Against Eunomius — Book VII

Since Eunomius claims that the word Lord refers to the ousia and not to the dignity of the Only-begotten, and he cites the Apostle as a witness to this view when he says to the Corinthians, Now the Lord is the Spirit (2 Corinthians 3:17), it may be appropriate that we should not pass over even this error on his part without correction. He claims that the word Lord signifies ousia, and as proof of this assumption he brings up the passage mentioned above. The Lord, it says, is the Spirit (2 Corinthians 3:17). But our friend who interprets Scripture according to his own preference calls Lordship by the name of ousia, and thinks he can prove his statement by means of the words quoted. Well, if Paul had said, Now the Lord is ousia, we too would have agreed with his argument. But since the inspired writing on one side says, the Lord is the Spirit, and Eunomius says on the other side, Lordship is ousia, I do not know where he finds support for his statement, unless he is prepared to say again that the word Spirit stands in Scripture for ousia. Let us consider, then, whether the Apostle anywhere, in his use of the term Spirit, employs that word to indicate ousia. He says, The Spirit itself bears witness with our Spirit (Romans 8:16), and no one knows the things of a man except the Spirit of man which is in him (1 Corinthians 2:11), and the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life (2 Corinthians 3:6), and if you through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, you shall live (Romans 8:13), and if we live in the Spirit let us also walk in the Spirit (Galatians 5:25). Who indeed could count all the Apostle's statements on this point? And in them we nowhere find ousia signified by this word. For whoever says that the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit signifies nothing other than the Holy Spirit which comes to be in the mind of the faithful; for in many other passages of his writings he gives the name of spirit to the mind, by which the recipients, through receiving communion with the Spirit, attain the dignity of adoption. Again, in the passage, No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of man which is in him, if man refers to the ousia, and spirit likewise, it will follow from the phrase that the man is maintained to be of two ousiai. Again, I do not know how someone who says that the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, sets ousia in opposition to letter; nor, again, how this writer imagines that when Paul says that we ought through the Spirit to destroy the deeds of the body, he is directing the meaning of spirit to express ousia; while as for living in the Spirit, and walking in the Spirit, this would be quite unintelligible if the sense of the word Spirit referred to ousia. For in what other than in ousia do all we who are alive partake of life? Thus when the Apostle is laying down advice for us on this matter that we should live in ousia, it is as though he said partake of life by means of yourselves, and not by means of others. If then it is not possible that this sense can be adopted in any passage, how can Eunomius here once more imitate the interpreters of dreams, and tell us to take spirit for ousia, so that he may arrive in proper syllogistic form at his conclusion that the word Lord is applied to the ousia? For if spirit is ousia (he argues), and the Lord is Spirit, the Lord is clearly found to be ousia. How undeniable is the force of this attempt! How can we evade or resolve this irrefutable necessity of demonstration? The word Lord, he says, is spoken of the ousia. How does he maintain it? Because the Apostle says, The Lord is the Spirit. Well, what does this have to do with ousia? He gives us the further instruction that spirit is put for ousia. These are the techniques of his demonstrative method! These are the results of his Aristotelian science! This is why, in your view, we are so much to be pitied, who are uninitiated in this wisdom! And you of course are to be deemed happy, who track out the truth by a method like this—that the Apostle's meaning was such that we are to suppose the Spirit was put by him for the ousia of the Only-begotten!

Since, however, Eunomius asserts that the word Lord is used in reference to the essence and not to the dignity of the Only-begotten, and cites as a witness to this view the Apostle, when he says to the Corinthians, Now the Lord is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:17, it may perhaps be opportune that we should not pass over even this error on his part without correction. He asserts that the word Lord is significative of essence, and by way of proof of this assumption he brings up the passage above mentioned. The Lord, it says, is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:17. But our friend who interprets Scripture at his own sweet will calls Lordship by the name of essence, and thinks to bring his statement to proof by means of the words quoted. Well, if it had been said by Paul, Now the Lord is essence, we too would have concurred in his argument. But seeing that the inspired writing on the one side says, the Lord is the Spirit, and Eunomius says on the other, Lordship is essence, I do not know where he finds support for his statement, unless he is prepared to say again that the word Spirit stands in Scripture for essence. Let us consider, then, whether the Apostle anywhere, in his use of the term Spirit, employs that word to indicate essence. He says, The Spirit itself bears witness with our Spirit Romans 8:16, and no one knows the things of a man save the Spirit of man which is in him 1 Corinthians 2:11, and the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life 2 Corinthians 3:6, and if you through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, you shall live Romans 8:13, and if we live in the Spirit let us also walk in the Spirit Galatians 5:25. Who indeed could count the utterances of the Apostle on this point? And in them we nowhere find essence signified by this word. For he who says that the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit, signifies nothing else than the Holy Spirit Which comes to be in the mind of the faithful; for in many other passages of his writings he gives the name of spirit to the mind, on the reception by which of the communion of the Spirit the recipients attain the dignity of adoption. Again, in the passage, No one knows the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him, if man is used of the essence, and spirit likewise, it will follow from the phrase that the man is maintained to be of two essences. Again, I know not how he who says that the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, sets essence in opposition to letter; nor, again, how this writer imagines that when Paul says that we ought through the Spirit to destroy the deeds of the body, he is directing the signification of spirit to express essence; while as for living in the Spirit, and walking in the Spirit, this would be quite unintelligible if the sense of the word Spirit referred to essence. For in what else than in essence do all we who are alive partake of life?– thus when the Apostle is laying down advice for us on this matter that we should live in essence, it is as though he said partake of life by means of yourselves, and not by means of others. If then it is not possible that this sense can be adopted in any passage, how can Eunomius here once more imitate the interpreters of dreams, and bid us to take spirit for essence, to the end that he may arrive in due syllogistic form at his conclusion that the word Lord is applied to the essence?– for if spirit is essence (he argues), and the Lord is Spirit, the Lord is clearly found to be essence. How incontestable is the force of this attempt! How can we evade or resolve this irrefragable necessity of demonstration? The word Lord, he says, is spoken of the essence. How does he maintain it? Because the Apostle says, The Lord is the Spirit. Well, what has this to do with essence? He gives us the further instruction that spirit is put for essence. These are the arts of his demonstrative method! These are the results of his Aristotelian science! This is why, in your view, we are so much to be pitied, who are uninitiated in this wisdom! And you of course are to be deemed happy, who track out the truth by a method like this — that the Apostle's meaning was such that we are to suppose the Spirit was put by him for the Essence of the Only-begotten!

