Against Eunomius — Answer to Eunomius’ Second Book

It is important for understanding the following book to determine what mental faculty *epinoia* is. Gregory says that Eunomius makes a deliberate mockery of the word. He reduces its meaning to the lowest possible level and makes it merely the imagining of unnatural things, either shrinking or expanding the boundaries of nature, or combining incompatible concepts. He gives examples like colossi, pygmies, and centaurs as products of this mental operation. Fancy, or notion, would thus represent Eunomius' view of it. But Gregory attributes every art and every science to the working of this faculty. According to my explanation, it is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, moving on to further discoveries by means of what is adjacent to and follows from our first perception regarding the thing being studied. He gives examples like ontology, arithmetic, and geometry on the one hand, and agriculture, navigation, and timekeeping on the other, as results of it. Anyone who judged this faculty more valuable than any other ability we possess would not be far wrong. Induction might almost represent this view of it. But then Gregory does not deny that false marvels are also produced by it. By means of it an entertainer might amuse an audience with fire-breathing monsters, men wrapped in the coils of serpents, and so on. He calls it an inventive faculty. It must therefore be something more spontaneous than logical reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, while it is more reliable than fancy or imagination.

It is important, for the understanding of the following Book, to determine what faculty of the mind ̓ Επίνοια is. Eunomius, Gregory says, makes a solemn travesty of the word. He reduces its force to its lowest level, and makes it only fancy the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions together. He instances colossi, pigmies, centaurs, as the result of this mental operation. Fancy, or notion, would thus represent Eunomius' view of it. But Gregory ascribes every art and every science to the play of this faculty. According to my account, it is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries, by means of what adjoins and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied. He instances Ontology (!), Arithmetic, Geometry, on the one hand, Agriculture, Navigation, Horology, on the other, as the result of it. Any one who should judge this faculty more precious than any other with the exercise of which we are gifted would not be far mistaken. Induction might almost represent this view of it. But then Gregory does not deny that lying wonders are also fabricated by it. By means of it and entertainer might amuse an audience with fire-breathing monsters, men enfolded in the coils of serpents, etc. He calls it an inventive faculty. It must therefore be something more spontaneous than ratiocination, whether deductive or inductive; while it is more reliable than Fancy or Imagination.

This is illustrated by what Saint John Damascene says about Epinoia in his Dialectica (chapter 65): It has two kinds. The first is the faculty that analyzes and clarifies our view of things that are undivided and taken as a whole. Through this faculty, a simple phenomenon becomes complex when examined theoretically: for example, man becomes a compound of soul and body. The second kind, by combining perception and imagination, produces fictions from real things—that is, it divides wholes into parts and then combines those parts, chosen arbitrarily, into new wholes; for example, Centaurs and Sirens. Analysis (scientific) would describe the first kind; imagination would describe the second. Basil and Gregory were thinking of the first kind, Eunomius of the second, yet both parties used the same term.

This is illustrated by what S. John Damascene, in his Dialectica (c. 65), says of ̓ Επίνοια: It is of two sorts. The first is the faculty which analyses and elucidates the view of things undissected and in the gross ( ὁ λοσχερῆ): whereby a simple phenomenon becomes complex speculatively: for instance, man becomes a compound of soul and body. The second, by a union of perception and fancy, produces fictions out of realities, i.e. divides wholes into parts, and combines those parts, selected arbitrarily, into new wholes; e.g. Centaurs, Sirens. Analysis (scientific) would describe the one; fancy, the other. Basil and Gregory were thinking of the one, Eunomius of the other; but still both parties used the same expression.

If, then, there is one word that will cover the whole meaning, it would seem to be Conception. This word, at least, both in its outward form and in its intention, stands to perception in a way strictly analogous to that in which Epinoia stands to Ennoia. Both Conception and Epinoia represent some regulated operation of the mind upon data immediately given. In both cases the mind is led to contemplate its own contents in a new light, whether sensations or innate ideas. The fitness of Conception as an equivalent of Epinoia will be clear when we consider the real point at issue between Basil and Eunomius. Their controversy centers on the term Ungenerate. Is it, or is it not, expressive of the ousia of the Deity? To answer this question, it was found necessary to determine how such a name for the Supreme has been acquired. By a conception, says Basil. No, says Eunomius: it would be dangerous to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of Conception may and does deceive us; it can create monstrosities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, the names of the Son are too; for instance, the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the Vine. But since our Lord Himself applied these to Himself, He would, according to you, be employing the faculty of conception; and it is blasphemous to think that He employed names which we too might have arrived at by conceiving of Him in these particular ways. Therefore, Conception is not the source of the Divine Names; rather they come from a perception or intention implanted in us directly from on high. Ungenerate is such a name; and it reveals to us the very ousia of the Deity. But Gregory defends Basil's position. He shows the entire relativity of our knowledge of the Deity. Ungenerate and every other name of God is due to a conception; in each case we perceive either an operation of the Deity, or an element of evil, and then we conceive of Him as operating in the one, or as free from the other; and so name Him. But there is no conception, because there is no perception, of the ousia of the Deity. Scripture, which has revealed His operations, has not revealed that. The human mind feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways; and never pursues the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God; but, as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of the Universe; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable purity as regards this, not that we divide up the subject of such attributes along with them, but, believing that this Being, whatever it be in ousia, is one, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas.

If, then, there is one word that will cover the whole meaning, it would seem to be Conception. This word at all events, both in its outward form and in its intention, stands to perception in a way strictly analogous to that in which ̓ Επίνοια stands to ̓́ Εννοια. Both Conception and ̓ Επίνοια represent some regulated operation of the mind upon data immediately given. In both cases the mind is led to contemplate in a new light its own contents, whether sensations or innate ideas. The fitness of Conception as an equivalent of ̓ Επίνοια will be clear when we consider the real point at issue between Basil and Eunomius. Their controversy rages round the term Ungenerate. Is it, or is it not, expressive of the substance (being) of the Deity? To answer this question, it was found necessary to ascertain how such a name for the Supreme has been acquired. By a conception, says Basil. No, says Eunomius: it would be dangerous to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of Conception may and does play us false; it can create monstrosities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, the names of the Son are too; for instance, the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the Vine. But as our Lord Himself applied these to Himself, He would, according to you, be employing the faculty of conception; and it is blasphemous to think that He employed names which we too might have arrived at by conceiving of Him in these particular ways. Therefore, Conception is not the Source of the Divine Names; but rather they come from a perception or intention implanted in us directly from on High. Ungenerate is such a name; and it reveals to us the very substance of the Deity. But Gregory defends Basil's position. He shows the entire relativity of our knowledge of the Deity. Ungenerate and every other name of God is due to a conception; in each case we perceive either an operation of the Deity, or an element of evil, and then we conceive of Him as operating in the one, or as free from the other; and so name Him. But there is no conception, because there is no perception, of the substance of the Deity. Scripture, which has revealed His operations, has not revealed that. The human mind…feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways; and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God; but, as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of the Universe;…and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this,…not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but, believing that this Being, whatever it be in substance, is one, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas.

To sum up, Eunomius found it convenient to try to disparage ̓ Επίνοια to the point of making it seem morally impossible that any name of God, but especially ̓ Αγέννητος, should come from such a source. He mocks the orthodox party for treating the privative terms for the Deity as merely privative, embodying only a notion, and for holding to the truth that God's name is above every name. He does not see how God can be above His works simply by virtue of things that do not belong to Him; this is only giving words priority over realities. He wants, and believes there exists, a word for the ousia of God, and he finds it in ̓ Αγέννητος, which according to him is not privative at all; it is the single name for the single Deity, and all the other names are contained within it. The universal Guardian thought it right to implant these names in our minds by a law of His creation. These utterances come from above. The importance of this word to the Anomœans is obvious. Gregory, as spokesman of the Nicene party, defends the capacity of the mental operation of conception to supply terms for the Deity, which, however, can none of them be final. God is incomprehensible. At the same time there is a spiritual insight of God (an ἔννοια in fact) which far surpasses Eunomius' intellectual certainty.

To sum up, it had suited Eunomius to try to disparage ̓ Επίνοια so far as to make it appear morally impossible that any name of God, but especially ̓ Αγέννητος, should be derived from such a source. He scoffs at the orthodox party for treating the privative terms for the Deity as merely privative, embodying only a notion, and for adhering to the truth that God's name is above every name. He does not see how God can be above His works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him; this is only giving to words the prerogative over realities. He wants, and believes in the existence of, a word for the substance of God, and he finds it in ̓ Αγέννητος, which according to him is not privative at all; it is the single name for the single Deity, and all the others are bound up in it. The universal Guardian thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by a law of His creation. These utterances are from above. The importance of this word to the Anomœans is obvious. Gregory, as spokesman of the Nicene party, defends the efficacy of the mental operation of conception to supply terms for the Deity, which, however, can none of them be final. God is incomprehensible. At the same time there is a spiritual insight of God (an ἔ ννοια in fact) which far surpasses Eunomius' intellectual certainty (see note p. 256).

The first part of my arguments against Eunomius has, with God's help, been sufficiently established in the preceding work. Anyone who wishes can see from what I have written how his deception has been completely exposed in that earlier part, and his falsehood no longer has any power against the truth, except for those who show a very shameless hostility toward it. But since, like some robber's ambush, he has assembled a second work against orthodoxy, once again with God's help the truth takes up arms through me against the forces of her enemies. Truth commands my arguments like a general and directs them at her pleasure against the enemy. Following her lead, I shall boldly venture into the second part of my arguments, not at all intimidated by the display of falsehood, despite its parade of numerous arguments. For He who has promised that one shall chase a thousand and that two shall put ten thousand to flight is faithful, since victory in battle comes not from numbers but from righteousness. Just as the massive Goliath, when he brandished against the Israelites that enormous spear we read about, inspired no fear in his opponent—though he was a shepherd and unskilled in military tactics—but instead met him in combat and lost his own head in a complete reversal of his expectations, so our Goliath, the champion of this foreign system, extends his blasphemy against his opponents as though his hand were on a naked sword, and flashes his sophisms fresh from his whetstone. Yet he has failed to inspire any fear in us, though we are no soldiers, or to find himself free to boast about a lack of adversaries. On the contrary, he has found us to be warriors improvised from the Lord's sheepfold, untrained in logical warfare and considering it no disadvantage to be so, but simply hurling our plain, crude argument of truth against him. Now then, that shepherd in the biblical account, after he had struck down the foreigner with his sling and broken his helmet with the stone so that it split open from the force of the blow, did not limit his courage to gazing at his fallen enemy. Instead, he ran up to him, took his head, and returned bearing it as a trophy to his people, parading that boastful head through the ranks of his countrymen. Looking to this example, we too must advance without fear to the second part of our work, and as far as possible imitate David's courage. Like him, after the first blow we must plant our foot upon the fallen enemy, so that this enemy of the truth may be displayed as much as possible as a headless corpse. For separated as he is from the true faith, he is far more truly beheaded than that Philistine. Since Christ is the head of every man, as the Apostle says, and it is only reasonable that the believer alone should be called a man (for Christ, I assume, cannot be the head of the unbelieving as well), it follows that anyone who is severed from the saving faith must be headless like Goliath, being cut off from the true head by his own sword which he had sharpened against the truth. Our task will not be to cut off this head, but to show that it is already cut off.

The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God's help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see from what I have worked out, how in that former part his fallacy has been completely exposed, and its falsehood has no further force against the truth, except in the case of those who show a very shameless animus against her. But since, like some robber's ambuscade, he has got together a second work against orthodoxy, again with God's help the truth takes up arms through me against the array of her enemies, commanding my arguments like a general and directing them at her pleasure against the foe; following whose steps I shall boldly venture on the second part of my contentions, nothing daunted by the array of falsehood, notwithstanding its display of numerous arguments. For faithful is He who has promised that a thousand shall be chased by one, and that ten thousand shall be put to flight by two, victory in battle being due not to numbers, but to righteousness. For even as bulky Goliath, when he shook against the Israelites that ponderous spear we read of, inspired no fear in his opponent, though a shepherd and unskilled in the tactics of war, but having met him in fight loses his own head by a direct reversal of his expectations, so our Goliath, the champion of this alien system, stretching forth his blasphemy against his opponents as though his hand were on a naked sword, and flashing the while with sophisms fresh from his whetstone, has failed to inspire us, though no soldiers, with any fear of his prowess, or to find himself free to exult in the dearth of adversaries; on the contrary, he has found us warriors improvised from the Lord's sheepfold, untaught in logical warfare, and thinking it no detriment to be so, but simply slinging our plain, rude argument of truth against him. Since then, that shepherd who is in the record, when he had cast down the alien with his sling, and broken his helmet with the stone, so that it gaped under the violence of the blow, did not confine his valour to gazing on his fallen foe, but running in upon him, and depriving him of his head, returns bearing it as a trophy to his people, parading that braggart head through the host of his countrymen; looking to this example it becomes us also to advance nothing daunted to the second part of our labours, but as far as possible to imitate David's valour, and, like him, after the first blow to plant our foot upon the fallen foe, so that enemy of the truth may be exhibited as much as possible as a headless trunk. For separated as he is from the true faith he is far more truly beheaded than that Philistine. For since Christ is the head of every man, as says the Apostle 1 Corinthians 11:2, and it is only reasonable that the believer alone should be so termed (for Christ, I take it, cannot be the head of the unbelieving also), it follows that he who is severed from the saving faith must be headless like Goliath, being severed from the true head by his own sword which he had whetted against the truth; which head it shall be our task not to cut off, but to show that it is cut off.

Let no one think I'm engaging in this relentless and uncompromising battle with my opponent out of pride or desire for human praise. If I were permitted to live a peaceful life without bothering anyone, it would be completely contrary to my nature to needlessly disturb my own peace by voluntarily provoking and stirring up a war against myself. But now that God's city, the Church, is under siege, and the great wall of the faith is being shaken and battered by the surrounding siege engines of heresy, and there is serious risk that the word of the Lord will be swept into captivity through their demonic assault, I consider it a terrible thing to refuse to take part in the Christian struggle. I have not turned aside to rest, but have regarded the sweat of labor as more honorable than the relaxation of rest, knowing well that just as every man, as the Apostle says, shall receive his own reward according to his own labor, so naturally he shall receive punishment for neglecting his labor in proportion to his strength. Therefore I took on the first encounter in this debate with good courage, drawing from my shepherd's bag—that is, from the teaching of the Church—my natural and spontaneous arguments for the overthrow of this blasphemy, not needing at all the equipment of arguments from secular sources to qualify me for the contest. And now I don't hold back from the second part of the encounter either, fixing my hope like great David on Him who teaches my hands to war and my fingers to fight, hoping that the writer's hand may in my case also be guided by divine power to overthrow these heretical opinions, and my fingers may serve to overthrow their malicious array by directing my argument with skill and precision against the enemy. But just as in human battles those who excel in courage and strength, protected by their armor and having already acquired military skill through their training for facing danger, station themselves at the head of their column, encountering danger for those positioned behind them, while the rest of the company, though serving only to give an appearance of numbers, nevertheless seem, if only by their closely-packed shields, to contribute to the common good—so in our battles that noble soldier of Christ and fierce champion against the aliens, the mighty spiritual warrior Basil, equipped as he is with the whole armor described by the Apostle, protected by the shield of faith, and ever holding before him that weapon of defense, the sword of the spirit, fights at the front of the Lord's army by his elaborate argument against this heresy, alive and resisting and prevailing over the enemy, while we the common crowd, sheltering ourselves beneath the shield of that champion of the faith, will not hold back from any battles within the scope of our ability, as our captain may lead us on against the enemy. Since he, then, in his refutation of the false and untenable position maintained by this heresy, affirms that "ungenerate" cannot be predicated of God except as a mere notion or conception—which he has demonstrated with proofs supported by common sense and the evidence of Scripture—while Eunomius, the author of the heresy, neither agrees with his statements nor is able to overturn them, but in his struggle with the truth, the more clearly the light of true doctrine shines forth, the more, like nocturnal creatures, he shuns the light, and, no longer able to find the sophisticated hiding places he is accustomed to, he wanders about at random, and getting into the labyrinth of falsehood goes round and round in the same place—nearly all of his second treatise being taken up with this empty nonsense—it is therefore appropriate that our battle with those who oppose us should take place on the same ground where our champion has been our leader through his own treatise.

And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with the foe. For if it were allowed me to pass a peaceful life meddling with no one, it would be far enough from my disposition to wantonly disturb my tranquillity, by voluntarily provoking and stirring up a war against myself. But now that God's city, the Church, is besieged, and the great wall of the faith is shaken, battered by the encircling engines of heresy, and there is no small risk of the word of the Lord being swept into captivity through their devilish onslaught, deeming it a dreadful thing to decline taking part in the Christian conflict, I have not turned aside to repose, but have looked on the sweat of toil as more honourable than the relaxation of repose, knowing well that just as every man, as says the Apostle, shall receive his own reward 1 Corinthians 3:14 according to his own labour, so as a matter of course he shall receive punishment for neglect of labour proportioned to his strength. Accordingly I supported the first encounter in the discussion with good courage, discharging from my shepherd's scrip, i.e. from the teaching of the Church, my natural and unpremeditated arguments for the subversion of this blasphemy, needing not at all the equipment of arguments from profane sources to qualify me for the contest; and now also I do not hang back from the second part of the encounter, fixing my hope like great David on Him Who teaches my hands to war, and my fingers to fight, if haply the hand of the writer may in my case also be guided by Divine power to the overthrow of these heretical opinions, and my fingers may serve for the overthrow of their malignant array by directing my argument with skill and precision against the foe. But as in human conflicts those who excel in valour and might, secured by their armour and having previously acquired military skill by their training for facing danger, station themselves at the head of their column, encountering danger for those ranged behind them, while the rest of the company, though serving only to give an appearance of numbers, seem nevertheless, if only by their serried shields, to conduce to the common good, so in these our conflicts that noble soldier of Christ and vehement champion against the aliens, the mighty spiritual warrior Basil — equipped as he is with the whole armour described by the Apostle, and secured by the shield of faith, and ever holding before him that weapon of defense, the sword of the spirit — fights in the van of the Lord's host by his elaborated argument against this heresy, alive and resisting and prevailing over the foe, while we the common herd, sheltering ourselves beneath the shield of that champion of the faith, shall not hold back from any conflicts within the compass of our power, according as our captain may lead us on against the foe. As he, then, in his refutation of the false and untenable opinion maintained by this heresy, affirms that ungenerate cannot be predicated of God except as a mere notion or conception, whereof he has adduced proofs supported by common sense and the evidence of Scripture, while Eunomius, the author of the heresy, neither falls in with his statements nor is able to overturn them, but in his conflict with the truth, the more clearly the light of true doctrine shines forth, the more, like nocturnal creatures, does he shun the light, and, no longer able to find the sophistical hiding-places to which he is accustomed, he wanders about at random, and getting into the labyrinth of falsehood goes round and round in the same place, almost the whole of his second treatise being taken up with this empty trifling — it is well accordingly that our battle with those opposed to us should take place on the same ground whereon our champion by his own treatise has been our leader.

First of all, I think it's best to briefly review our own doctrinal beliefs and how our opponents disagree with them, so that our examination of these issues can proceed in an orderly way. Now the central point of Christian orthodoxy is to believe that the Only-begotten God, who is the truth and the true light, and the power of God and the life, is truly all that He is said to be—both in other ways and especially in this: that He is God and the truth, that is, God in truth, always being what He is understood to be and what He is called, who never at any time did not exist, nor will ever cease to exist, whose being, as it essentially is, is beyond the reach of any curious inquiry that would try to grasp it. But to us, as the word of Wisdom says, He makes Himself known through the greatness and beauty of His creatures in proportion to the things that are known, granting us the gift of faith through the works of His hands, but not the comprehension of what He is. While this is the belief held by all Christians—at least by those who are truly worthy of that name, those who have been taught by the law to worship nothing that is not truly God, and by that very act of worship confess that the Only-begotten is God in truth and not a God falsely so called—there arose this deadly plague upon the Church, bringing barrenness to the holy seeds of the faith, promoting the errors of Judaism and sharing to some extent in the impiety of the Greeks. For in its invention of a created God it promotes the error of the Greeks, and in not accepting the Son it supports that of the Jews. This school, which would destroy the very Godhead of the Lord and teach people to think of Him as a created being rather than as what the Father is in ousia and power and dignity, since these foggy ideas find no support when exposed on all sides to the light of truth, have ignored all those names supplied by Scripture for the glorification of God and applied equally to the Father and to the Son, and have turned instead to the word "ungenerate," a term they fabricated themselves to cast contempt on the greatness of the Only-begotten God. For while an orthodox confession teaches us to believe in the Only-begotten God so that all people should honor the Son just as they honor the Father, these people, rejecting the orthodox terms by which the greatness of the Son is expressed as equal with the dignity of the Father, draw from this the beginnings and foundations of their heresy regarding His Divinity. For since the Only-begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is of Him, they misrepresent this doctrine by changing the terms and use them to tear the true faith to pieces. For while the truth teaches that the Father is from no pre-existing cause, these people have given to such a view the name of ungeneracy, and they designate the ousia of the Only-begotten from the Father by the term generation—then comparing the two terms "ungenerate" and "generate" as contradictories to each other, they use this opposition to mislead their senseless followers. To make this clearer with an illustration: the expressions "He was generated" and "He was not generated" are much the same as "He is seated" and "He is not seated," and all similar expressions. But they twist these expressions away from the natural meaning of the terms and are eager to impose another meaning on them with the goal of subverting orthodoxy. For while, as has been said, the words "is seated" and "is not seated" are not equivalent in meaning—one expression being contradictory of the other—they claim that this formal contradiction in expression indicates an essential difference, assigning generation to the Son and non-generation to the Father as their essential attributes. Yet just as it is impossible to regard a man's sitting or not sitting as the ousia of the man—for one would not use the same definition for a man's sitting as for the man himself—so, by the analogy of the above example, the non-generated ousia is in its inherent idea something wholly different from the thing expressed by not having been generated. But our opponents, with an eye toward their evil goal of establishing their denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, do not say that the ousia of the Father is ungenerate, but conversely, they declare ungeneracy to be His ousia, so that by this distinction regarding generation they may establish, through the verbal opposition, a diversity of natures. In the direction of impiety they look with ten thousand eyes, but regarding the unworkability of their own argument they are as incapable of vision as people who deliberately close their eyes. For who but someone whose mental vision is utterly blind can fail to see the loose and insubstantial character of the foundation of their doctrine, and that their argument in support of ungeneracy as an ousia has nothing to stand on? For this is the way their error would establish itself.

First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent's disagreement with them, so that our review of the propositions in question may proceed methodically. Now the main point of Christian orthodoxy is to believe that the Only-begotten God, Who is the truth and the true light, and the power of God and the life, is truly all that He is said to be, both in other respects and especially in this, that He is God and the truth, that is to say, God in truth, ever being what He is conceived to be and what He is called, Who never at any time was not, nor ever will cease to be, Whose being, such as it is essentially, is beyond the reach of the curiosity that would try to comprehend it. But to us, as says the word of Wisdom, He makes Himself known that He is by the greatness and beauty of His creatures proportionately to the things that are known, vouchsafing to us the gift of faith by the operations of His hands, but not the comprehension of what He is. Whereas, then, such is the opinion prevailing among all Christians, (such at least as are truly worthy of the appellation, those, I mean, who have been taught by the law to worship nothing that is not very God, and by that very act of worship confess that the Only-begotten is God in truth, and not a God falsely so called,) there arose this deadly blight of the Church, bringing barrenness on the holy seeds of the faith, advocating as it does the errors of Judaism, and partaking to a certain extent in the impiety of the Greeks. For in its figment of a created God it advocates the error of the Greeks, and in not accepting the Son it supports that of the Jews. This school, then, which would do away with the very Godhead of the Lord and teach men to conceive of Him as a created being, and not that which the Father is in essence and power and dignity, since these misty ideas find no support when exposed on all sides to the light of truth, have overlooked all those names supplied by Scripture for the glorification of God, and predicated in like manner of the Father and of the Son, and have betaken themselves to the word ungenerate, a term fabricated by themselves to throw contempt on the greatness of the Only-begotten God. For whereas an orthodox confession teaches us to believe in the Only-begotten God so that all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father, these men, rejecting the orthodox terms whereby the greatness of the Son is signified as on a par with the dignity of the Father, draw from thence the beginnings and foundations of their heresy in regard to His Divinity. For as the Only-begotten God, as the voice of the Gospel teaches, came forth from the Father and is of Him, misrepresenting this doctrine by a change of terms, they make use of them to rend the true faith in pieces. For whereas the truth teaches that the Father is from no pre-existing cause, these men have given to such a view the name of ungeneracy, and signify the substance of the Only-begotten from the Father by the term generation, — then comparing the two terms ungenerate and generate as contradictories to each other, they make use of the opposition to mislead their senseless followers. For, to make the matter clearer by an illustration, the expressions, He was generated and He was not generated, are much the same as, He is seated and He is not seated, and all such-like expressions. But they, forcing these expressions away from the natural significance of the terms, are eager to put another meaning upon them with a view to the subversion of orthodoxy. For whereas, as has been said, the words is seated and is not seated are not equivalent in meaning (the one expression being contradictory of the other), they pretend that this formal contradiction in expression indicates an essential difference, ascribing generation to the Son and non-generation to the Father as their essential attributes. Yet, as it is impossible to regard a man's sitting down or not as the essence of the man (for one would not use the same definition for a man's sitting as for the man himself), so, by the analogy of the above example, the non-generated essence is in its inherent idea something wholly different from the thing expressed by not having been generated. But our opponents, with an eye to their evil object, that of establishing their denial of the Godhead of the Only-begotten, do not say that the essence of the Father is ungenerate, but, conversely, they declare ungeneracy to be His essence, in order that by this distinction in regard to generation they may establish, by the verbal opposition, a diversity of natures. In the direction of impiety they look with ten thousand eyes, but with regard to the impracticability of their own contention they are as incapable of vision as men who deliberately close their eyes. For who but one whose mental optics are utterly purblind can fail to discern the loose and unsubstantial character of the principle of their doctrine, and that their argument in support of ungeneracy as an essence has nothing to stand upon? For this is the way in which their error would establish itself.

I will do my best to respond to our opponents' argument. They claim that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by nature simple, and that what is simple permits no composition. Therefore, if God who is declared to be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungenerate must belong to His very nature, and that nature is identical with ungeneracy. We reply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, because the former indicates the simplicity of the subject while the latter indicates its being without origin. These expressions are not interchangeable in meaning, even though both are predicated of one subject. From the name Ungenerate we have learned that the One who is so named is without origin, and from the name simple that He is free from all mixture or composition. These terms cannot be substituted for each other. Therefore it is not necessary that, because the Godhead is by its nature simple, that nature should be called ungeneracy. Rather, insofar as He is indivisible and without composition, He is called simple, while insofar as He was not generated, He is called ungenerate.

But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies' argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the Godhead is by nature simple, and that which is simple admits of no composition. If, then, God Who is declared to be without generation is by His nature without composition, His title of Ungenerate must belong to His very nature, and that nature is identical with ungeneracy. To whom we reply that the terms incomposite and ungenerate are not the same thing, for the former represents the simplicity of the subject, the other its being without origin, and these expressions are not convertible in meaning, though both are predicated of one subject. But from the appellation of Ungenerate we have been taught that He Who is so named is without origin, and from the appellation of simple that He is free from all admixture (or composition), and these terms cannot be substituted for each other. There is therefore no necessity that, because the Godhead is by its nature simple, that nature should be termed ungeneracy; but in that He is indivisible and without composition, He is spoken of as simple, while in that He was not generated, He is spoken of as ungenerate.

Now if the term ungenerate did not signify being without origin, but the idea of simplicity were part of what the term means, and if God were called ungenerate in their heretical sense merely because He is simple and incomposite, and if the terms simple and ungenerate mean the same thing, then the simplicity of the Son would also be equivalent to ungeneracy. For they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His physis simple, unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Therefore the term simplicity would have no such connection in its meaning with being ungenerate that His physis should be called ungeneracy because of its incomposite character. Otherwise they bring on themselves one of two absurd alternatives: either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or attributing ungeneracy to Him as well. For if God is simple, and the term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they must either claim the Son is of composite nature, which would imply that He is not God, or if they allow His Godhead, and God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out to be ungenerate at the same time, if the terms simple and ungenerate are convertible. To make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We affirm that each of these terms has its own distinct meaning, and that the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate by simple. Rather, by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore, we hold that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness. Similarly, when we speak of Him by the name of Son, we neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son. Rather, the term Son indicates that He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple means what the word plainly indicates. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should be defined by the term ungenerate simply because that essence is simple. For neither do we say of the Son, who is simple and whom we also believe to be generated, that His essence is simplicity. But just as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. Likewise, the Son being generated, our reason is freed from any necessity to define His essence as generateness just because His essence is simple. Here again each expression has its own distinct force. For the term generated suggests to you a source from which He comes, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this does not satisfy them. For they maintain that since the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy, and on this account He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to them we may also observe that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He who is so called is simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of the Father to be creation and making, since their argument about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by the same reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of the Father—not as though the power residing in the essence created and made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For just as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, neither is ungeneracy the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clarity and conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not because He has never been generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, then by the same reasoning the Son must also be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is clear that we must address the Father as ungenerate because He was not generated. But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but indicates a difference in our ways of understanding, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence of the Father, and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the Father's being without origin, when they have set aside the term ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner from the subject matter and disclosing what we seek in articulate syllables, it must follow that God either is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word left to express such distinct significance in regard to Him. For since according to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument, something else and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been removed from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to each Person and not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions about the word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be maintained without confusion, unless there is a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Therefore if the term denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by this name. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called Son-Fathers, all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from their account. But if they say that there is nothing to prevent the distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that this term also represents the essence, let them distinguish for us the related meanings of the word, so that the notion of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal contrast. For as an equivalent to saying the Son has, and the Father has not, been generated, we too agree with the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation. But how a clear manifestation of essence can be made by this name, this they are unable to say. But keeping silent on this matter, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his earlier treatise. Because God, he says, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What does the notion of simplicity have to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten generated, but without controversy He is also simple. But, he says, He is also without parts and incomposite. But what does this have to do with the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite, and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.

Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were called ungenerate in their heretical sense, merely because He is simple and incomposite, and if the terms simple and ungenerate are the same in meaning, then too must the simplicity of the Son be equivalent with ungeneracy. For they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His nature simple, unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Accordingly the term simplicity will in its meaning have no such connection with being ungenerate as that, by reason of its incomposite character, His nature should be termed ungeneracy; or they draw upon themselves one of two absurd alternatives, either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or attributing ungeneracy to Him also. For if God is simple, and the term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they must either make out the Son to be of composite nature, by which term it is implied that neither is He God, or if they allow His Godhead, and God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out at the same time to be ungenerate, if the terms simple and ungenerate are convertible. But to make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We affirm that each of these terms has its own peculiar meaning, and that the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate by simple; but by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore we hold that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness; and in like manner in speaking of Him also by the appellation of Son we neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include the notion of Son, but the term Son we hold to indicate that He is of the substance of the Father, and the term simple we hold to mean what the word bears upon its face. Since, then, the meaning of the term simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should, because that essence is simple, be defined by the term ungenerate. For neither of the Son, Who is simple, and Whom also we believe to be generated, do we say that His essence is simplicity. But as the essence is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not ungeneracy. In like manner also the Son being generated, our reason is freed from any necessity that, because His essence is simple, we should define that essence as generateness; but here again each expression has its peculiar force. For the term generated suggests to you a source whence, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this does not approve itself to them. For they maintain that since the essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than ungeneracy; on which account also He is said to be ungenerate. In answer to whom we may also observe that, since they call the Father both Creator and Maker, whereas He Who is so called is simple in regard to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the essence of the Father to be creation and making, since the argument about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by a parity of reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of the Father, not as though the power residing in the essence created and made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For as the essence of the builder is not the thing built, no more is ungeneracy the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clearness and conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called ungenerate, not by reason of His having never been generated, but because His essence is simple and incomposite, by a parity of reasoning the Son also must be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be generated because He was generated, it is manifest that we must address the Father as ungenerate, because He was not generated. But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate. But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence (of the Father), and not that He has His substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the Father's being without origin, when they have set aside the term ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner from the subject-matter, and disclosing what we seek in articulate syllables, it must follow that God is not, or is not to be called, ungenerate, there being no word left to express such peculiar significance in regard to Him. For inasmuch as according to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their fallacious argument, something else, and not that He was not generated, their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the distinction between generated and ungenerate having been got rid of from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as denoting a difference in the attributes proper to either Person, and not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions as to the word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the difference of the persons should be without confusion, unless there be a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Accordingly if the term denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by the appellation. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are called Son-Fathers, all accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from their account. But if they say that there is nothing to hinder the distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the term ungenerate, and that term represents the essence too, let them distinguish for us the kindred meanings of the word, so that the notion of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal opposition. For as an equivalent to saying The Son has, and the Father has not, been generated, we too assent to the statement that the latter is ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation. But from what point of view a clear manifestation of essence can be made by this appellation, this they are unable to say. But keeping silence on this head, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling subtleties in his former treatise. Because God, says he, being simple, is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What has the notion of simplicity to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the Only-begotten generated, but, without controversy, He is simple also. But, says he, He is without parts also, and incomposite. But what is this to the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite: and yet He is not on that account ungenerate.

But, he says, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Agreed—for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet He is the Son. But this is not the point. The task before us is this: in what sense of "ungenerate" is ousia declared? For just as this word marks the difference of properties, so they maintain that the ousia also is indicated without ambiguity by one of the things signified by this term.

But, says he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But this is not the point. For the task set before us is this: in what signification of ungenerate is essence declared? For as this word marks the difference of the properties, so they maintain that the essence also is indicated without ambiguity by one of the things signified by the appellation.

But Eunomius leaves this matter unaddressed and merely says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is spoken in this way, he claims, is dissolved and passes away with its utterance. But what utterance exists that is not dissolved in this way? We do not preserve undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we speak with our voice in the mold of speech that we form once and for all with our lips. Rather, as soon as one utterance has been sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For when the breath of our voice is dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the place where this dispersion of our voice has occurred. So if he makes this the distinguishing characteristic of a term that expresses a mere conception—that it does not remain but vanishes with the voice that utters it—he might as well call every term a mere conception, since no substance remains in any term after its utterance. Nor will he be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he exempts from the products of conception, is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this vocal expression through the lips does not remain in the air. From this we may see the insubstantial character of his assertions, because even if we describe our mental conceptions in writing without speech, it is not as though the substantial objects of our thoughts will acquire their significance from the letters while the non-substantial will have no part in what the letters express. For whatever enters our mind, whether intellectually existing or otherwise, we can store away in writing at our discretion. Voice and letters have equal value for expressing thought, since we communicate what we think by the latter just as by the former. What justification he sees, then, for making the mental conception perish with the voice alone, I cannot comprehend. For in the case of all speech uttered by means of sound, the passage of breath that conveys the voice returns to its kindred element, but the sense of the spoken words is engraved by hearing on the memory of the hearer's soul, whether it be true or false. Is this not, then, a weak interpretation of his conception that our writer offers, when he characterizes and defines it by the dissolution of the voice? For this reason the understanding hearer, as Isaiah says, objects to this inconceivable account of mental conception, showing it—to use the man's own words—to be a truly dissoluble and insubstantial one, and he discusses scientifically the force inherent in the term, advancing his argument by familiar examples to the contemplation of doctrine. Against him Eunomius, exalting himself with this pompous writing, attempts to overthrow the true account of mental conception in this manner.

But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, says he, is dissolved, and passes away with its utterance. But what is there that is uttered but is so dissolved? For we do not keep undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we utter with our voice in the mould of the speech which we form once for all with our lips, but as soon as one speech has been sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For the breath of our voice being dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the spot in which such dispersion of our voice has taken place: so that if he makes this the distinguishing characteristic of a term that expresses a mere conception, that it does not remain, but vanishes with the voice that gives it utterance, he may as well at once call every term a mere conception, inasmuch as no substance remains in any term subsequent to its utterance. No, nor will he be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he excepts from the products of conception, is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this expression of the voice through the lips does not abide in the air. And from this we may see the unsubstantial character of his assertions; because, even if without speech we describe in writing our mental conceptions, it is not as though the substantial objects of our thoughts will acquire their significance from the letters, while the non-substantial will have no part in what the letters express. For whatever comes into our mind, whether intellectually existing, or otherwise, it is possible for us at our discretion to store away in writing. And the voice and letters are of equal value for the expression of thought, for we communicate what we think by the latter as well as by the former. What he sees, then, to justify his making the mental conception perish with the voice only, I fail to comprehend. For in the case of all speech uttered by means of sound, the passage of the breath indeed which conveys the voice is towards its kindred element, but the sense of the words spoken is engraved by hearing on the memory of the hearer's soul, whether it be true or false. Is not this, then, a weak interpretation of this conception of his that our writer offers, when he characterizes and defines it by the dissolution of the voice? And for this reason the understanding hearer, as says Isaiah, objects to this inconceivable account of mental conception, showing it, to use the man's own words, to be a veritably dissoluble and unsubstantial one, and he discusses scientifically the force inherent in the term, advancing his argument by familiar examples to the contemplation of doctrine. Against whom Eunomius exalting himself with this pompous writing, endeavours to overthrow the true account of mental conception, after this manner.

But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to ask what his purpose is in refusing to admit that "ungenerate" can be predicated of God by way of conception. Now the teaching that has been held in common by all who have received the word of our religion is that all hope of salvation should be placed in Christ, since it is impossible for anyone to be found among the righteous unless faith in Christ supplies what is needed. And since this conviction is firmly established in the souls of the faithful, and all honor and glory and worship are due to the Only-begotten God as the Author of life, who does the works of the Father, as the Lord himself says in the Gospel, and who falls short of no excellence in all knowledge of what is good, I do not know how they have been so perverted by malice and jealousy of the Lord's honor that, as though they judged the worship paid by the faithful to the Only-begotten God to be harmful to themselves, they oppose his divine honors and try to persuade us that nothing said of him is true. For according to them, he is not truly God, though Scripture apparently calls him so, nor, though called Son, does he have a physis that makes good the title, nor does he share in dignity or physis with the Father. For, they say, it is not possible for the one who is begotten to be of equal honor with the one who made him, either in dignity, or in power, or in physis, because the latter's life is infinite and his existence is from eternity, while the Son's life is in a way circumscribed, with the beginning of his being begotten limiting his life at the start and preventing it from being coextensive with the Father's eternity, so that his life also is to be regarded as defective. And the Father was not always what he now is and is said to be, but, having been something else before, he afterwards determined that he would be a Father, or rather that he would be so called. For he was not rightly called Father even of the Son, but of a creature falsely given the title of son. And in every way, they say, the younger is necessarily inferior to the elder, the finite to the eternal, and what is begotten by the will of the begetter is inferior to the begetter himself in power, dignity, physis, precedence due to age, and all other privileges of respect. But how can we justly honor with the honors due to the true God that which lacks the perfection of the more divine attributes? Thus they would establish the doctrine that one who is limited in power, lacking in the perfection of life, subject to a superior, and doing nothing by himself except what is authorized by the more powerful, is worthy of no divine honor and consideration, but that while we call him God, we are using a term empty of all grandeur in its meaning. And since such statements as these, when stripped of their plausible disguise, provoke indignation and make the hearer shudder at their strangeness (for who can tolerate an evil counselor openly and recklessly urging the overthrow of Christ's majesty?), they therefore try to corrupt foolish hearers with these foreign ideas by wrapping their malicious and deceptive arguments in many seductive fallacies. For after laying down such premises as would naturally lead the hearers' minds in the desired direction, they leave the hearer to draw his own conclusion.

But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predicated of God by way of conception. Now the tenet which has been held in common by all who have received the word of our religion is, that all hope of salvation should be placed in Christ, it being impossible for any to be found among the righteous, unless faith in Christ supply what is desired. And this conviction being firmly established in the souls of the faithful, and all honour and glory and worship being due to the Only-begotten God as the Author of life, Who does the works of the Father, as the Lord Himself says in the Gospel, and Who falls short of no excellence in all knowledge of that which is good, I know not how they have been so perverted by malignity and jealousy of the Lord's honour, that, as though they judged the worship paid by the faithful to the Only-begotten God to be a detriment to themselves, they oppose His Divine honours, and try to persuade us that nothing that is said of them is true. For with them neither is He very God, though called so, it would seem, by Scripture, nor, though called Son, has He a nature that makes good the appellation, nor has He a community of dignity or of nature with the Father. For, say they, it is not possible for Him that is begotten to be of equal honour with Him Who made Him, either in dignity, or in power, or in nature, because the life of the latter is infinite, and His existence from eternity, while the life of the Son is in a manner circumscribed, the beginning of His being begotten limiting His life at the commencement, and preventing it from being coextensive with the eternity of the Father, so that His life also is to be regarded as defective; and the Father was not always what He now is and is said to be, but, having been something else before, He afterwards determined that He would be a Father, or rather that He would be so called. For not even of the Son was He rightly called Father, but of a creature supposititiously invested with the title of son. And every way, say they, the younger is of necessity inferior to the elder, the finite to the eternal, that which is begotten by the will of the begetter, to the begetter himself, both in power, and dignity, and nature, and precedence due to age, and all other prerogatives of respect. But how can we justly dignify with the honours due to the true God that which is wanting in the perfection of the diviner attributes? Thus they would establish the doctrine that one who is limited in power, and wanting in the perfection of life, and subject to a superior, and doing nothing of himself but what is sanctioned by the authority of the more powerful, is in no divine honour and consideration, but that, while we call him God, we are employing a term empty of all grandeur in its significance. And since such statements as these, when stripped of their plausible dress, move indignation and make the hearer shudder at their strangeness (for who can tolerate an evil counsellor nakedly and unadvisably urging the overthrow of the majesty of Christ?), they therefore try to pervert foolish hearers with these foreign notions by enveloping their malignant and insidious arguments in a number of seductive fallacies. For after laying down such premises as might naturally lead the mind of the hearers in the desired direction, they leave the hearer to draw his conclusion for himself.

After saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in ousia with the true Father, and after using sophisticated arguments to infer this from the opposition between generate and ungenerate, they work silently toward their conclusion, their impiety advancing through the natural course of logical inference. Just as a poisoner makes his drug acceptable to his victim by sweetening its deadliness with honey—he merely has to offer it, while the drug works its way into the vital organs without any further action from the poisoner and does its deadly work—so our opponents act in the same way. By coating their destructive teaching with sophisticated arguments, as if with honey, once they have planted in the hearer's mind the poisonous falsehood that God the Only-begotten is not truly God, they let everything else be inferred without saying another word. When people are convinced that He is not truly God, it naturally follows that no other divine attribute truly applies either. If He is truly neither Son nor God, except by misuse of terms, then the other names given to Him in Holy Scripture are departures from the truth. One thing cannot be truly predicated of Him while the other is false; they must follow from one another, so that if He is truly God, it follows that He is Judge and King, and His various attributes are as they are described. But if His godhead is falsely asserted, then the truth does not hold for any of His other attributes either. Once they have deceived people into believing that the attribute of Godhead is falsely applied to the Only-begotten, it follows that He is not rightly the object of worship and adoration, or in fact of any of the honors paid to God. So to make their attack on the Savior effective, this is the blasphemous method they have adopted. They argue there is no need to look at the complete set of attributes by which the Son's equality in honor and dignity with the Father is shown; instead, from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue for a distinctive difference of physis, for the divine physis is what is denoted by the term ungenerate. Furthermore, since all sensible people regard it as impossible to describe the ineffable Being by any use of words—because our knowledge does not extend to comprehending what transcends knowledge, nor does our use of words have such power as to fully express our thoughts when the mind is focused on anything supremely lofty and divine—these supposedly wise people, on the contrary, convict everyone else of senselessness and ignorance of logic, assert their own knowledge of such matters, and claim their ability to teach it to whomever they wish. Accordingly, they maintain that the divine physis is simply ungeneracy itself, and declaring this to be sovereign and supreme, they make this word encompass the whole greatness of Godhead, thus necessitating the inference that if ungeneracy is the main element of the essence, and the other divine attributes are connected with it—namely Godhead, power, imperishableness and so on—if ungeneracy means these things, then if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest. Just as reason, the capacity to laugh, and the capacity for knowledge are proper to man, and what is not humanity cannot be classified among the properties of his physis, so if true Godhead consists in ungeneracy, then whatever thing the latter name does not properly belong to will not have any of the other distinguishing attributes of Godhead in it. If, then, ungeneracy is not predicable of the Son, it follows that none of His sublime and godlike attributes are properly ascribed to Him. This, then, is what they define as a correct understanding of the divine mysteries—the rejection of the Son's Godhead—practically shouting in the ears of those who would listen to them: You are granted perfection in knowledge if only you do not believe in God the Only-begotten as being truly God, and do not honor the Son as the Father is honored, but regard Him as by physis a created being, not Lord and Master, but slave and subject. This is the aim and purpose of their plan, though the blasphemy is concealed in different terms.

For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the opposition between generate and ungenerate, they work in silence to the conclusion, their impiety prevailing by the natural course of inference. And as the poisoner makes his drug acceptable to his victim by sweetening its deadliness with honey, and, as for himself, has only to offer it, while the drug insinuating itself into the vitals without further action on the part of the poisoner does its deadly work — so, too, do our opponents act. For qualifying their pernicious teaching with their sophistical refinements, as with honey, when they have infused into the mind of the hearer the venomous fallacy that God the Only-begotten is not very God, they cause all the rest to be inferred without saying a word. For when they are persuaded that He is not truly God, it follows as a matter of course that no other Divine attribute is truly applicable. For if He is truly neither Son nor God, except by an abuse of terms, then the other names which are given to Him in Holy Scripture are a divergence from the truth. For the one thing cannot be predicated of Him with truth, and the other be destitute of it; but they must needs follow one another, so that, if He be truly God, it follows that He is Judge and King, and that His several attributes are such as they are described, while, if His godhead be falsely asserted, neither will the truth hold respecting any of His other attributes. They, then, having been deceived into the persuasion that the attribute of Godhead is falsely applied to the Only-begotten, it follows that He is not rightly the object of worship and adoration, or, in fact, of any of the honours that are paid to God. In order, then, to render their attack upon the Saviour efficacious, this is the blasphemous method that they have adopted. There is no need, they urge, of looking at the collective attributes by which the Son's equality in honour and dignity with the Father is signified, but from the opposition between generate and ungenerate we must argue a distinctive difference of nature; for the Divine nature is that which is denoted by the term ungenerate. Again, since all men of sense regard it as impracticable to indicate the ineffable Being by any force of words, because neither does our knowledge extend to the comprehension of what transcends knowledge, nor does the ministry of words have such power in us as to avail for the full enunciation of our thought, where the mind is engaged on anything eminently lofty and divine, — these wise folk, on the contrary, convicting men in general of want of sense and ignorance of logic, assert their own knowledge of such matters, and their ability to impart it to whomsoever they will; and accordingly they maintain that the divine nature is simply ungeneracy per se, and declaring this to be sovereign and supreme, they make this word comprehend the whole greatness of Godhead, so as to necessitate the inference that if ungeneracy is the main point of the essence, and the other divine attributes are bound up with it, viz. Godhead, power, imperishableness and so on — if (I say) ungeneracy mean these, then, if this ungeneracy cannot be predicated of something, neither can the rest. For as reason, and risibility, and capacity of knowledge are proper to man, and what is not humanity may not be classed among the properties of his nature, so, if true Godhead consists in ungeneracy, then, to whatsoever thing the latter name does not properly belong, no one at all of the other distinguishing attributes of Godhead will be found in it. If, then, ungeneracy is not predicable of the Son, it follows that no other of His sublime and godlike attributes are properly ascribed to Him. This, then, they define as a right comprehension of the divine mysteries — the rejection of the Son's Godhead — all but shouting in the ear of those who would listen to them; To you it is given to be perfect in knowledge, if only you believe not in God the Only-begotten as being very God, and honour not the Son as the Father is honoured, but regard Him as by nature a created being, not Lord and Master, but slave and subject. For this is the aim and object of their design, though the blasphemy is cloaked in different terms.

Therefore, wrapping up his earlier false reasoning in the twisting turns of his sophisticated arguments, and craftily manipulating the term ungenerate, he deceives the understanding of those he tricks, saying to them: "Well then, if it is not so by way of conception, nor by deprivation, nor by division (since He is without parts), nor as being another in Himself (since He is the one and only ungenerate), then He Himself must be, in ousia, ungenerate."

Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals away the intelligence of his dupes, saying to them, "Well, then, if neither by way of conception it is so, nor by deprivation, nor by division (for He is without parts), nor as being another in Himself (for He is the one only ungenerate), He Himself must be, in essence, ungenerate.

Seeing, then, the harm that results to those deceived by this fallacious reasoning—namely, that to deny He is truly God means departing from our confession of Him as our Lord, which is indeed where his words lead his teaching—our master does not deny that "ungenerate" is not a partial predicate of God, himself also admitting that God is without quantity, magnitude, or parts. But he challenges the statement that this term should not be applied to God by way of mental conception, and he provides his proofs. However, shifting from this position again, our writer in the second of his treatises confronts us with his sophistry, arguing against his own statements regarding mental conception.

Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning — that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confession of Him as our Lord, to which conclusion indeed his words would bring his teaching — our master does not indeed deny that ungenerate is no partial predicate of God, himself also admitting that God is without quantity, or magnitude, or parts; but the statement that this term ought not to be applied to Him by way of mental conception he impugns, and gives his proofs. But again, shifting from this position, our writer in the second of his treatises meets us with his sophistry, combating his own statements in regard to mental conception.

