealed, bared, as it were, of a mask, the glory that underlies the letter. And that which is discovered by this more exalted perception he says is the Lord, which is the Spirit. For he says, when it shall turn to the Lord the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:16-17. And in so saying he makes a distinction of contrast between the lordship of the spirit and the bondage of the letter; for as that which gives life is opposed to that which kills, so he contrasts the Lord with bondage. And that we may not be under any confusion when we are instructed concerning the Holy Spirit (being led by the word Lord to the thought of the Only-begotten), for this reason he guards the word by repetition, both saying that the Lord is the Spirit, and making further mention of the Spirit of the Lord, that the supremacy of His Nature may be shown by the honour implied in lordship, while at the same time he may avoid confusing in his argument the individuality of His Person. For he who calls Him both Lord and Spirit of the Lord, teaches us to conceive of Him as a separate individual besides the Only-begotten; just as elsewhere he speaks of the Spirit of Christ Romans 8:9, employing fairly and in its mystic sense this very term which is piously employed in the system of doctrine according to the Gospel tradition. Thus we, the most miserable of all men, being led onward by the Apostle in the mysteries, pass from the letter that kills to the Spirit that gives life, learning from Him Who was in Paradise initiated into the unspeakable mysteries, that all things the Divine Scripture says are utterances of the Holy Spirit. For well did the Holy Spirit prophesy Acts 28:25, — this he says to the Jews in Rome, introducing the words of Isaiah; and to the Hebrews, alleging the authority of the Holy Spirit in the words, wherefore as says the Holy Spirit Hebrews 3:7, he adduces the words of the Psalm which are spoken at length in the person of God; and from the Lord Himself we learn the same thing — that David declared the heavenly mysteries not in himself (that is, not speaking according to human nature). For how could any one, being but man, know the supercelestial converse of the Father with the Son? But being in the Spirit he said that the Lord spoke to the Lord those words which He has uttered. For if, He says, David in the Spirit calls him Lord, how is He then his son? Thus it is by the power of the Spirit that the holy men who are under Divine influence are inspired, and every Scripture is for this reason said to be given by inspiration of God, because it is the teaching of the Divine afflatus. If the bodily veil of the words were removed, that which remains is Lord and life and Spirit, according to the teaching of the great Paul, and according to the words of the Gospel also. For Paul declares that he who turns from the letter to the Spirit no longer apprehends the bondage that slays, but the Lord which is the life-giving Spirit; and the sublime Gospel says, the words that I speak are spirit and are life, as being divested of the bodily veil. The idea, however, that the Spirit is the essence of the Only-begotten, we shall leave to our dreamers: or rather, we shall make use, ex abundanti, of what they say, and arm the truth with the weapons of the adversary. For it is allowable that the Egyptian should be spoiled by the Israelites, and that we should make their wealth an ornament for ourselves. If the essence of the Son is called Spirit, and God also is Spirit, (for so the Gospel tells us), clearly the essence of the Father is called Spirit also. But if it is their peculiar argument that things which are introduced by different names are different also in nature, the conclusion surely is, that things which are named alike are not alien one from the other in nature either. Since then, according to their account, the essence of the Father and that of the Son are both called Spirit, hereby is clearly proved the absence of any difference in essence. For a little further on Eunomius says:– Of those essences which are divergent the appellations significant of essence are also surely divergent, but where there is one and the same name, that which is declared by the same appellation will surely be one also: — so that at all points He that takes the wise in their own craftiness has turned the long labours of our author, and the infinite toil spent on what he has elaborated, to the establishment of the doctrine which we maintain. For if God is in the Gospel called Spirit, and the essence of the Only-begotten is maintained by Eunomius to be Spirit, as there is no apparent difference in the one name as compared with the other, neither, surely, will the things signified by the names be mutually different in nature.

Now that I have exposed this futile and pointless sham-argument, I think I can justifiably skip over without discussion what he puts together next to attack our master's statement. His actual argument provides sufficient proof of how foolish his remarks are, as it openly proclaims its own weakness. To engage in debate with such things is like trampling on corpses. For when he confidently presents some passage from our master, treats it with preliminary slander and contempt, and promises to show it is completely worthless, he suffers the same fate that happens to small children. Their imperfect and immature intelligence, and their untrained perceptive abilities, don't allow them to understand accurately what they see. So they often imagine the stars are only a little above their heads, and in their childish foolishness they throw clods of dirt at them when they appear. Then when the clod falls back down, they clap their hands, laugh, and boast to their friends as if their throw had actually reached the stars themselves. This is exactly like the man who hurls his childish missile at the truth, who sets forth those brilliant statements of our master like stars, and then throws from the ground—from his lowly and groveling understanding—his earthly and unstable arguments. And these, once they have risen so high that they have nowhere left to fall from, turn back down by their own weight. Now the passage from the great Basil is worded as follows:

And now that I have exposed this futile and pointless sham-argument, it seems to me that I may well pass by without discussion what he next puts together by way of attack upon our master's statement. For a sufficient proof of the folly of his remarks is to be found in his actual argument, which of itself proclaims aloud its feebleness. To be entangled in a contest with such things as this is like trampling on the slain. For when he sets forth with much confidence some passage from our master, and treats it with preliminary slander and contempt, and promises that he will show it to be worth nothing at all, he meets with the same fortune as befalls small children, to whom their imperfect and immature intelligence, and the untrained condition of their perceptive faculties, do not give an accurate understanding of what they see. Thus they often imagine that the stars are but a little way above their heads, and pelt them with clods when they appear, in their childish folly; and then, when the clod falls, they clap their hands and laugh and brag to their comrades as if their throw had reached the stars themselves. Such is the man who casts at the truth with his childish missile, who sets forth like the stars those splendid sayings of our master, and then hurls from the ground — from his downtrodden and grovelling understanding — his earthy and unstable arguments. And these, when they have gone so high that they have no place to fall from, turn back again of themselves by their own weight. Now the passage of the great Basil is worded as follows:–

Yet what sensible person would agree with the claim that when the names of things are different, their essences must necessarily be different as well? The names Peter and Paul, and generally speaking the names of human beings, are different, while the essence of all is one. Therefore, in most respects we are identical to one another, and we differ from each other only in those special properties that are observed in individual persons. Consequently, names do not indicate essence, but rather the properties that mark out the particular individual. Thus, when we hear the name Peter, we do not understand the ousia by the name (and by ousia I mean here the material substratum), but we grasp the concept of the properties that we observe in him. These are the great man's words. And anyone who has time to waste on unprofitable matters can learn from Eunomius' actual writing what skill he who argues against this statement displays against us.

Yet what sane man would agree with the statement that of those things of which the names are different the essences must needs be divergent also? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and, generally speaking, of men, are different, while the essence of all is one: wherefore, in most respects we are mutually identical, and differ one from another only in those special properties which are observed in individuals: and hence also appellations are not indicative of essence, but of the properties which mark the particular individual. Thus, when we hear of Peter, we do not by the name understand the essence (and by ' essence ' I here mean the material substratum), but we are impressed with the conception of the properties which we contemplate in him. These are the great man's words. And what skill he who disputes this statement displays against us, we learn — any one, that is, who has leisure for wasting time on unprofitable matters — from the actual composition of Eunomius.

I must say I prefer not to insert into my own work the distasteful material this rhetorician produces, or to expose his ignorance and foolishness to ridicule in the middle of my arguments. He continues with a kind of praise for the class of meaningful words that express the subject, and in his usual style, he patches and glues together the discarded scraps of phrases. Poor Isocrates is chewed up once again and stripped of words and figures to make his point—here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same treatment and contributes phrases from his own works. Yet even with all this, this heavily patched and multicolored web of words is not finished. Every attack, every defense of his ideas, all his careful preparation, spontaneously collapses. Just as commonly happens with bubbles—when drops falling from above through water strike some obstacle and produce those foamy swellings which dissolve immediately after they form, leaving no trace on the water—such are the air-bubbles of our author's thoughts, vanishing without a touch the moment they are presented. For after all these supposedly irrefutable statements and dreamy philosophizing, in which he claims that the distinct character of the ousia is grasped through the difference in names, his argument—like some mass of foam carried downstream that breaks apart when it contacts any more solid body—follows its own spontaneous course and unexpectedly collides with the truth, dispersing into nothingness its insubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For he speaks in these words: Who is so foolish and so far removed from human nature as, when speaking about men, to call one a man and another a horse, and then compare them? I would answer him: You are right to call anyone foolish who makes such errors in using names. And I will use for supporting the truth the testimony you yourself give. For if it is extremely foolish to call one person a horse and another a man when both are really men, it is surely equally stupid, when the Father is confessed to be God and the Son is confessed to be God, to call one created and the other uncreated, since just as humanity in the first case, so the Godhead in this case does not permit a change of name to one expressing another kind. For what the irrational is in relation to man, the creature also is in relation to the Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name as the nature superior to it. And just as it is not possible to apply the same definition to the rational animal and the quadruped alike—for each is naturally differentiated from the other by its special property—so neither can you express by the same terms the created and the uncreated ousia, seeing that those attributes predicated of the latter ousia are not discoverable in the former. For just as rationality is not discoverable in a horse, nor solid hoofs in a man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the attribute of being created in the Godhead. But if He is God, He is certainly not created, and if He is created, He is not God—unless, of course, someone were to apply by some misuse or customary mode of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses are given men's names by their owners. Yet neither is the horse a man, though he is called by a human name, nor is the created being God, even though some claim for him the name of Godhead and give him the benefit of the empty sound of a two-syllable word. Since, then, Eunomius' heretical statement is found spontaneously to agree with the truth, let him take his own advice and stand by his own words, and by no means retract his own statements, but acknowledge that the man is truly foolish and stupid who names the subject not according to what it is, but says horse for man, and sea for sky, and creature for God. And let no one think it unreasonable that the creature should be set in opposition to God, but pay attention to the prophets and the Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the Father, "My Hand made all these things," meaning by Hand, in his figurative saying, the power of the Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things are from the Father, and that all things are through the Son, and the prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which itself also is given through the Spirit. For in one passage, the prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things that have come into being in their relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made them is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things. And again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division of entities, making all things depend on their productive cause, yet not counting in the number of all things that which produces them. So we are taught by this the difference of nature between the created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature, that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another. Since, then, all things are from God, and the Son is God, the creation is properly opposed to the Godhead. While, since the Only-begotten is something else than the nature of the universe—seeing that not even those who fight against the truth contradict this—it necessarily follows that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all things were made.

From his writings, I say, for I do not like to insert in my own work the nauseous stuff our rhetorician utters, or to display his ignorance and folly to contempt in the midst of my own arguments. He goes on with a sort of eulogy upon the class of significant words which express the subject, and, in his accustomed style, patches and sticks together the cast-off rags of phrases: poor Isocrates is nibbled at once more, and shorn of words and figures to make out the point proposed — here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same treatment, and makes him a contribution of phrases from his own labours — yet not even thus is this much-stitched and many-colored web of words finished off, but every assault, every defense of his conceptions, all his artistic preparation, spontaneously collapses, and, as commonly happens with the bubbles when the drops, borne down from above through a body of waters against some obstacle, produce those foamy swellings which, as soon as they gather, immediately dissolve, and leave upon the water no trace of their own formation — such are the air-bubbles of our author's thoughts, vanishing without a touch at the moment they are put forth. For after all these irrefragable statements, and the dreamy philosophizing wherein he asserts that the distinct character of the essence is apprehended by the divergence of names, as some mass of foam borne downstream breaks up when it comes into contact with any more solid body, so his argument, following its own spontaneous course, and coming unexpectedly into collision with the truth, disperses into nothingness its unsubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For he speaks in these words:– Who is so foolish and so far removed from the constitution of men, as, in discoursing of men to speak of one as a man, and, calling another a horse, so to compare them? I would answer him — You are right in calling any one foolish who makes such blunders in the use of names. And I will employ for the support of the truth the testimony you yourself give. For if it is a piece of extreme folly to call one a horse and another a man, supposing both were really men, it is surely a piece of equal stupidity, when the Father is confessed to be God, and the Son is confessed to be God, to call the one 'created' and the other 'uncreated,' since, as in the other case humanity, so in this case the Godhead does not admit a change of name to that expressive of another kind. For what the irrational is with respect to man, that also the creature is with respect to the Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name with the nature that is superior to it. And as it is not possible to apply the same definition to the rational animal and the quadruped alike (for each is naturally differentiated by its special property from the other), so neither can you express by the same terms the created and the uncreated essence, seeing that those attributes which are predicated of the latter essence are not discoverable in the former. For as rationality is not discoverable in a horse, nor solidity of hoofs in a man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the attribute of being created in the Godhead: but if He be God He is certainly not created, and if He be created He is not God; unless, of course, one were to apply by some misuse or customary mode of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses have men's names given them by their owners; yet neither is the horse a man, though he be called by a human name, nor is the created being God, even though some claim for him the name of Godhead, and give him the benefit of the empty sound of a dissyllable. Since, then, Eunomius' heretical statement is found spontaneously to fall in with the truth, let him take his own advice and stand by his own words, and by no means retract his own utterances, but consider that the man is really foolish and stupid who names the subject not according as it is, but says horse for man, and sea for sky, and creature for God. And let no one think it unreasonable that the creature should be set in opposition to God, but have regard to the prophets and to the Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the Father, My Hand made all these things, meaning by Hand, in his dark saying, the power of the Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things are of the Father, and that all things are by the Son 1 Corinthians 8:6, and the prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which itself also is given through the Spirit. For in the one passage, the prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things which have come into being in its relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made them is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things. And again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division of entities, making all things depend upon their productive cause, yet not reckoning in the number of all things that which produces them: so that we are hereby taught the difference of nature between the created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature, that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another. Since, then, all things are of God, and the Son is God, the creation is properly opposed to the Godhead; while, since the Only-begotten is something else than the nature of the universe (seeing that not even those who fight against the truth contradict this), it follows of necessity that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all things were made.

Since the Only-begotten is proclaimed to be God in the Divine Scriptures, let Eunomius consider his own argument and condemn as utterly foolish anyone who divides the Divine into created and uncreated, just as he condemns someone who divides man into horse and man. For he himself says, a little later on, after his intermediate nonsense, that the close relation of names to things is immutable, where he agrees by this statement to the fixed character of the true connection of names with their subjects. If, then, the name of Godhead is properly used in close connection with the Only-begotten God (and Eunomius, though he may wish to disagree with us, will surely concede that Scripture does not lie, and that the name of Godhead is not inappropriately attributed to the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that if the close relation of names to things is immutable, and the Lord is called by the name of God, he cannot understand any difference in the conception of Godhead between the Father and the Son, since this name is common to both—or rather not this name only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares, without any difference in meaning, the titles of the Father—good, incorruptible, just, judge, long-suffering, merciful, eternal, everlasting, and all that indicate the expression of majesty of nature and power—without any qualification being made in His case in any of these names regarding the exalted nature of the conception. But Eunomius passes by, as if with closed eyes, the large number of Divine titles, and looks only to one point, his generate and ungenerate—trusting his doctrine, tossed and driven as it is by the blasts of error, to a slight and weak cord.

Now seeing that the Only-begotten is in the Divine Scriptures proclaimed to be God, let Eunomius consider his own argument, and condemn for utter folly the man who parts the Divine into created and uncreated, as he does him who divides man into horse and man. For he himself says, a little further on, after his intermediate nonsense, the close relation of names to things is immutable, where he himself by this statement assents to the fixed character of the true connection of appellations with their subject. If, then, the name of Godhead is properly employed in close connection with the Only-begotten God (and Eunomius, though he may desire to be out of harmony with us, will surely concede that the Scripture does not lie, and that the name of the Godhead is not inharmoniously attributed to the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that if the close relation of names to things is immutable, and the Lord is called by the name of God, he cannot apprehend any difference in respect of the conception of Godhead between the Father and the Son, seeing that this name is common to both — or rather not this name only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares, without divergence of meaning, the appellations of the Father — good, incorruptible, just, judge, long-suffering, merciful, eternal, everlasting, all that indicate the expression of majesty of nature and power — without any reservation being made in His case in any of the names in regard of the exalted nature of the conception. But Eunomius passes by, as it were with closed eye, the number, great as it is, of the Divine appellations, and looks only to one point, his generate and ungenerate, — trusting to a slight and weak cord his doctrine, tossed and driven as it is by the blasts of error.

He claims that no one who cares about truth calls any generated thing "ungenerate," or calls God who is over all "Son" or "generate." This statement requires no further arguments from us to refute it. He doesn't hide his deception behind any veils, as he usually does, but treats the reversal of his absurd statement as if it were equivalent. He says that no generated thing is called ungenerate, nor is God who is over all called Son or generate, without making any special distinction for the Only-begotten Godhead of the Son compared to the rest of generated things. Instead, he sets all things that have come into being in opposition to God without discrimination, not exempting the Son from all things. And in reversing his absurdities, he clearly separates the Son from the Divine Nature when he says that no generated thing is called ungenerate, nor is God called Son or generate. He openly reveals through this contrast the horrible character of his blasphemy. After distinguishing things that have come into being from the ungenerate, he continues by saying in his reciprocal argument that it is impossible to call not the unbegotten, but God, Son or generate. Through these words he tries to show that what is not ungenerate is not God, and that the Only-begotten God is, by the fact of being begotten, as far removed from being God as the ungenerate is from being generated in fact or in name. He doesn't make this disharmonious and incongruous reversal of terms out of ignorance of what his argument implies. Rather, in his attack on orthodox doctrine, he opposes the Godhead to the generate—and this is the point he tries to establish through his words: that what is not ungenerate is not God. What would the true sequence of his argument be? After saying no generated thing is ungenerate, he should proceed with the inference that if anything is naturally ungenerate, it cannot be generate. Such a statement would contain truth and avoid blasphemy. But now, by his premise that no generated thing is ungenerate and his inference that God is not generated, he clearly excludes the Only-begotten God from being God, establishing that because He is not ungenerate, neither is He God. Do we need any further proofs to expose this monstrous blasphemy? Isn't this enough by itself to serve as evidence against this adversary of Christ, who through the arguments cited maintains that the Word, who in the beginning was God, is not God? What need is there to engage further with such people? We don't entangle ourselves in controversy with those who occupy themselves with idols and with the blood shed on their altars—not because we approve of the destruction of those who are obsessed with idols, but because their disease is too strong for our treatment. Just as the fact itself declares idolatry, and the evil that people do boldly and arrogantly anticipates the reproach of those who accuse it, so here too I think that the defenders of orthodoxy should keep silence toward one who openly proclaims his impiety to his own discredit, just as medicine also stands powerless in the case of a cancerous disease, because the disease is too strong for the art to treat.

He asserts that no man who has any regard for the truth either calls any generated thing 'ungenerate,' or calls God Who is over all 'Son' or 'generate.' This statement needs no further arguments on our part for its refutation. For he does not shelter his craft with any veils, as his wont is, but treats the inversion of his absurd statement as equivalent, while he says that neither is any generated thing spoken of as ungenerate, nor is God Who is over all called Son or generate, without making any special distinction for the Only-begotten Godhead of the Son as compared with the rest of the generated, but makes his opposition of all things that have come into being to God without discrimination, not excepting the Son from all things. And in the inversion of his absurdities he clearly separates, forsooth, the Son from the Divine Nature, when he says that neither is any generated thing spoken of as ungenerate, nor is God called Son or generate, and manifestly reveals by this contradistinction the horrid character of his blasphemy. For when he has distinguished the things that have come into being from the ungenerate, he goes on to say, in that antistrophal induction of his, that it is impossible to call (not the unbegotten, but) God, Son or generate, trying by these words to show that which is not ungenerate is not God, and that the Only-begotten God is, by the fact of being begotten, as far removed from being God as the ungenerate is from being generated in fact or in name. For it is not in ignorance of the consequence of his argument that he makes an inversion of the terms employed thus inharmonious and incongruous: it is in his assault on the doctrine of orthodoxy that he opposes the Godhead to the generate — and this is the point he tries to establish by his words, that that which is not ungenerate is not God. What was the true sequence of his argument? That having said no generated thing is ungenerate, he should proceed with the inference, nor, if anything is naturally ungenerate, can it be generate. Such a statement at once contains truth and avoids blasphemy. But now by his premise that no generated thing is ungenerate, and his inference that God is not generated, he clearly shuts out the Only-begotten God from being God, laying down that because He is not ungenerate, neither is He God. Do we then need any further proofs to expose this monstrous blasphemy? Is not this enough by itself to serve for a record against the adversary of Christ, who by the arguments cited maintains that the Word, Who in the beginning was God, is not God? What need is there to engage further with such men as this? For we do not entangle ourselves in controversy with those who busy themselves with idols and with the blood that is shed upon their altars, not that we acquiesce in the destruction of those who are besotted about idols, but because their disease is too strong for our treatment. Thus, just as the fact itself declares idolatry, and the evil that men do boldly and arrogantly anticipates the reproach of those who accuse it, so here too I think that the advocates of orthodoxy should keep silence towards one who openly proclaims his impiety to his own discredit, just as medicine also stands powerless in the case of a cancerous complaint, because the disease is too strong for the art to deal with.