But how will you make sense of what comes next? When Paul says, "Now the Lord is the Spirit," he continues by saying, "and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." So if the Lord is the Spirit, and Spirit means ousia, what are we supposed to understand by the ousia of the ousia? He speaks of another Spirit of the Lord who is the Spirit—that is, according to your interpretation, of another ousia. Therefore in your view, when the Apostle writes specifically about the Lord the Spirit and about the Spirit of the Lord, he means nothing other than an ousia of an ousia. Well, let Eunomius make whatever he wants of what is written. What we understand is this: Scripture, given by the inspiration of God as the Apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit, and its purpose is the benefit of humanity. For "every scripture is given by inspiration of God and is profitable," and the benefit is varied and multifaceted, as the Apostle says—"for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." However, such a blessing is not within reach for just anyone to grasp. Rather, the divine meaning lies hidden beneath the body of Scripture, as if under a veil, with some legislative rule or historical narrative covering the truths that are understood by the mind. For this reason, the Apostle tells us that those who look at the body of Scripture have a veil over their heart and cannot see the glory of the spiritual law, being blocked by the veil cast over the face of the lawgiver. Therefore he says, "the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life," showing that often the plain interpretation, if not understood in the proper sense, has an effect opposite to the life indicated by the Spirit. The Spirit sets before all people the perfection of virtue free from passion, while the historical content in the writings sometimes includes accounts even of inappropriate events and is understood, so to speak, to align with the passions of our nature. If anyone follows these according to the plain sense, he will make Scripture a teaching of death. Accordingly, he says the veil is cast over the perceptive faculties of the souls of those who handle what is written in too literal a way. But for those who turn their contemplation toward what is grasped by the intellect, the glory underlying the letter is revealed, stripped bare of its mask, as it were. And what is discovered by this more elevated perception, he says, is the Lord, which is the Spirit. He says, "when it turns to the Lord the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is the Spirit." In saying this, he draws a contrasting distinction between the lordship of the Spirit and the bondage of the letter. Just as what gives life is opposed to what kills, so he contrasts the Lord with bondage. And so we won't be confused when we are taught about the Holy Spirit (being led by the word "Lord" to think of the Only-begotten), he protects the meaning by repetition, both saying that the Lord is the Spirit and making further mention of the Spirit of the Lord. This shows the supremacy of his nature through the honor implied in lordship, while at the same time avoiding confusion in his argument about the distinctness of his hypostasis. For he who calls him both Lord and Spirit of the Lord teaches us to conceive of him as a distinct individual besides the Only-begotten, just as elsewhere he speaks of the Spirit of Christ, using appropriately and in its mystical sense this very term which is devoutly employed in the system of teaching according to gospel tradition. Thus we, the most miserable of all people, being led forward by the Apostle in these mysteries, pass from the letter that kills to the Spirit that gives life, learning from him who was in Paradise and initiated into unspeakable mysteries that everything divine Scripture says consists of utterances of the Holy Spirit. "For the Holy Spirit prophesied well"—he says this to the Jews in Rome, introducing the words of Isaiah. And to the Hebrews, citing the authority of the Holy Spirit with the words "Therefore as the Holy Spirit says," he introduces the words of the Psalm which are spoken at length in the person of God. And from the Lord himself we learn the same thing—that David declared the heavenly mysteries not in himself (that is, not speaking according to human nature). For how could anyone, being only human, know the supercelestial conversation of the Father with the Son? But being in the Spirit, he said that the Lord spoke to the Lord those words which he uttered. For "if," he says, "David in the Spirit calls him Lord, how is he then his son?" Thus it is by the power of the Spirit that the holy men under divine influence are inspired, and every Scripture is for this reason said to be given by inspiration of God, because it is the teaching of the divine breath. If the bodily veil of the words were removed, what remains is Lord and life and Spirit, according to the teaching of the great Paul and according to the words of the gospel as well. For Paul declares that whoever turns from the letter to the Spirit no longer grasps the bondage that kills, but the Lord which is the life-giving Spirit. And the sublime gospel says, "the words that I speak are spirit and are life," as being stripped of the bodily veil. However, the idea that the Spirit is the ousia of the Only-begotten we will leave to our dreamers—or rather, we will make abundant use of what they say and arm the truth with the weapons of the adversary. For it is permissible that the Egyptian should be plundered by the Israelites and that we should make their wealth an ornament for ourselves. If the ousia of the Son is called Spirit, and God also is Spirit (for the gospel tells us so), clearly the ousia of the Father is called Spirit as well. But if their particular argument is that things introduced by different names are also different in nature, the conclusion surely is that things named alike are not alien to one another in nature either. Since then, according to their account, the ousia of the Father and that of the Son are both called Spirit, this clearly proves the absence of any difference in ousia. For a little further on Eunomius says: "Of those ousiai which are divergent, the names signifying ousia are also surely divergent, but where there is one and the same name, what is declared by the same name will surely be one also"—so that at every point, he who takes the wise in their own craftiness has turned our author's long labors and the infinite toil spent on what he has worked out to the establishment of the teaching we uphold. For if God is called Spirit in the gospel, and the ousia of the Only-begotten is maintained by Eunomius to be Spirit, since there is no apparent difference in the one name compared with the other, neither surely will the things signified by the names be mutually different in nature.