Human nature has no capacity sufficient for fully comprehending the divine essence. It may be easy to demonstrate this in the case of human ability alone, and to say that the incorporeal creation is incapable of grasping and comprehending that nature which is infinite would not be far from the truth, as we can see from familiar examples. There are many and various things that have fleshly life—winged creatures and earthly ones, some that rise above the clouds by their wings, others that live in hollows or burrow underground. Comparing these, it appears there is no small difference between the inhabitants of air and land. But if the comparison is extended to the stars and the fixed heavens, it becomes clear that what soars on wings is not less removed from heaven than from the animals on earth. In the same way, the strength of angels compared with our own seems extraordinarily great because, undisturbed by sensation, it pursues lofty themes with pure, unclothed intelligence. Yet if we measure even their comprehension against the majesty of Him Who truly is, perhaps if someone dared to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his guess would fall within the bounds of probability. Wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and separates uncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former is not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter extends itself within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space; the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling investigation from every angle. In this life we can grasp the beginning and end of all things that exist, but the blessedness that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning. It is above all that either term signifies, being always the same, self-dependent, not progressing by degrees from one point to another in its life. For there is no participation of other life in its life such that we might infer end and beginning. Whatever it is, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. Increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature without passions excludes all notion of decrease. When we look up to heaven and partially grasp through our eyes the beauty in the heights, we do not doubt the existence of what we see. But if asked what it is, we cannot define its nature. We simply marvel as we contemplate the overarching vault, the reverse planetary motion, the so-called Zodiac engraved obliquely on the pole (whereby astronomers observe the motion of bodies revolving in the opposite direction), the differences of luminaries according to their magnitude and the distinctive qualities of their rays, their risings and settings that occur according to the circling year always at the same seasons unfailingly, the conjunctions of planets, the courses of those that pass below, the eclipses of those that are above, the shadowings by the earth, the reappearance of eclipsed bodies, the moon's many-formed changes, the motion of the sun midway within the poles, and how—filled with his own light, crowned with his encircling beams, and embracing all things in his sovereign light—he himself also at times suffers eclipse (the disc of the moon, as they say, passing before him), and how, by the will of Him Who has so ordained it, always running his own particular course, he completes his appointed orbit and progress, opening out the four seasons of the year in succession. When we contemplate these phenomena with the aid of sight, we have no doubt of their existence, though we are as far from comprehending their essential nature as if sight had given us no glimpse whatever of what we have seen. Similarly, regarding the Creator of the world, we know that He exists, but we cannot deny that we are ignorant of His essential nature. But since they boast that they know these things, let them first tell us about things of inferior nature—what they think of the body of the heavens, of the machinery that conveys the stars in their eternal courses, or of the sphere in which they move. However far speculation may proceed, when it reaches the uncertain and incomprehensible it must stop. For even if someone says that another body, similar in form to that body of the heavens and fitting its circular shape, checks its velocity so that, always turning in its course, it revolves in conformity to that other body upon itself, being kept by the force that embraces it from flying off at a tangent—yet how can he claim that these bodies will remain unworn by their constant friction with each other? And how is motion produced in the case of two coexisting bodies mutually fitted together, when one remains motionless? For the inner body, one would think, being held as in a vise by the motionlessness of that which embraces it, will be completely unable to act. And what maintains the embracing body in its fixedness so that it remains unshaken and unaffected by the motion of what fits into it? And if in restless curiosity of thought we conceive of some position for it that would keep it stationary, we must go on in logical consistency to search for the base of that base, and of the next, and of the next, and so on. The inquiry, proceeding from like to like, will go on to infinity and end in helpless perplexity. Even when some body has been proposed as the farthest foundation of the system of the universe, the mind still reaches after what is beyond, so there is no stopping in our inquiry after the limit of the embracing circles. But others say differently: according to the vain theory of those who have speculated on these matters, there is an empty space spread over the back of the heavens, and the motion of the universe revolves upon itself within this vacuum, meeting no resistance from any solid body capable of slowing it by opposition and checking its revolution. What, then, is that vacuum, which they say is neither a body nor an idea? How far does it extend, and what comes after it, and what relation exists between the firm, resisting body and that void and unsubstantial one? What unites things so contrary by nature? And how can the harmony of the universe consist of elements so incompatible? And what can anyone say of heaven itself? That it is a mixture of the elements it contains, or one of them, or something else besides them? What about the stars themselves? Where does their radiance come from? What is it and how is it composed? And what is the reason for their difference in beauty and magnitude? And the seven inner orbs revolving in a direction opposite to the motion of the universe—what are they, and by what influence are they propelled? Then too, what is that immaterial and ethereal empyrean, and the intermediate air that forms a wall of partition between that element in nature which gives heat and consumes, and that which is moist and combustible? And how does earth below form the foundation of the whole, and what keeps it firmly in its place? What controls its downward tendency? If anyone questions us on these and similar points, will any of us be found so presumptuous as to promise an explanation of them? No! The only reply that can be given by sensible people is this: that He Who made all things in wisdom can alone provide an account of His creation. For ourselves, through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, as the Apostle says.

It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human nature adequate to the full comprehension of the divine essence. It may be that it is easy to show this in the case of human capacity alone, and to say that the incorporeal creation is incapable of taking in and comprehending that nature which is infinite will not be far short of the truth, as we may see by familiar examples; for as there are many and various things that have fleshly life, winged things, and things of the earth, some that mount above the clouds by virtue of their wings, others that dwell in hollows or burrow in the ground, on comparing which it would appear that there was no small difference between the inhabitants of air and of land; while, if the comparison be extended to the stars and the fixed circumference, it will be seen that what soars aloft on wings is not less widely removed from heaven than from the animals that are on the earth; so, too, the strength of angels compared with our own seems preeminently great, because, undisturbed by sensation, it pursues its lofty themes with pure naked intelligence. Yet, if we weigh even their comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his conjecture would fall within the limits of probability, for wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature. The latter is limited, the former not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space: the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling curiosity from every point of view. In this life we can apprehend the beginning and the end of all things that exist, but the beatitude that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning, but is above all that is connoted by either, being ever the same, self-dependent, not travelling on by degrees from one point to another in its life; for there is no participation of other life in its life, such that we might infer end and beginning; but, be it what it may, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. For increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature passionless excludes all notion of decrease. And as, when looking up to heaven, and in a measure apprehending by the visual organs the beauty that is in the height, we doubt not the existence of what we see, but if asked what it is, we are unable to define its nature, but we simply admire as we contemplate the overarching vault, the reverse planetary motion, the so-called Zodiac graven obliquely on the pole, whereby astronomers observe the motion of bodies revolving in an opposite direction, the differences of luminaries according to their magnitude, and the specialities of their rays, their risings and settings that take place according to the circling year ever at the same seasons undeviatingly, the conjunctions of planets, the courses of those that pass below, the eclipses of those that are above, the obumbrations of the earth, the reappearance of eclipsed bodies, the moon's multiform changes, the motion of the sun midway within the poles, and how, filled with his own light, and crowned with his encircling beams, and embracing all things in his sovereign light, he himself also at times suffers eclipse (the disc of the moon, as they say, passing before him), and how, by the will of Him Who has so ordained, ever running his own particular course, he accomplishes his appointed orbit and progress, opening out the four seasons of the year in succession; we, as I say, when we contemplate these phenomena by the aid of sight, are in no doubt of their existence, though we are as far from comprehending their essential nature as if sight had not given us any glimpse whatever of what we have seen; and even so, with regard to the Creator of the world, we know that He exists, but of His essential nature we cannot deny that we are ignorant. But, boasting as they do that they know these things, let them first tell us about the things of inferior nature; what they think of the body of the heavens, of the machinery which conveys the stars in their eternal courses, or of the sphere in which they move; for, however far speculation may proceed, when it comes to the uncertain and incomprehensible it must stop. For though any one say that another body, like in fashion (to that body of the heavens), fitting to its circular shape, checks its velocity, so that, ever turning in its course, it revolves conformably to that other upon itself, being retained by the force that embraces it from flying off at a tangent, yet how can he assert that these bodies will remain unspent by their constant friction with each other? And how, again, is motion produced in the case of two coeval bodies mutually conformed, when the one remains motionless (for the inner body, one would have thought, being held as in a vice by the motionlessness of that which embraces it, will be quite unable to act); and what is it that maintains the embracing body in its fixedness, so that it remains unshaken and unaffected by the motion of that which fits into it? And if in restless curiosity of thought we should conceive of some position for it that should keep it stationary, we must go on in logical consistency to search for the base of that base, and of the next, and of the next, and so on, and so the inquiry, proceeding from like to like, will go on to infinity, and end in helpless perplexity, still, even when some body has been put for the farthest foundation of the system of the universe, reaching after what is beyond, so that there is no stopping in our inquiry after the limit of the embracing circles. But not so, say others: but (according to the vain theory of those who have speculated on these matters) there is an empty space spread over the back of the heavens, working in which vacuum the motion of the universe revolves upon itself, meeting with no resistance from any solid body capable of retarding it by opposition and of checking its course of revolution. What, then, is that vacuum, which they say is neither a body nor an idea? How far does it extend, and what succeeds it, and what relation exists between the firm, resisting body, and that void and unsubstantial one? What is there to unite things so contrary by nature? And how can the harmony of the universe consist out of elements so incongruous; and what can any one say of Heaven itself? That it is a mixture of the elements which it contains, or one of them, or something else beside them? What, again, of the stars themselves? Whence comes their radiance? What is it and how is it composed? And what is the reason of their difference in beauty and magnitude? And the seven inner orbs revolving in an opposite direction to the motion of the universe, what are they, and by what influence are they propelled? Then, too, what is that immaterial and ethereal empyrean, and the intermediate air which forms a wall of partition between that element in nature which gives heat and consumes, and that which is moist and combustible? And how does earth below form the foundation of the whole, and what is it that keeps it firmly in its place? What is it that controls its downward tendency? If any one should interrogate us on these and such-like points, will any of us be found so presumptuous as to promise an explanation of them? No! The only reply that can be given by men of sense is this:– that He Who made all things in wisdom can alone furnish an account of His creation. For ourselves, through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, as says the Apostle Hebrews 1:2.

If the lower creation that we can perceive with our senses surpasses human knowledge, how could He who made the worlds by His mere will be within reach of our understanding? Surely this is vanity and lying madness, as the Prophet says, to think we can comprehend things that are incomprehensible. We can see this in the way small children occupy themselves in their play. Often, when a sunbeam streams down on them through a window, they are delighted by its beauty and throw themselves at what they see, eager to catch the sunbeam in their hands. They compete with one another, grasping at the light with their fingers and imagining they have trapped the ray inside them. But when they open their hands and discover that the sunbeam they held has slipped through their fingers, they laugh and clap their hands. In the same way, the children of our generation, as the parable says, sit playing in the marketplaces. When they see the power of God shining into their souls through the dispensations of His providence and the wonders of His creation like a warm ray coming from the natural sun, they do not marvel at the divine gift or worship Him whom such things reveal. Instead, they go beyond the limits of the soul's capacities and seek with their sophisticated reasoning to grasp what cannot be grasped, thinking their arguments can lay hold of what they believe in. But when their argument unfolds and exposes the tangled web of their sophistries, discerning people immediately see that what they have grasped is nothing at all. So petty and childish are they, laboring in vain at impossibilities, trying to contain the inconceivable nature of God in the few syllables of the term ungenerate. They applaud their own foolishness and imagine God to be such that human reasoning can capture Him under a single term. While they claim to follow the teaching of the sacred writers, they are not afraid to raise themselves above them. What cannot be shown to have been said by any of those blessed ones whose words are recorded in the sacred books—these things, as the Apostle says, understanding neither what they say nor whereof they affirm—they nevertheless claim to know and boast of guiding others to such knowledge. Because of this, they declare that they have grasped that God the Only-begotten is not what He is called. Their premises force them to this conclusion.

If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be within the range of our apprehension? Surely this is vanity, and lying madness, as says the Prophet, to think it possible to comprehend the things which are incomprehensible. So may we see tiny children busying themselves in their play. For oft-times, when a sunbeam streams down upon them through a window, delighted with its beauty they throw themselves on what they see, and are eager to catch the sunbeam in their hands, and struggle with one another, and grasp the light in the clutch of their fingers, and fancy they have imprisoned the ray in them, but presently when they unclasp their hands and find that the sunbeam which they held has slipped through their fingers, they laugh and clap their hands. In like manner the children of our generation, as says the parable, sit playing in the market-places; for, seeing the power of God shining in upon their souls through the dispensations of His providence, and the wonders of His creation like a warm ray emanating from the natural sun, they marvel not at the Divine gift, nor adore Him Whom such things reveal, but passing beyond the limits of the soul's capabilities, they seek with their sophistical understanding to grasp that which is intangible, and think by their reasonings to lay hold of what they are persuaded of; but when their argument unfolds itself and discloses the tangled web of their sophistries, men of discernment see at once that what they have apprehended is nothing at all; so pettily and so childishly labouring in vain at impossibilities do they set themselves to include the inconceivable nature of God in the few syllables of the term ungenerate, and applaud their own folly, and imagine God to be such that human reasoning can include Him under one single term: and while they pretend to follow the teaching of the sacred writers, they are not afraid of raising themselves above them. For what cannot be shown to have been said by any of those blessed ones, any words of whose are recorded in the sacred books, these things, as says the Apostle, understanding neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm, they nevertheless say they know, and boast of guiding others to such knowledge. And on this account they declare that they have apprehended that God the Only-begotten is not what He is called. For to this conclusion they are compelled by their premises.

How pitiful they are in their cleverness! How wretched, how deadly is their overly wise philosophy! Who goes willingly into the pit as eagerly as these men work and exert themselves to dig out their lake of blasphemy? How far they have separated themselves from Christian hope! What a gulf they have fixed between themselves and the faith that saves! How far they have withdrawn from Abraham, the father of faith! He indeed—if in the lofty spirit of the Apostle we may interpret the words allegorically and so penetrate to the inner meaning of the story without losing sight of the truth of its actual events—he, I say, went out by divine command from his own country and relatives on a journey worthy of a prophet eager for knowledge of God. For no physical relocation seems to me to satisfy the idea of the blessings it indicates he found. For by going out from himself and from his country—by which I mean his earthly and fleshly mind—and raising his thoughts as far as possible above the common limits of nature, and abandoning the soul's kinship with the senses, so that undisturbed by any sensory objects his eyes might be open to invisible things, with neither sight nor sound to distract the mind in its work—walking, as the Apostle says, by faith and not by sight—he was raised so high by the sublimity of his knowledge that he came to be regarded as the peak of human perfection, knowing as much of God as finite human capacity at its fullest extent could possibly attain. Therefore the Lord of all creation, as though He were Abraham's discovery, is called specially the God of Abraham. Yet what does Scripture say about him? That he went out not knowing where he was going, nor even being able to learn the name of the One he loved, yet in no way impatient or ashamed because of such ignorance.

How pitiable are they for their cleverness! How wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit so eagerly as these men labour and bestir themselves to dig out their lake of blasphemy? How far have they separated themselves from the hope of the Christian! What a gulf have they fixed between themselves and the faith which saves! How far have they withdrawn themselves from Abraham the father of the faith! He indeed, if in the lofty spirit of the Apostle we may take the words allegorically, and so penetrate to the inner sense of the history, without losing sight of the truth of its facts — he, I say, went out by Divine command from his own country and kindred on a journey worthy of a prophet eager for the knowledge of God. Hebrews 11:8 For no local migration seems to me to satisfy the idea of the blessings which it is signified that he found. For going out from himself and from his country, by which I understand his earthly and carnal mind, and raising his thoughts as far as possible above the common boundaries of nature, and forsaking the soul's kinship with the senses — so that untroubled by any of the objects of sense his eyes might be open to the things which are invisible, there being neither sight nor sound to distract the mind in its work — walking, as says the Apostle, by faith, not by sight, he was raised so high by the sublimity of his knowledge that he came to be regarded as the acme of human perfection, knowing as much of God as it was possible for finite human capacity at its full stretch to attain. Therefore also the Lord of all creation, as though He were a discovery of Abraham, is called specially the God of Abraham. Yet what says the Scripture respecting him? That he went out not knowing whither he went, no, nor even being capable of learning the name of Him whom he loved, yet in no wise impatient or ashamed on account of such ignorance.

This, then, was what his safe guidance meant as he searched for what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the readily available means for learning about God, and that his mind, unhindered by any sense object, was never prevented from journeying in search of what lies beyond all that is known. Having gone far beyond the wisdom of his countrymen through reasoning (I mean the philosophy of the Chaldeans, which was limited to visible things), and rising above things that can be known by the senses, he desired to see the original pattern of all beauty based on the beauty of what he contemplated and the harmony of the heavenly wonders. And so too, all the other things he came to understand as he progressed through his reasoning—whether God's power, or His goodness, or His being without beginning, or His infinity, or whatever else can be conceived regarding the divine physis—he used all of them as provisions and tools for his journey forward, always making one discovery a stepping-stone to another, always reaching forward to what lay ahead, and establishing in his heart, as the Prophet says, each good stage of his progress. He passed by all knowledge gained through his own ability as falling short of what he was seeking. When he had gone beyond every guess about the divine physis suggested by any name among all our concepts of God, having cleansed his reason of all such ideas and arrived at a faith pure and free from all prejudice, he made this a sure and clear sign of the knowledge of God: the belief that He is greater and more exalted than any sign by which He may be known. For this reason, indeed, after the ecstasy that fell upon him and after his lofty meditations, falling back on his human weakness, he said, I am but dust and ashes—that is to say, without voice or power to express that good which his mind had conceived. For dust and ashes seem to indicate what is lifeless and barren, and so a law of faith arises for the life to come, teaching those who would approach God through this account of Abraham that it is impossible to draw near to God unless faith mediates and brings the searching soul into union with the incomprehensible physis of God. For leaving behind the curiosity that comes from knowledge, Abraham, the Apostle says, believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness. Now this was written not for his sake, the Apostle says, but for us, showing that God counts men's faith, not their knowledge, as righteousness. For knowledge acts in a kind of commercial way, dealing only with what is known. But the faith of Christians acts differently. For it is the substance not of things known, but of things hoped for. Now what we already have we no longer hope for. For what a man has, the Apostle says, why does he still hope for it? But faith makes our own what we do not see, assuring us by its own certainty of what does not appear. For so the Apostle speaks of the believer, that he endured as seeing Him who is invisible. Therefore, anyone who claims that it is possible to gain knowledge of the divine ousia through knowledge that uselessly puffs up is mistaken. For there is no one so great that he can claim equal understanding with the Lord, for as David says, Who among the clouds can be compared to the Lord? Nor is what is sought so small that it can be grasped by the reasoning of human shallowness. Listen to the preacher warning not to be quick to say anything before God, for God, he says, is in heaven above, and you are on earth beneath.

This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought — that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his instruction in the things of God, and that his mind, unimpeded by any object of sense, was never hindered from its journeying in quest of what lies beyond all that is known, but having gone by reasoning far beyond the wisdom of his countrymen, (I mean the philosophy of the Chaldees, limited as it was to the things which do appear,) and soaring above the things which are cognizable by sense, from the beauty of the objects of contemplation, and the harmony of the heavenly wonders, he desired to behold the archetype of all beauty. And so, too, all the other things which in the course of his reasoning he was led to apprehend as he advanced, whether the power of God, or His goodness, or His being without beginning, or His infinity, or whatever else is conceivable in respect to the divine nature, using them all as supplies and appliances for his onward journey, ever making one discovery a stepping-stone to another, ever reaching forth unto those things which were before, and setting in his heart, as says the Prophet, each fair stage of his advance, and passing by all knowledge acquired by his own ability as falling short of that of which he was in quest, when he had gone beyond every conjecture respecting the divine nature which is suggested by any name among all our conceptions of God, having purged his reason of all such fancies, and arrived at a faith unalloyed and free from all prejudice, he made this a sure and manifest token of the knowledge of God, viz. the belief that He is greater and more sublime than any token by which He may be known. On this account, indeed, after the ecstasy which fell upon him, and after his sublime meditations, falling back on his human weakness, I am, says he, but dust and ashes Genesis 18:27, that is to say, without voice or power to interpret that good which his mind had conceived. For dust and ashes seem to denote what is lifeless and barren; and so there arises a law of faith for the life to come, teaching those who would come to God, by this history of Abraham, that it is impossible to draw near to God, unless faith mediate, and bring the seeking soul into union with the incomprehensible nature of God. For leaving behind him the curiosity that arises from knowledge, Abraham, says the Apostle, believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness Genesis 15:6; Romans 4:22. Now it was not written for his sake, the Apostle says, but for us, that God counts to men for righteousness their faith, not their knowledge. For knowledge acts, as it were, in a commercial spirit, dealing only with what is known. But the faith of Christians acts otherwise. For it is the substance, not of things known, but of things hoped for. Now that which we have already we no longer hope for. For what a man has, says the Apostle, why does he yet hope for Romans 8:24? But faith makes our own that which we see not, assuring us by its own certainty of that which does not appear. For so speaks the Apostle of the believer, that he endured as seeing Him Who is invisible Hebrews 11:27. Vain, therefore, is he who maintains that it is possible to take knowledge of the divine essence, by the knowledge which puffs up to no purpose. For neither is there any man so great that he can claim equality in understanding with the Lord, for, as says David, Who is he among the clouds that shall be compared unto the Lord? nor is that which is sought so small that it can be compassed by the reasonings of human shallowness. Listen to the preacher exhorting not to be hasty to utter anything before God, for God, (says he,) is in heaven above, and thou upon earth beneath Ecclesiastes 5:2.

He shows, I think, through how these elements relate to or are separated from each other, how far the divine nature stands above human rational speculation. For that nature which transcends all intelligence is as high above earthly calculation as the stars are above the reach of our fingers, or rather, many times more than that.

He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations of human reason. For that nature which transcends all intelligence is as high above earthly calculation as the stars are above the touch of our fingers; or rather, many times more than that.

Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more reverent to believe that the majesty of God is greater than we can understand, than to imagine, after limiting His glory by our own mistaken ideas, that there is nothing beyond what we can conceive.

Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more reverent to believe the majesty of God to be greater than we can understand, than, after circumscribing His glory by our misconceptions, to suppose there is nothing beyond our conception of it.

For other reasons as well, it is safe to leave the Divine essence alone as unspeakable and beyond the scope of human reasoning. The desire to investigate what is obscure and trace out hidden things through human reasoning gives entrance to false notions just as much as to true ones, because someone who aspires to know the unknown will not always arrive at truth, but may also conceive of falsehood itself as truth. But the disciple of the Gospels and of Prophecy believes that He Who is, is—both from what he has learned from the sacred writers, and from the harmony of things that appear, and from the works of Providence. But what He is and how He is—leaving this as a useless and unprofitable speculation, such a disciple will open no door to falsehood against truth. For in speculative inquiry, fallacies readily find place. But where speculation is entirely at rest, the necessity of error is prevented. And that this is a true account of the case may be seen if we consider how heresies in the churches have wandered off into many and various opinions regarding God, with people deceiving themselves as they are swayed by one mental impulse or another, and how these very men with whom our treatise is concerned have slipped into such a pit of profanity. Would it not have been safer for all, following the counsel of wisdom, to abstain from searching into such deep matters, and in peace and quietness to keep inviolate the pure deposit of the faith? But since, in fact, human nothingness has begun intruding recklessly into matters that are above comprehension, and supporting by dogmatic teaching the inventions of their vain imagination, there has sprung up as a consequence a whole host of enemies to the truth, and among them these very men who are the subject of this treatise—dogmatizers of deceit who seek to limit the Divine Being, and all but openly idolize their own imagination, in that they deify the idea expressed by this ungeneracy of theirs, as if it were not only a certain relation discernible in the Divine nature, but as if it were itself God, or the ousia of God. Yet perhaps they would have done better to look to the sacred company of the Prophets and Patriarchs, to whom at various times and in various manners the Word of truth spoke, and, next in order, those who were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word, that they might give due honor to the claims on their belief of the things attested by the Holy Spirit Himself, and abide within the limits of their teaching and knowledge, and not venture on themes which are not comprehended in the canon of the sacred writers. For those writers, by revealing God, so long unknown to human life because of the prevalence of idolatry, and making Him known to men, both from the wonders which manifest themselves in His works and from the names which express the manifold variety of His power, lead men, as by the hand, to the understanding of the Divine nature, making known to them the bare grandeur of the thought of God. But the question of His ousia, as one which it is impossible to grasp, and which bears no fruit to the curious inquirer, they dismiss without any attempt at its solution. For whereas they have set forth respecting all other things that they were created—the heaven, the earth, the sea, times, ages, and the creatures that are in them—yet what each is in itself, and how and from where, on these points they are silent. So too concerning God Himself, they exhort men to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him, but regarding His nature, as being above every name, they neither name it nor concern themselves about it. For if we have learned any names expressive of the knowledge of God, all these are related and have analogy to such names as denote human characteristics. For just as those who would indicate some person unknown by marks of recognition speak of him as of good parentage and descent, if such happens to be the case, or as distinguished for his riches or his worth, or as in the prime of life, or of such or such stature, and in so speaking they do not set forth the nature of the person indicated, but give certain notes of recognition (for neither advantages of birth, nor of wealth, nor of reputation, nor of age constitute the man; they are considered simply as being observable in the man), thus too the expressions of Holy Scripture devised for the glory of God set forth one or another of the things which are declared concerning Him, each inculcating some special teaching. For by these expressions we are taught either His power, or that He admits not of deterioration, or that He is without cause and without limit, or that He is supreme above all things, or, in short, something, be it what it may, respecting Him. But His very ousia, as not to be conceived by the human intellect or expressed in words, this it has left untouched as a thing not to be made the subject of curious inquiry, ruling that it be revered in silence, in that it forbids the investigation of things too deep for us, while it enjoins the duty of being slow to utter any word before God. And therefore, whoever searches the whole of Revelation will find in it no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul? Who is acquainted with its very ousia, whether it is material or immaterial, whether it is purely incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal character? How it comes into being, how it is composed, from where it enters into the body, how it departs from it, or what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body? How, being intangible and without form, it is kept within its own sphere? What difference exists among its powers? How one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back on material passions—anger and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and boldness, friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in the faculties of the soul? Observing these things, who has not imagined that he has a sort of crowd of souls gathered together in himself, each of the aforesaid passions differing widely from the rest, and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so that even the rational faculty falls under and is subject to the predominating power of such forces, and contributes its own cooperation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? What word, then, of the inspired Scripture has taught us the manifold and multiform character of what we understand in speaking of the soul? Is it a unity composed of them all, and, if so, what is it that blends and harmonizes things mutually opposed, so that many things become one, while each element, taken by itself, is shut up in the soul as in some ample vessel? And how is it that we do not have the perception of them all as being involved in it, being at one and the same time confident and afraid, at once hating and loving and feeling in ourselves the working as well of all other emotions confused and intermingled? But, on the contrary, we take knowledge only of their alternate control, when one of them prevails, the rest remaining quiet. What in short is this composition and arrangement, and this capacious void within us, such that to each is assigned its own post, as though hindered by middle walls of partition from holding intercourse with its neighbor? And then again what account has explained whether passion is the fundamental ousia of the soul, or fear, or any of the other elements which I have mentioned, and what emotions are unsubstantial? For if these have an independent subsistence, then, as I have said, there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul, but a collection of souls, each of them occupying its distinct position as a particular and individual soul. But if we must suppose these to be a kind of emotion without subsistence, how can that which has no essential existence exercise lordship over us, having reduced us as it were to slavery under whichever of these things may have happened to prevail? And if the soul is something that thought alone can grasp, how can that which is manifold and composite be contemplated as such, when such an object ought to be contemplated by itself, independently of these bodily qualities? Then, as to the soul's power of growth, of desire, of nutrition, of change, and the fact that all the bodily powers are nourished, while feeling does not extend through all, but, as in things without life, some of our members are destitute of feeling—the bones for example, the cartilages, the nails, the hair, all of which take nourishment but do not feel—tell me who is there that understands this only half-complete operation of the soul as to these? And why do I speak of the soul? Even the inquiry as to that thing in the flesh itself which assumes all the corporeal qualities has not been

And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the desire of investigating what is obscure and tracing out hidden things by the operation of human reasoning gives an entrance to false no less than to true notions, inasmuch as he who aspires to know the unknown will not always arrive at truth, but may also conceive of falsehood itself as truth. But the disciple of the Gospels and of Prophecy believes that He Who is, is; both from what he has learned from the sacred writers, and from the harmony of things which do appear, and from the works of Providence. But what He is and how — leaving this as a useless and unprofitable speculation, such a disciple will open no door to falsehood against truth. For in speculative enquiry fallacies readily find place. But where speculation is entirely at rest, the necessity of error is precluded. And that this is a true account of the case, may be seen if we consider how it is that heresies in the churches have wandered off into many and various opinions in regard to God, men deceiving themselves as they are swayed by one mental impulse or another; and how these very men with whom our treatise is concerned have slipped into such a pit of profanity. Would it not have been safer for all, following the counsel of wisdom, to abstain from searching into such deep matters, and in peace and quietness to keep inviolate the pure deposit of the faith? But since, in fact, human nothingness has commenced intruding recklessly into matters that are above comprehension, and supporting by dogmatic teaching the figments of their vain imagination, there has sprung up in consequence a whole host of enemies to the truth, and among them these very men who are the subject of this treatise; dogmatizers of deceit who seek to limit the Divine Being, and all but openly idolize their own imagination, in that they deify the idea expressed by this ungeneracy of theirs, as not being only in a certain relation discernible in the Divine nature, but as being itself God, or the essence of God. Yet perchance they would have done better to look to the sacred company of the Prophets and Patriarchs, to whom at sundry times, and in various manners Hebrews 1:1, the Word of truth spoke, and, next in order, those who were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, that they might give honour due to the claims on their belief of the things attested by the Holy Spirit Himself, and abide within the limits of their teaching and knowledge, and not venture on themes which are not comprehended in the canon of the sacred writers. For those writers, by revealing God, so long unknown to human life by reason of the prevalence of idolatry, and making Him known to men, both from the wonders which manifest themselves in His works, and from the names which express the manifold variety of His power, lead men, as by the hand, to the understanding of the Divine nature, making known to them the bare grandeur of the thought of God; while the question of His essence, as one which it is impossible to grasp, and which bears no fruit to the curious enquirer, they dismiss without any attempt at its solution. For whereas they have set forth respecting all other things, that they were created, the heaven, the earth, the sea, times, ages, and the creatures that are therein, but what each is in itself, and how and whence, on these points they are silent; so, too, concerning God Himself, they exhort men to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him Hebrews 11:6, but in regard to His nature, as being above every name, they neither name it nor concern themselves about it. For if we have learned any names expressive of the knowledge of God, all these are related and have analogy to such names as denote human characteristics. For as they who would indicate some person unknown by marks of recognition speak of him as of good parentage and descent, if such happen to be the case, or as distinguished for his riches or his worth, or as in the prime of life, or of such or such stature, and in so speaking they do not set forth the nature of the person indicated, but give certain notes of recognition (for neither advantages of birth, nor of wealth, nor of reputation, nor of age, constitute the man; they are considered, simply as being observable in the man), thus too the expressions of Holy Scripture devised for the glory of God set forth one or another of the things which are declared concerning Him, each inculcating some special teaching. For by these expressions we are taught either His power, or that He admits not of deterioration, or that He is without cause and without limit, or that He is supreme above all things, or, in short, something, be it what it may, respecting Him. But His very essence, as not to be conceived by the human intellect or expressed in words, this it has left untouched as a thing not to be made the subject of curious enquiry, ruling that it be revered in silence, in that it forbids the investigation of things too deep for us, while it enjoins the duty of being slow to utter any word before God. And therefore, whosoever searches the whole of Revelation will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul? Who is acquainted with its very essence, whether it is material or immaterial, whether it is purely incorporeal, or whether it exhibits anything of a corporeal character; how it comes into being, how it is composed, whence it enters into the body, how it departs from it, or what means it possesses to unite it to the nature of the body; how, being intangible and without form, it is kept within its own sphere, what difference exists among its powers, how one and the same soul, in its eager curiosity to know the things which are unseen, soars above the highest heavens, and again, dragged down by the weight of the body, falls back on material passions, anger and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and cruelty, hope and memory, cowardice and audacity, friendship and hatred, and all the contraries that are produced in the faculties of the soul? Observing which things, who has not fancied that he has a sort of populace of souls crowded together in himself, each of the aforesaid passions differing widely from the rest, and, where it prevails, holding lordship over them all, so that even the rational faculty falls under and is subject to the predominating power of such forces, and contributes its own co-operation to such impulses, as to a despotic lord? What word, then, of the inspired Scripture has taught us the manifold and multiform character of what we understand in speaking of the soul? Is it a unity composed of them all, and, if so, what is it that blends and harmonizes things mutually opposed, so that many things become one, while each element, taken by itself, is shut up in the soul as in some ample vessel? And how is it that we have not the perception of them all as being involved in it, being at one and the same time confident and afraid, at once hating and loving and feeling in ourselves the working as well of all other emotions confused and intermingled; but, on the contrary, take knowledge only of their alternate control, when one of them prevails, the rest remaining quiescent? What in short is this composition and arrangement, and this capacious void within us, such that to each is assigned its own post, as though hindered by middle walls of partition from holding intercourse with its neighbour? And then again what account has explained whether passion is the fundamental essence of the soul, or fear, or any of the other elements which I have mentioned; and what emotions are unsubstantial? For if these have an independent subsistence, then, as I have said, there is comprehended in ourselves not one soul, but a collection of souls, each of them occupying its distinct position as a particular and individual soul. But if we must suppose these to be a kind of emotion without subsistence, how can that which has no essential existence exercise lordship over us, having reduced us as it were to slave under whichsoever of these things may have happened to prevail? And if the soul is something that thought only can grasp, how can that which is manifold and composite be contemplated as such, when such an object ought to be contemplated by itself, independently of these bodily qualities? Then, as to the soul's power of growth, of desire, of nutrition, of change, and the fact that all the bodily powers are nourished, while feeling does not extend through all, but, as in things without life, some of our members are destitute of feeling, the bones for example, the cartilages, the nails, the hair, all of which take nourishment, but do not feel — tell me who is there that understands this only half-complete operation of the soul as to these? And why do I speak of the soul? Even the inquiry as to that thing in the flesh itself which assumes all the corporeal qualities has not been pursued to any definite result. For if any one has made a mental analysis of that which is seen into its component parts, and, having stripped the object of its qualities, has attempted to consider it by itself, I fail to see what will have been left for investigation. For when you take from a body its color, its shape, its degree of resistance, its weight, its quantity, its position, its forces active or passive, its relation to other objects, what remains, that can still be called a body, we can neither see of ourselves, nor are we taught it by Scripture. But how can he who is ignorant of himself take knowledge of anything that is above himself? And if a man is familiarized with such ignorance of himself, is he not plainly taught by the very fact not to be astonished at any of the mysteries that are without? Wherefore also, of the elements of the world, we know only so much by our senses as to enable us to receive what they severally supply for our living. But we possess no knowledge of their substance, nor do we count it loss to be ignorant of it. For what does it profit me to inquire curiously into the nature of fire, how it is struck out, how it is kindled, how, when it has caught hold of the fuel supplied to it, it does not let it go till it has devoured and consumed its prey; how the spark is latent in the flint, how steel, cold as it is to the touch, generates fire, how sticks rubbed together kindle flame, how water shining in the sun causes a flash; and then again the cause of its upward tendency, its power of incessant motion?– Putting aside all which curious questions and investigations, we give heed only to the subservience of this fire to life, seeing that he who avails himself of its service fares no worse than he who busies himself with inquiries into its nature.

Therefore, Holy Scripture passes over all useless inquiry into substance as excessive and unnecessary. And I think this is why John, the Son of Thunder, who with the loud voice of the doctrines in his Gospel rose above the preaching that announced them, said at the end of his Gospel, "There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." He certainly does not mean by this the miracles of healing, for the narrative leaves none of these unrecorded, even though it does not mention the names of all who were healed. For when he tells us that the dead were raised, that the blind received their sight, that the deaf heard, that the lame walked, and that He healed all kinds of sickness and all kinds of disease, he does not leave any miracle unrecorded in this, but includes each and all of them in these general terms. But it may be that the Evangelist means this in his profound wisdom: that we are to learn the majesty of the Son of God not only by the miracles He did in the flesh. For these are small compared with the greatness of His other work. But look up to Heaven! See its glories! Transfer your thought to the wide extent of the earth, and the watery depths! Take in with your mind the whole world, and when you have come to knowledge of the nature beyond the world, learn that these are the true works of Him who lived among you in the flesh, which (he says), if each were written—and the ousia, manner, origin, and extent of each given—the world itself could not contain the fullness of Christ's teaching about the world itself. For since God has made all things in wisdom, and to His wisdom there is no limit (for His understanding, says the Scripture, is infinite), the world, which is bounded by its own limits, cannot contain within itself the account of infinite wisdom. If, then, the whole world is too small to contain the teaching of the works of God, how many worlds could contain an account of the Lord of them all? For perhaps it will not be denied even by the tongue of the blasphemer that the Maker of all things, which have been created by the mere command of His will, is infinitely greater than all. If, then, the whole creation cannot contain what might be said about itself (for so, according to our explanation, the great Evangelist testifies), how should human shallowness contain all that might be said of the Lord of Creation? Let those grand talkers tell us what man is, in comparison with the universe, what geometrical point is so without size, which of the atoms of Epicurus is capable of such infinitely small reduction in the empty imagination of those who make such problems the object of their study, which of them falls so little short of non-existence, as human shallowness when compared with the universe. As great David also says, with true insight into human weakness, "My age is as nothing unto You," not saying that it is absolutely nothing, but indicating, by this comparison to the non-existent, that what is so extremely brief is next to nothing at all.

Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thunder, who with the loud voice of the doctrines contained in his Gospel rose above that of the preaching which heralded them, said at the close of his Gospel, There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written. He certainly does not mean by these the miracles of healing, for of these the narrative leaves none unrecorded, even though it does not mention the names of all who were healed. For when he tells us that the dead were raised, that the blind received their sight, that the deaf heard, that the lame walked, and that He healed all manner of sickness and all manner of disease, he does not in this leave any miracle unrecorded, but embraces each and all in these general terms. But it may be that the Evangelist means this in his profound wisdom: that we are to learn the majesty of the Son of God not by the miracles alone which He did in the flesh. For these are little compared with the greatness of His other work. But look thou up to Heaven! Behold its glories! Transfer your thought to the wide compass of the earth, and the watery depths! Embrace with your mind the whole world, and when you have come to the knowledge of supramundane nature, learn that these are the true works of Him Who sojourned for you in the flesh, which (says he), if each were written — and the essence, manner, origin, and extent of each given — the world itself could not contain the fullness of Christ's teaching about the world itself. For since God has made all things in wisdom, and to His wisdom there is no limit (for His understanding, says the Scripture, is infinite), the world, that is bounded by limits of its own, cannot contain within itself the account of infinite wisdom. If, then, the whole world is too little to contain the teaching of the works of God, how many worlds could contain an account of the Lord of them all? For perhaps it will not be denied even by the tongue of the blasphemer that the Maker of all things, which have been created by the mere fiat of His will, is infinitely greater than all. If, then, the whole creation cannot contain what might be said respecting itself (for so, according to our explanation, the great Evangelist testifies), how should human shallowness contain all that might be said of the Lord of Creation? Let those grand talkers inform us what man is, in comparison with the universe, what geometrical point is so without magnitude, which of the atoms of Epicurus is capable of such infinitesimal reduction in the vain fancy of those who make such problems the object of their study, which of them falls so little short of non- existence, as human shallowness, when compared with the universe. As says also great David, with a true insight into human weakness, Mine age is as nothing unto You, not saying that it is absolutely nothing, but signifying, by this comparison to the non-existent, that what is so exceedingly brief is next to nothing at all.

But despite having only such a nature as their starting point, they speak boldly against the ineffable Power and try to contain the infinite nature within a single term, confining the Divine essence within the narrow boundaries of the word "ungeneracy," so that they may prepare the way for their blasphemy against the Only-begotten. Although the great Basil had corrected this error and shown, regarding these terms, that they have no existence in nature but are attached as concepts to the things they signify, they are so far from returning to the truth that they cling to what they have once asserted as if stuck to birdlime, and they will not release their grip on their deceptive argument. They do not allow the term "ungeneracy" to be used as a mental concept, but make it represent the Divine physis itself. Now to work through their entire argument and attempt to refute it by discussing word by word their trivial and long-winded nonsense would require much leisure, time, and freedom from other obligations. Just as I hear that Eunomius, after applying himself at his leisure and laboriously for a number of years exceeding those of the Trojan War, has constructed this fantasy for himself in his deep sleep, carefully seeking not how to explain any of the ideas he has reached, but how to drag and force them into conformity with his phrases, going around and collecting from certain books the words in them that sound most impressive. And just as beggars lacking clothing pin and patch together tunics for themselves out of rags, so he, plucking a phrase here and a phrase there, has woven together for himself the patchwork of his treatise, gluing in and fixing together the connections of his language with much labor and effort, displaying in this a petty and childish ambition for debate, which any person with an eye to reality would scorn, just as a mature wrestler, no longer in his prime, would scorn to act like a woman through excessive attention to dress. But it seems to me that when the scope of the whole question has been briefly examined, his roundabout flourishes may well be ignored.

But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by one appellation the infinite nature, confining the Divine essence within the narrow limits of the term ungeneracy, that they may thereby pave a way for their blasphemy against the Only-begotten; but although the great Basil had corrected this false opinion, and pointed out, in regard to the terms, that they have no existence in nature, but are attached as conceptions to the things signified, so far are they from returning to the truth, that they stick to what they have once advanced, as to birdlime, and will not loose their hold of their fallacious mode of argument, nor do they allow the term ungeneracy to be used in the way of a mental conception, but make it represent the Divine nature itself. Now to go through their whole argument, and to attempt to overthrow it by discussing word by word their frivolous and long-winded nonsense, would be a task requiring much leisure, and time, and freedom from calls of business. Just as I hear that Eunomius, after applying himself at his leisure, and laboriously, for a number of years exceeding those of the Trojan War, has fabricated this dream for himself in his deep slumbers, studiously seeking, not how to interpret any of the ideas which he has arrived at, but how to drag and force them into keeping with his phrases, and going round and collecting out of certain books the words in them that sound grandest. And as beggars in lack of clothing pin and tack together tunics for themselves out of rags, so he, cropping here a phrase and there a phrase, has woven together for himself the patchwork of his treatise, glueing in and fixing together the joinings of his diction with much labour and pains, displaying therein a petty and juvenile ambition for combat, which any man who has an eye to actuality would disdain, just as a steadfast wrestler, no longer in the prime of life, would disdain to play the woman by over-niceness in dress. But to me it seems that, when the scope of the whole question has been briefly run through, his roundabout flourishes may well be let alone.

I have said, then (for I make my master's words my own), that reason gives us only a dim and imperfect understanding of the Divine nature. Nevertheless, the knowledge we gain from the terms that piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have the same significance. Some of them express qualities inherent in God, and others express qualities that are not, as when we say that He is just or incorruptible. By the term just we mean that justice is found in Him, and by incorruptible we mean that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented by a term which does not belong to Him at all, and what is foreign to His nature may be represented by what does belong to Him. Since justice is the opposite of injustice, and everlastingness is the contrary of destruction, we may appropriately and without error use contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not unjust, which is the same as saying that He is just, and that He does not admit corruption. In the same way, other names of God, by a certain change of meaning, may be suitably used to express either sense—for example good, and immortal, and all expressions formed in a similar way. Each of these terms, depending on how it is taken, can indicate what does or does not belong to the Divine nature, so that, despite the formal change, our orthodox belief concerning the object remains firmly fixed. It amounts to the same thing whether we speak of God as incapable of evil, or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He lives forever. We understand no difference in the meaning of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though one may seem to convey affirmation and the other negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or when we speak of Him as without cause, we are not contradicting ourselves in meaning. By either name we declare that God is the supreme Ruler and First Cause of all. Accordingly, when we speak of Him as without cause and as Lord of all, in the former case we indicate what does not belong to Him, and in the latter case what does. It is possible, as I have said, by a change in what is signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice versa. It is permissible, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungenerately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at odds with each other, the meaning remains one and the same. In questions about God, the goal is not to produce a sweet and harmonious arrangement of words, but to work out an orthodox formulation of thought by which a worthy conception of God may be secured. Since it is only orthodox to conclude that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause, if this position is established, what further argument over words remains for people of sense and judgment, when every word that conveys such an idea to us has the same meaning? Whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence, as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a way, of similar force and equivalent to one another as far as the meaning of what is signified is concerned. It is mere foolishness to argue for this or that vocal sound, as if orthodoxy were a matter of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view has been carefully explained by our great master, so that all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may clearly see that, whatever the nature of God may be, He is not to be grasped by the senses, and that He transcends reason. Yet human thought, engaging in careful inquiry with such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unapproachable and sublime nature. It is neither sharp-sighted enough to see clearly what is invisible, nor so completely kept from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse of what it seeks to know. It attains such knowledge partly by the touch of reason, and partly from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that what is sought transcends knowledge. It has learned what is contrary to the Divine nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured about it. Not that it has been able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the knowledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this human mind sees what alone can be seen: that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good, is altogether such as I would call ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.

I have said, then (for I make my master's words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature; nevertheless, the knowledge that we gather from the terms which piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have a uniform significance; for some of them express qualities inherent in God, and others qualities that are not, as when we say that He is just or incorruptible, by the term just signifying that justice is found in Him, and by incorruptible that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented by a term which in no wise belongs to Him, and what is foreign to His nature may be represented by what belongs to Him. For whereas justice is the contradictory of injustice, and everlastingness the contrary of destruction, we may fitly and without impropriety employ contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not unjust, which is equivalent to saying that He is just, and that He admits not of corruption. So, too, we may say that other names of God, by a certain change of signification, may be suitably employed to express either meaning, for example good, and immortal, and all expressions of like formation; for each of these terms, according as it is taken, is capable of indicating what does or what does not appertain to the Divine nature, so that, notwithstanding the formal change, our orthodox opinion in regard to the object remains immovably fixed. For it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil, or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He ever lives. For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and the other of negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or again, when we speak of Him as without cause, we are guilty of no contradiction in sense, declaring as we do by either name that God is the prime Ruler and First Cause of all. Accordingly when we speak of Him as without cause, and as Lord of all, in the former case we signify what does not attach to Him, in the latter case what does; it being possible, as I have said, by a change of the things signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice versa. For it is allowable, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungenerately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at variance with each other, the sense remains one and the same. For the object to be aimed at, in questions respecting God, is not to produce a dulcet and melodious harmony of words, but to work out an orthodox formula of thought, whereby a worthy conception of God may be ensured. Since, then, it is only orthodox to infer that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause, if this opinion is established, what further contention of words remains for men of sense and judgment, when every word whereby such a notion is conveyed to us has the same signification? For whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence, as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a manner, of like force, and equivalent to one another, as far as the meaning of the things signified is concerned; and it is mere folly to contend for this or that vocal intonation, as if orthodoxy were a thing of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view, then, has been carefully enunciated by our great master, whereby all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may clearly see that, whatever be the nature of God, He is not to be apprehended by sense, and that He transcends reason, though human thought, busying itself with curious inquiry, with such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unapproachable and sublime nature, being neither keen-sighted enough to see clearly what is invisible, nor yet so far withheld from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse of what it seeks to know. For such knowledge it attains in part by the touch of reason, in part from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that what is sought transcends knowledge (for it has learned what is contrary to the Divine nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured respecting it). Not that it has been able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the knowledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this mind of man sees what alone can be seen, that that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good, is altogether such as I should pronounce ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.

Although our great teacher has removed all unworthy ideas about the Divine nature and has urged and taught everything that may be reverently and properly believed concerning it—namely, that the First Cause is neither something corruptible nor something brought into existence through any kind of birth, but rather stands outside the range of every such conception, and that by denying what is not inherent in God and affirming what may be reverently conceived as inherent in Him, we can best understand what He is—this fierce opponent of the truth nevertheless opposes these teachings and hopes that the impressive-sounding word "ungeneracy" will provide a clear definition of the ousia of God.

But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be reverently and fittingly held concerning it, viz. that the First Cause is neither a corruptible thing, nor one brought into being by any birth, but that it is outside the range of every conception of the kind; and that from the negation of what is not inherent, and the affirmation of what may be with reverence conceived to be inherent therein, we may best apprehend what He is — nevertheless this vehement adversary of the truth opposes these teachings, and hopes with the sounding word ungeneracy to supply a clear definition of the essence of God.

Anyone who has paid attention to how words are used can clearly see that the word incorruption uses its negative prefix to indicate that neither corruption nor birth belongs to God—just as many other words formed in the same way indicate the absence of something that is not present rather than the presence of something that is. For example: harmless, painless, guileless, undisturbed, passionless, sleepless, undiseased, impossible, unblamable, and similar words. All these terms truly apply to God and provide a kind of list and inventory of evil qualities from which God is separate. However, the terms we use give no positive description of that to which they are applied. We learn from them what something is not, but the force of these words does not tell us what it actually is. For example, if someone wanting to describe the nature of man were to say that it is not lifeless, not insentient, not winged, not four-footed, not amphibious, he would not be indicating what it is—he would simply be declaring what it is not, and he would be no more making false statements about man than he would be positively defining his subject. In the same way, from the many things that are said of the Divine nature, we learn the conditions under which we may conceive of God as existing, but such statements do not tell us what He is essentially.

And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that neither corruption nor birth appertains to God: just as many other words of like formation denote the absence of what is not inherent rather than the presence of what is; e.g. harmless, painless, guileless, undisturbed, passionless, sleepless, undiseased, impossible, unblamable, and the like. For all these terms are truly applicable to God, and furnish a sort of catalogue and muster of evil qualities from which God is separate. Yet the terms employed give no positive account of that to which they are applied. We learn from them what it is not; but what it is, the force of the words does not indicate. For if some one, wishing to describe the nature of man, were to say that it is not lifeless, not insentient, not winged, not four-footed, not amphibious, he would not indicate what it is: he would simply declare what it is not, and he would be no more making untrue statements respecting man than he would be positively defining his subject. In the same way, from the many things which are predicated of the Divine nature, we learn under what conditions we may conceive God as existing, but what He is essentially, such statements do not inform us.

While we carefully avoid any agreement with absurd ideas in our thinking about God, we allow ourselves to use many different names for Him, adapting them to our perspective. Since no suitable word has been found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names, each adding something new to our understanding of Him through some distinctive feature—thus seeking through variety of terminology to gain some glimpses toward comprehending what we seek. For when we question and examine ourselves about what God is, we express our conclusions in various ways: that He is the one who presides over the system and operation of all things that exist, that His existence has no cause while He is the Cause of existence for everything else; that He is the one who has no generation or beginning, no corruption, no turning backward, no diminution of supremacy; that He is the one in whom evil finds no place, and from whom no good is absent.

While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appellations in regard to Him, adapting them to our point of view. For whereas no suitable word has been found to express the Divine nature, we address God by many names, each by some distinctive touch adding something fresh to our notions respecting Him — thus seeking by variety of nomenclature to gain some glimmerings for the comprehension of what we seek. For when we question and examine ourselves as to what God is, we express our conclusions variously, as that He is that which presides over the system and working of the things that are, that His existence is without cause, while to all else He is the Cause of being; that He is that which has no generation or beginning, no corruption, no turning backward, no diminution of supremacy; that He is that in which evil finds no place, and from which no good is absent.

And if anyone wanted to distinguish such concepts using words, they would find it absolutely necessary to call that which cannot change for the worse unchanging and invariable, and to call the First Cause of all things ungenerate, and that which cannot be corrupted incorruptible; and that which has no ending immortal and never failing; and that which rules over all things Almighty. And so, forming names for all other divine attributes in accordance with reverent conceptions of Him, we designate them now by one name, now by another, according to our varying lines of thought, such as power, or strength, or goodness, or ungeneracy, or perpetuity.

And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse unchanging and invariable, and to call the First Cause of all ungenerate, and that which admits not of corruption incorruptible; and that which ceases at no limit immortal and never failing; and that which presides over all Almighty. And so, framing names for all other Divine attributes in accordance with reverent conceptions of Him, we designate them now by one name, now by another, according to our varying lines of thought, as power, or strength, or goodness, or ungeneracy, or perpetuity.

I say, then, that people have the right to construct words in this way, adapting their names to fit their subject according to each person's judgment. There is no absurdity in this, despite what our opponent pretends, reacting with horror as if to some frightening monster. We are fully justified in permitting the use of such new applications of words with respect to all things that can be named, including God Himself.