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he claims that he will present something even stronger, let us examine this as well as the passage cited, so that we do not appear to be retreating in the face of an overwhelming argument. But if, he says, I am to set aside all these positions and rely on my stronger argument, I would say this: even if all the terms that he puts forward as refutation were established, our statement will nonetheless be clearly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of names that signify properties indicates the divergence of the things themselves, it is surely necessary to allow that the divergence of names signifying ousia also indicates the divergence of the ousiai. And this would be found to hold true in all cases—I mean in the case of ousiai, energies, colors, shapes, and other qualities. For we designate the different ousiai by divergent names: fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. Why should we even mention the intelligible ousiai, in listing which the Apostle indicates, through difference of names, the divergence of ousia?

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he professes that he will allege something stronger still, let us examine this also, as well as the passage cited, lest we should seem to be withdrawing our opposition in face of an overwhelming force. If, however, he says, I am to abandon all these positions, and fall back upon my stronger argument, I would say this, that even if all the terms that he advances by way of refutation were established, our statement will none the less be manifestly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of the names which are significant of properties marks the divergence of the things, it is surely necessary to allow that with the divergence of the names significant of essence is also marked the divergence of the essences. And this would be found to hold good in all cases, I mean in the case of essences, energies, colors, figures, and other qualities. For we denote by divergent appellations the different essences, fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. Why need we mention the intelligible essences, in enumerating which the Apostle marks, by difference of names, the divergence of essence?

Who wouldn't be overwhelmed by this supposedly irresistible attack? The argument exceeds the promise, and the actual experience is more frightening than the threat. "I will come," he says, "to my stronger argument." What is it? That since the differences of properties are recognized by names that signify special attributes, we must naturally agree, he says, that differences of ousia are also expressed by divergent names. So what are these names of essences by which we learn the divergence of nature between the Father and the Son? He mentions fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His examples have won him the day; his argument sweeps everything before it. I cannot deny that names which are completely incommunicable do indicate difference of natures. But this keen and sharp-sighted intellect has just failed to notice these points: that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that just, incorruptible, and all those names that belong to the Divine Nature are used equally of both Father and Son. Thus, if divergent names indicate difference of natures, then common names will surely show the common character of the ousia. And if we must agree that the Divine ousia is to be expressed by names, we ought to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of generate and ungenerate, because good and incorruptible, just and wise, and all such terms apply strictly only to that Nature which surpasses all understanding, whereas "generated" shares its name even with the lower forms of creation. For we call a dog, a frog, and all things that come into the world by generation "generated." Moreover, the term "ungenerate" is not only used for what exists without a cause, but also properly applies to what is nonexistent. The Scindapsus is called ungenerate, the Blityri is ungenerate, the Minotaur is ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, and the Chimera are ungenerate—not in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if the others—those used equivocally either of the nonexistent or of lower animals—are the divergent ones, let his "generate" and "ungenerate" be so. Eunomius' powerful argument against us actually upholds the cause of truth by testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be perceived in the names. But if he claims that the difference of ousia exists between the generate and the ungenerate as it does between fire and water, and believes that the names, like those he has mentioned in his examples, stand in the same mutual relation as fire and water, then the horrible character of his blasphemy will be exposed here again, even if we remain silent. For fire and water have natures that are mutually destructive, and each is destroyed if it enters into the other by the prevalence of the more powerful element. If, then, he teaches that the Nature of the Ungenerate differs from that of the Only-begotten in this way, it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition part of the divergence of their essences, so that their nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and one would be consumed by the other if both were found to be mutually inclusive or coexistent.

Who would not be dismayed at this irresistible power of attack? The argument transcends the promise, the experience is more terrible than the threat. I will come, he says, to my stronger argument. What is it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those names which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he says, allow that differences of essence are also expressed by divergence of names. What then are these appellations of essences by which we learn the divergence of Nature between the Father and the son? He talks of fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His illustrations have won him the day: his argument carries all before it: I cannot contradict the statement that those names which are entirely incommunicable indicate difference of natures. But our man of keen and quick-sighted intellect has just missed seeing these points:– that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that just, and incorruptible, and all those names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the Father and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of appellations indicates difference of natures, the community of names will surely show the common character of the essence. And if we must agree that the Divine essence is to be expressed by names, it would behoove us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of generate and ungenerate, because good and incorruptible, just and wise, and all such terms as these are strictly applicable only to that Nature which passes all understanding, whereas generated exhibits community of name with even the inferior forms of the lower creation. For we call a dog, and a frog, and all things that come into the world by way of generation, generated. And moreover, the term ungenerate is not only employed of that which exists without a cause, but has also a proper application to that which is nonexistent. The Scindapsus is called ungenerate, the Blityri is ungenerate, the Minotaur is ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, the Chimæra are ungenerate, not in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if it is the others, those which are equivocally employed either of the non-existent or of the lower animals — if it is these, I say, which are divergent, let his generate and ungenerate be so: Eunomius' powerful argument against us itself upholds the cause of truth in testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be perceived in the names. But if he asserts the difference of essence to exist between the generate and the ungenerate, as it does between fire and water, and is of opinion that the names, like those which he has mentioned in his examples, are in the same mutual relation as fire and water, the horrid character of his blasphemy will here again be brought to light, even if we hold our peace. For fire and water have a nature mutually destructive, and each is destroyed, if it comes to be in the other, by the prevalence of the more powerful element. If, then, he lays down the doctrine that the Nature of the Ungenerate differs thus from that of the Only-begotten, it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition to be involved in the divergence of their essences, so that their nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and the one would be consumed by the other, if both should be found to be mutually inclusive or co-existent.

After this, he discusses the difference between names and things. He speaks of the ungenerate as being without a cause, and of the non-existent, such as the Scindapsus, Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops, and Scylla, which were never generated at all. He shows that things which are essentially different destroy each other, as fire destroys water, and so on in their various relationships. But in the case of the Father and the Son, since the ousia is common and the properties are mutually interchangeable, no harm comes to the Nature.

How then is the Son in the Father without being destroyed, and how does the Father, dwelling in the Son, remain continually unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire compared to water is maintained in the relation of the Generate to the Ungenerate? Their definition also does not recognize communion existing between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistant, tending downward and heavy, while air has a nature made up of opposite attributes. White and black are similarly found in opposition among colors, and everyone agrees that a circle is not the same as a triangle, for each, according to the definition of its shape, is precisely what the other is not. But I cannot discover where he sees opposition in the case of God the Father and God the Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power, incorruptibility—all other attributes of exalted significance are similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense his strength in the other. For on the one hand the Father makes all things through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in himself, being the Power of the Father. What use, then, are fire and water for showing essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He also calls us rash for using the unity of nature and difference of persons in Peter and Paul as an example, and says we are guilty of gross recklessness if we apply our argument to the contemplation of objects of pure reason by using material examples. How fitting, indeed, that the corrector of our errors should reprove us for rashness in interpreting the Divine Nature through material illustrations! Why then, deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal, air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed toward its goal, are you so keen-sighted in every direction when presenting this argument against your adversaries, that you do not see in yourself the very faults you blame in those you are accusing? Or should we grant concessions to you when you establish the diversity of ousia by material means, while we ourselves are rejected when we point out the kindred character of the Nature through examples within our grasp?

How then is the Son in the Father without being destroyed, and how does the Father, coming to be in the Son, remain continually unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire, as compared with water, is maintained in the relation of the Generate to the Ungenerate? Nor does their definition regard communion as existing between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistent, of downward tendency and heavy, while air has a nature made up of the contrary attributes. So white and black are found in opposition among colors, and men are agreed that the circle is not the same with the triangle, for each, according to the definition of its figure, is precisely that which the other is not. But I am unable to discover where he sees the opposition in the case of God the Father and God the Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power, incorruptibility — all other attributes of exalted significance are similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense His strength in the other; for on the one hand the Father makes all things through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in Himself, being the Power of the Father. Of what avail, then, are fire and water to show essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He calls us, moreover, rash for instancing the unity of nature and difference of persons of Peter and Paul, and says we are guilty of gross recklessness, if we apply our argument to the contemplation of the objects of pure reason by the aid of material examples. Fitly, fitly indeed, does the corrector of our errors reprove us for rashness in interpreting the Divine Nature by material illustrations! Why then, deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal, air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed to its aim, are you so keen-sighted in all directions in your promulgation of this argument, that your adversaries cannot lay hold of, that you do not see in yourself the faults you blame in those you are accusing? Or are we to make concessions to you when you are establishing the diversity of essence by material aid, and to be ourselves rejected when we point out the kindred character of the Nature by means of examples within our compass?

Peter and Paul, he says, were named by men, and that's why their names could be changed. But what existing thing hasn't been named by men? I call you as a witness for my argument. If you make the ability to change names a sign that things were named by men, you will surely have to admit that every name has been given to things by us, since the same names for objects haven't been used universally. Just as Paul was once Saul and Peter was formerly Simon, so too earth and sky and air and sea and all parts of creation haven't been named the same way by everyone, but are named one way by the Hebrews, another way by us, and are called by different names by every nation. If Eunomius' argument is valid when he claims that Peter and Paul were renamed because their names had been given by men, then our teaching will surely be valid too, since it starts from similar premises and says that all things are named by us because their names vary according to different nations. Now if this applies to all things, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are no exceptions, for even they are among the things whose names change. When we gather the concept of any subject that arises in us into the form of a name, we express our concept through words that vary at different times, not making but signifying the thing by the name we give it. The things themselves remain as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought through whatever words are available. Just as Peter's ousia wasn't changed when his name changed, so no other thing we contemplate is changed through the changing of names. For this reason we say that the term Ungenerate was applied by us to the true and first Father who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result regarding the signifying of the Subject if we acknowledged the same concept under another name. It's permissible, instead of speaking of him as Ungenerate, to call him the First Cause or Father of the Only-begotten, or to speak of him as existing without cause, and many such names which lead to the same thought. So Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very arguments in which he complains against us, because we know no name that signifies the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of its existence, while we assert that a name powerful enough to encompass the unspeakable and infinite Nature either doesn't exist at all or at least is unknown to us. Let him then stop using his customary fables and show us the names that signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the divergence of their names. But as long as Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses weren't capable of knowing the Name, and that no one has seen God at any time, and that no one has seen him nor can see him, and that the light around him is unapproachable, and there is no end to his greatness—as long as we say and believe these things, an argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature through the significance of names is like someone who thinks he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand. Just as the hollow of one's hand compares to the whole deep, so is all the power of language compared to that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.

But Peter and Paul, he says, were named by men, and hence it comes that it is possible in their case to change the appellations. Why, what existing thing has not been named by men? I call you to testify on behalf of my argument. For if you make change of names a sign of things having been named by men, you will thereby surely allow that every name has been imposed upon things by us, since the same appellations of objects have not obtained universally. For as in the case of Paul who was once Saul, and of Peter who was formerly Simon, so earth and sky and air and sea and all the parts of the creation have not been named alike by all, but are named in one way by the Hebrews, and in another way by us, and are denoted by every nation by different names. If then Eunomius' argument is valid when he maintains that it was for this reason, to wit, that their names had been imposed by men, that Peter and Paul were named afresh, our teaching will surely be valid also, starting as it does from like premises, which says that all things are named by us, on the ground that their appellations vary according to the distinctions of nations. Now if all things are so, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are not exceptions, for even they are among the things that change their name. For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the conception of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by words that vary at different times, not making, but signifying, the thing by the name we give it. For the things remain in themselves as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought by such words as are available. And just as the essence of Peter was not changed with the change of his name, so neither is any other of the things we contemplate changed in the process of mutation of names. And for this reason we say that the term Ungenerate was applied by us to the true and first Father Who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result as regards the signifying of the Subject, if we were to acknowledge the same concept under another name. For it is allowable instead of speaking of Him as Ungenerate, to call Him the First Cause or Father of the Only-begotten, or to speak of Him as existing without cause, and many such appellations which lead to the same thought; so that Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very arguments in which he makes complaint against us, because we know no name significant of the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of Its existence, while we assert that an appellation of such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to us. Let him then leave his accustomed language of fable, and show us the names which signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the divergence of their names. But so long as the saying of the Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses were not capable of the knowledge of the Name, and that no man has seen God at any time, and that no man has seen Him, nor can see 1 Timothy 6:16, and that the light around Him is unapproachable 1 Timothy 6:16, and there is no end of His greatness — so long as we say and believe these things, how like is an argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature, by means of the significance of names, to one who thinks that he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand! For as the hollow of one's hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of language in comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.

Now in saying these things, we do not intend to deny that the Father exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to agree that the Only-begotten God is generated—on the contrary, the latter has been generated, the former has not been generated. But we do not learn what He is in His own physis (nature)—the one who exists apart from generation and the one who is believed to have been generated—from the signification of having been generated and not having been generated. For when we say this person was generated (or was not generated), we receive a twofold thought: our attention is directed to the subject by the demonstrative part of the phrase, and we learn what is contemplated in the subject by the words "was generated" or "was not generated." It is one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we contemplate in that which is. Moreover, the word "is" is surely understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine physis—such as just, incorruptible, immortal, and ungenerate, and whatever else is said of Him. Even if this word does not happen to occur in the phrase, the thought of both the speaker and the hearer surely makes the name attach to "is," so that if this word were not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David says, "God, a righteous judge, strong and patient," if "is" were not understood with each of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon. But when "is" is understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be effective, being contemplated in reference to that which is. So then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by "is" we carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action. Likewise, as a result of saying, "He is generated" (or "ungenerate"), we divide our thought into a double conception: by "is" we understand the subject, and by "generated" or "ungenerate" we apprehend that which belongs to the subject. So then, when we are taught by David that God is a judge or patient, we do not learn the Divine ousia (essence), but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it. Similarly, in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the physis of that Being not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual physis. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Being—good, ungenerate, incorruptible—but to each of these, "is" does not fail to be supplied. Anyone, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him and were silent as to that ousia which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition of Being is one thing, and that of being in some particular way is another, and this has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to us the names of the ousia, and then divide the physis by the divergence of the appellations. So long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names have no separate existence.

Now in saying these things we do not intend to deny that the Father exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to agree to the statement that the Only-begotten God is generated — on the contrary the latter has been generated, the former has not been generated. But what He is, in His own Nature, Who exists apart from generation, and what He is, Who is believed to have been generated, we do not learn from the signification of having been generated, and not having been generated. For when we say this person was generated (or was not generated), we are impressed with a two-fold thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative part of the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the subject by the words was generated or was not generated, — as it is one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we contemplate in that which is. But, moreover, the word is is surely understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine Nature, — as just, incorruptible, immortal, and ungenerate, and whatever else is said of Him; even if this word does not happen to occur in the phrase, yet the thought both of the speaker and the hearer surely makes the name attach to is, so that if this word were not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David says, God, a righteous judge, strong and patient, if is were not understood with each of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when is is understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be of force, being contemplated in reference to that which is. As, then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by the is carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action, so also as a result of saying, He is generated (or ungenerate), we divide our thought into a double conception, by is understanding the subject, and by generated, or ungenerate, apprehending that which belongs to the subject. As, then, when we are taught by David that God is a judge, or patient, we do not learn the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it, so in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the Nature of that Being, not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual Nature. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Being — good, ungenerate, incorruptible, — but to each of these is does not fail to be supplied. Any one, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain, if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him, and were silent as to that essence which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition of Being is one thing, and that of being in some particular way is another; and this has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to us the names of the essence, and then divide the Nature by the divergence of the appellations;– so long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names have no separate existence.

Such then is Eunomius' stronger argument against the truth, while we pass over in silence many views that are found in this part of his work. For it seems right to me that those who run in this armed race against the enemies of the truth should arm themselves against those who are well defended by the appearance of falsehood, and not pollute their argument with ideas that are already dead and give off an offensive smell. His assumption that whatever things are united in the concept of their ousia must necessarily exist as bodies and be subject to corruption (for this is what he says in this part of his work), I will gladly pass by like some corpse-like stench, since I think every reasonable person will see how dead and rotten such an argument is. For who does not know that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one ousia underlies them all, and the consubstantial foundation in them is unrelated to bodily corruption? So that even children can plainly see the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they share the same ousia with one another, but because they possess a compound nature. The concept of compound nature is one thing, that of the common nature of their ousia is another, so that it is true to say corruptible bodies are of one ousia, but the reverse statement is not true at all if it is anything like: this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible, as is shown in the case of souls which have one ousia, while yet corruption does not attach to them by virtue of their shared ousia. And the explanation given about souls might properly be applied to every intellectual existence that we contemplate in creation. For the words Paul puts together do not signify, as Eunomius claims they do, some mutually different physeis of the supramundane powers. On the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument not diversities of physeis, but the varied characteristics of the operations of the heavenly host. For there are, he says, principalities, and thrones, and powers, and mights, and dominions. Now these names are such as to make it immediately clear to everyone that their meaning is arranged in regard to some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and to be the throne of someone—all these concepts would not be understood by anyone trained in argument to refer to diversities of ousia, since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of these names. So that anyone who says diversities of physis are signified by the names Paul lists deceives himself, understanding, as the Apostle says, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms, since the sense of the names clearly shows that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of ousiai.

Such then is Eunomius' stronger handle against the truth, while we pass by in silence many views which are to be found in this part of his composition; for it seems to me right that those who run in this armed race against the enemies of the truth should arm themselves against those who are fairly fenced about with the plausibility of falsehood, and not defile their argument with such conceptions as are already dead and of offensive odour. His supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their essence must needs exist corporeally and be joined to corruption (for this he says in this part of his work), I shall willingly pass by like some cadaverous odour, since I think every reasonable man will perceive how dead and corrupt such an argument is. For who knows not that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one essence underlies them all, and the consubstantial substratum in them is alien from bodily corruption? So that even children can plainly see the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they have the same essence one with another, but because of their possessing a compound nature. The idea of the compound nature is one, that of the common nature of their essence is another, so that it is true to say, corruptible bodies are of one essence, but the converse statement is not true at all, if it be anything like, this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible, as is shown in the case of the souls which have one essence, while yet corruption does not attach to them in virtue of the community of essence. And the account given of the souls might properly be applied to every intellectual existence which we contemplate in creation. For the words brought together by Paul do not signify, as Eunomius will have them do, some mutually divergent natures of the supra-mundane powers; on the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument, not diversities of natures, but the varied peculiarities of the operations of the heavenly host: for there are, he says, principalities, and thrones, and powers, and mights, and dominions. Now these names are such as to make it at once clear to every one that their significance is arranged in regard to some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and to be the throne of some one — all these conceptions would not be held by any one versed in argument to apply to diversities of essence, since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of the names: so that any one who says that diversities of nature are signified by the names rehearsed by Paul deceives himself, understanding, as the Apostle says, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms 1 Timothy 1:7, since the sense of the names clearly shows that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of essences.

I notice that while the demands of the subject forced me to follow this line of thinking, I have spent too much time on this passage. I must now return to the sequence of his complaints, so that we may answer every charge brought against us without leaving any out. First, I propose that we should examine his accusation that we claim an ordinary man accomplished the salvation of the world. Although we have already clarified this point to some extent in our previous investigations, we will deal with it again briefly, so that the minds of those judging us on this slanderous charge may be completely freed from misunderstanding. We are so far from attributing the cause of this great and indescribable grace to an ordinary man that even if anyone attributed such a great gift to Peter and Paul, or to an angel from heaven, we would say with Paul: let him be anathema. For Paul was not crucified for us, nor were we baptized into a human name. Surely our opponents' doctrine is not strengthened when we confess that Christ's saving power is greater than human nature—yet it may seem to be, because their goal is to maintain at all points the difference of the ousia of the Son from that of the Father. They try to demonstrate the dissimilarity of ousia not only by contrasting the Generated with the Ungenerate, but also by opposing the passible to the impassible. While this is more openly maintained in the later part of their argument, it is also clearly shown in their current discussion. For if he criticizes those who refer the Passion to the Human Nature, his intention is certainly to subject the Godhead Itself to the Passion. Since our understanding is twofold and allows for two interpretations—depending on whether we hold that the Divinity or the Humanity was in a condition of suffering—an attack on one of these views clearly supports the other. Accordingly, if they criticize those who regard the Passion as concerning the Man, they will clearly approve those who say that the Godhead of the Son was subject to passion, and the position these latter people maintain becomes an argument supporting their own absurd doctrine. For if, according to their statement, the Godhead of the Son suffers while that of the Father is preserved in absolute impassibility, then the impassible Nature is essentially different from that which admits passion. Since, therefore, the statement before us, though limited in number of words and thus short, provides principles and hypotheses for every kind of doctrinal error, it would seem right that our readers should require soundness in our reply rather than brevity. We, then, neither attribute our salvation to a man, nor admit that the incorruptible and Divine Nature is capable of suffering and mortality. But since we must certainly believe the Divine statements that declare to us that the Word who was in the beginning was God, and that afterward the Word made flesh was seen on earth and lived among men, we accept in our creed those concepts that agree with the Divine statements. For when we hear that He is Light, and Power, and Righteousness, and Life, and Truth, and that all things were made by Him, we consider all these and similar statements as things to be believed, referring them to God the Word. But when we hear of pain, of sleep, of need, of trouble, of bonds, of nails, of the spear, of blood, of wounds, of burial, of the tomb, and all else of this kind, even if they are somewhat opposed to what has previously been stated, we nonetheless admit them as things to be believed and true, understanding them with regard to the flesh, which we receive by faith as joined with the Word. For just as it is not possible to contemplate the distinctive attributes of the flesh as existing in the Word who was in the beginning, so also on the other hand we may not conceive those attributes that are proper to the Godhead as existing in the physis of the flesh. Therefore, since the Gospel's teaching about our Lord is mixed, partly consisting of lofty and Divine ideas and partly of those that are lowly and human, we assign each particular phrase accordingly to one or the other of these Natures that we understand in the mystery—what is human to the Humanity, what is lofty to the Godhead. We say that, as God, the Son is certainly impassible and incapable of corruption, and whatever suffering is asserted about Him in the Gospel, He certainly accomplished by means of His Human Nature which admitted such suffering. For truly the Godhead accomplishes the salvation of the world by means of that body which surrounded It, in such a way that the suffering belonged to the body, but the operation belonged to God. Even if some twist the Apostle's words to support the opposite doctrine—"God spared not His own Son" and "God sent His own Son" and other similar phrases that seem to refer the Passion to the Divine Nature rather than to the Humanity—we will nonetheless refuse to abandon sound doctrine, seeing that Paul himself declares the mystery of this matter more clearly to us. For he everywhere attributes the dispensation of the Passion to the Human element in Christ, when he says "for since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead," and "God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin in the flesh" (for he says "in the flesh," not in the Godhead); and "He was crucified through weakness" (where by weakness he means the flesh), "yet lives by power" (while he indicates the Divine Nature by power); and "He died unto sin" (that is, with regard to the body), "but lives unto God" (that is, with regard to the Godhead, so that by these words it is established that while the Man tasted death, the immortal Nature did not admit the suffering of death); and again, "He made Him to be sin for us, Who knew no sin," once more giving the name of sin to the flesh.