Then how will you make it fit with what follows? For when Paul says, Now the Lord is the Spirit, he goes on to say, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. If then the Lord is the Spirit, and Spirit means essence, what are we to understand by the essence of the essence? He speaks again of another Spirit of the Lord Who is the Spirit — that is to say, according to your interpretation, of another essence. Therefore in your view the Apostle, when he writes expressly of the Lord the Spirit, and of the Spirit of the Lord, means nothing else than an essence of an essence. Well, let Eunomius make what he likes of that which is written; what we understand of the matter is as follows. The Scripture, given by inspiration of God, as the Apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit, and its intention is the profit of men. For every scripture, he says, is given by inspiration of God and is profitable; and the profit is varied and multiform, as the Apostle says — for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness 2 Timothy 3:16. Such a boon as this, however, is not within any man's reach to lay hold of, but the Divine intention lies hid under the body of the Scripture, as it were under a veil, some legislative enactment or some historical narrative being cast over the truths that are contemplated by the mind. For this reason, then, the Apostle tells us that those who look upon the body of the Scripture have a veil upon their heart 2 Corinthians 3:15, and are not able to look upon the glory of the spiritual law, being hindered by the veil that has been cast over the face of the law-giver. Wherefore he says, the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life, showing that often the obvious interpretation, if it be not taken according to the proper sense, has an effect contrary to that life which is indicated by the Spirit, seeing that this lays down for all men the perfection of virtue in freedom from passion, while the history contained in the writings sometimes embraces the exposition even of facts incongruous, and is understood, so to say, to concur with the passions of our nature, whereto if any one applies himself according to the obvious sense, he will make the Scripture a doctrine of death. Accordingly, he says that over the perceptive powers of the souls of men who handle what is written in too corporeal a manner, the veil is cast; but for those who turn their contemplation to that which is the object of the intelligence, there is revealed, bared, as it were, of a mask, the glory that underlies the letter. And that which is discovered by this more exalted perception he says is the Lord, which is the Spirit. For he says, when it shall turn to the Lord the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is the Spirit 2 Corinthians 3:16-17. And in so saying he makes a distinction of contrast between the lordship of the spirit and the bondage of the letter; for as that which gives life is opposed to that which kills, so he contrasts the Lord with bondage. And that we may not be under any confusion when we are instructed concerning the Holy Spirit (being led by the word Lord to the thought of the Only-begotten), for this reason he guards the word by repetition, both saying that the Lord is the Spirit, and making further mention of the Spirit of the Lord, that the supremacy of His Nature may be shown by the honour implied in lordship, while at the same time he may avoid confusing in his argument the individuality of His Person. For he who calls Him both Lord and Spirit of the Lord, teaches us to conceive of Him as a separate individual besides the Only-begotten; just as elsewhere he speaks of the Spirit of Christ Romans 8:9, employing fairly and in its mystic sense this very term which is piously employed in the system of doctrine according to the Gospel tradition. Thus we, the most miserable of all men, being led onward by the Apostle in the mysteries, pass from the letter that kills to the Spirit that gives life, learning from Him Who was in Paradise initiated into the unspeakable mysteries, that all things the Divine Scripture says are utterances of the Holy Spirit. For well did the Holy Spirit prophesy Acts 28:25, — this he says to the Jews in Rome, introducing the words of Isaiah; and to the Hebrews, alleging the authority of the Holy Spirit in the words, wherefore as says the Holy Spirit Hebrews 3:7, he adduces the words of the Psalm which are spoken at length in the person of God; and from the Lord Himself we learn the same thing — that David declared the heavenly mysteries not in himself (that is, not speaking according to human nature). For how could any one, being but man, know the supercelestial converse of the Father with the Son? But being in the Spirit he said that the Lord spoke to the Lord those words which He has uttered. For if, He says, David in the Spirit calls him Lord, how is He then his son? Thus it is by the power of the Spirit that the holy men who are under Divine influence are inspired, and every Scripture is for this reason said to be given by inspiration of God, because it is the teaching of the Divine afflatus. If the bodily veil of the words were removed, that which remains is Lord and life and Spirit, according to the teaching of the great Paul, and according to the words of the Gospel also. For Paul declares that he who turns from the letter to the Spirit no longer apprehends the bondage that slays, but the Lord which is the life-giving Spirit; and the sublime Gospel says, the words that I speak are spirit and are life, as being divested of the bodily veil. The idea, however, that the Spirit is the essence of the Only-begotten, we shall leave to our dreamers: or rather, we shall make use, ex abundanti, of what they say, and arm the truth with the weapons of the adversary. For it is allowable that the Egyptian should be spoiled by the Israelites, and that we should make their wealth an ornament for ourselves. If the essence of the Son is called Spirit, and God also is Spirit, (for so the Gospel tells us), clearly the essence of the Father is called Spirit also. But if it is their peculiar argument that things which are introduced by different names are different also in nature, the conclusion surely is, that things which are named alike are not alien one from the other in nature either. Since then, according to their account, the essence of the Father and that of the Son are both called Spirit, hereby is clearly proved the absence of any difference in essence. For a little further on Eunomius says:– Of those essences which are divergent the appellations significant of essence are also surely divergent, but where there is one and the same name, that which is declared by the same appellation will surely be one also: — so that at all points He that takes the wise in their own craftiness has turned the long labours of our author, and the infinite toil spent on what he has elaborated, to the establishment of the doctrine which we maintain. For if God is in the Gospel called Spirit, and the essence of the Only-begotten is maintained by Eunomius to be Spirit, as there is no apparent difference in the one name as compared with the other, neither, surely, will the things signified by the names be mutually different in nature.

Now that I have exposed this futile and pointless sham-argument, I think I can justifiably skip over without discussion what he puts together next to attack our master's statement. His actual argument provides sufficient proof of how foolish his remarks are, as it openly proclaims its own weakness. To engage in debate with such things is like trampling on corpses. For when he confidently presents some passage from our master, treats it with preliminary slander and contempt, and promises to show it is completely worthless, he suffers the same fate that happens to small children. Their imperfect and immature intelligence, and their untrained perceptive abilities, don't allow them to understand accurately what they see. So they often imagine the stars are only a little above their heads, and in their childish foolishness they throw clods of dirt at them when they appear. Then when the clod falls back down, they clap their hands, laugh, and boast to their friends as if their throw had actually reached the stars themselves. This is exactly like the man who hurls his childish missile at the truth, who sets forth those brilliant statements of our master like stars, and then throws from the ground—from his lowly and groveling understanding—his earthly and unstable arguments. And these, once they have risen so high that they have nowhere left to fall from, turn back down by their own weight. Now the passage from the great Basil is worded as follows:

And now that I have exposed this futile and pointless sham-argument, it seems to me that I may well pass by without discussion what he next puts together by way of attack upon our master's statement. For a sufficient proof of the folly of his remarks is to be found in his actual argument, which of itself proclaims aloud its feebleness. To be entangled in a contest with such things as this is like trampling on the slain. For when he sets forth with much confidence some passage from our master, and treats it with preliminary slander and contempt, and promises that he will show it to be worth nothing at all, he meets with the same fortune as befalls small children, to whom their imperfect and immature intelligence, and the untrained condition of their perceptive faculties, do not give an accurate understanding of what they see. Thus they often imagine that the stars are but a little way above their heads, and pelt them with clods when they appear, in their childish folly; and then, when the clod falls, they clap their hands and laugh and brag to their comrades as if their throw had reached the stars themselves. Such is the man who casts at the truth with his childish missile, who sets forth like the stars those splendid sayings of our master, and then hurls from the ground — from his downtrodden and grovelling understanding — his earthy and unstable arguments. And these, when they have gone so high that they have no place to fall from, turn back again of themselves by their own weight. Now the passage of the great Basil is worded as follows:–

Yet what sensible person would agree with the claim that when the names of things are different, their essences must necessarily be different as well? The names Peter and Paul, and generally speaking the names of human beings, are different, while the essence of all is one. Therefore, in most respects we are identical to one another, and we differ from each other only in those special properties that are observed in individual persons. Consequently, names do not indicate essence, but rather the properties that mark out the particular individual. Thus, when we hear the name Peter, we do not understand the ousia by the name (and by ousia I mean here the material substratum), but we grasp the concept of the properties that we observe in him. These are the great man's words. And anyone who has time to waste on unprofitable matters can learn from Eunomius' actual writing what skill he who argues against this statement displays against us.

Yet what sane man would agree with the statement that of those things of which the names are different the essences must needs be divergent also? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and, generally speaking, of men, are different, while the essence of all is one: wherefore, in most respects we are mutually identical, and differ one from another only in those special properties which are observed in individuals: and hence also appellations are not indicative of essence, but of the properties which mark the particular individual. Thus, when we hear of Peter, we do not by the name understand the essence (and by ' essence ' I here mean the material substratum), but we are impressed with the conception of the properties which we contemplate in him. These are the great man's words. And what skill he who disputes this statement displays against us, we learn — any one, that is, who has leisure for wasting time on unprofitable matters — from the actual composition of Eunomius.