I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment; and that there is no absurdity in this, such as our controversialist makes a pretence of, shuddering at it as at some gruesome hobgoblin, and that we are fully justified in allowing the use of such fresh applications of words in respect to all things that can be named, and to God Himself.

For God is not an expression, and He doesn't have His essence in voice or utterance. Rather, God is in Himself what He is also believed to be, but He is named by those who call upon Him not according to what He is essentially (for the physis of Him Who alone exists is unspeakable), but He receives His names from what are believed to be His operations in regard to our life. To take a ready example: when we speak of Him as God, we call Him this because we regard Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden. But if His essence exists before His works, and we understand His works by our senses, and express them in words as best we can, why should we be afraid of calling things by words that came into use later than the things themselves? For if we wait to interpret any of God's attributes until we understand them, and we understand them only by what His works teach us, and if His power comes before its exercise and depends on the will of God, while His will resides in the spontaneity of the Divine physis, are we not clearly taught that the words which represent things came into existence later than the things themselves, and that the words which are framed to express the operations of things are reflections of the things themselves? And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, through the mouth of great David, when, using certain peculiar and appropriate names derived from his contemplation of God's works, he speaks of the Divine physis in this way: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations, or His physis? No one will say that they indicate anything but His operations. At what time, then, after showing mercy and pity, did God acquire His name from their display? Was it before human life began? But who was there to be the object of pity? Was it, then, after sin entered into the world? But sin entered after man. The exercise, therefore, of pity, and the name itself, came after man. What then? Will our adversary, wise as he claims to be above the Prophets, convict David of error in applying names to God derived from his opportunities of knowing Him? Or, in contending with him, will he use against him the pretense in his stately passage as if from a tragedy, saying that David glorifies the most blessed life of God with names drawn from human imagination, whereas it glorified itself alone, long before men were born to imagine them? David's advocate will readily admit that the Divine physis glorified itself alone even before the existence of human imagination, but will contend that the human mind can speak only as much concerning God as its capacity, instructed by His works, will allow. For, as the Wisdom of Solomon says, by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen.

For God is not an expression, neither has He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations in regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden. But if His essence is prior to His works, and we understand His works by our senses, and express them in words as we are best able, why should we be afraid of calling things by words of later origin than themselves? For if we stay to interpret any of the attributes of God till we understand them, and we understand them only by what His works teach us, and if His power precedes its exercise, and depends on the will of God, while His will resides in the spontaneity of the Divine nature, are we not clearly taught that the words which represent things are of later origin than the things themselves, and that the words which are framed to express the operations of things are reflections of the things themselves? And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness. Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations, or His nature? No one will say that they indicate anything but His operations. At what time, then, after showing mercy and pity, did God acquire His name from their display? Was it before man's life began? But who was there to be the object of pity? Was it, then, after sin entered into the world? But sin entered after man. The exercise, therefore, of pity, and the name itself, came after man. What then? will our adversary, wise as he is above the Prophets, convict David of error in applying names to God derived from his opportunities of knowing Him? Or, in contending with him, will he use against him the pretence in his stately passage as out of a tragedy, saying that he glories in the most blessed life of God with names drawn from human imagination, whereas it gloried in itself alone, long before men were born to imagine them? The Psalmist's advocate will readily admit that the Divine nature gloried in itself alone even before the existence of human imagination, but will contend that the human mind can speak only so much in respect of God as its capacity, instructed by His works, will allow. For, as says the Wisdom of Solomon, by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the Maker of them is seen Wisdom 13:5.

But in applying such names to the Divine essence, which surpasses all understanding, we do not seek to glorify it by the names we use, but rather to guide ourselves by means of such terms toward comprehension of the things that are hidden. "I said to the Lord," says the Prophet, "You are my God, my goods are nothing unto You." How then are we glorifying the most blessed life of God, as this man claims, when (as the Prophet says) our goods are nothing unto Him? Does he perhaps take "call" to mean "glory in"? Yet those who use the latter word correctly, and who have been trained to use words with precision, tell us that the word "glory in" is never used for mere indication, but that this idea is expressed by such words as "to make known," "to show," "to indicate," or some other of that kind, whereas the word "glory in" means to be proud of, or delight in a thing, and the like. But he claims that by using names drawn from human imagination we glory in the blessed life. We hold, however, that adding any honor to the Divine nature, which is above all honor, is more than human weakness can do. At the same time we do not deny that we endeavor, by words and names devised with due reverence, to give some notion of its attributes. And so, carefully following the path of due reverence, we understand that the first cause is that which has its existence not from any cause superior to itself. This view, if one accepts it as true, is praiseworthy for its truth alone. But if one should judge it to be superior to other aspects of the Divine nature, and so should say that God, exulting and rejoicing in this alone, glories in it as of paramount excellence, one would find support only from the Muse by whom Eunomius is inspired, when he says that ungeneracy glories in itself, that which, mark you, he calls God's ousia, and styles the blessed and Divine life.

But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, which passes all understanding, we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but to guide our own selves by the aid of such terms towards the comprehension of the things which are hidden. I said to the Lord, says the Prophet, You are my God, my goods are nothing unto You. How then are we glorifying the most blessed life of God, as this man affirms, when (as says the Prophet) our goods are nothing unto Him? Is it that he takes call to mean glory in? Yet those who employ the latter word rightly, and who have been trained to use words with propriety, tell us that the word glory in is never used of mere indication, but that that idea is expressed by such words as to make known, to show, to indicate, or some other of the kind, whereas the word for glory in means to be proud of, or delight in a thing, and the like. But he affirms that by employing names drawn from human imagination we glory in the blessed life. We hold, however, that to add any honour to the Divine nature, which is above all honour, is more than human infirmity can do. At the same time we do not deny that we endeavour, by words and names devised with due reverence, to give some notion of its attributes. And so, following studiously in the path of due reverence, we apprehend that the first cause is that which has its subsistence not from any cause superior to itself. Which view, if so be one accepts it as true, is praiseworthy for its truth alone. But if one should judge it to be superior to other aspects of the Divine nature, and so should say that God, exulting and rejoicing in this alone, glories in it, as of paramount excellence, one would find support only from the Muse by whom Eunomius is inspired, when he says, that ungeneracy glories in itself, that which, mark you, he calls God's essence, and styles the blessed and Divine life.

But let us hear how, in the way he thinks most necessary, and in the form that came before (for with such rhythms he again offers us a sample of his stylistic flourishes)—let us hear, I say, how by such means he plans to refute the opinion people have formed of him, and to keep hidden the ignorance of those he has deceived. For I will use our verbose writer's own verbal patterns and phrasing. When, he says, we assert that words by which thought is expressed die as soon as they are uttered, we add that whether words are uttered or not, whether they exist yet or not, God was and is ungenerate. Let us learn, then, what connection there is between the conception or the formation of words, and the things which we signify by this or that mode of speech. Accordingly, if God is ungenerate before the creation of man, we must regard as insignificant the words which indicate that thought, since they are dispersed along with the sounds that express them, if such thought happens to be named according to human conception. For to be, and to be called, are not interchangeable terms. But God is by His nature what He is, yet He is called by us by such names as the poverty of our nature will allow us to use, since our nature is incapable of expressing thought except through voice and words. Accordingly, understanding Him to be without origin, we express that thought by the term ungenerate. And what harm is it to Him who truly is, that He should be named by us as we conceive Him to be? For His ungenerate existence is not the result of His being called ungenerate, but the name is the result of the existence. But this clever friend of ours fails to see this, nor does he take a clear view of his own positions. For if he did, he would certainly have stopped criticizing those who formed the word ungeneracy to express the idea in their minds. For look at what he says: Words so spoken perish as soon as they are spoken; but God both is and was ungenerate, both after the words were spoken and before. You see that the Supreme Being is what He is, before the creation of all things, whether spoken of or not, being what He is neither in greater nor in lesser degree; while the use of words and names was not devised until after the creation of man, endowed by God with the faculty of reason and speech.

But let us hear how, in the way most needed, and the form that preceded (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), let us hear, I say, how by such means he proposes to refute the opinion formed of him, and to keep in the dark the ignorance of those whom he has deluded. For I will use our dithyrambist's own verbal inflections and phraseology. When, says he, we assert that words by which thought is expressed die as soon as they are uttered, we add that whether words are uttered or not, whether they are yet in existence or not, God was and is ungenerate. Let us learn, then, what connection there is between the conception or the formation of words, and the things which we signify by this or that mode of utterance. Accordingly, if God is ungenerate before the creation of man, we must esteem as of no account the words which indicate that thought, inasmuch as they are dispersed along with the sounds that express them, if such thought happen to be named after human notion. For to be, and to be called, are not convertible terms. But God is by His nature what He is, but He is called by us by such names as the poverty of our nature will allow us to make use of, which is incapable of enunciating thought except by means of voice and words. Accordingly, understanding Him to be without origin, we enunciate that thought by the term ungenerate. And what harm is it to Him Who indeed is, that He should be named by us as we conceive Him to be? For His ungenerate existence is not the result of His being called ungenerate, but the name is the result of the existence. But this our acute friend fails to see, nor does he take a clear view of his own positions. For if he did, he would certainly have left off reviling those who framed the word ungeneracy to express the idea in their minds. For look at what he says, Words so spoken perish as soon as they are spoken; but God both is and was ungenerate, both after the words were spoken and before. You see that the Supreme Being is what He is, before the creation of all things, whether silent or not, being what He is neither in greater nor in less degree; while the use of words and names was not devised till after the creation of man, endowed by God with the faculty of reason and speech.

If the creation came after its Creator, and humanity is the last thing in the order of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristic of humanity, and verbs and nouns are the component parts of speech, and ungeneracy is a noun, how does he not understand that he is fighting against his own arguments? For we say that human thought and intelligence have devised words that express the things they represent, and he admits that those who use speech are demonstrably later in time than the Divine life, and that the Divine physis is now, and always has been, without generation. If, then, he admits that the blessed life existed before humanity (for I return to that point), and we do not deny humanity's later creation, but maintain that we have used forms of speech ever since we came into being and received the faculty of reason from our Maker, and if ungeneracy is a word that expresses a particular idea, and every word is a part of human speech—it follows that whoever admits the Divine physis existed before humanity must at the same time admit that the name invented by humanity to express that physis was itself later in existence. For it was not likely that the use of speech should be exercised before the existence of creatures to use it, any more than farming should be exercised before the existence of farmers, or navigation before the existence of navigators, or in fact any of the occupations of life before life itself. Why, then, does he argue with us instead of following his premises to their logical conclusion?

If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristic of man, and verbs and nouns are the component elements of speech, and ungeneracy is a noun, how is it that he does not understand that he is combating his own arguments? For we, on our side, say that by human thought and intelligence words have been devised expressive of things which they represent, and he, on his side, allows that those who employ speech are demonstrably later in point of time than the Divine life, and that the Divine nature is now, and ever has been, without generation. If, then, he allows the blessed life to be anterior to man (for to that point I return), and we do not deny man's later creation, but contend that we have used forms of speech ever since we came into being and received the faculty of reason from our Maker, and if ungeneracy is a word expressive of a special idea, and every word is a part of human speech — it follows that he who admits that the Divine nature was anterior to man must at the same time admit that the name invented by man to express that nature was itself later in being. For it was not likely that the use of speech should be exercised before the existence of creatures to use it, any more than that farming should be exercised before the existence of farmers, or navigation before that of navigators, or in fact any of the occupations of life before that of life itself. Why, then, does he contend with us, instead of following his premises to their legitimate conclusion?

He says that God was what He is before the creation of humanity. We don't deny this. For whatever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the world. But we maintain that it received its name after the one who names came into being. Here's why: if we use words so they can teach us about the things they signify, and if only ignorance requires teaching, while the Divine Nature comprehends all knowledge and is above all teaching, then it follows that names were invented to denote the Supreme Being not for His sake, but for ours. For He did not attach the term "ungeneracy" to His nature so that He Himself might be instructed. He who knows all things has no need of syllables and words to instruct Him about His own nature and majesty.

He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the world. But we maintain that it received its name after the namer came into being. For if we use words for this purpose, that they may supply us with teaching about the things which they signify, and it is ignorance alone that requires teaching, while the Divine Nature, as comprehending all knowledge, is above all teaching, it follows that names were invented to denote the Supreme Being, not for His sake, but for our own. For He did not attach the term ungeneracy to His nature in order that He Himself might be instructed. For He Who knows all things has no need of syllables and words to instruct Him as to His own nature and majesty.

In order for us to gain some understanding of what may reverently be thought about Him, we have marked our different ideas with certain words and syllables, labeling our mental processes with verbal formulas that serve as distinctive signs and indicators. Our goal is to give a clear and straightforward declaration of our mental processes by means of words that are attached to and express our ideas. Why, then, does he criticize our claim that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate that God exists without origin or beginning, and that—independently of all speech, silence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation—God was and remains ungenerate? If someone were to argue that God was not ungenerate until the name ungeneracy had been found, then perhaps he might be excused for writing as he has written against such an absurdity. But if no one denies that God existed before speech and reason, and while we say the form of words by which the meaning is expressed was devised by mental conception, what is the point of his controversy with us? His aim is to show that the name is not a human invention, but that it existed before our creation, though I do not know by whom it was spoken. What does the assertion that God existed ungenerately before all things, and the claim that mental conception is posterior to God, have to do with this aim of his? For it has been fully demonstrated that God is not a conception, so we may press him with the same sort of argument and reply, so to speak, in his own words: It is utter folly to regard understanding as existing before those who exercise it; or again, as he proceeds a little below, Nor as though we intended this—to make men, the latest of God's works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding. The argument would indeed have great force if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, were to argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever has been (for who would go to such an extreme of folly as to assert that He who alone exists, and who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?)—why does he fight with shadows, contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness clear? Feeling ashamed of the fallacy concerning ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words to things, so that by throwing everything into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced into imagining that we have described God either as a conception or as posterior in existence to the invention of human terminology. Thus, leaving our argument unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field. For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed at. But what they were trying to establish was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of this question is reserved for some other of his writings. But here he makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though someone were simply questioning him on such points as these—what view he held about the term ungenerate, whether he thought it was invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself. And he, with much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this way.

But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certain words and syllables, labelling, as it were, our mental processes with verbal formulæ to serve as characteristic notes and indications, with the object of giving a clear and simple declaration of our mental processes by means of words attached to, and expressive of, our ideas. Why, then, does he find fault with our contention that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate the existence of God without origin or beginning, and that, independently of all exercise of speech, or silence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation, God was and remains ungenerate? If, indeed, any one should argue that God was not ungenerate till the name ungeneracy had been found, the man might be pardonable for writing as he has written, in contravention of such an absurdity. But if no one denies that He existed before speech and reason, whereas, while the form of words by which the meaning is expressed is said by us to have been devised by mental conception, the end and aim of his controversy with us is to show that the name is not of man's device, but that it existed before our creation, though by whom it was spoken I do not know, what has the assertion that God existed ungenerately before all things, and the contention that mental conception is posterior to God, got to do with this aim of his? For that God is not a conception has been fully demonstrated, so that we may press him with the same sort of argument, and reply, so to say, in his own words, e.g. It is utter folly to regard understanding as of earlier birth than those who exercise it; or again, as he proceeds a little below, Nor as though we intended this, i.e. to make men, the latest of God's works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding. Great indeed would be the force of the argument, if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, should argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever has been, (for who would go to such a pitch of folly as to assert that He Who alone is, and Who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?) why does he fight with shadows, contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness clear, that, feeling ashamed of the fallacy respecting ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words to things, so that by throwing all into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced, by imagining that God has been described by us either as a conception, or as posterior in existence to the invention of human terminology; and thus, leaving our argument unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field? For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed at. But what they were for establishing was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of this question is in reserve in some other of his writings. But here he makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though some one were simply questioning him on such points as these — what view he held as to the term ungenerate, whether he thought it invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself; and he, with much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this wise.

They say that God is ungenerate, and we agree with this. But we take exception to the claim that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence. For we maintain that this term describes God's ungenerate subsistence, but not that ungeneracy is God. But what is the nature of his refutation? It is this: that before humanity's creation God existed ungenerately. But what does this have to do with the point he promises to establish, that the term and its Subject are identical? For he asserts that ungeneracy is the Divine essence. But what kind of fulfillment of his promise is it to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What a wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! What perfection of logical refinement! Who that has not been initiated in the mysteries of this fearsome craft may venture to confront it? Yet in listing the meanings of the term conception, he makes a mockery of it. For, he says, of words used to express a conception of the mind, some exist only in pronunciation, such as those which signify nonentity, while others have their distinct meaning. Of these, some have an amplifying function, as in the case of colossal things, others a diminishing function, as in the case of tiny things, others a multiplying function, as in the case of many-headed monsters, others a combining function, as in the case of centaurs. After reducing the force of the term conception to its lowest value in this way, our clever friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. He says that it is without sense and meaning, that it imagines the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting incompatible notions together, or playing tricks with strange and monstrous combinations.

They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maintain that this term is declarative of God's ungenerate subsistence, but not that ungeneracy is God. But of what nature is his refutation? It is this: that before man's creation God existed ungenerately. But what has this to do with the point which he promises to establish, that the term and its Subject are identical? For he lays it down that ungeneracy is the Divine essence. But what sort of a fulfilment of his promise is it, to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What a wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! What perfection of logical refinement! Who that has not been initiated in the mysteries of the awful craft may venture to look it in the face? Yet in particularizing the meanings of the term conception, he makes a solemn travesty of it. For, says he, of words used to express a conception of the mind, some exist only in pronunciation, as for instance those which signify nonentity, while others have their peculiar meaning; and of these some have an amplifying force, as in the case of things colossal, others a diminishing, as in that of pigmies, others a multiplying, as in that of many-headed monsters, others a combinative, as in that of centaurs. After thus reducing the force of the term conception to its lowest value, our clever friend will allow it, you see, no further extension. He says that it is without sense and meaning, that it fancies the unnatural, either contracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions together, or juggling with strange and monstrous combinations.

With such mockery of the term conception, he shows, as well as he can, that it is useless and unprofitable for human life. What, then, was the origin of our higher branches of learning—of geometry, arithmetic, the logical and physical sciences, of the inventions of mechanical art, of the marvels of measuring time by the bronze sundial and the water-clock? What, again, of ontology, of the science of ideas, in short of all intellectual inquiry as applied to great and sublime subjects? What of agriculture, of navigation, and of the other activities of human life? How does the sea become a highway for humanity? How are things of the air brought into the service of things of the earth, wild things tamed, objects of terror brought under control, animals stronger than ourselves made obedient to the rein? Have not all these benefits to human life been achieved by conception? For, according to my understanding of it, conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, advancing to further discoveries by means of what is connected to and follows from our first perception regarding the thing being studied. For when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, by fitting what follows to the first result of our discoveries, we gradually lead our investigation to the end of our intended research.

With such gibes at the term conception, he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, was the origin of our higher branches of learning, of geometry, arithmetic, the logical and physical sciences, of the inventions of mechanical art, of the marvels of measuring time by the brazen dial and the water-clock? What, again, of ontology, of the science of ideas, in short of all intellectual speculation as applied to great and sublime objects? What of agriculture, of navigation, and of the other pursuits of human life? How comes the sea to be a highway for man? How are things of the air brought into the service of things of the earth, wild things tamed, objects of terror brought into subjection, animals stronger than ourselves made obedient to the rein? Have not all these benefits to human life been achieved by conception? For, according to my account of it, conception is the method by which we discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries by means of what adjoins to and follows from our first perception with regard to the thing studied. For when we have formed some idea of what we seek to know, by adapting what follows to the first result of our discoveries we gradually conduct our inquiry to the end of our proposed research.

But why list all the greater and more impressive achievements of this faculty? Anyone who is not hostile to the truth can see for himself that everything else that time has brought forth for the service and benefit of human life has been discovered by no other means than through conception. And it seems to me that anyone who judged this faculty more valuable than any other ability we have been given in this life by Divine Providence would not be far off in his judgment. In saying this I have the support of Job's teaching, where he shows God answering His servant from the whirlwind and the clouds, saying both other things fitting for Him to say, and that it is He who has placed man over the arts, and given to woman her skill in weaving and embroidery.

But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all else that Time has discovered for the service and benefit of human life, has been discovered by no other instrumentality than that of conception. And it seems to me, that any one who should judge this faculty more precious than any other with the exercise of which we are gifted in this life by Divine Providence would not be far mistaken in his judgment. And in saying this I am supported by Job's teaching, where he represents God as answering His servant by the tempest and the clouds, saying both other things meet for Him to say, and that it is He Who has set man over the arts, and given to woman her skill in weaving and embroidery.

No one whose nature isn't completely animal and brutish would deny that He didn't teach us such things through some visible operation, with Himself directly overseeing the work, as we see in matters of physical instruction. But it has been said that our first knowledge of such arts comes from Him, and if this is true, then surely He who gave our nature this faculty of conceiving and discovering the objects of our investigation was Himself our guide to these arts. By the law of causation, whatever is discovered and established through conception must be attributed to Him who is the author of that faculty. For example, human life invented the art of healing, but someone would still be right to claim that this art is a gift from God. Whatever discovery has been made in human life that serves any useful purpose in peace or war came to us from nowhere else but from an intelligence that conceives and discovers according to our various needs, and that intelligence is a gift of God. We owe everything that intelligence provides us to God. I don't deny the objection made by our opponents that lying wonders are also fabricated by this faculty. Their argument on this point actually supports our side. We too assert that the knowledge of opposites is the same, whether beneficial or harmful—for example, in the arts of healing and navigation, and so on. Someone who knows how to cure the sick with medicines will also know, if he were to turn his art to an evil purpose, how to mix some deadly ingredient into the food of healthy people. Someone who can steer a boat with its rudder into port can also steer it toward a reef or rock if he wants to destroy those on board. A painter, using the same art by which he depicts the most beautiful form on canvas, could give us an exact representation of the ugliest form. Similarly, a wrestling-master, through the experience he has gained in physical training, can set a dislocated limb or, if he wishes, dislocate a healthy one. But why burden our argument by multiplying examples? Just as in the cases mentioned above no one would deny that someone who has learned to practice an art for right purposes can also misuse it for wrong ones, so we say that God implanted the faculty of thought and conception in human nature for good, but when people abuse it as an instrument of discovery, it often becomes the servant of harmful inventions. Although this faculty can give a plausible appearance to what is false and unreal, it is nonetheless capable of investigating what actually and truly exists (subsists), and its ability for one must fairly be regarded as evidence of its ability for the other.

Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no one would gainsay whose nature is not altogether animal and brutish. But still it has been said that our first knowledge of such arts is from Him, and, if such is the case, surely He Who endowed our nature with such a faculty of conceiving and finding out the objects of our investigation was Himself our Guide to the arts. And by the law of causation, whatever is discovered and established by conception must be ascribed to Him Who is the Author of that faculty. Thus human life invented the Art of Healing, but nevertheless he would be right who should assert that Art to be a gift from God. And whatever discovery has been made in human life, conducive to any useful purposes of peace or war, came to us from no other quarter but from an intelligence conceiving and discovering according to our several requirements; and that intelligence is a gift of God. It is to God, then, that we owe all that intelligence supplies to us. Nor do I deny the objection made by our adversaries, that lying wonders also are fabricated by this faculty. For their contention as to this makes for our own side in the argument. For we too assert that the science of opposites is the same, whether beneficial or the reverse; e.g. in the case of the arts of healing and navigation, and so on. For he who knows how to relieve the sick by drugs will also know, if indeed he were to turn his art to an evil purpose, how to mix some deleterious ingredient in the food of the healthy. And he who can steer a boat with its rudder into port can also steer it for the reef or the rock, if minded to destroy those on board. And the painter, with the same art by which he depicts the fairest form on his canvas, could give us an exact representation of the ugliest. So, too, the wrestling-master, by the experience which he has gained in anointing, can set a dislocated limb, or, should he wish to do so, dislocate a sound one. But why encumber our argument by multiplying instances? As in the above-mentioned cases no one would deny that he who has learned to practise an art for right purposes can also abuse it for wrong ones, so we say that the faculty of thought and conception was implanted by God in human nature for good, but, with those who abuse it as an instrument of discovery, it frequently becomes the handmaid of pernicious inventions. But although it is thus possible for this faculty to give a plausible shape to what is false and unreal, it is none the less competent to investigate what actually and in very truth subsists, and its ability for the one must in fairness be regarded as an evidence of its ability for the other.

When someone sets out to frighten or captivate an audience, they need abundant imaginative power to achieve such a goal, and they should present to spectators monsters with many hands, many heads, or breathing fire, or people wrapped in serpent coils, or they should seem to make their size increase or stretch their natural dimensions to absurd proportions, or they should describe people transformed into springs and trees and birds—a kind of storytelling that appeals to those who enjoy such things. All this is the clearest proof that it is possible to reach higher knowledge through this creative faculty as well.

For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to the spectators many-handed, many-headed, or fire-breathing monsters, or men enfolded in the coils of serpents, or that he should seem to increase their stature, or enlarge their natural proportions to a ridiculous extent, or that he should describe men metamorphosed into fountains and trees and birds, a kind of narrative which is not without its attraction for such as take pleasure in things of that sort — all this, I say, is the clearest of demonstrations that it is possible to arrive at higher knowledge also by means of this inventive faculty.

For it is not the case that while the intelligence given to us by the Giver is fully capable of imagining things that do not exist, it has no ability at all to provide us with things that may benefit us. Just as the impulsive and elective faculty of the soul is established in our nature to direct us toward what is good and noble—though a person may also misuse it for what is evil—and no one can claim that because the elective faculty sometimes inclines toward evil it never inclines toward what is good, so the tendency of conception toward what is vain and unprofitable does not prove its inability for what is profitable. On the contrary, it demonstrates that it is not useless for what is beneficial and necessary to the mind. For just as in one case it discovers ways to produce pleasure or terror, so in the other it does not fail to find ways of arriving at truth. Now one of the questions we investigate is whether the First Cause, namely God, exists without beginning, or whether His existence depends on some beginning. But perceiving through thought that what we conceive as the consequence of something else cannot be a First Cause, we created a word to express such an idea, and we say that He who is without prior cause exists without origin, or, so to speak, ungenerately. And Him who exists in this way we call ungenerate and without origin, indicating by that name not what He is, but what He is not.

For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no faculty at all for providing us with things that may profit us. But as the impulsive and elective faculty of the soul is established in our nature, to incite us to what is good and noble, though a man may also abuse it for what is evil, and no one can call the fact that the elective faculty sometimes inclines to evil a proof that it never inclines to what is good — so the bias of conception towards what is vain and unprofitable does not prove its inability for what is profitable, but, on the contrary, is a demonstration of its not being unserviceable for what is beneficial and necessary to the mind. For as, in the one case, it discovers means to produce pleasure or terror, so, in the other, it does not fail to find ways for getting at truth. Now one of the objects of inquiry was whether the First Cause, viz. God, exists without beginning, or whether His existence is dependent on some beginning. But perceiving, by the aid of thought, that that cannot be a First Cause which we conceive of as the consequence of another, we devised a word expressive of such a notion, and we say that He who is without anterior cause exists without origin, or, so to say, ungenerately. And Him Who so exists we call ungenerate and without origin, indicating, by that appellation, not what He is, but what He is not.

But to make this idea as clear as possible, I will try to illustrate it with an even simpler example. Let us suppose we are asking about some tree, whether it is cultivated or wild. If it is the former, we call it planted; if the latter, not planted. Such a term accurately describes the truth, for the tree must necessarily be one way or the other. Yet the word does not indicate the particular physis of the plant. From the term "not-planted" we learn that it grows spontaneously, but whether what is thus signified is a plane tree, a vine, or some other such plant, the name applied to it does not tell us.

But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about some tree, whether it is cultivated or wild. If the former, we call it planted, if the latter, not planted. And such a term exactly hits the truth, for the tree must needs be after this manner or that. And yet the word does not indicate the peculiar nature of the plant. From the term not-planted we learn that it is of spontaneous growth; but whether what is thus signified is a plane, or a vine, or some other such plant, the name applied to it does not inform us.

This example being understood, it is time to move on to the thing it illustrates. We comprehend this much: that the First Cause has His existence from no prior cause. Accordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately, putting this notion of ungeneracy into verbal form. We show by the force of the term that He is without origin or beginning. But this appellation does not lead us to discern what that Being is who exists ungenerately. Nor should it be supposed that the processes of conception could enable us to rise above the limits of our nature, open up the incomprehensible to our view, and allow us to grasp the knowledge of that which no knowledge can approach. Nevertheless, our adversary storms against our Master and tries to tear apart his teaching concerning the faculty of thought and conception. He derides what has been said, reveling as usual in the rattle of his jingling phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from providing evidence concerning those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter. For, quoting certain of the Master's reflections on the faculty of conception, in which he shows that its exercise occurs not only with reference to vain and trivial objects but that it is competent to deal also with weightier matters, he brings Basil into court with the charge that his language follows pagan philosophy. Through his discussion about the grain, seed, and other food (in Genesis), he accuses Basil of circumscribing Divine Providence by not allowing that words were given to things by God, and of fighting in the ranks of the Atheists and taking arms against Providence. He charges that Basil admires the doctrines of the profane rather than the laws of God and ascribes to them the palm of wisdom, not having observed in the earliest of the sacred records that before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed are mentioned in Holy Writ.

This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence from no antecedent one. Accordingly, we call God ungenerate as existing ungenerately, reducing this notion of ungeneracy into verbal form. That He is without origin or beginning we show by the force of the term. But what that Being is which exists ungenerately, this appellation does not lead us to discern. Nor was it to be supposed that the processes of conception could avail to raise us above the limits of our nature, and open up the incomprehensible to our view, and enable us to compass the knowledge of that which no knowledge can approach. Nevertheless, our adversary storms at our Master, and tries to tear to pieces his teaching respecting the faculty of thought and conception, and derides what has been said, revelling as usual in the rattle of his jingling phraseology, and saying that he (Basil) shrinks from adducing evidence respecting those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter. For, quoting certain of the Master's speculations on the faculty of conception, in which he shows that its exercise finds place, not only in reference to vain and trivial objects, but that it is competent to deal also with weightier matters, he, by means of his speculation about the grain, and seed, and other food (in Genesis), brings Basil into court with the charge, that his language is a following of pagan philosophy, and that he is circumscribing Divine Providence, as not allowing that words were given to things by God, and that he is fighting in the ranks of the Atheists, and taking arms against Providence, and that he admires the doctrines of the profane rather than the laws of God, and ascribes to them the palm of wisdom, not having observed in the earliest of the sacred records, that before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed are mentioned in Holy Writ.

Here is the rewritten paragraph:

These are his charges against us—not exactly in his own words, since we have made changes necessary to smooth out the roughness and harshness of his writing style. So what is our answer to this careful defender of Divine Providence? He claims we are wrong because, while we don't deny that God created humanity as rational beings, we say that the invention of words came from the logical faculty God placed in human nature. This is the worst of his accusations, by which he charges our teacher of righteousness with going over to atheist beliefs, denounces him as joining and supporting their lawless group, and indeed accuses him of every terrible offense imaginable. Well then, let this corrector of our mistakes tell us: did God give names to the things He created? For this is what our new interpreter of the mysteries says: Before creating humanity, God named germ, and herb, and grass, and seed, and tree, and similar things, when by the word of His power He brought each of them into being. If he sticks to the bare letter, and in this way follows a Jewish approach, and has yet to learn that the Christian is a student not of the letter but of the Spirit (for the letter kills, says the Apostle, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6), and quotes to us the bare literal reading as though God Himself spoke these words—if he believes this, that God used fluent speech in the manner of human beings, expressing His thoughts through voice and pronunciation—if he believes this, he cannot reasonably deny what logically follows. For our speech is produced by the speech organs: the windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, and the mouth, with air drawn in from outside and breath from within working together to produce sound. The windpipe, fitting into the throat like a flute, sends sound up from below; and the roof of the mouth, because of the empty space above extending to the nostrils, works like a musical instrument to give the voice volume from above. The cheeks also help with speech, contracting and expanding according to their structure, or pushing the voice through a narrow passage by various movements of the tongue, which works now with one part, now with another, making the sound that passes over it hard or soft by touching the teeth or palate. Moreover, the lips contribute significantly to the result, affecting the voice through their various distinct movements and helping to shape the words as they are spoken.

Such are his charges against us; not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to correct the ruggedness and harshness of his style. What, then, is our answer to this careful guardian of Divine Providence? He asserts that we are in error, because, while we do not deny man's having been created a rational being by God, we ascribe the invention of words to the logical faculty implanted by God in man's nature. And this is the bitterest of his accusations, whereby our teacher of righteousness is charged with deserting to the tenets of the Atheists, and is denounced as partaking with and supporting their lawless company, and indeed as guilty of all the most atrocious offenses. Well, then, let this corrector of our blunders tell us, did God give names to the things which He created? For so says our new interpreter of the mysteries: Before the creation of man God named germ, and herb, and grass, and seed, and tree, and the like, when by the word of His power He brought them severally into being. If, then, he abides by the bare letter, and so far Judaizes, and has yet to learn that the Christian is a disciple not of the letter but of the Spirit (for the letter kills, says the Apostle, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6), and quotes to us the bare literal reading of the words as though God Himself pronounced them — if, I say, he believes this, that, after the similitude of men, God made use of fluency of speech, expressing His thoughts by voice and accent — if, I repeat, he believes this, he cannot reasonably deny what follows as its logical consequence. For our speech is uttered by the organs of speech, the windpipe, the tongue, the teeth, and the mouth, the inhalation of air from without and the breath from within working together to produce the utterance. For the windpipe, fitting into the throat like a flute, emits a sound from below; and the roof of the mouth, by reason of the void space above extending to the nostrils, like some musical instrument, gives volume from above to the voice. And the cheeks, too, are aids to speech, contracting and expanding in accordance with their structural arrangement, or propelling the voice through a narrow passage by various movements of the tongue, which it effects now with one part of itself now with another, giving hardness or softness to the sound which passes over it by contact with the teeth or with the palate. Again, the service of the lips contributes not a little to the result, affecting the voice by the variety of their distinctive movements, and helping to shape the words as they are uttered.

If God gives things their names, as our new interpreter of the Divine record assures us—naming seed, grass, tree, and fruit—He must necessarily have pronounced each of these words exactly as it is pronounced, that is, according to how the syllables are put together, some produced by the lips, others by the tongue, others by both. But if none of these words could be spoken except through the action of vocal organs producing each syllable and sound through some appropriate movement, he must necessarily attribute such organs to God and shape the Divine Being according to the requirements of speech. For each use of the vocal organs must have some form or other, and form is a bodily limitation. Furthermore, we know very well that all bodies are composite, but where you see composition you also see dissolution, and dissolution, as the concept implies, is the same thing as destruction. This, then, is the result of our opponent's victory over us: to show us the God of his imagination, whom he has fashioned through the name agennesia (ungeneracy)—speaking, to be sure, so that He will not lose His share in the invention of names, but equipped with vocal organs to utter them, and not without bodily nature to enable Him to use them (for you cannot conceive of actual speech in the abstract apart from a body), and gradually proceeding to the natural affections of the body—through the composite to dissolution, and so reaching His end in destruction.

If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of necessity have pronounced each of these words not otherwise than as it is pronounced; i.e. according to the composition of the syllables, some of which are sounded by the lips, others by the tongue, others by both. But if none of these words could be uttered, except by the operation of vocal organs producing each syllable and sound by some appropriate movement, he must of necessity ascribe the possession of such organs to God, and fashion the Divine Being according to the exigencies of speech. For each adaptation of the vocal organs must be in some form or other, and form is a bodily limitation. Further, we know very well that all bodies are composite, but where you see composition you see also dissolution, and dissolution, as the notion implies, is the same thing as destruction. This, then, is the upshot of our controversialist's victory over us; to show us the God of his imagining whom he has fashioned by the name ungeneracy — speaking, indeed, that He may not lose His share in the invention of names, but provided with vocal organs with which to utter them, and not without bodily nature to enable Him to employ them (for you cannot conceive of formal utterance in the abstract apart from a body), and gradually going on to the congenital affections of the body — through the composite to dissolution, and so finding His end in destruction.

This is the nature of this new-fangled deity, as can be deduced from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures and insists that Moses explicitly declares this when he says, "God said," adding His words: "Let there be light," and "Let there be a firmament," and "Let the waters be gathered together…and let the dry land appear," and "Let the earth bring forth," and "Let the waters bring forth," and whatever else is written in its proper sequence. Let us then examine the meaning of what is said. Who does not know, even if he is the simplest person, that there is a natural connection between hearing and speech, and that just as hearing cannot function when no one is speaking, so speech is ineffectual unless directed to hearing? If, then, he means literally that God said, let him also tell us to what hearing His words were addressed. Does he mean that He said them to Himself? If so, the commands He issues, He issues to Himself. Yet who will accept this interpretation—that God sits upon His throne prescribing what He Himself must do, and employing Himself as His minister to do His bidding? But even supposing one were to allow that it was not blasphemy to say this, who has any need of words and speech for himself, even among men? For everyone's own mental activity is sufficient to produce choice and will. But he will doubtless say that the Father held conversation with the Son. But what need of vocal utterance for that? For it is a property of bodily nature to signify the thoughts of the heart by means of words, which is why written characters equivalent to speech were invented for the expression of thought. For we express thought equally by speaking and by writing, but in the case of those who are not too far away we reach their hearing by voice, while we make our mind known to those who are at a distance by written characters. In the case of those present with us, we raise or lower the tones of our voice in proportion to their distance from us, and to those close by us we sometimes point out what they are to do simply by a nod. Such or such an expression of the eye is sufficient to convey our intention, or a movement of the hand is sufficient to signify our approval or disapproval of something going on. If, then, those who are confined by the body are able to make known the hidden workings of their minds to their neighbors even without voice, or speech, or written correspondence, and silence causes no hindrance to the conduct of business, can it be that in the case of the immaterial and intangible and, as Eunomius says, the Supreme and first Being, there is any need of words to indicate the thought of the Father and to make known His will to the Only-Begotten Son—words which, as he himself says, perish as soon as they are uttered? No one, I think, who has common sense will accept this as the truth, especially since all sound is poured forth into the air. For voice cannot be produced unless it takes form in air. Now, even they themselves must suppose some medium of communication between the speaker and the one to whom he speaks. For if there were no such medium, how could the voice travel from the speaker to the hearer? What, then, will they say is the medium or interval by which they divide the Father from the Son? Between bodies, indeed, there is an interval of atmospheric space, differing in its nature from the nature of human bodies. But God, who is intangible and without form and pure from all composition, in communicating His counsels with the Only-Begotten Son, who is similarly, or rather in the same manner, immaterial and without body—if He made His communication by voice, what medium would He have had through which the word, transmitted as in a current, might reach the ears of the Only-Begotten? For we need hardly stop to consider that God is not divisible into separate faculties of perception, as we are, whose perceptions separately apprehend their corresponding objects—for example, sight apprehends what may be seen, hearing what may be heard, so that touch does not taste, and hearing has no perception of odors and flavors, but each confines itself to that function to which it was appointed by nature, holding itself insensible, as it were, to those with which it has no natural correspondence, and incapable of experiencing the pleasure enjoyed by its neighboring sense. But with God it is otherwise. All in all, He is at once sight and hearing and knowledge—and there we stop, for it is not permitted us to ascribe the more animal perceptions to that refined nature. Still, we take a very low view of God and drag down the Divine to our own groveling standard if we suppose the Father speaking with His mouth and the Son's ear listening to His words. What, then, are we to suppose is the medium which conveys the Father's voice to the hearing of the Son? It must be created or uncreate. But we may not call it created, for the Word was before the creation of the world, and beside the Divine nature there is nothing uncreate. If, therefore, there was no creation then, and the Word spoken of in the cosmogony was older than creation, will he who maintains that speech and a voice are meant by the Word suggest what medium existed between the Father and the Son, whereby those words and sounds were expressed? For if a medium exists, it must necessarily exist in a nature of its own, so as to differ in nature both from the Father and the Son. Being, then, something necessarily different, it divides the Father and the Son from each other, as though inserted between the two. What, then, could it be? Not created, for creation is younger than the Word. Generated we have learned the Only-Begotten (and Him alone) to be. Except the Father, none is ungenerate. Therefore, truth obliges us to conclude that there is no medium between the Father and the Son. But where separation is not conceived, the closest connection is naturally implied. And what is so connected needs no medium for voice or speech. Now, by connected, I mean here what is in all respects inseparable. For in the case of a spiritual nature the term connection does not mean bodily connection, but the union and blending of spiritual with spiritual through identity of will. Accordingly, there is no divergence of will between the Father and the Son, but the image of goodness is after the Archetype of all goodness and beauty, and just as, if a man should look at himself in a mirror (for it is perfectly allowable to explain the idea by bodily illustrations), the copy will in all respects be conformed to the original, the shape of the man who is reflected being the cause of the shape on the glass, and the reflection making no independent movement or inclination unless commenced by the original, but, if it moves, moving along with it—in like manner we maintain that our Lord, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and inseparably one with the Father in every movement of His will. If the Father wills anything, the Son who is in the Father knows the Father's will, or rather He is Himself the Father's will. For if He has in Himself all that is the Father's, there is nothing of the Father's that He cannot have. If, then, He has all things that are the Father's in Himself, or, say we rather, if He has the Father Himself, then, along with the Father and the things that are the Father's, He must necessarily have in Himself the whole of the Father's will. He needs not, therefore, to know the Father's will by word, being Himself the Word of the Father in the highest sense of the term. What, then, is the word that can be addressed to Him who is the Word indeed? And how can He who is the Word indeed require a second word for instruction?

Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintains that Moses explicitly declares this, when he says, God said, adding His words, Let there be light, and, Let there be a firmament, and, Let the waters be gathered together…and let the dry land appear, and, Let the earth bring forth, and, Let the waters bring forth, and, whatsoever else is written in its order. Let us, then, examine the meaning of what is said. Who does not know, even if he be the merest simpleton, that there is a natural correlation between hearing and speech, and that, as it is impossible for hearing to discharge its function when no one is speaking, so speech is ineffectual unless directed to hearing? If, then, he means literally that God said, let him tell us also to what hearing His words were addressed. Does he mean that He said them to Himself? If so, the commands which He issues, He issues to Himself. Yet who will accept this interpretation, that God sits upon His throne prescribing what He Himself must do, and employing Himself as His minister to do His bidding? But even supposing one were to allow that it was not blasphemy to say this, who has any need of words and speech for himself, even though a man? For every one's own mental action suffices him to produce choice and volition. But he will doubtless say that the Father held converse with the Son. But what need of vocal utterance for that? For it is a property of bodily nature to signify the thoughts of the heart by means of words, whence also written characters equivalent to speech were invented for the expression of thought. For we declare thought equally by speaking and by writing, but in the case of those who are not too far distant we reach their hearing by voice, but declare our mind to those who are at a distance by written characters; and in the case of those present with us, in proportion to their distance from us, we raise or lower the tones of our voice, and to those close by us we sometimes point out what they are to do simply by a nod; and such or such an expression of the eye is sufficient to convey our determination, or a movement of the hand is sufficient to signify our approval or disapproval of something going on. If, then, those who are encompassed by the body are able to make known the hidden working of their minds to their neighbours, even without voice, or speech, or correspondence by means of letters, and silence causes no hindrance to the dispatch of business, can it be that in the case of the immaterial, and intangible, and, as Eunomius says, the Supreme and first Being, there is any need of words to indicate the thought of the Father and to make known His will to the Only-Begotten Son — words, which, as he himself says, are wont to perish as soon as they are uttered? No one, methinks, who has common sense will accept this as the truth, especially as all sound is poured forth into the air. For voice cannot be produced unless it takes consistence in air. Now, even they themselves must suppose some medium of communication between the speaker and him to whom he speaks. For if there were no such medium, how could the voice travel from the speaker to the hearer? What, then, will they say is the medium or interval by which they divide the Father from the Son? Between bodies, indeed, there is an interval of atmospheric space, differing in its nature from the nature of human bodies. But God, Who is intangible, and without form, and pure from all composition, in communicating His counsels with the Only-Begotten Son, Who is similarly, or rather in the same manner, immaterial and without body — if He made His communication by voice, what medium would He have had through which the word, transmitted as in a current, might reach the ears of the Only-Begotten? For we need hardly stop to consider that God is not separable into apprehensive faculties, as we are, whose perceptions separately apprehend their corresponding objects; e.g. sight apprehends what may be seen, hearing what may be heard, so that touch does not taste, and hearing has no perception of odours and flavours, but each confines itself to that function to which it was appointed by nature, holding itself insensible, as it were, to those with which it has no natural correspondence, and incapable of tasting the pleasure enjoyed by its neighbour sense. But with God it is otherwise. All in all, He is at once sight, and hearing, and knowledge; and there we stop, for it is not permitted us to ascribe the more animal perceptions to that refined nature. Still we take a very low view of God, and drag down the Divine to our own grovelling standard, if we suppose the Father speaking with His mouth, and the Son's ear listening to His words. What, then, are we to suppose is the medium which conveys the Father's voice to the hearing of the Son? It must be created or uncreate. But we may not call it created; for the Word was before the creation of the world: and beside the Divine nature there is nothing uncreate. If, therefore, there was no creation then, and the Word spoken of in the cosmogony was older than creation, will he, who maintains that speech and a voice are meant by the Word, suggest what medium existed between the Father and the Son, whereby those words and sounds were expressed? For if a medium exist, it must needs exist in a nature of its own, so as to differ in nature both from the Father and the Son. Being, then, something of necessity different, it divides the Father and the Son from each other, as though inserted between the two. What, then, could it be? Not created, for creation is younger than the Word. Generated we have learned the Only-begotten (and Him alone) to be. Except the Father, none is ungenerate. Truth, therefore, obliges us to the conclusion that there is no medium between the Father and the Son. But where separation is not conceived of the closest connection is naturally implied. And what is so connected needs no medium for voice or speech. Now, by connected, I mean here what is in all respects inseparable. For in the case of a spiritual nature the term connection does not mean corporeal connection, but the union and blending of spiritual with spiritual through identity of will. Accordingly, there is no divergence of will between the Father and the Son, but the image of goodness is after the Archetype of all goodness and beauty, and as, if a man should look at himself in a glass (for it is perfectly allowable to explain the idea by corporeal illustrations), the copy will in all respects be conformed to the original, the shape of the man who is reflected being the cause of the shape on the glass, and the reflection making no spontaneous movement or inclination unless commenced by the original, but, if it move, moving along with it — in like manner we maintain that our Lord, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and inseparably one with the Father in every movement of His Will. If the Father will anything, the Son Who is in the Father knows the Father's will, or rather He is Himself the Father's will. For, if He has in Himself all that is the Father's, there is nothing of the Father's that He cannot have. If, then, He has all things that are the Father's in Himself, or, say we rather, if He has the Father Himself, then, along with the Father and the things that are the Father's, He must needs have in Himself the whole of the Father's will. He needs not, therefore, to know the Father's will by word, being Himself the Word of the Father, in the highest acceptation of the term. What, then, is the word that can be addressed to Him who is the Word indeed? And how can He Who is the Word indeed require a second word for instruction?

But it might be said that the Father's voice was addressed to the Holy Spirit. However, the Holy Spirit does not need instruction through speech either, for being God, as the Apostle says, He searches all things, even the deep things of God. So if God speaks any word, and all speech is directed to the ear, let those who claim that God expresses Himself in continuous discourse tell us what audience He was addressing. He does not need to address Himself. The Son has no need of instruction through words. The Holy Spirit searches even the deep things of God. Creation did not yet exist. To whom, then, was God's word directed?

But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for being God, as says the Apostle, He searches all things, yea the deep things of God 1 Corinthians 2:10. If, then, God utters any word, and all speech is directed to the ear, let those who maintain that God expresses Himself in the language of continuous discourse, inform us what audience He addressed. Himself He needs not address. The Son has no need of instruction by words. The Holy Ghost searches even the deep things of God. Creation did not yet exist. To whom, then, was God's word addressed?

But, he says, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spoke. No! Nor is great David among those who lie, and he clearly says: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handiwork. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge." And after saying that the heavens and the firmament declare, and that day and night show knowledge and speech, he adds to what he has said that there is neither speech nor language, and that their voices are not heard. Yet how can such declaring and showing be anything other than words, and how is it that no voice addresses itself to the ear? Is the prophet contradicting himself, or is he stating an impossibility when he speaks of words without sound, and declaration without language, and announcement without voice? Or is there not rather the very perfection of truth in his teaching, which tells us, in the words I have quoted, that the declaration of the heavens and the word shouted forth by the day is no articulate voice or language of the lips, but is a revelation of the power of God to those who are capable of hearing it, even though no voice is heard?

But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spoke. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he expressly says; The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handy work. Day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge; and after saying that the heavens and the firmament declare, and that day and that night shows knowledge and speech, he adds to what he has said, that there is neither speech nor language, and that their voices are not heard. Yet how can such declaring and showing forth be other than words, and how is it that no voice addresses itself to the ear? Is the prophet contradicting himself, or is he stating an impossibility, when he speaks of words without sound, and declaration without language, and announcement without voice? Or, is there not rather the very perfection of truth in his teaching, which tells us, in the words which I have quoted, that the declaration of the heavens, and the word shouted forth by the day, is no articulate voice nor language of the lips, but is a revelation of the power of God to those who are capable of hearing it, even though no voice be heard?

What, then, do we think of this passage? If we understand it, we may also understand what Moses means. Holy Scripture often uses physical illustrations to help us more clearly grasp what is being revealed, as appears to be the case in this passage from David. He teaches us through his words that none of the things that exist came to be by chance or accident, as some have imagined—that our world and everything in it was formed by random and unplanned combinations of basic elements, and that no Providence governs the world. Instead, we are taught that there is a cause behind the system and governance of the universe, on whom all nature depends, from whom it receives its origin and cause, toward whom it moves and inclines, and in whom it exists. And since, as the Apostle says, His eternal power and godhead are understood, being clearly seen through the creation of the world (Romans 1:20), all creation—and especially, as Scripture says, the order of the heavens—declares the wisdom of the Creator through the skill displayed in His works. This is what it seems to me David wants to communicate: the testimony of visible things to the fact that the worlds were made with wisdom and skill, and continue forever by the power of the one who rules over all. The very heavens, he says, by displaying the wisdom of the one who made them, practically shout aloud with a voice, and though they have no voice, they proclaim the wisdom of their Creator. We can hear what are like words teaching us: "O people, when you look at us and see our beauty and size, and this continual revolution with its well-ordered and harmonious motion, always working in the same direction and in the same way, turn your thoughts to the one who presides over our system, and from the beauty you see, imagine the beauty of the invisible Archetype. In us there is nothing without its Lord, nothing that moves by its own independent motion. Everything that appears or that can be understood about us depends on a Power who is beyond investigation and sublime." This is not given in spoken words, but through the things that are seen, and it plants in our minds knowledge of divine power more effectively than if speech proclaimed it with a voice. So then, just as the heavens declare though they do not speak, and the firmament shows God's handiwork yet requires no voice for this purpose, and the day utters speech though there is no speaking, and no one can say that Holy Scripture is in error—in the same way, since both Moses and David have one and the same Teacher, I mean the Holy Spirit, who says that the command came before the creation, we are not told that God is the Creator of words, but of things made known to us by what our words signify. For to prevent us from supposing that creation has no Lord and originated spontaneously, He says it was created by the Divine Being and is established in an orderly and connected system by Him. Now it would take considerable time to discuss the order in which Moses didactically records his historical summary about the creation of the world. Or if we did, each successive passage would serve to prove even more clearly how mistaken and empty our opponents' opinion is. But anyone who wishes may read what we have written on Genesis and judge whether our teaching or theirs is more reasonable.