But I perceive that while the necessities of the subject compelled me to follow this line of thought, I have lingered too long over this passage. I must now resume the train of his complaints, that we may pass by none of the charges brought against us without an answer. And first I propose that we should examine this point, that he charges us with asserting that an ordinary man has wrought the salvation of the world. For although this point has been to some extent already cleared up by the investigations we have made, we shall yet briefly deal with it once more, that the mind of those who are acting as our judges on this slanderous accusation may be entirely freed from misapprehension. So far are we from referring to an ordinary man the cause of this great and unspeakable grace, that even if any should refer so great a boon to Peter and Paul, or to an angel from heaven, we should say with Paul, let him be anathema. For Paul was not crucified for us, nor were we baptized into a human name. 1 Corinthians 1:13 Surely the doctrine which our adversaries oppose to the truth is not thereby strengthened when we confess that the saving power of Christ is more potent than human nature:– yet it may seem to be so, for their aim is to maintain at all points the difference of the essence of the Son from that of the Father, and they strive to show the dissimilarity of essence not only by the contrast of the Generated with the Ungenerate, but also by the opposition of the passible to the impassible. And while this is more openly maintained in the last part of their argument, it is also clearly shown in their present discourse. For if he finds fault with those who refer the Passion to the Human Nature, his intention is certainly to subject to the Passion the Godhead Itself. For our conception being twofold, and admitting of two developments, accordingly as the Divinity or the Humanity is held to have been in a condition of suffering, an attack on one of these views is clearly a maintaining of the other. Accordingly, if they find fault with those who look upon the Passion as concerning the Man, they will clearly approve those who say that the Godhead of the Son was subject to passion, and the position which these last maintain becomes an argument in favour of their own absurd doctrine. For if, according to their statement, the Godhead of the Son suffers, while that of the Father is preserved in absolute impassibility, then the impassible Nature is essentially different from that which admits passion. Seeing, therefore, that the dictum before us, though, so far as it is limited by number of words, it is a short one, yet affords principles and hypotheses for every kind of doctrinal pravity, it would seem right that our readers should require in our reply not so much brevity as soundness. We, then, neither attribute our own salvation to a man, nor admit that the incorruptible and Divine Nature is capable of suffering and mortality: but since we must assuredly believe the Divine utterances which declare to us that the Word that was in the beginning was God, and that afterward the Word made flesh was seen upon the earth and conversed with men, we admit in our creed those conceptions which are consonant with the Divine utterance. For when we hear that He is Light, and Power, and Righteousness, and Life, and Truth, and that by Him all things were made, we account all these and such-like statements as things to be believed, referring them to God the Word: but when we hear of pain, of slumber, of need, of trouble, of bonds, of nails, of the spear, of blood, of wounds, of burial, of the sepulchre, and all else of this kind, even if they are somewhat opposed to what has previously been stated, we none the less admit them to be things to be believed, and true, having regard to the flesh; which we receive by faith as conjoined with the Word. For as it is not possible to contemplate the peculiar attributes of the flesh as existing in the Word that was in the beginning, so also on the other hand we may not conceive those which are proper to the Godhead as existing in the nature of the flesh. As, therefore, the teaching of the Gospel concerning our Lord is mingled, partly of lofty and Divine ideas, partly of those which are lowly and human, we assign every particular phrase accordingly to one or other of these Natures which we conceive in the mystery, that which is human to the Humanity, that which is lofty to the Godhead, and say that, as God, the Son is certainly impassible and incapable of corruption: and whatever suffering is asserted concerning Him in the Gospel, He assuredly wrought by means of His Human Nature which admitted of such suffering. For verily the Godhead works the salvation of the world by means of that body which encompassed It, in such wise that the suffering was of the body, but the operation was of God; and even if some wrest to the support of the opposite doctrine the words of the Apostle, God spared not His own Son, Romans 8:32 and, God sent His own Son, and other similar phrases which seem to refer, in the matter of the Passion, to the Divine Nature, and not to the Humanity, we shall none the less refuse to abandon sound doctrine, seeing that Paul himself declares to us more clearly the mystery of this subject. For he everywhere attributes to the Human element in Christ the dispensation of the Passion, when he says, for since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead 1 Corinthians 15:21, and, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin in the flesh (for he says, in the flesh, not in the Godhead); and He was crucified through weakness (where by weakness he means the flesh), yet lives by power 2 Corinthians 13:4 (while he indicates by power the Divine Nature); and, He died unto sin (that is, with regard to the body), but lives unto God Romans 6:10 (that is, with regard to the Godhead, so that by these words it is established that, while the Man tasted death, the immortal Nature did not admit the suffering of death); and again; He made Him to be sin for us, Who knew no sin 2 Corinthians 5:21, giving once more the name of sin to the flesh.

Although we make these remarks in passing, this side point may be just as important as the main question we're dealing with. When St. Peter says "He made Him Lord and Christ," and when the Apostle Paul tells the Hebrews that He made Him a priest, Eunomius seizes on the word "made" as if it applies to His existence before time, and thinks this proves his teaching that the Lord is a created thing. Let him now listen to Paul when he says, "He made Him to be sin for us, Who knew not sin." If Eunomius applies the word "made," which is used about the Lord in the passages from the Epistle to the Hebrews and from Peter's words, to the pre-temporal existence, he could just as easily apply the word in the passage that says God made Him to be sin to the first existence of His essence (ousia), and try to show by this—as with his other proof texts—that He was made, so that the word "made" refers to the ousia, acting consistently with himself, and to detect sin in that ousia. But if he recoils from this because of its obvious absurdity, and argues that by saying "He made Him to be sin," the Apostle is indicating the plan of salvation in the last times, let him persuade himself by the same reasoning that the word "made" refers to that plan of salvation in the other passages as well.

And although we make these remarks in passing, the parenthetic addition seems, perhaps, not less important than the main question before us. For since, when St. Peter says, He made Him Lord and Christ Acts 2:36, and again, when the Apostle Paul says to the Hebrews that He made Him a priest, Eunomius catches at the word made as being applicable to His pre-temporal existence, and thinks thereby to establish his doctrine that the Lord is a thing made, let him now listen to Paul when he says, He made Him to be sin for us, Who knew not sin 2 Corinthians 5:21. If he refers the word made, which is used of the Lord in the passages from the Epistle to the Hebrews, and from the words of Peter, to the pretemporal idea, he might fairly refer the word in that passage which says that God made Him to be sin, to the first existence of His essence, and try to show by this, as in the case of his other testimonies, that he was made, so as to refer the word made to the essence, acting consistently with himself, and to discern sin in that essence. But if he shrinks from this by reason of its manifest absurdity, and argues that, by saying, He made Him to be sin, the Apostle indicates the dispensation of the last times, let him persuade himself by the same train of reasoning that the word made refers to that dispensation in the other passages also.

Let us return to the point where we digressed. We could gather from Scripture countless other passages besides those already quoted that relate to this matter. No one should think that the divine Apostle contradicts himself and provides ammunition for both sides of those who argue about these doctrines. Careful examination will find that his argument is accurately directed toward one aim, and he is not inconsistent in his views. While he everywhere proclaims the combination of the human with the divine, he nonetheless discerns the proper physis of each. This means that while human weakness is changed for the better through communion with the imperishable, the divine power is not degraded by its contact with the lowly form of nature. So when he says "He spared not His own Son," he contrasts the true Son with other sons—whether begotten, exalted, or adopted (those brought into being at His command)—marking the special character of His nature by adding "own." And to prevent anyone from connecting the suffering of the Cross with the imperishable nature, he gives a fairly clear correction of such an error when he calls Him mediator between God and men, and man, and God. From the fact that both are predicated of the one Being, the proper conception can be held concerning each nature: impassibility concerning the divine nature, and the dispensation of the Passion concerning the human nature. When his thought divides what was made one through love for humanity but is distinguished in concept, he uses the more exalted names when proclaiming the nature that transcends all intelligence, calling Him God over all, the great God, the power of God, and the wisdom of God, and the like. But when alluding to all the suffering that was necessarily assumed with our nature because of our weakness, he gives to the union of the natures that name which is derived from ours, and calls Him Man. He does not by this word place the one he is setting before us on the same level as the rest of nature, but rather protects orthodoxy regarding each nature. The human nature is glorified by His assumption of it, and the divine is not polluted by its condescension, but makes the human element subject to sufferings while working the resurrection of what suffered through its divine power. Thus the experience of death is not referred to the one who had communion in our passible nature because of the union with Him of the Man, while at the same time the exalted and divine names descend to the Man, so that He who was manifested on the Cross is called even the Lord of glory, since the majesty implied in these names is transmitted from the divine to the human by the mixing of its nature with the lowly nature. For this reason he describes Him in varied and different language: at one time as Him who came down from heaven, at another time as Him who was born of woman; as God from eternity and Man in the last days. Thus too the Only-begotten God is held to be impassible, and Christ to be capable of suffering. His discourse does not speak falsely in these opposing statements, as it adapts to each nature the terms that belong to it. If these are the doctrines we have learned from inspired teaching, how do we refer the cause of our salvation to an ordinary man? And if we declare that the word "made" used by the blessed Peter refers not to the pre-temporal existence but to the new dispensation of the Incarnation, what does this have to do with the charge against us? For this great Apostle says that what was seen in the form of the servant has been made, by being assumed, to be what He who assumed it was in His own nature. Moreover, in the Epistle to the Hebrews we may learn the same truth from Paul, when he says that Jesus was made an Apostle and High Priest by God, being faithful to him that made Him so. For in that passage too, in giving the name of High Priest to Him who made the priestly propitiation for our sins with His own blood, he does not by the word "made" declare the first existence of the Only-begotten, but says "made" with the intention of representing that grace which is commonly spoken of in connection with the appointment of priests. For Jesus, the great High Priest (as Zechariah says), who offered up his own lamb—that is, His own body—for the sin of the world, who, because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, Himself also in like manner took part with them in blood (not in that He was in the beginning, being the Word and God, and being in the form of God, and equal with God, but in that He emptied Himself in the form of the servant and offered an oblation and sacrifice for us)—He, I say, became a High Priest many generations later, after the order of Melchisedech. Surely a reader who has more than a casual acquaintance with the discourse to the Hebrews knows the mystery of this matter. As in that passage He is said to have been made Priest and Apostle, so here He is said to have been made Lord and Christ—the latter for the dispensation on our behalf, the former by the change and transformation of the human to the divine (for by "making" the Apostle means making anew). Thus is revealed the dishonesty of our adversaries, who insolently twist the words referring to the dispensation to apply them to the pretemporal existence. For we learn from the Apostle not to know Christ in the same manner now as before, as Paul says, "Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we Him no more," in the sense that the one knowledge reveals to us His temporary dispensation, the other His eternal existence. Our argument has made a substantial answer to his charges: that we neither hold two Christs nor two Lords, that we are not ashamed of the Cross, that we do not glorify a mere man as having suffered for the world, that we certainly do not think the word "made" refers to the formation of the essence. But with this being our view, our argument has considerable support from our accuser himself, where in the midst of his discourse he uses his tongue in a flourishing attack upon us and produces this sentence among others: "This, then, is the conflict that Basil wages against himself, and he clearly appears neither to have applied his own mind to the intention of the Apostles, nor to be able to preserve the sequence of his own arguments; for according to them he must, if he is conscious of their irreconcilable character, admit that the Word who was in the beginning and was God became Lord, or he fits together statements that are mutually conflicting." Why, this is actually our statement which Eunomius repeats, who says that the Word that was in the beginning and was God became Lord. For, being what He was—God, and Word, and Life, and Light, and Grace, and Truth, and Lord, and Christ, and every exalted and divine name—He did become, in the Man assumed by Him, who was none of these, all else which the Word was, and among the rest did become Lord and Christ, according to the teaching of Peter and according to the confession of Eunomius—not in the sense that the Godhead acquired anything by way of advancement, but (all exalted majesty being contemplated in the divine nature) He thus becomes Lord and Christ, not by arriving at any addition of grace in respect of His Godhead (for the nature of the Godhead is acknowledged to be lacking in no good), but by bringing the human nature to that participation in the Godhead which is signified by the terms Christ and Lord.

Let us, however, return to the point from which we digressed; for we might gather together from the same Scripture countless other passages, besides those quoted, which bear upon the matter. And let no one think that the divine Apostle is divided against himself in contradiction, and affords by his own utterances matter for their contentions on either side to those who dispute upon the doctrines. For careful examination would find that his argument is accurately directed to one aim; and he is not halting in his opinions: for while he everywhere proclaims the combination of the Human with the Divine, he none the less discerns in each its proper nature, in the sense that while the human weakness is changed for the better by its communion with the imperishable, the Divine power, on the other hand, is not abased by its contact with the lowly form of nature. When therefore he says, He spared not His own Son, he contrasts the true Son with the other sons, begotten, or exalted, or adopted (those, I mean, who were brought into being at His command), marking the specialty of nature by the addition of own. And, to the end that no one should connect the suffering of the Cross with the imperishable nature, he gives in other words a fairly distinct correction of such an error, when he calls Him mediator between God and men 1 Timothy 2:5 and man 1 Timothy 2:5, and God, that, from the fact that both are predicated of the one Being, the fit conception might be entertained concerning each Nature — concerning the Divine Nature, impassibility, concerning the Human Nature, the dispensation of the Passion. As his thought, then, divides that which in love to man was made one, but is distinguished in idea, he uses, when he is proclaiming that nature which transcends and surpasses all intelligence, the more exalted order of names, calling Him God over all Romans 9:5, the great God Titus 2:13, the power of God, and the wisdom of God 1 Corinthians 1:24, and the like; but when he is alluding to all that experience of suffering which, by reason of our weakness, was necessarily assumed with our nature, he gives to the union of the Natures that name which is derived from ours, and calls Him Man, not by this word placing Him Whom he is setting forth to us on a common level with the rest of nature, but so that orthodoxy is protected as regards each Nature, in the sense that the Human Nature is glorified by His assumption of it, and the Divine is not polluted by Its condescension, but makes the Human element subject to sufferings, while working, through Its Divine power, the resurrection of that which suffered. And thus the experience of death is not referred to Him Who had communion in our passible nature by reason of the union with Him of the Man, while at the same time the exalted and Divine names descend to the Man, so that He Who was manifested upon the Cross is called even the Lord of glory 1 Corinthians 2:8, since the majesty implied in these names is transmitted from the Divine to the Human by the commixture of Its Nature with that Nature which is lowly. For this cause he describes Him in varied and different language, at one time as Him Who came down from heaven, at another time as Him Who was born of woman, as God from eternity, and Man in the last days; thus too the Only-begotten God is held to be impassible, and Christ to be capable of suffering; nor does his discourse speak falsely in these opposing statements, as it adapts in its conceptions to each Nature the terms that belong to it. If then these are the doctrines which we have learned from inspired teaching, how do we refer the cause of our salvation to an ordinary man? And if we declare the word made employed by the blessed Peter to have regard not to the pre-temporal existence, but to the new dispensation of the Incarnation, what has this to do with the charge against us? For this great Apostle says that that which was seen in the form of the servant has been made, by being assumed, to be that which He Who assumed it was in His own Nature. Moreover, in the Epistle to the Hebrews we may learn the same truth from Paul, when he says that Jesus was made an Apostle and High Priest by God, being faithful to him that made Him so Hebrews 3:1-2. For in that passage too, in giving the name of High Priest to Him Who made with His own Blood the priestly propitiation for our sins, he does not by the word made declare the first existence of the Only-begotten, but says made with the intention of representing that grace which is commonly spoken of in connection with the appointment of priests. For Jesus, the great High Priest (as Zechariah says), Who offered up his own lamb, that is, His own Body, for the sin of the world; Who, by reason of the children that are partakers of flesh and blood, Himself also in like manner took part with them in blood (not in that He was in the beginning, being the Word and God, and being in the form of God, and equal with God, but in that He emptied Himself in the form of the servant, and offered an oblation and sacrifice for us), He, I say, became a High Priest many generations later, after the order of Melchisedech. Surely a reader who has more than a casual acquaintance with the discourse to the Hebrews knows the mystery of this matter. As, then, in that passage He is said to have been made Priest and Apostle, so here He is said to have been made Lord and Christ — the latter for the dispensation on our behalf, the former by the change and transformation of the Human to the Divine (for by making the Apostle means making anew). Thus is manifest the knavery of our adversaries, who insolently wrest the words referring to the dispensation to apply them to the pretemporal existence. For we learn from the Apostle not to know Christ in the same manner now as before, as Paul thus speaks, Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we Him no more, in the sense that the one knowledge manifests to us His temporary dispensation, the other His eternal existence. Thus our discourse has made no inconsiderable answer to his charges:– that we neither hold two Christs nor two Lords, that we are not ashamed of the Cross, that we do not glorify a mere man as having suffered for the world, that we assuredly do not think that the word made refers to the formation of the essence. But, such being our view, our argument has no small support from our accuser himself, where in the midst of his discourse he employs his tongue in a flourishing onslaught upon us, and produces this sentence among others: This, then, is the conflict that Basil wages against himself, and he clearly appears neither to have 'applied his own mind to the intention of the Apostles,' nor to be able to preserve the sequence of his own arguments; for according to them he must, if he is conscious of their irreconcilable character, admit that the Word Who was in the beginning and was God became Lord, or he fits together statements that are mutually conflicting. Why, this is actually our statement which Eunomius repeats, who says that the Word that was in the beginning and was God became Lord. For, being what He was, God, and Word, and Life, and Light, and Grace, and Truth, and Lord, and Christ, and every name exalted and Divine, He did become, in the Man assumed by Him, Who was none of these, all else which the Word was and among the rest did become Lord and Christ, according to the teaching of Peter, and according to the confession of Eunomius;– not in the sense that the Godhead acquired anything by way of advancement, but (all exalted majesty being contemplated in the Divine Nature) He thus becomes Lord and Christ, not by arriving at any addition of grace in respect of His Godhead (for the Nature of the Godhead is acknowledged to be lacking in no good), but by bringing the Human Nature to that participation in the Godhead which is signified by the terms Christ and Lord.

Sufficient defense has been offered on these points. As for what Eunomius says by way of slander against our doctrine—that Christ was emptied to become Himself—there has been enough discussion above, where he has been shown to be attributing his own blasphemy to our doctrine. For it is not the one who confesses that the immutable Nature put on the created and perishable who speaks of a transition from like to like, but rather the one who conceives that there is no change from the majesty of Nature to what is more lowly. If, as their doctrine claims, He is created and man is also created, the wonder of the doctrine disappears and there is nothing marvelous in what is alleged, since created nature simply comes to be in itself. But we who have learned from prophecy about the change of the right hand of the Most High—and by the Right Hand of the Father we understand that Power of God which made all things, which is the Lord (not in the sense of depending upon Him as a part depends upon a whole, but as being truly from Him yet contemplated in individual existence)—say this: neither does the Right Hand differ from Him whose Right Hand it is regarding the concept of its Nature, nor can any other change in it be spoken of besides the dispensation of the Flesh. For truly the Right Hand of God was God Himself, manifested in the flesh, seen through that same flesh by those whose sight was clear. As He did the work of the Father, being both in fact and in thought the Right Hand of God, yet being changed with respect to the veil of the flesh by which He was surrounded, He appeared different from what He was by Nature when contemplated. Therefore He says to Philip, who was gazing only at what was changed: Look through what is changed to what is unchangeable, and if you see this, you have seen the Father Himself whom you seek to see. For he who has seen Me—not Him who appears in a state of change, but My very self, who am in the Father—will have seen the Father Himself in whom I am, because the very same character of Godhead is beheld in both. If, then, we believe that the immortal, impassible, and uncreated Nature came to be in the passible nature of the creature, and conceive the change to consist in this, on what grounds are we charged with saying that He was emptied to become Himself by those who keep repeating their own statements about our doctrines? For the participation of the created with the created is no change of the Right Hand. To say that the Right Hand of the uncreated Nature is created belongs to Eunomius alone and to those who adopt such opinions as he holds. For the person with an eye that looks on the truth will discern the Right Hand of the Highest to be such as he sees the Highest to be—Uncreated of Uncreated, Good of Good, Eternal of Eternal, without prejudice to its eternity by its being in the Father by way of generation. Thus our accuser has unknowingly been using against us reproaches that properly fall upon himself.