I must say I prefer not to insert into my own work the distasteful material this rhetorician produces, or to expose his ignorance and foolishness to ridicule in the middle of my arguments. He continues with a kind of praise for the class of meaningful words that express the subject, and in his usual style, he patches and glues together the discarded scraps of phrases. Poor Isocrates is chewed up once again and stripped of words and figures to make his point—here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same treatment and contributes phrases from his own works. Yet even with all this, this heavily patched and multicolored web of words is not finished. Every attack, every defense of his ideas, all his careful preparation, spontaneously collapses. Just as commonly happens with bubbles—when drops falling from above through water strike some obstacle and produce those foamy swellings which dissolve immediately after they form, leaving no trace on the water—such are the air-bubbles of our author's thoughts, vanishing without a touch the moment they are presented. For after all these supposedly irrefutable statements and dreamy philosophizing, in which he claims that the distinct character of the ousia is grasped through the difference in names, his argument—like some mass of foam carried downstream that breaks apart when it contacts any more solid body—follows its own spontaneous course and unexpectedly collides with the truth, dispersing into nothingness its insubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For he speaks in these words: Who is so foolish and so far removed from human nature as, when speaking about men, to call one a man and another a horse, and then compare them? I would answer him: You are right to call anyone foolish who makes such errors in using names. And I will use for supporting the truth the testimony you yourself give. For if it is extremely foolish to call one person a horse and another a man when both are really men, it is surely equally stupid, when the Father is confessed to be God and the Son is confessed to be God, to call one created and the other uncreated, since just as humanity in the first case, so the Godhead in this case does not permit a change of name to one expressing another kind. For what the irrational is in relation to man, the creature also is in relation to the Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name as the nature superior to it. And just as it is not possible to apply the same definition to the rational animal and the quadruped alike—for each is naturally differentiated from the other by its special property—so neither can you express by the same terms the created and the uncreated ousia, seeing that those attributes predicated of the latter ousia are not discoverable in the former. For just as rationality is not discoverable in a horse, nor solid hoofs in a man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the attribute of being created in the Godhead. But if He is God, He is certainly not created, and if He is created, He is not God—unless, of course, someone were to apply by some misuse or customary mode of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses are given men's names by their owners. Yet neither is the horse a man, though he is called by a human name, nor is the created being God, even though some claim for him the name of Godhead and give him the benefit of the empty sound of a two-syllable word. Since, then, Eunomius' heretical statement is found spontaneously to agree with the truth, let him take his own advice and stand by his own words, and by no means retract his own statements, but acknowledge that the man is truly foolish and stupid who names the subject not according to what it is, but says horse for man, and sea for sky, and creature for God. And let no one think it unreasonable that the creature should be set in opposition to God, but pay attention to the prophets and the Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the Father, "My Hand made all these things," meaning by Hand, in his figurative saying, the power of the Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things are from the Father, and that all things are through the Son, and the prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which itself also is given through the Spirit. For in one passage, the prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things that have come into being in their relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made them is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things. And again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division of entities, making all things depend on their productive cause, yet not counting in the number of all things that which produces them. So we are taught by this the difference of nature between the created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature, that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another. Since, then, all things are from God, and the Son is God, the creation is properly opposed to the Godhead. While, since the Only-begotten is something else than the nature of the universe—seeing that not even those who fight against the truth contradict this—it necessarily follows that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all things were made.

From his writings, I say, for I do not like to insert in my own work the nauseous stuff our rhetorician utters, or to display his ignorance and folly to contempt in the midst of my own arguments. He goes on with a sort of eulogy upon the class of significant words which express the subject, and, in his accustomed style, patches and sticks together the cast-off rags of phrases: poor Isocrates is nibbled at once more, and shorn of words and figures to make out the point proposed — here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same treatment, and makes him a contribution of phrases from his own labours — yet not even thus is this much-stitched and many-colored web of words finished off, but every assault, every defense of his conceptions, all his artistic preparation, spontaneously collapses, and, as commonly happens with the bubbles when the drops, borne down from above through a body of waters against some obstacle, produce those foamy swellings which, as soon as they gather, immediately dissolve, and leave upon the water no trace of their own formation — such are the air-bubbles of our author's thoughts, vanishing without a touch at the moment they are put forth. For after all these irrefragable statements, and the dreamy philosophizing wherein he asserts that the distinct character of the essence is apprehended by the divergence of names, as some mass of foam borne downstream breaks up when it comes into contact with any more solid body, so his argument, following its own spontaneous course, and coming unexpectedly into collision with the truth, disperses into nothingness its unsubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For he speaks in these words:– Who is so foolish and so far removed from the constitution of men, as, in discoursing of men to speak of one as a man, and, calling another a horse, so to compare them? I would answer him — You are right in calling any one foolish who makes such blunders in the use of names. And I will employ for the support of the truth the testimony you yourself give. For if it is a piece of extreme folly to call one a horse and another a man, supposing both were really men, it is surely a piece of equal stupidity, when the Father is confessed to be God, and the Son is confessed to be God, to call the one 'created' and the other 'uncreated,' since, as in the other case humanity, so in this case the Godhead does not admit a change of name to that expressive of another kind. For what the irrational is with respect to man, that also the creature is with respect to the Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name with the nature that is superior to it. And as it is not possible to apply the same definition to the rational animal and the quadruped alike (for each is naturally differentiated by its special property from the other), so neither can you express by the same terms the created and the uncreated essence, seeing that those attributes which are predicated of the latter essence are not discoverable in the former. For as rationality is not discoverable in a horse, nor solidity of hoofs in a man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the attribute of being created in the Godhead: but if He be God He is certainly not created, and if He be created He is not God; unless, of course, one were to apply by some misuse or customary mode of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses have men's names given them by their owners; yet neither is the horse a man, though he be called by a human name, nor is the created being God, even though some claim for him the name of Godhead, and give him the benefit of the empty sound of a dissyllable. Since, then, Eunomius' heretical statement is found spontaneously to fall in with the truth, let him take his own advice and stand by his own words, and by no means retract his own utterances, but consider that the man is really foolish and stupid who names the subject not according as it is, but says horse for man, and sea for sky, and creature for God. And let no one think it unreasonable that the creature should be set in opposition to God, but have regard to the prophets and to the Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the Father, My Hand made all these things, meaning by Hand, in his dark saying, the power of the Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things are of the Father, and that all things are by the Son 1 Corinthians 8:6, and the prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which itself also is given through the Spirit. For in the one passage, the prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things which have come into being in its relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made them is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things. And again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division of entities, making all things depend upon their productive cause, yet not reckoning in the number of all things that which produces them: so that we are hereby taught the difference of nature between the created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature, that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another. Since, then, all things are of God, and the Son is God, the creation is properly opposed to the Godhead; while, since the Only-begotten is something else than the nature of the universe (seeing that not even those who fight against the truth contradict this), it follows of necessity that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all things were made.