What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that Holy Scripture, to enable us more clearly to comprehend a matter to be revealed, makes use of a bodily illustration, as would seem to be the case in this passage from David, who teaches us by what he says that none of the things which are have their being from chance or accident, as some have imagined that our world and all that is therein was framed by fortuitous and undesigned combinations of first elements, and that no Providence penetrated the world. But we are taught that there is a cause of the system and government of the Universe, on Whom all nature depends, to Whom it owes its origin and cause, towards Whom it inclines and moves, and in Whom it abides. And since, as says the Apostle, His eternal power and godhead are understood, being clearly seen through the creation of the world Romans 1:20, therefore all creation and, before all, as says the Scripture, the system of the heavens, declare the wisdom of the Creator in the skill displayed by His works. And this is what it seems to me that he is desirous to set forth, viz. the testimony of the things which do appear to the fact that the worlds were framed with wisdom and skill, and abide for ever by the power of Him who is the Ruler over all. The very heavens, he says, in displaying the wisdom of Him Who made them, all but shout aloud with a voice, and, though without voice, proclaim the wisdom of their Creator. For we can hear as it were words teaching us: O men, when you gaze upon us and behold our beauty and magnitude, and this ceaseless revolution, with its well-ordered and harmonious motion, working in the same direction and in the same manner, turn your thoughts to Him Who presides over our system, and, by aid of the beauty which you see, imagine to yourselves the beauty of the invisible Archetype. For in us there is nothing without its Lord, nothing that moves of its own proper motion: but all that appears, or that is conceivable in respect to us, depends on a Power Who is inscrutable and sublime. This is not given in articulate speech, but by the things which are seen, and it instils into our minds the knowledge of Divine power more than if speech proclaimed it with a voice. As, then, the heavens declare, though they do not speak, and the firmament shows God's handy-work, yet requires no voice for the purpose, and the day utters speech, though there is no speaking, and no one can say that Holy Scripture is in error — in like manner, since both Moses and David have one and the same Teacher, I mean the Holy Spirit, Who says that the fiat went before the creation, we are not told that God is the Creator of words, but of things made known to us by the signification of our words. For, lest we should suppose the creation to be without its Lord, and spontaneously originated, He says that it was created by the Divine Being, and that it is established in an orderly and connected system by Him. Now it would be a work of time to discuss the order of what Moses didactically records in his historical summary respecting the creation of the world. Or (if we did) each second passage would serve to prove more clearly the erroneous and futile character of our adversaries' opinion. But whoever cares to do so may read what we have written on Genesis, and judge whether our teaching or theirs is the more reasonable.

But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words "He said" do not imply voice and words on the part of God. Rather, the writer, in showing that God's power is concurrent with His will, makes the idea easier to grasp. Since all things were created by the will of God, and since it is the ordinary way of human beings to signify their will first of all by speech and then to bring their work into harmony with their will, and since the scriptural account of Creation is like an introduction for the learner into the knowledge of God, representing to our minds the power of the Divine Being through objects more readily accessible to our understanding (for sensible apprehension aids intellectual knowledge)—for this reason, Moses, by saying that God commanded all things to be, signifies to us the inciting power of His will. And by adding "and it was so," he shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and performance. On the contrary, though the purposing initiates God's activity, the accomplishment keeps pace with the purpose, and the two are to be considered together and at once: the deliberate motion of the mind and the power that effects its purpose. For the idea of the Divine purpose and action leaves no conceivable interval between them. Rather, just as light is produced along with the kindling of fire, immediately coming out from it and shining forth along with it, in the same manner the existence of created things is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time.

But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words He said do not imply voice and words on the part of God; but the writer, in showing the power of God to be concurrent with His will, renders the idea more easy of apprehension. For since by the will of God all things were created, and it is the ordinary way of men to signify their will first of all by speech, and so to bring their work into harmony with their will, and the scriptural account of the Creation is the learner's introduction, as it were, to the knowledge of God, representing to our minds the power of the Divine Being by objects more ready to our comprehension (for sensible apprehension is an aid to intellectual knowledge), on this account, Moses, by saying that God commanded all things to be, signifies to us the inciting power of His will, and by adding, and it was so, he shows that in the case of God there is no difference between will and performance; but, on the contrary, that though the purposing initiates God's activity, the accomplishment keeps pace with the purpose, and that the two are to be considered together and at once, viz. the deliberate motion of the mind, and the power that effects its purpose. For the idea of the Divine purpose and action leaves no conceivable interval between them, but as light is produced along with the kindling of fire, at once coming out from it and shining forth along with it — in the same manner the existence of things created is an effect of the Divine will, but not posterior to it in time.

In the case of people who have natural practical abilities, we can distinguish between their capability and their actual performance. For instance, someone who knows the craft of shipbuilding is always a shipbuilder in terms of ability, but only operates as one when actually demonstrating that skill in work. With God it is different, because everything we can conceive of in Him is entirely work and action, with His will immediately passing over to its object. Just as the structure of the heavens testifies to the glory of their Creator and acknowledges Him who made them without needing a voice to do so, likewise anyone familiar with the Mosaic Scripture will see that God speaks of the world as His creation, having brought everything into being by the command of His will, and that He needs no words to make His mind known. Therefore, just as the person who heard the heavens declaring the glory of God did not look for formal speech on that occasion (because for those who can understand it, the universe speaks through what is being done, without regard or need for verbal explanation), so even if someone hears Moses describing how God gave order and arrangement to each part of Creation by name, that person should not suppose the prophet is speaking falsely, nor drag down the contemplation of sublime truths with lowly and degrading notions, thereby reducing God to a merely human standard and imagining that He directs His operations through the instrument of speech the way humans do. Rather, let His command mean His will only, and let the names of those created things simply indicate the reality of their coming into being. In this way one will learn these two things from what is recorded: first, that God made all things by His will, and second, that without any trouble or difficulty the Divine Will became physis (nature).

For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each other. For example, we say of a man who possesses the art of shipbuilding, that he is always a shipbuilder in respect of his ability to build ships, but that he operates only when he displays his skill in working. It is otherwise with God; for all that we can conceive as in Him is entirely work and action, His will passing over immediately to its object. As, then, the mechanism of the heavens testifies to the glory of their Creator and confesses Him Who made them, and needs no voice for the purpose, so on the other hand any one who is acquainted with the Mosaic Scripture will see that God speaks of the world as His creation, having brought the whole into being by the fiat of His will, and that He needs no words to make known His mind. As, then, he who heard the heavens declaring the glory of God looked not for set speech on the occasion (for, to those who can understand it, the universe speaks through the things which are being done, without regard or care for verbal explanation), so, even if any one hears Moses telling how God gave order and arrangement to each several part of Creation by name, let him not suppose the prophet to speak falsely, nor degrade the contemplation of sublime verities by mean and grovelling notions, thus, as it were, reducing God to a mere human standard, and supposing that after the manner of men he directs His operations by the instrumentality of speech; but let His fiat mean His will only, and let the names of those created things denote the mere reality of their coming into being. And thus he will learn these two things from what is recorded: (1) That God made all things by His will, and (2) that without any trouble or difficulty the Divine Will became nature.

But if someone interprets the phrase "God said" more literally, as proof that articulate speech was His creation, by the same logic he must understand "God saw" to mean that He did so using faculties of perception like ours, through physical organs of vision. Similarly, with "The Lord heard me and had mercy upon me," and again, "He smelled a sweet savour," and whatever other sensory expressions Scripture uses in reference to a head, foot, hand, eyes, fingers, or sandals belonging to God—taking all these in their plain literal meaning, he will present us with a deity shaped like a human being, modeled after what we see among ourselves. But if someone hearing that the heavens are the work of His fingers, that He has a strong hand and a mighty arm, and eyes and feet and sandals, draws from such words ideas worthy of God and does not degrade the concept of His pure nature by fleshly and sensory imaginings, it follows that on one hand he will regard the verbal utterances as indications of the Divine will, but on the other he will not conceive of them as articulate sounds. Rather, he will reason this way: the Creator of human reason has given us speech in proportion to the capacity of our nature, so that we might be able to express the thoughts of our minds; but to the extent that the Divine nature differs from ours, so great will be the degree of difference between our notions about it and its own inherent majesty and godhead. And just as our power compared with God's, and our life with His life, is as nothing, and all else that is ours compared with what is in Him is as nothing in comparison with Him, as the inspired Teaching says, so also our word compared with Him, Who is the Word indeed, is as nothing. For this word of yours was not in the beginning, but was created along with our nature, nor should it be regarded as having any reality of its own, but as our teacher Basil has said somewhere, it vanishes along with the sound of the voice, nor is any operation of the word discernible, but it has its existence in voice only, or in written characters. But the word of God is God Himself, the Word that was in the beginning and that abides forever, through Whom all things were and are, Who rules over all and has all power over the things in heaven and the things on earth, being Life and Truth and Righteousness and Light and all that is good, and upholding all things in being. Such, then, and so great being the word, as we understand it, of God, our opponent grants God, as some great thing, the power of language made up of nouns, verbs, and conjunctions, not perceiving that, just as He Who gave practical powers to our nature is not spoken of as fabricating each of their several results, but while He gave our nature its ability, it is by us that a house is constructed, or a bench, or a sword, or a plough, or whatever thing our life happens to need, each of which is our own work though it may be ascribed to Him Who is the author of our being and Who created our nature capable of every skill—so also our power of speech is the work of Him Who made our nature what it is, but the invention of each particular term needed to denote objects at hand is of our own devising. This is proved by the fact that many terms in use are of a base and unseemly character, of which no sensible person would conceive God the inventor. So if certain of our familiar expressions are ascribed by Holy Scripture to God as the speaker, we should remember that the Holy Spirit is addressing us in language of our own, just as in the history of the Acts we are told that each person received the teaching of the disciples in his own language in which he was born, understanding the sense of the words by the language he knew. And that this is true may be seen even more clearly by a careful examination of the enactments of the Levitical law. For they make mention of pans and cakes and fine flour and the like in the mystical sacrifices, instilling wholesome doctrine under the veil of symbol and enigma. Mention is also made of certain measures then in use, such as ephah and nebel and hin and the like. Are we then to suppose that God made these names and designations, or that in the beginning He commanded them to be such and to be so named, calling one kind of grain wheat, and its pith flour, and flat sweetmeats, whether heavy or light, cakes; and that He commanded a vessel of the kind in which a moist lump is boiled or baked to be called a pan, or that He spoke of a certain liquid measure by the name of hin or nebel, and measured dry produce by the homer? Surely it is trivial and mere Jewish folly, far removed from the grandeur of Christian simplicity, to think that God, Who is the Most High and above every name and thought, Who by sole virtue of His will governs the world which He brought into existence and upholds it in being, should set Himself like some schoolmaster to settle the fine points of terminology. Rather let us say that, just as we indicate to the deaf what we want them to do by gestures and signs, not because we have no voice of our own but because verbal communication would be utterly useless to those who cannot hear, so, inasmuch as human nature is in a sense deaf and insensible to higher truths, we maintain that the grace of God at various times and in various ways spoke by the Prophets, ordering their voices according to our capacity and the modes of expression with which we are familiar, and that by such means it leads us, as with a guiding hand, to the knowledge of higher truths, not teaching us in terms proportioned to their inherent sublimity (for how can the great be contained by the little?) but descending to the lower level of our limited comprehension. And just as God, after giving animals their power of motion, no longer prescribes each step they take, for their nature, having once for all taken its beginning from the Creator, moves of itself and makes its way, adapting its power of motion to its object from time to time (except insofar as it is said that a man's steps are directed by the Lord), so our nature, having received from God the power of speech and utterance and of expressing the will by the voice, proceeds on its way through things, giving them distinctive names by varying inflections of sound; and these signs are the verbs and nouns which we use, and through which we signify the meaning of things. And though the word "fruit" is used by Moses before the creation of fruit, and "seed" before that of seed, this does not disprove our assertion, nor is the sense of the lawgiver opposed to what we have said regarding thought and conception. For that end of past agriculture which we speak of as fruit, and that beginning of future agriculture which we speak of as seed, this thing, I mean, underlying these names—whether wheat or some other produce which is increased and multiplied by sowing—does not, he teaches us, grow spontaneously, but by the will of Him Who created them to grow with their peculiar power, so as to be the same fruit and to reproduce themselves as seed, and to support mankind with their increase. And by the Divine will the thing is produced, not the name, so that the actual thing is the work of the Creator, but the distinguishing names of things, by which speech furnishes us with a clear and accurate description of them, are the work and the invention of man's reasoning faculty, though the reasoning faculty itself and its nature are a work of God. And since all people are endowed with reason, differences of language will of necessity be found according to differences of country. But if anyone maintains that light, or heaven, or earth, or seed were named in human fashion by God, he will certainly conclude that they were named in some specific language. What that was, let him show. For he who knows the one thing will not, in all probability, be ignorant of the other. For at the river Jordan, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, and again in the hearing of the Jews, and at the Transfiguration, there came a voice from heaven, teaching people not only to regard the phenomenon as something more than a figure, but also to believe the beloved Son of God to be truly God. Now that voice was fashioned by God, suitable to the understanding of the hearers, in airy substance, and adapted to the language of the day, God, who wills that all people should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, having so articulated His words in the air with a view to the salvation of the hearers, as our Lord also says to the Jews when they thought it thundered because the sound took place in the air: "This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes." But before the creation of the world, inasmuch as there was no one to hear the word, and no bodily element capable of articulating the spoken voice, how can he who says that God used words give any appearance of probability to his assertion? God Himself is without body, creation did not yet exist. Reason does not allow us to conceive of anything material in respect to Him. Those who might have been benefited by the hearing were not yet created. And if people were not yet

But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words God said, as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of reason he must understand by the words God saw, that He did so by faculties of perception like our own, through the organs of vision; and so again by the words The Lord heard me and had mercy upon me, and again, He smelled a sweet savour, and whatever other sensuous expressions are employed by Scripture in reference to head, or foot, or hand, or eyes, or fingers, or sandals, as appertaining to God, taking them, I say, in their plain literal acceptation, he will present to us an anthropomorphous deity, after the similitude of what is seen among ourselves. But if any one hearing that the heavens are the work of His fingers, that He has a strong hand, and a mighty arm, and eyes, and feet, and sandals, deduces from such words ideas worthy of God, and does not degrade the idea of His pure nature by carnal and sensuous imaginations, it will follow that on the one hand he will regard the verbal utterances as indications of the Divine will, but on the other he will not conceive of them as articulate sounds, but will reason thus; that the Creator of human reason has gifted us with speech proportionally to the capacity of our nature, so that we might be able thereby to signify the thoughts of our minds; but that, so far as the Divine nature differs from ours, so great will be the degree of difference between our notions respecting it and its own inherent majesty and godhead. And as our power compared with God's, and our life with His life, is as nothing, and all else that is ours, compared with what is in Him, is as nothing in comparison with Him, as says the inspired Teaching, so also our word as compared with Him, Who is the Word indeed, is as nothing. For this word of yours was not in the beginning, but was created along with our nature, nor is it to be regarded as having any reality of its own, but, as our master (Basil) somewhere has said, it vanishes along with the sound of the voice, nor is any operation of the word discernible, but it has its subsistence in voice only, or in written characters. But the word of God is God Himself, the Word that was in the beginning and that abides for ever, through Whom all things were and are, Who rules over all, and has all power over the things in heaven and the things on earth, being Life, and Truth, and Righteousness, and Light, and all that is good, and upholding all things in being. Such, then, and so great being the word, as we understand it, of God, our opponent allows God, as some great thing, the power of language, made up of nouns, verbs, and conjunctions, not perceiving that, as He Who conferred practical powers on our nature is not spoken of as fabricating each of their several results, but, while He gave our nature its ability, it is by us that a house is constructed, or a bench, or a sword, or a plough, and whatsoever thing our life happens to be in need of, each of which things is our own work, although it may be ascribed to Him Who is the author of our being, and Who created our nature capable of every science, — so also our power of speech is the work of Him Who made our nature what it is, but the invention of each several term required to denote objects in hand is of our own devising. And this is proved by the fact that many terms in use are of a base and unseemly character, of which no man of sense would conceive God the inventor: so that, if certain of our familiar expressions are ascribed by Holy Scripture to God as the speaker, we should remember that the Holy Spirit is addressing us in language of our own, as e.g. in the history of the Acts we are told that each man received the teaching of the disciples in his own language wherein he was born, understanding the sense of the words by the language which he knew. And, that this is true, may be seen yet more clearly by a careful examination of the enactments of the Levitical law. For they make mention of pans, and cakes, and fine flour, and the like, in the mystic sacrifices, instilling wholesome doctrine under the veil of symbol and enigma. Mention, too, is made of certain measures then in use, such as ephah, and nebel, and hin, and the like. Are we, then, to suppose that God made these names and appellations, or that in the beginning He commanded them to be such, and to be so named, calling one kind of grain wheat, and its pith flour, and flat sweetmeats, whether heavy or light, cakes; and that He commanded a vessel of the kind in which a moist lump is boiled or baked to be called a pan, or that He spoke of a certain liquid measure by the name of hin or nebel, and measured dry produce by the homer? Surely it is trifling and mere Jewish folly, far removed from the grandeur of Christian simplicity, to think that God, Who is the Most High and above every name and thought, Who by sole virtue of His will governs the world, which He brought into existence, and upholds it in being, should set Himself like some schoolmaster to settle the niceties of terminology. Rather let us say, that as we indicate to the deaf what we want them to do, by gestures and signs, not because we have no voice of our own, but because a verbal communication would be utterly useless to those who cannot hear, so, in as much as human nature is in a sense deaf and insensible to higher truths, we maintain that the grace of God at sundry times and in various manners spoke by the Prophets, ordering their voices conformably to our capacity and the modes of expression with which we are familiar, and that by such means it leads us, as with a guiding hand, to the knowledge of higher truths, not teaching us in terms proportioned to their inherent sublimity, (for how can the great be contained by the little?) but descending to the lower level of our limited comprehension. And as God, after giving animals their power of motion, no longer prescribes each step they take, for their nature, having once for all taken its beginning from the Creator, moves of itself, and makes its way, adapting its power of motion to its object from time to time (except in so far as it is said that a man's steps are directed by the Lord), so our nature, having received from God the power of speech and utterance and of expressing the will by the voice, proceeds on its way through things, giving them distinctive names by varying inflections of sound; and these signs are the verbs and nouns which we use, and through which we signify the meaning of the things. And though the word fruit is made use of by Moses before the creation of fruit, and seed before that of seed, this does not disprove our assertion, nor is the sense of the lawgiver opposed to what we have said in respect to thought and conception. For that end of past husbandry which we speak of as fruit, and that beginning of future husbandry which we speak of as seed, this thing, I mean, underlying these names — whether wheat or some other produce which is increased and multiplied by sowing — does not, he teaches us, grow spontaneously, but by the will of Him Who created them to grow with their peculiar power, so as to be the same fruit and to reproduce themselves as seed, and to support mankind with their increase. And by the Divine will the thing is produced, not the name, so that the substantial thing is the work of the Creator, but the distinguishing names of things, by which speech furnishes us with a clear and accurate description of them, are the work and the invention of man's reasoning faculty, though the reasoning faculty itself and its nature are a work of God. And since all men are endowed with reason, differences of language will of necessity be found according to differences of country. But if any one maintain that light, or heaven, or earth, or seed were named after human fashion by God, he will certainly conclude that they were named in some special language. What that was, let him show. For he who knows the one thing will not, in all probability, be ignorant of the other. For at the river Jordan, after the descent of the Holy Ghost, and again in the hearing of the Jews, and at the Transfiguration, there came a voice from heaven, teaching men not only to regard the phenomenon as something more than a figure, but also to believe the beloved Son of God to be truly God. Now that voice was fashioned by God, suitably to the understanding of the hearers, in airy substance, and adapted to the language of the day, God, who wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth 1 Timothy 2:4, having so articulated His words in the air with a view to the salvation of the hearers, as our Lord also says to the Jews, when they thought it thundered because the sound took place in the air. This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes. But before the creation of the world, inasmuch as there was no one to hear the word, and no bodily element capable of accentuating the articulate voice, how can he who says that God used words give any air of probability to his assertion? God Himself is without body, creation did not yet exist. Reason does not suffer us to conceive of anything material in respect to Him. They who might have been benefited by the hearing were not yet created. And if men were not yet in being, neither had any form of language been struck out in accordance with national peculiarities, by what arguments, then, can he who looks to the bare letter make good his assertion, that God spoke thus using human parts of speech?

The pointlessness of such claims can also be seen in this way. The natures of the elements, which are the Creator's work, appear the same to everyone, and human experience finds no difference in fire, air, or water. The physis of each is one and unchanging, working in the same way and not being altered by the differences among those who experience it. In the same way, if God had assigned names to things, the naming would have been the same for everyone. But in reality, while the physis of things as established by God remains the same, the names that identify them are divided by so many different languages that it would be difficult even to count them all.

And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to all, and there is no difference to human sense in men's experience of fire, or air, or water, but the nature of each is one and unchanging, working in the same way, and suffering no modification from the differences of those who partake of it, so also the imposition of names, if applied to things by God, would have been the same for all. But, in point of fact, while the nature of things as constituted by God remains the same, the names which denote them are divided by so many differences of language, that it were no easy task even to calculate their number.

And if anyone brings up the confusion of tongues that happened at the building of the tower as contradicting what I have said, even there God is not spoken of as creating men's languages, but as confounding the existing one, so that all might not understand all. For when everyone lived together and were not yet divided by various racial differences, the whole human population dwelt together with one language among them. But when it was decreed by the Divine will that all the earth should be filled with humanity, then their common tongue was broken up, and people were scattered in various directions and adopted different forms of speech and language. They possessed a certain bond of unity through similarity of tongue, not disagreeing from others in their knowledge of things, but differing in how they named them. For a stone or a stick does not seem like one thing to one person and something else to another, but different peoples call them by different names. So our position remains unshaken: that human language is the invention of the human mind or understanding. For from the beginning, as long as all people had the same language, we see from Holy Scripture that people received no teaching of God's words. Nor, when people were separated into various different languages, did a Divine decree prescribe how each person should talk. But God, willing that people should speak different languages, gave human nature full liberty to formulate arbitrary sounds in order to make their meaning more intelligible. Accordingly, Moses, who lived many generations after the building of the tower, uses one of the later languages in his historical narrative of the creation and attributes certain words to God, relating these things in his own tongue in which he had been brought up and with which he was familiar. He did not change the names for God by foreign peculiarities and turns of speech in order to prove them the words of God Himself by the strangeness and novelty of the expressions.

And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God spoken of as creating men's languages, but as confounding the existing one Genesis 11:7, that all might not hear all. For when all lived together and were not as yet divided by various differences of race, the aggregate of men dwelt together with one language among them; but when by the Divine will it was decreed that all the earth should be replenished by mankind, then, their community of tongue being broken up, men were dispersed in various directions and adopted this and that form of speech and language, possessing a certain bond of union in similarity of tongue, not indeed disagreeing from others in their knowledge of things, but differing in the character of their names. For a stone or a stick does not seem one thing to one man and another to another, but the different peoples call them by different names. So that our position remains unshaken, that human language is the invention of the human mind or understanding. For from the beginning, as long as all men had the same language, we see from Holy Scripture that men received no teaching of God's words, nor, when men were separated into various differences of language, did a Divine enactment prescribe how each man should talk. But God, willing that men should speak different languages, gave human nature full liberty to formulate arbitrary sounds, so as to render their meaning more intelligible. Accordingly, Moses, who lived many generations after the building of the tower, uses one of the subsequent languages in his historical narrative of the creation, and attributes certain words to God, relating these things in his own tongue in which he had been brought up, and with which he was familiar, not changing the names for God by foreign peculiarities and turns of speech, in order by the strangeness and novelty of the expressions to prove them the words of God Himself.

But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew language is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other miracles this miracle was performed on behalf of the Israelites—that after the Exodus from Egypt, the language was quickly created for the use of the nation. And there is a passage in the Prophet which confirms this. For he says, when he came out of the land of Egypt he heard a strange language. If, then, Moses was a Hebrew, and the language of the Hebrews came after the others, Moses, I say, who was born some thousands of years after the Creation of the world and who relates the words of God in his own language—does he not clearly teach us that he does not attribute to God such a language of human form, but that he speaks as he does because it was impossible to express his meaning in any way other than in human language, though the words he uses have some Divine and profound significance?

But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other miracles this miracle was wrought in behalf of the Israelites, that after the Exodus from Egypt, the language was hastily improvised for the use of the nation. And there is a passage in the Prophet which confirms this. For he says, when he came out of the land of Egypt he heard a strange language. If, then, Moses was a Hebrew, and the language of the Hebrews was subsequent to the others, Moses, I say, who was born some thousands of years after the Creation of the world, and who relates the words of God in his own language — does he not clearly teach us that he does not attribute to God such a language of human fashion, but that he speaks as he does because it was impossible otherwise than in human language to express his meaning, though the words he uses have some Divine and profound significance?

To suppose that God used the Hebrew language when there was no one to hear and understand it is something, I think, no reasonable person would accept. We read in Acts that the Divine power divided itself into many languages for this purpose: so that no one of a foreign tongue might lose their share of the benefit. But if God spoke in human language before the Creation, whom would He benefit by using it? That His speech should be adapted to the capacity of the hearers for their profit—no one would consider this unworthy of God's love for humanity, for Paul the follower of Christ knew how to adapt his words appropriately to the habits and disposition of his hearers, making himself milk for infants and solid food for mature people. But where no purpose was to be served by such use of language, to argue that God, as it were, spoke such words to Himself when there was no one needing the information they would convey—such an idea is, I think, both blasphemous and absurd. So God neither spoke in the Hebrew language nor expressed Himself according to any form used among the Gentiles. But whatever of God's words are recorded by Moses or the Prophets are indications of the Divine will, flashing forth now in one way, now in another, on the pure intellect of those holy men, according to the measure of grace they shared. Moses, then, spoke his native language, the one in which he was educated. But he attributed these words to God, as I have said repeatedly, because of the childlike understanding of those who were being brought to the knowledge of God, in order to give a clear representation of the Divine will and to make his hearers more obedient by being awed by the authority of the speaker.

For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consent. We read in the Acts that the Divine power divided itself into many languages for this purpose, that no one of alien tongue might lose his share of the benefit. But if God spoke in human language before the Creation, whom was He to benefit by using it? For that His speech should have some adaptation to the capacity of the hearers, with a view to their profit, no one would conceive to be unworthy of God's love to man, for Paul the follower of Christ knew how to adapt his words suitably to the habits and disposition of his hearers, making himself milk for babes and strong meat for grown men. Hebrews 5:12 But where no object was to be gained by such use of language, to argue that God, as it were, declaimed such words by Himself, when there was no one in need of the information they would convey — such an idea, methinks, is at once both blasphemous and absurd. Neither, then, did God speak in the Hebrew language, nor did He express Himself according to any form in use among the Gentiles. But whatsoever of God's words are recorded by Moses or the Prophets, are indications of the Divine will, flashing forth, now in one way, now in another, on the pure intellect of those holy men, according to the measure of the grace of which they were partakers. Moses, then, spoke his mother-tongue, and that in which he was educated. But he attributed these words to God, as I have said, repeatedly, on account of the childishness of those who were being brought to the knowledge of God, in order to give a clear representation of the Divine will, and to render his hearers more obedient, as being awed by the authority of the speaker.

But Eunomius denies this—the author of all this contempt directed at us, and the companion and adviser of this impious group. Setting aside insolence for courtesy, I will present his own words. He maintains, in so many words, that he has the testimony of Moses himself for his claim that men were given the use of both things and their names by the Creator of nature, and that the naming of things came before in time the creation of those who would use them. Now, if he possesses some Moses of his own, from whom he learned this wisdom, and relies on such statements as his base of operations—namely, that God, as Eunomius himself says, establishes the laws of human speech, decreeing that things shall be called one way and not another—let him play games as much as he wants, with his Moses in the background to support his claims. But if there is only one Moses whose writings are the common source of instruction for those learned in the Divine Word, we will freely accept our condemnation if we find ourselves refuted by that Moses's law. But where did he find this law about verbs and nouns? Let him produce it in the exact words of the text. The account of Creation, the genealogy of successive generations, the history of certain events, the complex system of legislation, and various regulations regarding religious service and daily life—these are the chief topics in Moses's writings. But if he says there was any legislative enactment regarding words, let him point it out, and I will be silent. But he cannot, for if he could, he would not abandon the more striking evidences of the Deity for such as can only bring him ridicule, not credibility, from sensible people. For to think it the essential point in piety to attribute the invention of words to God, Whose praise the whole world and its wonders are unable to celebrate—must it not be extremely foolish to neglect higher grounds of praise and magnify God on purely human ones? His command preceded Creation, but it was recorded by Moses in human fashion, though issued Divinely. That will of God, which brought about the creation of the world by His Divine power, consisted, according to this careful student of the Scriptures, in the teaching of words. And as though God had said, "Let there be a word," or "Let speech be created," or "Let this or that have such and such a name," he brings forward the fact that Creation took place by the impulse of the Divine will to support his trivial argument. For despite all his study and experience in the Scriptures, he does not even know this: that the impulse of the mind is frequently called a voice in Scripture. And for this we have the evidence of Moses himself, whose meaning Eunomius frequently distorts, but whom on this point he simply ignores. For who is there, however slightly acquainted with the holy book, who does not know this: that the people of Israel who had just escaped from Egypt were suddenly frightened in the wilderness by the pursuing Egyptians, and when dangers surrounded them on all sides—on one side the sea blocked their passage like a wall, while the enemy cut off their retreat from behind—the people came together to the Prophet and blamed him for causing their helpless situation? And when he comforted them in their abject terror and roused them to courage, a voice came from God, addressing the Prophet by name: "Why do you cry to Me?" And yet before this the narrative makes no mention of any utterance by Moses. But the thought which the Prophet had lifted up to God is called a cry, though uttered in silence in the hidden thought of his heart. If, then, Moses cries, though without speaking, as witnessed by Him Who hears those groanings which cannot be uttered, is it strange that the Prophet, knowing the Divine will as far as it was lawful for him to tell it and for us to hear it, revealed it through known and familiar words, describing God's discourse in human fashion—not actually expressed in words, but signified by the effects themselves? In the beginning, he says, God created not the names of heaven and earth, but heaven and earth. And again, God said, "Let there be light," not the name "Light." And having divided the light from the darkness, God called, he says, the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.

But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For, changing insolence into courtesy, I will present him with his own words. He maintains, in so many words, that he has the testimony of Moses himself to his assertion that men were endowed with the use of the things named, and of their names, by the Creator of nature, and that the naming of the things given was prior in time to the creation of those who should use them. Now, if he is in possession of some Moses of his own, from whom he has learned this wisdom, and, making this his base of operations, relies on such statements as these, viz. that God, as he himself says, lays down the laws of human speech, enacting that things shall be called in one way and not in another, let him trifle as much as he pleases, with his Moses in the background to support his assertions. But if there is only one Moses whose writings are the common source of instruction to those who are learned in the Divine Word, we will freely accept our condemnation if we find ourselves refuted by the law of that Moses. But where did he find this law respecting verbs and nouns? Let him produce it in the very words of the text. The account of the Creation, and the genealogy of the successive generations, and the history of certain events, and the complex system of legislation, and various regulations in regard to religious service and daily life, these are the chief heads of the writings of Moses. But, if he says that there was any legislative enactment in regard to words, let him point it out, and I will hold my tongue. But he cannot; for, if he could, he would not abandon the more striking evidences of the Deity, for such as can only procure him ridicule, and not credit, from men of sense. For to think it the essential point in piety to attribute the invention of words to God, Whose praise the whole world and the wonders that are therein are incompetent to celebrate — must it not be a proceeding of extreme folly so to neglect higher grounds of praise, and to magnify God on such as are purely human? His fiat preluded Creation, but it was recorded by Moses after human fashion, though Divinely issued. That will of God, then, which brought about the creation of the world by His Divine power, consisted, says our careful student of the Scriptures, in the teaching of words. And as though God had said, Let there be a word, or, Let speech be created, or, Let this or that have such or such an appellation, so, in advocacy of his trifling, he brings forward the fact that it was by the impulse of the Divine will that Creation took place. For with all his study and experience in the Scriptures he knows not even this, that the impulse of the mind is frequently spoken of in Scripture as a voice. And for this we have the evidence of Moses himself, whose meaning he frequently perverts, but whom on this point he simply ignores. For who is there, however slightly acquainted with the holy volume, who does not know this, that the people of Israel who had just escaped from Egypt were suddenly affrighted in the wilderness by the pursuit of the Egyptians, and when dangers encompassed them on all sides, and on one side the sea cut off their passage as by a wall, while the enemy barred their flight in the rear, the people coming together to the Prophet charged him with being the cause of their helpless condition? And when he comforted them in their abject terror, and roused them to courage, a voice came from God, addressing the Prophet by name, Wherefore do you cry unto Me? Exodus 14:15 And yet before this the narrative makes no mention of any utterance on the part of Moses. But the thought which the Prophet had lifted up to God is called a cry, though uttered in silence in the hidden thought of his heart. If, then, Moses cries, though without speaking, as witnessed by Him Who hears, those groanings which cannot be uttered Romans 8:26, is it strange that the Prophet, knowing the Divine will, so far as it was lawful for him to tell it and for us to hear it, revealed it by known and familiar words, describing God's discourse after human fashion, not indeed expressed in words, but signified by the effects themselves? In the beginning, he says, God created, not the names of heaven and earth, but, the heaven and the earth. And again, God said, Let there be light, not the name Light: and having divided the light from the darkness, God called, he says, the light Day, and the darkness He called Night.

On these passages our opponents will probably take their stand. I will agree with what is said on their behalf, and I will myself use their positions later in our inquiry, so that what we teach may be more firmly established, with no point in controversy left without proper examination. God called, he says, the firmament Heaven, and He called the dry land Earth, and the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. How is it, then, they will ask, when Scripture admits that their names were given by God, that you say their names are the work of human invention? What, then, is our reply? We return to our straightforward statement, and we assert that He who brought all creation into being out of nothing is the Creator of things seen in substantial existence, not of insubstantial words that have no existence except in the sound of the voice and the movement of the tongue. But things are named by the indication of the voice in accordance with the nature and qualities inherent in each, with the names being adapted to the things according to the native language of each particular people.

On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage of their positions further on in our inquiry, in order that what we teach may be more firmly established, no point in controversy being left without due examination. God called, he says, the firmament Heaven, and He called the dry land Earth, and the light Day, and the darkness He called Night. How comes it, then, they will ask, when the Scripture admits that their appellations were given them by God, that you say that their names are the work of human invention? What, then, is our reply? We return to our plain statement, and we assert, that He Who brought all creation into being out of nothing is the Creator of things seen in substantial existence, not of unsubstantial words having no existence but in the sound of the voice and the lisp of the tongue. But things are named by the indication of the voice in conformity with the nature and qualities inherent in each, the names being adapted to the things according to the vernacular language of each several race.

But since the nature of most things we see in creation is not simple, all that they mean cannot be captured in one word. For instance, with fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word that denotes it is another. Fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, burning, drying, heating, and consuming whatever fuel it takes hold of, but the name is just a brief word of one syllable. For this reason, speech distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire and gives each of them its own name, as I said before. We cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is called bright or consuming or anything else we observe it to be, because such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. Similarly, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or another of its particular characteristics. By looking at these we learn one thing by the term heaven and another by firmament. When speech defines the limit of sensible creation, beyond which lies the transmundane void understood by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible, incorporeal, and invisible, the beginning and end of all material existences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of earthly things, we call that which encompasses all material nature and forms the boundary of all visible things by the name heaven. In the same way, regarding earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the term dry defines to some extent its opposite. Earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since it threw off, by divine command, the water that covered it and appeared in its own character. But the name earth does not continue to express only one of its qualities; rather, by its meaning, it embraces all that the word includes—for example, hardness, density, weight, resistance, and the ability to support animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word dry was not changed by speech to the last name given to it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called dry), but while both terms remained, a particular meaning attached itself to each: one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so with light and day, and again with night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these terms we note the substance of the things they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God, the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lies in the middle, upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job says, "He hangs the earth upon nothing." When light traveled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, it was necessary that a side of darkness should be left by the obstruction. So, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot help but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obstruction, God ordained this revolution as a measure of the duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical explanation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth's obstruction a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So what was called light was not named day, but just as there was light and not merely the name of light, so the measure of time was also created and the name followed—not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal designation. And if the Lawgiver had plainly said that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or without formation, but has its existence from God, we might have concluded for ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, the order seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them. So also by what he says he leads us to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. With this in view he describes the successive events of creation in orderly fashion, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language except by expressing their meaning with words that would indicate it. Since it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to light and day, but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measured interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though perhaps not drawn out in strict logical form—showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for his sake but for ours. Since we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the designation of words to distinguish the things stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does he need memory, since all things are within the range of his penetrating vision. What need, then, in his case, of parts of speech, when his own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Therefore all things that exist substantially are from God, but for our guidance all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if anyone says that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of humankind, he will commit no offense against the scheme of divine providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh's daughter who named him from what had happened? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, in consequence of the tyrant's order, his parents had placed the baby in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained from the water, she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence—a name by which God himself did not disdain to address his servant, nor did he deem it beneath him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the prophet's proper appellation.

But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, as, for instance, in the case of fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word which denotes it is another (for fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, of burning, of drying and heating, and consuming whatever fuel it lays hold of, but the name is but a brief word of one syllable), on this account speech, which distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire, gives each of them a name of its own, as I have said before. And one cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is spoken of as bright, or consuming, or anything else that we observe it to be. For such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. So likewise, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or other of its peculiar characteristics, in looking at which we learn one thing by the appellation heaven, and another by firmament. For when speech would define the limit of sensible creation, beyond which it is succeeded by the transmundane void apprehended by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible and incorporeal and invisible, the beginning and the end of all material subsistences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of terrestrial things, we call that which encompasses all material nature, and which forms the boundary of all things visible, by the name of heaven. In the same manner with regard to earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the appellation dry defines to a certain extent its opposite, for earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since having thrown off, by Divine command, the water that overspread it, it appeared in its own character. But the name earth does not continue to express the signification of some one only of its qualities, but, by virtue of its meaning, it embraces all that the word connotes, e.g. hardness, density, weight, resistance, capability of supporting animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word dry was not changed by speech to the last name put upon it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called so), but while both the appellations remained, a peculiar signification attached itself to each, the one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so in light and day, and again in night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these appellations we note the substance of the things which they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lying in the midst, and being upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job says, He hangs the earth upon nothing Job 26:7, it was necessary when light travelled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, that a side of darkness should be left by the obscuration, and so, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obscuration, God ordained this revolution for a measure of duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical elucidation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth's obstruction, a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So that what was called light was not named day, but as there was light, and not the bare name of light, so the measure of time also was created and the name followed, not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal notation. And as, if it had been plainly said by the Lawgiver that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or unfashioned, but that it has its subsistence from God, we might have concluded of ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, and the order which is seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them, so also by what he says he leads us on to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. And with this view he describes the successive events of Creation in orderly method, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language, except by expressing their signification by words that should indicate it. Since, then, it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different, by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to light and day, but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measure of the interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light, and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though not, perhaps, drawn out in strict logical form — showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for His sake but for ours. For as we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the notation of words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does He need memory, all things being within the range of His penetrating vision. What need, then, in His case, of parts of speech, when His own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God; but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if any one say that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be guilty of no offense against the scheme of Divine Providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that, if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example which we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh's daughter who named him from what had happened Exodus 2:10? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, then, in consequence of the tyrant's order, his parents had placed the babe in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess, who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained from the water, she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence — a name by which God Himself did not disdain to address His servant, nor did He deem it beneath Him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the Prophet's proper appellation.

In the same way, Jacob took hold of his brother's heel before him and was called a supplanter from the position in which he was born. Those who are knowledgeable in such matters tell us that this is what the word Jacob means when translated into Greek. Similarly, Pharez was named by his nurse because of what happened at his birth, yet no one on that account, like Eunomius, showed any jealousy that he was taking authority that belonged to God. Furthermore, the mothers of the patriarchs gave them their names, such as Reuben, Simeon, Levi, and all those who came after them. And no one jumped up, like our new author does, as a defender of Divine providence to forbid women from seizing Divine authority by giving names. And what should we say about other details in the sacred record, such as the waters of strife, the place of mourning, the hill of the foreskins, the valley of the cluster, the field of blood, and similar names that were given by humans but were often recorded as being spoken by the Person of God? From these we may learn that people can communicate the meaning of things through words without being presumptuous, and that the Divine nature does not depend on words for evidence of itself.

In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother's heel, was called a supplanter Genesis 25:26, from the attitude in which he came to the birth. For those who are learned in such matters tell us that such is the interpretation of the word Jacob, as translated into Greek. So, too, Pharez was so named by his nurse from the incident at his birth Genesis 38:29, yet no one on that account, like Eunomius, displayed any jealousy of his assuming an authority above that of God. Moreover the mothers of the patriarchs gave them their names, as Reuben, and Simeon, and Levi, and all those who came after them. And no one started up, like our new author, as patron of Divine providence, to forbid women to usurp Divine authority by the imposition of names. And what shall we say of other particulars in the sacred record, such as the waters of strife, and the place of mourning, and the hill of the foreskins, and the valley of the cluster, and the field of blood, and such-like names, of human imposing, but oftentimes recorded to have been uttered by the Person of God, from which we may learn that men may notify the meaning of things by words without presumption, and that the Divine nature does not depend on words for its evidence to itself?

But I will pass over his other ramblings against the truth, since they have no force against our doctrines, for I consider it pointless to linger any longer over such absurdities. Who could be so lacking in more important subjects of thought as to waste energy on foolish arguments, and to argue with men who claim we are saying that human forethought carries greater weight and authority than God's guardianship, and that we attribute the carelessness that confuses weaker minds to the providence of God? These are the exact words of our accuser. But for my part, I think it is just as absurd to pay attention to remarks like that as to occupy myself with old women's dreams. For to think of securing the dignity of rule and sovereignty for the Divine Being through a particular form of words, and to show that the great power of God depends on this, while on the other hand neglecting Him and disregarding the providence that belongs to Him, and to make it a criticism against us that people, having received from God the faculty of reason, make arbitrary use of words to signify things—what is this but an old woman's tale, or a drunkard's dream? For the true power, and authority, and dominion, and sovereignty of God do not, we believe, consist in syllables. If that were so, any inventor of words might claim equal honor with God. But the infinite ages, and the beauties of the universe, and the rays of the heavenly lights, and all the wonders of land and sea, and the angelic hosts and heavenly powers, and whatever else exists in the realm above that is revealed to us under various figures by Holy Scripture—these are the things that bear witness to God's power over all. In contrast, to attribute the invention of vocal sound to those who are naturally endowed with the faculty of speech involves no impiety toward Him who gave them their voice. Nor indeed do we consider it a great thing to invent words that signify things. For the being to whom Holy Scripture in the creation account gave the name of man (ἄνθρωπος), a word of human invention, that same being Job calls mortal (βροτός), while among secular writers, some call him human being (φώς), and others articulate speaker (μέροψ)—to say nothing of other variations of the name. Do we, then, elevate them to equal honor with God, because they also invented names equivalent to that of man, all signifying the same subject? But, as I have said before, let us leave this idle talk, and make no account of his string of insults, in which he charges us with lying against the Divine oracles, and uttering slanders with shamelessness even against God.

But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger any longer over such absurdities. For who can be so wanting in the more important subjects of thought as to waste energy on silly arguments, and to contend with men who speak of us as asserting that man's forethought is of superior weight and authority to God's guardianship, and that we ascribe the carelessness which confuses the feebler minds to the providence of God? These are the exact words of our calumniator. But I, for my part, think it equally as absurd to pay attention to remarks like that, as to occupy myself with old wives' dreams. For to think of securing the dignity of rule and sovereignty to the Divine Being by a form of words, and to show the great power of God to be dependent upon this, and on the other hand to neglect Him and disregard the providence which belongs to Him, and to lay it to our reproach that men, having received from God the faculty of reason, make an arbitrary use of words to signify things — what is this but an old wife's fable, or a drunkard's dream? For the true power, and authority, and dominion, and sovereignty of God do not, we think, consist in syllables. Were it so, any and every inventor of words might claim equal honour with God. But the infinite ages, and the beauties of the universe, and the beams of the heavenly luminaries, and all the wonders of land and sea, and the angelic hosts and supra-mundane powers, and whatever else there is whose existence in the realm above is revealed to us under various figures by Holy Scripture — these are the things that bear witness to God's power over all. Whereas, to attribute the invention of vocal sound to those who are naturally endowed with the faculty of speech, this involves no impiety towards Him Who gave them their voice. Nor indeed do we hold it to be a great thing to invent words significative of things. For the being to whom Holy Scripture in the history of the creation gave the name of man Genesis 1:26 ( ἄ νθρωπος), a word of human devising, that same being Job calls mortal ( βροτός), while of profane writers, some call him human being ( φώς), and others articulate speaker ( μέροψ)– to say nothing of other varieties of the name. Do we, then, elevate them to equal honour with God, because they also invented names equivalent to that of man, alike signifying their subject. But, as I have said before, let us leave this idle talk, and make no account of his string of revilings, in which he charges us with lying against the Divine oracles, and uttering slanders with effrontery even against God.

Let me move on to what remains. Eunomius brings forward once more some of the Master's words, which say this: And it is in precisely the same way that we are taught by Holy Scripture the use of a conception. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when declaring to people the nature of His Godhead, explains it by certain special characteristics, calling Himself the Door, the Bread, the Way, the Vine, the Shepherd, the Light. Now I think it best to pass over his insulting remarks about these words (for this is how his rhetorical training has taught him to argue with his opponents), nor will I let myself be disturbed by his outbursts of childish foolishness. Let us, however, examine one sharp and supposedly irresistible argument which he puts forward to refute us. Which of the sacred writers, he asks, gives evidence that these names were attributed to our Lord by a conception? But which of them, I reply, forbids it, considering it blasphemy to regard such names as the result of a conception? For if he maintains that its not being mentioned is proof that it is forbidden, by the same logic he must admit that its not being forbidden is an argument that it is permitted. Is our Lord called by these names, or does Eunomius deny this also? If he does deny that these names are spoken of Christ, we have won without a battle. For what greater victory could there be than to prove our adversary is fighting against God by robbing the sacred words of the Gospel of their meaning? But if he admits that it is true that Christ is named by these names, let him say in what manner they can be applied without irreverence to the Only-begotten Son of God. Does he take the stone as indicating His physis? Does he understand His ousia under the figure of the Axe (not to burden our argument by listing the rest)? None of these names represents the physis of the Only-begotten, or His Godhead, or the particular character of His ousia. Nevertheless He is called by these names, and each title has its own special appropriateness. For we cannot, without irreverence, suppose anything in the words of God to be pointless and meaningless. Let him say, then, if he disallows these names as the result of a conception, how do they apply to Christ? For we on our part say this: that since our Lord provided for human life in various ways, each variety of His kindness is suitably distinguished by His several names, His providential care and working on our behalf passing over into the form of a name. And such a name is said by us to be arrived at by a conception. But if this is not agreeable to our opponents, let it be as each of them pleases. In his ignorance, however, of the figures of Scripture, our opponent contradicts what is said. For if he had learned the Divine names, he must have known that our Lord is called a Curse and Sin, and a Heifer, and a lion's Whelp, and a Bear bereaved of her cubs, and a Leopard, and such names, according to various modes of conception, by Holy Scripture, the sacred and inspired writers using such names, as if using well-aimed arrows, to indicate the central point of the idea they had in view. Yet these words, when taken in their literal and obvious meaning, seem not above suspicion, but each single one of them, unless we allow it to be said of God through some process of conception, will not escape the taint of a blasphemous suggestion. But it would be a lengthy task to bring them all forward and explain in every case how, in the general idea, these words have been turned away from their obvious meanings, and how it is only in connection with the faculty of conception that the names of God can be reconciled with the reverence which is His due.

To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master's words, to this effect: And it is in precisely the same manner that we are taught by Holy Scripture the employment of a conception. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when declaring to men the nature of His Godhead, explains it by certain special characteristics, calling Himself the Door, the Bread, the Way, the Vine, the Shepherd, the Light. Now I think it seemly to pass over his insolent remarks on these words (for it is thus that his rhetorical training has taught him to contend with his opponents), nor will I suffer myself to be disturbed by his ebullitions of childish folly. Let us, however, examine one pungent and irresistible argument which he puts forward for our refutation. Which of the sacred writers, he asks, gives evidence that these names were attributed to our Lord by a conception? But which of them, I reply, forbids it, deeming it a blasphemy to regard such names as the result of a conception? For if he maintains that its not being mentioned is a proof that it is forbidden, by a parity of reasoning he must admit that its not being forbidden is an argument that it is permitted. Is our Lord called by these names, or does Eunomius deny this also? If he does deny that these names are spoken of Christ, we have conquered without a battle. For what more signal victory could there be, than to prove our adversary to be fighting against God, by robbing the sacred words of the Gospel of their meaning? But if he admits that it is true that Christ is named by these names, let him say in what manner they may be applied without irreverence to the Only-begotten Son of God. Does he take the stone as indicative of His nature? Does he understand His essence under the figure of the Axe (not to encumber our argument by enumerating the rest)? None of these names represents the nature of the Only-begotten, or His Godhead, or the peculiar character of His essence. Nevertheless He is called by these names, and each appellation has its own special fitness. For we cannot, without irreverence, suppose anything in the words of God to be idle and unmeaning. Let him say, then, if he disallows these names as the result of a conception, how do they apply to Christ? For we on our part say this, that as our Lord provided for human life in various forms, each variety of His beneficence is suitably distinguished by His several names, His provident care and working on our behalf passing over into the mould of a name. And such a name is said by us to be arrived at by a conception. But if this is not agreeable to our opponents, let it be as each of them pleases. In his ignorance, however, of the figures of Scripture, our opponent contradicts what is said. For if he had learned the Divine names, he must have known that our Lord is called a Curse and Sin Galatians 3:13, and a Heifer Hebrews 9:13, and a lion's Whelp Genesis 49:9, and a Bear bereaved of her whelps Hosea 13:3, and a Leopard Hosea 13:7 and such-like names, according to various modes of conception, by Holy Scripture, the sacred and inspired writers by such names, as by well-directed shafts, indicating the central point of the idea they had in view; even though these words, when taken in their literal and obvious signification, seem not above suspicion, but each single one of them, unless we allow it to be predicated of God by some process of conception, will not escape the taint of a blasphemous suggestion. But it would be a lengthy task to bring them forward, and elucidate in every case how, in the general idea, these words have been perverted out of their obvious meanings, and how it is only in connection with the conceptive faculty that the names of God can be reconciled with that reverence which is His due.