Sufficient defense has been offered on these points, and as for that which Eunomius says by way of calumny against our doctrine, that Christ was emptied to become Himself there has been sufficient discussion in what has been said above, where he has been shown to be attributing to our doctrine his own blasphemy. For it is not one who confesses that the immutable Nature has put on the created and perishable, who speaks of the transition from like to like, but one who conceives that there is no change from the majesty of Nature to that which is more lowly. For if, as their doctrine asserts, He is created, and man is created also, the wonder of the doctrine disappears, and there is nothing marvellous in what is alleged, since the created nature comes to be in itself. But we who have learned from prophecy of the change of the right hand of the Most High, — and by the Right Hand of the Father we understand that Power of God, which made all things, which is the Lord (not in the sense of depending upon Him as a part upon a whole, but as being indeed from Him, and yet contemplated in individual existence) — say thus: that neither does the Right Hand vary from Him Whose Right Hand It is, in regard to the idea of Its Nature, nor can any other change in It be spoken of besides the dispensation of the Flesh. For verily the Right Hand of God was God Himself; manifested in the flesh, seen through that same flesh by those whose sight was clear; as He did the work of the Father, being, both in fact and in thought, the Right Hand of God, yet being changed, in respect of the veil of the flesh by which He was surrounded, as regarded that which was seen, from that which He was by Nature, as a subject of contemplation. Therefore He says to Philip, who was gazing only at that which was changed, Look through that which is changed to that which is unchangeable, and if you see this, you have seen that Father Himself, Whom you seek to see; for he that has seen Me — not Him Who appears in a state of change, but My very self, Who am in the Father — will have seen that Father Himself in Whom I am, because the very same character of Godhead is beheld in both John 14:9-10. If, then, we believe that the immortal and impassible and uncreated Nature came to be in the passible Nature of the creature, and conceive the change to consist in this, on what grounds are we charged with saying that He was emptied to become Himself, by those who keep prating their own statements about our doctrines? For the participation of the created with the created is no change of the Right Hand. To say that the Right Hand of the uncreated Nature is created belongs to Eunomius alone, and to those who adopt such opinions as he holds. For the man with an eye that looks on the truth will discern the Right Hand of the Highest to be such as he sees the Highest to be — Uncreated of Uncreated, Good of Good, Eternal of Eternal without prejudice to Its eternity by Its being in the Father by way of generation. Thus our accuser has unawares been employing against us reproaches that properly fall upon himself.

Regarding those who are troubled by the idea of suffering and therefore argue that the Father's and Son's essences are different—claiming that the Father's exalted nature does not permit suffering, while the Son, because of some defect or divergence, condescended to share in suffering—I want to add these points to what has already been said: Nothing is truly a passion unless it tends toward sin, nor should we strictly call the necessary processes of nature by the name of passion, as our composite nature follows its course in a kind of orderly sequence. The mutual joining of different elements in the formation of our body is a harmonious combination of several dissimilar parts. When the time comes and the bond holding these elements together is loosened, the combined nature dissolves back into the elements from which it was composed. This is actually a work of nature rather than a passion. We use the name passion only for what is opposed to the virtuous impassible state, and we believe that the One who granted us salvation was always free from this, being in all points tempted like we are yet without sin (Hebrews 4:15). He did not share in true passion, which is a diseased condition of the will, for it says He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth (1 Peter 2:22). But He did share in those distinctive attributes of our nature that, through a kind of customary misuse of terms, are called by the same name of passion—these include birth, nourishment, growth, sleep, toil, and all those natural dispositions that the soul experiences regarding bodily inconveniences: the desire for what is lacking when that longing passes from the body to the soul, the sense of pain, the dread of death, and everything similar, except those things that, if followed, lead to sin. When we perceive His power extending through all things in heaven, air, earth, and sea—whatever exists in heaven and whatever exists beneath the earth—we believe that He is universally present, yet we do not say that He is any of those things in which He exists (for He is not the Heaven, which He has marked out with His enfolding span, nor is He the earth, which He upholds, nor is He the water, which encompasses the liquid nature). Similarly, we do not say that in passing through those sufferings of the flesh He was subject to passion. Rather, just as we say that He is the cause of all things that exist, that He holds the universe in His grasp, that He directs everything in motion and keeps everything stationary upon a settled foundation by the unspeakable power of His own majesty, so we say that He was born among us to cure the disease of sin, adapting the exercise of His healing power to correspond to the suffering and applying the healing in the way He knew would be good for that part of creation which He knew was in weakness. Since it was necessary for Him to heal the sufferings by touch, we say that He healed them in this way. Yet He is not, because He is the Healer of our weakness, to be considered passible on this account. Even in the case of human beings, ordinary usage does not allow us to say such a thing. We do not say that someone who touches a sick person to heal them is himself a partaker of the sickness, but rather that he gives the sick person the gift of a return to health without sharing in the sickness, for the suffering does not touch him—he touches the disease. Now if someone who by his skill does good for people's bodies is not called dull or feeble but is called a lover of humanity and a benefactor and the like, why do they slander the dispensation toward us as being mean and inglorious, and use it to argue that the ousia of the Son is divergent in an inferior way, on the grounds that the nature of the Father is superior to sufferings while that of the Son is not pure from passion? If the aim of the dispensation of the Incarnation was not that the Son should be subject to suffering but that He should be manifested as a lover of humanity, while the Father is also undoubtedly a lover of humanity, then if one simply considers the aim, the Son is in the same position as the Father. But if it was not the Father who accomplished the destruction of death, do not be surprised—for all judgment also He has committed to the Son, Himself judging no one. He does not do all things through the Son because He is unable either to save the lost or judge the sinner, but because He does these things too by His own Power, by which He works all things. Therefore those who were saved by the Son were saved by the Power of the Father, and those who are judged by Him undergo judgment by the Righteousness of God. For Christ, as the Apostle says, is the Righteousness of God (Romans 1:17), which is revealed by the Gospel. Whether you look at the world as a whole or at the parts of the world that make up that complete whole, all these are works of the Father in that they are works of His Power. Thus the word that says both that the Father made all things and that none of these things that exist came into being without the Son speaks truly on both points, for the operation of the Power relates to Him whose Power it is. Therefore, since the Son is the Power of the Father, all the works of the Son are works of the Father. That He entered upon the dispensation of the Passion not by weakness of nature but by the power of His will could be shown by countless Gospel passages. But since the matter is clear, I will pass over these so that my discourse will not be prolonged by dwelling on points that are already accepted. If what took place is evil, we must separate both the Father and the Son from that evil. But if the saving of those who were lost is good, and if what took place is not passion but love of humanity, why do you exclude from our thanksgiving for our salvation the Father, who by His own Power, which is Christ, accomplished freedom from death for humanity?

But with reference to those who stumble at the idea of passion, and on this ground maintain the diversity of the Essences — arguing that the Father, by reason of the exaltation of His Nature, does not admit passion, and that the Son on the other hand condescended, by reason of defect and divergence, to the partaking of His sufferings — I wish to add these remarks to what has been already said:– That nothing is truly passion which does not tend to sin, nor would one strictly call by the name of passion the necessary routine of nature, regarding the composite nature as it goes on its course in a kind of order and sequence. For the mutual concurrence of heterogeneous elements in the formation of our body is a kind of a combination harmoniously conjoined out of several dissimilar elements; but when, at the due time, the tie is loosed which bound together this concurrence of the elements, the combined nature is once more dissolved into the elements of which it was composed. This then is rather a work than a passion of the nature. For we give the name of passion only to that which is opposed to the virtuous unimpassioned state and of this we believe that He Who granted us salvation was at all times devoid, Who was in all points tempted like as we are yet without sin Hebrews 4:15. Of that, at least, which is truly passion, which is a diseased condition of the will, He was not a partaker; for it says He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth 1 Peter 2:22; but the peculiar attributes of our nature, which, by a kind of customary abuse of terms, are called by the same name of passion, — of these, we confess, the Lord did partake — of birth, nourishment, growth, of sleep and toil, and all those natural dispositions which the soul is wont to experience with regard to bodily inconveniences — the desire of that which is lacking, when the longing passes from the body to the soul, the sense of pain, the dread of death, and all the like, save only such as, if followed, lead to sin. As, then, when we perceive His power extending through all things in heaven, and air, and earth, and sea, whatever there is in heaven, whatever there is beneath the earth, we believe that He is universally present, and yet do not say that He is any of those things in which He is (for He is not the Heaven, Who has marked it out with His enfolding span, nor is He the earth, Who upholds the circle of the earth, nor yet is He the water, Who encompasses the liquid nature), so neither do we say that in passing through those sufferings of the flesh of which we speak He was subject to passion, but, as we say that He is the cause of all things that are, that He holds the universe in His grasp, that He directs all that is in motion and keeps upon a settled foundation all that is stationary, by the unspeakable power of His own majesty, so we say that He was born among us for the cure of the disease of sin, adapting the exercise of His healing power in a manner corresponding to the suffering, applying the healing in that way which He knew to be for the good of that part of the creation which He knew to be in infirmity. And as it was expedient that He should heal the sufferings by touch, we say that He so healed it; yet is He not, because He is the Healer of our infirmity, to be deemed on this account to have been Himself passible. For even in the case of men, ordinary use does not allow us to affirm such a thing. We do not say that one who touches a sick man to heal him is himself partaker of the infirmity, but we say that he does give the sick man the boon of a return to health, and does not partake of the infirmity: for the suffering does not touch him, it is he who touches the disease. Now if he who by his art works any good in men's bodies is not called dull or feeble, but is called a lover of men and a benefactor and the like, why do they slander the dispensation to usward as being mean and inglorious, and use it to maintain that the essence of the Son is divergent by way of inferiority, on the ground that the Nature of the Father is superior to sufferings, while that of the Son is not pure from passion? Why, if the aim of the dispensation of the Incarnation was not that the Son should be subject to suffering, but that He should be manifested as a lover of men, while the Father also is undoubtedly a lover of men, it follows that if one will but regard the aim, the Son is in the same case with the Father. But if it was not the Father Who wrought the destruction of death, marvel not — for all judgment also He has committed unto the Son, Himself judging no man; not doing all things by the Son for the reason that He is unable either to save the lost or judge the sinner, but because He does these things too by His own Power, by which He works all things. Then they who were saved by the Son were saved by the Power of the Father, and they who are judged by Him undergo judgment by the Righteousness of God. For Christ, as the Apostle says, is the Righteousness of God Romans 1:17, which is revealed by the Gospel; and whether you look at the world as a whole, or at the parts of the world which make up that complete whole, all these are works of the Father, in that they are works of His Power; and thus the word which says both that the Father made all things, and that none of these things that are came into being without the Son, speaks truly on both points; for the operation of the Power bears relation to Him Whose Power It is. Thus, since the Son is the Power of the Father, all the works of the Son are works of the Father. That He entered upon the dispensation of the Passion not by weakness of nature but by the power of His will, one might bring countless passages of the Gospel to show; but these, as the matter is clear, I will pretermit, that my discourse may not be prolonged by dwelling on points that are admitted. If, then, that which comes to pass is evil, we have to separate from that evil not the Father only, but the Son also; but if the saving of them that were lost is good, and if that which took place is not passion, but love of men, why do you alienate from our thanksgiving for our salvation the Father, Who by His own Power, which is Christ, wrought for men their freedom from death?

But we must return once more to our passionate writer and take up again his harsh attack against us. He complains that we deny the Essence of the Son has been made, claiming we contradict Peter's words, He made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified Acts 2:36. He is very forceful in his anger and insults on this matter, and he also maintains certain points by which he thinks he refutes our teaching. Let us examine, then, the strength of his arguments. Who, please tell me, you most reckless of men, he says, when he has the form of a servant, takes the form of a servant? No reasonable person, we will reply to him, would use such language, except someone completely alien to the hope of Christians. But you belong to this class, you who accuse us of recklessness because we do not admit the Creator is created. For if the Holy Spirit does not lie when He says through the prophet, 'All things serve You,' and the whole creation is in servitude, and the Son is, as you say, created, He is clearly a fellow-servant with all things, being degraded by His participation in creation to participate also in servitude. And Him Who is in servitude you will surely clothe with the servant's form, for you will not, of course, be ashamed of the appearance of servitude when you acknowledge that He is a servant by nature. Who now is it, I ask, my most sharp rhetorician, who transfers the Son from the servile form to another form of a servant? Is it the one who claims for Him uncreated being, and thereby proves that He is no servant, or you, rather, who continually cry that the Son is the servant of the Father, and was actually under His authority before He took the servant's form? I ask for no other judges; I leave the decision on these questions in your own hands. For I suppose that no one is so shameless in dealing with the truth as to oppose acknowledged facts out of sheer impudence. What we have said is clear to anyone: that by the distinctive attributes of servitude is marked that which is servile by nature, and to be created is an attribute proper to servitude. Thus one who asserts that He, being a servant, took upon Himself our form, is surely the one who transfers the Only-begotten from servitude to servitude.

But we must return once more to our vehement writer of speeches, and take up again that severe invective of his against ourselves. He makes it a complaint against us that we deny that the Essence of the Son has been made, as contradicting the words of Peter, He made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified Acts 2:36; and he is very forcible in his indignation and abuse upon this matter, and moreover maintains certain points by which he thinks that he refutes our doctrine. Let us see, then, the force of his attempts. Who, pray, you most reckless of men, he says, when he has the form of a servant, takes the form of a servant? No reasonable man, shall be our reply to him, would use language of this kind, save such as may be entirely alien from the hope of Christians. But to this class you belong, who charge us with recklessness because we do not admit the Creator to be created. For if the Holy Spirit does not lie, when He says by the prophet, 'All things serve You,' and the whole creation is in servitude, and the Son is, as you say, created, He is clearly a fellow-servant with all things, being degraded by His partaking of creation to partake also of servitude. And Him Who is in servitude you will surely invest with the servant's form: for you will not, of course, be ashamed of the aspect of servitude when you acknowledge that He is a servant by nature. Who now is it, I pray, my most keen rhetorician, who transfers the Son from the servile form to another form of a servant? He who claims for Him uncreated being, and thereby proves that He is no servant, or you, rather, who continually cry that the Son is the servant of the Father, and was actually under His dominion before He took the servant's form? I ask for no other judges; I leave the vote on these questions in your own hands. For I suppose that no one is so shameless in his dealings with the truth as to oppose acknowledged facts out of sheer impudence. What we have said is clear to any one, that by the peculiar attributes of servitude is marked that which is by nature servile, and to be created is an attribute proper to servitude. Thus one who asserts that He, being a servant, took upon Him our form, is surely the man who transfers the Only-begotten from servitude to servitude.

However, he tries to fight against our words and says a little further on (for I will pass over for now his intermediate remarks, since they have been more or less fully discussed in my previous arguments), when he charges us with being bold in saying or thinking things beyond comprehension and calls us most miserable—he adds, I say, this: For if the blessed Peter is not speaking of the Word Who was in the beginning and was God, but of Him Who was seen and Who emptied Himself, as Basil says, and if the man who was seen emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and He Who emptied Himself to take the form of a servant emptied Himself to come into being as man, then the man who was seen emptied himself to come into being as man. It may be that my readers' judgment has immediately detected from the above citation both the dishonesty and the foolishness of the argument he maintains. Yet a brief refutation of what he says shall be added on our side, not so much to overthrow his blundering sophism, which is indeed overthrown by itself for those who have ears to hear, as to avoid the appearance of passing over his allegation without discussion under the pretense of contempt for the worthlessness of his argument. Let us accordingly look at the point this way. What are the Apostle's words? Be it known, he says, that God made Him Lord and Christ. Then, as though someone had asked him on whom such grace was bestowed, he points as it were with his finger to the subject, saying, this Jesus, Whom you crucified. What does Basil say about this? That the demonstrative word declares that the person who was made Christ was the one who had been crucified by the hearers—for he says, you crucified, and it was likely that those who had demanded the murder done upon Him were hearers of the speech, for the time from the crucifixion to Peter's discourse was not long. What, then, does Eunomius advance in answer to this? If the blessed Peter is not speaking of the Word Who was in the beginning and was God, but of Him Who was seen and Who emptied Himself, as Basil says, and if the man who was seen emptied himself to take the form of a servant—Hold on! Who says this, that the man who was seen emptied himself again to take the form of a servant? Or who maintains that the suffering of the Cross took place before the manifestation in the flesh? The Cross did not precede the body, nor the body the form of the servant. But God is manifested in the flesh, while the flesh that displayed God in itself, after having by itself fulfilled the great mystery of the Death, is transformed by commixture to that which is exalted and Divine, becoming Christ and Lord, being transferred and changed to that which He was, Who manifested Himself in that flesh. But if we should say this, our champion of the truth maintains once more that we say that He Who was shown upon the Cross emptied Himself to become another man, putting his sophism together as follows in its wording: If, he says, the man who was seen emptied himself to take the form of a servant, and He Who emptied Himself to take the form of a servant emptied Himself to come into being as man, then the man who was seen emptied himself to come into being as man.

He tries, however, to fight against our words, and says, a little further on (for I will pass over at present his intermediate remarks, as they have been more or less fully discussed in my previous arguments), when he charges us with being bold in saying or thinking things uncontrivable, and calls us most miserable, — he adds, I say, this:– For if it is not of the Word Who was in the beginning and was God that the blessed Peter speaks, but of Him Who was 'seen,' and Who 'emptied Himself,' as Basil says, and if the man Who was 'seen' 'emptied Himself' to take 'the form of a servant,' and He Who 'emptied Himself' to take the form of a servant,' 'emptied Himself' to come into being as man, then the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself,' to come into being as man. It may be that the judgment of my readers has immediately detected from the above citation the knavery, and, at the same time, the folly of the argument he maintains: yet a brief refutation of what he says shall be subjoined on our side, not so much to overthrow his blundering sophism, which indeed is overthrown by itself for those who have ears to hear, as to avoid the appearance of passing his allegation by without discussion, under the pretence of contempt for the worthlessness of his argument. Let us accordingly look at the point in this way. What are the Apostle's words? Be it known, he says, that God made Him Lord and Christ Acts 2:36. Then, as though some one had asked him on whom such a grace was bestowed, he points as it were with his finger to the subject, saying, this Jesus, Whom you crucified. What does Basil say upon this? That the demonstrative word declares that that person was made Christ, Who had been crucified by the hearers — for he says, you crucified, and it was likely that those who had demanded the murder that was done upon Him were hearers of the speech; for the time from the crucifixion to the discourse of Peter was not long. What, then, does Eunomius advance in answer to this? If it is not of the Word Who was in the beginning and was God that the blessed Peter speaks, but of Him Who was 'seen,' and Who 'emptied Himself,' as Basil says, and if the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself' to take 'the form of a servant' — Hold! Who says this, that the man who was seen emptied himself again to take the form of a servant? Or who maintains that the suffering of the Cross took place before the manifestation in the flesh? The Cross did not precede the body, nor the body the form of the servant. But God is manifested in the flesh, while the flesh that displayed God in itself, after having by itself fulfilled the great mystery of the Death, is transformed by commixture to that which is exalted and Divine, becoming Christ and Lord, being transferred and changed to that which He was, Who manifested Himself in that flesh. But if we should say this, our champion of the truth maintains once more that we say that He Who was shown upon the Cross emptied Himself to become another man, putting his sophism together as follows in its wording:– If, quoth he, the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself' to take the 'form of a servant,' and He Who 'emptied Himself' to take the 'form of a servant,' 'emptied Himself' to come into being as man, then the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself' to come into being as man.

How well he remembers the task before him! How much to the point is the conclusion of his argument! Basil declares that the Apostle said that the man who was seen was made Christ and Lord, and this clear and quick-witted overturner of his statements says, "If Peter does not say that the ousia of Him Who was in the beginning was made, the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself' to take the 'form of a servant,' and He Who 'emptied Himself' to take the 'form of a servant' emptied Himself to become man." We are conquered, Eunomius, by this invincible wisdom! The fact that the Apostle's discourse refers to Him Who was crucified through weakness is supposedly powerfully disproved when we learn that if we believe this to be so, the man who was seen again becomes another, emptying Himself for another coming into being of man. Will you never stop mocking what should be safe from such attacks? Will you not be ashamed at destroying by such ridiculous sophisms the reverence that surrounds the Divine mysteries? Will you not turn now, if never before, to understand that the Only-begotten God, Who is in the bosom of the Father, being Word, and King, and Lord, and all that is exalted in word and thought, does not need to become anything that is good, seeing that He is Himself the fullness of all good things? What then is that, by changing into which He becomes what He was not before? Well, just as He Who knew no sin becomes sin, that He may take away the sin of the world, so on the other hand the flesh which received the Lord becomes Christ and Lord, being transformed by the commixture into that which it was not by physis: by this we learn that neither would God have been manifested in the flesh, had not the Word been made flesh, nor would the human flesh that surrounded Him have been transformed to what is Divine, had not that which was apparent to the senses become Christ and Lord. But they treat the simplicity of what we preach with contempt, who use their syllogisms to trample on the being of God, and desire to show that He Who by creation brought into being all things that exist, is Himself a part of creation, and twist, to help them in such an effort to establish their blasphemy, the words of Peter, who said to the Jews, "Be it known to all the house of Israel that God made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified." This is the proof they present for the statement that the ousia of the Only-begotten God is created! What? Tell me, were the Jews, to whom the words were spoken, in existence before the ages? Was the Cross before the world? Was Pilate before all creation? Was Jesus in existence first, and after that the Word? Was the flesh more ancient than the Godhead? Did Gabriel bring glad tidings to Mary before the world was? Did not the Man that was in Christ take His beginning by way of birth in the days of Caesar Augustus, while the Word that was God in the beginning is our King, as the prophet testifies, before all ages? Do you not see what confusion you bring upon the matter, turning, as the phrase goes, things upside down? It was the fiftieth day after the Passion, when Peter preached his sermon to the Jews and said, "Him Whom you crucified, God made Christ and Lord." Do you not notice the order of his saying? Which stands first, which second in his words? He did not say, "Him Whom God made Lord, you crucified," but, "Whom you crucified, Him God made Christ and Lord": so that it is clear from this that Peter is speaking, not of what was before the ages, but of what was after the dispensation.