Since the Only-begotten is proclaimed to be God in the Divine Scriptures, let Eunomius consider his own argument and condemn as utterly foolish anyone who divides the Divine into created and uncreated, just as he condemns someone who divides man into horse and man. For he himself says, a little later on, after his intermediate nonsense, that the close relation of names to things is immutable, where he agrees by this statement to the fixed character of the true connection of names with their subjects. If, then, the name of Godhead is properly used in close connection with the Only-begotten God (and Eunomius, though he may wish to disagree with us, will surely concede that Scripture does not lie, and that the name of Godhead is not inappropriately attributed to the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that if the close relation of names to things is immutable, and the Lord is called by the name of God, he cannot understand any difference in the conception of Godhead between the Father and the Son, since this name is common to both—or rather not this name only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares, without any difference in meaning, the titles of the Father—good, incorruptible, just, judge, long-suffering, merciful, eternal, everlasting, and all that indicate the expression of majesty of nature and power—without any qualification being made in His case in any of these names regarding the exalted nature of the conception. But Eunomius passes by, as if with closed eyes, the large number of Divine titles, and looks only to one point, his generate and ungenerate—trusting his doctrine, tossed and driven as it is by the blasts of error, to a slight and weak cord.

Now seeing that the Only-begotten is in the Divine Scriptures proclaimed to be God, let Eunomius consider his own argument, and condemn for utter folly the man who parts the Divine into created and uncreated, as he does him who divides man into horse and man. For he himself says, a little further on, after his intermediate nonsense, the close relation of names to things is immutable, where he himself by this statement assents to the fixed character of the true connection of appellations with their subject. If, then, the name of Godhead is properly employed in close connection with the Only-begotten God (and Eunomius, though he may desire to be out of harmony with us, will surely concede that the Scripture does not lie, and that the name of the Godhead is not inharmoniously attributed to the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that if the close relation of names to things is immutable, and the Lord is called by the name of God, he cannot apprehend any difference in respect of the conception of Godhead between the Father and the Son, seeing that this name is common to both — or rather not this name only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares, without divergence of meaning, the appellations of the Father — good, incorruptible, just, judge, long-suffering, merciful, eternal, everlasting, all that indicate the expression of majesty of nature and power — without any reservation being made in His case in any of the names in regard of the exalted nature of the conception. But Eunomius passes by, as it were with closed eye, the number, great as it is, of the Divine appellations, and looks only to one point, his generate and ungenerate, — trusting to a slight and weak cord his doctrine, tossed and driven as it is by the blasts of error.

He claims that no one who cares about truth calls any generated thing "ungenerate," or calls God who is over all "Son" or "generate." This statement requires no further arguments from us to refute it. He doesn't hide his deception behind any veils, as he usually does, but treats the reversal of his absurd statement as if it were equivalent. He says that no generated thing is called ungenerate, nor is God who is over all called Son or generate, without making any special distinction for the Only-begotten Godhead of the Son compared to the rest of generated things. Instead, he sets all things that have come into being in opposition to God without discrimination, not exempting the Son from all things. And in reversing his absurdities, he clearly separates the Son from the Divine Nature when he says that no generated thing is called ungenerate, nor is God called Son or generate. He openly reveals through this contrast the horrible character of his blasphemy. After distinguishing things that have come into being from the ungenerate, he continues by saying in his reciprocal argument that it is impossible to call not the unbegotten, but God, Son or generate. Through these words he tries to show that what is not ungenerate is not God, and that the Only-begotten God is, by the fact of being begotten, as far removed from being God as the ungenerate is from being generated in fact or in name. He doesn't make this disharmonious and incongruous reversal of terms out of ignorance of what his argument implies. Rather, in his attack on orthodox doctrine, he opposes the Godhead to the generate—and this is the point he tries to establish through his words: that what is not ungenerate is not God. What would the true sequence of his argument be? After saying no generated thing is ungenerate, he should proceed with the inference that if anything is naturally ungenerate, it cannot be generate. Such a statement would contain truth and avoid blasphemy. But now, by his premise that no generated thing is ungenerate and his inference that God is not generated, he clearly excludes the Only-begotten God from being God, establishing that because He is not ungenerate, neither is He God. Do we need any further proofs to expose this monstrous blasphemy? Isn't this enough by itself to serve as evidence against this adversary of Christ, who through the arguments cited maintains that the Word, who in the beginning was God, is not God? What need is there to engage further with such people? We don't entangle ourselves in controversy with those who occupy themselves with idols and with the blood shed on their altars—not because we approve of the destruction of those who are obsessed with idols, but because their disease is too strong for our treatment. Just as the fact itself declares idolatry, and the evil that people do boldly and arrogantly anticipates the reproach of those who accuse it, so here too I think that the defenders of orthodoxy should keep silence toward one who openly proclaims his impiety to his own discredit, just as medicine also stands powerless in the case of a cancerous disease, because the disease is too strong for the art to treat.

He asserts that no man who has any regard for the truth either calls any generated thing 'ungenerate,' or calls God Who is over all 'Son' or 'generate.' This statement needs no further arguments on our part for its refutation. For he does not shelter his craft with any veils, as his wont is, but treats the inversion of his absurd statement as equivalent, while he says that neither is any generated thing spoken of as ungenerate, nor is God Who is over all called Son or generate, without making any special distinction for the Only-begotten Godhead of the Son as compared with the rest of the generated, but makes his opposition of all things that have come into being to God without discrimination, not excepting the Son from all things. And in the inversion of his absurdities he clearly separates, forsooth, the Son from the Divine Nature, when he says that neither is any generated thing spoken of as ungenerate, nor is God called Son or generate, and manifestly reveals by this contradistinction the horrid character of his blasphemy. For when he has distinguished the things that have come into being from the ungenerate, he goes on to say, in that antistrophal induction of his, that it is impossible to call (not the unbegotten, but) God, Son or generate, trying by these words to show that which is not ungenerate is not God, and that the Only-begotten God is, by the fact of being begotten, as far removed from being God as the ungenerate is from being generated in fact or in name. For it is not in ignorance of the consequence of his argument that he makes an inversion of the terms employed thus inharmonious and incongruous: it is in his assault on the doctrine of orthodoxy that he opposes the Godhead to the generate — and this is the point he tries to establish by his words, that that which is not ungenerate is not God. What was the true sequence of his argument? That having said no generated thing is ungenerate, he should proceed with the inference, nor, if anything is naturally ungenerate, can it be generate. Such a statement at once contains truth and avoids blasphemy. But now by his premise that no generated thing is ungenerate, and his inference that God is not generated, he clearly shuts out the Only-begotten God from being God, laying down that because He is not ungenerate, neither is He God. Do we then need any further proofs to expose this monstrous blasphemy? Is not this enough by itself to serve for a record against the adversary of Christ, who by the arguments cited maintains that the Word, Who in the beginning was God, is not God? What need is there to engage further with such men as this? For we do not entangle ourselves in controversy with those who busy themselves with idols and with the blood that is shed upon their altars, not that we acquiesce in the destruction of those who are besotted about idols, but because their disease is too strong for our treatment. Thus, just as the fact itself declares idolatry, and the evil that men do boldly and arrogantly anticipates the reproach of those who accuse it, so here too I think that the advocates of orthodoxy should keep silence towards one who openly proclaims his impiety to his own discredit, just as medicine also stands powerless in the case of a cancerous complaint, because the disease is too strong for the art to deal with.