But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny this fact. What then? Does Eunomius claim that these words indicate His physis itself? If so, he is asserting that the Divine physis is multiform, and that the variety it displays in what is signified by the names is very complex. For the meanings of the words Bread and Lion are not the same, nor those of Axe and Water, but to each of them we can assign its own definition, which the others do not share. They do not, therefore, signify physis or ousia, yet no one will presume to say that this way of naming is completely inappropriate and meaningless. If, then, these words are given to us, but not as indicators of ousia, and every word given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these names be properly applied to the Only-begotten Son of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under various names, according to the variety of His operations, so that we may think of Him in the aspect so named. What harm, then, is done to our reverent ideas of God by this mental operation, instituted with a view to our thinking about the things done, and which we call conception, though if anyone chooses to call it by some other name, we will make no objection.

But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm that the words are indicative of His nature itself? If so, he asserts that the Divine nature is multiform, and that the variety which it displays in what is signified by the names is very complex. For the meanings of the words Bread and Lion are not the same, nor those of Axe and Water, but to each of them we can assign a definition of its own, of which the others do not partake. They do not, therefore, signify nature or essence, yet no one will presume to say that this nomenclature is quite inappropriate and unmeaning. If, then, these words are given us, but not as indicative of essence, and every word given in Scripture is just and appropriate, how else can these appellations be fitly applied to the Only-begotten Son of God, except in connection with the faculty of conception? For it is clear that the Divine Being is spoken of under various names, according to the variety of His operations, so that we may think of Him in the aspect so named. What harm, then, is done to our reverential ideas of God by this mental operation, instituted with a view to our thinking upon the things done, and which we call conception, though if any one choose to call it by some other name, we shall make no objection.

Like a mighty wrestler, Eunomius refuses to let go of his grip on us and directly states that these names are the product of human thought and conception, and that through this mental operation some people arrive at conclusions that no Apostle or Evangelist ever taught. After this bold attack, he raises his self-righteous voice and spits out his vile abuse at us with a tongue well trained in such language. For he says that attributing homonyms derived from analogy to human thought and conception is the work of a mind that has lost all sound judgment and studies the Lord's words with a weakened understanding and dishonest thought patterns. Have mercy! What a logical argument! How scientifically it reaches its conclusion! Who after this will dare to defend the concept of conception, when such a stench pours from his mouth upon those who try to speak? I suppose we who do try to speak must refrain from examining his argument for fear he will stir up the cesspool of his abuse against us. And truly it is foolish to let ourselves be provoked by childish absurdities. We will therefore allow our insolent opponent full freedom to indulge in his method as he wishes. But we will return to the Master's argument so that from there too we may gather reinforcements for the truth. Eunomius has been reminded of analogy and has recognized that the homonyms are derived from it. Now where or from whom did he learn these terms? Not from Moses, not from the Prophets and Apostles, not from the Evangelists. It is impossible that he learned them from any Scripture's teaching. How then did he come to use them? The very word that describes this or that meaning of a thought as analogy—is it not the invention of the thinking faculty of the person who speaks it? How is it then that he fails to see that he is using the very views he fights against as his allies in the war? For he makes war against our principle that words are formed by the operation of conception, and would try to establish, with the help of words formed on that very principle, that it is unlawful to use them. It is not, he says, the teaching of any of the sacred writers. To whom then among the ancients do you yourself attribute the term ungenerate, and its being predicated of the ousia of God? Or is it permissible for you, when you want to establish some of your impious conclusions, to coin and invent terms to your own liking, but if something is said by someone else that contradicts your impiety, to deprive your opponent of similar freedom? Great indeed would be the power you would claim if you could make good your claim to such authority as this—that what you forbid to others should be allowed to you alone, and that what you yourself presume to do by virtue of it, you should prevent others from doing. You condemn, as if by decree, the doctrine that these names were applied to Christ as a result of conception, because none of the sacred writers have declared that they ought to be so applied. How then can you lay down the law that the Divine ousia should be denoted by the word ungenerate—a term which none of the sacred writers can be shown to have handed down to us? For if this is the test of the right use of words, that only such shall be employed as the inspired word of Scripture authorizes, the word ungenerate must be erased from your own writings, since none of the sacred writers has sanctioned the expression. But perhaps you accept it because of the meaning that resides in it. Well, we ourselves in the same way accept the term conception because of the meaning that resides in it. Accordingly we will either exclude both from use, or neither, and whichever alternative is adopted, we are equally victorious. For if the term ungenerate is completely suppressed, all our opponents' clamor against the truth is suppressed along with it, and a doctrine worthy of the Only-begotten Son of God will shine forth, since logical opposition can furnish no name to detract from the Lord's majesty. But if both are retained, in that case also the truth will prevail, and we along with it, when we have changed the word ungeneracy from the substance into a conception of the Deity. But as long as he does not exclude the term ungenerate from his own writings, let our modern Pharisee admonish himself not to look at the speck in our eye before he has cast out the beam that is in his own.

But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that these names are the work of human thought and conception, and that, by the exercise of this operation of the mind by some, results are arrived at which no Apostle or Evangelist has taught. And after this doughty onslaught he raises that sanctimonious voice of his, spitting out his foul abuse at us with a tongue well schooled to such language. For, says he, to ascribe homonyms, drawn from analogy, to human thought and conception is the work of a mind that has lost all judicial sense, and that studies the words of the Lord with an enfeebled understanding and dishonest habit of thought. Mercy on us! What a logical argument! How scientifically it proceeds to its conclusion! Who after this will dare to speak up for the cause of conception, when such a stench is poured forth from his mouth upon those who attempt speaking? I suppose, then, that we, who do attempt speaking, must forbear to examine his argument, for fear of his stirring up against us the cesspool of his abuse. And verily it is weak-minded to let ourselves be irritated by childish absurdities. We will therefore allow our insolent adversary full liberty to indulge in his method as he will. But we will return to the Master's argument, that thence too we may muster reinforcements for the truth. Eunomius has been reminded of analogy and has perceived the homonyms to be derived from it. Now where or from whom did he learn these terms? Not from Moses, not from the Prophets and Apostles, not from the Evangelists. It is impossible that he should have learned them from the teaching of any Scripture. How came he, then, to use them? The very word which describes this or that signification of a thought as analogy, is it not the invention of the thinking faculty of him who utters it? How is it, then, that he fails to perceive that he is using the views he fights against as his allies in the war? For he makes war against our principle of words being formed by the operation of conception, and would endeavour to establish, by the aid of words formed on that very principle, that it is unlawful to use them. It is not, says he, the teaching of any of the sacred writers. To whom, then, of the ancients do you yourself ascribe the term ungenerate, and its being predicated of the essence of God? Or is it allowable for you, when you want to establish some of your impious conclusions, to coin and invent terms to your own liking; but if anything is said by some one else in contravention of your impiety, to deprive your adversary of similar licence? Great indeed would be the power you would assume if you could make good your claim to such authority as this, that what you refuse to others should be allowable to you alone, and that what you yourself presume to do by virtue of it, you should prevent others from doing. You condemn, as by an edict, the doctrine that these names were applied to Christ as a result of conception, because none of the sacred writers have declared that they ought so to be applied. How, then, can you lay down the law that the Divine essence should be denoted by the word ungenerate — a term which none of the sacred writers can be shown to have handed down to us? For if this is the test of the right use of words, that only such shall be employed as the inspired word of Scripture shall authorize, the word ungenerate must be erased from your own writings, since none of the sacred writers has sanctioned the expression. But perhaps you accept it by reason of the sense that resides in it. Well, we ourselves in the same way accept the term conception by reason of the sense that resides in it. Accordingly we will either exclude both from use, or neither, and whichever alternative be adopted, we are equally masters of the field. For if the term ungenerate be altogether suppressed, all our adversaries' clamour against the truth is suppressed along with it, and a doctrine worthy of the Only-begotten Son of God will shine forth, inasmuch as logical opposition can furnish no name to detract from the majesty of the Lord. But if both be retained, in that case also the truth will prevail, and we along with it, when we have altered the word ungeneracy from the substance, into a conception, of the Deity. But so long as he does not exclude the term ungenerate from his own writings, let our modern Pharisee admonish himself not to behold the mote that is in our eye, before he has cast out the beam that is in his own.

But God, he says, gave the weakest of earthly things a share in the most honorable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, and to the highest He gave the names of the lowest, though the natural inferiority of the latter was not transferred to the former along with their names. We quote this in his exact words. If these words contain some deep and hidden meaning that has escaped us, let those who see what is beyond our range of vision inform us—initiated as they are by him in his esoteric and unspeakable mysteries. But if they admit no interpretation beyond what is obvious, I hardly know which of the two are more to be pitied, those who say such things or those who listen to them. To the weakest of earthly things, he says, God has given names in common with the most honorable, though not giving them an equal share of dignity. Let us examine what this means. The weakest things, he says, are honored with merely the name belonging to the honorable, their physis not corresponding with their name. And this he claims is the work of the God of truth—to honor the worse physis with the worthier title! On the other hand, he says that God applies the less honorable names to things superior in their physis, the physis of the latter not being carried over to the former along with the title. But to make the matter even clearer, the absurdity shall be shown by actual examples. If anyone should call a man who is esteemed for every virtue intemperate, or, on the other hand, a man equally in disrepute for his vices good and moral, would sensible people think him of sound mind, or one who had any regard for truth, reversing, as would be the case, the meanings of words and giving them an unnatural meaning? I for my part think not. He speaks, then, of things relating to God completely out of keeping with our common understanding and with the holy Scriptures. For in matters of ordinary life it is only those who are unsettled by drink or madness who go wrong in names and use them out of their proper meaning, calling, it may be, a man a dog, or vice versa. But Holy Scripture is so far from approving such confusion that we may clearly hear the voice of prophecy lamenting it. "Woe to him," says Isaiah, "who calls darkness light and light darkness, who calls bitter sweet and sweet bitter." Now what induces Eunomius to apply this absurdity to his God? Let those who are initiated in his mysteries say what they judge those weakest of earthly things to be, which God has honored with most honorable titles. The weakest of existing things are those animals whose generation takes place from the corruption of moist elements, just as the most honorable are virtue and holiness and whatever else is pleasing in the sight of God. Are flies, then, and midges and frogs and whatever insects are generated from dung honored with the names of holiness and virtue, so as to be consecrated with honorable names, though not sharing in such high qualities, as Eunomius says? But we have never yet heard anything like this, that these weak things are called by high-sounding titles, or that what is great and honorable by physis is degraded by the name of any one of them. Noah was a righteous man, says the Scripture, Abraham was faithful, Moses meek, Daniel wise, Joseph chaste, Job blameless, David perfect in patience. Let them say, then, whether all these had their names by contraries; or, to take the case of those who are unfavorably spoken of, such as Nabal the Carmelite, and Pharaoh the Egyptian, and Abimelech the alien, and all those who are mentioned for their vices, whether they were honored with honorable names by the voice of God. Not so! But God judges and distinguishes His creatures as they are in physis and truth, not by names contrary to them, but by such appropriate titles as may give the clearest idea of their meaning.

But God, he says, gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, and to the highest He imparted the names of the lowest, though the natural inferiority of the latter was not transferred to the former along with their names. We quote this in his very words. If they contain some deep and recondite meaning which has escaped us, let those inform us who see what is beyond our range of vision — initiated as they are by him in his esoteric and unspeakable mysteries. But if they admit of no interpretation beyond what is obvious, I scarcely know which of the two are more to be pitied, those who say such things or those who listen to them. To the weakest of terrestrial things, he says, God has given names in common with the most honourable, though not giving them an equal share of dignity. Let us examine what is meant by this. The weakest things, he says, are dignified with the bare name belonging to the honourable, their nature not corresponding with their name. And this he states to be the work of the God of truth — to dignify the worse nature with the worthier appellation! On the other hand, he says that God applies the less honourable names to things superior in their nature, the nature of the latter not being carried over to the former along with the appellation. But that the matter may be made plainer still, the absurdity shall be shown by actual instances. If any one should call a man who is esteemed for every virtue, intemperate; or, on the other hand, a man equally in disrepute for his vices, good and moral, would sensible people think him of sound mind, or one who had any regard for truth, reversing, as would be the case, the meanings of words, and giving them a non-natural signification? I for my part think not. He speaks, then, of things relating to God, out of all keeping with our common ideas and with the holy Scriptures. For in matters of ordinary life it is only those who are unsettled by drink or madness that go wrong in names, and use them out of their proper meaning, calling, it may be, a man a dog, or vice versa. But Holy Scripture is so far from sanctioning such confusion, that we may clearly hear the voice of prophecy lamenting it. Woe unto him, says Isaiah, that calls darkness light, and light darkness, that calls bitter sweet, and sweet bitter Isaiah 5:20. Now what induces Eunomius to apply this absurdity to his God? Let those who are initiated in his mysteries say what they judge those weakest of terrestrial things to be, which God has dignified with most honourable appellations. The weakest of existing things are those animals whose generation takes place from the corruption of moist elements, as the most honourable are virtue, and holiness, and whatever else is pleasing in the sight of God. Are flies, then, and midges, and frogs, and whatever insects are generated from dung, dignified with the names of holiness and virtue, so as to be consecrated with honourable names, though not sharing in such high qualities, as says Eunomius? But never as yet have we heard anything like this, that these weak things are called by high-sounding titles, or that what is great and honourable by nature is degraded by the name of any one of them. Noah was a righteous man, says the Scripture, Abraham was faithful, Moses meek, Daniel wise, Joseph chaste, Job blameless, David perfect in patience. Let them say, then, whether all these had their names by contraries; or, to take the case of those who are unfavourably spoken of, as Nabal the Carmelite, and Pharaoh the Egyptian, and Abimelech the alien, and all those who are mentioned for their vices, whether they were dignified with honourable names by the voice of God. Not so! But God judges and distinguishes His creatures as they are in nature and truth, not by names contrary to them, but by such appropriate appellations as may give the clearest idea of their meaning.

This is what our strong-minded opponent—who accuses us of dishonesty and charges us with being irrational in judgment—this is what he pretends to know about the Divine nature. These are the opinions he puts forward about God, as if God mocks His creatures with names that do not correspond to their true meaning, giving the weakest things the most honorable titles and pouring contempt on the honorable by making them identical with what is base. Now a virtuous person, even if carried beyond the limits of truth involuntarily, is overwhelmed with shame. Yet Eunomius thinks it is no shame to God that He should appear to give a false impression of things through their names. The Scriptures do not give this kind of testimony about the Divine nature. God is patient and full of mercy and truth, says David. But how can He be a God of truth if He gives false names to things and perverts the truth in the meanings of their names? Again, he is called a righteous Lord. Is it righteous to honor things that lack honor with honorable names, and while giving the bare name, to withhold the honor that it signifies? This is the testimony these theologians give about their newfangled God. This is the result of their boasted skill in dialectic: to portray God Himself delighting in deception and not above the passion of jealousy. For surely it is nothing better than deception to fail to name weak things as they truly are in their nature and worth, but instead to clothe them with empty names borrowed from superior things, without making their value match their name. And it is nothing better than jealousy if, having the power to give the more honorable name to things being named for some superiority, He begrudged them the honor itself, considering the happiness of the weak a personal loss to Himself. But I would recommend that all who are wise, even if the God of these Gnostics is shown by logical necessity to be of such a character, should not think this way about the true God, the Only-begotten, but should look at the truth of facts, giving each of them their due, and from this deduce His name. Come, you blessed, says our Lord, and again, Depart, you cursed, not honoring the one who deserves cursing with the name of blessed, nor dismissing the one who has stored up blessing for himself along with the wicked.

This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment — this it is that he pretends to know of the Divine nature. These are the opinions that he puts forth respecting God, as though He mocked His creatures with names untrue to their meaning, bestowing on the weakest the most honourable appellations, and pouring contempt on the honourable by making them synonymous with the base. Now a virtuous man, if carried, even involuntarily, beyond the limits of truth, is overwhelmed with shame. Yet Eunomius thinks it no shame to God that He should seem to give a false color to things by their appellations. Not such is the testimony of the Scriptures to the Divine nature. God is long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy and truth, says David. But how can He be a God of truth Who gives false names to things, and Who perverts the truth in the meanings of their names? Again, He is called by him a righteous Lord. Is it, then, a righteous thing to dignify things without honour by honourable names, and, while giving the bare name, to grudge the honour that it denotes? Such is the testimony of these Theologians to their new-fangled God. This is the end of their boasted dialectic cleverness, to display God Himself delighting in deceit, and not superior to the passion of jealousy. For surely it is no better than deceit not to name weak things, as they are in their true nature and worth, but to invest them with empty names, derived from superior things, not proportioning their value to their name; and it is no better than jealousy if, having it in His power to bestow the more honourable appellation on things to be named for some superiority, He grudged them the honour itself, as deeming the happiness of the weak a loss to Himself personally. But I should recommend all who are wise, even if the God of these Gnostics is by stress of logic shown to be of such a character, not to think thus of the true God, the Only-begotten, but to look at the truth of facts, giving each of them their due, and thence to deduce His name. Come, you blessed, says our Lord; and again, Depart, you cursed Matthew 25:34, not honouring him who deserves cursing with the name of blessed, nor, on the other hand, dismissing him who has treasured up for himself the blessing, along with the wicked.

But what does our author mean, and what is the goal of this argument? No one should think that because he lacked something to say, in order to make his work seem longer, he has gone on with all this meaningless rambling. His very lack of sense has a purpose and hints at heresy. By saying that the most honorable names are given to the weakest things, even though those things do not naturally share an equal portion of dignity, he secretly prepares the way for the blasphemy that follows, so he can teach his followers this: that although the Only-begotten is called God, and Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and the Truth, and the Judge, and the King, and God over all, and the great God, and the Prince of peace, and the Father of the world to come, and so on, His honor is limited to the name alone.

But what is our author's meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order that he may seem to extend his discourse to the utmost, he has indulged in all this senseless twaddle. Its very senselessness is not without a meaning, and smacks of heresy. For to say that the most honourable names are applied to the weakest things, though not having by nature an equal apportionment of dignity, secretly paves the way, as it were, for the blasphemy to follow, that he may teach his disciples this; that although the Only-begotten is called God, and Wisdom, and Power, and Light, and the Truth, and the Judge, and the King, and God over all, and the great God, and the Prince of peace, and the Father of the world to come, and so forth, His honour is limited to the name.

He does not actually share in the dignity that the meaning of those names indicates. The wise Daniel, when correcting the Babylonians' idolatrous error so they would not worship the bronze image or the dragon but would reverence the name of God (which people in their foolishness had attributed to those things), clearly demonstrated by his actions that the high and exalted name of God bore no resemblance to the reptile or to the molten bronze image. But this enemy of God works hard in his teaching to prove exactly the opposite regarding the Only-begotten Son of God. He declares in his characteristic style: Do not pay attention to the names that our Lord shares in such a way as to conclude that He possesses an unspeakable and sublime nature. For many of the weakest things are also given honorable names that sound impressive, even though their nature is not transformed to match the greatness of their titles. Accordingly, he says that inferior things receive honor from God only in terms of their names, with no corresponding equality of dignity accompanying what they are called. Therefore, when we have learned all the names of the Son that carry lofty meaning, we must remember that the honor these names imply is attributed to Him only at the level of words, but that according to the system of naming they use, He does not actually share in the dignity that the words signify.

He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates; and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians' error of idolatry, that they should not worship the brazen image or the dragon, but reverence the name of God, which men in their folly had ascribed to them, clearly showed by what he did that the high and lofty name of God had no likeness to the reptile, or to the image of molten brass — this enemy of God exerts himself in his teaching to prove the very opposite of this in regard to the Only-begotten Son of God, exclaiming in the style which he affects, Do not regard the names of which our Lord is a partaker, so as to infer His unspeakable and sublime nature. For many of the weakest things are likewise invested with names of honour, lofty indeed in sound, though their nature is not transformed so as to come up to the grandeur of their appellations. Accordingly he says that inferior things receive their honour from God only so far as their names go, no equality of dignity accompanying their appellations. When, therefore, we have learned all the names of the Son that are of lofty signification, we must bear in mind that the honour which they imply is ascribed to Him only so far as the words go, but that, according to the system of nomenclature which they adopt, He does not partake of the dignity implied by the words.

But by dwelling on such nonsense, I fear I am secretly pleasing our opponents. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to be exhausting my audience's patience before we even reach the main battle. I will leave these points for my more learned hearers to address and continue with my task. Nor will I now address something he has said that is closely connected with our inquiry: that these things have been arranged so that human thought and conception can claim no authority over names. But who maintains that something not seen in its own hypostasis has authority over anything? For only creatures governed by their own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are operations of the mind that depend on the deliberate choice of speakers, having no independent hypostasis but existing only in the force of what is said. But this, he says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who applies suitable names to each thing named through limitations and rules of relation, operation, and proportion. But this is either complete nonsense or contradicts his earlier statements. For if he now claims that God assigns names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen, that God gives lofty names to dishonorable things without allowing them to share in the dignity their names indicate, and again, that He degrades lofty things with dishonorable names, though their physis is not affected by the lowliness of their names? But perhaps we are being unfair to him by subjecting his senseless jumble of phrases to such accusations. For they are completely alien to any sense—I do not mean only to reverent sense—and they will be found utterly devoid of reason by all who understand how to form accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume but turns out to be only viscous matter disgusting to see and even more disgusting to touch, I shall pass over his remarks in silence, considering that the best answer to his idle chatter. For it would be better that we not inquire what law governs operation, proportion, and relation, and who prescribes laws to God regarding rules and modes of proportion and relation, than that by occupying ourselves with such matters we should disgust our hearers and stray from more important inquiries.

But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to myself to be wearing out the patience of my audience before we come to the brunt of the battle. These points, then, I will leave it to my more learned hearers to dispose of, and proceed with my task. Nor will I now notice a thing he has said, which, however, is closely connected with our inquiry; viz. that these things have been so arranged that human thought and conception can claim no authority over names. But who is there that maintains that what is not seen in its own subsistence has authority over anything? For only those creatures that are governed by their own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are an operation of the mind, which depends on the deliberate choice of those who speak, having no independent subsistence, but subsisting only in the force of the things said. But this, he says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who, by limitations and rules of relation, operation, and proportion, applies suitable appellations to each of the things named. But this either is sheer nonsense, or contradicts his previous assertions. For if he now professes that God affixes names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen that God bestows lofty names on things without honour, not allowing them a share in the dignity which their names indicate, and again, that He degrades things of a lofty nature by names without honour, their nature not being affected by the meanness of their appellations? But perhaps we are unfair to him in subjecting his senseless collocation of phrases to such accusations as these. For they are altogether alien to any sense (I do not mean only to a sense in keeping with reverence), and they will be found to be utterly devoid of reason by all who understand how to form an accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume, which turns out, however, to be only viscous matter disgusting to look at, and still more disgusting to handle, I shall pass over his remarks in silence, deeming that the best answer to his idle effusions. For it would be better that we should not inquire what law governs operation, and proportion, and relation, and who it is that prescribes laws to God in respect to rules and modes of proportion and relation, than that, by busying ourselves in such matters, we should nauseate our hearers, and digress from more important matters of inquiry.

I'm afraid that everything we'll find in Eunomius' discourse will turn out to be just empty swelling and foam, so that what has already been said must necessarily end our argument, since his writings will provide no material to work with. Smoke or mist makes the air around it heavy and thick, and prevents the eye from functioning normally, yet it doesn't form itself into something solid enough that someone could grasp and hold it in their hands, or offer resistance when struck. If someone said the same thing about his pompous writing, the comparison would be accurate. A lot of nonsense is packed into his swollen and sticky discourse, and to someone without much discernment—like viewing mist from a distance—it seems to have some substance and form. But if you come closer and examine what is actually said, the theories slip from your grasp like smoke and vanish into nothing. They have no solidity or resistance to oppose the force of your argument. So it's difficult to know what to do. People who like to complain will find either option objectionable: whether we leap over his empty wordiness as if over a ravine and direct our argument toward level, open ground—against those points that seem to have some strength against the truth—or fight our absurd battle along the whole line of his foolishness. In the latter case, for those who don't love hard work, our labor extending over thousands of lines to no useful purpose will be tiresome and unprofitable. But if we attack only those points that seem to have some force against the truth, we'll give our adversaries a chance to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs that we can't refute. Since two courses are open to us—either to take all their arguments one by one, or to run through only the more important ones—the first being tedious to our hearers, the second likely to be suspected by our opponents—I think it best to take a middle course, and in this way avoid criticism from either side as much as possible. What, then, is our method? After clearing away the rubbish from his worthless productions as well as we can, we will briefly run through the main points of his argument in such a way that we neither plunge needlessly into the depths of his nonsense, nor leave any of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that God speaks in the same way humans do, and that the Creator of all things gives them appropriate names that indicate the things themselves. Therefore, opposing himself to the person who argued that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from God, he accuses him of error and of abandoning his fundamental proposition. Having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments to support his position.

But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessarily close our argument, as his writings will supply no material to work on. For as a smoke or a mist makes the air in which it resides heavy and thick, and incapacitates the eye for the discharge of its natural function, yet does not form itself into so dense a body that he who will may grasp and hold it in his palms, and offer resistance to its stroke, so if one should say the same of his pompous piece of writing, the comparison would not be untrue. Much nonsense is worked up in his tumid and viscous discourse, and to one not gifted with over-much discernment, like a mist to one viewing it from afar, it seems to have some substance and shape, but if you come up to it and scrutinize what is said, the theories slip from your hold like smoke, and vanish into nothing, nor have they any solidity or resistance to oppose to the stroke of your argument. It is difficult, therefore, to know what to do. For to those who like to complain either alternative will seem objectionable; whether, leaping over his empty wordiness, as over a ravine, we direct the course of our argument to the level and open country, against those points which seem to have any strength against the truth, or form our absurd battle along the whole line of his inanities. For in the latter case, to those who do not love hard work, our labour, extending over some thousands of lines to no useful purpose, will be wearisome and unprofitable. But if we attack those points only which seem to have some force against the truth, we shall give occasion to our adversaries to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs which we are unable to refute. Since, then, two courses are open to us, either to take all their arguments seriatim, or to run through those only which are more important — the one course tedious to our hearers, the other liable to be suspected by our assailants — I think it best to take a middle course, and so, as far as possible, to avoid censure on either hand. What, then, is our method? After clearing his vain productions, as well as we can, of the rubbish they have accumulated, we will summarily run through the main points of his argument in such a way as neither to plunge needlessly into the profundities of his nonsense, nor to leave any of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that God speaks after the manner of men, and that the Creator of all things gives them suitable names, indicative of the things themselves. And, therefore, opposing himself to him who contended that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from God, he accuses him of error, and of desertion from his fundamental proposition: and having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments in support of his position.

Eunomius says that Basil claims we first get a basic idea of something, and then a more detailed and precise investigation of that thing is called conception. Eunomius thinks he disproves this with the following argument: where you don't find both this first notion and this second, more detailed and precise notion, the mental activity we call thought and conception doesn't occur. However, anyone who listens carefully will recognize his dishonesty here. Our teacher Basil didn't lay down this definition for all thought and conception. Instead, after making a specific division within the objects of thought and conception—without burdening the discussion with too many words—and after clarifying this particular category, he left it to sensible people to figure out the whole from this part on their own. Similarly, if someone said we get our definition of an animal by examining various species of animals, he couldn't be accused of missing the truth if he used man as an example. There would be no need to correct him as mistaken unless he gave the same definition for a bird, a four-footed animal, or a sea creature as he did for a man. In the same way, since there are so many different perspectives from which we can consider this conception, it's no refutation of Basil's statement to say it's improperly named in one case just because another species exists. Therefore, even if another species comes under consideration, it doesn't mean the one previously identified was wrongly named. Now, he says, if one of the Apostles or Prophets could be shown to have used these names for Christ, the falsehood would have some support. What diligent study of God's word these remarks demonstrate from our opponent! None of the Prophets or Apostles spoke of our Lord as Bread, or a Stone, or a Fountain, or an Axe, or Light, or a Shepherd! What then does David say, and about whom? The Lord shepherds me. You who shepherd Israel, give ear. What difference does it make whether He is spoken of as shepherding or as a Shepherd? And again, With You is the Well of life. Does he deny that our Lord is called a Well? And again, The Stone which the builders rejected. And John too—when he represents our Lord's power to uproot evil under the image of an axe, saying, And now the Axe is laid to the root of the trees—isn't he a weighty and credible witness to the truth of our words?

Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under consideration is called conception. And Eunomius disproves this, as he thinks, by the following argument, that where this first, and this second notion, i.e. one more minute and accurate than the other, are not found, the operation which we call thought and conception does not find place. Here, however, he will be convicted of dishonesty by all who have ears to hear. For it was not of all thought and conception that our master (Basil) laid down this definition, but, after making a special subdivision of the objects of thought and conception (not to encumber the question with too many words), and having made this part clear, he left men of sense to reason out the whole from the part for themselves. And as, if any one should say that we get our definition of an animal from considering a number of animals of different species, he could not be convicted of missing the truth in making man an instance in point, nor would there be any need to correct him as deviating from the fact, unless he should give the same definition of a winged, or four-footed, or aquatic animal as of a man, so, when the points of view from which we may consider this conception are so many and various, it is no refutation of Basil's statement to say that it is improperly so called in one case because there is another species. Accordingly, even if another species come under consideration, it by no means follows that the one previously given is erroneously so called. Now if, says he, one of the Apostles or Prophets could be shown to have used these names of Christ, the falsehood would have something for its encouragement. To what industrious study of the word of God on the part of our opponent do not these words bear testimony! None of the Prophets or Apostles has spoken of our Lord as Bread, or a Stone, or a Fountain, or an Axe, or Light, or a Shepherd! What, then, says David, and of whom? The Lord shepherds me. You Who shepherdest Israel, give ear. What difference does it make whether He is spoken of as shepherding, or as a Shepherd? And again, With You is the Well of life. Does he deny that our Lord is called a Well? And again, The Stone which the builders rejected Matthew 21:42. And John, too — where, representing our Lord's power to uproot evil under the name of an axe, he says, And now also the Axe is laid to the root of the trees Matthew 3:10 — is he not a weighty and credible witness to the truth of our words?

And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light, and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him and a Light shone around him, and afterwards when he heard the words of the Light saying, "I am Jesus, whom you persecute"—is he not a competent witness? And regarding the name Bread, let him read the Gospel and see how the bread given by Moses and supplied to Israel from heaven was taken by our Lord as a type of Himself: "For Moses gave you not that Bread, but My Father gives you the true Bread" (meaning Himself) "which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world." But this genuine hearer of the law says that none of the Prophets or Apostles has applied these names to Christ. What shall we say, then, of what follows? Even if our Lord Himself adopts them, yet since in the Savior's names there is no first or second, none more minute or accurate than another, for He knows them all at once with equal accuracy, it is not possible to apply his (Basil's) account of the operation of conception to any of His names.

And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light, and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light shone round about him, and afterwards when he heard the words of the Light saying, I am Jesus, Whom you persecute. Acts 9:5, — is he not a competent witness? And as regards the name Bread, let him read the Gospel and see how the bread given by Moses, and supplied to Israel from heaven, was taken by our Lord as a type of Himself: For Moses gave you not that Bread, but My Father gives you the true Bread (meaning Himself) which comes down from heaven and gives life unto the world. But this genuine hearer of the law says that none of the Prophets or Apostles has applied these names to Christ. What shall we say, then, of what follows? Even if our Lord Himself adopts them, yet, since in the Saviour's names there is no first or second, none more minute or accurate than another, for He knows them all at once with equal accuracy, it is not possible to accommodate his (Basil's) account of the operation of conception to any of His names.

I have flooded my discussion with much of his nonsense, but I trust my readers will forgive me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his foolish statements. I do this not because we take pleasure in our author's inappropriate behavior (for what advantage can we gain from refuting our adversaries' foolishness?), but so that truth may be advanced by confirmation from whatever source. Since, he says, our Lord applies these titles to Himself, not considering any one of them first, or second, or more precise and accurate than the rest, you cannot say that these names are the result of conception. Why, he has forgotten his own point! How does he know the words against which he declares war? Our teacher and guide had mentioned an example familiar to everyone, to illustrate the doctrine of conception, and having explained his meaning by simpler illustrations, he lifts the consideration of the question to higher things. He had said that the word grain, considered by itself, is one thing only as to substance, but that, as to the various properties we see in it, it varies its names, being called seed, and fruit, and food, and the like. Similarly, he says, our Lord is in respect to Himself what He is essentially, but when named according to the differences of His operations, He does not have one name in all cases, but takes a different name according to each notion produced in us from the operation. How, then, does what he says disprove our theory that it is possible for many names to be properly attached, according to the diversity of His operations and His relation to their effects, to the Son of God, though one in respect of the underlying reality, even as grain, though one, has various names assigned to it, according to the point of view from which we regard it? How, then, can what is said be overthrown by our saying that Christ used all these names of Himself? For the question was not who assigned them, but about the meaning of the names, whether they denote ousia, or whether they are derived from His operations by the process of conception. But our clever and strong-minded opponent, overturning our theory of conception, which declares that it is possible to find many names for one and the same subject, according to the meanings of its operations, attacks us vigorously, asserting that such names were not given to our Lord by another. But what does this have to do with the case at hand? Since these names are used by our Lord, will he not allow that they are names, or titles, or words expressing ideas? For if he will not admit them to be names, then, in doing away with the titles, he does away at the same time with the conception. But if he does not deny that these words are names, what harm can he do to our doctrine of conception by showing that such titles were given to our Lord, not by someone else, but by Himself? For what was said was this: that, as in the instance of grain, our Lord, though substantively One, bears titles appropriate to His operations. And as it is admitted that grain has its names by virtue of our conception of its associations, it was shown that these terms describing our Lord are not of His ousia, but are formed by the method of conception in our minds concerning Him. But our opponent deliberately avoids attacking these positions, and maintains that our Lord received these names from Himself, in the same way as, if one sought for the true interpretation of the name Isaac, whether it means laughter, as some say, or something else, one of Eunomius' way of thinking should confidently reply that the name was given to him as a child by his mother: but that, one might say, was not the question, that is, by whom the name was given, but what does it mean when translated into our language? And this being the point of the inquiry, whether our Lord's various titles were the result of conception, instead of being indicative of His ousia, he who thus seeks to demonstrate that they are not so derived because they are used by our Lord Himself—how can he be numbered among sensible people, fighting as he does against the truth, and equipping himself with such arguments for the fight that only serve to show the superior strength of his enemy?

I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his inanities; not that we take pleasure in our author's indecorum, (for what advantage can we derive from the refutation of our adversaries' folly?) but that truth may be advanced by confirmation from whatever quarter. Since, says he, our Lord applies these appellations to Himself, not deeming any one of them first, or second, or more minute and accurate than the rest, you cannot say that these names are the result of conception. Why, he has forgotten his own object! How comes he by the knowledge of the words against which he declares war? Our master and guide had made mention of an example familiar to all, in illustration of the doctrine of conception, and having explained his meaning by lower illustrations, he lifts the consideration of the question to higher things. He had said that the word grain, regarded by itself, is one thing only as to substance, but that, as to the various properties we see in it, it varies its appellations, being called seed, and fruit, and food, and the like. Similarly, says he, our Lord is in respect to Himself what He is essentially, but when named according to the differences of His operations, He has not one appellation in all cases, but takes a different name according to each notion produced in us from the operation. How, then, does what he says disprove our theory that it is possible for many appellations to be attached with propriety, according to the diversity of His operations, and His relation to their effects, to the Son of God, though one in respect of the underlying force, even as grain, though one, has various names apportioned to it, according to the point of view from which we regard it? How, then, can what is said be overthrown by our saying that Christ used all these names of Himself? For the question was not, who ascribed them, but about the meaning of the names, whether they denote essence, or whether they are derived from His operations by the process of conception. But our shrewd and strong-minded opponent, overturning our theory of conception, which declares that it is possible to find many appellations for one and the same subject, according to the significances of its operations, attacks us vigorously, asserting that such names were not given to our Lord by another. But what has this to do with the case in point? Since these names are used by our Lord, will he not allow that they are names, or appellations, or words expressive of ideas? For if he will not admit them to be names, then, in doing away with the appellations, he does away at the same time with the conception. But if he does not deny that these words are names, what harm can he do to our doctrine of conception by showing that such titles were given to our Lord, not by some one else, but by Himself? For what was said was this, that, as in the instance of grain, our Lord, though substantively One, bears epithets suitable to His operations. And as it is admitted that grain has its names by virtue of our conception of its associations, it was shown that these terms significative of our Lord are not of His essence, but are formed by the method of conception in our minds respecting Him. But our antagonist studiously avoids attacking these positions, and maintains that our Lord received these names from Himself, in the same way as, if one sought for the true interpretation of the name Isaac, whether it means laughter, as some say, or something else, one of Eunomius' way of thinking should confidently reply that the name was given to him as a child by his mother: but that, one might say, was not the question, i.e. by whom the name was given, but what does it mean when translated into our language? And this being the point of the inquiry, whether our Lord's various appellations were the result of conception, instead of being indicative of His essence, he who thus seeks to demonstrate that they are not so derived because they are used by our Lord Himself — how can he be numbered among men of sense, warring as he does against the truth, and equipping himself with such alliances for the war as serve to show the superior strength of his enemy?

Then going farther, as if he had achieved his goal up to this point, he takes up other accusations against us that he thinks are more difficult to answer than the previous ones. With many preliminary groans and attempts to prejudice his hearers against us and to sharpen their interest in his speech, he accuses us of trying to establish blasphemous doctrines and of attributing to our own thinking names that God assigned (though he never mentions what assignment he means, or when and where it happened). He also accuses us of throwing everything into confusion and identifying the ousia of the Only-begotten with his operation, without actually arguing the case or showing how we prove that ousia and operation are identical. He concludes with the same list of charges as follows: And now, going beyond this, he (Basil) slanders even the Most High with the vilest blasphemies, using at the same time incoherent language and illustrations that miss the point. Before investigating this, I would like to know what our language is incoherent from and what point it misses—not that I actually want to know, but only to demonstrate the confusion and obscurity of his speech, which he forces upon the credulous people among us, taking pride in his clever phrases that he proclaims to those who admire such things. He is apparently unaware that in the judgment of educated people, this speech of his will serve only as a record of his own disgrace.

Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the former, and with many preliminary groans and attempts to prejudice his hearers against us, and to whet their appetite for his address, accusing us withal of seeking to establish doctrines savouring of blasphemy, and of ascribing to our own conception names assigned by God (though he nowhere mentions what assignment he refers to, nor when and where it took place), and, further, of throwing everything into confusion, and identifying the essence of the Only-begotten with his operation, without arguing the matter, or showing how we prove the identity of the essence and the operation, he winds up with the same list of charges, as follows: And now, passing beyond this, he (Basil) asperses even the Most High with the vilest blasphemies, using at the same time broken language, and illustrations wide of the mark. Now prior to inquiry, I should like to be told what our language is broken from, and what mark it is wide of; not that I want to know, except to show the confusion and obscurity of his address, which he dins into the ears of the old wives among our men, pluming himself on his nice phrases, which he mouths out to the admirers of such things, ignorant, as it would seem, that in the judgment of educated men this address of his will serve only as a memorial of his own infamy.

But all this is beside our purpose. I wish our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his manner of speaking, and not in matters of faith. After all, it would have been of relatively little importance to him to be praised or blamed for expressing himself in one style or another. But however that may be, the next part of his charges against us contains this in addition: He says that when considering the case of grain and of our Lord, after exercising his ideas in various ways upon them, he declares that even in the same way the most holy ousia of God admits of the same variety of conception. This is the most serious of his accusations, and it is in pursuing this that he delivers those heavy criticisms of his, charging what we have said with blasphemy, absurdity, and so forth. What, then, is the proof of our blasphemy? Eunomius says that he has mentioned certain well-known facts about grain—observing how it grows, and how when ripe it provides food, growing, multiplying, and being distributed by certain forces of nature—and, having mentioned these, he adds that it is only reasonable to suppose that the Only-begotten Son also admits of different modes of being conceived of, by reason of certain differences of operation, certain analogies, proportions, and relations. For he uses these terms respecting Him to excess. And is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with such objects as these? What objects? Why, grain, and God the Only-begotten! You see his cleverness. He wants to show that insignificant grain and God the Only-begotten are equally removed from the dignity of the Ungenerate. And to show that we are not treating his words unfairly, we may learn his meaning from the very words he has written. For, he asks, is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with these? And in speaking this way, he presents the case of grain and of our Lord as on the same level in terms of dignity, thinking it equally absurd to compare God with either. Now everyone knows that things equally distant from a given object have equality with respect to each other, so that according to our wise theologian the Maker of the worlds, who holds all nature in His hand, is shown to be on a par with the most insignificant seed, since He and grain to the same degree fall short of comparison with God. To such a level of blasphemy has he come!

But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery, and not in matters of faith; since it would have been of comparatively little importance to him to be praised or blamed for expressing himself in one style or another. But however that may be, the sequel of his charges against us contains this in addition: Considering the case of grain (he says), and of our Lord, after exercising his conceptions in various ways upon them, he declares that even in like manner the most holy essence of God admits of the same variety of conception. This is the gravest of his accusations, and it is in prosecuting this that he rehearses those heavy invectives of his, charging what we have said with blasphemy, absurdity, and so forth. What, then, is the proof of our blasphemy? He has mentioned (says Eunomius) certain well-known facts about grain — perceiving how it grows, and how when ripe it affords food, growing, multiplying, and being dispensed by certain forces of nature — and, having mentioned these, he adds that it is only reasonable to suppose that the Only-begotten Son also admits of different modes of being conceived of, by reason of certain differences of operation, certain analogies, proportions, and relations. For he uses these terms respecting Him to satiety. And is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with such objects as these? — What objects? Why, grain, and God the Only-begotten! You see his artfulness. He would show that insignificant grain and God the Only-begotten are equally removed from the dignity of the Ungenerate. And to show that we are not treating his words unfairly, we may learn his meaning from the very words he has written. For, he asks, is it not absurd, or rather blasphemous, to compare the Ungenerate with these? And in thus speaking, he instances the case of grain and of our Lord as on a level in point of dignity, thinking it equally absurd to compare God with either. Now every one knows that things equally distant from a given object are possessed of equality as regards each other, so that according to our wise theologian the Maker of the worlds, Who holds all nature in His hand, is shown to be on a par with the most insignificant seed, since He and grain to the same degree fall short of comparison with God. To such a pitch of blasphemy has he come!

But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity and see how it is logically connected with his whole discourse. After saying that it is absurd to compare God with grain and with Christ, he says that God is not, like them, subject to change. But regarding the Only-begotten, he keeps silence on the question of whether He too is not subject to change, thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare grain, with God. He breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he argues that the indestructibility of the Father does not actually attach to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality that actuates itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. However, there is but one single notion in indestructibility, considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son. No difference in indestructibility is observable either in degrees of intensity or in any other aspect of the process of destruction. This I say it is appropriate to assert both now and at all times, so as to reject the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. To be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, makes him assert that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he clearly shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction—and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility—how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming: God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies. If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be of the same kind, since it is through an energy that they both exist. But the blasphemy to which this logically leads is clear to everyone who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my discussion. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should exist by itself without there being something to set the energy in motion. We say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or worked. These capacities, that of operating and that of being operated upon, must necessarily stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one is removed, the remaining one cannot exist by itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not exist by itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, molded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For just as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise—in the case of things perceptible by sense, skillfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities but by impulses of choice—so, if anyone defines the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and worked to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator, whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to being acted upon, so that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy defines Him as one of those things which are subject to being acted upon and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he denies such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma—that of asserting His non-existence and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon—the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He truly exists and is not subject to being acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to being acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discourse. For after saying that it is absurd to compare God with grain and with Christ, he says of God that He is not, like them, subject to change; but in respect to the Only-begotten, keeping silence on the question whether He too is not subject to change, and thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare grain, with God, he breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses of the indestructibility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality, actuating itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. That, however, there is but one single notion in indestructibility, considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son, no difference as to indestructibility being observable either in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to assert, so as to preclude the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces him to assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he well shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction — and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility — how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming, God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies. If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be homogeneous, inasmuch as it is through an energy, that they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically tends is clear to every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should subsist of itself without there being something to set the energy in motion; as we say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore, that of operating, and that of being operated upon, must needs stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed, the remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not subsist of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any one define the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and wrought to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator: whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to be acted upon, that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon, cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be acted upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma, that of asserting His non- existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He verily exists, and is not subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son—such as justice, goodness, eternity, incapacity for evil, or infinite perfection in all conceivable goodness? Will anyone dare to say that any of the virtues in the divine nature are acquired, or deny that all good whatsoever springs from and is seen in it? For whatever is good is from Him, and whatever is lovely is from Him. But he adds to this that God is in His very essence ungenerate too. Now, if he means by this that the Father's essence is ungenerate, I agree with what is said and do not oppose his teaching, for none of the orthodox maintains that the Father of the Only-begotten is Himself begotten. But if, while his wording suggests only this, he actually maintains that ungeneracy itself is the essence, I say we must not leave such a position unexamined, but expose his attempt to win the assent of the unwary to his blasphemy.

But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son, as justice, goodness, eternity, incapacity for evil, infinite perfection in all conceivable goodness? Is there one who will venture to say that any of the virtues in the Divine nature are acquired, or to deny that all good whatsoever springs from and is seen in it? For whatsoever is good is from Him, and whatsoever is lovely is from Him. But he appends to this, that He is in His very essence ungenerate too. Well, if he means by this that the Father's essence is ungenerate, I agree with what is said, and do not oppose his doctrine: for not one of the orthodox maintains that the Father of the Only-begotten is Himself begotten. But if, while the form of his expression indicates only this, he maintains that the ungeneracy itself is the essence, I say that we ought not to leave such a position unexamined, but expose his attempt to gain the assent of the unwary to his blasphemy.

That the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things can be seen from what he himself has put forward. God, he says, is indestructible and ungenerate by His very essence, since He is unmixed and pure from all diversity and difference. This is what he says about God, whose essence he declares to be indestructibility and ungeneracy. There are three names, then, that he applies to God: being, indestructibility, ungeneracy. If the idea of these three words with respect to God is one, it follows that the Godhead and these three are identical. It's just like if someone, wanting to describe a human being, should say that he is a rational, able-to-laugh, and broad-nailed creature. Because there is no essential variation from these qualities in individual humans, we say that the terms are equivalent to each other, and that the three things seen in the subject are one thing—namely, humanity as described by these names. If, then, Godhead means this—ungeneracy, indestructibility, being—then by doing away with one of these he necessarily does away with the Godhead. For just as we would say that a creature which was neither rational nor able to laugh was not human either, so in the case of these three terms (ungeneracy, indestructibility, being), if the Godhead is described by these, should one of the three be absent, its absence destroys the definition of Godhead. Let him tell us, then, in reply, what opinion he holds about God the Only-begotten. Does he think Him generate or ungenerate? Of course he must say generate, unless he wants to contradict himself. If, then, being and indestructibility are equivalent to ungeneracy, and by all of these Godhead is denoted, then whoever lacks ungeneracy must also lack being and indestructibility, and in that case the Godhead must also necessarily be taken away. And so his blasphemous logic brings him to a twofold conclusion. For if being, indestructibility, and ungeneracy are applied to God in the same sense, our new God-maker is clearly convicted of regarding the Son he has created as destructible, by his not regarding Him as ungenerate. Not only that, but he regards the Son as altogether without being, through his inability to see Him in the Godhead—since he views Him as one in whom ungeneracy and indestructibility are not found, because he takes ungeneracy and indestructibility to be identical with being. But since in this there is obvious destruction, let someone counsel these unhappy people to turn to the only course left to them, and instead of setting themselves in open opposition to the truth, to allow that each of these terms has its own proper meaning, which can be seen even better from their contraries. For we find ungenerate set against generate, and we understand the indestructible by its opposition to the destructible, and being by contrast with that which has no subsistence. For just as that which was not generated is called ungenerate, and that which is not destructible is called indestructible, so that which is not non-existent we call being. Conversely, just as we do not call the generate ungenerate, nor the destructible indestructible, so that which is non-existent we do not call being. Being, then, is discernible in the being this or that, goodness or indestructibility in the being of this or of that kind, generacy or ungeneracy in the manner of the being. And thus the ideas of being, manner, and quality are distinct from each other.

Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, he says, is indestructible and ungenerate by His very essence, as being unmixed and pure from all diversity and difference. This he says of God, Whose essence he declares to be indestructibility and ungeneracy. There are three names, then, that he applies to God, being, indestructibility, ungeneracy. If the idea of these three words in respect of God is one, it follows that the Godhead and these three are identical. Just as if any one, wanting to describe a man, should say that he was a rational, risible, and broad-nailed creature; whereupon, because there is no essential variation from these in the individuals, we say that the terms are equivalent to each other, and that the three things seen in the subject are one thing, viz. the humanity described by these names. If, then, Godhead means this, ungeneracy, indestructibility, being, by doing away with one of these he necessarily does away with the Godhead. For just as we should say that a creature which was neither rational nor risible was not man either, so in the case of these three terms (ungeneracy, indestructibility, being), if the Godhead is described by these, should one of the three be absent, its absence destroys the definition of Godhead. Let him tell us, then, in reply, what opinion he holds of God the Only-begotten. Does he think Him generate or ungenerate? Of course he must say generate, unless he is to contradict himself. If, then, being and indestructibility are equivalent to ungeneracy, and by all of these Godhead is denoted, to Whom ungeneracy is wanting, to Him being and indestructibility must needs be wanting also, and in that case the Godhead also must necessarily be taken away. And thus his blasphemous logic brings him to a twofold conclusion. For if being, and indestructibility, and ungeneracy are applied to God in the same sense, our new God-maker is clearly convicted of regarding the Son created by Him as destructible, by his not regarding Him as ungenerate, and not only so, but altogether without being, through his inability to see Him in the Godhead, as one in whom ungeneracy and indestructibility are not found, since he takes the ungeneracy and indestructibility to be identical with the being. But since in this there is manifest perdition, let some one counsel these unhappy folk to turn to the only course which is left them, and, instead of setting themselves in open opposition to the truth, to allow that each of these terms has its own proper signification, such as may be seen still better from their contraries. For we find ungenerate set against generate, and we understand the indestructible by its opposition to the destructible, and being by contrast with that which has no subsistence. For as that which was not generated is called ungenerate, and that which is not destructible is called indestructible, so that which is not non-existent we call being, and, conversely, as we do not call the generate ungenerate, nor the destructible indestructible, so that which is non-existent we do not call being. Being, then, is discernible in the being this or that, goodness or indestructibility in the being of this or of that kind, generacy or ungeneracy in the manner of the being. And thus the ideas of being, manner, and quality are distinct from each other.