How well he remembers the task before him! How much to the point is the conclusion of his argument! Basil declares that the Apostle said that the man who was seen was made Christ and Lord, and this clear and quick-witted over-turner of his statements says, If Peter does not say that the essence of Him Who was in the beginning was made, the man who was 'seen' 'emptied himself' to take the 'form of a servant,' and He Who 'emptied Himself' to take the 'form of a servant, emptied Himself to become man. We are conquered, Eunomius, by this invincible wisdom! The fact that the Apostle's discourse refers to Him Who was crucified through weakness 2 Corinthians 13:4 is forsooth powerfully disproved when we learn that if we believe this to be so, the man who was seen again becomes another, emptying Himself for another coming into being of man. Will you never cease jesting against what should be secure from such attempts? will you not blush at destroying by such ridiculous sophisms the awe that hedges the Divine mysteries? will you not turn now, if never before, to know that the Only-begotten God, Who is in the bosom of the Father, being Word, and King, and Lord, and all that is exalted in word and thought, needs not to become anything that is good, seeing that He is Himself the fullness of all good things? What then is that, by changing into which He becomes what He was not before? Well, as He Who knew not sin becomes sin, that He may take away the sin of the world, so on the other hand the flesh which received the Lord becomes Christ and Lord, being transformed by the commixture into that which it was not by nature: whereby we learn that neither would God have been manifested in the flesh, had not the Word been made flesh, nor would the human flesh that compassed Him about have been transformed to what is Divine, had not that which was apparent to the senses become Christ and Lord. But they treat the simplicity of what we preach with contempt, who use their syllogisms to trample on the being of God, and desire to show that He Who by creation brought into being all things that are, is Himself a part of creation, and wrest, to assist them in such an effort to establish their blasphemy, the words of Peter, who said to the Jews, Be it known to all the house of Israel that God made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified Acts 2:36. This is the proof they present for the statement that the essence of the Only-begotten God is created! What? Tell me, were the Jews, to whom the words were spoken, in existence before the ages? Was the Cross before the world? Was Pilate before all creation? Was Jesus in existence first, and after that the Word? Was the flesh more ancient than the Godhead? Did Gabriel bring glad tidings to Mary before the world was? Did not the Man that was in Christ take beginning by way of birth in the days of Cæsar Augustus, while the Word that was God in the beginning is our King, as the prophet testifies, before all ages? See you not what confusion you bring upon the matter, turning, as the phrase goes, things upside down? It was the fiftieth day after the Passion, when Peter preached his sermon to the Jews and said, Him Whom you crucified, God made Christ and Lord. Do you not mark the order of his saying? Which stands first, which second in his words? He did not say, Him Whom God made Lord, you crucified, but, Whom you crucified, Him God made Christ and Lord: so that it is clear from this that Peter is speaking, not of what was before the ages, but of what was after the dispensation.

How is it, then, that you fail to see your whole argument on this subject is being overthrown, and you keep making yourself ridiculous with your childish web of sophistry, saying that if we believe the one who was visible to the senses has been made by God to be Christ and Lord, it necessarily follows that the Lord once more emptied himself again to become man and underwent a second birth? What advantage does your teaching get from this? How does what you say show the King of creation to be created? For my part, I assert on the other side that our position is supported by those who argue against us, and that the rhetorician, in his excessive attention to the matter, has failed to see that in pushing the argument to what he supposed was an absurdity, he is actually fighting on the side of those he attacks, using the very weapons meant for their overthrow. For if we are to believe that the change of condition in Jesus's case was from a lofty state to a lowly one, and if the divine and uncreated nature alone transcends creation, he will perhaps, when he thoroughly examines his own argument, come over to the side of truth and agree that the Uncreated came to be in the created out of love for humanity. But if he imagines that he demonstrates the created character of the Lord by showing that he, being God, took part in human nature, he will find many such passages to establish the same opinion that support his argument in a similar way. For since he was the Word and was God, and afterwards, as the prophet says, was seen upon earth and conversed with men (Baruch 3:37), he will hereby be proved to be one of the creatures! And if this is held to be beside the point, similar passages too are not quite relevant to the subject. For in meaning it is just the same to say that the Word who was in the beginning was manifested to men through the flesh, and to say that being in the form of God he put on the form of a servant. And if one of these statements gives no help for establishing his blasphemy, he must necessarily give up the other one as well. He is kind enough, however, to advise us to abandon our error and to point out the truth which he himself maintains. He tells us that the Apostle Peter declares that the one who was in the beginning the Word and God was made. Well, if he were making up dreams for our amusement and giving us information about the prophetic interpretation of sleep visions, there might be no risk in allowing him to set forth the riddles of his imagination as he pleases. But when he tells us he is explaining divine utterances, it is no longer safe for us to leave him to interpret the words as he likes. What does Scripture say? God made Lord and Christ this Jesus whom you crucified (Acts 2:36). When everything, then, is found to agree—the demonstrative word pointing to the one who is spoken of by the name of his humanity, the charge against those who were stained with blood guilt, the suffering of the cross—our thought necessarily turns to what was visible to the senses. But he asserts that while Peter uses these words, it is the pretemporal existence that is indicated by the word "made." Well, we may safely allow nurses and old wives to joke with children and to interpret the meaning of dreams as they choose, but when inspired Scripture is set before us for explanation, the great Apostle forbids us to resort to old wives' tales. When I hear the cross spoken of, I understand the cross, and when I hear mention of a human name, I understand the nature which that name signifies. So when I hear from Peter that this one was made Lord and Christ, I do not doubt that he speaks of the one who had been before the eyes of men, since the saints agree with one another in this matter as well as in others. For just as he says that the one who was crucified has been made Lord, so Paul also says that he was highly exalted after the Passion and the Resurrection, not being exalted insofar as he is God. For what height is there more sublime than the divine height, that he should say God was exalted to it? But he means that the lowliness of the humanity was exalted, the word, I suppose, indicating the assimilation and union of the man who was assumed to the exalted state of the divine nature. And even if one were to allow him license to misinterpret the divine utterance, not even so will his argument conclude in accordance with the aim of his heresy. For let it be granted that Peter does say of the one who was in the beginning, God made him Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified—we shall find that even so his blasphemy does not gain any strength against the truth. God made him, he says, Lord and Christ. To which of the words are we to refer the word "made"? With which of those employed in this sentence are we to connect the word? There are three before us: "this," and "Lord," and "Christ." With which of these three will he connect the word "made"? No one is so bold against the truth as to deny that "made" refers to Christ and Lord, for Peter says that he, being already whatever he was, was made Christ and Lord by the Father.

How comes it, then, that you fail to see that the whole conception of your argument on the subject is being overthrown, and go on making yourself ridiculous with your childish web of sophistry, saying that, if we believe that He who was apparent to the senses has been made by God to be Christ and Lord, it necessarily follows that the Lord once more emptied Himself anew to become Man, and underwent a second birth? What advantage does your doctrine get from this? How does what you say show the King of creation to be created? For my own part I assert on the other side that our view is supported by those who contend against us, and that the rhetorician, in his exceeding attention to the matter, has failed to see that in pushing, as he supposed, the argument to an absurdity, he is fighting on the side of those whom he attacks, with the very weapons he uses for their overthrow. For if we are to believe that the change of condition in the case of Jesus was from a lofty state to a lowly one, and if the Divine and uncreated Nature alone transcends the creation, he will, perhaps, when he thoroughly surveys his own argument, come over to the ranks of truth, and agree that the Uncreated came to be in the created, in His love for man. But if he imagines that he demonstrates the created character of the Lord by showing that He, being God, took part in human nature, he will find many such passages to establish the same opinion which carry out their support of his argument in a similar way. For since He was the Word and was God, and afterwards, as the prophet says, was seen upon earth and conversed with men Baruch 3:37, He will hereby be proved to be one of the creatures! And if this is held to be beside the question, similar passages too are not quite akin to the subject. For in sense it is just the same to say that the Word that was in the beginning was manifested to men through the flesh, and to say that being in the form of God He put on the form of a servant: and if one of these statements gives no help for the establishment of his blasphemy, he must needs give up the remaining one also. He is kind enough, however, to advise us to abandon our error, and to point out the truth which He himself maintains. He tells us that the Apostle Peter declares Him to have been made Who was in the beginning the Word and God. Well, if he were making up dreams for our amusement, and giving us information about the prophetic interpretation of the visions of sleep, there might be no risk in allowing him to set forth the riddles of his imagination at his pleasure. But when he tells us that he is explaining the Divine utterances, it is no longer safe for us to leave him to interpret the words as he likes. What does the Scripture say? God made Lord and Christ this Jesus whom you crucified Acts 2:36. When everything, then, is found to concur — the demonstrative word denoting Him Who is spoken of by the Name of His Humanity, the charge against those who were stained with blood-guiltiness, the suffering of the Cross — our thought necessarily turns to that which was apparent to the senses. But he asserts that while Peter uses these words it is the pretemporal existence that is indicated by the word made. Well, we may safely allow nurses and old wives to jest with children, and to lay down the meaning of dreams as they choose: but when inspired Scripture is set before us for exposition, the great Apostle forbids us to have recourse to old wives' tattle. When I hear the Cross spoken of, I understand the Cross, and when I hear mention of a human name, I understand the nature which that name connotes. So when I hear from Peter that this one was made Lord and Christ, I do not doubt that he speaks of Him Who had been before the eyes of men, since the saints agree with one another in this matter as well as in others. For, as he says that He Who was crucified has been made Lord, so Paul also says that He was highly exalted, after the Passion and the Resurrection, not being exalted in so far forth as He is God. For what height is there more sublime than the Divine height, that he should say God was exalted thereunto? But he means that the lowliness of the Humanity was exalted, the word, I suppose, indicating the assimilation and union of the Man Who was assumed to the exalted state of the Divine Nature. And even if one were to allow him licence to misinterpret the Divine utterance, not even so will his argument conclude in accordance with the aim of his heresy. For be it granted that Peter does say of Him Who was in the beginning, God made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified, we shall find that even so his blasphemy does not gain any strength against the truth. God made Him, he says, Lord and Christ. To which of the words are we to refer the word made? with which of those that are employed in this sentence are we to connect the word? There are three before us:– this, and Lord, and Christ. With which of these three will he construct the word made? No one is so bold against the truth as to deny that made has reference to Christ and Lord; for Peter says that He, being already whatever He was, was made Christ and Lord by the Father.

These words aren't mine—they come from the one who fights against the Word. In the very passage we're examining, he says exactly this: "The blessed Peter speaks of Him Who was in the beginning and was God, and explains to us that it was He Who became Lord and Christ." So Eunomius claims that He Who was whatever He was became Lord and Christ, just as the story of David tells us that he, being the son of Jesse and a shepherd, was anointed to be king. The anointing didn't make him into a man—rather, he, being what he was by his own physis, was transformed from an ordinary man to a king. What follows from this? Does it prove that the ousia of the Son was made, if, as Eunomius says, God made Him both Lord and Christ when He was in the beginning and was God? Lordship isn't a name for His being but for His being in authority, and the title of Christ indicates His kingdom, while the idea of His kingdom is one thing and that of His physis is another. Suppose Scripture does say that these things happened with regard to the Son of God. Let's consider which view is more pious and more rational. Which can we properly say is made partaker of superiority by way of advancement—God or man? Who has such a childish mind as to suppose that the Divinity progresses to perfection by way of addition? But regarding the Human Nature, such a supposition isn't unreasonable, since the words of the Gospel clearly attribute to our Lord increase with respect to His Humanity—it says, "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and favor." Which, then, is the more reasonable interpretation to draw from the Apostle's words—that He Who was God in the beginning became Lord by way of advancement, or that the lowliness of the Human Nature was raised to the height of majesty as a result of its communion with the Divine? The prophet David also, speaking in the person of the Lord, says, "I am established as king by Him," with a meaning very close to "I was made Christ." And again, in the person of the Father to the Lord, he says, "Be Lord in the midst of Your enemies," with the same meaning as Peter's "Be made Lord of Your enemies." So just as the establishment of His kingdom doesn't signify the formation of His ousia but the advance to His dignity, and He Who commands Him to be Lord doesn't order what is non-existent to come into being at that particular time but gives to Him Who exists the rule over those who are disobedient—in the same way the blessed Peter, when he says that one has been made Christ (that is, king of all), adds the word "Him" to distinguish the idea both from the ousia and from the attributes contemplated in connection with it. For He made Him what has been declared when He already was what He is. Now if it were acceptable to assert that the transcendent Nature became anything by way of advancement, like a king from being an ordinary man, or lofty from being lowly, or Lord from being servant, it might be proper to apply Peter's words to the Only-begotten. But since the Divine Nature, whatever it is believed to be, always remains the same, being above all augmentation and incapable of diminution, we are absolutely compelled to refer his statement to the Humanity. For God the Word is now, and always remains, what He was in the beginning—always King, always Lord, always God and Most High—not having become any of these things by way of advancement, but being by virtue of His physis all that He is declared to be. On the other hand, He Who was elevated from Man to the Divinity by being assumed, being one thing and becoming another, is strictly and truly said to have become Christ and Lord. For He made Him to be Lord from being a servant, to be King from being a subject, to be Christ from being in subordination. He highly exalted what was lowly and gave to Him who had the Human Name that Name which is above every name. And thus came to pass that unspeakable mixture and conjunction of human littleness commingled with Divine greatness, whereby even those names which are great and Divine are properly applied to the Humanity, while on the other hand the Godhead is spoken of by human names. For it is the same Person who both has the Name which is above every name and is worshipped by all creation in the human Name of Jesus. As it says, "at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things in earth and things under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." But enough of these matters.

These words are not mine: they are those of him who fights against the Word. For he says, in the very passage that is before us for examination, exactly thus:– The blessed Peter speaks of Him Who was in the beginning and was God, and expounds to us that it was He Who became Lord and Christ. Eunomius, then, says that He Who was whatsoever He was became Lord and Christ, as the history of David tells us that he, being the son of Jesse, and a keeper of the flocks, was anointed to be king: not that the anointing then made him to be a man, but that he, being what he was by his own nature, was transformed from an ordinary man to a king. What follows? Is it thereby the more established that the essence of the Son was made, if, as Eunomius says, God made Him, when He was in the beginning and was God, both Lord and Christ? For Lordship is not a name of His being but of His being in authority, and the appellation of Christ indicates His kingdom, while the idea of His kingdom is one, and that of His Nature another. Suppose that Scripture does say that these things took place with regard to the Son of God. Let us then consider which is the more pious and the more rational view. Which can we allowably say is made partaker of superiority by way of advancement — God or man? Who has so childish a mind as to suppose that the Divinity passes on to perfection by way of addition? But as to the Human Nature, such a supposition is not unreasonable, seeing that the words of the Gospel clearly ascribe to our Lord increase in respect of His Humanity: for it says, Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and favour. Which, then, is the more reasonable suggestion to derive from the Apostle's words?– that He Who was God in the beginning became Lord by way of advancement, or that the lowliness of the Human Nature was raised to the height of majesty as a result of its communion with the Divine? For the prophet David also, speaking in the person of the Lord, says, I am established as king by Him, with a meaning very close to I was made Christ: and again, in the person of the Father to the Lord, he says, Be Lord in the midst of Your enemies, with the same meaning as Peter, Be made Lord of Your enemies. As, then, the establishment of His kingdom does not signify the formation of His essence, but the advance to His dignity, and He Who bids Him be Lord does not command that which is non-existent to come into being at that particular time, but gives to Him Who is the rule over those who are disobedient — so also the blessed Peter, when he says that one has been made Christ (that is, king of all) adds the word Him to distinguish the idea both from the essence and from the attributes contemplated in connection with it. For He made Him what has been declared when He already was that which He is. Now if it were allowable to assert of the transcendent Nature that it became anything by way of advancement, as a king from being an ordinary man, or lofty from being lowly, or Lord from being servant, it might be proper to apply Peter's words to the Only-begotten. But since the Divine Nature, whatever it is believed to be, always remains the same, being above all augmentation and incapable of diminution, we are absolutely compelled to refer his saying to the Humanity. For God the Word is now, and always remains, that which He was in the beginning, always King, always Lord, always God and Most High, not having become any of these things by way of advancement, but being in virtue of His Nature all that He is declared to be, while on the other hand He Who was, by being assumed, elevated from Man to the Divinity, being one thing and becoming another, is strictly and truly said to have become Christ and Lord. For He made Him to be Lord from being a servant, to be King from being a subject, to be Christ from being in subordination. He highly exalted that which was lowly, and gave to Him that had the Human Name that Name which is above every name. And thus came to pass that unspeakable mixture and conjunction of human littleness commingled with Divine greatness, whereby even those names which are great and Divine are properly applied to the Humanity, while on the other hand the Godhead is spoken of by human names. For it is the same Person who both has the Name which is above every name, and is worshipped by all creation in the human Name of Jesus. For he says, at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things in earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. But enough of these matters.

It may now be time to examine what Eunomius himself said concerning the words of the Apostle Peter, and what our father said about him. If a thorough examination makes our discussion quite long, the fair-minded reader will surely forgive this and will not blame us for wasting time on words, but will instead blame the one who created the need for them. Let me also make some brief preliminary remarks before the proposed examination: perhaps they too will prove relevant to the purpose of our discussion.

It is now, perhaps, time to make enquiry into what is said concerning the words of the Apostle Peter, by Eunomius himself, and by our father concerning the latter. If a detailed examination should extend our discourse to considerable length, the fair-minded reader will no doubt pardon this, and will not blame us for wasting time in words, but lay the blame on him who has given occasion for them. Let me be allowed also to make some brief remarks preliminary to the proposed enquiry: it may be that they too will be found not to be out of keeping with the aim of our discussion.

That no created thing deserves human worship is declared so clearly as a law by the divine word that this truth can be learned from almost all of inspired Scripture. Moses, the Tables, the Law, the following Prophets, the Gospels, and the decrees of the Apostles all alike forbid the act of reverencing creation. It would be too lengthy to set out in order the particular passages that refer to this matter, but even if we present only a few from among the many instances of inspired testimony, our argument is equally convincing, since each divine word, however small, has equal force for declaring the truth. Now, since our conception of what exists is divided into two—creation and the uncreated Nature—if our adversaries' current position should prevail, so that we would say the Son of God is created, we would be absolutely forced either to disregard the Gospel's proclamation and refuse to worship God the Word who was in the beginning, on the ground that we must not offer worship to creation, or, if the marvels recorded in the Gospels are too compelling for us and lead us to reverence and worship Him who is revealed in them, to place the created and the Uncreated on the same level of honor. For if, according to our adversaries' opinion, even the created God is worshipped despite having no superiority in His physis above the rest of creation, and if this view should prevail, the doctrines of religion will be completely transformed into a kind of anarchy and democratic independence. When people believe that the nature they worship is not one, but have their thoughts turned away to diverse Godheads, no one will stop the conception of Deity as it progresses through creation. Instead, the Divine element, once recognized in creation, will become a stepping-stone to the same conception in whatever is contemplated next, and that in turn for the next in order. As a result of this inferential process, the error will extend to all things, as the first deceit makes its way through contiguous cases even to the very last.

That no created thing is deserving of man's worship, the divine word so clearly declares as a law, that such a truth may be learned from almost the whole of the inspired Scripture. Moses, the Tables, the Law, the Prophets that follow, the Gospels, the decrees of the Apostles, all alike forbid the act of reverencing the creation. It would be a lengthy task to set out in order the particular passages which refer to this matter; but though we set out only a few from among the many instances of the inspired testimony, our argument is surely equally convincing, since each of the divine words, albeit the least, has equal force for declaration of the truth. Seeing, then, that our conception of existences is divided into two, the creation and the uncreated Nature, if the present contention of our adversaries should prevail, so that we should say that the Son of God is created, we should be absolutely compelled either to set at naught the proclamation of the Gospel, and to refuse to worship that God the Word Who was in the beginning, on the ground that we must not address worship to the creation, or, if these marvels recorded in the Gospels are too urgent for us, by which we are led to reverence and to worship Him Who is displayed in them, to place, in that case, the created and the Uncreated on the same level of honour; seeing that if, according to our adversaries' opinion, even the created God is worshipped, though having in His nature no prerogative above the rest of the creation, and if this view should get the upper hand, the doctrines of religion will be entirely transformed to a kind of anarchy and democratic independence. For when men believe that the nature they worship is not one, but have their thoughts turned away to diverse Godheads, there will be none who will stay the conception of the Deity in its progress through creation, but the Divine element, once recognized in creation, will become a stepping-stone to the like conception in the case of that which is next contemplated, and that again for the next in order, and as a result of this inferential process the error will extend to all things, as the first deceit makes its way by contiguous cases even to the very last.