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he claims that he will present something even stronger, let us examine this as well as the passage cited, so that we do not appear to be retreating in the face of an overwhelming argument. But if, he says, I am to set aside all these positions and rely on my stronger argument, I would say this: even if all the terms that he puts forward as refutation were established, our statement will nonetheless be clearly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of names that signify properties indicates the divergence of the things themselves, it is surely necessary to allow that the divergence of names signifying ousia also indicates the divergence of the ousiai. And this would be found to hold true in all cases—I mean in the case of ousiai, energies, colors, shapes, and other qualities. For we designate the different ousiai by divergent names: fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. Why should we even mention the intelligible ousiai, in listing which the Apostle indicates, through difference of names, the divergence of ousia?

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he professes that he will allege something stronger still, let us examine this also, as well as the passage cited, lest we should seem to be withdrawing our opposition in face of an overwhelming force. If, however, he says, I am to abandon all these positions, and fall back upon my stronger argument, I would say this, that even if all the terms that he advances by way of refutation were established, our statement will none the less be manifestly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of the names which are significant of properties marks the divergence of the things, it is surely necessary to allow that with the divergence of the names significant of essence is also marked the divergence of the essences. And this would be found to hold good in all cases, I mean in the case of essences, energies, colors, figures, and other qualities. For we denote by divergent appellations the different essences, fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. Why need we mention the intelligible essences, in enumerating which the Apostle marks, by difference of names, the divergence of essence?

Who wouldn't be overwhelmed by this supposedly irresistible attack? The argument exceeds the promise, and the actual experience is more frightening than the threat. "I will come," he says, "to my stronger argument." What is it? That since the differences of properties are recognized by names that signify special attributes, we must naturally agree, he says, that differences of ousia are also expressed by divergent names. So what are these names of essences by which we learn the divergence of nature between the Father and the Son? He mentions fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His examples have won him the day; his argument sweeps everything before it. I cannot deny that names which are completely incommunicable do indicate difference of natures. But this keen and sharp-sighted intellect has just failed to notice these points: that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that just, incorruptible, and all those names that belong to the Divine Nature are used equally of both Father and Son. Thus, if divergent names indicate difference of natures, then common names will surely show the common character of the ousia. And if we must agree that the Divine ousia is to be expressed by names, we ought to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of generate and ungenerate, because good and incorruptible, just and wise, and all such terms apply strictly only to that Nature which surpasses all understanding, whereas "generated" shares its name even with the lower forms of creation. For we call a dog, a frog, and all things that come into the world by generation "generated." Moreover, the term "ungenerate" is not only used for what exists without a cause, but also properly applies to what is nonexistent. The Scindapsus is called ungenerate, the Blityri is ungenerate, the Minotaur is ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, and the Chimera are ungenerate—not in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if the others—those used equivocally either of the nonexistent or of lower animals—are the divergent ones, let his "generate" and "ungenerate" be so. Eunomius' powerful argument against us actually upholds the cause of truth by testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be perceived in the names. But if he claims that the difference of ousia exists between the generate and the ungenerate as it does between fire and water, and believes that the names, like those he has mentioned in his examples, stand in the same mutual relation as fire and water, then the horrible character of his blasphemy will be exposed here again, even if we remain silent. For fire and water have natures that are mutually destructive, and each is destroyed if it enters into the other by the prevalence of the more powerful element. If, then, he teaches that the Nature of the Ungenerate differs from that of the Only-begotten in this way, it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition part of the divergence of their essences, so that their nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and one would be consumed by the other if both were found to be mutually inclusive or coexistent.

Who would not be dismayed at this irresistible power of attack? The argument transcends the promise, the experience is more terrible than the threat. I will come, he says, to my stronger argument. What is it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those names which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he says, allow that differences of essence are also expressed by divergence of names. What then are these appellations of essences by which we learn the divergence of Nature between the Father and the son? He talks of fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His illustrations have won him the day: his argument carries all before it: I cannot contradict the statement that those names which are entirely incommunicable indicate difference of natures. But our man of keen and quick-sighted intellect has just missed seeing these points:– that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that just, and incorruptible, and all those names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the Father and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of appellations indicates difference of natures, the community of names will surely show the common character of the essence. And if we must agree that the Divine essence is to be expressed by names, it would behoove us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of generate and ungenerate, because good and incorruptible, just and wise, and all such terms as these are strictly applicable only to that Nature which passes all understanding, whereas generated exhibits community of name with even the inferior forms of the lower creation. For we call a dog, and a frog, and all things that come into the world by way of generation, generated. And moreover, the term ungenerate is not only employed of that which exists without a cause, but has also a proper application to that which is nonexistent. The Scindapsus is called ungenerate, the Blityri is ungenerate, the Minotaur is ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, the Chimæra are ungenerate, not in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if it is the others, those which are equivocally employed either of the non-existent or of the lower animals — if it is these, I say, which are divergent, let his generate and ungenerate be so: Eunomius' powerful argument against us itself upholds the cause of truth in testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be perceived in the names. But if he asserts the difference of essence to exist between the generate and the ungenerate, as it does between fire and water, and is of opinion that the names, like those which he has mentioned in his examples, are in the same mutual relation as fire and water, the horrid character of his blasphemy will here again be brought to light, even if we hold our peace. For fire and water have a nature mutually destructive, and each is destroyed, if it comes to be in the other, by the prevalence of the more powerful element. If, then, he lays down the doctrine that the Nature of the Ungenerate differs thus from that of the Only-begotten, it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition to be involved in the divergence of their essences, so that their nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and the one would be consumed by the other, if both should be found to be mutually inclusive or co-existent.

After this, he discusses the difference between names and things. He speaks of the ungenerate as being without a cause, and of the non-existent, such as the Scindapsus, Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops, and Scylla, which were never generated at all. He shows that things which are essentially different destroy each other, as fire destroys water, and so on in their various relationships. But in the case of the Father and the Son, since the ousia is common and the properties are mutually interchangeable, no harm comes to the Nature.