But I think it's best to pass over his disgusting remarks (for that's what we must call his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and focus more pleasantly on the actual subject matter of our thought. For all the poison that our opponent has spewed out trying to overthrow our Master's reflections on conception is not the kind that poses any danger to those who encounter it, no matter how foolish they are or how easily deceived. Who is so lacking in understanding as to think there's anything worthwhile in what Eunomius says, or to see any cleverness in his tricks against the truth when he takes our Master's reference to grain (which he meant simply as an illustration, thereby providing his hearers with a kind of method and introduction to studying higher matters), and applies it literally to the Lord of all? Consider his claim that the most fitting reason for God's begetting the Son was His sovereign authority and power—which could be said not only regarding the universe and its elements, but also regarding beasts and creeping things—while our reverent theologian teaches that the same thing is fitting in our conception of God the Only-begotten. Or again, consider his saying that God was called ungenerate, or Father, or any other name, even before creatures existed to call Him such, as if he were afraid that if His name wasn't being spoken among creatures not yet born, He would be ignorant or forgetful of Himself, not knowing His own physis (nature) because His name wasn't being spoken. Consider also the insolence of his attack on our teaching—what bitterness, what cleverness he displays while trying to establish the absurdity of what he (Basil) said: namely, that He who was in a sense the Father before all ages and time, and all sensible and intellectual nature, must somehow wait for man's creation in order to be named through man's conception, not having been so named either by the Son or by any of the intelligent beings of His creation. Why, I imagine no one can be so incredibly stupid as to be unaware that God the Only-begotten, who is in the Father and who sees the Father in Himself, has no need of any name or title to make Him known, nor is the mystery of the Holy Spirit, who searches out the deep things of God, brought to our knowledge by a verbal designation, nor can the incorporeal nature of the supramundane powers name God by voice and tongue. For in the case of immaterial intellectual nature, mental activity itself is speech that has no need of material instruments of communication. Even in the case of human beings, we would have no need to use words and names if we could otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings and impulses. But as things are, since the thoughts that arise in us cannot be revealed in that way, because our nature is burdened with its fleshly envelope, we are forced to express to each other what goes on in our minds by giving things their respective names as signs of their meaning.

But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and dwell more pleasurably on the subject matter of our thought. For all the venom that our disputant has disgorged with the view of overthrowing our Master's speculations in regard to conception, is not of such a kind as to be dangerous to those who come in its way, however stupid they may be and liable to be imposed on. For who is so devoid of understanding as to think that there is anything in what Eunomius says, or to see any ingenuity in his artifices against the truth when he takes our Master's reference to grain (which he meant simply by way of illustration, thereby providing his hearers with a sort of method and introduction to the study of higher instances), and applies it literally to the Lord of all? To think of his assertion that the most becoming cause for God's begetting the Son was His sovereign authority and power, which may be said not only in regard to the universe and its elements, but in regard to beasts and creeping things; and of our reverend theologian teaching that the same is becoming in our conception of God the Only-begotten — or again, of his saying that God was called ungenerate, or Father, or any other name, even before the existence of creatures to call Him such, as being afraid lest, His name not being uttered among creatures as yet unborn, He should be ignorant or forgetful of Himself, through ignorance of His own nature because of His name being unspoken! To think, again, of the insolence of his attack upon our teaching; what acrimony, what subtlety does he display, while attempting to establish the absurdity of what he (Basil) said, namely that He Who was in a manner the Father before all worlds and time, and all sensitive and intellectual nature, must somehow wait for man's creation in order to be named by means of man's conception, not having been so named, either by the Son or by any of the intelligent beings of His creation! Why no one, I imagine, can be so densely stupid as to be ignorant that God the Only-begotten, Who is in the Father, and Who sees the Father in Himself, is in no need of any name or title to make Him known, nor is the mystery of the Holy Spirit, Who searches out the deep things of God 1 Corinthians 2:10, brought to our knowledge by a nominal appellation, nor can the incorporeal nature of supramundane powers name God by voice and tongue. For, in the case of immaterial intellectual nature, the mental energy is speech which has no need of material instruments of communication. For even in the case of human beings, we should have no need of using words and names if we could otherwise inform each other of our pure mental feelings and impulses. But (as things are), inasmuch as the thoughts which arise in us are incapable of being so revealed, because our nature is encumbered with its fleshly surrounding, we are obliged to express to each other what goes on in our minds by giving things their respective names, as signs of their meaning.

But if it were somehow possible to reveal the movements of thought by some other means, setting aside the formal use of words, we would communicate with one another more clearly and lucidly, displaying through thought itself the essential nature of the things we are examining. However, because we are unable to do this, we have assigned specific names to things—calling one Heaven, another Earth, and so forth—and as each thing relates to another, acts, or is acted upon, we have distinguished them with particular names so that our thoughts about them can be communicated and made known. But supramundane and immaterial nature, being free and independent of bodily form, needs no words or names either for itself or for what is above it. Whatever utterance from such intellectual nature is recorded in Holy Scripture is provided for the sake of the hearers, who would otherwise be unable to learn what is being presented unless it were communicated to them through voice and word. And if David in the spirit speaks of something being said by the Lord to the Lord, it is David himself who is speaking, since he cannot make known to us the teaching of what is meant except by expressing through voice and word his own understanding of the mysteries given to him by divine inspiration.

But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should converse with one another more lucidly and clearly, revealing by the mere action of thought the essential nature of the things which are under consideration. But now, by reason of our inability to do so, we have given things their special names, calling one Heaven, another Earth, and so on, and as each is related to each, and acts or suffers, we have marked them by distinctive names, so that our thoughts in regard to them may not remain uncommunicated and unknown. But supramundane and immaterial nature being free and independent of bodily envelopment, requires no words or names either for itself or for that which is above it, but whatever utterance on the part of such intellectual nature is recorded in Holy Writ is given for the sake of the hearers, who would be unable otherwise to learn what is to be set forth, if it were not communicated to them by voice and word. And if David in the spirit speaks of something being said by the Lord to the Lord, it is David himself who is the speaker, being unable otherwise to make known to us the teaching of what is meant except by interpreting by voice and word his own knowledge of the mysteries given him by Divine inspiration.

I think it best to pass over all his arguments against the doctrine of conception, even though he accuses those who think the name of God—as humanity uses it to refer to the Supreme Being—results from this conception of being insane. Anyone who wishes can learn from his own words what he is thinking when he feels compelled to attack that doctrine. We have already stated our own view on the use of words: since things exist as they are in their nature, the rational faculty that God implanted in our nature invented words to indicate those actual things. If anyone attributes their origin to the Giver of this faculty, we would not disagree, for we too maintain that motion, sight, and the rest of the operations carried on by the senses are accomplished by the One who gave us such faculties. Therefore, the reason we name God, who is by His nature what He is, can by common agreement be traced back to Him, but the freedom to name all things we conceive of in one way or another lies in that aspect of our nature which—whether one wants to call it conception or something else—makes no difference to us. One sure piece of evidence in our favor is this: the Divine Being is not named the same way by everyone, but each person interprets his idea as he thinks best. Passing over in silence his worthless nonsense about conception, let us hold to our beliefs and simply note along the way some of the observations that appear in the midst of his empty speeches, where he pretends that God, sitting down with our first parents like some teacher or grammarian, gave them a lesson in words and names. Here he says that those who were first formed by God, or those who were born from them in continuous succession, would have lived together in dumbness and silence unless they had been taught what each thing should be called and named, and would have been unable to carry out any of the useful functions of life, since the meaning of each thing would be uncertain for lack of interpreters—verbs and nouns, no less. Such is this writer's delusion. He thinks the faculty God implanted in our nature is inadequate for any method of reasoning, and that unless it is taught each thing individually, like those who are taught Hebrew or Latin word by word, one must be ignorant of the nature of things, having no understanding of fire, water, air, or anything else unless one has learned about them through the names they bear. But we maintain that the One who made all things in His wisdom and who fashioned this living rational creature endowed him with all his rational faculties by the simple fact of implanting reason in his nature. Since we naturally possess our faculties of perception as a gift from the One who fashioned the eye and planted the ear, we can use them for their natural purposes on our own, and we do not need anyone to name the colors, for instance, that the eye perceives, for the eye is capable of informing itself about such things. Nor do we need someone else to acquaint us with the things we perceive through hearing, taste, or touch, since we possess within ourselves the means of discerning everything our perception tells us about. Likewise, we maintain that the intellectual faculty, originally made by God, acts on its own from then on when it observes realities, and to prevent confusion in its knowledge, it attaches some verbal marker to each thing as a stamp indicating its meaning. Great Moses himself confirms this teaching when he says that names were assigned by Adam to the animals, recording the fact in these words: "And out of the ground God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to all the beasts of the field."

All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that the name of God, as used by mankind to indicate the Supreme Being, is the result of this conception. For what he is thinking of when he considers himself bound to revile that doctrine, all who will may learn from his own words. What opinion we ourselves hold on the use of words we have already stated, viz. that, things being as they are in regard to their nature, the rational faculty implanted in our nature by God invented words indicative of those actual things. And if any one ascribe their origin to the Giver of the faculty, we would not contradict him, for we too maintain that motion, and sight, and the rest of the operations carried on by the senses are effected by Him Who endowed us with such faculties. So, then, the cause of our naming God, Who is by His nature what He is, is referable by common consent to Himself, but the liberty of naming all things that we conceive of in one way or another lies in that thing in our nature, which, whether a man wish to call it conception or something else, we are quite indifferent. And there is this one sure evidence in our favour, that the Divine Being is not named alike by all, but that each interprets his idea as he thinks best. Passing over, then, in silence his rubbishy twaddle about conception, let us hold to our tenets, and simply note by the way some of the observations that occur in the midst of his empty speeches, where he pretends that God, seating Himself by our first parents, like some pedagogue or grammarian, gave them a lesson in words and names; wherein he says that they who were first formed by God, or those who were born from them in continuous succession, unless they had been taught how each several thing should be called and named, would have lived together in dumbness and silence, and would have been unequal to the discharge of any of the serviceable functions of life, the meaning of each being uncertain through lack of interpreters — verbs forsooth, and nouns. Such is the infatuation of this writer; he thinks the faculty implanted in our nature by God insufficient for any method of reasoning, and that unless it be taught each thing severally, like those who are taught Hebrew or Latin word by word, one must be ignorant of the nature of the things, having no discernment of fire, or water, or air, or anything else, unless one have acquired the knowledge of them by the names that they bear. But we maintain that He Who made all things in His wisdom, and Who moulded this living rational creature, by the simple fact of His implanting reason in his nature, endowed him with all his rational faculties. And as naturally possessing our faculties of perception by the gift of Him Who fashioned the eye and planted the ear, we can of ourselves employ them for their natural objects, and have no need of any one to name the colors, for instance, of which the eye takes cognizance, for the eye is competent to inform itself in such matters; nor do we need another to make us acquainted with the things which we perceive by hearing, or taste, or touch, possessing as we do in ourselves the means of discerning all of which our perception informs us. And so, again, we maintain that the intellectual faculty, made as it was originally by God, acts thenceforward by itself when it looks out upon realities, and that there be no confusion in its knowledge, affixes some verbal note to each several thing as a stamp to indicate its meaning. Great Moses himself confirms this doctrine when he says Genesis 2:19-20 that names were assigned by Adam to the brute creation, recording the fact in these words: And out of the ground God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to all the beasts of the field.

But the nonsense he has concocted against our teaching about conception seems to cling to us like some thick and sticky clay, holding us back and preventing us from moving on to more important matters. For how can anyone pass over his solemn and profound philosophy, such as when he says that God's greatness is seen not only in the works of His hands, but that His wisdom is also displayed in their names, which are adapted with such peculiar fitness to the nature (physis) of each work of His creation? Having perhaps come across Plato's Cratylus, or hearing about it from someone who had read it, he patched that nonsense onto his own argument because of his own poverty of ideas, acting like people who beg for their bread. For just as beggars receive some small amount from each person who gives to them and collect their bread from many different sources, so the discourse of Eunomius, because of his scanty supply of the true bread, busily collects scraps of phrases and ideas from everywhere. And so, being impressed by the beauty of Plato's style, he thinks it proper to make Plato's theory a doctrine of the Church. For by how many names, for example, is the created firmament called according to the varieties of language? We call it Heaven, the Hebrew calls it Samaim, the Roman calls it caelum, and other names are given to it by the Syrian, the Mede, the Cappadocian, the African, the Scythian, the Thracian, and the Egyptian. Nor would it be easy to list all the different names that are applied to Heaven and other objects by the different nations that use them. Which of these names, then, tell me, is the appropriate word in which the great wisdom of God is manifested? If you prefer the Greek name to the rest, the Egyptian will perhaps confront you with his own. And if you give first place to the Hebrew, there is the Syrian to claim precedence for his own word, nor will the Roman yield supremacy, nor will the Mede allow himself to be outdone, while each of the other nations will claim the prize. What, then, will become of his teaching when it is torn to pieces by the claimants for so many different languages? But by these names, he says, as by publicly announced laws, it is shown that God made names exactly suited to the nature (physis) of the things they represent. What a grand doctrine! What grand views our theologian assigns to the Divine teachings—such views as people do not even begrudge to bath attendants! For we allow them to give names to the operations they perform, and yet no one honors them as divine for inventing such names as foot-baths, depilatories, towels, and the like—words which appropriately designate the articles in question.

But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and prevent us from applying ourselves to more important matters. For how can one pass over his solemn and profound philosophy, as when he says that God's greatness is seen not only in the works of His hands, but that His wisdom is displayed in their names also, adapted as they are with such peculiar fitness to the nature of each work of His creation? Having perchance fallen in with Plato's Cratylus, or hearing from some one who had met with it, by reason, I suppose, of his own poverty of ideas, he attached that nonsense patchwise to his own, acting like those who get their bread by begging. For just as they, receiving some trifle from each who bestows it on them, collect their bread from many and various sources, so the discourse of Eunomius, by reason of his scanty store of the true bread, assiduously collects scraps of phrases and notions from all quarters. And thus, being struck by the beauty of the Platonic style, he thinks it not unseemly to make Plato's theory a doctrine of the Church. For by how many appellations, say, is the created firmament called according to the varieties of language? For we call it Heaven, the Hebrew calls it Samaim, the Roman cœlum, other names are given to it by the Syrian, the Mede, the Cappadocian, the African, the Scythian, the Thracian the Egyptian: nor would it be easy to enumerate the multiplicity of names which are applied to Heaven and other objects by the different nations that employ them. Which of these, then, tell me, is the appropriate word wherein the great wisdom of God is manifested? If you prefer the Greek to the rest, the Egyptian haply will confront you with his own. And if you give the first place to the Hebrew, there is the Syrian to claim precedence for his own word, nor will the Roman yield the supremacy, nor the Mede allow himself to be outdone; while of the other nations each will claim the prize. What, then, will be the fate of his dogma when torn to pieces by the claimants for so many different languages? But by these, says he, as by laws publicly promulgated, it is shown that God made names exactly suited to the nature of the things which they represent. What a grand doctrine! What grand views our theologian allows to the Divine teachings, such indeed as men do not grudge even to bathing-attendants! For we allow them to give names to the operations they engage in, and yet no one invests them with Divine honours for the invention of such names as foot-baths, depilatories, towels, and the like — words which appropriately designate the articles in question.

But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus' nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms and empty space, and the accidental generation of things, is similar to what we mean by conception. What an understanding of Epicurus! If we attribute words that express things to the logical faculty in our nature, we are thereby convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of indivisible bodies, combinations of atoms, the collision and rebound of particles, and so on. I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he takes as his own patron and the ally of his system, whose opinion, he says in his later remarks, coincides with our views about conception. For he says that philosopher taught that Providence does not extend through all nature, nor penetrate into the realm of earthly things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds to our discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining a doctrine accurately! But he goes on to say that we must either deny that God created things, or, if we grant it, we must not deprive Him of the naming of things. And yet even with respect to the animal creation, as we have already said, we are taught the very opposite of both these alternatives by Holy Scripture—that Adam did not make the animals, nor did God name them, but the creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives us praise of speech in general, as though someone wished to disparage it, and after his extremely abusive and bombastic pile of words, he says that by a law and rule of His providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our knowledge and use of things necessary for our service. And after pouring out nonsense of this kind in the depths of his delusions, he passes on in his discourse to his supposedly irresistible and unanswerable argument. I will not state it word for word, but simply give the gist of it. We are not, he says, to attribute the invention of words to poets, who are greatly mistaken in their notions of God. What a generous concession he makes to God in crediting Him with the inventions of poetic craft, so that God may thereby seem more sublime and august to people, when the disciples of Eunomius believe that such expressions as those used by Homer for sideways, rang out, aside, mix, clung to his hand, hissed, thumped, rattled, clashed, rang terribly, twanged, shouted, pondered, and many others, are not used by poets by a certain arbitrary freedom, but that they introduce them into their poems by some mysterious revelation from God! Let this, too, be passed over, and also that clever and supposedly irresistible argument, that it is not in our power to cite Scriptural instances of holy men who have invented new terms. Now if human nature had been imperfect up to the time of such men's appearance, and not yet completed by the gift of reason, it would have been appropriate for them to seek that the deficiency might be supplied. But if from the very first man's nature existed self-sufficient and complete for all purposes of reason and thought, why should anyone, in order to establish this doctrine of conception, humor them so far as to look for instances where holy men originated sounds or names? Or, if we cannot produce any instances, why should anyone regard it as adequate proof that such and such syllables and words were appointed by God Himself?

But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus' nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms and empty space, and the fortuitous generation of things, is akin to what we mean by conception. What an understanding of Epicurus! If we ascribe words expressive of things to the logical faculty in our nature, we thereby stand convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of indivisible bodies, and combinations of atoms, and the collision and rebound of particles, and so on. I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he takes as his own patron, and the ally of his system, whose opinion, he says, in his subsequent remarks, coincides with our views about conception. For he says that that philosopher taught that Providence does not extend through all nature, nor penetrate into the region of terrestrial things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds to our discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining a doctrine with accuracy! But he goes on to say that we must either deny the creation of things to God, or, if we concede it, we must not deprive Him of the imposition of names. And yet even in respect to the brute creation, as we have said already, we are taught the very opposite (of both these alternatives) by Holy Scripture — that neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them, but the creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives us an encomium of speech in general (as though some one wished to disparage it), and after his eminently abusive and bombastic conglomeration of words, he says that, by a law and rule of His providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our knowledge and use of things necessary for our service; and after pouring forth twaddle of this kind in the profundity of his slumbers, he passes on in his discourse to his irresistible and unanswerable argument. I will not state it in so many words, but simply give the drift of it. We are not, he says, to ascribe the invention of words to poets, who are much mistaken in their notions of God. What a generous concession does he make to God in investing Him with the inventions of the poetic faculty, so that God may thereby seem to men more sublime and august, when the disciples of Eunomius believe that such expressions as those used by Homer for side-ways, rang out, aside, mix, clung to his hand, hissed, thumped, rattled, clashed, rang terribly, twanged, shouted, pondered, and many others, are not used by poets by a certain arbitrary licence, but that they introduce them into their poems by some mysterious initiation from God! Let this, too, be passed over, and withal that clever and irresistible attempt, that it is not in our power to quote Scriptural instances of holy men who have invented new terms. Now if human nature had been imperfect up to the time of such men's appearance, and not as yet completed by the gift of reason, it would have been well for them to seek that the deficiency might be supplied. But if from the very first man's nature existed self-sufficing and complete for all purposes of reason and thought, why should any one, in order to establish this doctrine of conception, humour them so far as to seek for instances where holy men initiated sounds or names? Or, if we cannot adduce any instances, why should any one regard it as a sufficient proof that such and such syllables and words were appointed by God Himself?

But, he says, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriate to things. What, then, is our answer? We account for God's willingness to admit people to communion with Himself by His love for humanity. But since that which is by nature finite cannot rise above its prescribed limits or lay hold of the superior nature of the Most High, for this reason He brings His power, so full of love for humanity, down to the level of human weakness, as far as it is possible for us to receive it, and bestows on us this helpful gift of grace. For just as by divine dispensation the sun, tempering the intensity of his full beams with the intervening air, pours down light as well as heat on those who receive his rays, being himself unapproachable because of the weakness of our nature, so the divine power, after the manner of the illustration I have used, though exalted far above our nature and inaccessible to all approach, like a tender mother who joins in the inarticulate utterances of her baby, gives to our human nature what it is capable of receiving. And thus in the various manifestations of God to humanity He both adapts Himself to humanity and speaks in human language, and assumes wrath, and pity, and such emotions, so that through feelings corresponding to our own our infantile life might be led by the hand, and lay hold of the divine nature by means of the words which His foresight has given. For no one who has thought at all about the truth of things will deny that it is irreverent to imagine that God is subject to any passion such as we see in respect to pleasure, or pity, or anger. And yet the Lord is said to take pleasure in His servants, and to be angry with the backsliding people, and again to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and to show compassion—the word teaching us in each of these expressions that God's providence helps our infirmity by using our own idioms of speech, so that those who are inclined to sin may be restrained from committing it by fear of punishment, and that those who are overtaken by it may not despair of return by the way of repentance when they see God's mercy, while those who are walking uprightly and strictly may yet more adorn their life with virtue, knowing that by their own life they rejoice Him Whose eyes are over the righteous. But just as we cannot call a man deaf who converses with a deaf man by means of signs—his only way of hearing—so we must not suppose speech in God because of His employing it by way of accommodation in addressing humanity. For we ourselves are accustomed to direct brute beasts by clucking and whistling and the like, and yet this, by which we reach their ears, is not our language, but we use our natural speech in talking to one another, while in regard to cattle, some suitable noise or sound accompanied with gesture is sufficient for all purposes of communication.

But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriate to things. What, then, is our answer? We account for God's willingness to admit men to communion with Himself by His love towards mankind. But since that which is by nature finite cannot rise above its prescribed limits, or lay hold of the superior nature of the Most High, on this account He, bringing His power, so full of love for humanity, down to the level of human weakness, so far as it was possible for us to receive it, bestowed on us this helpful gift of grace. For as by Divine dispensation the sun, tempering the intensity of his full beams with the intervening air, pours down light as well as heat on those who receive his rays, being himself unapproachable by reason of the weakness of our nature, so the Divine power, after the manner of the illustration I have used, though exalted far above our nature and inaccessible to all approach, like a tender mother who joins in the inarticulate utterances of her babe, gives to our human nature what it is capable of receiving; and thus in the various manifestations of God to man He both adapts Himself to man and speaks in human language, and assumes wrath, and pity, and such-like emotions, so that through feelings corresponding to our own our infantile life might be led as by hand, and lay hold of the Divine nature by means of the words which His foresight has given. For that it is irreverent to imagine that God is subject to any passion such as we see in respect to pleasure, or pity, or anger, no one will deny who has thought at all about the truth of things. And yet the Lord is said to take pleasure in His servants, and to be angry with the backsliding people, and, again, to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and to show compassion — the word teaching us in each of these expressions that God's providence helps our infirmity by using our own idioms of speech, so that such as are inclined to sin may be restrained from committing it by fear of punishment, and that those who are overtaken by it may not despair of return by the way of repentance when they see God's mercy, while those who are walking uprightly and strictly may yet more adorn their life with virtue, as knowing that by their own life they rejoice Him Whose eyes are over the righteous. But just as we cannot call a man deaf who converses with a deaf man by means of signs, — his only way of hearing — so we must not suppose speech in God because of His employing it by way of accommodation in addressing man. For we ourselves are accustomed to direct brute beasts by clucking and whistling and the like, and yet this, by which we reach their ears, is not our language, but we use our natural speech in talking to one another, while, in regard to cattle, some suitable noise or sound accompanied with gesture is sufficient for all purposes of communication.

But our pious opponent will not allow God to use our language because of our tendency toward evil, closing his eyes (good man!) to the fact that for our sake He did not refuse to be made sin and a curse. Such is the overflow of His love for humanity that He willingly came to experience not only our good, but our evil. And if He shared in our evil, why should He refuse to share in speech, the noblest of our gifts? But he brings forward David as his support and claims that David said names were given to things by God, because it is written: He tells the number of the stars; He calls them all by their names. But I think it must be clear to every sensible person that what is said about the stars has nothing whatever to do with the subject. However, since it is quite possible that some people may carelessly agree with his statement, I will briefly discuss the point. Holy Scripture often attributes expressions to God that seem quite consistent with our own, for example: The Lord was angry, and it repented Him because of their sins; and again, He repented that He had anointed Saul king; and again, The Lord awaked as one out of sleep; and besides this, it mentions His sitting, and standing, and moving, and the like, which are not actually connected with God but are not without their usefulness as an accommodation to those who are being taught. For in the case of those who are too unrestrained, a show of anger holds them back through fear. And to those who need the medicine of repentance, it says that the Lord repents along with them of the evil, and those who become arrogant through prosperity it warns, by God's repentance regarding Saul, that their good fortune is not a guaranteed possession, though it may seem to come from God. To those who are not swallowed up by their sinful fall but who have risen from a life of vanity as from sleep, it says that God arises out of sleep. To those who stand firmly upon righteousness—that He stands. To those who are seated in righteousness—that He sits. And again, in the case of those who have moved away from their steadfastness in righteousness—that He moves or walks; as in the case of Adam, the sacred history records God's walking in the garden in the cool of the day, signifying by this the fall of the first man into darkness, and by the moving, his weakness and instability in regard to righteousness.

But our pious opponent will not allow of God's using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes ( good man!) to the fact that for our sakes He did not refuse to be made sin and a curse. Such is the superabundance of His love for man, that He voluntarily came to prove not only our good, but our evil. And if He was partaker in our evil, why should He refuse to be partaker in speech, the noblest of our gifts? But he advances David in his support, and declares that he said that names were imposed on things by God, because it is thus written, He tells the number of the stars; He calls them all by their names. But I think it must be obvious to every man of sense that what is thus said of the stars has nothing whatever to do with the subject. Since, however, it is not improbable that some may unwarily give their assent to his statement, I will briefly discuss the point. Holy Scripture oftentimes is wont to attribute expressions to God such that they seem quite accordant with our own, e.g. The Lord was angry, and it repented Him because of their sins; and again, He repented that He had anointed Saul king 1 Samuel 15:35; and again, The Lord awaked as one out of sleep; and besides this, it makes mention of His sitting, and standing, and moving, and the like, which are not as a fact connected with God, but are not without their use as an accommodation to those who are under teaching. For in the case of the too unbridled, a show of anger restrains them by fear. And to those who need the medicine of repentance, it says that the Lord repents along with them of the evil, and those who grow insolent through prosperity it warns, by God's repentance in respect to Saul, that their good fortune is no certain possession, though it seem to come from God. To those who are not engulfed by their sinful fall, but who have risen from a life of vanity as from sleep, it says that God arises out of sleep. To those who steadfastly take their stand upon righteousness — that He stands. To those who are seated in righteousness — that He sits. And again, in the case of those who have moved from their steadfastness in righteousness — that He moves or walks; as, in the case of Adam, the sacred history records God's walking in the garden in the cool of the day Genesis 3:8, signifying thereby the fall of the first man into darkness, and, by the moving, his weakness and instability in regard to righteousness.

But most people will probably think this is too far removed from what we're currently investigating. However, no one will consider this next point irrelevant to our subject: many people think that whatever is incomprehensible to them is equally incomprehensible to God, and that whatever escapes their own knowledge is also beyond His power to know. Now since we use number to measure quantity, and number is nothing more than a combination of units growing into multitude in a complex way (for the ten is a unit brought to that value by combining units, and likewise the hundred is a unit composed of tens, and in the same way the thousand is another unit, and so proportionally the ten thousand is another through multiplication, one being made up to its value by thousands, the other by hundreds, and by assigning all of these to their underlying class we create signs of the quantity of things being counted)—accordingly, in order that we might be taught by Holy Scripture that nothing is unknown to God, it tells us that the multitude of stars is numbered by Him, not that their numbering happens as I have described (for who is so simple as to think that God gains knowledge of things through odd and even numbers, and that by putting units together He arrives at the total of the collective quantity?), but since in our own case exact knowledge of quantity is obtained through number, in order that we might be taught regarding God that all things are comprehended by the knowledge of His wisdom, and that nothing escapes His precise awareness, Scripture represents God as numbering the stars, advising us through these words to understand that we must not imagine God takes note of things by the measure of human knowledge, but that all things, however incomprehensible and above human understanding, are embraced by the knowledge of the wisdom of God. For since the stars escape numbering because of their multitude, as far as our human conception is concerned, Holy Scripture, teaching the whole from the part, in saying they are numbered by God attests that not one of the things unknown to us escapes God's knowledge. And therefore it says, Who tells the multitude of the stars, certainly not meaning that He did not know their number beforehand; for how could He be ignorant of what He Himself created, seeing that the Ruler of the Universe could not be ignorant of what is comprehended in His power, which includes the worlds in its embrace? Why, then, would He number what He already knows? For measuring quantity by number is the part of those who need information. But He Who knew all things before they were created does not need number to inform Him. But when David says that He numbers the stars, it is clear that Scripture descends to such language in accordance with our understanding, to teach us symbolically that the things we do not know are accurately known to God. Just as He is said to number, though needing no arithmetical process to arrive at knowledge of created things, so also the Prophet tells us that He calls them all by their names, not meaning, I think, that He does so through any vocal utterance. For truly such language would result in a strangely unworthy conception of God, if it meant that these names in common use among ourselves were applied to the stars by God. For if anyone were to allow that these names were applied by God, it would follow that the names of the Greek idol gods were also applied by Him to the stars, and we would have to regard as true all the tales from mythological history told about those star names, as though God Himself authorized their utterance. Thus the distribution of the seven planets contained in the heavens among the Greek idols would excuse those who have erred regarding them, if people were persuaded that such an arrangement was God's doing. Thus the fables about Orion and the Scorpion would be believed, along with the legends about the ship Argo, the Swan, the Eagle, the Dog, and the mythical story of Ariadne's crown. Moreover, it would pave the way for supposing God to be the inventor of the names in the zodiacal circle, devised after some imagined resemblance in the constellations, if Eunomius is right in supposing that David said these names were given by God.

But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping with our subject; the fact that many think that what is incomprehensible to themselves is equally incomprehensible to God, and that whatever escapes their own cognizance is also beyond the power of His. Now since we make number the measure of quantity, and number is nothing else than a combination of units growing into multitude in a complex way (for the decad is a unit brought to that value by the composition of units, and again the hundred is a unit composed of decads, and in like manner the thousand is another unit, and so in due proportion the myriad is another by a multiplication, the one being made up to its value by thousands, the other by hundreds, by assigning all which to their underlying class we make signs of the quantity of the things numbered), accordingly, in order that we may be taught by Holy Scripture that nothing is unknown to God, it tells us that the multitude of the stars is numbered by Him, not that their numbering takes place as I have described, (for who is so simple as to think that God takes knowledge of things by odd and even, and that by putting units together He makes up the total of the collective quantity?) but, since in our own case the exact knowledge of quantity is obtained by number, in order, I say, that we might be taught in respect to God that all things are comprehended by the knowledge of His wisdom, and that nothing escapes His minute cognizance, on this account it represents God as numbering the stars, counselling us by these words to understand this, viz. that we must not imagine God to take note of things by the measure of human knowledge, but that all things, however incomprehensible and above human understanding, are embraced by the knowledge of the wisdom of God. For as the stars on account of their multitude escape numbering, as far as our human conception is concerned, Holy Scripture, teaching the whole from the part, in saying that they are numbered by God attests that not one of the things unknown to us escapes the knowledge of God. And therefore it says, Who tells the multitude of the stars, of course not meaning that He did not know their number beforehand; for how should He be ignorant of what He Himself created, seeing that the Ruler of the Universe could not be ignorant of that which is comprehended in His power; which includes the worlds in its embrace? Why, then, should He number what He knows? For to measure quantity by number is the part of those who want information. But He Who knew all things before they were created needs not number as His informant. But when David says that He numbers the stars, it is evident that the Scripture descends to such language in accordance with our understanding, to teach us emblematically that the things which we know not are accurately known to God. As, then, He is said to number, though needing no arithmetical process to arrive at the knowledge of things created, so also the Prophet tells us that He calls them all by their names, not meaning, I imagine, that He does so by any vocal utterance. For verily such language would result in a conception strangely unworthy of God, if it meant that these names in common use among ourselves were applied to the stars by God. For, should any one allow that these were so applied by God, it must follow that the names of the idol gods of Greece were applied by Him also to the stars, and we must regard as true all the tales from mythological history that are told about those starry names, as though God Himself sanctioned their utterance. Thus the distribution among the Greek idols of the seven planets contained in the heavens will exempt from blame those who have erred in respect to them, if men be persuaded that such an arrangement was God's. Thus the fables of Orion and the Scorpion will be believed, and the legends respecting the ship Argo, and the Swan, and the Eagle, and the Dog, and the mythical story of Ariadne's crown. Moreover it will pave the way for supposing God to be the inventor of the names in the zodiacal circle, devised after some fancied resemblance in the constellations, if Eunomius is right in supposing that David said that these names were given them by God.

Since it would be absurd to regard God as the inventor of such names—otherwise even the names of these idol gods would seem to have originated from God—we should not accept what has been said without investigation, but should understand its meaning by comparing it to those things that number teaches us. Now, since it confirms the accuracy of our knowledge when we call someone we know by their name, we are taught here that He Who encompasses the Universe in His knowledge not only comprehends the total sum of everything, but also has exact knowledge of each individual unit that makes up that total. Therefore Scripture says not only that He counts the number of the stars, but that He calls them all by their names, which means that His precise knowledge extends to the smallest of them, and that He knows each one specifically, just as a person knows someone familiar to them by name. If anyone claims that the names God gave to the stars are different ones, unknown to human language, he strays far from the truth. For if there were other names for stars, Holy Scripture would not have mentioned those commonly used among the Greeks—Isaiah saying, "Who makes the Pleiades, and Hesperus, and Arcturus, and the Chambers of the South," and Job mentioning Orion and Aseroth. From this it is clear that Holy Scripture uses words that are in common use for our instruction. Thus we hear in Job of Amalthea's horn, and in Isaiah of the Sirens—the former naming abundance according to Greek mythology, the latter representing the pleasure derived from hearing through the figure of the Sirens. So then, just as in these cases the inspired word has used names drawn from mythological stories for the benefit of the hearers, here too it freely uses the names given to the stars by human imagination, teaching us that all things whatsoever that are named among people have their origin from God—the things themselves, not their names. For it does not say "Who names," but "Who makes Pleiad, and Hesperus, and Arcturus." I think, then, it has been sufficiently demonstrated in what I have said that David supports our position, teaching us by this statement not that God gives the stars their names, but that He has exact knowledge of them, in the way that people have the most certain knowledge of those whom they can, through long familiarity, call by their names.

Since, then, it is monstrous to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin from God, it will be well not to receive what has been said without inquiry, but to get to the meaning in this case also after the analogy of those things of which number informs us. Well, since it attests the accuracy of our knowledge, when we call one familiar to us by his name, we are here taught that He Who embraces the Universe in His knowledge not only comprehends the total of the aggregate quantity, but has an exact knowledge of the units also that compose it. And therefore the Scripture says not only that He tells the number of the stars, but that He calls them all by their names, which means that His accurate knowledge extends to the minutest of them, and that He knows each particular respecting them, just as a man knows one who is familiar to him by name. And if any one say that the names given to the stars by God are different ones, unknown to human language, he wanders far away from the truth. For if there were other names of stars, Holy Scripture would not have made mention of those which are in common use among the Greeks, Esaias saying, Which makes the Pleiads, and Hesperus, and Arcturus, and the Chambers of the South, and Job making mention of Orion and Aseroth; so that from this it is clear that Holy Scripture employs for our instruction such words as are in common use. Thus we hear in Job of Amalthea's horn, and in Esaias of the Sirens, the former thus naming plenty after the conceit of the Greeks, the latter representing the pleasure derived from hearing, by the figure of the Sirens. As, then, in these cases the inspired word has made use of names drawn from mythological fables, with a view to the advantage of the hearers, so here it freely makes use of the appellations given to the stars by human fancy, teaching us that all things whatsoever that are named among men have their origin from God — the things, not their names. For it does not say Who names, but Who makes Pleiad, and Hesperus, and Arcturus. I think, then, it has been sufficiently shown in what I have said that David supports our opinion, in teaching us by this utterance, not that God gives the stars their names, but that He has an exact knowledge of them, after the fashion of men, who have the most certain knowledge of those whom they are able, through long familiarity, to call by their names.

And if we present the interpretation that most commentators give to these words of the Psalmist, Eunomius' interpretation of them will be shown to be even more foolish. For those who have most carefully examined the meaning of the inspired Scripture declare that not all the works of creation are worthy of being counted by God. For in the Gospel accounts of feeding the crowds in the wilderness, women and children are not considered worthy of being counted. And in the account of the Exodus of the children of Israel, only those are counted in the register who were old enough to bear arms against their enemies and to perform brave deeds. For not all names of things are suitable to be spoken by the Divine lips, but the counting is only for what is pure and heavenly, which, by the excellence of its condition remaining pure from all mixture with darkness, is called a star, and the naming is only for what, for the same reason, is worthy to be recorded in the Divine records. For concerning His adversaries He says, I will not take up their names into my lips.

And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of foolishness. For those who have most carefully searched out the sense of the inspired Scripture, declare that not all the works of creation are worthy of the Divine reckoning. For in the Gospel narratives of feeding the multitudes in the wilderness, women and children are not thought worthy of enumeration. And in the account of the Exodus of the children of Israel, those only are enumerated in the roll who were of age to bear arms against their enemies, and to do deeds of valour. For not all names of things are fit to be pronounced by the Divine lips, but the enumeration is only for that which is pure and heavenly, which, by the loftiness of its state remaining pure from all admixture with darkness, is called a star, and the naming is only for that which, for the same reason, is worthy to be registered in the Divine tablets. For of His adversaries He says, I will not take up their names into my lips.

But we may clearly learn from the prophecy of Isaiah what names the Lord gives to such stars, where it says, "I have called you by your name; you are Mine" (Isaiah 43:1). So if a person makes himself God's possession, his action becomes his name. But let the reader decide about this. However, Eunomius adds to his earlier statement that the beginnings of creation testify to the fact that names were given by God to the things He created. But I think it would be unnecessary to repeat what I have already set out sufficiently as the result of my research. He may put his own arbitrary interpretation on the word "Adam," which the Apostle tells us points prophetically to Christ. For no one can be so deluded, when Paul has revealed the hidden mysteries to us through the power of the Spirit, as to consider Eunomius a more trustworthy interpreter of divine things—a man who openly attacks the words of inspired testimony and who through his false interpretation of the word tries to prove that the various kinds of animals were not named by Adam. We should also pass over his insulting expressions, tasteless vulgarity, and foul and disgusting language, with its usual fluency going on about our Master as a sower of tares, about a deceptive show of grain, the blight of Valentinus, and his grain piled in our Master's mind. And we will cover in silence the rest of his offensive talk as we cover decaying corpses in the ground, so that the stench may not prove harmful to many. Rather, let us proceed to what remains for us to say. For once again he brings forward a statement of our Master to this effect: We call God indestructible and ungenerate, applying these words from different points of view. For when we look to the ages that are past, finding the life of God transcending all limitation, we call Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, Him who is infinite, unlimited, and without end, we call indestructible. As, then, that which has no end of life is indestructible, so that which has no beginning we call ungenerate, representing things this way by the faculty of conception.

But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, I have called you by your name; you are Mine Isaiah 43:1. So that if a man makes himself God's possession, his act becomes his name. But be this as the reader pleases. Eunomius, however, adds to his previous statement that the beginnings of creation testify to the fact, that names were given by God to the things which He created; but I think that it would be superfluous to repeat what I have already sufficiently set forth as the result of my investigations; and he may put his own arbitrary interpretation on the word Adam, which, the Apostle tells us, points prophetically to Christ. For no one can be so infatuated, when Paul, by the power of the Spirit, has revealed to us the hidden mysteries, as to count Eunomius a more trustworthy interpreter of Divine things — a man who openly impugns the words of the inspired testimony, and who by his false interpretation of the word would fain prove that the various kinds of animals were not named by Adam. We shall do well, also, to pass over his insolent expressions, and tasteless vulgarity, and foul and disgusting tongue, with its accustomed fluency going on about our Master as a sower of tares, and about a deceptive show of grain, and the blight of Valentinus, and his grain piled in our Master's mind: and we will veil in silence the rest of his unsavoury talk as we veil putrefying corpses in the ground, that the stench may not prove injurious to many. Rather let us proceed to what remains for us to say. For once more he adduces a dictum of our Master, to this effect. We call God indestructible and ungenerate, applying these words from different points of view. For when we look to the ages that are past, finding the life of God transcending all limitation, we call Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, Him Who is infinite, illimitable, and without end, we call indestructible. As, then, that which has no end of life is indestructible, so that which has no beginning we call ungenerate, representing things so by the faculty of conception.

I will skip over the insults Eunomius has placed at the beginning of his discussion of these matters—things like "alteration of seed," "teacher of sowing," "illogical censure," and whatever other slurs he dares to utter with his foul tongue. Let us instead turn to the point he is trying to establish through his slanderous accusation. He promises to prove that we are saying God is not indestructible by His physis. But we only consider those things foreign to His physis that can be added to or taken away from it. However, in the case of things without which the subject cannot be conceived by the mind, how can anyone be accused of separating His physis from itself? If the indestructibility we attribute to God were something added on from outside and did not always belong to Him, or might cease to belong to Him, then his slanderous attack might be justified. But if it is always the same, and our argument is that God is always what He is, and that He receives nothing by way of increase or addition of properties but continues always in whatever is conceived and called good, why should we be slanderously accused of not attributing indestructibility to Him as part of His essential physis? But he pretends to base his accusation on Basil's words which I have already quoted, as though we granted indestructibility to God by reference to the ages. Now if this statement came from us ourselves, our defense might perhaps seem suspect, as if we now wanted to correct or justify any questionable expressions of ours. But since our statements are taken from the lips of an opponent, what stronger proof could we have of their truth than the testimony of our opponents themselves? How does the statement stand, then, which Eunomius seizes upon to prejudice us? When, he says, we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to come, we speak of the infinite, illimitable, and unending as indestructible. Does Eunomius consider such attribution the same as granting? Yet who is so unfamiliar with common usage that he does not know the proper meaning of these expressions? For a person grants something when he possesses what another does not have, while a person attributes something when he designates with a name what another already has. How is it, then, that our teacher of truth is not ashamed of his obviously slanderous accusation? But just as those who are deprived of sight through some disease behave inappropriately before the eyes of those who can see, supposing that what they themselves cannot see is also unobserved by those whose sight is unimpaired, such is the case with our sharp-sighted and quick-witted opponent, who assumes his hearers are afflicted with the same blindness to the truth as himself. And who is so foolish as not to compare the words he slanderously attacks with his accusation itself, and by reading them side by side to detect the malice of the writer? Our statement attributes indestructibility; he accuses it of granting indestructibility. What does this have to do with our statement? Every person has a right to be judged by his own deeds, not to be blamed for those of others; and in this present case, while he accuses us and directs his bitterness at us, in truth he is condemning no one but himself. For if it is wrong to grant indestructibility to God, and no one does this except himself, is not our slanderer his own accuser, attacking his own statements and not ours? And regarding the term indestructibility, we assert that just as the life that is endless is rightly called indestructible, so that which is without beginning is rightly called ungenerate. And yet Eunomius says we lend Him primacy over all created things simply by reference to the ages.

I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as alteration of seed, and teacher of sowing, and illogical censure, and whatever other aspersions he ventures on with his foul tongue. Let us rather turn to the point which he tries to establish by his calumnious accusation. He promises to convict us of saying that God is not by His nature indestructible. But we hold only such things foreign to His nature as may be added to or subtracted from it. But, in the case of things without which the subject is incapable of being conceived by the mind, how can any one be open to the charge of separating His nature from itself? If, then, the indestructibility which we ascribe to God were adventitious, and did not always belong to Him, or might cease to belong to Him, he might be justified in his calumnious attack. But if it is always the same, and our contention is, that God is always what He is, and that He receives nothing by way of increase or addition of properties, but continues always in whatsoever is conceived and called good, why should we be slanderously accused of not ascribing indestructibility to Him as of His essential nature? But he pretends that he grounds his accusation on the words of Basil which I have already quoted, as though we bestowed indestructibility on God by reference to the ages. Now if our statement were put forward by ourselves, our defense might perhaps seem open to suspicion, as if we now wanted to amend or justify any questionable expressions of ours. But since our statements are taken from the lips of an adversary, what stronger demonstration could we have of their truth than the evidence of our opponents themselves? How is it, then, with the statement which Eunomius lays hold of with a view to our prejudice? When, he says, we turn our thoughts to the ages that are yet to be, we speak of the infinite, and illimitable, and unending, as indestructible. Does Eunomius count such ascription as identical with bestowing? Yet who is such a stranger to existing usage as to be ignorant of the proper meaning of these expressions? For that man bestows who possesses something which another has not, while that man ascribes who designates with a name what another has. How is it, then, that our instructor in truth is not ashamed of his plainly calumnious impeachment? But as those who, from some disease, are bereft of sight, are unseemly in their behaviour before the eyes of the seeing, supposing that what is not seen by themselves is a thing unobserved also by those whose sight is unimpaired, just such is the case of our sharp-sighted and quick-witted opponent, who supposes his hearers to be afflicted with the same blindness to the truth as himself. And who is so foolish as not to compare the words which he calumniously assails with his charge itself, and by reading them side by side to detect the malice of the writer? Our statement ascribes indestructibility; he charges it with bestowing indestructibility. What has this to do with our statement? Every man has a right to be judged by his own deeds, not to be blamed for those of others; and in this present case, while he accuses us, and points his bitterness at us, in truth he is condemning no one but himself. For if it is reprehensible to bestow indestructibility on God, and this is done by no one but himself, is not our slanderer his own accuser, assailing his own statements and not ours? And with regard to the term indestructibility, we assert that as the life which is endless is rightly called indestructible, so that which is without beginning is rightly called ungenerate. And yet Eunomius says that we lend Him the primacy over all created things simply by reference to the ages.

I will pass over in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to the same level as all created things and, in short, allowing the Son of God no higher honor than theirs. Still, for the sake of my more intelligent listeners, I will here give an example of his senseless malice. He says that Basil grants God the primacy over all things by reference to the ages. What unintelligible nonsense this is! Man is made God's patron and gives to God a primacy that depends on the ages! What is this empty flourish of baseless expressions, when our teacher simply says that whatever in the Divine essence transcends the measurable distances of the ages in either direction is called by certain distinctive names, in the case of Him who, as the Apostle says, has neither beginning of days nor end of life, so that the distinction of the conception might be marked by distinction in the names. And yet on this account Eunomius has the audacity to write that to call that which is anterior to all beginning ungenerate, and again that which is circumscribed by no limit immortal and indestructible, is a bestowing or lending on our part, and other nonsense of the kind. Moreover, he says that we divide the ages into two parts, as if he had not read the words he quoted, or as if he were addressing those who had forgotten his own previous statements. For what does our teacher say? If we look at the time before the Creation, and if passing in thought through the ages we reflect on the infinitude of the Eternal Life, we signify the thought by the term ungenerate. And if we turn our thoughts to what follows and consider the being of God as extending beyond all ages, we interpret the thought by the word endless or indestructible. Well, how does such an account cut the ages in two, if by such available words and names we signify that eternity of God which is equally observable from every point of view, in all things the same, unbroken in continuity? For seeing that human life, moving from stage to stage, advances in its progress from a beginning to an end, and our life here is divided between that which is past and that which is expected, so that the one is the subject of hope, the other of memory, on this account, as in relation to ourselves we grasp a past and a future in this measurable extent, so also we apply the thought, though incorrectly, to the transcendent nature of God—not of course that God in His own existence leaves any interval behind or passes on afresh to something that lies before, but because our intellect can only conceive things according to our nature and measures the eternal by a past and a future, where neither the past blocks the mind's movement toward the limitless and infinite, nor the future tells us of any pause or limit of His endless life. If, then, it is in this way that we think and speak, why does he keep accusing us of dividing the ages? Unless, indeed, Eunomius would maintain that Holy Scripture does so too, signifying as it does by the same idea the infinity of the Divine existence—David, for example, making mention of the kingdom from everlasting, and Moses speaking of the kingdom of God as extending beyond all ages, so that we are taught by both that every duration conceivable is surrounded by the Divine nature, bounded on all sides by the infinity of Him who holds the universe in His embrace. For Moses, looking to the future, says that He reigns from generation to generation for evermore. And great David, turning his thought backward to the past, says, God is our King before the ages, and again, God, who was before the ages, shall hear us. But Eunomius, in his cleverness abandoning such guides as these, says that we talk of the life that is without beginning as one thing, and of that which is without end as quite another, and again of diversities of various ages, effecting by their own diversity a separation in our idea of God. But so that our controversy may not grow to a tedious length, we will add, without criticism or comment, the outcome of Eunomius' work on the subject, well fitted as it is by his effort displayed in the cause of error to make the truth yet more evident to the eyes of the discerning.

I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no higher honour than theirs. Still, for the sake of my more intelligent hearers, I will here give an instance of his insensate malice. Basil, he says, lends God the primacy over all things by reference to the ages. What unintelligible nonsense is this! Man is made God's patron, and gives to God a primacy owing to the ages! What is this vain flourish of baseless expressions, seeing that our Master simply says that whatever in the Divine essence transcends the measurable distances of the ages in either direction is called by certain distinctive names, in the case of Him Who, as says the Apostle, has neither beginning of days nor end of life Hebrews 7:3, in order that the distinction of the conception might be marked by distinction in the names. And yet on this account Eunomius has the effrontery to write, that to call that which is anterior to all beginning ungenerate, and again that which is circumscribed by no limit, immortal and indestructible, is a bestowing or lending on our part, and other nonsense of the kind. Moreover, he says that we divide the ages into two parts, as if he had not read the words he quoted, or as if he were addressing those who had forgotten his own previous statements. For what says our Master? If we look at the time before the Creation, and if passing in thought through the ages we reflect on the infinitude of the Eternal Life, we signify the thought by the term ungenerate. And if we turn our thoughts to what follows, and consider the being of God as extending beyond all ages, we interpret the thought by the word endless or indestructible. Well, how does such an account sever the ages in two, if by such possible words and names we signify that eternity of God which is equally observable from every point of view, in all things the same, unbroken in continuity? For seeing that human life, moving from stage to stage, advances in its progress from a beginning to an end, and our life here is divided between that which is past and that which is expected, so that the one is the subject of hope, the other of memory; on this account, as, in relation to ourselves, we apprehend a past and a future in this measurable extent, so also we apply the thought, though incorrectly, to the transcendent nature of God; not of course that God in His own existence leaves any interval behind, or passes on afresh to something that lies before, but because our intellect can only conceive things according to our nature, and measures the eternal by a past and a future, where neither the past precludes the march of thought to the illimitable and infinite, nor the future tells us of any pause or limit of His endless life. If, then, it is thus that we think and speak, why does he keep taunting us with dividing the ages? Unless, indeed, Eunomius would maintain that Holy Scripture does so too, signifying as it does by the same idea the infinity of the Divine existence; David, for example, making mention of the kingdom from everlasting, and Moses, speaking of the kingdom of God as extending beyond all ages, so that we are taught by both that every duration conceivable is environed by the Divine nature, bounded on all sides by the infinity of Him Who holds the universe in His embrace. For Moses, looking to the future, says that He reigns from generation to generation for evermore. And great David, turning his thought backward to the past, says, God is our King before the ages, and again, God, Who was before the ages, shall hear us. But Eunomius, in his cleverness taking leave of such guides as these, says that we talk of the life that is without beginning as one, and of that which is without end as quite another, and again, of diversities of sundry ages, effecting by their own diversity a separation in our idea of God. But that our controversy may not grow to a tedious length, we will add, without criticism or comment, the outcome of Eunomius' labours on the subject, well fitted as they are by his industry displayed in the cause of error to render the truth yet more evident to the eyes of the discerning.