To show that I am not making a random statement beyond what is reasonable, I will cite as credible testimony for my assertion the error that still prevails among the pagans. Since they, with their untrained and limited intelligence, were inclined to look with wonder at the beauties of nature, they did not use the things they saw as a leader and guide to the beauty of the Nature that transcends them. Instead, they made their intelligence stop at the objects it perceived and marveled at each part of creation separately. For this reason they did not limit their conception of the Deity to any single thing they saw, but considered everything they looked at in creation to be divine. Thus among the Egyptians, as the error developed more strongly in regard to intellectual objects, the countless forms of spiritual beings were reckoned to be many natures of Gods. Among the Babylonians the unerring circuit of the firmament was considered a God, whom they also named Bel. Likewise, the foolishness of the pagans deified individually the seven successive spheres, with one person bowing down to one, another to another, according to some individual form of error. Since they perceived all these circles moving in relation to one another, and since they had gone astray regarding the highest, they maintained the same error by logical sequence down to the last of them. In addition to these, the ether itself, and the atmosphere spread beneath it, the earth and sea and the region below ground, and in the earth itself all things useful or necessary for human life—of all these there was none which they held to be without part or share in the Divine physis (nature), but they bowed down to each of them, bringing themselves through some object visible in creation into bondage to all the successive parts of creation. Had the act of worshiping creation been clearly unlawful to them from the beginning, they would not have been led astray into this deception of polytheism. Let us be careful, then, that we do not share the same fate—we who, being taught by Scripture to worship the true Godhead, were trained to consider all created existence as external to the Divine physis, and to worship and revere that uncreated Nature alone, whose mark and sign is that it never either begins to be or ceases to be. For the great Isaiah speaks of the Divine physis concerning these doctrines in his exalted utterance—speaking in the person of the Deity: I am the first, and hereafter am I, and no God was before Me, and no God shall be after Me. Knowing more perfectly than all others the mystery of the religion of the Gospel, this great prophet, who foretold even that marvelous sign concerning the Virgin and gave us the good news of the birth of the Child, and clearly pointed out to us that Name of the Son—he, in short, who through the Spirit includes in himself all the truth—in order that the characteristic of the Divine Nature by which we distinguish that which really is from that which came into being might be made as plain as possible to all, utters this saying in the person of God: I am the first, and hereafter am I, and before Me no God has been, and after Me is none. Since, then, neither is that God which was before God, nor is that God which is after God—for that which is after God is the creation, and that which is before God is nothing, and Nothing is not God (or one should rather say, that which is before God is God in His eternal blessedness, defined in contrast to Nothing)—since, I say, this inspired utterance was spoken through the mouth of the prophet, we learn through him the doctrine that the Divine Nature is one, continuous with itself and indivisible, not admitting in itself priority and posteriority, though it is declared in Trinity, and with none of the things we contemplate in it more ancient or more recent than another. Since, then, the saying is the saying of God, whether you grant that the words are the words of the Father or of the Son, the orthodox doctrine is equally upheld by either. For if it is the Father who speaks thus, He bears witness to the Son that He is not after Himself: for if the Son is God, and whatever is after the Father is not God, it is clear that the saying bears witness to the truth that the Son is in the Father, and not after the Father. If, on the other hand, one were to grant that this utterance is of the Son, the phrase, None has been before Me, will be a clear sign that He whom we contemplate in the Beginning is understood together with the eternity of the Beginning. If, then, anything is after God, this is discovered, by the passages quoted, to be a creature and not God, for He says, That which is after Me is not God.

To show that I am not making a random statement beyond what probability admits of, I will cite as a credible testimony in favour of my assertion the error which still prevails among the heathen. Seeing that they, with their untrained and narrow intelligence, were disposed to look with wonder on the beauties of nature, not employing the things they beheld as a leader and guide to the beauty of the Nature that transcends them, they rather made their intelligence halt on arriving at the objects of its apprehension, and marvelled at each part of the creation severally — for this cause they did not stay their conception of the Deity at any single one of the things they beheld, but deemed everything they looked on in creation to be divine. And thus with the Egyptians, as the error developed its force more in respect of intellectual objects, the countless forms of spiritual beings were reckoned to be so many natures of Gods; while with the Babylonians the unerring circuit of the firmament was accounted a God, to whom they also gave the name of Bel. So, too, the foolishness of the heathen deifying individually the seven successive spheres, one bowed down to one, another to another, according to some individual form of error. For as they perceived all these circles moving in mutual relation, seeing that they had gone astray as to the most exalted, they maintained the same error by logical sequence, even to the last of them. And in addition to these, the æther itself, and the atmosphere diffused beneath it, the earth and sea and the subterranean region, and in the earth itself all things which are useful or needful for man's life — of all these there was none which they held to be without part or lot in the Divine nature, but they bowed down to each of them, bringing themselves, by means of some one of the objects conspicuous in the creation, into bondage to all the successive parts of the creation, in such a way that, had the act of reverencing the creation been from the beginning even to them a thing evidently unlawful, they would not have been led astray into this deceit of polytheism. Let us look to it, then, lest we too share the same fate — we who in being taught by Scripture to reverence the true Godhead, were trained to consider all created existence as external to the Divine nature, and to worship and revere that uncreated Nature alone, Whose characteristic and token is that it never either begins to be or ceases to be; since the great Isaiah thus speaks of the Divine nature with reference to these doctrines, in his exalted utterance — who speaks in the person of the Deity, I am the first, and hereafter am I, and no God was before Me, and no God shall be after Me. For knowing more perfectly than all others the mystery of the religion of the Gospel, this great prophet, who foretold even that marvellous sign concerning the Virgin, and gave us the good tidings of the birth of the Child, and clearly pointed out to us that Name of the Son — he, in a word, who by the Spirit includes in himself all the truth — in order that the characteristic of the Divine Nature, whereby we discern that which really is from that which came into being, might be made as plain as possible to all, utters this saying in the person of God: I am the first, and hereafter am I, and before Me no God has been, and after Me is none. Since, then, neither is that God which was before God, nor is that God which is after God, (for that which is after God is the creation, and that which is anterior to God is nothing, and Nothing is not God — or one should rather say, that which is anterior to God is God in His eternal blessedness, defined in contradistinction to Nothing — since, I say, this inspired utterance was spoken by the mouth of the prophet, we learn by his means the doctrine that the Divine Nature is one, continuous with Itself and indiscerptible, not admitting in Itself priority and posteriority, though it be declared in Trinity, and with no one of the things we contemplate in it more ancient or more recent than another. Since, then, the saying is the saying of God, whether you grant that the words are the words of the Father or of the Son, the orthodox doctrine is equally upheld by either. For if it is the Father that speaks thus, He bears witness to the Son that He is not after Himself: for if the Son is God, and whatever is after the Father is not God, it is clear that the saying bears witness to the truth that the Son is in the Father, and not after the Father. If, on the other hand, one were to grant that this utterance is of the Son, the phrase, None has been before Me, will be a clear intimation that He Whom we contemplate in the Beginning is apprehended together with the eternity of the Beginning. If, then, anything is after God, this is discovered, by the passages quoted, to be a creature, and not God: for He says, That which is after Me is not God.

Now that this preliminary view of existences has been presented to us, it may be the right time to examine the passage before us. Peter says to the Jews, "Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified" (Acts 2:36), while on our part we say that it is not reverent to apply the word "made" to the divine nature of the Only-begotten, but rather that it should be applied to that form of a servant (Philippians 2:7), which came into being through the Incarnation at the proper time of his appearing in the flesh. On the other hand, those who interpret the phrase in the opposite way say that in the word "made" the Apostle indicates the pre-temporal generation of the Son. Therefore, we will present the passage in the middle, and after a detailed examination of both interpretations, leave the judgment of the truth to our reader. Eunomius himself may be a sufficient advocate for our adversaries' view, for he argues strenuously on the matter, so that by going through his argument word by word we shall completely follow the reasoning of those who oppose us. We ourselves will champion the doctrine on our side as best we can, following as closely as possible the line of argument previously set forth by the great Basil. But you who act as judges in this matter by your reading, execute true judgment, as one of the prophets says (Zechariah 7:9), not awarding the victory to contentious preconceptions, but to the truth as it is shown by examination. And now let the accuser of our doctrines come forward and read his indictment, as in a court of law.

Now that we have had presented to us this preliminary view of existences, it may be opportune to examine the passage before us. It is said, then, by Peter to the Jews, Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified Acts 2:36, while on our part it is said that it is not pious to refer the word made to the Divine Nature of the Only-begotten, but that it is to be referred to that form of a servant Philippians 2:7, which came into being by the Incarnation, in the due time of His appearing in the flesh; and, on the other hand, those who press the phrase the contrary way say that in the word made the Apostle indicates the pretemporal generation of the Son. We shall, therefore, set forth the passage in the midst, and after a detailed examination of both the suppositions, leave the judgment of the truth to our reader. Of our adversaries' view Eunomius himself may be a sufficient advocate, for he contends gallantly on the matter, so that in going through his argument word by word we shall completely follow out the reasoning of those who strive against us: and we ourselves will act as champion of the doctrine on our side as best we may, following so far as we are able the line of the argument previously set forth by the great Basil. But do you, who by your reading act as judges in the cause, execute true judgment, as one of the prophets Zechariah 7:9 says, not awarding the victory to contentious preconceptions, but to the truth as it is manifested by examination. And now let the accuser of our doctrines come forward, and read his indictment, as in a court of law.

Beyond what we have already mentioned, by refusing to apply the word 'made' to the ousia of the Son and by being ashamed of the Cross, he accuses the Apostles of something that not even those who have tried hardest to criticize them for stupidity have charged against them. At the same time, through his teachings and arguments, he clearly introduces two Christs and two Lords. He claims it was not the Word Who was in the beginning that God made Lord and Christ, but rather the One Who 'emptied Himself to take the form of a servant' and 'was crucified through weakness.' In any case, the great Basil writes explicitly as follows: 'Moreover, the Apostle does not intend to present to us that existence of the Only-begotten which was before the ages (which is now the subject of our argument), for he clearly speaks not of the very ousia of God the Word Who was in the beginning with God, but of Him Who emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and became conformable to the body of our humiliation, and was crucified through weakness.' And again, 'Anyone who even slightly pays attention to the meaning of the Apostle's words knows that he is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but is introducing the terms that belong to the Incarnation. For he says, Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified, clearly emphasizing through the demonstrative word that aspect in Him which was human and was seen by all.'

In addition, moreover, to what we have mentioned, by his refusal to take the word 'made' as referring to the essence of the Son, and withal by his being ashamed of the Cross, he ascribes to the Apostles what no one even of those who have done their best to speak ill of them on the score of stupidity, lays to their charge; and at the same time he clearly introduces, by his doctrines and arguments, two Christs and two Lords; for he says that it was not the Word Who was in the beginning Whom God made Lord and Christ, but He Who 'emptied Himself to take the form of a servant,' and 'was crucified through weakness 2 Corinthians 13:4.' At all events the great Basil writes expressly as follows:– 'Nor, moreover, is it the intention of the Apostle to present to us that existence of the Only-begotten which was before the ages (which is now the subject of our argument), for he clearly speaks, not of the very essence of God the Word, Who was in the beginning with God, but of Him Who emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and became conformable to the body of our humiliation Philippians 3:21, and was crucified through weakness.' And again, 'This is known to any one who even in a small degree applies his mind to the meaning of the Apostle's words, that he is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but is introducing the terms which belong to the Incarnation; for he says, Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified, evidently laying stress by the demonstrative word on that in Him which was human and was seen by all. '

Here is what this man says—the man who substitutes his own thinking for the Apostles' intention. We cannot speak of this as 'application,' lest anyone blame those holy men chosen to preach godliness, or accuse their teaching of falling into such absurdity. What confusion fills those who impose their own nonsense on the memory of the saints! What absurdity they display when they imagine that the man 'emptied himself' to become man, and when they claim that He who through obedience 'humbled himself' to take the form of a servant was made like men even before He took that form! Who, tell me, you most reckless of men, takes the form of a servant when he already has the form of a servant? And how can anyone 'empty himself' to become the very thing he already is? You will find no way around this, bold as you are in saying or thinking impossible things. Are you not truly the most miserable of all men—you who suppose that a man has died for all people, and attribute your own redemption to him? For if blessed Peter does not speak of the Word who was in the beginning and was God, but of the one who was 'seen' and who 'emptied Himself,' as Basil says, and if the man who was seen 'emptied Himself' to take 'the form of a servant,' and if He who 'emptied Himself' to take 'the form of a servant' emptied Himself to come into being as man, then the man who was seen emptied himself to come into being as man. The very nature of reality rejects this, and it is explicitly contradicted by the writer who celebrates this dispensation in his discourse on the Divine Nature, when he says not that the man who was seen, but that the Word who was in the beginning and was God took upon Him flesh—which means the same thing as taking 'the form of a servant.' So if you hold these things to be true, abandon your error and stop believing that the man 'emptied himself' to become man. And if you cannot persuade those who refuse to be persuaded, demolish their disbelief with another statement, a second argument against them. Remember the one who says, 'Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant.' No human being will claim this phrase for himself. None of the saints who ever lived was the Only-begotten God and became man—for that is what it means to 'take the form of a servant' while 'being in the form of God.' Therefore, if blessed Peter speaks of Him who 'emptied Himself' to 'take the form of a servant,' and if He who was 'in the form of God' did 'empty Himself' to 'take the form of a servant,' and if He who in the beginning was God, being the Word and the Only-begotten God, is He who was 'in the form of God,' then blessed Peter speaks to us of Him who was in the beginning and was God, and explains to us that it was He who became Lord and Christ. This, then, is the conflict that Basil wages against himself, and he clearly appears neither to have 'applied his own mind to the Apostles' intention' nor to be able to preserve the consistency of his own arguments. For according to his arguments, if he recognizes their irreconcilable character, he must admit that the Word who was in the beginning and was God became Lord; or if he tries to fit together mutually conflicting statements and stubbornly stands by them, he will add to them others even more contradictory, and maintain that there are two Christs and two Lords. For if the Word that was in the beginning and was God is one being, and He who 'emptied Himself' and 'took the form of a servant' is another, and if God the Word, by whom are all things, is Lord, and this Jesus, who was crucified after all things had come into being, is also Lord, then according to his view there are two Lords and Christs. Our author, then, cannot by any argument clear himself from this obvious blasphemy. But if anyone were to say in his defense that the Word who was in the beginning is indeed the same one who became Lord, but that He became Lord and Christ with respect to His presence in the flesh, he will surely be forced to say that the Son was not Lord before His presence in the flesh. In any case, even if Basil and his faithless followers falsely proclaim two Lords and two Christs, for us there is one Lord and Christ, by whom all things were made, not becoming Lord by way of promotion, but existing before all creation and before all ages, the Lord Jesus, by whom are all things, while all the saints with one unified voice teach us this truth and proclaim it as the most excellent of doctrines. Here blessed John teaches us that God the Word, by whom all things were made, has become incarnate, saying, 'And the Word was made flesh'; here the most admirable Paul, urging those who listen to him toward humility, speaks of Christ Jesus, who was in the form of God and emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and was humbled to death, even the death of the Cross; and again in another passage he calls Him who was crucified 'the Lord of Glory': 'for had they known it,' he says, 'they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory.' Indeed, he speaks far more openly than this about the very essential nature using the name 'Lord,' where he says, 'Now the Lord is the Spirit.' If, then, the Word who was in the beginning, in that He is Spirit, is Lord and the Lord of glory, and if God made Him Lord and Christ, it was the very Spirit and God the Word that God so made, and not some other Lord that Basil dreams about.

This, then, is what the man has to say who substitutes — for we may not speak of it as 'application,' lest any one should blame for such madness men holy and chosen for the preaching of godliness, so as to reproach their doctrine with a fall into such extravagance — who substitutes his own mind for the intention of the Apostles! With what confusion are they not filled, who refer their own nonsense to the memory of the saints! With what absurdity do they not abound, who imagine that the man 'emptied himself' to become man, and who maintain that He Who by obedience 'humbled himself' to take the form of a servant was made conformable to men even before He took that form upon Him! Who, pray, you most reckless of men, when he has the form of a servant, takes the form of a servant? And how can any one 'empty himself' to become the very thing which he is? You will find no contrivance to meet this, bold as you are in saying or thinking things uncontrivable. Are you not verily of all men most miserable, who suppose that a man has suffered death for all men, and ascribe your own redemption to him? For if it is not of the Word Who was in the beginning and was God that the blessed Peter speaks, but of him who was 'seen,' and who 'emptied Himself,' as Basil says, and if the man who was seen 'emptied Himself' to take 'the form of a servant,' and He Who 'emptied Himself' to take 'the form of a servant,' emptied Himself to come into being as man, then the man who was seen emptied himself to come into being as man. The very nature of things is repugnant to this; and it is expressly contradicted by that writer who celebrates this dispensation in his discourse concerning the Divine Nature, when he says not that the man who was seen, but that the Word Who was in the beginning and was God took upon Him flesh, which is equivalent in other words to taking 'the form of a servant.' If, then, you hold that these things are to be believed, depart from your error, and cease to believe that the man 'emptied himself' to become man. And if you are not able to persuade those who will not be persuaded, destroy their incredulity by another saying, a second decision against them. Remember him who says, 'Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant.' There is none among men who will appropriate this phrase to himself. None of the saints that ever lived was the Only-begotten God and became man:– for that is what it means to 'take the form of a servant,' 'being in the form of God.' If, then, the blessed Peter speaks of Him Who 'emptied Himself' to 'take the form of a servant,' and if He Who was 'in the form of God?' did 'empty Himself' to 'take the form of a servant,' and if He Who in the beginning was God, being the Word and the Only-begotten God, is He Who was 'in the form of God,' then the blessed Peter speaks to us of Him Who was in the beginning and was God, and expounds to us that it was He Who became Lord and Christ. This, then, is the conflict which Basil wages against himself, and he clearly appears neither to have 'applied his own mind to the intention of the Apostles', nor to be able to preserve the sequence of his own arguments; for, according to them, he must, if he is conscious of their irreconcilable character, admit that the Word Who was in the beginning and was God became Lord; or if he tries to fit together statements that are mutually conflicting, and contentiously stands by them, he will add to them others yet more hostile, and maintain that there are two Christs and two Lords. For if the Word that was in the beginning and was God be one, and He Who 'emptied Himself' and 'took the form of a servant' be another, and if God the Word, by Whom are all things, be Lord, and this Jesus, Who was crucified after all things had come into being, be Lord also, there are, according to his view, two Lords and Christs. Our author, then, cannot by any argument clear himself from this manifest blasphemy. But if any one were to say in support of him that the Word Who was in the beginning is indeed the same Who became Lord, but that He became Lord and Christ in respect of His presence in the flesh, He will surely be constrained to say that the Son was not Lord before His presence in the flesh. At all events, even if Basil and his faithless followers falsely proclaim two Lords and two Christs, for us there is one Lord and Christ, by Whom all things were made, not becoming Lord by way of promotion, but existing before all creation and before all ages, the Lord Jesus, by Whom are all things, while all the saints with one harmonious voice teach us this truth and proclaim it as the most excellent of doctrines. Here the blessed John teaches us that God the Word, by Whom all things were made, has become incarnate, saying, 'And the Word was made flesh '; here the most admirable Paul, urging those who attend to him to humility, speaks of Christ Jesus, Who was in the form of God, and emptied Himself to take the form of a servant, and was humbled to death, even the death of the Cross Philippians 2:7-8; and again in another passage calls Him Who was crucified 'the Lord of Glory': 'for had they known it,' he says, 'they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory 1 Corinthians 2:8 '. Indeed, he speaks far more openly than this of the very essential nature by the name of 'Lord,' where he says, 'Now the Lord is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:17 '. If, then, the Word Who was in the beginning, in that He is Spirit, is Lord, and the Lord of glory, and if God made Him Lord and Christ, it was the very Spirit and God the Word that God so made, and not some other Lord Whom Basil dreams about.

Well, that is his accusation. But I think it is necessary first to review briefly the main points he raises, and then to proceed to correct his statements through my argument. This way, those who are judging the truth can easily remember the charges against us that we must answer, and we can address each accusation in proper order. He says that we are ashamed of the Cross of Christ, that we slander the saints, that we claim a man emptied himself to become man, that we suppose the Lord had the form of a servant before his appearance through the Incarnation, that we attribute our redemption to a man, and that we speak in our teaching of two Christs and two Lords. Or, if we do not do this, then we deny that the Only-begotten was Lord and Christ before the Passion. To avoid this blasphemy, he wants us to confess that the ousia of the Son was created, claiming that the Apostle Peter established such a teaching by his own voice. This is the substance of the accusation. As for all his abuse directed at us, I will pass over it in silence, since it is completely irrelevant. Perhaps this rhetorical display of carefully crafted phrases is the usual habit of those who play the rhetorician—a device to inflate the size of their indictment. Let our sophist then use his skill to show his insolence and boast of his strength in attacking us, showing off his blows in the breaks between arguments. Let him call us foolish, the most reckless of all people, the most miserable of all people, full of confusion and absurdity, and mock us however he pleases in any way he likes, and we will endure it. For a reasonable person, disgrace lies not in hearing someone who abuses him, but in responding to what he says. There may even be some benefit in his attacks against us, for perhaps while he occupies his abusive tongue in denouncing us, he will at least pause in his conflict against God. So let him indulge in as much insolence as he wants—no one will respond to him. For if a man has foul and disgusting breath because of bodily illness or some infectious and harmful disease, he would not provoke any healthy person to imitate his misfortune by acquiring the disease himself in order to repay the unpleasantness of the man's bad odor in the same evil manner. Common human nature tells us to pity such people, not to imitate them. So let us pass over everything of this sort—all the mockery, indignation, provocation, and abuse he has carefully woven into his argument—and examine only his arguments as they relate to the doctrinal issues at stake. We will begin again from the beginning and address each of his charges in turn.