How then is the Son in the Father without being destroyed, and how does the Father, dwelling in the Son, remain continually unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire compared to water is maintained in the relation of the Generate to the Ungenerate? Their definition also does not recognize communion existing between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistant, tending downward and heavy, while air has a nature made up of opposite attributes. White and black are similarly found in opposition among colors, and everyone agrees that a circle is not the same as a triangle, for each, according to the definition of its shape, is precisely what the other is not. But I cannot discover where he sees opposition in the case of God the Father and God the Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power, incorruptibility—all other attributes of exalted significance are similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense his strength in the other. For on the one hand the Father makes all things through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in himself, being the Power of the Father. What use, then, are fire and water for showing essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He also calls us rash for using the unity of nature and difference of persons in Peter and Paul as an example, and says we are guilty of gross recklessness if we apply our argument to the contemplation of objects of pure reason by using material examples. How fitting, indeed, that the corrector of our errors should reprove us for rashness in interpreting the Divine Nature through material illustrations! Why then, deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal, air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed toward its goal, are you so keen-sighted in every direction when presenting this argument against your adversaries, that you do not see in yourself the very faults you blame in those you are accusing? Or should we grant concessions to you when you establish the diversity of ousia by material means, while we ourselves are rejected when we point out the kindred character of the Nature through examples within our grasp?

How then is the Son in the Father without being destroyed, and how does the Father, coming to be in the Son, remain continually unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire, as compared with water, is maintained in the relation of the Generate to the Ungenerate? Nor does their definition regard communion as existing between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistent, of downward tendency and heavy, while air has a nature made up of the contrary attributes. So white and black are found in opposition among colors, and men are agreed that the circle is not the same with the triangle, for each, according to the definition of its figure, is precisely that which the other is not. But I am unable to discover where he sees the opposition in the case of God the Father and God the Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power, incorruptibility — all other attributes of exalted significance are similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense His strength in the other; for on the one hand the Father makes all things through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in Himself, being the Power of the Father. Of what avail, then, are fire and water to show essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He calls us, moreover, rash for instancing the unity of nature and difference of persons of Peter and Paul, and says we are guilty of gross recklessness, if we apply our argument to the contemplation of the objects of pure reason by the aid of material examples. Fitly, fitly indeed, does the corrector of our errors reprove us for rashness in interpreting the Divine Nature by material illustrations! Why then, deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal, air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed to its aim, are you so keen-sighted in all directions in your promulgation of this argument, that your adversaries cannot lay hold of, that you do not see in yourself the faults you blame in those you are accusing? Or are we to make concessions to you when you are establishing the diversity of essence by material aid, and to be ourselves rejected when we point out the kindred character of the Nature by means of examples within our compass?

Peter and Paul, he says, were named by men, and that's why their names could be changed. But what existing thing hasn't been named by men? I call you as a witness for my argument. If you make the ability to change names a sign that things were named by men, you will surely have to admit that every name has been given to things by us, since the same names for objects haven't been used universally. Just as Paul was once Saul and Peter was formerly Simon, so too earth and sky and air and sea and all parts of creation haven't been named the same way by everyone, but are named one way by the Hebrews, another way by us, and are called by different names by every nation. If Eunomius' argument is valid when he claims that Peter and Paul were renamed because their names had been given by men, then our teaching will surely be valid too, since it starts from similar premises and says that all things are named by us because their names vary according to different nations. Now if this applies to all things, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are no exceptions, for even they are among the things whose names change. When we gather the concept of any subject that arises in us into the form of a name, we express our concept through words that vary at different times, not making but signifying the thing by the name we give it. The things themselves remain as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought through whatever words are available. Just as Peter's ousia wasn't changed when his name changed, so no other thing we contemplate is changed through the changing of names. For this reason we say that the term Ungenerate was applied by us to the true and first Father who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result regarding the signifying of the Subject if we acknowledged the same concept under another name. It's permissible, instead of speaking of him as Ungenerate, to call him the First Cause or Father of the Only-begotten, or to speak of him as existing without cause, and many such names which lead to the same thought. So Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very arguments in which he complains against us, because we know no name that signifies the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of its existence, while we assert that a name powerful enough to encompass the unspeakable and infinite Nature either doesn't exist at all or at least is unknown to us. Let him then stop using his customary fables and show us the names that signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the divergence of their names. But as long as Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses weren't capable of knowing the Name, and that no one has seen God at any time, and that no one has seen him nor can see him, and that the light around him is unapproachable, and there is no end to his greatness—as long as we say and believe these things, an argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature through the significance of names is like someone who thinks he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand. Just as the hollow of one's hand compares to the whole deep, so is all the power of language compared to that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.

But Peter and Paul, he says, were named by men, and hence it comes that it is possible in their case to change the appellations. Why, what existing thing has not been named by men? I call you to testify on behalf of my argument. For if you make change of names a sign of things having been named by men, you will thereby surely allow that every name has been imposed upon things by us, since the same appellations of objects have not obtained universally. For as in the case of Paul who was once Saul, and of Peter who was formerly Simon, so earth and sky and air and sea and all the parts of the creation have not been named alike by all, but are named in one way by the Hebrews, and in another way by us, and are denoted by every nation by different names. If then Eunomius' argument is valid when he maintains that it was for this reason, to wit, that their names had been imposed by men, that Peter and Paul were named afresh, our teaching will surely be valid also, starting as it does from like premises, which says that all things are named by us, on the ground that their appellations vary according to the distinctions of nations. Now if all things are so, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are not exceptions, for even they are among the things that change their name. For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the conception of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by words that vary at different times, not making, but signifying, the thing by the name we give it. For the things remain in themselves as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought by such words as are available. And just as the essence of Peter was not changed with the change of his name, so neither is any other of the things we contemplate changed in the process of mutation of names. And for this reason we say that the term Ungenerate was applied by us to the true and first Father Who is the Cause of all, and that no harm would result as regards the signifying of the Subject, if we were to acknowledge the same concept under another name. For it is allowable instead of speaking of Him as Ungenerate, to call Him the First Cause or Father of the Only-begotten, or to speak of Him as existing without cause, and many such appellations which lead to the same thought; so that Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very arguments in which he makes complaint against us, because we know no name significant of the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of Its existence, while we assert that an appellation of such force as to include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at all, or at any rate is unknown to us. Let him then leave his accustomed language of fable, and show us the names which signify the essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the divergence of their names. But so long as the saying of the Scripture is true that Abraham and Moses were not capable of the knowledge of the Name, and that no man has seen God at any time, and that no man has seen Him, nor can see 1 Timothy 6:16, and that the light around Him is unapproachable 1 Timothy 6:16, and there is no end of His greatness — so long as we say and believe these things, how like is an argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the infinite Nature, by means of the significance of names, to one who thinks that he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand! For as the hollow of one's hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of language in comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and incomprehensible.