As he continues his argument, he asks us what we mean by the ages. Yet we could more reasonably ask him the same question. After all, he's the one who claims to know the ousia of God, defining on his own authority what is beyond human approach and comprehension. So let him give us a detailed explanation of the nature of the ages, since he boasts about his knowledge of transcendent matters. And let him stop aggressively threatening us poor ignorant people with the double-edged danger of the dilemma in our answer, telling us that whether we hold this view or that view about the ages, the result must be absurd either way. For if, he says, you claim the ages are eternal, you will be Greeks and Valentinians and uneducated. And if you say they are generated, you will no longer be able to attribute ungeneracy to God. What a terribly unanswerable attack! If, Eunomius, something is held to be generated, we no longer hold the doctrine of divine ungeneracy! And please tell us what has happened to your subtle distinctions between generacy and ungeneracy, by which you tried to establish that the ousia of the Son is dissimilar from that of the Father? For it seems from what we're now being taught that the Father is not dissimilar in ousia when considered in relation to generacy, but that in fact, if we maintain His ungeneracy, we reduce Him to non-existence—since if we speak of the ages as generated, we are forced to abandon the Ungenerate. But let's examine the force of the argument by which he would compel us to accept this absurdity. When, he says, those things by comparison with which God is without beginning don't exist, He who is compared with them must also not exist. What a strong and overpowering grip this is! How tightly this wrestler has us by the waist in his inescapable hold! He says that God's ungeneracy is added to Him through comparison with the ages. By whom is it added? Who says that ungeneracy is added as something acquired through comparison with something else to Him who has no beginning? Neither such a word nor such a meaning will be found in any of our writings. Our words indeed justify themselves and contain nothing like what is alleged against us. And as for the meaning of what is said, who can be a more reliable interpreter than the one who said it? Don't we have the better right to say what we mean when we speak of God's life as extending beyond the ages? And what we say is what we have already said in our previous writings. But, he says, comparison with the ages being impossible, it is impossible that any addition should come to God from it—meaning of course that ungeneracy is an addition. Let him tell us by whom such an addition has been made. If by himself, he simply becomes ridiculous in charging us with his own foolishness. If by us, let him quote our words, and then we will admit the force of his accusation.

For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it is he who professes to know the essence of God, defining on his own authority what is unapproachable and incomprehensible by man. Let him, then, give us a scientific lecture on the nature of the ages, boasting as he does of his familiarity with transcendental things, and let him not so fiercely brandish over us, poor ignorant individuals, the double danger of the dilemma involved in our reply, telling us that, whether we hold this or that view of the ages, the result must be in either case an absurdity. For if (says he) you say that they are eternal, you will be Greeks, and Valentinians, and uninstructed: and if you say that they are generate, you will no longer be able to ascribe ungeneracy to God. What a terribly unanswerable attack! If, O Eunomius, something is held to be generate, we no longer hold the doctrine of the Divine ungeneracy! And pray what has become of your subtle distinctions between generacy and ungeneracy, by which you sought to establish the dissimilarity of the essence of the Son from that of the Father? For it seems from what we are now being taught that the Father is not dissimilar in essence when contemplated in respect of generacy, but that, in fact, if we hold His ungeneracy, we reduce Him to non- existence; since if we speak of the ages as generate, we are driven to relinquish the Ungenerate. But let us examine the force of the argument, by which he would compel us to allow this absurdity. When, says he, those things by comparison with which God is without beginning are non-existent, He Who is compared with them must be non-existent also. What a sturdy and overpowering grip is this! How tightly has this wrestler got us by the waist in his inextricable grasp! He says that God's ungeneracy is added to Him through comparison with the ages. By whom is it so added? Who is there that says that to Him Who has no beginning ungeneracy is added as an acquisition through comparison with something else? Neither such a word nor such a sense will be found in any writings of ours. Our words indeed carry their own justification, and contain nothing like what is alleged against us; and of the meaning of what is said, who can be a more trustworthy interpreter than he who said it? Have not we, then, the better title to say what we mean when we speak of the life of God as extending beyond the ages? And what we say is what we have said already in our previous writings. But, says he, comparison with the ages being impossible, it is impossible that any addition should accrue from it to God, meaning of course that ungeneracy is an addition. Let him tell us by whom such an addition has been made. If by himself, he becomes simply ridiculous in laying his own folly to our charge: if by us, let him quote our words, and then we will admit the force of his accusation.

But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is just the trivial play of children who amuse themselves by starting to build houses in sand. Having composed part of a paragraph without bringing it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is exactly what we say: that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no way bounded by any limit to its infinity. So far our opponent devotes his labors and efforts to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is not limited on any side, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, he leaves the subject of life and, grouping all the ideas we have about the Divine life under one heading, he unifies everything. If, he says, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds supporting arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable addition on our friend's part. It would seem, then, that we may use the same language regarding righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of ungeneracy. If asked to define justice, be ready with the incorporeal as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God's attributes be interchangeable terms, there being no special meaning to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius prescribes this, why do the Scriptures pointlessly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so insane as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its ousia, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and cannot be viewed in any form of complex composition, the human mind, groveling on earth and buried in this earthly life, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways, and never pursues the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasp of Him would indeed be easy if there were one single assigned path before us to the knowledge of God. But as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe; from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence. Again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable purity regarding this. When we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of evils, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind. Not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it is in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other as opposites, as if, when one exists there, the other could not coexist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject). But the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between incorporeal and just, even though the words do not coincide in meaning? And what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of the unending and the unbeginning, is not cut in two by this difference of name. Nor is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.

But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having composed a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his labours and exertions to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages, or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all the ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies everything. If, says he, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one, unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable addition on the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same language in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let, then, no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of ungeneracy; if to define justice, be ready with the incorporeal as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God's attributes be convertible terms, there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between incorporeal and just, even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of the unending and the unbeginning, is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.

Such is our position. Our adversary's view, regarding the precise meaning of this term, cannot be supported by any sound reasoning. He only randomly spits out these strangely meaningless and bombastic expressions in the framework of his sentences and periods. But the conclusion of everything he says is this: that there is no difference in meaning between the most varied names. But we must certainly, it seems to me, quote this passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be falsely accusing him of something that does not belong to him. True expressions, he says, derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same. And so one or the other of these two things must necessarily be held: either that the reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different. With these and many other similar words, he proceeds to accomplish the goal he has before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and affinities, such as species, proportion, part, time, and manner—in order that by the removal of all these, Ungeneracy may become indicative of the ousia of God. His process of proof is as follows (I will express his idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from the ousia; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the ousia. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would disagree with this. But how does he arrive at his intended conclusion, when he says, when we mean the unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to mean the ousia? The ungenerate, then, according to him is expressive of the very ousia of God. We, on the other hand, while we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the meaning of unbeginning, think that the belief that the idea expressed by the words "not generated" is the ousia of God is a madman's only. Who indeed can be so out of his mind as to declare the absence of any generation to be the definition of that ousia (for just as generation is involved in the generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)? Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we allow the indication of that which is absent to be His ousia? Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God's Ungeneracy is expressive of God's life. But to make his delusion on this subject quite plain, let us look at it in the following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the definition of the ousia to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the ousia of the Son to ungeneracy.

Such is our position; our adversary's, with regard to the precise meaning of this term, is such as can derive no help from any reasonings; he only spits forth at random about it these strangely unmeaning and bombastic expressions, in the framework of his sentences and periods. But the upshot of all he says is this; that there is no difference in the meaning of the most varied names. But we must most certainly, as it seems to me, quote this passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be calumniously charging him with something that does not belong to him. True expressions, he says, derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same: and so one or other of these two things must of necessity be held: either that the reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different. With these and many other such-like words, he proceeds to effect the object he has before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and affinities, such as species, proportion, part, time, manner: in order that by the withdrawal of all these Ungeneracy may become indicative of the substance of God. His process of proof is in the following manner (I will express his idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from the substance; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the substance. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would gainsay this. But how does he arrive at his contemplated conclusion, when he says, when we mean the unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to mean the substance? The ungenerate, then, according to him is expressive of the very substance of God. We, on the other hand, while we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the meaning of unbeginning, think that the belief that the idea expressed by the words not generated is the substance of God is a madman's only. Who indeed can be so beside himself as to declare the absence of any generation to be the definition of that substance (for as generation is involved in the generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)? Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we allow the indication of that which is absent to be His substance? Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God's Ungeneracy is expressive of God's life. But to make quite plain his delusion upon this subject, let us look at it in the following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the definition of the substance to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the substance of the Son to ungeneracy.

He says: The Life that is the same and completely single must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though it may seem to vary in mere names, manner, and order. For true expressions get their precision from the underlying realities they indicate. Different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same. So one of these two things must necessarily be true: either the reality indicated is quite different (if the expressions are different), or else the indicating expressions are not different. And in this case there is no other underlying reality besides the life of the Son for one either to base an idea on or to apply a different expression to. Is there, I may ask, anything wrong with these quoted words that would prevent them from being rightly spoken or written about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a Life that is completely single? Is there not for Him also one and the same fitting expression, though He may seem to vary in mere names, manner, and order? Must not one of these two things also be held fixed for Him: either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different, since there is no other underlying reality besides His life for one either to base an idea on or to apply a different expression to? We are not mixing up anything here with what Eunomius has said about the Father. We have simply moved from the same accepted premise to the same conclusion as he did, merely inserting the Son's name instead. If, then, the Son too is a single life, unmixed, removed from every sort of compositeness or complexity, and there is no underlying reality besides this life of the Son (for how can the mixture of anything foreign be suspected in that which is simple? What we must think of along with something else is no longer simple), and if the Father's ousia is also a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of its very life and its very singleness, there are no differences, no increase or decrease in quantity or quality creating any variation, then it must be that things that coincide in concept this way should be called by the same name as well. If, that is, the thing detected in both the Father and the Son—I mean the singleness of life—is one, and the very idea of singleness excludes any variation, as we have said, then it must be that the name fitting the one should be attached to the other as well. For just as that which reasons, is mortal, and is capable of thought and knowledge is called man equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is not changed either by the fact that Abel came into existence by generation or by the fact that Adam did so without generation, so if the simplicity and incompositeness of the Father's life has ungeneracy for its name, then in the same way for the Son's life the same idea will necessarily have to be attached to the same utterance, if, as Eunomius says, one of these two things must necessarily be true: either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different.

He says, The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manner, and order it may seem to vary. For true expressions derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same; and so one or other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the reality indicated is quite different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different; and there is in this case no other subject reality besides the life of the Son, for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon. Is there, I may ask, any unfitness in the words quoted, which would prevent them being rightly spoken or written about the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a Life thoroughly single? Is there not for Him also one and the same befitting expression, though in mere names, and manner, and order He may seem to vary? Must not, for Him also, one or other of these two things be held fixed, either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different, there being no other subject reality, besides his life, for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon? We mix up nothing here with what Eunomius has said about the Father; we have only passed from the same accepted premise to the same conclusion as he did, merely inserting the Son's name instead. If, then, the Son too is a single life, unadulterated, removed from every sort of compositeness or complication, and there is no subject reality besides this life of the Son (for how in that which is simple can the mixture of anything foreign be suspected? What we have to think of along with something else is no longer simple), and if the Father's substance also is a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of its very life and its very singleness, there are no differences, no increase or decrease in quantity or quality in it creating any variation, it needs must be that things thus coinciding in idea should be called by the same appellation also. If, that is, the thing that is detected both in the Father and the Son, I mean the singleness of life, is one, the very idea of singleness excluding, as we have said, any variation, it needs must be that the name befitting the one should be attached to the other also. For as that which reasons, and is mortal, and is capable of thought and knowledge, is called man equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is not altered either by the fact that Abel passed into existence by generation, or by the fact that Adam did so without generation, so, if the simplicity and incompositeness of the Father's life has ungeneracy for its name, in like manner for the Son's life the same idea will necessarily have to be attached to the same utterance, if, as Eunomius says, one or other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating expressions are not different.

But why do we waste time on these foolish arguments when we should instead put Eunomius' book directly into the hands of serious students? That way, apart from any detailed examination, we could immediately prove to discerning readers not only the blasphemy of his opinion but also the weakness of his writing style. In various ways, not following our understanding of it but pursuing his own imagination, he misinterprets the word "Conception." Just as in a night battle no one can distinguish friend from foe, he does not realize that he is stabbing his own doctrine with the very weapons he thinks he is using against us. For the point where he thinks he most differs from the orthodox church is this: he attempts to prove that God became Father at some later time, and that the title of Fatherhood came later than all the other names that belong to Him. He claims God was called Father from the moment He purposed in Himself to become, and did become, Father. Well then, since in this treatise he is trying to prove that all the names applied to the Divine Nature coincide with each other and that there is no difference whatever between them, and since one of these applied names is Father (for just as God is indestructible and eternal, so also He is Father), we must either accept his opinion about this term as well, which would contradict his earlier position, since the idea of Fatherhood would then be involved in any of these other terms (for it is clear that if the meaning of "indestructible" and "Father" is exactly the same, He will be believed to be, just as He is always indestructible, likewise always Father, there being one single meaning, he says, in all these names); or else, if he fears thus acknowledging the eternal Fatherhood of God, he must necessarily abandon his whole argument and admit that each of these names has a meaning unique to itself. And so all this nonsense of his about the Divine names bursts like a bubble and vanishes like smoke.

But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius' book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any examination of it, to prove at once to the discerning, not only the blasphemy of his opinion, but also the nervelessness of his style? While in various ways, not going upon our apprehension of it, but following his own fancy, he misinterprets the word Conception, just as in a night-battle nobody can distinguish friend and foe, he does not understand that he is stabbing his own doctrine with the very weapons he thinks he is turning upon us. For the point in which he thinks he is most removed from the church of the orthodox is this; that he attempts to prove that God became Father at some later time, and that the appellation of Fatherhood is later than all those other names which attach to Him; for that He was called Father from that moment in which He purposed in Himself to become, and did become, Father. Well, then, since in this treatise he is for proving that all the names applied to the Divine Nature coincide with each other, and that there is no difference whatever between them, and since one among these applied names is Father (for as God is indestructible and eternal, so also He is Father), we must either sanction, in the case of this term also, the opinion he holds about the rest, and so contravene his former position, seeing that the idea of Fatherhood is found to be involved in any of these other terms (for it is plain that if the meaning of indestructible and Father is exactly the same, He will be believed to be, just as He is always indestructible, so likewise always Father, there being one single signification, he says, in all these names): or else, if he fears thus to testify to the eternal Fatherhood of God, he must perforce abandon his whole argument, and own that each of these names has a meaning peculiar to itself; and thus all this nonsense of his about the Divine names bursts like a bubble, and vanishes like smoke.

But if he should still insist in response to this opposition of divine names that only the term Father and the term Creator are applied to God to express production, both words being so applied because of an operation (as he says), then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject by conceding what would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (since both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, because if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite permissible to interchange the names and turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father would be devoid of any meaning of essential relation. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is thereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who think about it. For just as it is absurd to consider a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns both these terms to Him, according to Eunomius. But let us return to the question before us. He attacks our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that we thereby destroy the proof of His simplicity, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His ousia. Here I write in my own language, trimming down his wearisome wordiness; and to his foolish and weak redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except regarding his charge that we are senseless. Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt about its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation on it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, dwell on that to which everyone assents, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so lacking in reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking about Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fullness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has also made discoveries in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences connected with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar has nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is entirely possible for the idea of each of these sciences to be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not damaged regarding its simplicity, how can anyone imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other divine names, must—unless all these names are made to mean one thing—become composed of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His physis?

But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are applied to God as expressing production, both words being so applied, as he says, because of an operation, then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject, by thus conceding what it would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (for both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, since if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite allowable to interchange the names, and to turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son, and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father is to be devoid of any meaning of essential relation. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is hereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who reflect. For as it is absurd to deem a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns, according to Eunomius, both these terms to Him. But let us hold to the question before us. He abuses our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that the proof of His simplicity is destroyed by us so, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His essence. Here I write in my own language, curtailing his wearisome prolixity; and in answer to his foolish and nerveless redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except as regards his charging us with senselessness. Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt as to its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation upon it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, linger on that to which all assent, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so devoid of reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking of Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fullness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has made discoveries also in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar means nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is within the bounds of possibility that the idea of each of these sciences should be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity, how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to mean one thing, become of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His nature?

But let us examine a still more aggressive charge he makes against us. It is this: If one must say something even harsher, he does not even keep the Divine substance pure and unmixed from inferior and contradictory elements. This is the charge, but what is the proof of it? Observe the forceful rhetorical attack! If He is imperishable only because His Life is unending, and ungenerate only because it is unbeginning, then in whatever respect He is not imperishable He is perishable, and in whatever respect He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats: He will then be, as unbeginning, both ungenerate and perishable at the same time, and, as unending, both imperishable and generated at the same time. Such is his harsher statement, which, according to his threat, he has launched against us to prove that we say the Divine ousia is mixed with contradictory and even inferior elements. However, I think it is clear to all who preserve within themselves the uncorrupted power of judging the truth that our Master has given this slanderer no basis at all in what he has said, but that Eunomius has twisted it as he pleased and then, playing at arguing, has drawn out this childish sophistry. But to make it even clearer to all my readers, I will repeat that statement of the Master word for word and then set Eunomius' words alongside it. We call the universal Deity (he says) imperishable and ungenerate, using these words with different applications of thought. For when we focus our view on the ages behind us, we find the life of the Deity transcending every limit, and so we name Him ungenerate. But when we turn our thoughts to the ages to come, we call what is infinite in Him, the boundless, the absence of any end to His living, imperishability. So, just as this endlessness is called imperishable, so too this beginninglessness is called ungenerate, and we arrive at these names by conception. Such are the Master's words, and through them he teaches us this: that the Divine Life is essentially single and continuous with itself, starting from no beginning, circumscribed by no end, and that the intuitions we possess regarding this Life can be made clear through words. That is, we express the never having come from any cause by the term unbeginning or ungenerate, and we express the not being circumscribed by any limit and not being destroyed by any death by the term imperishable or unending. And he defines that this absence of cause makes it right for us to speak of the Divine life as existing ungenerately, and this being without end we are to denote as imperishable, since anything that has ceased to exist is necessarily in a state of annihilation, and when we hear of anything annihilated, we immediately think of the destruction of its ousia. He says, then, that One who never ceases to exist and is completely foreign to all destruction and dissolution is to be called imperishable.

But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us; it is this: If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even keep the Divine substance pure and unadulterated from inferior and contradictory elements. This is the charge, but the proof of it is — what? Observe the strong professional attack! If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats, He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated. Such is his harsher statement, which, according to his threat, he has discharged against us, to prove that we say that the Divine substance is mingled with contradictory and even inferior elements. However, I think it is plain to all who keep unimpaired within themselves the power of judging the truth, that our Master has given no handle at all, in what he has said, to this calumniator, but that the latter has garbled it at will, and then, playing at arguing, has drawn out this childish sophistry. But that it may be plainer still to all my readers, I will repeat that statement of the Master word for word, and then confront Eunomius' words with it. We call the Universal Deity (he says) imperishable and ungenerate, using these words with different applications of thought; for when we concentrate our view upon the ages behind us, we find the life of the Deity transcending every limit, and so name Him 'ungenerate'; but when we turn our thoughts upon the ages to come, we call the infinite in Him, the boundless, the absence of all end to His living, 'imperishability.' As, then, this endlessness is called imperishable, so too this beginninglessness is called ungenerate; and we arrive at these names by Conception. Such are the Master's words, and by them he teaches us this: that the Divine Life is essentially single and continuous with Itself, starting from no beginning, circumscribed by no end; and that the intuitions which we possess regarding this Life it is possible to make clear by words. That is, we express the never having come from any cause by the term unbeginning or ungenerate; and we express the not being circumscribed by any limit, and not being destroyed by any death, by the term imperishable, or unending; and this absence of cause, he defines, makes it right for us to speak of the Divine life as existing ungenerately; and this being without end we are to denote as imperishable, since anything that has ceased to exist is necessarily in a state of annihilation, and when we hear of anything annihilated, we at once think of the destruction of its substance. He says then, that One Who never ceases to exist, and is a stranger to all destruction and dissolution, is to be called imperishable.

What, then, does Eunomius say to this? If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherever He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherever He is not ungenerate He is generated. Who granted you this, Eunomius, that imperishability is not connected with the whole life of God? Who ever divided that Life into two parts and then gave specific names to each half of the Life, so that the division to which one name applied could not be said to fit the other? This is the result of your dialectical cleverness: to say that the Life which has no beginning is perishable, and that what is imperishable cannot be connected with what is unbeginning! It is just as if, when someone had said that man was rational, as well as capable of speculation and knowledge, attaching each phrase to the subject according to a different application and idea, someone else were to mock him and continue in the same vein, saying: If man is capable of speculation and knowledge, he cannot, in this respect, be rational, but wherever he is capable of such knowledge, he is this and this only, and his nature does not allow him to be the other. And conversely, if rational were made the definition of man, he would deny in this case that man is capable of speculation and knowledge, for wherever he is rational, he is proven devoid of mind. But if the ridiculousness and absurdity in this case is plain to anyone, neither in that former case is it at all uncertain. When you have read the passage from the Master, you will find that his childish sophistry will vanish like a shadow. In our case of the definition of man, the capability of knowledge is not prevented by the possession of reason, nor the reason by the capability of knowledge. No more is the eternity of the Divine Life deprived of imperishability if it be unbeginning, or of beginninglessness if we recognize its imperishability. This would-be seeker after truth, with the tricks of his dialectical cleverness, inserts into our argument what comes from his own stock, and so he fights with himself and overthrows himself, without ever touching anything of ours. For our position was nothing but this: that the Life as existing without beginning is called, by means of a fresh conception, ungenerate—is called, I say, not made such—and that we identify the Life as going on into infinity with the term imperishable—identify it, I say, as such, not make it such. And the result is that while it is a property of the Divine Life, inherent in the subject, to be infinite in both respects, the thoughts connected with that subject are expressed in this way or that only with regard to that particular term which indicates the thought expressed. One thought connected with that life is that it does not exist from any cause; this is indicated by the term ungenerate. Another thought about it is that it is limitless and endless; this is represented by the word imperishable. Thus, while the subject remains what it is, above everything, whether name or thought, the not being from any cause and the not changing into the non-existent are signified by means of the conception implied in the aforesaid words.

What, then, does Eunomius say to this? If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Who conceded to you this, Eunomius, that the imperishability is not to be associated with the whole life of God? Who ever divided that Life into two parts, and then put particular names to each half of the Life, so that to the division which the one name fitted the other could not be said to apply? This is the result of your dialectic sharpness; to say that the Life which has no beginning is perishable, and that what is imperishable cannot be associated with what is unbeginning! It is just as if, when one had said that man was rational, as well as capable of speculation and knowledge, attaching each phrase to the subject of them according to a different application and idea, some one was to jeer, and to go on in the same strain, If man is capable of speculation and knowledge, he cannot, as regards this, be rational, but wherein he is capable of such knowledge, he is this and this only, and his nature does not admit of his being the other; and reversely, if rational were made the definition of man, he were to deny in this case his being capable of this speculation and knowledge; for wherein he is rational, he is proved devoid of mind. But if the ridiculousness and absurdity in this case is plain to any one, neither in that former case is it at all doubtful. When you have read the passage from the Master, you will find that his childish sophistry will vanish like a shadow. In our case of the definition of man, the capability of knowledge is not hindered by the possession of reason, nor the reason by the capability of knowledge: no more is the eternity of the Divine Life deprived of imperishability, if it be unbeginning, or of beginninglessness, if we recognize its imperishability. This would-be seeker after truth, with the artifices of his dialectic shrewdness, inserts in our argument what comes from his own repertoire; and so he fights with himself and overthrows himself, without ever touching anything of ours. For our position was nothing but this; that the Life as existing without beginning is styled, by means of a fresh Conception, as ungenerate: is styled, I say, not, is made such; and that we mark the Life as going on into infinity with the appellation of imperishable; mark it, I say, as such, not, make it such; and that the result is, that while it is a property of the Divine Life, inherent in the subject, to be infinite in both views, the thoughts associated with that subject are expressed in this way or in that only as regards that particular term which indicates the thought expressed. One thought associated with that life is, that it does not exist from any cause; this is indicated by the term ungenerate. Another thought about it is, that it is limitless and endless; this is represented by the word imperishable. Thus, while the subject remains what it is, above everything, whether name or thought, the not being from any cause, and the not changing into the non-existent, are signified by means of the Conception implied in the aforesaid words.

What, then, out of everything we have said, has provoked him to this childish foolishness, in which he returns to the attack and repeats himself with these words: "He will, then, as unbeginning, be both ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, be both imperishable and generated"? It is obvious to anyone with even the slightest capacity for thought, without our needing to test this logically, how absurdly foolish this is—or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same argument he uses to establish this combination of the perishable and the unbeginning, he could ridicule any proper and worthy name conceived for the Deity. After all, these are not the only two ideas we associate with the Divine Life—I mean, being without beginning and not admitting dissolution. It is also called immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just, and there are countless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each of which is expressed by a distinct sound with its own particular meaning. Well, we can apply this method of unnatural combination that Eunomius has devised to any name—any name, I mean, that expresses some proper conception of the Deity. For example, immateriality and absence of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life, but not with the same thought in both cases. By the term "immaterial" we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term "without anger" we convey freedom from any emotion of anger. Now Eunomius will very likely breeze right through all this and perform his dance, just as before, on our words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: "If He is called immaterial with respect to being separated from all mixture with matter, then in this respect He will not be without anger; and if He is without anger by reason of not indulging in anger, it is impossible to attribute immateriality to Him, but logic will compel us to admit that, insofar as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful." And you will find the same thing applies to His other attributes. If you like, we will propose another pairing of the same kind: His immutability and His incorporeality. Since both these terms are used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case too Eunomius' skill will produce the same absurdity. For if His always being as He is is signified by the term "immutable," and if the term "incorporeal" represents the spirituality of His ousia (essence), Eunomius will certainly say the same thing here too: that the terms are irreconcilable and alien to each other, and that the notions our minds attach to them have no point of contact with one another. For insofar as God is always the same, He is immutable but not incorporeal; and with regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His ousia, while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable. The result is that when immutability is considered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It is corporeal; but if spirituality is what you are looking for, you prove that It is both incorporeal and mutable.

What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in these words: He will, then, be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable, and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated. It is plain to any possessing the least reflection, without our testing this logically, how absurdly foolish it is, or rather, how condemnably blasphemous. By the same argument as that whereby he establishes this union of the perishable and the unbeginning, he can make sport of any proper and worthily conceived name for the Deity. For it is not these two ideas only that we associate with the Divine Life, I mean, the being without beginning, and the not admitting of dissolution; but It is called as well immaterial and without anger, immutable and incorporeal, invisible and formless, true and just; and there are numberless other ways of thinking about the Divine Life, each one of which is announced by an expressive sound with a peculiar meaning of its own. Well, to any name — any name, I mean, expressive of some proper conception of the Deity — it is open for us to apply this method of unnatural union devised by Eunomius. For instance, immateriality and absence of anger are both predicated of the Divine Life; but not with the same thought in both cases; for by the term immaterial we convey the idea of purity from any mixture with matter, and by the term without anger the strangeness to any emotion of anger. Now in all probability Eunomius will run trippingly over all this, and have his dance, just as before, upon our words. Stringing together his absurdities in the same way, he will say: If wherein He is separated from all mixture with matter He is called immaterial, in this respect He will not be without anger; and if by reason of His not indulging in anger He is without anger, it is impossible to attribute to him immateriality, but logic will compel us to admit that, in so far as He is exempt from matter, He is both immaterial and wrathful; and so you will find the same to be the case in respect to his other attributes. And if you like we will propound another pairing of the same, i.e. His immutability and His incorporeality. For both these terms being used of the Divine Life in a distinct sense, in their case also Eunomius' skill will embellish the same absurdity. For if His being always as He is is signified by the term immutable, and if the term incorporeal represents the spirituality of His essence, Eunomius will certainly say the same here also, that the terms are irreconcilable, and alien to each other, and that the notions which our minds attach to them have no point of contact one with the other; for insofar as God is always the same He is immutable, but not incorporeal; and in regard to the spirituality and formlessness of His essence, while He possesses attributes of incorporeality, He is not immutable; so that it happens that when immutability is considered with respect to the Divine Life, along with that immutability it is established that It is corporeal; but if spirituality is the object of search, you prove that It is at once incorporeal and mutable.

These are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. Why should we go through his entire argument with tedious length? In every case you can see an attempt to establish the same worthless point. For example, using logic like the above, truth and justice will be found to oppose each other, since there is a difference in meaning between truth and justice. By the same reasoning, Eunomius will say about these also that truth is not injustice, and that justice is absent from truth. The result will be that when we think of God being alien to injustice, the Divine Being will be shown to be both just and untrue, while if we regard His being alien to untruth, we prove Him to be both true and unjust. The same applies to His being invisible and formless. According to wise reasoning similar to what we have presented, it will not be permissible to say either that the invisible exists in what is formless, or to say that what is formless exists in what is invisible. Instead, he will include form in what is invisible, and conversely, he will prove that what is formless is visible, using the same language about these as he devised about what is imperishable and unbeginning. The effect is that when we regard the incomposite nature of the Divine Life, we confess that it is formless, yet not invisible; and when we reflect that we cannot see God with our bodily eyes, while thus admitting His invisibility, we cannot admit His being formless. Now if these examples seem ridiculous and foolish, every sensible person will condemn even more the absurdity of the statements from which his argument has logically brought him to such a level of absurdity. Yet he criticizes the Master's words as wrong for seeing what is imperishable in what is unending, and what is unending in what is imperishable. Well then, let us also have our fun in a manner somewhat like this cleverness of Eunomius. Let us examine his opinion about these two names mentioned, and see what it is.

Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in every instance you may see an attempt to establish the same futility. For instance, by an implication such as that above, what is true and what is just will be found opposed to each other; for there is a difference in meaning between truth and justice. So that by a parity of reasoning Eunomius will say about these also, that truth is not injustice, and that justice is absent from truth; and it will happen that, when in respect of God we think of His being alien to injustice, the Divine Being will be shown to be at once just and untrue, while if we regard His being alien to untruth, we prove Him to be at once true and unjust. So, too, of His being invisible and formless. For according to a wise reasoning similar to that which we have adduced, it will not be permissible to say either that the invisible exists in that which is formless, or to say that that which is formless exists in that which is invisible; but he will comprise form in that which is invisible, and so again, conversely, he will prove that that which is formless is visible, using the same language in respect of these as he devised in respect to that which is imperishable and unbeginning, to the effect that when we regard the incomposite nature of the Divine Life, we confess that it is formless, yet not invisible; and that when we reflect that we cannot see God with our bodily eyes, while thus admitting His invisibility, we cannot admit His being formless. Now if these instances seem ridiculous and foolish, much more will every sensible man condemn the absurdity of the statements, starting from which his argument has logically brought him to such a pitch of absurdity. Yet he carps at the Master's words, as wrong in seeing that which is imperishable in that which is unending, and that which is unending in that which is imperishable. Well, then, let us also have our sport, in a manner something like this cleverness of Eunomius. Let us examine his opinion about these two names aforesaid, and see what it is.

Eunomius says either "endless" means something different from "imperishable," or the two terms must mean the same thing. If he calls both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he says that "imperishable" means one thing and "unending" means another, then necessarily, when things differ from each other, the force of one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If the idea of "imperishable" is one thing and "endless" is another, and each of these is what the other is not, then he will not grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable. Instead, the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must ask my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a playful tone against our opponent's mockeries, so that we might break through the childish effort of his sophistries. If it would not be too tiresome for my readers, it would be appropriate to set forth again what Eunomius says in his own words. He says, "If God is imperishable only because of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only because of the unbeginning, then wherever He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherever He is not ungenerate He is generated." Then returning to the attack, he repeats: "He will then be, as unbeginning, both ungenerate and perishable, and as unending, both imperishable and generated." I pass over the unnecessary and irrelevant remarks he has inserted here, as they contribute nothing to proving his point. Now I think it is easy for anyone to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation he lays against us. For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate, the Master says, using these words with different applications. His transcending every limit of the ages and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent—this absence of limit or boundary on either side in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy. But Eunomius would make out that we say the being-without-beginning is His ousia, and again that the being-without-end is His ousia, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of ousia. In this way he establishes an absurdity, and while setting up and then fighting against positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own invention to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument at any single point. For the claim that God is imperishable only where His Life is unending is his statement, not ours. Likewise, the claim that the imperishable is not without beginning is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would make a negative attribute an ousia, whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an ousia. Now it is a negative attribute of God that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation. We express this by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his slanderous accusations. For in defining ungeneracy as an ousia, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For since "beginning" means one thing and "end" means another by virtue of an intervening extension, if anyone allows the privation of the first of these to be ousia, he must suppose His Life to be only half-subsisting in this being-without-beginning, and not to extend further by virtue of His nature to the being-without-end, if ungeneracy is regarded as itself His nature. But if anyone insists that both are ousia, then according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as ousia, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term. Thus Eunomius' argument will not be without force, since that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa. According to his account, each of the things mentioned is an ousia, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different from that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.

Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing, and that that of being unending is another, then of necessity, in the case of things differing from each other, the force of the one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of the imperishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable, but the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must beg my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the mockeries of our opponent, that we might thereby break through the puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too wearisome to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what Eunomius says in his own words. If, says he, God is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated. Then returning to the charge, he repeats, He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable: and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated; for I pass over the superfluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed here, as in no way contributing to the proving of his point. Now I think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he lays against us. For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate, says the Master, using these words with different applications. His transcending, he continues, every limit of the ages, and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either hand in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy. But Eunomius would make out that we say that the being without beginning is His essence, and again that the being without end is His essence, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he establishes an absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument in any single point. For that God is imperishable only wherein His Life is unending, is his statement, not ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning, is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a negative attribute an essence; whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a negative attribute of God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in defining ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means one thing, and end means another, by virtue of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the first of these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half subsisting in this being without beginning, and not to extend further, by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if ungeneracy be regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are essence, then, according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of Eunomius will not be without force, inasmuch as that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa, since according to his account each of the things mentioned is an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different to that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.

But so that he himself may come to recognize his own trivial argument, we will refute him from his own statements. For in the course of his argument he says that God, in that He is without end, is ungenerate, and that, in that He is ungenerate, He is without end, as if the meanings of the two terms were identical. If, then, because He is without end He is ungenerate, and being without end and ungenerate are convertible terms, and he admits that the Son also is without end, by the same reasoning he must necessarily admit that the Son is ungenerate, if (as he has said) His being without end and His being without beginning are identical in meaning. For just as in the ungenerate he sees that which is without beginning, so he allows that in that which is without end he also sees that which is without beginning. For otherwise he would not have made the terms completely convertible. But God, he says, is ungenerate by physis, and not by contrast with the ages. Well, who contends that God is not by physis all that He is said to be? For we do not say that God is just, and almighty, and Father, and imperishable by contrast with the ages, nor by His relation to any other thing that exists. But in connection with the subject itself, whatever He may be in His physis, we hold every idea that is a reverent idea, so that even if neither ages nor any other created thing had been made, God would be no less what we believe Him to be, having no need of the ages to constitute Him what He is. But, says Eunomius, He has a Life that is not external, nor composite, nor admitting of differences; for He Himself is Life eternal by virtue of that Life itself immortal, by virtue of that immortality imperishable. This we are taught concerning the Only-begotten as well, nor can anyone challenge this teaching without openly opposing the declaration of Saint John. For life was not brought in from outside to the Son either (for He says, I am the Life), nor is His Life either composite, nor does it admit difference, but by virtue of that life itself He is immortal (for in what else but in life can we see immortality?), and by virtue of that immortality He is imperishable. For that which is stronger than death must naturally be incapable of corruption.

But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his argument he says that God, in that He is without end, is ungenerate, and that, in that He is ungenerate, He is without end, as if the meanings of the two terms were identical. If, then, by reason of His being without end He is ungenerate, and the being without end and ungenerate are convertible terms, and he admits that the Son also is without end, by a parity of reasoning he must necessarily admit that the Son is ungenerate, if (as he has said) His being without end and His being without beginning are identical in meaning. For just as in the ungenerate he sees that which is without beginning, so he allows that in that which is without end also he sees that which is without beginning. For otherwise he would not have made the terms wholly convertible. But God, he says, is ungenerate by nature, and not by contrast with the ages. Well, who is there that contends that God is not by nature all that He is said to be? For we do not say that God is just, and almighty, and Father, and imperishable, by contrast with the ages, nor by His relation to any other thing that exists. But in connection with the subject itself, whatever He may be in His nature, we entertain every idea that is a reverent idea; so that supposing neither ages, nor any other created thing, had been made, God would no less be what we believe Him to be, being in no need of the ages to constitute Him what He is. But, says Eunomius, He has a Life that is not extraneous, nor composite, nor admitting of differences; for He Himself is Life eternal by virtue of that Life itself immortal, by virtue of that immortality imperishable. This we are taught respecting the Only-begotten as well; nor can any one impugn this teaching without openly opposing the declaration of S. John. For life was not brought in from without upon the Son either (for He says, I am the Life), nor is His Life either composite, nor does it admit difference, but by virtue of that life itself He is immortal (for in what else but in life can we see immortality?), and by virtue of that immortality He is imperishable. For that which is stronger than death must naturally be incapable of corruption.

Our argument agrees with him up to this point. But the riddle that comes with his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to interpret, for he seems to have drawn what he says from that system. "Being incorruptible without beginning, He is ungenerate without end, being so called absolutely, and independently of anything beside Himself." Now anyone who has purified ears and an enlightened understanding knows, even without me saying it, that beyond the jingle of words produced by their extraordinary combination, there is no trace of sense in what he says. And if any shadow of an idea could be found in such a noise of words, it would prove to be either profane or ridiculous. For what do you mean when you say that He is without beginning as being without end, and without end as being without beginning? Do you think beginning is identical with end, and that the two words are used in the same sense, just as the names Simon and Peter represent one and the same subject? And on this account, in accordance with your thinking that beginning and end are the same, did you combine under one meaning these two words which denote the absence of each other—end, I mean, and beginning—and take "being without end" as interchangeable with "being without beginning," and blend and confuse one word with the other? Is this the meaning of such a mixing up of words, when you say that He is ungenerate as being without end, and that He is without end as being ungenerate? Yet how is it that you did not see the profanity as well as the ridiculous folly of your words? For if by this novel confusion of the words they are made interchangeable, so that ungenerate means ungenerate without end, and that which is without end is such ungenerately, it follows by necessity that that which is without end must be so as being ungenerate. And thus it comes to pass, my good friend, that your much-talked-of ungeneracy, which you say is the only characteristic of the Father's ousia, will be found to be shared with whatever is immortal, and to be making all things consubstantial with the Father, because it appears alike in all things whose life, by reason of their immortality, goes on to infinity—archangels, that is, angels, human souls, and perhaps also the Apostate host, the Devil and his demons. For if that which is without end and imperishable must also by your argument be ungenerately imperishable, then in whatever is without end and imperishable there must be implied ungeneracy. These are the absurdities into which those men fall who, before they have learned what is fitting for them to learn, only publish their own ignorance by what they attempt to teach. For if he had any faculty of discernment, he would not be ignorant of the particular sense inherent in his terms "without beginning" and "without end," and that the term "without end" is common to all things whose life we believe capable of extension to infinity, while the term "without beginning" belongs to Him alone who is without originating cause. How, then, is it possible for us to regard that which is common to them all as equivalent to that which is believed by all to be a special attribute of the Deity alone, so that we thereby either extend ungeneracy to everything that shares in immortality, or else must not allow immortality to any one of them, seeing that being without end is to belong only to the ungenerate, and conversely, being ungenerate is to belong only to that which is without end? Thus everything without end would have to be regarded as ungenerate.

Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to interpret: for he seems to have produced what he has said from that system. Being incorruptible without beginning, He is ungenerate without end, being so called absolutely, and independently of anything beside Himself. Now whoever has purged ears and an enlightened understanding knows, even without my saying it, that beyond the jingle of words produced by their extraordinary combination, there is no trace of sense in what he says; and if any shadow of an idea could be found in such a din of words, it would prove to be either profane or ridiculous. For what do you mean when you say that He is without beginning as being without end, and without end as being without beginning? Do you think beginning identical with end, and that the two words are employed in the same sense, just as the appellations Simon and Peter represent one and the same subject, and on this account, in accordance with your thinking beginning and end the same, did you, combining under one signification these two words which denote privation of each other — end, I mean, and beginning — and taking the being without end as convertible with the being without end, blend and confound one word with the other; and is this the meaning of such a mixing up of words, when you say that He is ungenerate as being without end, and that He is without end as being ungenerate? Yet how is it that you did not see the profanity as well as the ridiculous folly of your words? For if by this novel confusion of the words they are made convertible, so that ungenerate means ungenerate without end, and that which is without end is such ungenerately, it follows by necessity that that which is without end must needs be so as being ungenerate: and thus it comes to pass, my good friend, that your much-talked-of ungeneracy, which you say is the only characteristic of the Father's essence, will be found to be shared with whatever is immortal, and to be making all things consubstantial with the Father, because it is alike apparent in all things whose life, by reason of their immortality, goes on to infinity, archangels, that is, angels, human souls, and, it may be also, in the Apostate host, the Devil and his dæmons. For if that which is without end, and imperishable, must also by your argument be ungenerately imperishable, then in whatsoever is without end and imperishable there must be connoted ungeneracy. These are the absurdities into which those men fall who, before they have learned what it is fitting for them to learn, only publish their own ignorance by what they attempt to teach. For if he had any faculty of discernment, he would not be ignorant of the peculiar sense inherent in his terms, without beginning, and without end, and that the term without end is common to all things whose life we believe capable of extension to infinity, while the term without beginning belongs to Him alone Who is without originating cause. How, then, is it possible for us to regard that which is common to them all, as equivalent to that which is believed by all to be a special attribute of the Deity alone, so that we thereby either extend ungeneracy to everything that shares in immortality, or else must not allow immortality to any one of them, seeing that the being without end is to belong only to the ungenerate, and vice versa, the being ungenerate is to belong only to that which is without end? Thus everything without end would have to be regarded as ungenerate.

Let's set this aside, along with the usual flood of foul slander in his words, and move on to his later quotations from Basil. But I think it would perhaps be best to pass over most of these later words without examining them. In all of them he shows himself the same, not engaging with what we have actually said, but only inventing points for himself to refute which he pretends are taken from our statement. Anyone with good judgment would consider it useless to go through these carefully, because any intelligent reader of his book can perceive his abusive language from his very words. He says that God's Glory existed before our leader's conception. We do not deny that either. For God's glory, whatever we are to think of it, existed not only before this present generation of ours, but before all creation—it transcends the ages. So what does his argument gain from this fact, that God's glory is admitted to be superior not only to Basil, but to all the ages? Yes, but this name is His glory, he says. But please tell us, so that we may agree with this statement, who has proved that the name is identical with the glory? A law of our nature, he replies, teaches us that in naming realities, the dignity of the names does not depend on the will of those who give them. What is this law of nature? And how is it that it is not in force among all people? If nature had really enacted such a law, it ought to have authority among all who share the common nature, just as the other things peculiar to that nature do. If, in short, it was the law of nature that caused the names to spring up for us from the objects, just as her plants spring up from seeds and roots, and she did not entrust the meaningful naming of each of the subjects to the choice of those who had to indicate the objects, then all humanity would speak one language. For if the names imposed upon these objects did not vary, we would not differ from one another in the area of speech. He says it is a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon realities from a source above us. How is it, then, that the Prophets were ignorant of this holy thing, and were not instructed in this design of Providence, since according to your account they did not make God at all of this Ungeneracy? How, too, is it that God Himself never knew of this kind of holiness, when He did not give names from above to the animals which He had formed, but gave away this power of name-giving to Adam? If it is closely connected with the designs of Providence, as Eunomius says, and a holy thing, that their sounds should be imposed from above upon realities, it is certainly an unholy thing, and an unfitting thing, that these names should have been fitted to the things that are by anyone here below. But the universal Guardian, he says, thought it right to implant these names in our minds by a law of His creation. And how was it, then, if these were implanted in the minds of men, that from Adam onward to your transgression no fruits of this folly were produced, though they were implanted, according to you, in those minds, so that ungeneracy should be the name of the Father's ousia? Adam and all in succession after him would have pronounced this word, if such had been implanted by God in his physis. For just as all that now grows upon the earth continues always, owing to a transmission of its seed from the first creation, and not one single seed at the present time changes the natural form, so this word, if it had been, as you say, implanted by God in our physis, would have sprung up along with the first utterances of the first-formed human beings, and would have accompanied the line of their posterity. But seeing that this word did not exist at the first (for no one in former generations and up to the present ever uttered such a word, except this man), it is clear that it is a bastard invention, that has sprung up from the seed of weeds, not from that good seed which God has sown, to use gospel language, in the field of our physis. For all the things that characterize our common physis do not have their beginning now, but appeared with that physis at its first formation; such as, for instance, the operation of the senses, the appetitive or contrary instinct of the person with regard to anything, and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his physis, none of which a particular epoch has introduced among those born in it. But our humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none which it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as, while sight is a faculty common to our physis, scientific observation comes by training to those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is not everyone, for instance, who can observe with the theodolite, or prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do anything else where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight), so too, while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a common property of humanity united to the very ousia of our physis from above, the invention of terms that signify realities is the work of people who, possessing from above the power of reason, are continually finding out, according as they wish for them toward the clarification of that which they plainly see, certain words expressive of these things. But if these views are to prevail, he says, one of two things is proved: either that conception is prior to those who conceive, or that the names naturally befitting the Deity, and pre-existing before everything, are later than the beginning of humanity. Should we continue the fight against such assertions, and join issue with such obvious absurdity?

But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words; and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But I think it would perhaps be well to pass without examination over most of these subsequent words. For in all of them he shows himself the same, not grappling with that which we have really said, but only inventing for himself points for refutation which he pretends are taken from our statement. To go carefully through these would be pronounced useless by any one possessed of judgment; for any understanding reader of his book can from his very words perceive his scurrility. He says that God's Glory is prior to our leader's conception. We too do not deny that. For God's glory, whatever we are to think of it, is prior not only to this present generation of ours, but to all creation; it transcends the ages. What, then, is gained for his argument from this fact, that God's glory is conceded to be superior not only to Basil, but to all the ages? Yes, but this name is His glory, he says. But pray tell us, in order that we may assent to this statement, who has proved that the appellation is identical with the glory? A law of our nature, he replies, teaches us that, in naming realities, the dignity of the names does not depend on the will of those who give them. What is this law of nature? And how is it that it is not in force among all? If nature had really enacted such a law, it ought to have authority among all who share the common nature, just as the other things peculiar to that nature have. If, in fine, it was the law of nature that caused the appellations to spring up for us from the objects, just as her plants spring up from seeds and roots, and she did not entrust the significant naming of each of the subjects to the choice of those who had to indicate the objects, then all mankind would be of one tongue. For if the names imposed upon these objects did not vary, we should not differ from one another in the department of speech. He says it is a holy thing, and most closely connected with the designs of Providence, that their sounds should be imposed upon realities from a source above us. How is it, then, that the Prophets were ignorant of this holy thing, and were not instructed in this design of Providence, who according to your account did not make God at all of this Ungeneracy? How, too, is it that the Deity Himself never knew of this kind of holiness, when He did not give names from above to the animals which He had formed, but gave away this power of name-giving to Adam? If it is closely connected with the designs of Providence, as Eunomius says, and a holy thing, that their sounds should be imposed from above upon realities, it is certainly an unholy thing, and an unfitting thing, that these names should have been fitted to the things that are by any here below. But the universal Guardian, he says, thought it right to engraft these names in our minds by a law of His creation. And how was it, then, if these were engrafted in the minds of men, that from Adam onward to your transgression no fruits of this folly were produced, grafted as they were, according to you, in those minds, so that ungeneracy should be the name of the Father's essence? Adam and all in succession after him would have pronounced this word, if such had been grafted by God in his nature. For as all that now grows upon the earth continues always, owing to a transmission of its seed from the first creation, and not one single seed at the present time innovates upon the natural form, so this word, if it had been, as you say, grafted by God in our nature, would have sprung up along with the first utterances of the first-formed human beings, and would have accompanied the line of their posterity. But seeing that this word did not exist at the first (for no one in former generations and up to the present ever uttered such a word, except this man), it is plain that it is a bastard invention, that has sprung up from the seed of tares, not from that good seed which God has sown, to use evangelic words, in the field of our nature. For all the things that characterize our common nature do not have their beginning now, but appeared with that nature at its first formation; such, for instance, as the operation of the senses, the appetitive, or contrary, instinct of the man with regard to anything, and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his nature, none of which a particular epoch has introduced among those born in it; but our humanity is preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none which it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as, while sight is a faculty common to our nature, scientific observation comes by training to those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is not every one, for instance, who can observe with the theodolite, or prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do anything else, where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight), so too, while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a common property of humanity united to the very essence of our nature from above, the invention of terms significative of realities is the work of men who, possessing from above the power of reason, are continually finding out, according as they wish for them towards the elucidation of that which they plainly see, certain words expressive of these things. But if these views are to prevail, says he, one of two things is proved; either that conception is anterior to those who conceive, or that the names naturally befitting the Deity, and pre-existent to everything, are posterior to the beginning of man. Ought we to continue the fight against such assertions, and join issue with such manifest absurdity?

But who could possibly be so simple-minded as to be fooled by such arguments and to think that if names are once believed to be a product of the reasoning faculty, he must either allow that the utterance of names existed before those who utter them, or else think he is sinning against the Deity because every person continues to name the Deity according to how each one is able to conceive of Him after birth? Regarding this last assumption, it has already been explained that the Supreme Being does not Himself need words delivered by a voice and tongue, and it would be unnecessary to repeat what would only weigh down the argument. In short, a Being whose physis is neither lacking nor excessive, but simply perfect, neither fails to possess anything that is necessary, nor possesses what is not necessary. Therefore, since we have already proved, and all thinking people unanimously agree, that being called by names is not a necessity of the Deity, no one can deny the extreme profanity of assigning to Him what is not a necessity.

But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning faculty, he must allow that the utterance of names is anterior to those who utter them, or else that he must think he is sinning against the Deity, in that every man continues to name the Deity, according as each after birth is capable of conceiving Him? As to this last supposition, it has been already explained that the Supreme Being has no need Himself of words as delivered by a voice and a tongue; and it would be superfluous to repeat what would only encumber the argument. In fine, a Being Whose nature is neither lacking nor redundant, but simply perfect, neither fails to possess anything that is necessary, nor possesses what is not necessary. Since, then, we have proved previously, and all thinking men unanimously agree, that the calling by names is not a necessity of the Deity, no one can deny the extreme profanity of thus assigning to Him what is not a necessity.