Well, such is his accusation. But I think it necessary in the first place to go briefly, by way of summary, over the points that he urges, and then to proceed to correct by my argument what he has said, that those who are judging the truth may find it easy to remember the indictment against us, which we have to answer, and that we may be able to dispose of each of the charges in regular order. He says that we are ashamed of the Cross of Christ, and slander the saints, and say that a man has emptied himself to become man, and suppose that the Lord had the form of a servant before His presence by the Incarnation, and ascribe our redemption to a man, and speak in our doctrine of two Christs and two Lords, or, if we do not do this, then we deny that the Only-begotten was Lord and Christ before the Passion. So that we may avoid this blasphemy, he will have us confess that the essence of the Son has been made, on the ground that the Apostle Peter by his own voice establishes such a doctrine. This is the substance of the accusation; for all that he has been at the trouble of saying by way of abuse of ourselves, I will pass by in silence, as being not at all to the point. It may be that this rhetorical stroke of phrases framed according to some artificial theory is the ordinary habit of those who play the rhetorician, an invention to swell the bulk of their indictment. Let our sophist then use his art to display his insolence, and vaunt his strength in reproaches against us, showing off his strokes in the intervals of the contest; let him call us foolish, call us of all men most reckless, of all men most miserable, full of confusion and absurdity, and make light of us at his good pleasure in any way he likes, and we will bear it; for to a reasonable man disgrace lies, not in hearing one who abuses him, but in making retort to what he says. There may even be some good in his expenditure of breath against us; for it may be that while he occupies his railing tongue in denouncing us he will at all events make some truce in his conflict against God. So let him take his fill of insolence as he likes: none will reply to him. For if a man has foul and loathsome breath, by reason of bodily disorder, or of some pestilential and malignant disease, he would not rouse any healthy person to emulate his misfortune so that one should choose, by himself acquiring disease, to repay, in the same evil kind, the unpleasantness of the man's ill odour. Such men our common nature bids us to pity, not to imitate. And so let us pass by everything of this kind which by mockery, indignation, provocation, and abuse, he has assiduously mixed up with his argument, and examine only his arguments as they concern the doctrinal points at issue. We shall begin again, then, from the beginning, and meet each of his charges in turn.

The beginning of his accusation was that we are ashamed of the Cross of the one who underwent the Passion for our sake. Surely he doesn't intend to charge us also with preaching a doctrine of dissimilarity in ousia! In fact, this reproach of making the Cross a shameful thing belongs rather to those who turn aside to this opinion. For both parties alike hold the dispensation of the Passion as part of the faith. We hold it necessary to honor the God who was manifested by the Cross just as the Father is honored. They, however, find the Passion a hindrance to glorifying the Only-begotten God equally with the Father who begot him. Therefore our sophist's charges recoil upon himself, and in the words with which he imagines himself to be accusing us, he is actually publishing his own doctrinal impiety. For it is clear that the reason he sets the Father above the Son and exalts him with supreme honor is this: in the Father the shame of the Cross is not seen. And the reason he asserts that the physis of the Son varies in the sense of inferiority is this: the reproach of the Cross is referred to him alone and does not touch the Father. Let no one think that in saying this I am only following the general drift of his composition, for in going through all the blasphemy of his speech, which is laboriously brought together there, I found in a passage later than the one before us this very blasphemy clearly expressed in undisguised language. I propose to set forth in the orderly course of my own argument what they have written, which runs thus: If, he says, he can show that the God who is over all, who is the unapproachable Light, was incarnate or could be incarnate, came under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of men, bore the Cross, then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. Who then is it who is ashamed of the Cross? Is it the one who, even after the Passion, worships the Son equally with the Father, or the one who even before the Passion insults him, not only by ranking him with the creation but by maintaining that he is of passible physis on the ground that he could not have come to experience his sufferings had he not had a physis capable of such sufferings? We on our part assert that even the body in which he underwent his Passion, by being mingled with the Divine Nature, was made by that commixture to be that which the assuming Nature is. So far are we from entertaining any low idea concerning the Only-begotten God that if anything belonging to our lowly nature was assumed in his dispensation of love for man, we believe that even this was transformed to what is divine and incorruptible. But Eunomius makes the suffering of the Cross to be a sign of divergence in ousia in the sense of inferiority, considering, I know not how, the surpassing act of power by which he was able to perform this to be an evidence of weakness. He fails to perceive the fact that while nothing which moves according to its own physis is looked upon as surprisingly wonderful, all things that overpass the limitations of their own physis become especially the objects of admiration, and to them every ear is turned, every mind is attentive, in wonder at the marvel. And hence it is that all who preach the word point out the wonderful character of the mystery in this respect: that God was manifested in the flesh, that the Word was made flesh, that the Light shined in darkness, the Life tasted death, and all such declarations which the heralds of the faith are wont to make, whereby is increased the marvelous character of the one who manifested the superabundance of his power by means external to his own physis. But though they think fit to make this a subject for their insolence, though they make the dispensation of the Cross a reason for partitioning off the Son from equality of glory with the Father, we believe, as those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word delivered to us by the Holy Scriptures, that the God who was in the beginning afterwards, as Baruch says, was seen upon the earth and conversed with men, and becoming a ransom for our death, loosed by his own resurrection the bonds of death, and by himself made the resurrection a way for all flesh, and being on the same throne and in the same glory with his own Father, will in the day of judgment give sentence upon those who are judged according to the desert of the lives they have led. These are the things which we believe concerning the one who was crucified, and for this cause we cease not to extol him exceedingly, according to the measure of our powers, that he who by reason of his unspeakable and unapproachable greatness is not comprehensible by any except by himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit—he, I say, was able even to descend to community with our weakness. But they adduce this proof of the Son's alienation in physis from the Father: that the Lord was manifested by the flesh and by the Cross, arguing on the ground that the Father's physis remained pure in impassibility and could not in any way admit of a community which tended to passion, while the Son, by reason of the divergence of his physis by way of humiliation, was not incapable of being brought to experience the flesh and death, seeing that the change of condition was not great but one which took place in a certain sense from one like state to another state kindred and homogeneous, because the physis of man is created and the physis of the Only-begotten is created also. Who then is fairly charged with being ashamed of the Cross? The one who speaks basely of it, or the one who contends for its more exalted aspect? I know not whether our accuser, who thus abases the God who was made known upon the Cross, has heard the lofty speech of Paul, in what terms and at what length he discourses with his exalted lips concerning that Cross. For Paul, who was able to make himself known by miracles so many and so great, says, God forbid that I should glory in anything else than in the Cross of Christ. And to the Corinthians he says that the word of the Cross is the power of God to them that are in a state of salvation. To the Ephesians, moreover, he describes by the figure of the Cross the power that controls and holds together the universe, when he expresses a desire that they may be exalted to know the exceeding glory of this power, calling it height and depth and breadth and length, speaking of the several projections we behold in the figure of the Cross by their proper names, so that he calls the upper part height and that which is below, on the opposite side of the junction, depth, while by the name length and breadth he indicates the cross-beam projecting to either side, that hereby might be manifested this great mystery: that both things in heaven and things under the earth and all the furthest bounds of the things that are, are ruled and sustained by the one who gave an example of this unspeakable and mighty power in the figure of the Cross. But I think there is no need to contend further with such objections, as I judge it superfluous to be anxious about urging arguments against calumny when even a few words suffice to show the truth. Let us therefore pass on to another charge.

The beginning of his accusation was that we are ashamed of the Cross of Him Who for our sakes underwent the Passion. Surely he does not intend to charge against us also that we preach the doctrine of dissimilarity in essence! Why, it is rather to those who turn aside to this opinion that the reproach belongs of going about to make the Cross a shameful thing. For if by both parties alike the dispensation of the Passion is held as part of the faith, while we hold it necessary to honour, even as the Father is honoured, the God Who was manifested by the Cross, and they find the Passion a hindrance to glorifying the Only-begotten God equally with the Father that begot Him, then our sophist's charges recoil upon himself, and in the words with which he imagines himself to be accusing us, he is publishing his own doctrinal impiety. For it is clear that the reason why he sets the Father above the Son, and exalts Him with supreme honour, is this — that in Him is not seen the shame of the Cross: and the reason why he asseverates that the nature of the Son varies in the sense of inferiority is this — that the reproach of the Cross is referred to Him alone, and does not touch the Father. And let no one think that in saying this I am only following the general drift of his composition, for in going through all the blasphemy of his speech, which is there laboriously brought together, I found, in a passage later than that before us, this very blasphemy clearly expressed in undisguised language; and I propose to set forth, in the orderly course of my own argument, what they have written, which runs thus:– If, he says, he can show that the God Who is over all, Who is the unapproachable Light, was incarnate, or could be incarnate, came under authority, obeyed commands, came under the laws of men, bore the Cross, then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light. Who then is it who is ashamed of the Cross? He who, even after the Passion, worships the Son equally with the Father, or he who even before the Passion insults Him, not only by ranking Him with the creation, but by maintaining that He is of passible nature, on the ground that He could not have come to experience His sufferings had He not had a nature capable of such sufferings? We on our part assert that even the body in which He underwent His Passion, by being mingled with the Divine Nature, was made by that commixture to be that which the assuming Nature is. So far are we from entertaining any low idea concerning the Only-begotten God, that if anything belonging to our lowly nature was assumed in His dispensation of love for man, we believe that even this was transformed to what is Divine and incorruptible; but Eunomius makes the suffering of the Cross to be a sign of divergence in essence, in the sense of inferiority, considering, I know not how, the surpassing act of power, by which He was able to perform this, to be an evidence of weakness; failing to perceive the fact that, while nothing which moves according to its own nature is looked upon as surprisingly wonderful, all things that overpass the limitations of their own nature become especially the objects of admiration, and to them every ear is turned, every mind is attentive, in wonder at the marvel. And hence it is that all who preach the word point out the wonderful character of the mystery in this respect — that God was manifested in the flesh, that the Word was made flesh, that the Light shined in darkness, the Life tasted death, and all such declarations which the heralds of the faith are wont to make, whereby is increased the marvellous character of Him Who manifested the superabundance of His power by means external to his own nature. But though they think fit to make this a subject for their insolence, though they make the dispensation of the Cross a reason for partitioning off the Son from equality of glory with the Father, we believe, as those who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word delivered to us by the Holy Scriptures, that the God who was in the beginning, afterwards, as Baruch says, was seen upon the earth, and conversed with men Baruch 3:37, and, becoming a ransom for our death, loosed by His own resurrection the bonds of death, and by Himself made the resurrection a way for all flesh, and being on the same throne and in the same glory with His own Father, will in the day of judgment give sentence upon those who are judged, according to the desert of the lives they have led. These are the things which we believe concerning Him Who was crucified, and for this cause we cease not to extol Him exceedingly, according to the measure of our powers, that He Who by reason of His unspeakable and unapproachable greatness is not comprehensible by any, save by Himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit, He, I say, was able even to descend to community with our weakness. But they adduce this proof of the Son's alienation in nature from the Father, that the Lord was manifested by the flesh and by the Cross, arguing on the ground that the Father's nature remained pure in impassibility, and could not in any way admit of a community which tended to passion, while the Son, by reason of the divergence of His nature by way of humiliation, was not incapable of being brought to experience the flesh and death, seeing that the change of condition was not great, but one which took place in a certain sense from one like state to another state kindred and homogeneous, because the nature of man is created, and the nature of the Only-begotten is created also. Who then is fairly charged with being ashamed of the Cross? He who speaks basely of it, or he who contends for its more exalted aspect? I know not whether our accuser, who thus abases the God Who was made known upon the Cross, has heard the lofty speech of Paul, in what terms and at what length he discourses with his exalted lips concerning that Cross. For he, who was able to make himself known by miracles so many and so great, says, God forbid that I should glory in anything else, than in the Cross of Christ. And to the Corinthians he says that the word of the Cross is the power of God to them that are in a state of salvation. To the Ephesians, moreover, he describes by the figure of the Cross the power that controls and holds together the universe, when he expresses a desire that they may be exalted to know the exceeding glory of this power, calling it height, and depth, and breadth, and length, speaking of the several projections we behold in the figure of the Cross by their proper names, so that he calls the upper part height, and that which is below, on the opposite side of the junction, depth, while by the name length and breadth he indicates the cross-beam projecting to either side, that hereby might be manifested this great mystery, that both things in heaven, and things under the earth, and all the furthest bounds of the things that are, are ruled and sustained by Him Who gave an example of this unspeakable and mighty power in the figure of the Cross. But I think there is no need to contend further with such objections, as I judge it superfluous to be anxious about urging arguments against calumny when even a few words suffice to show the truth. Let us therefore pass on to another charge.

He says that we slander the saints. Well, if he heard it himself, let him tell us the words of our slander. If he thinks we said it to others, let him prove his accusation with witnesses. If he can show it from what we have written, let him read the words, and we will accept the blame. But he cannot produce anything of the kind—our writings are available for anyone who wants to examine them. If it was not said to him, and he has not heard it from others, and he has no evidence to offer from our writings, I think the person who must respond to this point may well remain silent. Silence is surely the proper answer to a baseless accusation.

He says that by us the saints are slandered. Well, if he has heard it himself, let him tell us the words of our defamation: if he thinks we have uttered it to others, let him show the truth of his charge by witnesses: if he demonstrates it from what we have written, let him read the words, and we will bear the blame. But he cannot bring forward anything of the kind: our writings are open for examination to any one who desires it. If it was not said to himself, and he has not heard it from others, and has no proof to offer from our writings, I think he who has to make answer on this point may well hold his peace: silence is surely the fitting answer to an unfounded charge.

The Apostle Peter says, "God made this Jesus, whom you crucified, Lord and Christ" (Acts 2:36). Learning this from him, we say that the whole context of the passage points in one direction—the Cross itself, the human name, the way the phrase is expressed. For Scripture says that regarding one person two things were done—by the Jews, the Passion, and by God, honor. This doesn't mean one person suffered while another was honored by exaltation. Peter explains this even more clearly in what follows: "being exalted by the right hand of God." Who then was exalted? The one who was lowly, or the One who was the Highest? What else is the lowly but the Humanity? What else is the Highest but the Divinity? Surely God does not need to be exalted, since He is the Highest. It follows, then, that the Apostle means that the Humanity was exalted, and its exaltation happened by its becoming Lord and Christ. This took place after the Passion. Therefore the Apostle's word "made" does not indicate the Lord's pre-eternal existence, but rather the change from lowly to lofty that was accomplished by the right hand of God. Even this phrase declares the mystery of godliness. For when he says "exalted by the right hand of God," he clearly reveals the unspeakable dispensation of this mystery: that the Right Hand of God, who made all things that exist (which is the Lord, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing that exists subsists), itself raised to its own height the Man united with it, making him also to be what it is by nature. Now it is Lord and King. Christ is the King's name—it made him these things too. For just as he was highly exalted by being in the Highest, so too he became all else—Immortal in the Immortal, Light in the Light, Incorruptible in the Incorruptible, Invisible in the Invisible, Christ in the Christ, Lord in the Lord. For even in physical combinations, when one of the combined parts greatly exceeds the other, the inferior tends to change completely into what is more potent. We are plainly taught this by the voice of the Apostle Peter in his mystical discourse: that the lowly nature of him who was crucified through weakness (and weakness, as we have heard from the Lord, marks the flesh)—that lowly nature, I say, by virtue of its combination with the infinite and boundless element of good, no longer remained in its own measures and properties, but was raised up together with itself by the Right Hand of God, and became Lord instead of servant, Christ a King instead of a subject, Highest instead of lowly, God instead of man. What handle against the saints, then, did he who pretends to give warning against us in defense of the Apostles find in the material of our writings? Let us pass over this charge in silence as well, for I think it a petty and unworthy thing to defend against charges that are false and unfounded. Let us move on to the more pressing part of his accusation.

The Apostle Peter says, God made this Jesus, Whom you crucified, Lord and Christ Acts 2:36. We, learning this from him, say that the whole context of the passage tends one way — the Cross itself, the human name, the indicative turn of the phrase. For the word of the Scripture says that in regard to one person two things were wrought — by the Jews, the Passion, and by God, honour; not as though one person had suffered and another had been honoured by exaltation: and he further explains this yet more clearly by his words in what follows, being exalted by the right hand of God. Who then was exalted? He that was lowly, or He that was the Highest? And what else is the lowly, but the Humanity? What else is the Highest, but the Divinity? Surely, God needs not to be exalted, seeing that He is the Highest. It follows, then, that the Apostle's meaning is that the Humanity was exalted: and its exaltation was effected by its becoming Lord and Christ. And this took place after the Passion. It is not therefore the pre-temporal existence of the Lord which the Apostle indicates by the word made, but that change of the lowly to the lofty which was effected by the right hand of God. Even by this phrase is declared the mystery of godliness; for he who says exalted by the right hand of God manifestly reveals the unspeakable dispensation of this mystery, that the Right Hand of God, that made all things that are, (which is the Lord, by Whom all things were made, and without Whom nothing that is subsists,) Itself raised to Its own height the Man united with It, making Him also to be what It is by nature. Now It is Lord and King: Christ is the King's name: these things It made Him too. For as He was highly exalted by being in the Highest, so too He became all else — Immortal in the Immortal, Light in the Light, Incorruptible in the Incorruptible, Invisible in the Invisible, Christ in the Christ, Lord in the Lord. For even in physical combinations. when one of the combined parts exceeds the other in a great degree, the inferior is wont to change completely to that which is more potent. And this we are plainly taught by the voice of the Apostle Peter in his mystic discourse, that the lowly nature of Him Who was crucified through weakness, (and weakness, as we have heard from the Lord, marks the flesh,) that lowly nature, I say, by virtue of its combination with the infinite and boundless element of good, remained no longer in its own measures and properties, but was by the Right Hand of God raised up together with Itself, and became Lord instead of servant, Christ a King instead of a subject, Highest instead of Lowly, God instead of man. What handle then against the saints did he who pretends to give warning against us in defense of the Apostles find in the material of our writings? Let us pass over this charge also in silence; for I think it a mean and unworthy thing to stand up against charges that are false and unfounded. Let us pass on to the more pressing part of his accusation.

He claims that we say man has emptied Himself to become man, and that He Who humbled Himself to the form of the servant through obedience shared the form of men even before He took that form. The wording hasn't been changed; we've simply transferred his exact words from his speech to ours. Now if anything like this appears in our writings (for I consider my master's writings to be ours as well), then no one should accuse our speaker of slander. I ask only for respect for the truth, and we ourselves will provide the evidence. But if none of this appears in our writings, while his language not only blames us but is indignant and angry as if the matter were clearly proven, calling us full of absurdity, nonsense, confusion, inconsistency, and so on, I don't know what the right response is. Just as people who are confused by the groundless rages of madmen can't decide on any plan of action, I myself can find no way to address this confusion. Our master says (for I will again quote his argument word for word): He is not explaining to us the mode of the Divine existence, but the terms that belong to the Incarnation. Our accuser starts from this point and says that we maintain man emptied Himself to become man! What connection is there between one statement and the other? If we say that the Apostle has not explained to us the mode of the Divine existence, but points through his phrase to the dispensation of the Passion, we are on these grounds charged with speaking of the emptying of man to become man, and with saying that the form of the servant existed before time, and that the Man Who was born of Mary existed before the coming in the flesh! Well, I think it's unnecessary to spend time discussing what is already agreed upon, since truth itself clears us of the charge. In a case where someone may have given slanderers some grounds against themselves, it's proper to resist accusers. But where there's no danger of being suspected of some absurd charge, the accusation becomes proof not of the false charge made against the person being slandered, but of the accuser's madness. However, just as in dealing with the charge of being ashamed of the Cross, we showed through our examination that the charge rebounded on the accuser, so we will show how this charge too returns upon those who make it, since they, not we, teach the doctrine of the Son's change from like to like in the dispensation of the Passion. We will briefly examine the statements of each side, placing them side by side. We say that the Only-begotten God, having brought all things into being through His own agency, has full power over all things by Himself, while human nature is also one of the things He made. When this nature had fallen away to evil and come to be in the destruction of death, He drew it up once more to immortal life through His own agency, by means of the Man in whom He dwelt, taking to Himself complete humanity, and He mingled His life-giving power with our mortal and perishable nature, and changed our deadness to living grace and power through union with Himself. We declare this to be the mystery of the Lord according to the flesh: that He Who is immutable came to be in that which is mutable, in order that by altering it for the better and changing it from the worse, He might abolish the evil that is mingled with our mutable condition, destroying the evil in Himself. For our God is a consuming fire, by whom all the material of wickedness is done away. This is our statement. What does our accuser say? Not that He Who was immutable and uncreated was mingled with that which came into being through creation and had therefore suffered a change toward evil. Rather, he says that He, being Himself created, came to that which was related and of the same kind as Himself, not coming from a transcendent nature to put on the lower nature because of His love for humanity, but becoming the very thing which He already was.