Now in saying these things, we do not intend to deny that the Father exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to agree that the Only-begotten God is generated—on the contrary, the latter has been generated, the former has not been generated. But we do not learn what He is in His own physis (nature)—the one who exists apart from generation and the one who is believed to have been generated—from the signification of having been generated and not having been generated. For when we say this person was generated (or was not generated), we receive a twofold thought: our attention is directed to the subject by the demonstrative part of the phrase, and we learn what is contemplated in the subject by the words "was generated" or "was not generated." It is one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we contemplate in that which is. Moreover, the word "is" is surely understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine physis—such as just, incorruptible, immortal, and ungenerate, and whatever else is said of Him. Even if this word does not happen to occur in the phrase, the thought of both the speaker and the hearer surely makes the name attach to "is," so that if this word were not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David says, "God, a righteous judge, strong and patient," if "is" were not understood with each of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon. But when "is" is understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be effective, being contemplated in reference to that which is. So then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by "is" we carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action. Likewise, as a result of saying, "He is generated" (or "ungenerate"), we divide our thought into a double conception: by "is" we understand the subject, and by "generated" or "ungenerate" we apprehend that which belongs to the subject. So then, when we are taught by David that God is a judge or patient, we do not learn the Divine ousia (essence), but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it. Similarly, in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the physis of that Being not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual physis. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Being—good, ungenerate, incorruptible—but to each of these, "is" does not fail to be supplied. Anyone, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him and were silent as to that ousia which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition of Being is one thing, and that of being in some particular way is another, and this has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to us the names of the ousia, and then divide the physis by the divergence of the appellations. So long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names have no separate existence.

Now in saying these things we do not intend to deny that the Father exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to agree to the statement that the Only-begotten God is generated — on the contrary the latter has been generated, the former has not been generated. But what He is, in His own Nature, Who exists apart from generation, and what He is, Who is believed to have been generated, we do not learn from the signification of having been generated, and not having been generated. For when we say this person was generated (or was not generated), we are impressed with a two-fold thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative part of the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the subject by the words was generated or was not generated, — as it is one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we contemplate in that which is. But, moreover, the word is is surely understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine Nature, — as just, incorruptible, immortal, and ungenerate, and whatever else is said of Him; even if this word does not happen to occur in the phrase, yet the thought both of the speaker and the hearer surely makes the name attach to is, so that if this word were not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when David says, God, a righteous judge, strong and patient, if is were not understood with each of the epithets included in the phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when is is understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be of force, being contemplated in reference to that which is. As, then, when we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning Him some operation of judgment, and by the is carry our minds to the subject, and are hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is the same with the action, so also as a result of saying, He is generated (or ungenerate), we divide our thought into a double conception, by is understanding the subject, and by generated, or ungenerate, apprehending that which belongs to the subject. As, then, when we are taught by David that God is a judge, or patient, we do not learn the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which are contemplated in it, so in this case too when we hear of His being not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name, it is for him who discloses the Nature of that Being, not to rehearse the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us its actual Nature. For every name which you may use is an attribute of the Being, but is not the Being — good, ungenerate, incorruptible, — but to each of these is does not fail to be supplied. Any one, then, who undertakes to give the account of this good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain, if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him, and were silent as to that essence which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being, but the definition of Being is one thing, and that of being in some particular way is another; and this has so far remained untold and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to us the names of the essence, and then divide the Nature by the divergence of the appellations;– so long as what we require remains unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon names, seeing that the names have no separate existence.

Such then is Eunomius' stronger argument against the truth, while we pass over in silence many views that are found in this part of his work. For it seems right to me that those who run in this armed race against the enemies of the truth should arm themselves against those who are well defended by the appearance of falsehood, and not pollute their argument with ideas that are already dead and give off an offensive smell. His assumption that whatever things are united in the concept of their ousia must necessarily exist as bodies and be subject to corruption (for this is what he says in this part of his work), I will gladly pass by like some corpse-like stench, since I think every reasonable person will see how dead and rotten such an argument is. For who does not know that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one ousia underlies them all, and the consubstantial foundation in them is unrelated to bodily corruption? So that even children can plainly see the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they share the same ousia with one another, but because they possess a compound nature. The concept of compound nature is one thing, that of the common nature of their ousia is another, so that it is true to say corruptible bodies are of one ousia, but the reverse statement is not true at all if it is anything like: this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible, as is shown in the case of souls which have one ousia, while yet corruption does not attach to them by virtue of their shared ousia. And the explanation given about souls might properly be applied to every intellectual existence that we contemplate in creation. For the words Paul puts together do not signify, as Eunomius claims they do, some mutually different physeis of the supramundane powers. On the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument not diversities of physeis, but the varied characteristics of the operations of the heavenly host. For there are, he says, principalities, and thrones, and powers, and mights, and dominions. Now these names are such as to make it immediately clear to everyone that their meaning is arranged in regard to some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and to be the throne of someone—all these concepts would not be understood by anyone trained in argument to refer to diversities of ousia, since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of these names. So that anyone who says diversities of physis are signified by the names Paul lists deceives himself, understanding, as the Apostle says, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms, since the sense of the names clearly shows that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of ousiai.

Such then is Eunomius' stronger handle against the truth, while we pass by in silence many views which are to be found in this part of his composition; for it seems to me right that those who run in this armed race against the enemies of the truth should arm themselves against those who are fairly fenced about with the plausibility of falsehood, and not defile their argument with such conceptions as are already dead and of offensive odour. His supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their essence must needs exist corporeally and be joined to corruption (for this he says in this part of his work), I shall willingly pass by like some cadaverous odour, since I think every reasonable man will perceive how dead and corrupt such an argument is. For who knows not that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one essence underlies them all, and the consubstantial substratum in them is alien from bodily corruption? So that even children can plainly see the argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they have the same essence one with another, but because of their possessing a compound nature. The idea of the compound nature is one, that of the common nature of their essence is another, so that it is true to say, corruptible bodies are of one essence, but the converse statement is not true at all, if it be anything like, this consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible, as is shown in the case of the souls which have one essence, while yet corruption does not attach to them in virtue of the community of essence. And the account given of the souls might properly be applied to every intellectual existence which we contemplate in creation. For the words brought together by Paul do not signify, as Eunomius will have them do, some mutually divergent natures of the supra-mundane powers; on the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is mentioning in his argument, not diversities of natures, but the varied peculiarities of the operations of the heavenly host: for there are, he says, principalities, and thrones, and powers, and mights, and dominions. Now these names are such as to make it at once clear to every one that their significance is arranged in regard to some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and to be the throne of some one — all these conceptions would not be held by any one versed in argument to apply to diversities of essence, since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of the names: so that any one who says that diversities of nature are signified by the names rehearsed by Paul deceives himself, understanding, as the Apostle says, neither what he says, nor whereof he affirms 1 Timothy 1:7, since the sense of the names clearly shows that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of essences.