I don't think we need to spend more time on this or examine closely what comes next. To the more careful reader, the argument our opponent has developed will itself appear to serve as a defense of orthodox belief. For instance, he says that imperishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. I see no reason to argue with him, whether these qualities simply belong to the Deity or whether they are, by their very meaning, His essence. Whichever of these two positions is accepted, it will fully support our argument. If being imperishable simply belongs to the essence, then not being generated will also most certainly simply belong to it, and so the concept of ungeneracy will be removed from being the defining mark of the essence. On the other hand, if someone affirms that imperishability is God's essence because God is not subject to destruction, and therefore defines immortality as His very essence because He is stronger than death, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), then imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability and the Son is imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no difference exists between them regarding the concept of imperishability, one essence will not differ from the other essence in any way, since in both equally the nature is completely free from corruption. Even if he should use the same method as before and present us with his dilemma, from which he thinks there is no escape, saying that if we distinguish what belongs to something from what it is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His simplicity, then imperishability and ungeneracy are clearly seen to signify His very essence—even then we can show that he is fighting on our side. For if he insists that God is made composite by our saying that anything belongs to Him, then he certainly cannot exclude Fatherhood from the essence either, but must confess that He is Father by His nature just as much as He is imperishable and immortal. And so, without intending it, he must admit that the Son also shares in that intimate nature, because it will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to Him that is likewise essential. But if he says that Fatherhood belongs to God yet is outside the sphere of the substance, then he must grant us that we may say whatever we like belongs to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is not at all compromised if His quality of ungeneracy is understood to mean something outside the essence. However, if he declares that imperishability and ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are equivalent, since there is no difference between them because the same meaning lies in each, and if he thus asserts that the very concept of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, then the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second as well. But even these men have no doubt, let us note, that the Son is imperishable. Therefore, by Eunomius' argument, the Son is also ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So he must accept one of two alternatives: either he must agree with us that ungeneracy is different from imperishability, or, if he sticks to his claims, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable in order to avoid having to say He is ungenerate, or ungenerate in order to avoid proving Him perishable.

But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our opponent will itself appear in the light of a special pleader on the side of orthodoxy. He says, for instance, that imperishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. For my part I see no need to contend with him, no matter whether these qualities aforesaid only accrue to the Deity, or whether they are, by virtue of their signification, His essence; whichever of these two views is adopted, it will completely support our argument. For if the being imperishable only accrues to the essence, the not being generated will also most certainly only accrue to it; and so the idea of ungeneracy will be ejected from being the mark of the essence. If, on the other hand, because God is not subject to destruction, one affirms imperishability to be His essence, and, because He is stronger than death, one therefore defines immortality to be His very essence, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability, and the Son imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no difference exists between them as regards the idea of imperishability, one essence will differ from the other essence in no way at all, seeing that in both equally the nature is a stranger to any corruption. Even if he should resume the same method as before, and place us on the horns of his dilemma from which, as he thinks, there is no escape, saying that, if we distinguish that which accrues from that which is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His simplicity, then the imperishability and the ungeneracy are seen at once to be significative of His very essence — even then again we can show that he is fighting for our side. For if he will have it that God is made composite by our saying that anything accrues to Him, then he certainly cannot eject the Fatherhood either from the essence, but must confess that He is Father by His nature as much as He is imperishable and immortal; and so without intending it he must admit the Son also to partake of that intimate nature; for it will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to Him thus essential. But if he says that the Fatherhood accrues to God, but is outside the circle of the substance, then he must concede to us that we may say anything we like accrues to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is in no way marred, if His quality of ungeneracy is made to mean something outside the essence. If, however, he declares that the imperishability and the ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are equivalent, since, by reason of the same meaning lying in each, there is no difference between them, and if he thus assert that the very idea of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second too. But that the Son is imperishable, let us observe, even these men entertain no doubt; therefore, by Eunomius' argument, the Son also is ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So that he must accept one of two alternatives; either he must agree with us that ungeneracy is other than imperishability, or, if he abides by his assertions, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable, in order that he may not have to say that He is ungenerate; or ungenerate, in order that he may not prove Him perishable.

I'm not sure which is better: to follow this subject step by step, or to end our contest with such foolishness right here. When people are selling poisonous drugs, a very small test assures buyers of the destructive power contained in the entire drug, and no one doubts, after discovering through a test its partial deadliness, that the whole drug being sold is completely of this deadly character. In the same way, I think it should no longer be doubtful to thoughtful people that this poisonous dose of argument, a sample of which has been shown in what we have already examined, will continue throughout to be just like what we have already refuted. For this reason I think it better not to prolong this detailed examination of his absurdities. Nevertheless, since the champions of this error discover plausibility for it from many sources, and there is reason to fear that overlooking any of their efforts will provide a convenient excuse for misrepresenting us as having avoided their strongest point, I ask those who follow us in this work to continue with our argument, without accusing us of being too wordy, while it expands to meet the attacks of error along the entire front. Notice, then, that he has barely finished weaving in the depths of his sleep this dream about conception before he arms himself again from his storehouse with those monstrous and senseless methods, and turns his argument into another dream much more meaningless than his previous illusion. But we can best understand how absurd his efforts are by observing his treatment of privation; though to wrestle with his nonsense in its full extent would require a Eunomius, or one of his school, men who have never spent a thought on serious realities. We will, however, briefly go over the main points of it, so that while none of his charges is omitted, no meaningless detail may help to prolong the discussion to an absurd length.

But now I do not know which it is best to do; to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in the case of those who are selling destructive drugs, a very slight experiment guarantees to the purchasers the destructive power latent in all the drug, and no one doubts, after he has found out by an experiment its partial deadliness, that the drug sold is entirely of this deadly character, so I think it can be no longer doubtful to reflecting persons that this poisonous dose of argument, of which a specimen has been shown in what we have already examined, will continue throughout to be such as that which we have just refuted. For this reason I think it better not to prolong this detailed dwelling upon his absurdities. Nevertheless, seeing that the champions of this error discover plausibility for it from many quarters, and there is reason to fear lest to have overlooked any of their efforts will be made a specious pretext for misrepresenting us as having shirked their strongest point, I beg for this reason those who follow us out in this work to accompany our argument still, without charging us with prolixity, while it expands itself to meet the attacks of error along the whole line. Observe, then, that he has scarcely ceased weaving in the depths of his slumber this dream about conception before he arms himself again from his storehouse with those monstrous and senseless methods, and turns his argument into another dream much more meaningless than his previous illusion. But we may best know how absurd his efforts are by observing his treatment of privation; though to grapple with his nonsense in all its range would require a Eunomius, or one of his school, men who have never spent a thought on serious realities. We will, however, in a concise way run over the heads of it, that while none of his charges is omitted, no meaningless item may help to prolong the discussion to an absurd length.

When he is about to introduce this discussion of terms of privation, he claims he will demonstrate what he calls the incurable absurdity of our teaching, along with its pretended and blameworthy caution. This is his promise; but what is his proof of these accusations? He says that some have claimed the Deity is ungenerate only by virtue of the privation of generation, but we say, in refuting these people, that neither this word nor this concept applies in any way to the Deity. Let him identify who actually maintains such a position, if anyone from the first creation of humanity to the present day, whether in foreign lands or among the Greeks, has ever committed to such a statement; and we will be silent. But no one in all of human history will be found to have said such a thing, except perhaps some madman. For who was ever so drunk, who was ever so overcome by madness or delirium, as to say explicitly that generation naturally belongs to the ungenerate God, but that, deprived of this natural condition, He becomes ungenerate instead of generated? But these are rhetorical tricks: to escape the shame of refutation when they are proven wrong by inventing fictional opponents. This is how he defended that famous Apology of his, shifting the blame for that title to jurors and accusers, though he was unable to show that there were any accusers, any trial, or any court at all. Now too, with the air of someone correcting another's foolishness, he pretends that necessity forces him to speak this way. This is what his proof of our incurable absurdity and our pretended and blameworthy caution amounts to. But he goes on to say that we do not know what to do in our present situation, and that to cover our confusion we attack him for his worldly learning, while we ourselves claim exclusive possession of the Holy Spirit's teaching. Here is his other fantasy: that he has acquired so much secular learning that he appears through it to be a formidable opponent to Basil. Just as some people have imagined themselves enthroned with royal power and exalted rank, because the deluded vision of their dreams, born from their waking desires, puts such fantasies in their hearts. He says that Basil, not knowing what to do after what has been said, attacks him for his worldly learning. He would indeed have valued such an attack highly, that is, being thought formidable because of his abundance of words even by any ordinary listener, not to mention by Basil and by people like him (if any are completely like him, or ever have been). But as for his intervening argument, if such crude vulgarity and such tasteless mockery can be called argument, by which he thinks he attacks our position, I pass over all of it, for I consider it an abominable and offensive thing to contaminate our treatise with such filth; and I loathe these things as people loathe some swollen and foul ulcer, or turn away from the sight of those whose skin is bloated by excess of fluids and disfigured with lumpy growths. And for a while our argument will be allowed to develop freely, without having to turn to defend itself against people who are ready to mock and tear apart everything that is said.

When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of privation, he takes upon himself to show the incurable absurdity, as he calls it, of our teaching, and its simulated and culpable caution. Such is his promise; but the proof of these accusations is, what? Some have said that the Deity is ungenerate by virtue only of the privation of generation; but we say, in refutation of these, that neither this word nor this idea is in any way whatever applicable to the Deity. Let him point out the maintainer of such a statement, if any from the first creation of man to the present day, whether in foreign or in Greek lands, has ever committed himself to such an utterance; and we will be silent. But no one in the whole history of mankind will be found to have said such a thing, except some madman. For who was ever so reeling from intoxication, who was ever so beside himself with madness or delirium, as to say, in so many words, that generation belongs naturally to the ungenerate God, but that, deprived of this natural condition, He becomes ungenerate instead of generated? But these are the shifts of rhetoric; namely, to escape when they are refuted from the shame of their refutation by means of some supposititious characters. It was in this way that he has apologized for that celebrated Apology of his, transferring as he did the blame for that title to jurymen and accusers, though unable to show that there were any accusers, any trial, or any court at all. Now, too, with the air of one who would correct another's folly, he pretends that he is driven by necessity to speak in this way. This is what his proof of our incurable absurdity, and our simulated and culpable caution, amounts to. But he goes on to say that we do not know what to do in our present position, and that to cover our perplexity we take to abusing him for his worldly learning, while we ourselves claim a monopoly of the teaching of the Holy Spirit. Here is his other dream, namely, that he has got so much of the heathen learning, that he appears by means of it a formidable antagonist to Basil. Just so there have been some men who have imagined themselves enthroned with basilicals, and of an exalted rank, because the deluded vision of their dreams, born of their waking longings, puts such fancies into their hearts. He says that Basil, not knowing what to do after what has been said, abuses him for his worldly learning. He would indeed have set a high value on such abuse, that is, on being thought formidable because of the abundance of his words even by any ordinary hearer, not to mention by Basil, and by men like him (if any are entirely like him, or ever have been). But, as for his intervening argument, if such low scurrility, and such tasteless buffoonery, can be called argument, by which he thinks he impugns our cause, I pass it all over, for I deem it an abominable and ungracious thing to soil our treatise with such pollutions; and I loathe them as men loathe some swollen and noisome ulcer, or turn from the spectacle presented by those whose skin is bloated by excess of humours, and disfigured with tuberous warts. And for a while our argument shall be allowed to expand itself freely, without having to turn to defend itself against men who are ready to scoff at and to tear to pieces everything that is said.

Every term—that is, every true term—is an expression that articulates some movement of thought. And every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed, as far as possible, toward the knowledge and contemplation of some reality. Now the entire world of realities is divided into two parts: the intelligible and the sensible. Regarding sensible phenomena, knowledge is readily available to everyone because perception of them is so immediate; the judgment of the senses leaves no room for doubt about what stands before them. The differences in color and the differences in all the other qualities we judge by hearing, smell, touch, or taste can be known and named by anyone who shares our common humanity. The same applies to all other things that seem more obvious to our understanding—things pertaining to the age we live in, designed for political and moral purposes. But in contemplating the intelligible world, because that world transcends the grasp of the senses, we circle around the object of our search in various ways. Then, according to the idea that arises in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to come as close as possible to the full meaning of the thing we are thinking about through expressive phrases. In this effort, though it is sometimes possible to succeed in both respects—when thought hits the mark and speech interprets the notion with the appropriate word—it may also happen that we fail in both, or at least in one of the two, when either our comprehending faculty or our interpreting capacity misses the proper mark. Since there are two factors that make any term correct—mental precision and verbal expression—the result that gains approval in both ways will certainly be preferable. But it will still be a valuable achievement not to have missed the right conception, even if the word itself happens to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever our thought focuses on those high and unseen things that the senses cannot reach—I mean that divine and unspeakable world about which it is reckless to grasp anything at random in thought, and even more reckless to trust any chance word to represent the conception arising from it—then we turn from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or badly depending on the speaker's mental faculty. Instead, we search for the thought alone that lies within the phrases, to see whether it is sound or not, and we leave the minutiae of phrase and name to be dealt with by the technicalities of grammarians. Now, since we mark with a label only those things we know, and since those things above our knowledge cannot be grasped by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark on something we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases no appropriate term can be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled to use many different names, as opportunity allows, to reveal our conjectures as they arise within us regarding the Deity. But on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence begins from the non-existent and ends in the non-existent), or lastly, we grasp the phenomenon by means of an association of qualities in which dying, suffering, change, alteration, and the like are combined. Recognizing this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His physis, ideas and phrases that express separation from all such conditions. We call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, suffering, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of terms can be organized into whatever system people wish by those who want one, and they can assign to these actual terms other labels—privative, for instance, or negative, or whatever they like. We leave the teaching and learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it. We will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

Every term — every term, that is, which is really such — is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed as far as it is possible to the knowledge and the contemplation of some reality. But then the whole world of realities is divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible. With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account of the perception of them being so near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no doubt about the subject before them. The differences in color, and the differences in all the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of hearing, or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the other things which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension, the things, that is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in the contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the object of our search; and then, according to the idea arising in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often possible to have achieved the task in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets the notion with the appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or the interpreting capacity is carried beside the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by which every term is made a correct term, the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which commands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but it will not be a lesser gain, not to have missed the right conception, even though the word itself may happen to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and unseen things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and unspeakable world with regard to which it is an audacious thing to grasp in thought anything in it at random and more audacious still to trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising from it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or ill according to the mental faculty of the speaker, we search for the thought, and that alone, which is found within the phrases, to see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the minutiæ of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities of grammarians. Now, seeing that we mark with an appellation only those things which we know, and those things which are above our knowledge it is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases there is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by many and differing names, as there may be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent, and ends in the non-existent), or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an association of qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of appellations can be reduced to any system that they like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on these actual appellations other appellations privative, for instance, or negative, or whatever they like. We yield the teaching and the learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it; and we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

If God did not exist previously, or if there will be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning. The same applies to terms like inalterable, incorporeal, or imperishable—if there is any hint of body, destruction, or change with regard to Him. But if it is part of our faith to attribute none of these things to Him, then it is our sacred duty to use privative names—that is, names that deny the things incompatible with His nature—and to say all that we have already listed so many times: that He is imperishable, unending, ungenerate, and the other terms in that category. The meaning inherent in each of these terms only tells us about the absence of what is obvious to our perception, but does not explain the actual physis of the one who is removed from those incompatible conditions. The meaning of these names does point out what the Deity is not, but what that further thing—which is not these things—essentially is, remains unrevealed. Moreover, even the rest of these names, whose meaning does indicate some position or state, do not give us an indication of the Divine physis itself, but only of the results of our reverent thinking about it. When we conclude generally that nothing in existence, whether an object of sense or of thought, comes about spontaneously or by chance, but that everything discoverable in the world is connected to the Being who transcends all existences and in whom it has the source of its continued existence, and we then perceive the beauty and majesty of the wonderful sights in creation, we gain from these and similar signs a new range of thoughts about the Deity. We express each one of the thoughts arising within us with a special name, following the advice of Wisdom, who says that by the greatness and beauty of the creatures, the Maker of them is seen proportionately. We therefore call Him Creator, the one who has made all mortal things, and Almighty, the one who has encompassed so vast a creation, whose might has been able to realize His will. When we perceive the good that is in our own life, we accordingly give the name Good to Him who is our life's first cause. Then, having learned from the Divine writings about the incorruptibility of the judgment to come, we therefore call Him Judge and Just. To sum up in one word: we transfer the thoughts that arise within us about the Divine Being into the form of a corresponding name, so that there is no name given to the Divine Being apart from some distinct understanding about Him. Even the word God (Theos) we understand to have come into usage from the activity of His seeing, for our faith tells us that the Deity is everywhere, sees (theasthai) all things, and penetrates all things. Then we stamp this thought with this name (Theos), guided to it by the Holy Voice. For someone who says, "O God, attend to me," and "Look, O God," and "God knows the secrets of the heart," clearly reveals the hidden meaning of this word—namely, that Theos is so called from theasthai. For there is no difference between saying "Attend to," "Look," and "See." Since, then, the seer must look toward something to be seen, God is rightly called the Seer of that which is to be seen. We are taught, then, by this word one particular operation of the Divine Being, though we do not grasp in thought by means of it His ousia itself, believing nevertheless that the Divine glory suffers no loss because we are at a loss for a naturally appropriate name. For this inability to express such inexpressible things, while it reflects the poverty of our own nature, provides evidence of God's glory, teaching us, in the words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally appropriate to God is to believe Him to be above every name. That He transcends every effort of thought and is far beyond any defining by a name constitutes proof to humanity of His ineffable majesty.

Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning; and so also neither inalterable, nor incorporeal, nor imperishable, if there is any suspicion of body, or destruction, or alteration with regard to Him. But if it be part of our religion to attribute to Him none of these things, then it is a sacred duty to use of Him names privative of the things abhorrent to His Nature, and to say all that we have so often enumerated already, viz. that He is imperishable, and unending, and ungenerate, and the other terms of that class, where the sense inherent in each only informs us of the privation of that which is obvious to our perception, but does not interpret the actual nature of that which is thus removed from those abhorrent conditions. What the Deity is not, the signification of these names does point out; but what that further thing, which is not these things, is essentially, remains undivulged. Moreover, even the rest of these names, the sense of which does indicate some position or some state, do not afford that indication of the Divine nature itself, but only of the results of our reverent speculations about it. For when we have concluded generally that no single thing existing, whether an object of sense or of thought, is formed spontaneously or fortuitously, but that everything discoverable in the world is linked to the Being Who transcends all existences, and possesses there the source of its continuance, and we then perceive the beauty and the majesty of the wonderful sights in creation, we thus get from these and such-like marks a new range of thoughts about the Deity, and interpret each one of the thoughts thus arising within us by a special name, following the advice of Wisdom, who says that by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionately the Maker of them is seen Wisdom 13:5. We address therefore as Creator Him Who has made all mortal things, and as Almighty Him Who has compassed so vast a creation, Whose might has been able to realize His wish. When too we perceive the good that is in our own life, we give in accordance with this the name of Good to Him Who is our life's first cause. Then also having learned from the Divine writings the incorruptibility of the judgment to come, we therefore call Him Judge and Just, and to sum up in one word, we transfer the thoughts that arise within us about the Divine Being into the mould of a corresponding name; so that there is no appellation given to the Divine Being apart from some distinct intuition about Him. Even the word God ( Θεὸς) we understand to have come into usage from the activity of His seeing; for our faith tells us that the Deity is everywhere, and sees ( θεασθαι) all things, and penetrates all things, and then we stamp this thought with this name ( Θεὸς), guided to it by the Holy Voice. For he who says, O God, attend unto me, and, Look, O God, and, God knows the secrets of the heart plainly, reveals the latent meaning of this word, viz. that Θεὸς is so called from θεασθαι. For there is no difference between saying Attend unto, Look, and See. Since, then, the seer must look towards some sight, God is rightly called the Seer of that which is to be seen. We are taught, then, by this word one sectional operation of the Divine Being, though we do not grasp in thought by means of it His substance itself, believing nevertheless that the Divine glory suffers no loss because of our being at a loss for a naturally appropriate name. For this inability to give expression to such unutterable things, while it reflects upon the poverty of our own nature, affords an evidence of God's glory, teaching us as it does, in the words of the Apostle, that the only name naturally appropriate to God is to believe Him to be above every name Philippians 2:9. That he transcends every effort of thought, and is far beyond any circumscribing by a name, constitutes a proof to man of His ineffable majesty.

That's what we can know about the names we use in any way when referring to God. We've offered a straightforward explanation of them, without complicated arguments, for the benefit of readers who come with good intentions. As for Eunomius' weak arguments about these names, we think it would be disgraceful and inappropriate for us to take them seriously enough to refute them. What could anyone say in response to someone who claims that we give more importance to the outward appearance of a name than to the value of what is named, giving names priority over realities and treating unequal things as equal? Those are his actual words. Well, anyone who is able should carefully judge whether this slanderous accusation he makes against us contains anything dangerous enough to make it worthwhile for us to defend ourselves against the charge of giving names priority over realities. After all, it's obvious to everyone that no single name has any substantial reality in itself, but rather every name is simply a marker placed on some reality or concept, having no existence of its own either as a fact or as a thought.

Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, unencumbered with argument, for the benefit of our candid hearers; as for Eunomius' nerveless contentions about these names, we judge it a thing disgraceful and unbecoming to us seriously to confute them. For what could one say in answer to a man who declares that we attach more weight to the outward form of the name than to the value of the thing named, giving to names the prerogative over realities, and equality to things unequal? Such are the words that he gives utterance to. Well, let any one who can do so considerately, judge whether this calumnious charge of his against us has anything in it dangerous enough to make it worth our while to defend ourselves as to our giving to names the prerogative over realities; for it is plain to every one that there is no single name that has in itself any substantial reality, but that every name is but a recognizing mark placed on some reality or some idea, having of itself no existence either as a fact or a thought.

How is it possible to assign one's gifts to what doesn't exist? Let this man, who claims to use words and phrases according to their natural meaning, explain this to his followers. I wouldn't have mentioned this at all, except that it forces me to prove our author's weakness in both thought and expression. As for all the passages from Scripture that he drags in—though they have nothing to do with his point—where he formulates a difference of immortality between angels and humans, I don't know what he's aiming at or what he hopes to prove by them, so I'll pass over them. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits no degrees of more or less based on comparison. For if one thing in the comparison suffers a reduction or loss of its immortality through the force of contrast, then such a thing cannot be called immortal at all. How can something be called absolutely immortal if mortality is detected in it through this comparison and contrast? And consider his hair-splitting: he won't allow the idea of privation to be consistent and universal, but instead claims that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of bad things shouldn't be called by that term. If he gets his way here, he will take the truth from the Apostle's words, which say that He only has immortality, which He gives to others. How this newly introduced dictum of his relates to his preceding argument, neither we nor anyone else among thoughtful people can understand. Yet because we lack the mental strength to grasp these scientific subtleties, he calls us unscientific both in our judgment about objects and in our use of terms—those are his exact words. But I'll pass over all this without further comment, since it has no power to shake the truth. I'll also pass over how he misrepresents our explanation of the imperishable and the unembodied—namely, that the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not found, and the former signifies what is not receptive of destruction. And how he says we don't think it right to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas that don't apply to them, or to imagine that each indicates something not present or not occurring, but rather that they indicate the actual ousia (essence). All this I consider worthy only of silence and deep oblivion, and I leave it to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative prefix doesn't mark the absence of the bad, but that the word under investigation means the ousia itself!

How it is possible, then, to assign one's gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural force, explain to the followers of his error. I would not, however, have mentioned this at all, if it had not placed a necessity upon me of proving our author's weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the passages from the inspired writings which he drags in, though quite unconnected with his object, formulating thereby a difference of immortality in angels and in men, I do not know what he has in his eye, or what he hopes to prove by them, and I pass them by. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits of no degrees of more and less arising from comparison. For if the one member of the comparison is, by the force of contrast, to suffer a diminution or privation as regards its immortality, it must needs be that such a member is not to be called immortal at all; for how can that be called absolutely immortal in which mortality is detected by this juxtaposition and comparison? And to think of that fine hair-splitting of his, in not allowing the idea of privation to be unvarying and general, but in asserting, on the contrary, that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of bad things is not to be marked by that term! If he is to get his way here, he will take the truth from the Apostle's words, which say that He only has immortality 1 Timothy 6:16, which He gives to others. What this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his preceding argument, neither we nor any one else among reflecting people are able to understand. Yet because we have not the mental strength to take in these scientific subtleties, he calls us unscientific both in our judgment as to objects, and in our use of terms; those are his very words. But all this, as having no power to shake the truth, I pass over without further notice; and also how he misrepresents the view we have expounded of the imperishable, and of the unembodied, namely, that of these terms the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not to be found, and the former signifies that which is not receptive of destruction: and also how he says, that we do not think it right to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas inapplicable to them, or to imagine that each of them is indicative of something not present or not accruing; but rather we think they are indicative of the actual essence; all this I deem worthy only of silence and deep oblivion, and leave to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative sign does not mark the absence of the bad, but that the word which is the subject of our inquiry means the essence itself!

Well, if this creator of an empty system doesn't consider the term imperishable or indestructible to be privative of destruction, then it necessarily follows that this word form indicates the exact opposite of the privation of destruction. That is, if indestructibility is not the negation of destruction, it must be the assertion of something contradictory to itself, because it is the very nature of opposites that when you remove one, you allow the other to take its place. But as for the tedious task he forces upon us of proving that the Deity cannot experience death—as if anyone held the opposite view—we leave that aside. For we hold that in the case of opposites, it makes no difference whether we say that something is A, or that it is not the opposite of A. For instance, in the present discussion, when we have said that God is Life, we implicitly rule out by this assertion any thought of death in connection with Him, even though we don't say this explicitly. And when we assert that He cannot experience death, we at the same time show Him to be Life.

Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern necessity it must follow that this shape given to the word indicates the very reverse (of the privation of destruction). If, that is, indestructibility is not the negation of destruction, it must be the assertion of something incongruous with itself; for it is the very nature of opposites that, when you take away the one, you admit the other to come in in its place. But as for the bitter task which he necessitates of proving that the Deity is unreceptive of death, as if there existed any one who held the contrary opinion, we leave it to take care of itself. For we hold that in the case of opposites, it makes no difference at all whether we say that something is A, or that it is not the opposite of A; for instance, in the present discussion, when we have said that God is Life, we implicitly forbid by this assertion the thought of death in connection with Him, even though we do not express this in speech; and when we assert that He is unreceptive of death, we in the same breath show Him to be Life.

But I do not see, he objects, how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of things that do not belong to Him. And based on this clever argument, he calls it a union of folly and profanity that our great Basil has dared to use such terms. But I would advise him not to indulge too freely in mockery against those who use these terms, or he might unconsciously be heaping insults on himself at the same time. For I think that he himself would not deny that the very greatness of the Divine Nature is recognized precisely in this: in the absence of any participation in those things that the lower natures are shown to possess. For if God were involved in any of these characteristics, He would not possess His superiority, but would be completely identified with any individual among the beings who share that characteristic. But if He is above such things precisely because He does not possess them, then He also stands above those who do possess them—just as we say that the Sinless is superior to those in sin. The fact of being removed from evil is evidence of abounding in the best. But let him heap these insults on us to his heart's content. We will only remark, in passing, on a single one of the points mentioned under this heading, and will then return to the discussion of the main question.

But I do not see, he rejoins, how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him. And on the strength of this clever sally he calls it a union of folly and profanity, that our great Basil has ventured on such terms. But I would counsel him not to indulge his ribaldry too freely against those who use these terms, lest he should be unconsciously at the same moment heaping insults on himself. For I think that he himself would not gainsay that the very grandeur of the Divine Nature is recognized in this, viz. in the absence of all participation in those things which the lower natures are shown to possess. For if God were involved in any of these peculiarities, He would not possess His superiority, but would be quite identified with any single individual among the beings who share that peculiarity. But if He is above such things, by reason, in fact, of His not possessing them, then He stands also above those who do possess them; just as we say that the Sinless is superior to those in sin. The fact of being removed from evil is an evidence of abounding in the best. But let him heap these insults on us to his heart's content. We will only remark, in passing, on a single one of the points mentioned under this head, and will then return to the discussion of the main question.

He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, and generated beings as ungenerate, all to the same degree. Isn't it clear to everyone what this blasphemy from this fighter against God is trying to prove? Or must we expose this profanity through careful argument? Everyone knows the principle that things separated by the same distance from something else are equal to one another. So if the destructible and the generated are surpassed by the same amount by the Deity, and if our Lord is generated, then Eunomius must draw the blasphemous conclusion that follows from these premises. It's clear he treats generation as the same thing as destruction and death, just as in his earlier arguments he declares that the ungenerate is the same thing as the indestructible. So if he views destruction and generation as being on the same level, and claims that the Deity is equally distant from both of them, and if our Lord is generated, let no one ask us to spell out the logical conclusion—let him draw it himself. This is the result if it's true, as he says, that God is equally removed from both the generated and the destructible. But he goes on to say that we cannot call Him indestructible and immortal based on any absence of death and destruction. Let those who are easily led and follow whatever each new teacher tells them believe this, and let them declare that destruction and death do belong to God in order to make it possible to call Him immortal and indestructible! If these negative terms, as Eunomius says, don't indicate the absence of death and destruction, then his treatment of these terms most certainly proves that their opposites—things alien to immortality and indestructibility—are present in Him. Everything we can conceive of is either absent from something else or not absent: for example, light and darkness, life and death, health and disease, and so on. In all these cases, if someone asserts that one concept is absent, he necessarily demonstrates that the other is present. So if Eunomius denies that God can be called immortal because of the absence of death, he will clearly prove the presence of death in Him, and thus deny any immortality in the universal Deity. Perhaps someone will say we're being unfair to his words, since no one is mad enough to claim that God is not immortal. But when no one knows what certain people secretly think, we have to judge those hidden thoughts by their words.

He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degree. Is it not, then, plain to all what this blasphemy of a fighter against God would prove? Or must we by verbal demonstration unveil the profanity? Well, who does not know the axiom, that things which are distanced to the same amount (by something else) are level with one another? If, then, the destructible and the generated are surpassed in the same degree by the Deity, and if our Lord is generated, it will be for Eunomius to draw the blasphemous conclusion resulting from these data. For it is clear that he regards generation as the same thing as destruction and death, just as in his previous discussions he declares the ungenerate to be the same thing as the indestructible. If, then, he looks upon destruction and generation as upon the same level, and asserts that the Deity is equally removed from both of them, and if our Lord is generated, let no one demand from ourselves that we should apply the logical conclusion, but let him draw it for himself; if indeed it is true, as he says, that from the generated and from the destructible God is equally removed. But, he proceeds, it is not allowable for us to call Him indestructible and immortal by virtue of any absence of death and destruction. Let those who are led by the nose, and turn in any direction that each successive teacher pleases, believe this, and let them declare that destruction and death do belong to God, to make it possible for Him to be called immortal and indestructible! For if these terms of privation, as Eunomius says, do not indicate the absence of death and destruction, then the presence in Him of the things opposite to, and estranged from, these is most certainly proved by this treatment of terms. Each one among conceivable things is either absent from something else, or it is not absent: for instance, light, darkness; life, death; health, disease, and so on. In all these cases, if one asserts that the one conception is absent, he will necessarily demonstrate that the other is present. If, then, Eunomius denies that God can be called immortal by reason of the absence of death, he will plainly prove the presence of death in Him, and so deny any immortality in the case of the universal Deity. But perhaps some one will say that we fix unfairly on his words; for that no one is so mad as to affirm that God is not immortal. But then, when none of mankind possess any knowledge of that which certain people secretly imagine, it is by their words that we have to make our guess about those secret things.

Therefore let us examine this statement of his again: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How are we to accept this claim—that death is not absent from the Deity though He is called immortal? If he really commands us to think this way, Eunomius' God will certainly be mortal and subject to destruction, for one from whom death is not absent is not immortal in his ousia. But again, if these terms do not signify the absence of death or destruction, then either they are applied falsely to God overall, or they contain some different meaning within themselves. What this meaning is, our system-maker must explain to us. We, on the other hand—the people who according to Eunomius are unscientific in our judgment of things and in our use of terms—have been taught to call someone sound (for instance) not when strength is absent from him, but when disease is absent from him; and unmutilated not when he stays away from drinking-parties, but when he has no mutilation upon him. We name other qualities in the same way, based on the presence or absence of something: manly and unmanly, for instance; sleepy and sleepless; and all other such terms that custom approves.

Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How are we to accept this statement, that death is not absent from the Deity though He be called immortal? If he really commands us to think like this, Eunomius' God will be certainly mortal, and subject to destruction; for he from whom death is not absent is not in his essence immortal. But again; if these terms signify the absence neither of death nor of destruction, either they are applied falsely to the God overall, or else they comprise within themselves some different meaning. What this meaning is, our system-maker must explain to us. Whereas we, the people who according to Eunomius are unscientific in our judgment of objects and in our use of terms, have been taught to call sound (for instance), not the man from whom strength is absent, but the man from whom disease is absent; and unmutilated, not the man who keeps away from drinking-parties, but the man who has no mutilation upon him; and other qualities in the same way we name from the presence or the absence of something; manly, for instance, and unmanly; sleepy and sleepless; and all the other terms like that, which custom sanctions.

So let me return to this claim of his: God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death. How should we accept this statement—that death is not absent from the Deity even though He is called immortal? If he really commands us to think this way, Eunomius' God will certainly be mortal and subject to destruction. For one from whom death is not absent is not immortal in his ousia.

Still, I cannot see what profit there is in bothering to examine such nonsense. For someone like me, who has lived to gray hairs and whose eyes are fixed on truth alone, to take upon his lips the absurd and flippant utterances of a contentious opponent, risks bringing no small condemnation on himself. I will therefore pass over both those words and the adjoining passage—for instance, this: "Truth gives no evidence of any union of natures with God." Well, if these words had not been spoken, who ever was there (except yourself) who mentioned a double physis in the Deity at all? You, however, connect each idea of each name with the ousia of the Father, and deny that anything externally accrues to Him, centering every one of His names in that ousia. Again: "Neither does she write in the statute-book of our religion any idea that is external and fabricated by ourselves." Regarding these words again, I shall make clear that I have not quoted them to amuse the reader with their absurdity. Rather, I have done so to show with what a slender supply of arguments this man, after criticizing us for our lack of system, proceeds to take these audacious liberties with the name of Truth. What is he in reasoning, and what is he in speech, that he should revel in showing himself off before his hidebound readers, who applaud him as victorious over everybody by force of argument when he has brought these disjointed utterances of his dry bombastic jargon to an end? "Immortality," he says, "is the ousia itself." But what, then, do you assert to be the ousia of the Only-begotten? I ask you that: is it immortality, or is it not? For remember that in His ousia also the singleness admits, as you say, of no complexity of physis. If, then, Eunomius denies that immortality is the ousia of the Son, it is clear what he is aiming at. For it does not require an exceedingly penetrating understanding to discover what is the direct opposite to the immortal. Just as the logic of dichotomy exhibits the destructible instead of the indestructible, and the mutable instead of the immutable, so it exhibits the mortal instead of the immortal. What, therefore, will this setter forth of new doctrine do? What proper name will he give us for the ousia of the Only-begotten? Again I put this question to our author. He must either grant that it is immortality, or deny it. If, then, he will not agree that it is immortality, he must agree to the contradictory proposition: by denying the superior term he proves that it is death. If, on the other hand, he shrinks from anything so monstrous and names the ousia of the Only-begotten also as immortality, he must necessarily agree with us that there is consequently no difference whatever in ousia between them. If the physis of the Father and the physis of the Son are equally immortality, and if immortality does not divide itself by any manner of difference, then it is confessed by our foes themselves that on the score of ousia no manner of difference is discoverable between the Father and the Son.

Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs, and whose eyes are fixed on truth alone, to take upon his lips the absurd and flippant utterances of a contentious foe, incurs no slight danger of bringing condemnation on himself. I will therefore pass over both those words and the adjoining passage; this, for instance, Truth gives no evidence of any union of natures with God. Well, if these words had not been spoken, who ever was there (except yourself) who mentioned a double nature in the Deity at all? You, however, unite each idea of each name with the essence of the Father, and deny that anything externally accrues to Him, centering every one of His names in that essence. Again, Neither does she write in the statute-book of our religion any idea that is external and fabricated by ourselves. With regard to these words again I shall deprecate the idea that I have quoted them with a view of amusing the reader with their absurdity; rather I have done so with a view to show with what a slender equipment of arguments this man, after rating us for our want of system, advances to take these audacious liberties with the name of Truth. What is he in reasoning, and what is he in speech, that he should thus revel in showing himself off before his hidebound readers, who applaud him as victorious over everybody by force of argument when he has brought these disjointed utterances of his dry bombastic jargon to an end. Immortality, he says, is the essence itself. But what, then, do you assert to be the essence of the Only-begotten? I ask you that: is it immortality, or is it not? For remember that in His essence also the singleness admits, as you say, of no complexity of nature. If, then Eunomius denies that immortality is the essence of the Son, it is clear what he is aiming at; for it does not require an exceedingly penetrating understanding to discover what is the direct opposite to the immortal. Just as the logic of dichotomy exhibits the destructible instead of the indestructible, and the mutable instead of the immutable, so it exhibits the mortal instead of the immortal. What, therefore, will this setter forth of new doctrine do? What proper name will he give us for the essence of the Only-begotten? Again I put this question to our author. He must either grant that it is immortality, or deny it. If, then, he will not assent to its being immortality, he must assent to the contradictory proposition; by negativing the superior term he proves that it is death. If, on the other hand, he shrinks from anything so monstrous, and names the essence of the Only-begotten also as immortality, he must perforce agree with us that there is in consequence no difference whatever, as to essence, between them. If the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son are equally immortality, and if immortality does not divide itself by any manner of difference, then it is confessed by our foes themselves, that on the score of essence no manner of difference is discoverable between the Father and the Son.

But it is time now to expose the angry accusation he brings against us at the end of his treatise, claiming that we say the Father comes from what is absolutely non-existent. He steals an expression from its context, tearing it away as if from its surrounding body into naked isolation, and tries to criticize it by attacking the word, or rather covering it with the foam of his maddened teeth. I will therefore first give the meaning of the passage in which our teacher explained this point to us, then I will quote it word for word. By doing this, the man who intrudes upon the explanatory work of orthodox writers only to undermine the truth itself will be revealed in his true colors. Our teacher, in introducing us in his own treatise to the true meaning of ungenerate, suggested a way to arrive at real knowledge of the disputed term somewhat as follows, pointing out at the same time that it had a meaning very far removed from any idea of ousia (essence). He says that the Evangelist, in beginning our Lord's genealogy according to the flesh from Joseph and then going back through the generations one after another, and then ending the genealogy with Adam, and because there was no earthly father before this first-formed creature, saying that he was the son of God, makes it clear to every reader's understanding with regard to the Deity that He from whom Adam came does not Himself have His existence from another, in the same way as the human lives just described. When, having passed through the whole genealogy, we finally grasp the thought of the Deity, we perceive at the same moment the First Cause of it all. But if any such cause is found depending on something else, then it is not a first cause. Therefore, if God is the First Cause of the universe, there will be nothing whatever beyond this cause of all things. Such was our teacher's explanation of the meaning of ungenerate, and so that our testimony about it may not go beyond the exact truth, I will quote the passage.

But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be from what is absolutely non-existent. Stealing an expression from its context, from which he drags it, as from its surrounding body, into a naked isolation, he tries to carp at it by worrying the word, or rather covering it with the slaver of his maddened teeth. I will therefore first give the meaning of the passage in which our Master explained this point to us; then I will quote it word for word: by so doing the man who intrudes upon the expository work of orthodox writers, only to undermine the truth itself, will be revealed in his true colors. Our Master, in introducing us in his own treatise to the true meaning of ungenerate, suggested a way to arrive at a real knowledge of the term in dispute somewhat as follows, pointing out at the same time that it had a meaning very far removed from any idea of essence. He says that the Evangelist, in beginning our Lord's lineage according to the flesh from Joseph, and then going back to the generation continually preceding, and then ending the genealogy in Adam, and, because there was no earthly father anterior to this first-formed creature, saying that he was the son of God, makes it obvious to every reader's intelligence with regard to the Deity, that He, from Whom Adam was, has not Himself His subsistence from another, after the likeness of the human lives just given. When, having passed through the whole of it, we at last grasp the thought of the Deity, we perceive at the same moment the First Cause of it all. But if any such cause be found dependent on something else, then it is not a first cause. Therefore, if God is the First Cause of the Universe, there will be nothing whatever transcending this cause of all things. Such was our Master's exposition of the meaning of ungenerate; and in order that our testimony about it may not go beyond the exact truth, I will quote the passage.

The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Savior Jesus Christ, and moving from the last to the first, begins with Joseph, saying that he was 'the son of Heli, who was the son of Matthat,' and continues ascending until his list reaches Adam. But when he comes to the end and says that Seth 'was the son of Adam, who was the son of God,' he stops there. Since he has said that Adam was the son of God, we will ask these men, 'But God, whose son is He?' Isn't it obvious to everyone's understanding that God is no one's son? But to be no one's son is to be without a cause, clearly; and to be without a cause is to be ungenerate. Now in the case of human beings, being someone's son is not the ousia. Likewise, in the case of the Deity who rules the world, it is not possible to say that being ungenerate is the ousia.

The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first, begins with Joseph, saying that he was 'the son of Heli, which was the son of Matthat,' and so by ascending brings his enumeration up to Adam; but when he has come to the top and said, that Seth 'was the son of Adam, which was the son of God,' then he stops this process. As, then, he has said that Adam was the son of God, we will ask these men, 'But God, who is He the son of?' Is it not obvious to every one's intelligence that God is the son of no one? But to be the son of no one is to be without a cause, plainly; and to be without a cause is to be ungenerate. Now in the case of men, the being son of somebody is not the essence; no more, in the case of the Deity Who rules the world, is it possible to say that the being ungenerate is the essence.

With what eyes will you now dare to look at your guide? I am speaking to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who has erected such a monument to his shamelessness in argument? Are you not ashamed now, if not before, to take the hand of a man like this to lead you to the truth? Do you not regard it as a sign of his doctrinal madness that he so shamelessly stands against the truth contained in Scripture? Is this the way to champion the truth of doctrine—namely, to accuse Basil of deriving the God over all from that which has absolutely no existence? Should I tell you how he phrases it? Should I transcribe the very words of his shamelessness? I pass over their insolence; I do not blame their invective, for I do not censure someone whose breath smells bad because it smells bad, or someone who has bodily mutilation because he is mutilated. Such things are the misfortunes of nature; they escape blame from those who can reflect. This strength of vituperation, then, is infirmity in reasoning; it is an affliction of a soul whose powers of sound argument are damaged. No word from me, then, about his invectives. But as to that syllogism, with its supposedly strong and irrefutable structure, in whose conclusion, to achieve his beloved object, he arrives at this accusation against us, I will write it out in its own precise words. We will allow him to say that the Son exists by participation in the self-existent; but instead of this, he has unconsciously affirmed that the God over all comes from absolute nonentity. For if the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. To which of these statements should we first direct our attention? Should we criticize his opinion about the Son existing by participation in the Deity, and his bespattering with the filth of his tongue those who will not agree with it; or should we examine the sophism so coldly constructed from the stuff of dreams? However, everyone who possesses a spark of practical wisdom is aware that it is only poets and makers of mythology who produce sons by participation from the Divine Being. Those who string together the myths in their poems fabricate a Dionysus, or a Hercules, or a Minos, and such figures, out of the combination of the superhuman with human bodies; and they exalt such personages above the rest of humanity, representing them as more highly esteemed because of their participation in a superior nature. Therefore, with regard to this opinion of his, carrying as it does within itself the evidence of its own folly and profanity, it is best to be silent; and to repeat instead that irrefutable syllogism of his, in order that every poor ignoramus on our side may understand what and how many are the advantages which those who are not trained in his technical methods are deprived of. He says, If the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. He brandishes this Aristotelian weapon over us, but who has yet conceded to him that to say that anyone has no father amounts to saying that he has been generated from absolute nonentity? He who enumerates those persons whose line is recorded in Scripture is plainly thinking of a father preceding each person mentioned. For what relation is Heli to Joseph? What relation is Matthat to Heli? And what relation is Adam to Seth? Is it not plain to a mere child that this catalogue of names is a list of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, Adam must be the father of one thus born from him; and so tell me, who is the father of the Deity Who is over all? Come, answer this question, open your lips and speak, exert all your skill in expression to meet such an inquiry. Can you discover any expression that will escape the grasp of your own syllogism? Who is the father of the Ungenerate? Can you say? If you can, then He is not ungenerate. Pressed thus, you will say what necessity indeed compels you to say—No one is. Well, my dear sir, do you not yet find the weak seams of your sophism giving way? Do you not perceive that you have drooled upon your own lap? What does our great Basil say? That the Ungenerate One is from no father. For the conclusion to be drawn from the mention of fathers in the preceding genealogy permits the word father, even in the silence of the evangelist, to be added to this confession of faith. Whereas you have transformed no one into nothing at all, and again nothing at all into absolute nonentity, thereby concocting that fallacious syllogism of yours. Accordingly this clever result of professional shrewdness shall be turned against yourself. I ask, Who is the father of the Ungenerate One? No one, you will be obliged to answer; for the Ungenerate One cannot have a father. Then, if no one is the father of the Ungenerate, and you have changed no one into nothing at all, and nothing at all is, according to your argument, the same as absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is, as you say, perfectly legitimate, then the man (that is, you) who says that no one is the father of the Ungenerate One says that the Deity Who is over all comes from absolute nonentity!

With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who has reared such a monument as this of his shamelessness in argument? Are ye not ashamed now, at least, if not before, to take the hand of a man like this to lead you to the truth? Do ye not regard it as a sign of his madness as to doctrine, that he thus shamelessly stands out against the truth contained in Scripture? Is this the way to play the champion of the truth of doctrine — namely, to accuse Basil of deriving the God over all from that which has absolutely no existence? Am I to tell the way he phrases it? Am I to transcribe the very words of his shamelessness? I let the insolence of them pass; I do not blame their invective, for I do not censure one whose breath is of bad odour, because it is of bad odour; or one who has bodily mutilation, because he is mutilated. Things such as that are the misfortunes of nature; they escape blame from those who can reflect. This strength of vituperation, then, is infirmity in reasoning; it is an affliction of a soul whose powers of sound argument are marred. No word from me, then, about his invectives. But as to that syllogism, with its stout irrefragable folds, in whose conclusion, to effect his darling object, he arrives at this accusation against us, I will write it out in its own precise words. We will allow him to say that the Son exists by participation in the self-existent; but (instead of this), he has unconsciously affirmed that the God over all comes from absolute nonentity. For if the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing says that He comes from nonentity. To which of these statements shall we first direct our attention? Shall we criticize his opinion about the Son existing by participation in the Deity, and his bespattering those who will not acquiesce in it with the foulness of his tongue; or shall we examine the sophism so frigidly constructed from the stuff of dreams? However, every one who possesses a spark of practical sagacity is not unaware that it is only poets and moulders of mythology who father sons by participation upon the Divine Being. Those, that is, who string together the myths in their poems, fabricate a Dionysus, or a Hercules, or a Minos, and such-like, out of the combination of the superhuman with human bodies; and they exalt such personages above the rest of mankind, representing them as of greater estimation because of their participation in a superior nature. Therefore, with regard to this opinion of his, carrying as it does within itself the evidence of its own folly and profanity, it is best to be silent; and to repeat instead that irrefragable syllogism of his, in order that every poor ignoramus on our side may understand what and how many are the advantages which those who are not trained in his technical methods are deprived of. He says, If the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate, then the man who says that God comes from nothing, says that He comes from nonentity. He brandishes over us this Aristotelian weapon, but who has yet conceded to him, that to say that any one has no father amounts to saying that he has been generated from absolute nonentity? He who enumerates those persons whose line is recorded in Scripture is plainly thinking of a father preceding each person mentioned. For what relation is Heli to Joseph? What relation is Matthat to Heli? And what relation is Adam to Seth? Is it not plain to a mere child that this catalogue of names is a list of fathers? For if Seth is the son of Adam, Adam must be the father of one thus born from him; and so tell me, who is the father of the Deity Who is over all? Come, answer this question, open your lips and speak, exert all your skill in expression to meet such an inquiry. Can you discover any expression that will elude the grasp of your own syllogism? Who is the father of the Ungenerate? Can you say? If you can, then He is not ungenerate. Pressed thus, you will say, what indeed necessity compels you to say — No one is. Well, my dear sir, do you not yet find the weak seams of your sophism giving way? Do you not perceive that you have slavered upon your own lap? What says our great Basil? That the Ungenerate One is from no father. For the conclusion to be drawn from the mention of fathers in the preceding genealogy permits the word father, even in the silence of the evangelist, to be added to this confession of faith. Whereas, you have transformed no one into nothing at all, and again nothing at all into absolute nonentity, thereby concocting that fallacious syllogism of yours. Accordingly this clever result of professional shrewdness shall be turned against yourself. I ask, Who is the father of the Ungenerate One? No one, you will be obliged to answer; for the Ungenerate One cannot have a father. Then, if no one is the father of the Ungenerate, and you have changed no one into nothing at all, and nothing at all is, according to your argument, the same as absolute nonentity, and the transposition of equivalents is, as you say, perfectly legitimate, then the man ( i.e. you) who says that no one is the father of the Ungenerate One, says that the Deity Who is over all comes from absolute nonentity!

Such, to use your own words, is the evil—as one might expect—not of valuing the reputation for being clever before one actually is clever (for perhaps this does not amount to a very great misfortune), but of not knowing oneself, and how great the distance is between the soaring Basil and a grovelling reptile. For if those eyes of his, with their divine insight, still looked upon this world, if he still swept over mankind now living on the wings of his wisdom, he would have shown you with the swooping rush of his words how frail is that native shell of folly in which you are enclosed, how great is the one whom you oppose with your errors, while with insults and accusations hurled at him you are hunting for a reputation among decrepit and despicable creatures. Still, you need not give up all hope of feeling that great man's talons. For this work of ours, while it will be a great thing for it to be judged even a fraction of one such talon when compared with his, has, as regards yours, ability enough to have broken through the outer crust of your heresy and to have exposed the deformity that hides within.

Such, to use your own words, is the evil, as one might expect, not indeed of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such (for perhaps this does not amount to a very great misfortune), but of not knowing oneself, and how great the distance is between the soaring Basil and a grovelling reptile. For if those eyes of his, with their divine penetration, still looked on this world, if he still swept over mankind now living on the pinions of his wisdom, he would have shown you with the swooping rush of his words, how frail is that native shell of folly in which you are encased, how great is he whom you oppose with your errors, while, with insults and invectives hurled at him, you are hunting for a reputation among decrepit and despicable creatures. Still you need not give up all hope of feeling that great man's talons. For this work of ours, while, as compared with his, it will be a great thing for it to be judged the fraction of one such talon, has, as regards yours, ability enough to have broken asunder the outside crust of your heresy, and to have detected the deformity that hides within.