He asserts that we say that man has emptied Himself to become man, and that He Who by obedience humbled Himself to the form of the servant shared the form of men even before He took that form. No change has been made in the wording; we have simply transferred the very words from his speech to our own. Now if there is anything of this sort in our writings, (for I call my master's writings ours) let no one blame our orator for calumny. I ask for all regard for the truth: and we ourselves will give evidence. But if there is nothing of all this in our writings, while his language not merely lays blame upon us, but is indignant and wrathful as if the matter were clearly proved, calling us full of absurdity, nonsense, confusion, inconsistency, and so on, I am at a loss to see the right course to take. Just as men who are perplexed at the groundless rages of madmen can decide upon no plan to follow, so I myself can find no device to meet this perplexity. Our master says (for I will again recite his argument verbally), He is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but the terms which belong to the Incarnation. Our accuser starts from this point, and says that we maintain that man emptied Himself to become man! What community is there between one statement and the other? If we say that the Apostle has not set forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but points by his phrase to the dispensation of the Passion, we are on this ground charged with speaking of the emptying of man to become man, and with saying that the form of the servant had pretemporal existence, and that the Man Who was born of Mary existed before the coming in the flesh! Well, I think it superfluous to spend time in discussing what is admitted, seeing that truth itself frees us from the charge. In a case, indeed, where one may have given the calumniators some handle against oneself, it is proper to resist accusers: but where there is no danger of being suspected of some absurd charge, the accusation becomes a proof, not of the false charge made against him who is calumniated, but of the madness of the accuser. As, however, in dealing with the charge of being ashamed of the Cross, we showed by our examination that the charge recoiled upon the accuser, so we shall show how this charge too returns upon those who make it, since it is they, and not we, who lay down the doctrine of the change of the Son from like to like in the dispensation of the Passion. We will examine briefly, bringing them side by side, the statements of each party. We say that the Only-begotten God, having by His own agency brought all things into being, by Himself has full power over all things, while the nature of man is also one of the things that were made by Him: and that when this had fallen away to evil, and come to be in the destruction of death, He by His own agency drew it up once more to immortal life, by means of the Man in whom He tabernacled, taking to Himself humanity in completeness, and that He mingled His life-giving power with our mortal and perishable nature, and changed, by the combination with Himself, our deadness to living grace and power. And this we declare to be the mystery of the Lord according to the flesh, that He Who is immutable came to be in that which is mutable, to the end that altering it for the better, and changing it from the worse, He might abolish the evil which is mingled with our mutable condition, destroying the evil in Himself. For our God is a consuming fire Hebrews 12:29, by whom all the material of wickedness is done away. This is our statement. What does our accuser say? Not that He Who was immutable and uncreated was mingled with that which came into being by creation, and which had therefore suffered a change in the direction of evil; but he does say that He, being Himself created, came to that which was kindred and homogeneous with Himself, not coming from a transcendent nature to put on the lowlier nature by reason of His love to man, but becoming that very thing which He was.

When it comes to the general character of the term, the name "creature" is one label applied to all things that have come into being from nothing. However, the different categories of things we observe under the term "creature" are separated from one another by their varying properties. So if He is created and man is created, then He was emptied—to use Eunomius' expression—to become Himself, and changed His position not from the transcendent to the lowly, but from what is similar in kind to what is similar in dignity (except regarding the specific characteristics of the bodily and the incorporeal). To whom will the fair verdict of those judging our case now be given? Who will appear to them to be under the weight of these accusations? The one who says the created was saved by the uncreated God, or the one who attributes the cause of our salvation to a creature? Surely the judgment of devout people is not in doubt. Anyone who clearly knows the difference between the created and the uncreated—terms whose separation is marked by lordship and slavery, since the uncreated God, as the prophet says, rules with His power forever, while all things in creation are servants to Him, according to the voice of the same prophet who says "all things serve You"—anyone, I say, who carefully considers these matters surely cannot fail to recognize the person who makes the Only-begotten change from servitude to servitude. For if, according to Paul, the whole creation is in bondage, and if, according to Eunomius, the essential nature of the Only-begotten is created, our opponents are surely maintaining through their doctrines not that the master was mingled with the servant, but that a servant came to be among servants. As for our supposedly saying that the Lord was in the form of a servant before His presence in the flesh, that is just like accusing us of saying that the stars are black and the sun misty, and the sky low, and water dry, and so on. A man who does not base his accusation on what he has actually heard, but makes up whatever seems good to him at his own whim, need not hold back from making such charges against us. It is exactly the same thing for us to be called to account for one set of accusations as for the other, considering that they have no basis in anything we have actually said. How could someone who says clearly that the true Son was in the glory of the Father insult the eternal glory of the Only-begotten by conceiving it to have been in the form of a servant? When our author decides to speak evil of us while also taking care to present his case with some appearance of truth, it may perhaps not be unnecessary or useless to refute his baseless accusations.

For as regards the general character of the appellation, the name of creature is one, as predicated of all things that have come into being from nothing, while the divisions into sections of the things which we contemplate as included in the term creature, are separated one from the other by the variation of their properties: so that if He is created, and man is created, He was emptied, to use Eunomius' phrase, to become Himself, and changed His place, not from the transcendent to the lowly, but from what is similar in kind to what (save in regard of the special character of body and the incorporeal) is similar in dignity. To whom now will the just vote of those who have to try our cause be given, or who will seem to them to be under the weight of these charges? He who says that the created was saved by the uncreated God, or he who refers the cause of our salvation to the creature? Surely the judgment of pious men is not doubtful. For any one who knows clearly the difference which there is between the created and the uncreated, (terms of which the divergence is marked by dominion and slavery, since the uncreated God, as the prophet says, rules with His power for ever, while all things in the creation are servants to Him, according to the voice of the same prophet, which says all things serve You,) he, I say, who carefully considers these matters, surely cannot fail to recognize the person who makes the Only-begotten change from servitude to servitude. For if, according to Paul, the whole creation is in bondage Romans 8:21, and if, according to Eunomius, the essential nature of the Only-begotten is created, our adversaries maintain, surely, by their doctrines, not that the master was mingled with the servant, but that a servant came to be among servants. As for our saying that the Lord was in the form of a servant before His presence in the flesh, that is just like charging us with saying that the stars are black and the sun misty, and the sky low, and water dry, and so on:– a man who does not maintain a charge on the ground of what he has heard, but makes up what seems good to him at his own sweet will, need not be sparing in making against us such charges as these. It is just the same thing for us to be called to account for the one set of charges as for the other, so far as concerns the fact that they have no basis for them in anything that we have said. How could one who says distinctly that the true Son was in the glory of the Father, insult the eternal glory of the Only-begotten by conceiving it to have been in the form of a servant? When our author thinks proper to speak evil of us, and at the same time takes care to present his case with some appearance of truth, it may perhaps not be superfluous or useless to rebut his unfounded accusations.

His next accusation has the same kind of absurdity. He charges us with saying that there are two Christs and two Lords, but he cannot prove this charge from our actual words. Instead, he freely uses falsehood to suit his purposes. Since he apparently thinks he can say whatever he wants, why does he state his lie so carefully and specifically claim that we speak of only two Christs? He might as well say, if he wishes, that we preach ten Christs, or a hundred, or stretch the number to a thousand, so he could make his slander more forceful. For the blasphemy involved in the doctrine of two Christs is the same as in the doctrine of more, and both charges are equally lacking in proof. When he shows that we actually do speak of two Christs, then let him have a verdict against us, just as if he had proved ten thousand. But he says he convicts us by our own statements. Well, let us examine once more those words of our teacher by which he thinks he can make his charges against us. He says that the one who says God made Him Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified, is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but the terms which belong to the Incarnation, emphasizing by the demonstrative word that in Him which was human and was seen by all. This is what he wrote. But how has Eunomius managed by these words to introduce his two Christs? Does saying that the demonstrative word emphasizes what is visible prove that we maintain two Christs? Should we, to avoid being charged with speaking of two Highests, deny the fact that the Lord was highly exalted after His Passion? Since God the Word, Who was in the beginning, was Highest, and was also highly exalted after His Passion when He rose from the dead, as the Apostle says. We must necessarily choose one of two options: either say that He was highly exalted after the Passion, which is the same as saying that He was made Lord and Christ, and be accused by Eunomius, or, if we avoid the accusation, deny the confession of the high exaltation of Him Who suffered.

His next charge too has its own absurdity of the same sort. For he reproaches us with saying that there are two Christs, and two Lords, without being able to make good his charge from our words, but employing falsehood at discretion to suit his fancy. Since, then, he deems it within his power to say what he likes, why does he utter his falsehood with such care about detail, and maintain that we speak but of two Christs? Let him say, if he likes, that we preach ten Christs, or ten times ten, or extend the number to a thousand, that he may handle his calumny more vigorously. For blasphemy is equally involved in the doctrine of two Christs, and in that of more, and the character of the two charges is also equally devoid of proof. When he shows, then, that we do speak of two Christs, let him have a verdict against us, as much as though he had given proof of ten thousand. But he says that he convicts us by our own statements. Well, let us look once more at those words of our master by means of which he thinks to raise his charges against us. He says he (he, that is, who says Him God made Lord and Christ, this Jesus Whom you crucified) is not setting forth to us the mode of the Divine existence, but the terms which belong to the Incarnation…laying stress by the demonstrative word on that in Him which was human and was seen by all. This is what he wrote. But whence has Eunomius managed by these words to bring on the stage his two Christs? Does saying that the demonstrative word lays stress on that which is visible, convey the proof of maintaining two Christs? Ought we (to avoid being charged with speaking of two Highests) to deny the fact that by Him the Lord was highly exalted after His Passion? Seeing that God the Word, Who was in the beginning, was Highest, and was also highly exalted after His Passion when He rose from the dead, as the Apostle says. We must of necessity choose one of two courses — either say that He was highly exalted after the Passion (which is just the same as saying that He was made Lord and Christ), and be impeached by Eunomius, or, if we avoid the accusation, deny the confession of the high exaltation of Him Who suffered.

Now at this point it seems right to put forward once more our accuser's statement in support of our own defense. We shall therefore repeat word for word the statement laid down by him, which supports our argument as follows: The blessed John, he says, teaches us that God the Word, by Whom all things were made, has become incarnate, saying 'And the Word was made flesh.' Does he understand what he is writing when he adds this to his own argument? I can hardly think that the same man can both be aware of the meaning of these words and contend against our statement. For if anyone examines the words carefully, he will find that there is no conflict between what we say and what he says. We both consider the dispensation in the flesh separately, and regard the Divine power by itself, and he, like us, says that the Word that was in the beginning has been manifested in the flesh. Yet no one ever charged him, nor does he charge himself, with preaching two Words—Him Who was in the beginning and Him Who was made flesh—for he surely knows that the Word is identical with the Word, He who appeared in the flesh with Him Who was with God. But the flesh was not identical with the Godhead, until this too was transformed to the Godhead, so that necessarily one set of attributes belongs to God the Word, and a different set of attributes belongs to the form of the servant. If, then, in view of such a confession, he does not reproach himself with the duality of Words, why are we falsely charged with dividing the object of our faith into two Christs? We say that He Who was highly exalted after His Passion was made Lord and Christ by His union with Him Who is truly Lord and Christ, knowing from what we have learned that the Divine nature (physis) is always one and the same, and with the same mode of existence, while the flesh in itself is that which reason and sense perceive concerning it, but when mixed with the Divine no longer remains in its own limitations and properties, but is taken up to that which is overwhelming and transcendent. Our contemplation, however, of the respective properties of the flesh and of the Godhead remains free from confusion, so long as each of these is contemplated by itself, as, for example, the Word was before the ages, but the flesh came into being in the last times—but one could not reverse this statement and say that the latter is before time, or that the Word has come into being in the last times. The flesh is of a passible nature, the Word of an operative nature, and neither is the flesh capable of making the things that are, nor is the power possessed by the Godhead capable of suffering. The Word was in the beginning with God, the man was subject to the trial of death, and neither was the Human nature from everlasting, nor the Divine nature mortal, and all the rest of the attributes are contemplated in the same way. It is not the Human nature that raises up Lazarus, nor is it the power that cannot suffer that weeps for him when he lies in the grave—the tear proceeds from the Man, the life from the true Life. It is not the Human nature that feeds the thousands, nor is it omnipotent might that hastens to the fig-tree. Who is it that is weary with the journey, and Who is it that by His word made all the world exist? What is the brightness of the glory, and what is that which was pierced with the nails? What form is it that is struck in the Passion, and what form is it that is glorified from everlasting? This much is clear, even if one does not follow the argument into detail, that the blows belong to the servant in whom the Lord was, the honors to the Lord Whom the servant surrounded, so that by reason of contact and the union of the natures the proper attributes of each belong to both, as the Lord receives the stripes of the servant, while the servant is glorified with the honor of the Lord. For this is why the Cross is said to be the Cross of the Lord of glory, and why every tongue confesses that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

Now at this point it seems right to put forward once more our accuser's statement in support of our own defense. We shall therefore repeat word for word the statement laid down by him, which supports our argument as follows:– The blessed John, he says, teaches us that God the Word, by Whom all things were made, has become incarnate, saying 'And the Word was made flesh.' Does he understand what he is writing when he adds this to his own argument? I can hardly myself think that the same man can at once be aware of the meaning of these words and contend against our statement. For if any one examines the words carefully, he will find that there is no mutual conflict between what is said by us and what is said by him. For we both consider the dispensation in the flesh apart, and regard the Divine power in itself: and he, in like manner with ourselves, says that the Word that was in the beginning has been manifested in the flesh: yet no one ever charged him, nor does he charge himself, with preaching two Words, Him Who was in the beginning, and Him Who was made flesh; for he knows, surely, that the Word is identical with the Word, He who appeared in the flesh with Him Who was with God. But the flesh was not identical with the Godhead, till this too was transformed to the Godhead, so that of necessity one set of attributes befits God the Word, and a different set of attributes befits the form of the servant. If, then, in view of such a confession, he does not reproach himself with the duality of Words, why are we falsely charged with dividing the object of our faith into two Christs? — we, who say that He Who was highly exalted after His Passion, was made Lord and Christ by His union with Him Who is verily Lord and Christ, knowing by what we have learned that the Divine Nature is always one and the same, and with the same mode of existence, while the flesh in itself is that which reason and sense apprehend concerning it, but when mixed with the Divine no longer remains in its own limitations and properties, but is taken up to that which is overwhelming and transcendent. Our contemplation, however, of the respective properties of the flesh and of the Godhead remains free from confusion, so long as each of these is contemplated by itself, as, for example, the Word was before the ages, but the flesh came into being in the last times: but one could not reverse this statement, and say that the latter is pretemporal, or that the Word has come into being in the last times. The flesh is of a passible, the Word of an operative nature: and neither is the flesh capable of making the things that are, nor is the power possessed by the Godhead capable of suffering. The Word was in the beginning with God, the man was subject to the trial of death; and neither was the Human Nature from everlasting, nor the Divine Nature mortal: and all the rest of the attributes are contemplated in the same way. It is not the Human Nature that raises up Lazarus, nor is it the power that cannot suffer that weeps for him when he lies in the grave: the tear proceeds from the Man, the life from the true Life. It is not the Human Nature that feeds the thousands, nor is it omnipotent might that hastens to the fig-tree. Who is it that is weary with the journey, and Who is it that by His word made all the world subsist? What is the brightness of the glory, and what is that that was pierced with the nails? What form is it that is buffeted in the Passion, and what form is it that is glorified from everlasting? So much as this is clear, (even if one does not follow the argument into detail,) that the blows belong to the servant in whom the Lord was, the honours to the Lord Whom the servant compassed about, so that by reason of contact and the union of Natures the proper attributes of each belong to both, as the Lord receives the stripes of the servant, while the servant is glorified with the honour of the Lord; for this is why the Cross is said to be the Cross of the Lord of glory 1 Corinthians 2:8, and why every tongue confesses that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father Philippians 2:11.

But if we are to discuss the other points in the same way, let us consider what it is that dies and what it is that destroys death; what it is that is renewed and what it is that empties itself. The Godhead empties itself so that it may come within the capacity of human nature, and human nature is renewed by becoming divine through its commixture with the divine. For just as air is not retained in water when it is dragged down by some heavy body and left in the depth of the water, but rises quickly to its kindred element, while the water is often raised up together with the air in its upward rush, being molded by the circle of air into a convex shape with a thin, membrane-like surface, so too, when the true Life that underlay the flesh sped upward, after the Passion, to itself, the flesh also was raised up with it, being forced upward from corruption to incorruptibility by the divine immortality. And as fire that lies hidden beneath the surface in wood is often unnoticed by the senses of those who see or even touch it, but is manifest when it blazes up, so too at his death—which he brought about by his own will, who separated his soul from his body, who said to his own Father "Into your hands I commend my spirit" (Luke 23:46), who, as he says, had power to lay it down and had power to take it again—he who, because he is the Lord of glory, despised what is considered shameful among men, having concealed, as it were, the flame of his life in his bodily nature through the dispensation of his death, kindled and inflamed it once more by the power of his own Godhead, fostering into life that which had been brought to death. Having infused that humble first-fruits of our nature with the infinity of his divine power, he made it also to be that which he himself was—making the servile form to be Lord, and the man born of Mary to be Christ, and him who was crucified through weakness to be life and power, and making all that is piously conceived to be in God the Word to be also in that which the Word assumed, so that these attributes no longer seem to be in either physis by way of division, but that the perishable physis, being made anew through its commixture with the divine in conformity with the physis that overwhelms it, participates in the power of the Godhead. This is like saying that mixture makes a drop of vinegar mingled in the deep to be sea, because the natural quality of this liquid does not continue in the infinity of that which overwhelms it. This is our doctrine, which does not, as Eunomius charges against it, preach a plurality of Christs, but the union of the man with the divinity, and which calls by the name of making the transmutation of the mortal to the immortal, of the servant to the Lord, of sin to righteousness, of the curse to the blessing, of the man to Christ. What further have our slanderers left to say to show that we preach two Christs in our doctrine, if we refuse to say that he who was in the beginning from the Father uncreatedly Lord, and Christ, and the Word, and God, was made, and declare that the blessed Peter was pointing briefly and incidentally to the mystery of the Incarnation, according to the meaning now explained, that the physis which was crucified through weakness has itself also, as we have said, become, by the overwhelming power of him who dwells in it, that which the indweller himself is in fact and in name, even Christ and Lord?

But if we are to discuss the other points in the same way, let us consider what it is that dies, and what it is that destroys death; what it is that is renewed, and what it is that empties itself. The Godhead empties Itself that It may come within the capacity of the Human Nature, and the Human Nature is renewed by becoming Divine through its commixture with the Divine. For as air is not retained in water when it is dragged down by some weighty body and left in the depth of the water, but rises quickly to its kindred element, while the water is often raised up together with the air in its upward rush, being moulded by the circle of air into a convex shape with a slight and membrane-like surface, so too, when the true Life that underlay the flesh sped up, after the Passion, to Itself, the flesh also was raised up with It, being forced upwards from corruption to incorruptibility by the Divine immortality. And as fire that lies in wood hidden below the surface is often unobserved by the senses of those who see, or even touch it, but is manifest when it blazes up, so too, at His death (which He brought about at His will, Who separated His soul from His Body, Who said to His own Father Into Your hands I commend My Spirit Luke 23:46, Who, as He says, had power to lay it down and had power to take it again), He Who, because He is the Lord of glory, despised that which is shame among men, having concealed, as it were, the flame of His life in His bodily Nature, by the dispensation of His death, kindled and inflamed it once more by the power of His own Godhead, fostering into life that which had been brought to death, having infused with the infinity of His Divine power that humble first-fruits of our nature, made it also to be that which He Himself was — making the servile form to be Lord, and the Man born of Mary to be Christ, and Him Who was crucified through weakness to be Life and power, and making all that is piously conceived to be in God the Word to be also in that which the Word assumed, so that these attributes no longer seem to be in either Nature by way of division, but that the perishable Nature being, by its commixture with the Divine, made anew in conformity with the Nature that overwhelms it, participates in the power of the Godhead, as if one were to say that mixture makes a drop of vinegar mingled in the deep to be sea, by reason that the natural quality of this liquid does not continue in the infinity of that which overwhelms it. This is our doctrine, which does not, as Eunomius charges against it, preach a plurality of Christs, but the union of the Man with the Divinity, and which calls by the name of making the transmutation of the Mortal to the Immortal, of the Servant to the Lord, of Sin to Righteousness, of the Curse to the Blessing, of the Man to Christ. What further have our slanderers left to say, to show that we preach two Christs in our doctrine, if we refuse to say that He Who was in the beginning from the Father uncreatedly Lord, and Christ, and the Word, and God, was made, and declare that the blessed Peter was pointing briefly and incidentally to the mystery of the Incarnation, according to the meaning now explained, that the Nature which was crucified through weakness has Itself also, as we have said, become, by the overwhelming power of Him Who dwells in It, that which the Indweller Himself is in fact and in name, even Christ and Lord?